Is Time Merely Constant Change?

[Doctordick]

Anssi, it is certainly possible that you understand what I have presented but I get the strong feeling that your understanding is just a little askew; just enough to lead to bothersome complications. I think one of the problems here is that your expectations are more complex than what I am presenting: i.e., you reading things in there which are not there. This leads to subtle misinterpretations of what I say which may tend to lead you astray. Perhaps a quick and dirty presentation of the central issues would be helpful.

As I said above, the "what is", is "what is" explanation is the only explanation which does not require an epistemological construct. When I defined an explanation as a method of generating your expectations, I had in mind the concept of yielding the probability which would describe your expectations that a particular state was to be expected. Of course, the "what is", is "what is" explanation yields only zero for any state not actually in the basis of that explanation (i.e., what is known or thought to be known). Thus it is that "the method" is, "look at the table of 'what is' which you have to work with. (Again, I am working in the abstract so that the great extent of that table is not an issue.)

I think you understand that the symbols used to refer to the ontological elements of the "what is", is "what is" explanation are immaterial so that I can use numerical reference labels. Since the explanation yields a number (the probability of a specific state) and the specific state is described by a set of numbers, it follows that, from this perspective, any explanation is fundamentally a mathematical function. The "what is", is "what is" table is a representation of that function for those specific instances which are known. Any flaw-free explanation must also yield exactly those points (they represent the information the explanation is to explain).

Thus it is that the only difference between the desired explanation and the "what is", is "what is" explanation is that the desired explanation yields expectations for states not in the known set (i.e., it is capable of making predictions for the future). Thus it is that any explanation constitutes a mathematical function which fits the points established by the "what is", is "what is" explanation and, in addition, yields values for points not in that set. What all scientists are looking for, are the simplest relationships which fulfill that requirement.

This is a point fitting problem: i.e., one is looking for a mathematical function which fits the entire collection of points displayed in that table. As anyone who has studied mathematics understands, there exist an infinite number of algorithms which will fit any finite set of numbers. That is why the issue of "simplest" arises. Now one man's "simple" is often another's "complex" so we should leave the issue open and consider only the consequences of fundamental constraints on the possibilities.

So first of all I understood we have established that "x, tau, t"-structure so to be able to represent reality.

Slightly askew of what I was describing; what this structure is to represent is "what we think we know". Reality has been defined to be "a valid ontology". What we know of reality is only a part of that "valid ontology" (there may exist ontological elements of which we are unaware and they are not in our "data base") and, in addition, you must keep in mind that there exists absolutely no way of determining whether or not a particular ontological element we think we know is valid or not. Thus it is that I find the phrase "to represent reality" to be somewhat misleading. This can easily lead to sloppy thinking and is best avoided.

There is also a second issue which must be kept in mind: the (x, tau, t) representation is being designed to represent the "valid ontological elements" we know and, as such, the difference between valid and invalid elements must be kept in mind during the analysis of that design. Note that I earlier commented that we can ignore the existence of invalid elements within the actual data being represented as any acceptable explanation must explain all the data which certainly must include the valid components (we are, after all, looking for a mathematical function which fits "all" the known points).

And had we made an attempt to define ontological elements, we could lay down some "presents" on that table accordingly.

Making an attempt to define ontological elements has almost nothing to do with what is being represented here (i.e., with the logic of the representation itself) as defining the ontological elements is essentially no more than setting down a specific set of (x, tau, t) labels for each element. The representation is a set of points in an (x, tau, t) Euclidean space. By my definition of the t index, the collection of points (which I have chosen to represent as B) with identical "t" indices are representations of a specific present. It follows that the representation itself has time (as I have defined it) embedded in the representation. Time is nothing more or less than the t axis.

One's expectation with regard to "known information" are no more than a "true/false" decision on any given present. In the "what is", is "what is" explanation, the method is no more than "look in the table". If a particular B(t) is in the table the answer to your expectations is, "true". If it is not there, the answer is false.

Here I am speaking of the representation itself as an abstract structure; the table (which represents the "what is", is "what is" would, by definition, include all of the information known to us (our entire personal past so to speak). But represented in a totally abstract form.

And here we are looking at a method of "seeing what existed in the past" without having all the information about each and every moment we ever experienced? The "result" is simply, whether or not a single ontological element existed in a particular t?

No, the structure is designed to represent "each and every moment we ever experienced". My next comment was to point out that, if we did indeed have the mental capability to actually construct and record that table (as an information base we could consciously consult) the idea of using such a thing might be useful. Don't take that comment as anything more than a mere comment on the circumstance. As I said, that feat is clearly beyond our mental capabilities and it would be much more useful to have some sort of rule which would tell you if a particular B(t) existed in the table. I am doing no more than pointing in a direction which would yield what I would think of as "a useful explanation"; useful in the sense that we would prefer a rule which would not exceed our mental capabilities.

What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.

I tried to prepare you for this perspective when I commented on that post where I had asked the question, "How do you tell the difference between an electron and a Volkswagen?". As I said then, you will find my answer a few posts down from there. The correct answer is the labels, "Volkswagen" and "electron", presume a great quantity of information about the rest of the universe is either understood or unimportant. Identification is itself a statement of what will be taken as valid associated acceptable criteria. In other words, we are talking about a single ontological element (or an object, which I earlier defined to be a collection of ontological elements) of the set B(t) where the rest of the elements of B(t) are either unimportant or known.

I might comment that, as the future is fundamentally unknown, "the rest of the elements are known" is the assumption that they either won't be different or the difference is predicted. Another way to see this is to realize that the behavior of the significant element is based on the presumption that the behavior of the associated criteria is correctly understood. All this is just buried in assumptions too voluminous to even discuss. If we are going to be "exact" we need to avoid all these assumptions.

And here we are looking at a method of "seeing what existed in the past" without having all the information about each and every moment we ever experienced? The "result" is simply, whether or not a single ontological element existed in a particular t?

In a sense yes; but certainly not clear the way you put it. What I am describing is a rule which would yield the existence of a single specific ontological element in that incomprehensible table. First, remember that we are talking about what we would like "a useful explanation" to provide which means we are talking about a useful epistemological construct (i.e., a specific set of labels have been introduced in that "what is", is "what is" explanation). That means that we would like to have a rule which would yield the (x, tau) indices in our (x, tau, t) representation (those different ontological elements in that representation) which are going to be regarded as the same ontological element in that epistemological construct.

Or, to put it a little simpler, we would like a rule which would give us the appropriate (x, tau) indices as a function of time given that all the other points in that B(t) are known (or unimportant, which is really the same thing). This is essentially what any rule discovered by science tells us about the behavior of things. It is presumed that the rest of the universe is either unimportant or has its impact embedded in the rule: the rules of science talk about the behavior of objects (how specific identified entities behave).

I have to proceed very carefully here so I can be sure I get the right idea.

The proposed representation of the "what is", is "what is" explanation is essentially identical to the common Newtonian representation of reality (i.e., a space "x" coordinate and a time "t" coordinate) except that it is neither three dimensional or continuous (Newtonian "time lines" constitute a presumption that these points are the same entity) and no "measure" of any kind has been introduced (neither in the space or time axes). Sort of, "the actual facts we have to explain" are being represented as collections of known points in a (x, tau, t) space.

Or are you just saying that because we can see what has changed between presents if we have information about what existed at each moment?

If there has been no change, how do you know the "t" index of the referenced ontological element should be different? How do you know you are talking about a different "time"?

And so does this function return "1" if the specific set is found in any "present" in the past?

In this case, your use of the word "any" worries me. The "what is", is "what is" explanation has been laid out as a table of indices B(t) which describes that set of points in the (x, tau, space) which represents ontologically recognizable cases of what you think you know (the basis of your future epistemological solution). The table provides you with the set of answers to the question, does the specific set of points, B(t) exist in that table? B(t) can be seen as a set of numbers and the answer can be seen as either a one or a zero representing "yes" and "no". Thus, your expectations concerning "what you think you know" can be seen as a mathematical function: i.e., the function yields the probability that a specific "present" (annotated as B(t) ) is a valid entry in that "what is", is "what is" table of what you know.

Now, an acceptable scientifically usable explanation has to go a bit further. If it makes no predictions, it is a pretty worthless explanation. What that is essentially saying is that the scientifically usable explanation must yield the probability that a specific "present" ;not in that "what is", is "what is" table of what you think you know; will turn up as an acceptable entry via a change in your past (what you know or what you think you know): i.e., the future.

Fundamentally, this is a point fitting problem and it is well known that there are an infinite number of functions which will fit a finite number of points. Which function you choose to "believe" valid (your epistemological theory) must satisfy two very important constraints: first, it must agree with your knowledge of the past and second, it needs to be simple enough to mentally comprehend. Those two constraints are the cause of the underlying need for compartmentalization. Since this presentation is an abstract analysis of ontological constraints and not concerned with the complexity of epistemological solutions, compartmentalization is not a pertinent factor.

What I'm wondering now is; if we first have some kind of partially filled "x, tau, t"-table, how could it contain knowledge about the un-filled parts?

It can't! But you must see that any table (the actual set of ontological events our epistemological solution must explain) is essentially incomplete: i.e., we are not all knowing and the future will bring forth entries for that table which we don't currently have. What we would like to have is a rule which would tell us what those entries should be. Now that "rule" might be wrong but there is one thing we know for sure, any valid rule must yield the entries for the table which we already have: i.e., if our expectations for entries not in the table are to be given by some function, that function must first yield, exactly, the entries representing what we know (or think we know). If it doesn't then it is either the wrong "function" or something we thought we knew was wrong: i.e., the "theoretical epistemological solution represented by that ontology together with that "function" is wrong. The fundamental issue here is normally referred to as "induction" and there is no logical defense of induction other than, "it's something I understand and, gee it seems to work"

I figured you said there exists a function that would yield the complete table, if we just give it... what? Partial table?

Not the complete table, but rather, our "expectations" for the entries to the table; a subtly different statement. The idea that "there exists a function" which would, forever, yield the complete table, is equivalent to saying that the complete universe is a knowable thing. That there exists a function which yields a complete table (for the known past) at this moment, is a fact; there are, in fact, an infinite number of functions which satisfy that requirement. The problem is that most all of them are far to complex to even consider as usable representations of reality. But that is not my concern as I have no interest in developing an epistemological solution; what I am concerned about are the constraints on the fundamental behavior of ontological elements in any epistemological solution, a very different issue.

I think Doctordick was saying that even things that do not exist can have explanations, therefore not every "epistemological structure" must necessarily refer to some ontology.

I would have said, "some valid ontology". Otherwise, I think your comment is accurate. Perhaps you can talk a little sense into Rade. My major complaint is that standard languages are chock full of vague definitions and these lead to misunderstandings. I am afraid Rade's central purpose is to accent these misunderstandings and that serves no purpose except confusion.

I hope I have not confused any of you further -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Anssi, it is certainly possible that you understand what I have presented but I get the strong feeling that your understanding is just a little askew

Me too! :) I basically know what this is about, but I am struggling with some important details regarding how you handle the tables to a useful end.

As I said above, the "what is", is "what is" explanation is the only explanation which does not require an epistemological construct. When I defined an explanation as a method of generating your expectations, I had in mind the concept of yielding the probability which would describe your expectations that a particular state was to be expected.

i.e. that a particular state that occurred in some moment in the past was to be expected according to other "presents" around it?

The "explanation" can be seen as a mathematical function that could be used to transform one x,tau-present to another present?

I think you understand that the symbols used to refer to the ontological elements of the "what is", is "what is" explanation are immaterial so that I can use numerical reference labels. Since the explanation yields a number (the probability of a specific state) and the specific state is described by a set of numbers, it follows that, from this perspective, any explanation is fundamentally a mathematical function. The "what is", is "what is" table is a representation of that function for those specific instances which are known. Any flaw-free explanation must also yield exactly those points (they represent the information the explanation is to explain).

i.e. we are looking for a function that would produce the changes in our known past? An infinite amount of such functions exists, but most are terribly complex, and that is why we are looking for a simplest such function? So it is not that different from traditional theoretical physics, except we are trying to keep the elements of reality undefined? Even then, we need to try and define some things before we can build any sort of x, tau, t-table? Is this correct?

Thus it is that the only difference between the desired explanation and the "what is", is "what is" explanation is that the desired explanation yields expectations for states not in the known set (i.e., it is capable of making predictions for the future). Thus it is that any explanation constitutes a mathematical function which fits the points established by the "what is", is "what is" explanation and, in addition, yields values for points not in that set. What all scientists are looking for, are the simplest relationships which fulfill that requirement.

Yeah ok, this sounds like it perhaps answers what I just asked... I think :)

This is a point fitting problem: i.e., one is looking for a mathematical function which fits the entire collection of points displayed in that table. As anyone who has studied mathematics understands, there exist an infinite number of algorithms which will fit any finite set of numbers. That is why the issue of "simplest" arises. Now one man's "simple" is often another's "complex" so we should leave the issue open and consider only the consequences of fundamental constraints on the possibilities.

Yup.

I've also been wondering how should one express something like, say, a definition for "space" in the "x, tau, t"-table? Is it about identifying space in different manners? Hmmm...

So first of all I understood we have established that "x, tau, t"-structure so to be able to represent reality.

Slightly askew of what I was describing; what this structure is to represent is "what we think we know". Reality has been defined to be "a valid ontology". What we know of reality is only a part of that "valid ontology" (there may exist ontological elements of which we are unaware and they are not in our "data base") and, in addition, you must keep in mind that there exists absolutely no way of determining whether or not a particular ontological element we think we know is valid or not. Thus it is that I find the phrase "to represent reality" to be somewhat misleading. This can easily lead to sloppy thinking and is best avoided.

True.

There is also a second issue which must be kept in mind: the (x, tau, t) representation is being designed to represent the "valid ontological elements" we know and, as such, the difference between valid and invalid elements must be kept in mind during the analysis of that design. Note that I earlier commented that we can ignore the existence of invalid elements within the actual data being represented as any acceptable explanation must explain all the data which certainly must include the valid components (we are, after all, looking for a mathematical function which fits "all" the known points).

Hmmm... here "invalid elements" refers to elements we think exists but are merely artificial parts in our worldview? As oppose to the elements you added arbitrarily to the "x, tau, t"-tables in post #398?

And had we made an attempt to define ontological elements, we could lay down some "presents" on that table accordingly.

Making an attempt to define ontological elements has almost nothing to do with what is being represented here (i.e., with the logic of the representation itself) as defining the ontological elements is essentially no more than setting down a specific set of (x, tau, t) labels for each element.

Yup, in other words, we have to have attempted to make some definitions before we can have any filled "x, tau, t"-table in our hands, right? That's what I think I said; as soon as we have made an attempt to define ontological elements, we can lay down some "presents" on the table according to our definitions, but not before? Even if these labels are taken as abstract references to "possible ontological elements", we can't label anything until we have assumed it is a "thing"?

I'm being pressed for time, so I'll continue from here soon...

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

And here we are looking at a method of "seeing what existed in the past" without having all the information about each and every moment we ever experienced?

