Is the New Channel Impacting Nebraska's Nuclear Plant Operations?

In summary: Quote:The majority of the country's nuclear reactors are reaching the end of their design lives at a time when the industry is trying to cut costs.And then they continue on to make case after case that this is not true. They even quote a NRC spokesman saying the majority of plants are good for 60 years. That is far, far, from needing to be replaced. In summary, the conversation discusses a potential risk to a nuclear power plant due to flooding. However, the plant has taken necessary precautions and remains in a stable condition. The media has blown the story out of proportion, but it is important to address aging equipment and maintain transparency in the industry.
  • #36
NUCENG said:
When the water level downstream of the dam is higher than normal it would be logical that the differential pressure that could fail the dam would be lower that during non-flood conditions. So why would the dam be likely to fail now?

There is a lot more water in the system than in normal times so the dam is near maximum capacity. That has more to do with anything than differential pressure which isn't usually a factor.

There are a lot of things involved in a flood; the change in force from a normal river to one at flood stage is something that has to be seen to be believed. There a lot of debries upstream that wants to come dow and it tends to collect into a large mass. Earth berms get soaked and the dirt looses its cohesion. Water going over the top of a dam quickly erodes even concrete. Temporary dams of junk form and suddenly release, which can increase the force in the system briefly and cause break throughs.


It is easy to underestimate what a couple of feet of water can do (ask the Japanese about that one.) Never drive through a flooded street, nor go kyaking on a flooded river. (I drove over a flooded bridge once which turned out not to be the smartest move of my life; if you can't be good be lucky...)
 
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  • #37
This is what drives me nuts about the circle the wagons mentality whenver there is a nuclear "oopsie".

The Omaha Public Power District has said the complex will not be reactivated until the flooding subsides. Its spokesman, Jeff Hanson, said the berm wasn't critical to protecting the plant but a crew will look at whether it can be patched.

"That was an additional layer of protection we put in," Hansom said.

OK, so this dam wasn't important or anything, they just put it in there as a backup. Redundancy, multiple lines of defence, defence in depth and all that good stuff.

The berm's collapse didn't affect the reactor shutdown cooling or the spent fuel pool cooling, but the power supply was cut after water surrounded the main electrical transformers, the NRC said. Emergency generators powered the plant until an off-site power supply was connected Sunday afternoon, according to OPPD.

Somehow that negates the idea that this was a non-critical backup just to be on the safe side...
 
  • #38
Orcas George said:
There is a lot more water in the system than in normal times so the dam is near maximum capacity. That has more to do with anything than differential pressure which isn't usually a factor.

There are a lot of things involved in a flood; the change in force from a normal river to one at flood stage is something that has to be seen to be believed. There a lot of debries upstream that wants to come dow and it tends to collect into a large mass. Earth berms get soaked and the dirt looses its cohesion. Water going over the top of a dam quickly erodes even concrete. Temporary dams of junk form and suddenly release, which can increase the force in the system briefly and cause break throughs.


It is easy to underestimate what a couple of feet of water can do (ask the Japanese about that one.) Never drive through a flooded street, nor go kyaking on a flooded river. (I drove over a flooded bridge once which turned out not to be the smartest move of my life; if you can't be good be lucky...)

Thank you,. I claim no expertise in civil engineering, and that is a little counter-intuitive. If the dam is near capacity are they releasing water?
 
  • #40
NUCENG said:
Thank you,. I claim no expertise in civil engineering, and that is a little counter-intuitive. If the dam is near capacity are they releasing water?

Releasing water to where, exactly? I mean, what are you asking?
 
  • #42
zapperzero said:
Slightly(?) offtopic. Minot is being flooded.
http://abcnews.go.com/US/minot-north-dakota-residents-flee-nuclear-silos-protected/story?id=13913535
Minuteman III nuclear missile silos are also in the flood's path. At least two silos are being protected by sandbags and pumps, but are reported to be safe.

Nothing to worry about there. If the silos are flooded the missiles can not launch. I would expect that the warheads would have been removed days before any serious flooding scenario, but even if they weren't, they would cause no problem other than the fact that they would have to be retired from present service and ten tons of paperwork would have to be filed with all of the military agencies that would be involved. I was a Nuclear Weapons Officer at one time. Believe me, you do not want to do that paperwork.
 
  • #43
NUCENG said:
Thank you,. I claim no expertise in civil engineering, and that is a little counter-intuitive. If the dam is near capacity are they releasing water?