No, the structure is designed to represent "each and every moment we ever experienced". My next comment was to point out that, if we did indeed have the mental capability to actually construct and record that table (as an information base we could consciously consult) the idea of using such a thing might be useful. Don't take that comment as anything more than a mere comment on the circumstance. As I said, that feat is clearly beyond our mental capabilities and it would be much more useful to have some sort of rule which would tell you if a particular B(t) existed in the table. I am doing no more than pointing in a direction which would yield what I would think of as "a useful explanation"; useful in the sense that we would prefer a rule which would not exceed our mental capabilities.
I tried to prepare you for this perspective when I commented on that post where I had asked the question, "How do you tell the difference between an electron and a Volkswagen?". As I said then, you will find my answer a few posts down from there. The correct answer is the labels, "Volkswagen" and "electron", presume a great quantity of information about the rest of the universe is either understood or unimportant.

Yup... So this is essentially the same as saying, we define objects by observing properties (functions/behaviour)? The difference between an electron and a volkswagen, as they exist in our worldview, is how we have defined them; how they relate to other things in our worldview, or how they behave. When we observe something (an electron or a volkswagen), it is their their behaviour that we observe and recognize them as such (walks like a duck...).

Identification is itself a statement of what will be taken as valid associated acceptable criteria. In other words, we are talking about a single ontological element (or an object, which I earlier defined to be a collection of ontological elements) of the set B(t) where the rest of the elements of B(t) are either unimportant or known.

So, when you say "What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.", is this about finding a mathematical function that would explain the "journey" (the behaviour) of a single ontological element through a series of t's? (I feel my assumptions are shaky... :)

Or, to put it a little simpler, we would like a rule which would give us the appropriate (x, tau) indices as a function of time given that all the other points in that B(t) are known (or unimportant, which is really the same thing). This is essentially what any rule discovered by science tells us about the behavior of things. It is presumed that the rest of the universe is either unimportant or has its impact embedded in the rule: the rules of science talk about the behavior of objects (how specific identified entities behave).
The proposed representation of the "what is", is "what is" explanation is essentially identical to the common Newtonian representation of reality (i.e., a space "x" coordinate and a time "t" coordinate) except that it is neither three dimensional or continuous (Newtonian "time lines" constitute a presumption that these points are the same entity) and no "measure" of any kind has been introduced (neither in the space or time axes).

Yeah okay, this is starting to sound clearer and clearer. As we are laying down "pasts" in the manner you are proposing, we can start forming mathematical functions that explain the changes between presents. And a function that explains all our past in this manner, can be considered valid.

With a small extra assumption one can assume it also predicts the future, much like Newtonian mechanics can be used to make predictions?

And so does this function return "1" if the specific set is found in any "present" in the past?

In this case, your use of the word "any" worries me.

Yup, I clearly had picked it up wrong.

Fundamentally, this is a point fitting problem and it is well known that there are an infinite number of functions which will fit a finite number of points. Which function you choose to "believe" valid (your epistemological theory) must satisfy two very important constraints: first, it must agree with your knowledge of the past and second, it needs to be simple enough to mentally comprehend.

Yup! I think I now have a better idea about what you are saying, and I can again return to that old post... Next time!

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Anssi,

I don't know that it is beneficial to try to understand my previous posts as they are cast in what I thought you knew at the time. Since this could be in error, trying to understand those posts could be counter productive. Perhaps you should first read the following carefully.

I am beginning to suspect that your major problem is that you are trying to figure out how this attack is going to help you construct valid epistemological solutions to understanding the universe. It isn't (or at least is not designed to do such a thing); as I have tried to make clear, any useful solution is "is just buried in assumptions too voluminous to even discuss". The issue is, "If we are going to be "exact" we need to avoid all these assumptions". On the other hand, if we avoid these assumptions, the correct solution is going to be so out of reach as it is guaranteed unachievable (beyond our ability to comprehend).

That is why I keep harping on the issue of not trying to find a valid epistemological solution: it is fundamentally an unachievable goal. What I am trying to do is to present to you an abstract "exact" representation of the problem; which is an achievable goal (i.e., the representation is achievable, not the solution). I have laid out the representation as a "what is", is "what is" explanation because that structure is easily understood (as a representation, not as a real usable entity).

All I am doing is representing "what we know" (or think we know) as points in a (x, tau, t) space. A table of those points is capable of representing any knowledge of any kind. That is all there is to it! In doing so I defined two very important indices: "x" and "t". The index "x" is there to express "difference" (different "x" means "different ontological element") and the index "t" is there to express "difference in what we know" (different "t" means "a change in our knowledge"). The index "tau" is only there because representation as points in an index space is incapable of specifying multiple occurrences of the same ontological element (an essential part of any "usable" explanation).

Yup... So this is essentially the same as saying, we define objects by observing properties (functions/behaviour)?

No, not exactly. We define objects by the circumstance within which we find them. If the surrounding circumstance is not the certifying circumstance for that object, then we are looking at something else. The fundamental issue is that B(t) for all the other significant entities is "known". There is a subtlety here which is very important and much neglected. When we discover some familiar behavior outside the certifying circumstance, we call it a metaphor. The issue here is possibly not as important to understanding my perspective as I think but it seems to me that it is very important to recognize that, whenever we speak of something specific, we are actually presuming the surrounding circumstance is clearly understood.

So, when you say "What we would really like is a procedure (think of it as a fundamental rule) which would accomplish that result for a any single ontological element.", is this about finding a mathematical function that would explain the "journey" (the behavior) of a single ontological element through a series of t's? (I feel my assumptions are shaky... :)

Yes; that is what I am saying ordinary useful explanations accomplish (with regard to either "single ontological elements" or collections of such elements where internal behavior of the collection can be neglected: i.e., objects as I have defined them).

Yeah okay, this is starting to sound clearer and clearer. As we are laying down "pasts" in the manner you are proposing, we can start forming mathematical functions that explain the changes between presents. And a function that explains all our past in this manner, can be considered valid.

Again, I think your understanding is a little askew of what I am saying. All I am saying is that "your expectations" (since they can be seen as a number associated with each specific B(t) which itself is expressed as a set of numbers) can be seen as a mathematical function. Since any flaw free explanation can be expressed as a specific "what is", is "what is" explanation (i.e., little more than a specific set of labels), all explanations can be seen as mathematical functions which must yield those true/false results for that table which represents what "we think we know" (since we are free to symbolize the elements any way we choose). It would be more appropriate to say that any function which does not yield all of our past must be considered "invalid" (i.e., it is most definitely flawed).

You must be careful to understand that the function is to produce "your expectations" and, "your expectations" are not necessarily what actually happened. For example, the "what is", is "what is" explanation yields the expectation for a specific B(t) (given that all B(t) for lesser values of t are known) is simply, "any B is equally possible" (and the probably of "one of any" is zero since the number of possibilities for "any" is infinite). So, the "what is", is "what is" explanation yields exactly the correct answer for the past (it is flaw free) but fails as a "useful" explanation as it tells you utterly nothing about the future (or, for that matter, any B(t) not in the table of what you know).

With a small extra assumption one can assume it also predicts the future, much like Newtonian mechanics can be used to make predictions?

One can make no such assumption! The future is totally undefined and no prediction can be logically defended. On the other hand, our expectations are another matter. This is where induction plays a roll. It is also why I brought up that "Volkswagen" vs "electron" issue. If some part of the future is known then expectations for associated events can be predicted (by comparison with statistics of the past). When it is the future, portions of it may be known by elimination: i.e., if the surrounding circumstance is not the certifying circumstance for the event of interest, the event of interest didn't occur and no expectations exist. On the other hand, if the surrounding circumstances are the certifying circumstance, your expectations will be that the event of interest will occur. This is the very issue of induction and you need to understand the implications (maybe not now, but later anyway).

For the moment, I think your real difficulty is that you are trying to read more into what I have said than I have said.

Looking to hear from you -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

Anssi,

I don't know that it is beneficial to try to understand my previous posts as they are cast in what I thought you knew at the time. Since this could be in error, trying to understand those posts could be counter productive. Perhaps you should first read the following carefully.

I am beginning to suspect that your major problem is that you are trying to figure out how this attack is going to help you construct valid epistemological solutions to understanding the universe. It isn't (or at least is not designed to do such a thing); as I have tried to make clear, any useful solution is "is just buried in assumptions too voluminous to even discuss". The issue is, "If we are going to be "exact" we need to avoid all these assumptions". On the other hand, if we avoid these assumptions, the correct solution is going to be so out of reach as it is guaranteed unachievable (beyond our ability to comprehend).

Well, what I've gathered before this presentation is that a large number of valid epistemological solutions are bound to exists; ones that express different ontological elements but are merely semantically different, and produce essentially the same predictions for reality (only the predictions too are expressed in those different ontological elements)

What you are saying above, I reckon, is the same thing. Any valid solution hinges on a some set of undefendable assumptions, and staying on the objective ground is achieved only by not doing those assumptions, and to achieve this you are expressing this "x, tau, t"-table.

And I've gathered that any specific (filled) "x, tau, t"-table is a epistemological solution (valid or invalid), since some assumptions have been made so to be able to fill it.

I didn't assume - while writing the previous post - that this sort of framework is meant to be something that could tell us what ontological elements really exist (since I find the whole question meaningless and confused one), but I did assume it is good for finding internally coherent solutions (keeping in mind each is only a solution, not the solution). Are these false assumptions?

That is why I keep harping on the issue of not trying to find a valid epistemological solution: it is fundamentally an unachievable goal.

Yeah, that's what I would hope people would understand, apparently there are many ways to arrive to this conclusion.

What I am trying to do is to present to you an abstract "exact" representation of the problem; which is an achievable goal (i.e., the representation is achievable, not the solution). I have laid out the representation as a "what is", is "what is" explanation because that structure is easily understood (as a representation, not as a real usable entity).

Yup, I think I understand this, but then I may have made some wrong assumptions that nevertheless yield sensical interpretation of what you are saying ;)

One thing I've been wondering though, perhaps you can try and explain the role of symmetry again. Was the point of that simply that it is "differences" that give us any ground for our attempts to classify ontological elements?

No, not exactly. We define objects by the circumstance within which we find them. If the surrounding circumstance is not the certifying circumstance for that object, then we are looking at something else. The fundamental issue is that B(t) for all the other significant entities is "known". There is a subtlety here which is very important and much neglected. When we discover some familiar behavior outside the certifying circumstance, we call it a metaphor. The issue here is possibly not as important to understanding my perspective as I think but it seems to me that it is very important to recognize that, whenever we speak of something specific, we are actually presuming the surrounding circumstance is clearly understood.

I'm wondering if there are some important details in this description that I am missing. It sounds to me like a semantically different way of saying that we define(classify) objects by observing behaviour, or patterns, or however I would wish to express the situation, that would nevertheless be just a (necessarily) vague picture painted with semantical concepts (pattern, behaviour, etc...)

Basically it seems to make sense to me. As long as we cannot say in any objective sense there exists some thing X, we are merely conceptualizing reality into some set of components, and what allows us to do that, can be in my opinion expressed equally well as "surrounding circumstances", or "stable patterns", as long as one understands the necessary weaknesses of these descriptions... (surrounding circumistances of "what"? or "stable in what sense?")

Damn it's tricky to use natural language to discuss these issues :)

Again, I think your understanding is a little askew of what I am saying. All I am saying is that "your expectations" (since they can be seen as a number associated with each specific B(t) which itself is expressed as a set of numbers) can be seen as a mathematical function. Since any flaw free explanation can be expressed as a specific "what is", is "what is" explanation (i.e., little more than a specific set of labels), all explanations can be seen as mathematical functions which must yield those true/false results for that table which represents what "we think we know" (since we are free to symbolize the elements any way we choose). It would be more appropriate to say that any function which does not yield all of our past must be considered "invalid" (i.e., it is most definitely flawed).

Yeah I agree. Natural language just keeps tricking me :)

You must be careful to understand that the function is to produce "your expectations" and, "your expectations" are not necessarily what actually happened. For example, the "what is", is "what is" explanation yields the expectation for a specific B(t) (given that all B(t) for lesser values of t are known) is simply, "any B is equally possible" (and the probably of "one of any" is zero since the number of possibilities for "any" is infinite). So, the "what is", is "what is" explanation yields exactly the correct answer for the past (it is flaw free) but fails as a "useful" explanation as it tells you utterly nothing about the future (or, for that matter, any B(t) not in the table of what you know).

So whenever you are referring to the "what is, is what is" explanation, you are just referring to the table of known past, but not any of the assumptions that one has made about the behaviour of the elements marked down in that table?

But in order to fill any table, you must have made some assumptions regarding the identity of those elements, right? (Even though you have made these assumptions knowing well that they are undefendable) Hmmm, or is it possible to mark down mere differences? Hmmmm

With a small extra assumption one can assume it also predicts the future, much like Newtonian mechanics can be used to make predictions?

One can make no such assumption! The future is totally undefined and no prediction can be logically defended. On the other hand, our expectations are another matter. This is where induction plays a roll.

Yeah. Is my assertion valid if I reiterate that by "prediction" I don't mean explicitly knowing the future, but merely having some anticipation for it... I tend to use this terminology because of the meaning "prediction" has in the context of an intelligent organism trying to make useful predictions about the future (useful for survival). That is, our predictions fail all the time, and they are always based on undefendable set of assumptions. Yes?

It is also why I brought up that "Volkswagen" vs "electron" issue. If some part of the future is known then expectations for associated events can be predicted (by comparison with statistics of the past).

I'm not sure what you are referring to when you say "...part of the future is known..."? If we have "certain expectations" for some part of future (by having made some set of "undefendable assumptions")

When it is the future, portions of it may be known by elimination: i.e., if the surrounding circumstance is not the certifying circumstance for the event of interest, the event of interest didn't occur and no expectations exist. On the other hand, if the surrounding circumstances are the certifying circumstance, your expectations will be that the event of interest will occur. This is the very issue of induction and you need to understand the implications (maybe not now, but later anyway).

For the moment, I think your real difficulty is that you are trying to read more into what I have said than I have said.

Yeah, probably... And the complications introduced by natural language :)

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hi again Anssi,

I have been trying to sculpt with "Poser" and, so far, not being very successful; but I am learning things. I was surprised to find your post so soon when I looked this evening. And I agree with you whole heartedly; it is quite easy to become confounded by the complications introduced by natural language. That is exactly why I continue to insist that you make no attempts to find epistemological solutions consistent with my representation. What I am saying is that my representation is universal in that absolutely any explanation can be cast in exactly the form of that "what is", is "what is" table.

Essentially, if there exists a workable explanation of anything, any attempt to understand that explanation amounts to exactly the same problem as understanding anything else: i.e., all of the knowledge required to understand that explanation can be expressed in exactly the same model (as points in a (x, tau, t) space).

Well, what I've gathered before this presentation is that a large number of valid epistemological solutions are bound to exists

Again, there is no reason to make that assumption; it is entirely possible that only one exists. The real issue here is that we do not have the power to settle that question and even consideration of it is counter productive as it distracts us from the serious problem of maintaining objectivity. And don't be upset by that comment as I am as guilty of being drawn into unproductive side issues as is anyone here.