Yes, which is why it is flooding downstream of the dam(s). The odd thing to realize is that these floods are "controlled"; the engineers have to make the heartbreaking decision to flood the towns downstream in order to prevent an uncontrolled dam collapse. Obviously the natural tendency is to hold off doing it as long as possible in hopes that it stops raining but the longer you wait the worse it gets if you have to do it. This is one reason why NOAA (the national weather forecasting office) is such a critical resource to the country.
 
  • #44
NUCENG said:
Thank you,. I claim no expertise in civil engineering, and that is a little counter-intuitive. If the dam is near capacity are they releasing water?

In the overwhelming majority of dams I have seen close up, the spilling of water when they reach rated capacity is usually built right into the dam design, with the spillway designed to carry any water in excess of the rated maximum water height limit. I suppose you could sand bag the tops of the spillways to try to retain more water if you wanted to.

Off topic. It is a shame that we can not divert that flood water every spring to west of the Rockies. We sure could use it in the states further west. We could actually put people to work in agriculture in Arizona, Nevada, and California if only we could get it to the Colorado River.
 
  • #45
The dams are supposed to used for flood control. There is much irony that they have led to the record flooding instead.
 
  • #46
Joe Neubarth said:
Nothing to worry about there. If the silos are flooded the missiles can not launch. I would expect that the warheads would have been removed days before any serious flooding scenario, but even if they weren't, they would cause no problem other than the fact that they would have to be retired from present service and ten tons of paperwork would have to be filed with all of the military agencies that would be involved. I was a Nuclear Weapons Officer at one time. Believe me, you do not want to do that paperwork.

I don't think it's any sort of danger either. The thought of those missiles maybe drowning in mud made me giggle a bit, in fact, unlike that other little mishap at Minot a few years ago which still gives me the nuclear heebie-jeebies whenever I think about it.
 
  • #48
zapperzero said:
Releasing water to where, exactly? I mean, what are you asking?

In past years I have been in areas with flooding and was always told the worst thing for a dam is "over-topping" or water overflowing the dam itself. So most dams in this area have spillways to allow flow downstream to prevent that condition which could lead to dam failure. My understanding, may be wrong, so I'm asking if the dam upstream of Ft Calhoun is releasing water?
 
  • #49
All the dams are releasing water. If an old Earth fill/chalk damn is over topped it will fail. They have the spillways full open and are praying nothing more will happen.
 
  • #51
zapperzero said:
I don't think it's any sort of danger either. The thought of those missiles maybe drowning in mud made me giggle a bit, in fact, unlike that other little mishap at Minot a few years ago which still gives me the nuclear heebie-jeebies whenever I think about it.
That incident was embarrassing to the Air Force but not THAT dangerous unless the plane carrying the weapon system crashed. Of course that can happen any time you transport a weapon via air in cargo planes. Weapons being returned are supposed to be separated from their delivery vehicle. In this case the young men involved did not understand that and just shipped the whole assembly on the wing of a plane back to the facility where they had the capacity to remove the weapon.
 
  • #52
Joe Neubarth said:
That incident was embarrassing to the Air Force but not THAT dangerous unless the plane carrying the weapon system crashed. Of course that can happen any time you transport a weapon via air in cargo planes. Weapons being returned are supposed to be separated from their delivery vehicle. In this case the young men involved did not understand that and just shipped the whole assembly on the wing of a plane back to the facility where they had the capacity to remove the weapon.

The issue was the result of a number of people assuming that the multiple required checks to ensure that no weapons were inside the missiles were done and that "there's no way everyone didn't check this already". Which in fact was what happened. We have a term for that in the Air Force: Complacency. The people involved never knew the weapons were even loaded until after the plane landed and the weapons were found.

The weapons themselves were never in any danger, like you said, but as seen in the past B-52's do crash, so better safe than sorry!
 
  • #53
Drakkith said:
The issue was the result of a number of people assuming that the multiple required checks to ensure that no weapons were inside the missiles were done and that "there's no way everyone didn't check this already". Which in fact was what happened. We have a term for that in the Air Force: Complacency. The people involved never knew the weapons were even loaded until after the plane landed and the weapons were found.

The weapons themselves were never in any danger, like you said, but as seen in the past B-52's do crash, so better safe than sorry!