What you are saying above, I reckon, is the same thing. Any valid solution hinges on a some set of undefendable assumptions, and staying on the objective ground is achieved only by not doing those assumptions, and to achieve this you are expressing this "x, tau, t"-table.

Essentially, yes!

And I've gathered that any specific (filled) "x, tau, t"-table is a epistemological solution (valid or invalid), since some assumptions have been made so to be able to fill it.

The actual answer to this question is, "maybe, maybe not". You sort of have the horse on the wrong side of the cart. The real issue is that the table cannot represent a flaw free epistemological solution without being specifically filled out as, if the table does not exist, the explanation cannot be checked against it. These issues once again get hairy because real epistemological solutions (theories) make both assumptions about what exists and assumptions about things which exist not being important. The only important fact here is the fact that an epistemological argument itself consists of a set of symbols which can be expressed in exactly the same table we are discussing. The subtlety of this can get profound and we really ought not to be drawn off into that discussion. Please, let us put it off until I have presented my full model.

There are essentially three things I want to do with that "what is", is "what is" table before I get into the issue of symmetry. All three of these steps involve adding "invalid ontological elements". I claim this as a reasonable thing to do because all epistemological solutions do this kind of thing: i.e., they invent reasons for things to be the way they are and, if that invention allows them to explain things and, all results are consistent with the existence of those invented things, then there exists no reason to deny that invention. In particular, we have the fact that there exists no way to tell the difference between an invented ontological element and a valid ontological element. This is a freedom available in ontological constructs not available in epistemological constructs and I will eventually show you that it is exactly this freedom which allows one create a solution to the problem. But that will come later; for the moment, all I want is for you to allow these three steps and understand exactly what the three steps provide.

The first step involves the issue of "expectations" being a mathematical function of "what we think is known": i.e., P(B(t)), the probability of having the set B(t), is a function of that B(t) where B is a set of number pairs (x and tau indices). At the moment, this is a very strange mathematical function as the number of arguments changes with the index "t". I am afraid I have never heard of such a function from the mathematical community. However, in this case, the problem is easily eliminated; all one need do is propose a collection of "invalid ontological elements" to fill in the gap. So our "what is", is "what is" table now has the same number of entries for every "t" (we just don't know what they are).

You must understand that their existence is now a presumed fact and that our past includes not knowing exactly what references should be attached to them (other than the fact that they are seen occasionally at other times: i.e., they are members of some supposedly known B(t). If you happened to know a flaw free epistemological solution, you would know which occurrences went with that solution. But, as far as we are concerned, they are still undefined as we have no epistemological solutions; but at least the mathematical function which yields our expectations has the same number of arguments in every case.

The second set I wish to add has to do with the "t" index. If time is to be a communicable element of an epistemological solution then the value of that index must be deducible from the "what is", is "what is" table. That means that, given a particular set of (x, tau) indices supposedly defining a particular B in the table, it must be possible to deduce the appropriate index "t" to be attached to that set. Again, this is easily solved by adding "invalid ontological elements" (i.e., fictitious entries in the table which will establish every entry B as different from every other such entry). If you need a procedure for developing these entries, I will give you a specific procedure; however, there are clearly a number of different procedures which will accomplish this goal. The end product is a table where, given a specific B (a specific collection of (x, tau) indices) one can examine the table and, by elimination, discover what the t index had to be.

Analysis of this second set leads to the development of the third set. If I can make the index "t" recoverable from the "what is", is "what is" table then it is clear that the same procedure can make other indices recoverable. In particular, I am interested in recovering a specific "x" index, given that all the other indices defining a particular B(t) are known. Once again, it is easily shown that addition of fictitious entries in that table can make every B(t) different even if any specific "x" index is missing. This means that, given (n-1) of the n indices (remember, our first step was to make the number of indices in every B the same: i.e., after that is accomplished, n has a specific value and the second step merely increments that value whatever that value happens to be. But the net result is that, given those (n-1) indices, we can consult our table and immediately declare what the missing index had to be.

This means that the missing index can be seen as is a function of the other indices. Again, we may not know what that function is but we do know that the function must agree with our table. What this says is that there exists a mathematical function which will yield

$$(x,\tau)_n(t) = f((x,\tau)_1, (x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x.\tau)_{n-1},t)$$
​

It follows that the function F defined by

$$F((x,\tau)_1,(x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x,\tau)_n) = (x(t),\tau(t))_n - f((x,\tau)_1, (x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x.\tau)_{n-1},t) = 0$$
​

is a statement of the general constraint which guarantees that the entries conform to the given table. That is to say, this procedure yields a result which guarantees that there exists a mathematical function, the roots of which are exactly the entries to our "what is", is "what is" table. Clearly, it would be nice to know the structure of that function. If you understand what I have just written (which is somewhat of a restatement of an earlier post) then, I will proceed to the issue of symmetry and how that concept further constrains the nature of the function which is to yield the probability of our expectations.

... (since I find the whole question meaningless and confused one), but I did assume it is good for finding internally coherent solutions (keeping in mind each is only a solution, not the solution). Are these false assumptions?

Finding solutions is not the critical issue here; finding constraints on solutions is another matter and one which we are going to solve: i.e., rules of thumb which will clearly delineate a flawed solutions.

One thing I've been wondering though, perhaps you can try and explain the role of symmetry again. Was the point of that simply that it is "differences" that give us any ground for our attempts to classify ontological elements?

I will attack that issue as soon as you make it clear that you understand the reasons and the rationality of including the "invalid ontological elements" I have described above.

I'm wondering if there are some important details in this description that I am missing. It sounds to me like a semantically different way of saying that we define(classify) objects by observing behaviour, or patterns, or however I would wish to express the situation, that would nevertheless be just a (necessarily) vague picture painted with semantical concepts (pattern, behaviour, etc...)

The issue is that there are two important patterns here; first, the behavior of the "defined entity" and, second, the surrounding events which define that "defined entity". What a lot of people miss is the fact that surrounding events are a critical issue in identifying "defined entities". I really don't think you have a serious problem here as you have demonstrated a very analytical approach to your perspective. For the moment, I think these issues can be laid aside.

So whenever you are referring to the "what is, is what is" explanation, you are just referring to the table of known past, but not any of the assumptions that one has made about the behavior of the elements marked down in that table?

Exactly right. It is my overt intention to make no steps which place a constraint of any kind on the behavior of these elements.

But in order to fill any table, you must have made some assumptions regarding the identity of those elements, right? (Even though you have made these assumptions knowing well that they are undefendable) Hmmm, or is it possible to mark down mere differences? Hmmmm

Again, the answer is, "yes and no". Again, you are getting the horse behind the wagon (so to speak). I can certainly fill in the table (if I am careful) in a way which does not yield any direct epistemological solution but I certainly cannot have a solution in mind and fill out that table in a manner defending that solution which does not include some assumptions (and some "invalid ontological elements").

That is, our predictions fail all the time, and they are always based on undefendable set of assumptions. Yes?

Again, you are getting into subtle issues and I can show you that our predictions need not fail all the time; however, success is very closely related to magic: i.e., misdirection of attention.

I'm not sure what you are referring to when you say "...part of the future is known..."? If we have "certain expectations" for some part of future (by having made some set of "undefendable assumptions")

No, by defining the circumstance in such a way that success is guaranteed. As I said, it's magic and you have to understand the nature of magic. But please, don't worry about this for the time being. We can get back to it after you understand what I am talking about.

As you have said, "Damn it's tricky to use natural language to discuss these issues :) ." Let us go on; things will become clearer later.

Thanks for your attention -- Dick

 

[Rade]

Dr.D.--a question. When you made this statement above

...you must keep in mind that there exists absolutely no way of determining whether or not a particular ontological element we think we know is valid or not...

are you saying that there is absolutely no way for "you" to determine whether or not "you" (e.g., Dr.D. as an ontological element) are "valid" or not ? Thanks for clarification.

 

[AnssiH]

I have been trying to sculpt with "Poser" and, so far, not being very successful; but I am learning things.

For serious sculpting, you definitely want to check out ZBrush;
http://www.pixologic.com/home.php

Thank you for restating the issues regarding the useful mathematical functions for "x,tau,t"-table. Now I don't have to keep jumping back to that old post that much :)

The first step involves the issue of "expectations" being a mathematical function of "what we think is known": i.e., P(B(t)), the probability of having the set B(t), is a function of that B(t) where B is a set of number pairs (x and tau indices).

Hmmm... That way you put that; "the probability of having the set B(t) is a function of that B(t)" was so odd that I first suspected a typo... But reading back to the older posts and scratching my head a bit, perhaps you are saying essentially that it is possible to build a function which yields the probability that a given "present" (or portion of?) exists somewhere in an "incomplete past" which we are representing as an x,tau,t-table?

It is possible I am getting something topsy turvy, but it is very difficult to think of meaningful questions since my idea about this is still rather shaky... Perhaps partially because I am not sure where this is heading. You said earlier this is somewhat similar to Newtonian mechanics, so I must assume that once we have built an "x,tay,t"-table, we have not only assumed what ontological elements existed at given moments, but also how they behave?

At the moment, this is a very strange mathematical function as the number of arguments changes with the index "t". I am afraid I have never heard of such a function from the mathematical community. However, in this case, the problem is easily eliminated; all one need do is propose a collection of "invalid ontological elements" to fill in the gap. So our "what is", is "what is" table now has the same number of entries for every "t" (we just don't know what they are).

You must understand that their existence is now a presumed fact and that our past includes not knowing exactly what references should be attached to them (other than the fact that they are seen occasionally at other times:

The text I emphasized in italics is clearly and important bit since you specifically said I must understand it... ...which is unfortunate because I don't :)
I understand you end up adding invalid (arbitrary?) elements on purpose so to make the mathematical functions easier to handle, but I don't understand why their existence is a presumed fact after you have specifically said they are invalid elements? Since this is so blatantly odd, I don't think you have made an error, but I must be getting some idea rather topsy turvy... :I

i.e., they are members of some supposedly known B(t). If you happened to know a flaw free epistemological solution, you would know which occurrences went with that solution. But, as far as we are concerned, they are still undefined as we have no epistemological solutions; but at least the mathematical function which yields our expectations has the same number of arguments in every case.

The second set I wish to add has to do with the "t" index. If time is to be a communicable element of an epistemological solution then the value of that index must be deducible from the "what is", is "what is" table. That means that, given a particular set of (x, tau) indices supposedly defining a particular B in the table, it must be possible to deduce the appropriate index "t" to be attached to that set. Again, this is easily solved by adding "invalid ontological elements" (i.e., fictitious entries in the table which will establish every entry B as different from every other such entry). If you need a procedure for developing these entries, I will give you a specific procedure; however, there are clearly a number of different procedures which will accomplish this goal. The end product is a table where, given a specific B (a specific collection of (x, tau) indices) one can examine the table and, by elimination, discover what the t index had to be.

This stuff about obtaining the t-index was something I was confused about earlier too, but thought it would get clarified further down the road.

I'm wondering what does it mean that there is an "appropriate index t" to be attached to some set. The t is just an arbitrary number isn't, it, since t was introduced just to be able to express a set of presents.

I do understand the need to add invalid elements so to make sure no two presents are identical, I just don't get what relevance the "t" value is going to have...

Analysis of this second set leads to the development of the third set. If I can make the index "t" recoverable from the "what is", is "what is" table then it is clear that the same procedure can make other indices recoverable. In particular, I am interested in recovering a specific "x" index, given that all the other indices defining a particular B(t) are known. Once again, it is easily shown that addition of fictitious entries in that table can make every B(t) different even if any specific "x" index is missing. This means that, given (n-1) of the n indices (remember, our first step was to make the number of indices in every B the same: i.e., after that is accomplished, n has a specific value and the second step merely increments that value whatever that value happens to be. But the net result is that, given those (n-1) indices, we can consult our table and immediately declare what the missing index had to be.

This means that the missing index can be seen as is a function of the other indices.

Hmm, does this have to do with the "surrounding circumstances" that you were talking about before? I'm wondering how the information about one missing index can be embedded to the other indices of that present... Especially when some of those elements are invalid elements we added on purpose (and thus arbitrary?)

This seemed to make more sense to me in the earlier post where you explained that there's a way to first find if a present (minus 1 element) exists on the "augmented table #2", and if it does, check what the missing element was from table #1 (just check the same t).

Again, we may not know what that function is but we do know that the function must agree with our table. What this says is that there exists a mathematical function which will yield

$$(x,\tau)_n(t) = f((x,\tau)_1, (x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x.\tau)_{n-1},t)$$
​

It follows that the function F defined by

$$F((x,\tau)_1,(x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x,\tau)_n) = (x(t),\tau(t))_n - f((x,\tau)_1, (x,\tau)_2, \cdots, (x.\tau)_{n-1},t) = 0$$
​

is a statement of the general constraint which guarantees that the entries conform to the given table. That is to say, this procedure yields a result which guarantees that there exists a mathematical function, the roots of which are exactly the entries to our "what is", is "what is" table. Clearly, it would be nice to know the structure of that function. If you understand what I have just written (which is somewhat of a restatement of an earlier post) then, I will proceed to the issue of symmetry and how that concept further constrains the nature of the function which is to yield the probability of our expectations.

Clearly I don't... Hopefully you can figure out what I'm getting wrong ,and additionally, if you think it might be helpful in clarifying these issues too, please proceed to the next step also.

Thanks for your attention -- Dick

Thank you for your patience :)

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Dr.D.--a question. When you made this statement above

are you saying that there is absolutely no way for "you" to determine whether or not "you" (e.g., Dr.D. as an ontological element) are "valid" or not ? Thanks for clarification.

This is a discussion about ontology, so certainly the answer is that there is no way to tell if our "self" is an ontological element. Is there a dualistic "mind"-object, or is subejctive experience a phenomenon caused by the interaction of other elements that do not have by themselves a "mind".

So even when we say "I exist" or "this apple exists", it isn't meant to be an assertion about the ontological nature of those things. How they exist ontologically is a question about "what am I made of" (with obvious complications) or "what is the apple made of" (which is essentially what physics is attempting to answer... by defining ontological elements and their behaviour in such a sense that they explain the existence of that apple as we have observed it)

I hope this clarifies the issue. The wikipedia page about "ontology" seems like an okay overview as well.

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

...So even when we say "I exist" or "this apple exists", it isn't meant to be an assertion about the ontological nature of those things. I hope this clarifies the issue...
-Anssi

Thank you, Anssi. As I see it, it is the function of "ontology" (the study of being qua being ) to establish that there are metaphysical entities (such as Anssi) that have natures and interact with other entities,--it is the function of "science" to establish the specific nature of those entities and the laws of those interactions. So, if this is what you mean when you say "I exist" to yourself, then we are seeing eye to eye, if not, then I am sorry but I have no idea what you are saying about "ontology". Cordially, Rade.

 

[D_Arsonval]

Wholly smokes!

Lots of replies, answers, theories, thoughts on this one!
“Is Time Just an Illusion?”

Is enduring something within you, an illusion?
Have you spent any time in pain, emotional or likewise?

I realize words like “Real”, and “Illusion” can be used to fit our
own purpose.

Just surfing the educated crowd here…
toying with the idea of where all the 21st Century Philosophers
are hanging out. (I'm sure they're here somewhere.)

John

 

[AnssiH]

Rade, I think I understand what you are trying to say, but it appears to me that the way you have defined "ontology" to yourself could little bit non-standard (and kind of meaningless too). This could be a source of great confusion. Let's see if I can give you a meaningful reply...

Thank you, Anssi. As I see it, it is the function of "ontology" (the study of being qua being ) to establish that there are metaphysical entities (such as Anssi) that have natures and interact with other entities,--

Since you gave "Anssi" as an example of a "metaphysical entity", I believe you are still referring to the fact that our "subjective experience exists".

That my subjective experience exists doesn't lead me to believe that I am a metaphysical entity. That would be so only in dualism and in idealism. In materialism the subjective experience is thought to be caused by the interaction of smaller entities that are thought to be "metaphysical" or "ontological" elements. -> It is not given that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element.

If on the other hand you regard any thing we have defined, as something that exists ontologically, this kind of defeats the purpose of the concept "ontology", because the whole reason why there is such a field as ontology is to ask what are things that exist even when we are not there to define them as such.

We need to make a distinction between something that exists in an everyday sense, and something that exists ontologically. When I say that a star constellation is not an ontological element, I am not suggesting I am a brain in a vat and the star constellation is only in my mind. I am suggesting it is completely arbitrary accident that we have given names to some groups of stars and call them constellations; that we define them as constellations does not change the nature of reality.

Fairly obvious when I am talking about constellations, but now you have to extrapolate that idea to other things we have names for. Apple, sand, your ankle, electrons. This is ontology. "Whatever you say a thing is, it isn't" = our words may represent reality, but they are not the reality itself, they are only referring to whatever entities we have classified reality into (and how we happen to understand those entities).

In the words of Alan Watts; "What we call things, facts, or events are after all no more than convenient units of perception, recognisable pegs for names, selected from the infinite multitude of lines and surfaces, colours and textures, spaces and densities which surround us. There is no more a fixed and final way of dividing these variations into things than of grouping the stars in constellations" ---Note though that the brain does not do its model of reality based on "lines, surfaces, colours, textures, spaces and densities", but these in themselves are "concepts" that have been formed as part of that mental model of reality; they are not ontological elements either.

That inlcudes what we call our "self"! The ontological question about the existence of "self" is IMO best understood when you turn the question into one about identity. What is your identity? In a materialistic sense, while you say you exist, the whole content of your experience is still just a certain physical state of the brain, and the state you were in yesterday is not with you anymore. There is no metaphysical identity to yourself that persists, and that poses no problems to the existence of subjective experience.

it is the function of "science" to establish the specific nature of those entities and the laws of those interactions.

Well it's a two-way street between philosophy and science. In a pure objective form, the philosophy of science should be that it seeks to build valid models (prediction-wise) about reality, but it doesn't necessarily tell you if electrons really are metaphysical entities, or just some sort of persistent patterns (~portion of reality) we happen to call "electrons". I.e. we should regard scientific models as models. Perhaps easier example is that, even though certain models explain gravity as something caused by particles called "gravitons", it doesn't mean observing gravity proves gravitons exists.

Perhaps using E-prime would help here. It's english but all references to "being" removed -> instead of saying "electron is a particle and a wave", we'd say "Electrons behave partially like a wave and partially like a particle". (And when you explain what are "waves" and "particles" in E-prime, you see you can again only refer they are "like" some conception that you hope other people understand like you do)

This stuff gets really hairy when you get deeper into it, mainly because classifying reality (or any system) into things remains to be your only way to comprehend anything at all. That's the way we work.

Hmmm, looks I write too much :P Well hopefully it was helpful.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

For serious sculpting, you definitely want to check out ZBrush;
http://www.pixologic.com/home.php

The results look good but I haven't the time to look into it now; I am trying to get a handle on Maya which cost me a pretty penny to set up. At the moment I am pretty convinced Poser is a rotten program but Maya seems to be quite powerful. Wish me luck.

I suspect your biggest problem is that you are over complicating what I am saying. I know you don't see it that way but I think that is because of the natural tendency to try and comprehend what I am saying in terms of your world view which is a major mistake (it fundamentally presumes that world view is valid, an issue which cannot be defended at this moment).

Hmmm... That way you put that; "the probability of having the set B(t) is a function of that B(t)" was so odd that I first suspected a typo... But reading back to the older posts and scratching my head a bit, perhaps you are saying essentially that it is possible to build a function which yields the probability that a given "present" (or portion of?) exists somewhere in an "incomplete past" which we are representing as an x,tau,t-table?

This is an excellent example of over complicating things. The set, "B(t)", is absolutely nothing more than the set of indices (numbers: the numeric labels given to the ontological elements acquired at the "present" referred to as "t"). B(t) is a representation of a specific present in that "what is", is "what is" table. These are "numbers". That table is an exact representation of a "what is", is "what is" explanation and it "IS" the representation of a mathematical function which yields exactly your expectations under the "what is", is "what is" explanation.

That is to say, for any possible collections of indices (i.e., any conceivable specific present; absolutely any B(t) you can come up with) the probability of that particular set of indices is a function of what those indices are! It is a simple tabular function: i.e., you want to know the probability a a specific set of indices, you merely look at the table. If that set of indices is in the table, the probability is one; if that set is not there, the probability is zero.

As I have said several times, the problem with the "what is", is "what is" explanation is it yields utterly no hypotheses on either the future or on any possibilities (unknown to you) lying between the indices which represent what you know (or think you know). All it yields is "what you think you know". As an aside, the answer, "it could be anything", immediately yields a probability of zero for any specific set of indices. That should be clear to you; but I will explain it anyway. Since the number of possibilities in, "it could be anything" is infinite and one (the number of specific sets being asked about) divided by infinity (the number of possibilities) is zero, the probability of that specific set is zero.

...that it is possible to build a function...

No! That the function exists and that the function (which needs be nothing more than a procedure for finding the result) is is in fact exactly that "what is", is "what is" table: all you have to do is look it up! It is what is called a "tabular function" being defined by a table. My sole purpose was to get you to see "explanations" as "functions" which yield your "expectations".

It is possible I am getting something topsy turvy, but it is very difficult to think of meaningful questions since my idea about this is still rather shaky... Perhaps partially because I am not sure where this is heading.

Please don't worry about "where this is heading"; you will know exactly where this is heading the moment we get there and not before because you have never been there before. And believe me, it's not complex at all; it is in fact quite simple. The real problem is that no one ever looks.

You said earlier this is somewhat similar to Newtonian mechanics, so I must assume that once we have built an "x,tay,t"-table, we have not only assumed what ontological elements existed at given moments, but also how they behave?

At this point, you are getting way out ahead of the issues at hand. I didn't say "this is somewhat similar to Newtonian mechanics". What I tried to say was that the (x, tau, t) table was very similar to representations of dynamic phenomena used in Newtonian mechanics. B(t) (that set of indices representing a specific set of ontological elements) can be seen as a set of points in a two dimensional plane at a fixed t (where t is an axis orthogonal to that plane). Think of it as a snapshot of a two dimensional universe you are aware of at time t.

What I am trying to present to you is a representation of the problem you are trying to solve. A representation capable of representing the information upon which any solution to that problem must be based (how to make a general representation of "what you think you know" without defining "what you think you know"). And all I get from you is an overwhelming urge to define "what you think you know". Forget about it! It is only by maintaining that lack of definition that we can maintain an objective representation of the problem confronting us.

Your solution to any problem must be based on what you think you know: i.e., on "what is" as you see it. That means that, in order to examine the ontology behind that explanation, we need to have a method of representing the information: we need a way of representing "what you think you know" without making any presumptions about what that is. Every explanation of anything must begin from a "what is", is "what is" explanation. That is why I start from that point; so I can define exactly how I am going to handle that information – not so I can define the information.

The text I emphasized in italics is clearly and important bit since you specifically said I must understand it... ...which is unfortunate because I don't :)

All I am saying is that, since the "what is", is "what is" table constitutes "what you think you know" (i.e., the exact data which any flaw free explanation must explain), these invalid elements added to the table become ontological elements presumed to exist: i.e., their existence thereafter is a presumed fact. (To my analysis, it amounts to no more than an intellectual convenience, but to subsequent explanations based upon that "what is", is "what is" table, it is presumed fact.)

The central issue here is that, if an explanation is perfectly consistent with what you think you know and the explanation is based upon some invalid ontological elements (in among those critical "valid ontological elements"; which I have defined to be "reality") then the explanation still explains all those "valid ontological elements" as, by definition, it explains everything you think you know: i.e., the "what is", is "what is" table. If you think there exist any explanations of reality which contain no such invalid ontological concepts, you are, without a doubt, dealing in thoughtless gullibility.

In a way, this may be the critical factor which drives everyone to distraction. They don't seem to be able to comprehend the idea that all explanations need to include mental fabrications.

What is, in my opinion, quite obvious here (and I cannot comprehend how the idea can be consistently overlooked by supposedly intelligent people) is that what people think reality is, is a mix of truly objective aspects and total mental fabrications. What they seem to miss is the fact that all epistemological constructs are based on the presumption of some ontology; in particular, on the presumption that the ontology is known. It is a fact that, given a flaw free explanation, there exists no way of defending the validity of any ontological element underlying that explanation. It is the opinion of the scientific community that only failure of the explanation itself bears on the question. It is the common (and overtly gullible) assumption that a "flaw free explanation" is a logical guarantee of the validity of the ontology. I am afraid that, that is a logically undefendable assertion.

The only handle we have on the problem is that there exists a very simple logical difference between "valid ontological elements" and "fabricated ontological elements". That difference consists of the fact that absolutely every flaw free epistemological construct must explain those "valid ontological elements" while the "fabricated ontological elements are free to be anything that epistemological construct needs them to be. That is to say, the fabricated ontological elements are part and parcel of the epistemological construct and are free variables unconstrained by "reality". It is exactly the freedom to create these invalid ontological elements which makes it possible to explain things, The idea that a successful theory constitutes a defense of the reality of those ontological elements it is the single most overt flaw in the modern scientific paradigm.

In addition to that, there is another belief held as inviolate by every scientist or philosopher I have ever spoken to (a belief which totally blocks their minds from even considering what I have discovered): "since we cannot tell the difference between these two components (valid ontological elements and mentally fabricated ontological elements) we cannot handle them as different". All I can say about that assertion is that it is an opinion. Yes, it is an opinion based on thousands of years of experience with the defense of epistemological constructs but it has no bearing at all on the defense of ontological validity. This is a fundamentally flawed perspective when it comes to analyzing ontological issues.

Every scientist blocks his mind to the idea that he is creating "fabricated ontological elements" anytime he says "suppose ...".

I understand you end up adding invalid (arbitrary?) elements on purpose so to make the mathematical functions easier to handle, but I don't understand why their existence is a presumed fact after you have specifically said they are invalid elements? Since this is so blatantly odd, I don't think you have made an error, but I must be getting some idea rather topsy turvy... :I

They are a presumed fact in that every flaw free explanation must explain them. What is blatantly odd is the fact that I present them as "invalid ontological elements" and not as "suppose these elements are valid...". That is an honest objective paradigm and does not make any assumption of truth: i.e., these invalid elements will be handled in a manner logically different from "valid ontological elements".

This stuff about obtaining the t-index was something I was confused about earlier too, but thought it would get clarified further down the road.

If you cannot obtain the t index from the data available to you, t cannot be a parameter of your explanation. The issue is that simple!

I'm wondering what does it mean that there is an "appropriate index t" to be attached to some set. The t is just an arbitrary number isn't, it, since t was introduced just to be able to express a set of presents.

Absolutely, "t", the number placed upon a specific present, has no basis in reality. But the "t" associated with an explanation has to be appropriate to that explanation: i.e., the specific value of that t (or, to be exact, an interpretation of the time being referenced) must be recoverable from the data which constitutes the explanation. Essentially it has to be an implicit parameter of the explanation or the explanation cannot have it as a parameter.

Hmm, does this have to do with the "surrounding circumstances" that you were talking about before? I'm wondering how the information about one missing index can be embedded to the other indices of that present... Especially when some of those elements are invalid elements we added on purpose (and thus arbitrary?)

You need to take this one step at a time. Let us first try to understand how adding invalid elements to the "what is", is "what is"] table can allow a look up to determine the correct associated "t" index. All you need to do is assure that no two presents, B(t), are identical (which can be accomplished by adding indices to B such that any two which were identical before you added these indices are no longer identical. Then, a simple look up tells you either that the probability of the element is zero (it never happened) or what the t index was when it did happen.

One thing you might find enlightening is the fact that the "what is", is "what is" explanation has a very interesting property, quite obvious from the perspective I am presenting but not obvious at all from common perspectives on explanation. Notice that in the "what is", is "what is" explanation, where the table is known up to some specific index t, the probability for every B contemplated for the next index, say t' is zero (the same for every one of the entire infinite set); however, "a moment later", when the B(t') becomes a member of the "known information", the probability for the correct answer becomes one while all the other possibilities remain zero. Modern science has only recently (from a historical perspective) become aware of this phenomena. It is exactly the phenomena they are referring to with the phrase, "collapse of the wave function". Think about that for a little while.

I think that, if you relax and stop worrying about where I am going and the consequences, you will find the logic quite easy to follow. Sorry if I get abrupt but I have had almost fifty years to think about this and I see lots of things that seem utterly obvious to me. I am very sorry that I have difficulty comprehending the problems everyone else has with my thoughts.

Again, I am looking forward to your response -- Dick
PS:

This stuff gets really hairy when you get deeper into it, mainly because classifying reality (or any system) into things remains to be your only way to comprehend anything at all. That's the way we work.

Classifying reality is essentially identifying patterns in the "what is", is "what is" table which can be seen as "the same thing", using whatever data transformation which makes that result reasonable and/or acceptable.

 

[AnssiH]

The results look good but I haven't the time to look into it now; I am trying to get a handle on Maya which cost me a pretty penny to set up. At the moment I am pretty convinced Poser is a rotten program but Maya seems to be quite powerful. Wish me luck.

Heh, yeah, Maya is alright. All these programs have their own little quirks. And actually ZBrush may have little bit steep learning curve for fun and play. There's this other capable sculpting software called "Mudbox", but I don't think it's available for Mac yet.

I suspect your biggest problem is that you are over complicating what I am saying. I know you don't see it that way but I think that is because of the natural tendency to try and comprehend what I am saying in terms of your world view which is a major mistake (it fundamentally presumes that world view is valid, an issue which cannot be defended at this moment).

Could be that too, but I feel bigger obstacle is that it's hard for me to remember everything about your terminology (which has been quite familiar to you for some decades :), and so interpreting some sentences in any meaningful way becomes very difficult :P (i.e. I find my self going back to old posts a lot :) But it seems that with every new post couple of things that were full of questions before, become clearer.