When I went through Nuclear Weapons School they told us to NEVER sign off on anything unless we are absolutely certain that it has been done according to the book. That screw up in the Dakotas was a perfect example of young people trying to brush off the paperwork.

An age old Military axiom comes to mind: "You get what you INSPECT."
 
  • #54
Joe Neubarth said:
When I went through Nuclear Weapons School they told us to NEVER sign off on anything unless we are absolutely certain that it has been done according to the book. That screw up in the Dakotas was a perfect example of young people trying to brush off the paperwork.

An age old Military axiom comes to mind: "You get what you INSPECT."

Take the "Young" out of "Young People" and you've hit that on the head.
 
  • #56
Joe Neubarth said:
That incident was embarrassing to the Air Force but not THAT dangerous unless the plane carrying the weapon system crashed. Of course that can happen any time you transport a weapon via air in cargo planes. Weapons being returned are supposed to be separated from their delivery vehicle. In this case the young men involved did not understand that and just shipped the whole assembly on the wing of a plane back to the facility where they had the capacity to remove the weapon.

I don't know... I can see some overeager young'uns loading them on a pylon. I don't see how they got them out of their bunker in the first place and I don't see how come the pilots did not have any indication of what they were carrying.

Plus, Minot AFB was certainly qualified and equipped to offload weapons. Plus, they were supposed to be shipping just shapes that day, not weapons. Lots of things wrong with the story, such as it got out. Enough to give one pause.
 
  • #57
Meanwhile, at Fort Calhoun, they are pumping water out of the turbine building basement.
 
  • #58
Not according to their reports. Everything is just fine.
 
  • #59
swl said:
From the link above:
"Fort Calhoun was designed for floods up to 1014 feet above sea level, and the current flood stands at 1006 feet."

If it was designed for floods up to 1014 feet, why is it already flooding at 1006 feet?
Is this an example of failure within design basis?

I live out in Southern California where we think a sprinkle is rain. Most people who have lived out here do not understand real rain or swollen rivers. There is a rumor that back in 1905 the San Diego River (For the past 106 years, essentially a creek) flooded from bank to bank (a half mile or more across.). Most of the young people here do not have a clue what could happen if we received a hundred year flood. San Diego Stadium (Where the Super Bowl has been played) would be out of sight under the water. Not only that, but thousands of apartments, business offices, Condos, my favorite restaurant and twenty hotels would all be gone. Yep, all of that new development was built on the 100 year flood plain.

Now, that is a perfect example of a lack of preparation for what happens in 100 year floods. When the waters rise in the midwest, the ground becomes saturated and seepage can go into basements. If the plant was designed for a 100 year flood, they have pumps in the basement that can easily handle the seepage. It looks like they are working. Thank God!
 
  • #60
Why would the turbine rooms be below flood level? Or critical electrical rooms. Sounds like Fukushima.
 
  • #62
robinson said:
Why would the turbine rooms be below flood level? Or critical electrical rooms. Sounds like Fukushima.
Robinson, that is an insult to American Engineering. It might be valid, but BOY was that a nasty thing to say!

Seepage in saturated ground is expected. The degree of seepage may be in debate but not the actual process.
 
  • #63
Missouri River floodwater seeped into the turbine building at a nuclear power plant near Omaha on Monday, but plant officials said the seepage was expected and posed no safety risk because the building contains no nuclear material.

Jaczko said the Army Corps of Engineers doesn't expect the river to rise enough to cause additional significant problems at either of the nuclear plants in Nebraska.

"Bottom line, it looks like the levels are going to be at a place where the plant should be able to deal with it," Jaczko said.

Flooding remains a concern all along the Missouri because of massive amounts of water the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has released from upstream reservoirs. The river is expected to rise as much as 5 to 7 feet above flood stage in much of Nebraska and Iowa and as much as 10 feet over flood stage in parts of Missouri.
http://old.news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20110627/ap_on_re_us/us_missouri_river_flooding_nuclear_safety

Clearly critical areas are low enough to be effected long before it reaches the level they claim the plant was designed for.
 
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  • #64
Joe Neubarth said:
Robinson, that is an insult to American Engineering. It might be valid, but BOY was that a nasty thing to say!