This confusion about the "probability of B(t)" is a good example. I was just thinking if I have a set of numbers "X", how is "probability of X a function of that same X" :D You know, cause I had already forgotten what was meant with probability etc...

Given your latest response, this seems rather clear now. If I make up a set of numbers and want to find out if a particular "present" (1) is that set of numbers, then quite simply I can look at the table and find out; in the hypothetical fully filled table, the probability of finding that set of numbers from a present "1", is a function of the present "1" that has actually been laid down on the table.

In other words we could say; "the probability of having a presumed set X at particlar B(t) is a function of that B(t)" (Which is in my opinion a clearer way to say this simple fact; IF I now interpreted you correctly.

No! That the function exists and that the function (which needs be nothing more than a procedure for finding the result) is is in fact exactly that "what is", is "what is" table: all you have to do is look it up! It is what is called a "tabular function" being defined by a table. My sole purpose was to get you to see "explanations" as "functions" which yield your "expectations".

Okay. Should I study what are "tabular functions" (is it important here?)

And should I not pay attention to the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't have a "filled table" (that we are not all-knowing about our past, like you put it)? I mean that seemed to me to be what you were referring to when you said this is essentially a "point fitting problem", and that we are "looking for a mathematical function which fits the entire collection of points displayed in that table". That seemed to be a referring to the fact that the table is never fully filled.

In a way, this may be the critical factor which drives everyone to distraction. They don't seem to be able to comprehend the idea that all explanations need to include mental fabrications.

What is, in my opinion, quite obvious here (and I cannot comprehend how the idea can be consistently overlooked by supposedly intelligent people) is that what people think reality is, is a mix of truly objective aspects and total mental fabrications. What they seem to miss is the fact that all epistemological constructs are based on the presumption of some ontology; in particular, on the presumption that the ontology is known.

Well it's true that most people don't really grasp that because they never think about it (seems like it doesn't much interest them... and of course in daily life it just makes one's head hurt :), but then there are few philosophers who have expressed this issue in different ways. (For instance, I am a big fan of the concept of noumenons)

Also, I would go so far as to express it as, what we think reality is, is not just a mix of objective aspects and mental fabrications, but rather all mental fabrications whose correlation with objective reality is unknown... but that's just semantics! :D (And up to what is meant with "objective")

In addition to that, there is another belief held as inviolate by every scientist or philosopher I have ever spoken to (a belief which totally blocks their minds from even considering what I have discovered): "since we cannot tell the difference between these two components (valid ontological elements and mentally fabricated ontological elements) we cannot handle them as different". All I can say about that assertion is that it is an opinion.

Yeah, and I think few philosophers and philosophically aligned physicists have expressed a more objective opinion saying "physical models are models dammit!" :) It is surprising to me how hard it is for some people to accept this. (One more time I hear someone using "Occam's razor" to argue about ontology...)

If you cannot obtain the t index from the data available to you, t cannot be a parameter of your explanation. The issue is that simple!

Ahha, of course! (Why didn't you say so )

You need to take this one step at a time. Let us first try to understand how adding invalid elements to the "what is", is "what is"] table can allow a look up to determine the correct associated "t" index. All you need to do is assure that no two presents, B(t), are identical (which can be accomplished by adding indices to B such that any two which were identical before you added these indices are no longer identical.

And if I remember correctly, it was the only reason why they could be identical is that we added those invalid ontological elements to make each present have the same amount of elements? (Since had we not done it, we could not have two consequent "presents" that are identical; since by definition they would be marked as a single "present", right?)

Then, a simple look up tells you either that the probability of the element is zero (it never happened) or what the t index was when it did happen.

One thing you might find enlightening is the fact that the "what is", is "what is" explanation has a very interesting property, quite obvious from the perspective I am presenting but not obvious at all from common perspectives on explanation. Notice that in the "what is", is "what is" explanation, where the table is known up to some specific index t, the probability for every B contemplated for the next index, say t' is zero (the same for every one of the entire infinite set); however, "a moment later", when the B(t') becomes a member of the "known information", the probability for the correct answer becomes one while all the other possibilities remain zero. Modern science has only recently (from a historical perspective) become aware of this phenomena. It is exactly the phenomena they are referring to with the phrase, "collapse of the wave function". Think about that for a little while.

Hmmm, I can't pick up any meaning from this... (Hell, maybe that's just what you wanted to hear :)

I mean, with just the "what is, is what is" table, which does not provide any expectations about the future, this to me is similar to NOT having made any assumptions about how anything in reality exists or behaves (and as such one could not make any assumptions about how things unfold in the future either). I can't think of any meaningful association to quantum phenomena... What do you have in mind?

I think that, if you relax and stop worrying about where I am going and the consequences, you will find the logic quite easy to follow. Sorry if I get abrupt but I have had almost fifty years to think about this and I see lots of things that seem utterly obvious to me. I am very sorry that I have difficulty comprehending the problems everyone else has with my thoughts.

Well, I'm just trying to express how I understand what you are saying, with the hopes that you can figure out what I'm getting wrong. I hope it makes your task easier. Don't worry about the long parts I've snipped; it's usually simply because I agree what you are explaining.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

But it seems that with every new post couple of things that were full of questions before, become clearer.

That is very nice to know; at least it means we are getting somewhere.

Okay. Should I study what are "tabular functions" (is it important here?

Study “tabular functions”? I think not. All I mean by a “tabular function” is a function where the result is obtained from a table. Back when I was young (that’s prior to computers and “slide rules” were usually only good to three digits) we quite often used things like log tables, trigonometric tables, etc. Prior to Newton, gunners used “range tables” to fire their guns. These “range tables” were constructed through experiment. Now days, gunnery is all done on computers (thanks to Newton for the most part). As a matter of fact, computers were originally invented to create gunnery tables in WWII from mathematical relations since the mathematicians often made errors. Any table of information can be seen as a “tabular function”. When one says something is a function of something else, all it means is that, if you are given the second item (that something else) and you know the “functional relationship” you also know what the answer is: “the function”.

For example, what one looks like is a pretty strong function of how old they are. Just because mathematicians have done a lot with the idea don’t think they have a patent on the concept.

And should I not pay attention to the complications that arise due to the fact that we don't have a "filled table" (that we are not all-knowing about our past, like you put it)?

That isn’t an important issue at all since your solution to the epistemological problem cannot depend upon facts you have forgotten. The solution is based on what you think you know. Now that may be a very large table, but it is not infinite nor is it all incompassing.

I mean that seemed to me to be what you were referring to when you said this is essentially a "point fitting problem", and that we are "looking for a mathematical function which fits the entire collection of points displayed in that table". That seemed to be a referring to the fact that the table is never fully filled.

That is correct, every moment of your life is another B(t) to be added to your personal table. What we want to do is look at that information objectively! Ah, yes, you asked about the definition of objectivity. What you think you know IS an objective perspective; at least you think it is. My only concern is that I can represent that perspective, no matter what it is: i.e., that it can be represented as a table of ontological elements you think are valid. The important issue here is that the symbols you use to represent those entries is a free parameter; a parameter, the meaning of which I have to deduce from the table you present to me.

(For instance, I am a big fan of the concept of noumenons)

I am ignorant of the “concept of noumenons”! I have never heard the term before.

(One more time I hear someone using "Occam's razor" to argue about ontology...)

I am of the opinion that the issue of “ontology” has never been examined “scientifically”; the scientist simply have never conceived of a way of handling it. And they never will so long as they hold the necessity of definition as primary.

Aha, of course! (Why didn't you say so )

I thought I had!

And if I remember correctly, it was the only reason why they could be identical is that we added those invalid ontological elements to make each present have the same amount of elements? (Since had we not done it, we could not have two consequent "presents" that are identical; since by definition they would be marked as a single "present", right?)

I get the impression here that you are mixing two very different issues. What I am looking for is a way of representing any possible ”what is”, is “what is” table. My concern is that the fundamental representation be capable of representing each and every possible explanation. When the issue comes to “valid ontological elements”, the representation must represent these as different elements in spite of the fact that any specific explanation might (erroneously by the way) consider them to be the same element. This is a subtle issue which logically must exist in any analysis of supposed “facts”. The “tau” index was introduced to solve this basic problem. My complaint with your response is that you are worrying about the issue of their really being the same. If the “valid table” has them as the same, then they must be the same. What I don’t want to do is specify that the table, as given, is valid.

Hmmm, I can't pick up any meaning from this... (Hell, maybe that's just what you wanted to hear :)

No, I never want to hear comments that imply that you didn’t understand what I said. I just thought you would appreciate that fact. But I will try to explain it a little fuller. Quantum Mechanics has (in the current interpretation) the concept of “wave function collapse”. Since the wave function is what yields the probability that a specific result will occur, measurement is taken as having an effect on the wave function (actually it is the result of considering the “wave function” to be an ontologically real thing). When a measurement is accomplished (i.e., the actual value of the relevant measurement is known), the value of the measurement is now known whereas, prior to the measurement, it was something dependent upon that “wave function”. This, supposedly real event, is commonly referred to as “collapse of the wave function”. One of the philosophical problems with the “collapse of the wave function” is that it occurs everywhere at the same time: i.e., the simultaneity of this event is a direct violation of relativity. Go read some articles on the consequences of “entanglement”. This is a direct consequence of trying to hold “wave functions” and “physical existence of entities” as both being valid ontological concepts simultaneously.

I mean, with just the "what is, is what is" table, which does not provide any expectations about the future, this to me is similar to NOT having made any assumptions about how anything in reality exists or behaves (and as such one could not make any assumptions about how things unfold in the future either). I can't think of any meaningful association to quantum phenomena... What do you have in mind?

The meaningful association with quantum mechanics is the “uncertainty of the outcome”.

Don't worry about the long parts I've snipped; it's usually simply because I agree what you are explaining.

That’s nice to know! At least someone out there thinks some of what I say makes sense.

Have fun Anssi -- Dick

 

[AnssiH]

That is very nice to know; at least it means we are getting somewhere.
Study “tabular functions”? I think not. All I mean by a “tabular function” is a function where the result is obtained from a table.

Heh, I googled "tabular function" and got results that looked pretty complicated :) Anyway, I see what you meant.

That is correct, every moment of your life is another B(t) to be added to your personal table. What we want to do is look at that information objectively! Ah, yes, you asked about the definition of objectivity. What you think you know IS an objective perspective; at least you think it is.

...or at least most people think it is. This way of defining "objective" is a difficult thing for me to remember since it's been my philosophy for so long that any phenomena or thing we can think of is a case of have made a purely subjective categorizing or classification (So I need to do it in order to "think", so to speak, but I cannot claim to "know" the reality of what I'm thinking of).

I think I know how you mean that though, since you defined "intuition" little bit differently than I did, and sure enough, we must work with "what we think we know" when we investigate the world, so I think I can accept this definition too.

I am ignorant of the “concept of noumenons”! I have never heard the term before.

The way I see it, a "noumenon" is referring to the reality behind a "phenomenon" we are subjectively aware of (I.e. it is contrasted by "phenomenon"). The reason Kant was using that concept was to refer to the idea that being subjectively aware of some phenomenon is a case of having mentally categorized reality, and the actual ontological reality behind that mental idea is not captured by that categorizing (which results into what we call "phenomena" and "things" so to speak")

Noumenon is closely related to "thing in itself" (which is equally tricky concept since we arrive at such a thing as "a thing" only by having categorized relality!)

In my opinion that concept has been misunderstood many times. Sometimes it seems people take it as an assertion towards some sort of idealism (big surprise, right?).

But if I cut and paste the text from wikipedia entry, I think I can arrive at what I think Kant meant to say (or should have said... keeping in mind this is very old stuff and we have much more information about reality to work with now)

1. Human understanding is structured by categories that the mind creates in order to make sense of raw unstructured experience

2. Humans can make sense of reality in these various ways (categorizing, classification), but can never directly know the noumena, the "things-in-themselves," the actual (ontological) dynamics of the natural world.

'These unknown somethings are "noumena"—although we can never know how or why as our perceptions of these unknown somethings are bound by the limitations of the categories of the understanding and we are therefore never able to fully know the "thing-in-itself".'

Note here that Kant may have been thinking there are "innate categories of understanding" to the mind. I.e. something similar to platonism. I beg to differ at this point. But it doesn't make the concept of noumenons invalid. The way I view it is that it is required for us to break reality into "sensible parts" so to understand it (i.e. it is "innate" to the brain to attempt to build a predictive model of reality this way), but any time you break reality into ANY sensible parts, you are talking about your "mental fabrications" about reality around you, and reality is not actually made of "parts" no matter how much we need to see things that way. (Incidentally, a different isolated culture would probably describe physical things with very different sorts of components than we do)

Couple more things that Kant said, that seem to be close to your philosophy (except for how you see "intuition")

About "things-in-themselves"
"...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears."
(Could it be tabular representation of "what we think we know"??)

About "Noumena"
"But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition".

i.e. we cannot say we understand noumena since it is by definition the non-classified reality; it is non-sensible since it is the reality without it having been "defined" into anything. (Once again perhaps he thought there are "platonistic innate categories" to mind, but we need not think of something that naive to arrive at the same conclusion)

I get the impression here that you are mixing two very different issues. What I am looking for is a way of representing any possible ”what is”, is “what is” table. My concern is that the fundamental representation be capable of representing each and every possible explanation. When the issue comes to “valid ontological elements”, the representation must represent these as different elements in spite of the fact that any specific explanation might (erroneously by the way) consider them to be the same element. This is a subtle issue which logically must exist in any analysis of supposed “facts”. The “tau” index was introduced to solve this basic problem. My complaint with your response is that you are worrying about the issue of their really being the same. If the “valid table” has them as the same, then they must be the same. What I don’t want to do is specify that the table, as given, is valid.

Right.

No, I never want to hear comments that imply that you didn’t understand what I said. I just thought you would appreciate that fact. But I will try to explain it a little fuller. Quantum Mechanics has (in the current interpretation) the concept of “wave function collapse”. Since the wave function is what yields the probability that a specific result will occur, measurement is taken as having an effect on the wave function (actually it is the result of considering the “wave function” to be an ontologically real thing). When a measurement is accomplished (i.e., the actual value of the relevant measurement is known), the value of the measurement is now known whereas, prior to the measurement, it was something dependent upon that “wave function”. This, supposedly real event, is commonly referred to as “collapse of the wave function”. One of the philosophical problems with the “collapse of the wave function” is that it occurs everywhere at the same time: i.e., the simultaneity of this event is a direct violation of relativity. Go read some articles on the consequences of “entanglement”.

Yeah I know what is meant with "wave function", and it always amazes me when someone considers it to be a real thing, although these days as there are so many ways to understand QM, it seems more and more people actually think for themselves and realize wave function is just a concept that is useful in thinking about quantum systems.

Incidentally, I was commenting on this apparent violation between wave functions and spacetime here:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=130623

Even though I don't think of much about the "reality of spacetime" either (as I'm sure you have noticed :), I thought it was relevant to comment that Bell experiments are explainable with the idea of spacetime as well (and as long as you are talking about photons, quite trivially so). Well, that shouldn't be surprising since it is essentially similar to "transactional interpretation". Perhaps you can appreciate that sort of joggling with "ontological elements" (keep in mind I am NOT making assertions about how reality IS... ...but only about how things can be explained to ourselves)

This is a direct consequence of trying to hold “wave functions” and “physical existence of entities” as both being valid ontological concepts simultaneously.

Heh, so I guess that is a sentence that would fit right into that post about spacetime interpretation. But then there must be more invalid things in our ideas about reality, since we need to find an explanation for the correlation in bell experiments. The route I think could be more fruitful than "static spacetime" is perhaps ditching relative simultaneity as an ontological concept, and then take a good hard look at "non-locality"... maybe.

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

Hi again, I finally got my “Fedora 6” running decently on my PC . But for some strange reason, I can't access my e-mail (maybe the server is down) so I went to physicsforums to see if I could see that and noticed your post which is quite informative. You have given me another word to express my thoughts.

The way I see it, a "noumenon" is referring to the reality behind a "phenomenon" we are subjectively aware of (I.e. it is contrasted by "phenomenon").

That is to say, it is a valid ontological element of reality by definition.

... i.e. we cannot say we understand noumena since it is by definition the non-classified reality; it is non-sensible since it is the reality without it having been "defined" into anything.

That is to say, it is a mere entry in my ”what is”, is “what is” table. And you should understand why I insist on leaving the “valid ontological elements” totally undefined: they are there as a basis which the explanation (your world view) was invented to explain.

The way I see it, a "noumenon" is referring to the reality behind a "phenomenon" we are subjectively aware of (I.e. it is contrasted by "phenomenon").

And the “phenomenon” we are subjectively aware of are built from those mentally fabricated ontological elements we have invented to allow us to think about the problem of explaining “reality”. The “phenomenon” are categorizations of “what we think we know”. A fabrication; but a fabrication which serves a purpose; the real purpose of that fabrication is to allow our severely limited minds generate expectations consistent with reality. (As I have said before, it's a data compression problem.) As long as that “explanation” explains the past (what we think we know: that ”what is”, is “what is” table) then we think of it as a valid “explanation of reality” (after all, we have utterly no evidence to support the idea that it is wrong as long as it explains everything we think we know). As many philosophers have said, there is no logical defense for the presumption it will be valid tomorrow.

What I think a lot of people fail to recognize is that I do not concern myself at all with the problem of flawed theories (ones which fail to completely explain the past: “what we think we know”). I concern myself only with absolutely flawless epistemological constructs. I want to know exactly what kind of constraints such a thing must obey. The only absolutely flaw free explanation of what you think you know is that ”what is”, is “what is” explanation (all it does is yield “what you think you know”). As I have commented several times, it is nonetheless, a pretty worthless explanation (other than the fact that it will still be valid tomorrow in that it will simply have some more entries). But it certainly can't be used in reality as the volume of information required simply exceeds our ability to consider. (We are confronted with a data compression problem!)

The issue here is, what kinds of “fabricated ontological elements” can I invent which will simplify the problem (the problem of “explaining reality”) without eliminating any possibilities; while, at the same time, maintaining the flaw free nature of the explanation itself: i.e., continuing to yield exactly the entries in that ”what is”, is “what is” table (including the fabricated ontological elements).

Sorry I get carried away. Meanwhile, back to your post.

The reason Kant was using that concept was to refer to the idea that being subjectively aware of some phenomenon is a case of having mentally categorized reality, and the actual ontological reality behind that mental idea is not captured by that categorizing (which results into what we call "phenomena" and "things" so to speak")

I agree with you one hundred percent.

Noumenon is closely related to "thing in itself" (which is equally tricky concept since we arrive at such a thing as "a thing" only by having categorized reality!)

That is why I insist on working directly with the concept of referencing these things via the ”what is”, is “what is” table: we totally avoid the issue of comprehending any concepts as all I am doing is examining the problem itself.

1. Human understanding is structured by categories that the mind creates in order to make sense of raw unstructured experience.

... in order to make sense of that raw unstructured ”what is”, is “what is” table.

2. Humans can make sense of reality in these various ways (categorizing, classification), but can never directly know the noumena, the "things-in-themselves," the actual (ontological) dynamics of the natural world.

They can never prove their expectations are correct; all they can really say is, “what they expect”.

'These unknown somethings are "noumena"—although we can never know how or why as our perceptions of these unknown somethings are bound by the limitations of the categories of the understanding and we are therefore never able to fully know the "thing-in-itself".'

All we can really know is that ”they are”, what “they are” strange how we come back to that same kind of expression isn't it!

Couple more things that Kant said, that seem to be close to your philosophy (except for how you see "intuition")

Now why do people complain about the way I see “intuition”? All I say is that there are things I do, say, feel and think I understand, where I can not explain the mechanism by which this ability is achieved. So I call the mechanism “intuition” and simply regard it as “unexplained” except that I am pretty sure it comes from experience (it certainly improves with practice).

About "things-in-themselves"
“...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think [of] them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears."[/I]
(Could it be tabular representation of "what we think we know"??)

Well, as far as I am concerned, I can conceive of no other way of referring to them which does not require defining them.

Even though I don't think of much about the "reality of space time" either (as I'm sure you have noticed :)

I read your post on the “Quantum Physics” forum and had to laugh. You brought up almost exactly the same issues I used to bring up with the professors when I was in graduate school. I think we do think a lot alike.

The route I think could be more fruitful than "static space time" is perhaps ditching relative simultaneity as an ontological concept, and then take a good hard look at "non-locality"... maybe.

The only problem with this comment is that the concern is with solving the problem of explaining reality. This is an issue I have no interest in attacking; I will simply leave it to the scientists. A correct solution is much like hitting a thirty foot jump shot; you need a lot of practice to develop the intuition required to correlate all the significant issues. My point being that none of these solutions are arrived at by logic; they are only defeated by logic.

These forums are full of people who believe that great solutions come about by accident and that they might be the ones to discover something significant. As I have said several times, the attitude is that, if they stir the pot of what is known enough, maybe something of value will float to the top; it's what I call the “guess and by golly approach”. Let me point out that if the purpose of science is to discover new valuable ways of explaining reality, most all scientists can count themselves as failures. There is no organization to the search at all.

My attack is very simple. I am trying to see what a flaw free solution might look like if we had one. Since I don't have one, other than that ”what is”, is “what is” table, that has to be the only representation I can examine. As I said above, the question is, what “invalid ontological elements” can I invent which will simplify the problem. I have already pointed out a number of such things. I invented the t index (what I have called “time”) to allow changes in “what we think we know”; I invented the x index to allow representation of “difference” (notice that the concept of measure is notably absent: “space time” is certainly not being introduced); I invented the tau index to allow a flaw free explanation to possesses entities (ontological elements) which are not different without presuming no real difference; I invented the idea of representing “all flaw free explanations” as mathematical functions which yield true or false results embedded in that ”what is”, is “what is” table. And finally (where we are at the moment) I invented the idea of inserting additional “invalid ontological elements” in order to simplify that mathematical function. The purpose of the first set was to make the number of arguments in the function the same. The purpose of the second set was to make the t index a recoverable entity from the table. And finally, I showed that by adding such “invalid ontological elements” it was possible to define a function which would yield the ”what is”, is “what is” table as simple roots (places where that function evaluates to zero) of that function.

You should find this last step as interesting because, if you can actually find an “analytical” mathematical function which does indeed populate that ”what is”, is “what is” table correctly, that analytical function also has the property of yielding values for all possibilities: i.e., it provides a mechanism for predicting the future. The problem is that what we are really talking about here is a “point fitting” problem and, as any mathematician knows, there are always an infinite number of analytical functions which will fit a finite number of points; nevertheless, you should see this as a simplifying move. We are now looking for an analytical function which yields an exact fit to that ”what is”, is “what is” table. That function, should we find one sufficiently simple to be used, would essentially be a usable explanation of reality: i.e., its roots would essentially yield expectations identical to what we think we know.

Do you understand my interest in examining such a function?

Are we having fun -- Dick

P.S. My wife and I were in Helsinki in September of 2002 (I think, though I could have the date wrong). We were in Scandinavia because of the 300th anniversary of the creation of St. Petersburg, Russia; we had expected somewhat of a celebration but it didn't happen. We enjoyed Scandinavia a lot more than we enjoyed Russia. I just felt sorry for most of the Russians. And, yes, I knew Linus Torvalds was from Helsinki U.

 

[Rade]

... [1]In materialism the subjective experience is thought to be caused by the interaction of smaller entities that are thought to be "metaphysical" or "ontological" elements. -> It is not given that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element...[2]Since you gave "Anssi" as an example of a "metaphysical entity", I believe you are still referring to the fact that our "subjective experience exists"...[3]If on the other hand you regard any thing we have defined, as something that exists ontologically, this kind of defeats the purpose of the concept "ontology", because the whole reason why there is such a field as ontology is to ask what are things that exist even when we are not there to define them as such...

Well, no, you are not understanding what I say. [1]I hold that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element since I reject materialism as a false dichotomy to idealism. I hold that "Anssi" is much more than the sum of some smaller ontological entities-- that "Anssi" is a metaphysical given and not a figment of his own imagination. [2]As to your comment about "subjective experience exists"--well, no, this is not what I say. I say that "existence exists" is the first axiom of philosophy and that your "subjective experience" forms dialectic union with that which exists--that you cannot "know" what exists as it exists itself but only as it exists as a dialectic union of the object with the subject. [3]No, I do not hold that what exists ontologically is what we define--what exists ontologically is a "primary fact of reality that cannot be analyzed, requires no proof or explanation--but is on what all proofs and explanations rest". What exists ontologically is NOT SUBJECT TO THE PROCESS OF DEFINITION.

 

[AnssiH]

Hi again, I finally got my “Fedora 6” running decently on my PC . But for some strange reason, I can't access my e-mail (maybe the server is down) so I went to physicsforums to see if I could see that and noticed your post which is quite informative. You have given me another word to express my thoughts.

Cool :) I thought noumenon would be a concept you'd very much appreciate.

What I think a lot of people fail to recognize is that I do not concern myself at all with the problem of flawed theories (ones which fail to completely explain the past: “what we think we know”). I concern myself only with absolutely flawless epistemological constructs. I want to know exactly what kind of constraints such a thing must obey.

Yeah, let me tell you it can be very difficult to figure out how you mean that exactly (has been for me too). Not surprising I guess, since we all naturally think of things by trying to define/conceptualize/classify them into comprehensible chunks. So this includes the case of trying to understand what you are saying.

Perhaps it would be helpful to really stress the fact that this is not so much an attempt to find what ontological elements exist, but an exercise at finding some constraints for our explanations.

Now why do people complain about the way I see “intuition”? All I say is that there are things I do, say, feel and think I understand, where I can not explain the mechanism by which this ability is achieved. So I call the mechanism “intuition” and simply regard it as “unexplained” except that I am pretty sure it comes from experience (it certainly improves with practice).

Yeah :) I have no problems with however one defines intuition (and I personally try to keep it away from equation, as it appears to be a mere side-effect of us not being conscious of what is occurring at the low levels of the cortical hierarchy), but I was just warning you that Kant seems to use "intuition" as caused by those "innate categories".

I read your post on the “Quantum Physics” forum and had to laugh. You brought up almost exactly the same issues I used to bring up with the professors when I was in graduate school.

Did they have anything relevant to say about those issues? No?

My attack is very simple. I am trying to see what a flaw free solution might look like if we had one. Since I don't have one, other than that ”what is”, is “what is” table, that has to be the only representation I can examine. As I said above, the question is, what “invalid ontological elements” can I invent which will simplify the problem. I have already pointed out a number of such things. I invented the t index (what I have called “time”) to allow changes in “what we think we know”; I invented the x index to allow representation of “difference” (notice that the concept of measure is notably absent: “space time” is certainly not being introduced); I invented the tau index to allow a flaw free explanation to possesses entities (ontological elements) which are not different without presuming no real difference; I invented the idea of representing “all flaw free explanations” as mathematical functions which yield true or false results embedded in that ”what is”, is “what is” table. And finally (where we are at the moment) I invented the idea of inserting additional “invalid ontological elements” in order to simplify that mathematical function. The purpose of the first set was to make the number of arguments in the function the same. The purpose of the second set was to make the t index a recoverable entity from the table. And finally, I showed that by adding such “invalid ontological elements” it was possible to define a function which would yield the ”what is”, is “what is” table as simple roots (places where that function evaluates to zero) of that function.

You should find this last step as interesting because, if you can actually find an “analytical” mathematical function which does indeed populate that ”what is”, is “what is” table correctly, that analytical function also has the property of yielding values for all possibilities: i.e., it provides a mechanism for predicting the future. The problem is that what we are really talking about here is a “point fitting” problem and, as any mathematician knows, there are always an infinite number of analytical functions which will fit a finite number of points; nevertheless, you should see this as a simplifying move. We are now looking for an analytical function which yields an exact fit to that ”what is”, is “what is” table. That function, should we find one sufficiently simple to be used, would essentially be a usable explanation of reality: i.e., its roots would essentially yield expectations identical to what we think we know.

Do you understand my interest in examining such a function?

Certainly. Although I understand the associated math very superficially (I mean I understand the idea of finding a function that is doing the "point-fitting")

Are we having fun

Busy fun :) I think we can probably proceed to the next issue? (regarding symmetry?)

P.S. My wife and I were in Helsinki in September of 2002 (I think, though I could have the date wrong). We were in Scandinavia because of the 300th anniversary of the creation of St. Petersburg, Russia; we had expected somewhat of a celebration but it didn't happen. We enjoyed Scandinavia a lot more than we enjoyed Russia. I just felt sorry for most of the Russians. And, yes, I knew Linus Torvalds was from Helsinki U.

Heh, cool :) Yeah, Russia and Finland are still two very different worlds certainly.

-Anssi

 

[AnssiH]

Well, no, you are not understanding what I say. [1]I hold that "Anssi" is a valid ontological element since I reject materialism as a false dichotomy to idealism. I hold that "Anssi" is much more than the sum of some smaller ontological entities--

You are referring to "strong emergence"? (Instead of normal everyday emergence; some function as a result of natural interaction between some components)

that "Anssi" is a metaphysical given and not a figment of his own imagination. [2]As to your comment about "subjective experience exists"--well, no, this is not what I say. I say that "existence exists" is the first axiom of philosophy and that your "subjective experience" forms dialectic union with that which exists--that you cannot "know" what exists as it exists itself but only as it exists as a dialectic union of the object with the subject. [3]No, I do not hold that what exists ontologically is what we define--what exists ontologically is a "primary fact of reality that cannot be analyzed, requires no proof or explanation--but is on what all proofs and explanations rest". What exists ontologically is NOT SUBJECT TO THE PROCESS OF DEFINITION.

I would agree with the 3rd point you are making, but I am unable to figure out why do you imply it is given that "self" is a valid ontological element. Isn't it relevant to ask what is the ontology behind our "thoughts" (i.e. what causes conscious experience)? Unless if by "ontological element" you don't mean to refer to fundamental (or "undivisible") elements at all?