Sure, American Engineering is way superior to Japanese. (Pay no attention to the fact that Japanese said about the same thing about them and Russian engineering - before 2011-03-11)

A story about American Engineering prowess:

http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/7006951239/fission-stories-46-powerless-nuclear-power-plants

Fission Stories #46: Powerless Nuclear Power Plants

Did the station blackout event at Vogtle described in Fission Stories #45 shock the nuclear industry into taking actions to prevent recurrence? Hardly. Almost exactly one year later, on March 7, 1991, the boom of a mobile crane neared, but did not touch, a 500,000 volt overhead power line connecting the main transformer at Diablo Canyon Unit 1in California to the offsite electrical power grid. Plant procedures required mobile cranes to be kept at least 27 feet away from overhead power lines. The boom of the mobile crane in question ventured to within 2 or 3 feet of the 500,000 volt power lines. Electrical arcing (i.e., nuclear-sized sparks) between the boom and the transmission lines caused an electrical fluctuation that tripped the main transformer. Since the backup transformer was out of service for maintenance at the time, Unit 1 lost all offsite power. The three emergency diesel generators automatical1y started and supplied power to essential equipment. Power to the rest of Unit 1’s electrical equipment was restored about five hours later by cross-tying connections to a Unit 2 transformer (i.e., putting all the eggs in one basket).

Okay, some snoozed through the Vogtle wakeup call. But surely the Diablo Canyon event triggered actions to prevent power plants from becoming powerless. Guess again.

On March 13, 1991, six days after the Diablo Canyon miscue, the Unit 4 reactor at the Turkey Point nuclear plant south of Miami, Florida experienced a loss of offsite power at a time when all its emergency diesel generators were unavailable.

Turkey Point Unit 4 along with Unit 3 (Units 1 and 2 are fossil-fired generators), had been shut down the previous November for a lengthy outage to fix safety problems. All the irradiated fuel had been transferred from the reactor core to the spent fue1 pools. As long as one irradiated fuel assembly resides in the reactor core, at least one emergency diesel generator (EDG) must be available. But when that last irradiated fuel assembly is relocated to the spent fuel pool (which now contains ALL the irradiated fuel assemblies), none of the EDGs is required to be available—despite the fact that they supply backup power to the spent fuel pools.

When the event began, the startup transformer was connected to the offsite electrical grid. It was supplying power from the grid to equipment throughout the plant. Due to an electrical disturbance, the startup transformer was automatically disconnected from the grid and prevented from reconnecting.

Workers inspected the startup transformer and associated circuit breakers and found no electrical fault indications. About an hour after the incident began, the operators re-energized the startup transformer. In the next hour, power was restored to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps and forced cooling to the spent fuel pool was resumed.

Did the Turkey Point event finally deliver the safety warning that the Vogtle and Diablo Canyon events failed to send? Maybe, but apparently not to folks in Arizona. On November 15, 1991, workers at Palo Verde Unit 3 were replacing the “A” phase bushing on the main transformer.

(read the rest by following the URL)

Do you still think American engineering is immune to Fukushimosis?
 
  • #65
swl said:
From the link above:
"Fort Calhoun was designed for floods up to 1014 feet above sea level, and the current flood stands at 1006 feet."

If it was designed for floods up to 1014 feet, why is it already flooding at 1006 feet?
Is this an example of failure within design basis?

It's flooding outside the buildings, not inside. The floodgates keep the water from entering the buildings, not from entering the general area.

In fact, that was just one of the problems the NRC noted when looking at Ft Calhoun's initial plan for increasing flood protection by 5 feet. Besides stacking sandbags on top of floodgates, there were also some modifications that would have required some welding. The NRC didn't believe crews could actually maneuver around in the rising flood waters well enough to accomplish the welding and stacking.

While the failed AcquaDam isn't essential to protect the critical parts of the plant, it certainly did fulfill a very useful function in keeping the area surrounding the buildings free enough of water that work could be done outside the buildings.

I wouldn't say the exterior water was an example of design failure, but it isn't an example of a great plan, either.

Pumping water out of a basement isn't anything special, either. One of the best ways to prevent leaky basements in houses is to let the water accumulating outside the basement pass from outside drain tiles to inside drain tiles (underneath the basement floor) where it's pumped into your normal waste water lines. In fact, when I worked with a masonry crew for a couple years, we used to punch holes in every few bottom blocks of the basement and run small plastic PVC pipes to the interior drain tiles just in case water seeped into the blocks higher up. (We built some rather exotic houses, including one in which the basement was built in the natural creek bed with the creek diverted around the house - cool looking as could be when it was finished and never leaked - the first year anyway - I didn't work with them long enough to know if the creek eventually reverted back to its natural path.)
 