-Anssi

 

[Doctordick]

The deduction of quantum mechanics.

Perhaps it would be helpful to really stress the fact that this is not so much an attempt to find what ontological elements exist, but an exercise at finding some constraints for our explanations.

I think you are right here. Though I have come to the conclusion that very few if any people with really good backgrounds in mathematical physics actually read any of these forums, posting here has nonetheless been very educational for me. I see what I have discovered from quite a different perspective (more of a philosophical perspective) than I did five years ago. I first got on the web at the suggestion of my son-in-law after a conversation we had back in 2002 (he was a national consultant on web page design at the time). While cleaning the attic, I had accidentally run across a copy of something I had tried to publish twenty years before (it had been rejected by several journals as not being physics). My son-in-law suggested the web as a method of reaching people. As I said, it's been a learning experience for me.

Did they have anything relevant to say about those issues? No?

You know they didn't. One of them actually once responded with, “only geniuses worry about things like that and, believe me, you're no genius, worry about learning physics!” It started me wondering what a “genius” was. I am sure you have heard the line, “there is a thin line between genius and madness”. I have since decided that the word “genius” was invented by learned people as an excuse for not having figured those things out for themselves: in fact, I suspect the only advantage so called “geniuses” have over ordinary scholars is that they do ask such questions.

Certainly. Although I understand the associated math very superficially (I mean I understand the idea of finding a function that is doing the "point-fitting")

What math you need to know I think I can explain; if I have a clear idea as to what you don't understand that is.

I think we can probably proceed to the next issue? (regarding symmetry?)

Yes, I think we can; however, I would like to put that off to the next post as there is one other thing I would like to introduce you to. You might google “quantum mechanics and square root”. Many physics advancements have occurred in conjunction with the introduction of new mathematics and many physicists try to relate new mathematical systems to their problems in the hope that the new relationships will prove useful. Take a look at “The Square Root of Not”. I have noticed quite a lot of interest related to that particular mathematical “phenomena” lately. I was aware of exactly the same issue back when I was a graduate student; but from quite a different perspective. Before we go into the issue of symmetry, I would first like to show you the reason for the fundamental significance of square roots (or rather, the importance of squaring) to our problem. It is a well known fact that these operations yield results very important to quantum mechanical relationships but the real issue here is, how can we justify such a representation as more than just a mindless stab in the dark.

As I am sure you have picked up, I am concerned with the issue that absolutely “any explanation” can be seen as a mathematical function which yields the probability of a certain set of numbers being an entry in that ”what is”, is “what is” table. It is fundamental that the output of that function is a probability. Now probabilities are defined to be represented by positive numbers bounded by zero and one (zero meaning it can't happen and one meaning it absolutely does happen). This fact is a major constraint on the set of functions which are capable of representing “an explanation” under the perspective we have taken here.

The problem with any constraint of any kind is that simply finding the constraint is not sufficient; we must also come up with a way of representing that constraint in a way which can be logically implemented in our representation. After all, one could say simply say, “the explanation must make sense” but how in the world would one represent such a constraint? This probability constraint is actually quite simple to implement. The implementation uses the fact that the square of a number is positive definite (squaring will guarantee that the output will be bounded by zero and positive infinity). All that is left then is to develop a mechanism which will reduce the upper bound from infinity to “one”. That is a simple scaling operation and is the fundamental issue behind the quantum mechanical notion of “normalization” (it is essentially one of the “Postulates of Quantum Mechanics”). If you look at the bottom of that page you will see the comment, “The central equation of quantum mechanics must be accepted as a postulate”: i.e., it is to be seen as a successful “mindless stab in the dark” (from the physicist's point of view, it is defended by induction, not deduction). This is the exact issue I have discovered to be faulty, it turns out that its validity is absolutely unavoidable and may be directly deduced. What is really interesting is that, when that deduction is performed, relativity (both special and general) become exactly defined also.

Here, I will approach the issue of normalization from an only slightly different perspective. Absolutely any mathematical function can be seen as a set of instructions for transforming one set of numbers into a second set of numbers. You and I have already discussed the issue that a set of numbers can represent anything so the concept A is a function of B can represent any functional relationship including semantic relationships in philosophy. It follows that, in our perspective, “a function” generates a set of numbers. These numbers can be seen as defining a point in an abstract space with dimensionality equal to the number of numbers in the output of that function. Those numbers can be seen as representing the components of a vector in that space which points to that point; the function which yields these multiple outputs is often referred to as a “vector function” for the rather obvious reason that its output can be seen as a vector.

There is a concept in Euclidean geometry called a “scalar product” which is a defined product of two vectors yielding a scalar product (often referred to as a “dot” product because of the standard way of representing it). We can use this idea to represent a simple method of obtaining a positive definite number from absolutely any conceivable mathematical function. Suppose we are given some arbitrary function $\vec{\phi}(B(t))$, then $\vec{\phi}\cdot \vec{\phi}$ is a positive definite number.

Scaling it so that the maximum cannot exceed one is, for the most part quite simple. All we need do is find the absolute maximum which can exist (given that function) and divide phi by the positive square root of that number. Understanding what is meant by probability, you should comprehend that the sum of the probabilities for each and every possibility needs to be one. Since the only reason this explanation (this function) was introduced was to provide probabilities for B(t) in the future, (essentially for points outside our ”what is”, is “what is” table) we must essentially sum over all the possibilities. Since the the possibilities will range over all possible values for those arguments we are talking about the generalization of a sum commonly referred to as an integral. The value of that number is given by

$$A = \int_{x_1=-\infty}^{x_1=+\infty}\int_{x_2=-\infty}^{x_2=+\infty}\cdots\int_{x_n=-\infty}^{x_n=+\infty} \vec{\phi}\cdot \vec{\phi}dx_1dx_2 \cdots dx_n$$
​

It may be a bear to do, but it is at least mathematically defined if phi is known. The definition has however introduced some minor problems. In order to obtain the proper probability we need to divide the scaler product by A. It should be clear to you that the actual value of A above is a function of the exact definition of phi. The integral over phi might very well yield a usable value for A; however, it is also possible that the integral will yield unusable results (that would be zero or infinity) as phi is a representation of “any” possible function. We all know that division by zero is undefined so a result of zero would be unacceptable; however, let's look at what the result zero means in our representation. A result of zero means that the sum of all possibilities is zero. That means absolutely nothing can happen. This result can be seen as a strong indicator that the explanation (that function being represented by phi) is the wrong explanation. That sort of gets us out of that dilemma: i.e., it certainly can't occur with a flaw free explanation.

The problem with infinity is a bit more subtle. Division by infinity is no mathematical difficulty but it is a bothersome result anyway as it generates a probability function $\vec{\phi}(B(t))\cdot\phi}(B(t))$/A which is identically zero which means the probability of any individual B(t) is exactly zero. Not exactly the result we were looking for though it is indeed a very rational expectation. When we open up the possibilities to an infinite number of cases, we should expect the probability of a specific one to go to zero.

Actually, the solution to this difficulty is quite straight forward. If the number of possibilities is infinite, we cannot concern ourselves with a specific result. We must instead resort to comparing collections of possibilities (which essentially amounts to comparing two integrals over different ranges). In essence, that means that it is the ratio of one probability to another which interests us where both probabilities are taken over limited sets of possibilities. Here we can take advantage of a very simple observation: the factor A was introduced solely to assure that the probability was not greater than one. When we are dealing with ratios of probabilities, this constraint is simply not necessary. That is essentially the issue behind the common concept of “normalization” in quantum mechanics. It is the form of the function itself and how it changes with circumstances which is significant.

So to review what I have just done, I have introduced a mechanism for guaranteeing that the constraints embodied in the concept of probability are no longer an extraneous constraint. Since any explanation can be seen as a function yielding the probability for a specific B(t), it follows that the solution to the epistemological problem (finding an explanation) amounts to picking a phi which is consistent with the actual points in our ”what is”, is “what is” table. Since phi is unconstrained in any way, a flaw free explanation of the known past certainly exists (it is after all a finite point fitting problem) and all of the possibilities are included in the set of functions being considered (which is explicitly, all of them).

Hopefully I have not confused you. If I have, I will do my best to straighten things out.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Langbein]

Why is it likely to believe that time is something else than time ?

As time can be described, why is likely to believe that time has only one explanation ?

If time should happen to be time and not something else, couldn't it be thinkable or possible that the explanation of time, that wold not be the time itself, but an explanation of time, rather would be a set of time explanations ?

Could it be some different kinds of "time".

 

[Doctordick]

Why is it likely to believe that time is something else than time ?

As time can be described, why is likely to believe that time has only one explanation ?

If time should happen to be time and not something else, couldn't it be thinkable or possible that the explanation of time, that wold not be the time itself, but an explanation of time, rather would be a set of time explanations ?

Could it be some different kinds of "time".

I agree with you one hundred percent. This is exactly why I defined what I meant by time as I did. I am in the process of showing what can be deduced from my definition of time. What you mean by the term may be entirely different but, unless you can demonstrate some important usefulness of your perspective, I think mine is superior. Now that is just an opinion you understand; I make no claim that a better explanation of the issue does not exist, I just haven't heard one myself.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Langbein]

This is exactly why I defined what I meant by time as I did.

But if time is defined to be something else than it usualy is wouldn't the answer to the original question be like this:

Question: Is time "just" an illusion ?

Answer: If "time" is defined to be something else than the ordinary and common meaning of the term "time", then it will be an illusion, if the new definition defines it to be an illusion.

If the nature of "time" can be described as a sum of different properties that has some complementary relationships to each other, would it then be wise to remove some of those "complementary properties" ?

If the magnetic component by definition is left out of the term "electro magnetic vaves" will it then have a meaning to ask question about the nature of electro magnetic vaves ?

Is it thinkable that the nature of time might have such compementary properties ?

 

[AnssiH]

Sorry for late response. I had to find time to read this post properly (had to do some googling while reading it :)

You know they didn't. One of them actually once responded with, “only geniuses worry about things like that and, believe me, you're no genius, worry about learning physics!” It started me wondering what a “genius” was. I am sure you have heard the line, “there is a thin line between genius and madness”. I have since decided that the word “genius” was invented by learned people as an excuse for not having figured those things out for themselves: in fact, I suspect the only advantage so called “geniuses” have over ordinary scholars is that they do ask such questions.

Heh, that's probably true :)

What math you need to know I think I can explain; if I have a clear idea as to what you don't understand that is.

I'll try to ask the meaningful questions. Although often I can find the answers by some googling. (I messed around with vectors and dot products and what not about a year ago and had already forgotten everything :)

You might google “quantum mechanics and square root”. Many physics advancements have occurred in conjunction with the introduction of new mathematics and many physicists try to relate new mathematical systems to their problems in the hope that the new relationships will prove useful. Take a look at “The Square Root of Not”. I have noticed quite a lot of interest related to that particular mathematical “phenomena” lately. I was aware of exactly the same issue back when I was a graduate student; but from quite a different perspective. Before we go into the issue of symmetry, I would first like to show you the reason for the fundamental significance of square roots (or rather, the importance of squaring) to our problem. It is a well known fact that these operations yield results very important to quantum mechanical relationships but the real issue here is, how can we justify such a representation as more than just a mindless stab in the dark.

As I am sure you have picked up, I am concerned with the issue that absolutely “any explanation” can be seen as a mathematical function which yields the probability of a certain set of numbers being an entry in that ”what is”, is “what is” table. It is fundamental that the output of that function is a probability. Now probabilities are defined to be represented by positive numbers bounded by zero and one (zero meaning it can't happen and one meaning it absolutely does happen). This fact is a major constraint on the set of functions which are capable of representing “an explanation” under the perspective we have taken here.

The problem with any constraint of any kind is that simply finding the constraint is not sufficient; we must also come up with a way of representing that constraint in a way which can be logically implemented in our representation. After all, one could say simply say, “the explanation must make sense” but how in the world would one represent such a constraint? This probability constraint is actually quite simple to implement. The implementation uses the fact that the square of a number is positive definite (squaring will guarantee that the output will be bounded by zero and positive infinity). All that is left then is to develop a mechanism which will reduce the upper bound from infinity to “one”. That is a simple scaling operation and is the fundamental issue behind the quantum mechanical notion of “normalization” (it is essentially one of the “Postulates of Quantum Mechanics”). If you look at the bottom of that page you will see the comment, “The central equation of quantum mechanics must be accepted as a postulate”: i.e., it is to be seen as a successful “mindless stab in the dark” (from the physicist's point of view, it is defended by induction, not deduction). This is the exact issue I have discovered to be faulty, it turns out that its validity is absolutely unavoidable and may be directly deduced. What is really interesting is that, when that deduction is performed, relativity (both special and general) become exactly defined also.

Here, I will approach the issue of normalization from an only slightly different perspective. Absolutely any mathematical function can be seen as a set of instructions for transforming one set of numbers into a second set of numbers. You and I have already discussed the issue that a set of numbers can represent anything so the concept A is a function of B can represent any functional relationship including semantic relationships in philosophy. It follows that, in our perspective, “a function” generates a set of numbers. These numbers can be seen as defining a point in an abstract space with dimensionality equal to the number of numbers in the output of that function. Those numbers can be seen as representing the components of a vector in that space which points to that point; the function which yields these multiple outputs is often referred to as a “vector function” for the rather obvious reason that its output can be seen as a vector.

There is a concept in Euclidean geometry called a “scalar product” which is a defined product of two vectors yielding a scalar product (often referred to as a “dot” product because of the standard way of representing it). We can use this idea to represent a simple method of obtaining a positive definite number from absolutely any conceivable mathematical function.

Most of the above seems pretty clear, but here I get a bit lost. A function can yield a vector, but to get a scalar product we need two vectors. Can we get a positive definite number from a single mathematical function?

Another thing I didn't get from the post was whether there is a specific meaning to a scalar product, or could we use any method of "obtaining positive definite number from any mathematical function"?

Suppose we are given some arbitrary function $\vec{\phi}(B(t))$, then $\vec{\phi}\cdot \vec{\phi}$ is a positive definite number.

Scaling it so that the maximum cannot exceed one is, for the most part quite simple. All we need do is find the absolute maximum which can exist (given that function) and divide phi by the positive square root of that number.

After some googling, I assume "phi" it just represents any mathematical function. But I must be getting something wrong because if we have a function which gives the maximum of, say, 100, then dividing some result from between 0 and 100 by 10, will not necessarily give us a result less than 1... What am I reading wrong?

At any rate, obviously I understand it is possible to scale results so they come bounded by 0 and 1. I guess that was the important bit.

Understanding what is meant by probability, you should comprehend that the sum of the probabilities for each and every possibility needs to be one. Since the only reason this explanation (this function) was introduced was to provide probabilities for B(t) in the future, (essentially for points outside our ”what is”, is “what is” table) we must essentially sum over all the possibilities. Since the the possibilities will range over all possible values for those arguments we are talking about the generalization of a sum commonly referred to as an integral. The value of that number is given by

$$A = \int_{x_1=-\infty}^{x_1=+\infty}\int_{x_2=-\infty}^{x_2=+\infty}\cdots\int_{x_n=-\infty}^{x_n=+\infty} \vec{\phi}\cdot \vec{\phi}dx_1dx_2 \cdots dx_n$$
​

I can't really understand mathematical expressions too well (especially since I can hardly see them as the symbols generated by LaTeX are so incredibly small :( )
Anyway, I can understand what you are saying above the LaTeX.