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  • #66
zapperzero said:
I don't know... I can see some overeager young'uns loading them on a pylon. I don't see how they got them out of their bunker in the first place and I don't see how come the pilots did not have any indication of what they were carrying.

Plus, Minot AFB was certainly qualified and equipped to offload weapons. Plus, they were supposed to be shipping just shapes that day, not weapons. Lots of things wrong with the story, such as it got out. Enough to give one pause.

I don't want to derail the thread, so if you want to know why send me a message.
 
  • #67
nikkkom said:
Sure, American Engineering is way superior to Japanese. (Pay no attention to the fact that Japanese said about the same thing about them and Russian engineering - before 2011-03-11)

A story about American Engineering prowess:

http://allthingsnuclear.org/post/7006951239/fission-stories-46-powerless-nuclear-power-plants

Fission Stories #46: Powerless Nuclear Power Plants

Did the station blackout event at Vogtle described in Fission Stories #45 shock the nuclear industry into taking actions to prevent recurrence? Hardly. Almost exactly one year later, on March 7, 1991, the boom of a mobile crane neared, but did not touch, a 500,000 volt overhead power line connecting the main transformer at Diablo Canyon Unit 1in California to the offsite electrical power grid. Plant procedures required mobile cranes to be kept at least 27 feet away from overhead power lines. The boom of the mobile crane in question ventured to within 2 or 3 feet of the 500,000 volt power lines. Electrical arcing (i.e., nuclear-sized sparks) between the boom and the transmission lines caused an electrical fluctuation that tripped the main transformer. Since the backup transformer was out of service for maintenance at the time, Unit 1 lost all offsite power. The three emergency diesel generators automatical1y started and supplied power to essential equipment. Power to the rest of Unit 1’s electrical equipment was restored about five hours later by cross-tying connections to a Unit 2 transformer (i.e., putting all the eggs in one basket).

Okay, some snoozed through the Vogtle wakeup call. But surely the Diablo Canyon event triggered actions to prevent power plants from becoming powerless. Guess again.

On March 13, 1991, six days after the Diablo Canyon miscue, the Unit 4 reactor at the Turkey Point nuclear plant south of Miami, Florida experienced a loss of offsite power at a time when all its emergency diesel generators were unavailable.

Turkey Point Unit 4 along with Unit 3 (Units 1 and 2 are fossil-fired generators), had been shut down the previous November for a lengthy outage to fix safety problems. All the irradiated fuel had been transferred from the reactor core to the spent fue1 pools. As long as one irradiated fuel assembly resides in the reactor core, at least one emergency diesel generator (EDG) must be available. But when that last irradiated fuel assembly is relocated to the spent fuel pool (which now contains ALL the irradiated fuel assemblies), none of the EDGs is required to be available—despite the fact that they supply backup power to the spent fuel pools.

When the event began, the startup transformer was connected to the offsite electrical grid. It was supplying power from the grid to equipment throughout the plant. Due to an electrical disturbance, the startup transformer was automatically disconnected from the grid and prevented from reconnecting.

Workers inspected the startup transformer and associated circuit breakers and found no electrical fault indications. About an hour after the incident began, the operators re-energized the startup transformer. In the next hour, power was restored to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps and forced cooling to the spent fuel pool was resumed.

Did the Turkey Point event finally deliver the safety warning that the Vogtle and Diablo Canyon events failed to send? Maybe, but apparently not to folks in Arizona. On November 15, 1991, workers at Palo Verde Unit 3 were replacing the “A” phase bushing on the main transformer.

(read the rest by following the URL)

Do you still think American engineering is immune to Fukushimosis?

The initial statement was tongue in cheek, but so obvious that I did not put a smiling face at the end of the text.

Now, on a more serious point, your examples of loss of American reported power incidents at times when systems are down and there is less concern for total continuity of power are in no way comparable to the outright insanity that is Fukushima.

Fukushima was and is an engineering disaster from beginning to end. It should never have been allowed to start up with the site engineering so totally Fuk'd up as it was. It amazes me that nobody caught those outrageous engineering gaffs in the past 40 years.
 
  • #68
Nikkom, That "All Things Nuclear" article is another example of how to lie with facts.
It lies about the incident at Turkey Point.
"Lie" means 'to deceive by intent' and that's what that article does.

I was working at that plant then and don't even remember the day it happened so had to find the NRC report on it..
The report is here: http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/gen-comm/info-notices/1991/in91068.html

First lie: "..the Unit 4 reactor at the Turkey Point nuclear plant south of Miami, Florida experienced a loss of offsite power at a time when all its emergency diesel generators were unavailable."
Wow, you'd think we were in same shape as Fukushima and that's what the author wants you to think..
In fact,
we had years earlier installed an emergency feed from the adjoining fossil unit's blackstart diesels for just such a situation where our emergency diesels were unavailable due to maintenance work or disaster. The blackstarts were same type, twenty cylinder GM locomotive engines.
So the author infers the falsehood that no diesel power was available; and that's deceit by intent and that's lying.
Here's from the NRC report:
""An alternate source of power supply to the CCW, ICW, and spent fuel pool cooling pumps was available from four, non-safety-related (black start) diesel generators. ""
Indeed we could have got power from them if we'd needed it, they did start and stand by but weren't needed.
Again from NRC report: "The licensee manually started, but did not load, two of the black start diesel generators."
That's why we put that feed from the blackstarts there, as backup for our emergency diesels.

Furthermore we had other backup in- house power sources from other transformers,
from NRC report : "Other backup sources of power to the pumps included interconnection with the Unit 3 startup transformer and transfer to another Unit 4 transformer (after defeating circuit breaker interlocks)."

Furthermore we had a THIRD backup to both those other backups, again from NRC report:
" An alternate method of spent fuel pool cooling, which was available, involved the use of a trailer-mounted diesel generator and a diesel powered fire pump or a non-safety grade screen wash pump. Detailed procedures for use of the alternative cooling methods were available."

So the author's intentionally deceitful allegation that the fuel was left without a means of cooling is at least three lies(count 'em we had 3 backups in place) but i'll only count it as one.

Second lie: "..a lengthy outage to fix safety problems." Sounds as if the place was falling apart, eh?
In fact the outage was to install more diesel generators. I remember THAT fact very well.
Here's from NRC report:
""In November 1990, the licensee for the Turkey Point Plant began an 11-month dual unit outage to conduct a major electrical system upgrade including installing two additional emergency diesel generators (EDGs)."
Author lied by asserting a falsehood as to reason for outage. We put in two more emergency diesels.
We had executives who understood the seriousness of a station blackout and were willing to spend the money to "do it right".

Third lie :"...none of the EDGs is required to be available—despite the fact that they supply backup power to the spent fuel pools." suggests there's something wrong with that idea.
WELL DUHHHH , meathead, that's why we defuel BEFORE we take out both diesels, because there's tons of heat capacity in the fuel pool and you could get along fine with NO cooling for many days.. and OF COURSE we get multiple backups in place before we do that! Wouldn't you ?
So his suggestion of wrong-doing is deceit by intent.

Fourth lie: Now this statement is true: "About an hour after the incident began, the operators re-energized the startup transformer. In the next hour, power was restored to the spent fuel pool cooling pumps and forced cooling to the spent fuel pool was resumed.."
...
Having baited his hook with that little bit of truth he tries to set it with:
..."Did the Turkey Point event finally deliver the safety warning..."" inferring it was a near miss
Don't take the bait it's a bald faced lie.. Again from NRC report: "The temperature of the spent fuel pool had increased from 84(degrees)F to 87(degrees)F during the 2-hour duration of the event."

Now i can't speak to the other reactors he wrote about.
Mine was put into the safest possible configuration, work was in progress to improve electrical system reliability, multiple layers of backup were in place and operable, and the event was a yawn.

That 'intellectual' ATN author is exercising his first amendment right to be incredibly asinine.
I'd wager he repeats the performance. old jim
 
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  • #69
BTW when i try to access NRC READING ROOM via Google i get a security warning that a site named "akamaihd.net" may be attempting monkey business.

I went straight in through NRC.gov and it worked okay.

I don't know it there's internet hijinks afoot or maybe i have a virus. Be careful.

Am going to bed now, will let virus scan chew on it overnight.

Over and out for day

old jim
 
  • #70
jim hardy said:
BTW when i try to access NRC READING ROOM via Google i get a security warning that a site named "akamaihd.net" may be attempting monkey business.
old jim

You get a redirect to akamai - which is a caching service. Dunno why that would happen. Maybe your ISP is being clever.
 

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