It may be a bear to do, but it is at least mathematically defined if phi is known. The definition has however introduced some minor problems. In order to obtain the proper probability we need to divide the scaler product by A. It should be clear to you that the actual value of A above is a function of the exact definition of phi. The integral over phi might very well yield a usable value for A; however, it is also possible that the integral will yield unusable results (that would be zero or infinity) as phi is a representation of “any” possible function. We all know that division by zero is undefined so a result of zero would be unacceptable; however, let's look at what the result zero means in our representation. A result of zero means that the sum of all possibilities is zero. That means absolutely nothing can happen. This result can be seen as a strong indicator that the explanation (that function being represented by phi) is the wrong explanation. That sort of gets us out of that dilemma: i.e., it certainly can't occur with a flaw free explanation.

The problem with infinity is a bit more subtle. Division by infinity is no mathematical difficulty but it is a bothersome result anyway as it generates a probability function $\vec{\phi}(B(t))\cdot\phi}(B(t))$/A which is identically zero which means the probability of any individual B(t) is exactly zero. Not exactly the result we were looking for though it is indeed a very rational expectation. When we open up the possibilities to an infinite number of cases, we should expect the probability of a specific one to go to zero.

Actually, the solution to this difficulty is quite straight forward. If the number of possibilities is infinite, we cannot concern ourselves with a specific result. We must instead resort to comparing collections of possibilities (which essentially amounts to comparing two integrals over different ranges). In essence, that means that it is the ratio of one probability to another which interests us where both probabilities are taken over limited sets of possibilities. Here we can take advantage of a very simple observation: the factor A was introduced solely to assure that the probability was not greater than one. When we are dealing with ratios of probabilities, this constraint is simply not necessary. That is essentially the issue behind the common concept of “normalization” in quantum mechanics. It is the form of the function itself and how it changes with circumstances which is significant.

So to review what I have just done, I have introduced a mechanism for guaranteeing that the constraints embodied in the concept of probability are no longer an extraneous constraint. Since any explanation can be seen as a function yielding the probability for a specific B(t), it follows that the solution to the epistemological problem (finding an explanation) amounts to picking a phi which is consistent with the actual points in our ”what is”, is “what is” table. Since phi is unconstrained in any way, a flaw free explanation of the known past certainly exists (it is after all a finite point fitting problem) and all of the possibilities are included in the set of functions being considered (which is explicitly, all of them).

Hopefully I have not confused you. If I have, I will do my best to straighten things out.

I can sort of kind of understand what you are saying (for the most part), but I don't quite get what it says about quantum mechanics :I

I'll try to give a more meaningful reply if you try and sort out my confusions :P

-Anssi

 

[Tosh]

To return to the thread:

Is time an illusion? No comment, but I would ask another question,

Is time relevant to us?
As time passes, we lose a part of ourselves. If we don't use it for good, it is wasted.

 

[Langbein]

But why not just answer what time is ?

If it can be wasted it will have to be "something" ?

An illusion can not be wasted, can it ?

If we are living in time, and using or wasting time, and doing things like earning money per hour, paying interrest per year, etc, somebody should now what time is ?

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Anssi, I am sorry I confused you. Sometimes I write a lot without realizing the various ways what I write can be taken; to paraphrase an old cliche, there are more ways to misinterpret what is being said than is dreamt of in your philosophy (which is really the essence of our conversation and I, of all people, should remember that). It is no fault of yours but you have missed intended central point of my ramblings.

The essence of magic is the misdirection of attention and physics has much to do with magic (it makes a lot of sense unless you happen to question something they can not answer). It is often very easy to miss a simple point simply because other issues catch your attention so I perhaps shouldn't have put so many varied issues in a single post; but it does tend to reveal those misunderstandings so I suppose I can be excused. I hadn't intended to send you off on a wild goose chase through google.

I think that the most important comment in my post was, “After all, one could say simply say, “the explanation must make sense” but how in the world would one represent such a constraint?” I will try to reassert my point a little differently.

I had proved earlier that expectations could be seen as a mathematical function of what was being asked: i.e., expectations as a probability (a number bounded by zero and one) and the description of the circumstance being asked about (a collection of numerical references to ontological elements). Think of the issue this way: any circumstance may be described by a collection of numbers (think of it as someone typing input into a computer) and what we would like to discover is a computer program which would output the probability that the circumstance being so described is actually a valid description of reality. If such a program existed, it would go a long way towards passing the Turing test (it would certainly “know” when you were lying and when you were telling the truth). If that weren't an intelligent program, it certainly would know how to make intelligent judgments.

Well, let's go back and look at that problem again. If there existed such a program, that program would be a member of the collection of “all possible programs” wouldn't it? If it doesn't exist, so what? That simply means it doesn't exist and that is no more than “tough cookies” so to speak; if it doesn't exist, you can be pretty sure no one will find it: i.e., it is a total waste of time to consider that possibility (we might as well just go drink some beer). The real problem here is that the set of “all possible programs” is a pretty large set to search. Neither you nor I am apt to find it just by looking for it. And neither is anyone else.

And exactly what are scientists doing anyway? Aren't they out there, looking for the truth? Putting forth possibilities and looking for problems in their suggestions? In reality, isn't that almost the definition of “the scientific method”? I would rather sit back and think a little; ask myself, “exactly what am I looking for?”

The only reason I brought up the “quantum mechanics and square root” thing was that there is currently a little fire behind the perspective that “square roots” are important functions with characteristics which might explain some things. As I said, “many physicists try to relate new mathematical systems to their problems in the hope that the new relationships will prove useful”.

What I was trying to point out was that absolutely every square root is something which can be squared. In fact, it is possible to define a very specific process which gives universality to the concept: i.e., an operation which always yields a positive definite scalar. A universal concept which can be applied to any conceivable function. Given that we are looking for a function which yields a probability, should one really be surprised to find that the behavior of “square roots” is an important issue?

To put it another way, let's go look at that computer program which yields a yes/no answer to the question, “was what was typed in true description of reality or not?” Now, let us attach to a computer a device which performs a very simple operation. Let the output of the first computer be a collection of n numbers (make n as large as you wish) and let the attached device square each of those numbers and then add them together to generate a final result. The result is clearly a positive definite number. If we “normalize that number” (divide it by the largest number possible given the n you chose with bit width of numbers in the system) then the output will be a number bounded by zero and one. It can certainly be interpreted as a probability.

Now, there are two questions I want to ask about that circumstance. If, the AI program we originally discussed, exists, can it be implemented on the combination I have just described. The answer is of course “yes”. That program is to produce a single number bounded by zero and one and that output can certainly be squared so the added device has not blocked the search for that program in any way (if the original program exists, one can add a simple step which generates the positive square root of that correct answer and the added device will simply square it and give us back the correct answer). The second, more important question, is; has that added device eliminated a single program from the set of “all possible programs” to be examined?. It should be clear to you that the correct answer to that question is a resounding “no”.

To put it another way, any procedure which is to yield a number bounded by zero and one (i.e., a probability) must involve an operation which guarantees the output lies in that range (i.e., an operation which is analogous to squaring) and one should not be surprised that, things that can be “squared” (i.e., square roots) are important functions to examine. If we are to be objective about this, we must eliminate no possibilities.

That is the central issue of my attack; I am being very careful to eliminate no possibilities. Defining the last operation required to develop a probability to be a vector dot product satisfies a required obvious constraint and, at the same time, eliminates no possible procedures (often referred to as methods). I have defined an explanation to be “a method of obtaining expectations” from given known information. The vector phi is the output of some unknown function and the probability that the argument of that function, B(t) is a valid entry in our ”what is”, is “what is” table is defined to be a vector dot product of that vector with itself (essentially, the square of its magnitude). If phi is indeed the function we are looking for then the square of that function is the probability density of seeing B(t). The important fact here is that no possibility has been eliminated by this representation: i.e., if a solution exists, phi exists.

I apologize that I misspoke in my last post: I referred to the vector dot product as the probability when it is not; it is the probability density (this has to do with the fact that the possibilities are infinite and our sum over all possibilities must become an integral). Sorry about that.

Most of the above seems pretty clear, but here I get a bit lost. A function can yield a vector, but to get a scalar product we need two vectors. Can we get a positive definite number from a single mathematical function?

Of course we can; but I hope what I have just written above clarifies why we are not interested in looking for such a thing.

Another thing I didn't get from the post was whether there is a specific meaning to a scalar product, or could we use any method of "obtaining positive definite number from any mathematical function"?

Sure; the issue isn't how we do it but rather the fact that it has to be done in order to obtain a probabilistic result. If you come up with a method which is applicable to every possible function and can be laid out as a well defined procedure, it would work just as well as the one I am using.

After some googling, I assume "phi" it just represents any mathematical function. But I must be getting something wrong because if we have a function which gives the maximum of, say, 100, then dividing some result from between 0 and 100 by 10, will not necessarily give us a result less than 1... What am I reading wrong?

Very simple, I was sloppy. I showed the dot product being divided by A when I should have shown each phi divided by the square root of A (exactly the same thing but easy to confuse). One normally presumes that phi is the function being normalized, not the actual probability. Plus that, the magnitude of phi squared is, as I said above, the probability density, not the probability. If that bothers you let me know and I will go into it in more detail (it is actually quite a simple issue).

I can't really understand mathematical expressions too well (especially since I can hardly see them as the symbols generated by LaTeX are so incredibly small :( )

Could I ask what browser you are using? I am using “FireFox” in its default mode and the font in the LaTex expressions seems to be actually larger than the font in the main text. Maybe you have some preference set strangely. Sorry I can't help as I am quite ignorant of such things but quite surprised to hear of your difficulty. All the windows machines and “the Internet Explorer” seem to yield about the same result.

I can sort of kind of understand what you are saying (for the most part), but I don't quite get what it says about quantum mechanics :I

The only reason I even bring up quantum mechanics is that it is the most successful theory ever proposed and, by the time we finish, it will be quite obvious why it is so successful. What I am presenting to you is actually a logical deduction of quantum mechanics itself. Along with that, I will show you some subtle flaws in modern physics and their perspective on quantum mechanics.

By the way, the single most significant question asked by most scientists is, “where do we go from here?” That question makes the implicit assumption that “where we are” is significant. That is not the question I ask; I simply ask, where should we be going? What is important about the difference is that “where we are” can have no bearing on the answer; the answer must be universal.

Looking to hear from you again -- Dick

 

[Tosh]

But why not just answer what time is ?

If it can be wasted it will have to be "something" ?

An illusion can not be wasted, can it ?

If we are living in time, and using or wasting time, and doing things like earning money per hour, paying interrest per year, etc, somebody should now what time is ?

Each moment is a temporary physical object...is that ok?

Neither can we hold or imagine the boundaries of the universe.

 

[Doctordick]

Each moment is a temporary physical object...is that ok?

Not for me it isn't! I want a little more than your word for it.

Neither can we hold or imagine the boundaries of the universe.

Another statement of seeming "absolute" belief. If you can't prove it to me, I am going to continue my search for the boundries to our understanding under the presumption that "the universe" is a concept we dreamed up. What you need to do is prove to me that your concept of "the universe" is as accurate a representation as you seem to think it is.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

Each moment is a temporary physical object...is that ok?

"Time" is that which is intermediate between "moments"--each "momemt" is outside "time".

 

[Siah]

"Time" is that which is intermediate between "moments"--each "momemt" is outside "time".

What is the difference between the 'moment' and the 'intermediate'?

 

[AnssiH]

Hi Anssi, I am sorry I confused you. Sometimes I write a lot without realizing the various ways what I write can be taken; to paraphrase an old cliche, there are more ways to misinterpret what is being said than is dreamt of in your philosophy (which is really the essence of our conversation and I, of all people, should remember that). It is no fault of yours but you have missed intended central point of my ramblings.

The essence of magic is the misdirection of attention and physics has much to do with magic (it makes a lot of sense unless you happen to question something they can not answer). It is often very easy to miss a simple point simply because other issues catch your attention so I perhaps shouldn't have put so many varied issues in a single post; but it does tend to reveal those misunderstandings so I suppose I can be excused. I hadn't intended to send you off on a wild goose chase through google.

Heh, don't worry about it. I educated myself little bit on the mathematical concepts you mention, and the post seems much clearer to me now. I think I even figured out what that tiny LaTeX scribble is :)

Tell me if I got it right;
We are looking for a function that would give us a probability for a certain specific input being found from the table. We should expect squaring & normalization to 1 to be an important part of that function, as long as we want the output to be between 0 and 1. That's basically the gist of it, right?

Plus, whatever that proposed function is, will also determine what numbers apart from the given input we would expect to be possible entries at that specific "t" (~if we were to believe it is "valid" function). Sum over all these possibilities and so forth. Functions yielding the sum of "0" would indeed seem rather invalid :)

Could I ask what browser you are using? I am using “FireFox” in its default mode and the font in the LaTex expressions seems to be actually larger than the font in the main text. Maybe you have some preference set strangely. Sorry I can't help as I am quite ignorant of such things but quite surprised to hear of your difficulty. All the windows machines and “the Internet Explorer” seem to yield about the same result.

I'm using IE7. I'm sure it is displayed the same way in every machine since LaTeX seems to just generate a bitmap image. It just generates some numbers and symbols little bit blurred (even when I've zoomed in), and when I don't know know what to expect, I can't be sure what everything is. I checked out "probability density" and integrals, and now it's obvious that's X1 = infinity & Xn = infinity etc :)

The only reason I even bring up quantum mechanics is that it is the most successful theory ever proposed and, by the time we finish, it will be quite obvious why it is so successful. What I am presenting to you is actually a logical deduction of quantum mechanics itself. Along with that, I will show you some subtle flaws in modern physics and their perspective on quantum mechanics.

Okay, onwards...

By the way, the single most significant question asked by most scientists is, “where do we go from here?” That question makes the implicit assumption that “where we are” is significant. That is not the question I ask; I simply ask, where should we be going? What is important about the difference is that “where we are” can have no bearing on the answer; the answer must be universal.

You mean, we shouldn't burden ourselves unnecessarily by how we have chosen to describe reality thus far?

-Anssi

 

[Rade]

What is the difference between the 'moment' and the 'intermediate'?

See my thoughts below from another thread on "time":

As I see it, "time" is defined by "moments", time is not composed of moments, thus "moments" are outside of time but are the bounds of time, and the bounds of time are the "nows" (outside time). This must be true because time is divisible (continuous) but moments are not divisible. So, suppose two discrete moments A & C and also some continuous time [E-G]. Now A and C are not in motion (nor in rest) but they form the begin and end of the time [E-G]. Now, since A and C are contrary things (begin and end), like black and white, they can contain something intermediate between them, and that which is intermediate between the two discrete moments A (begin) and C (end) is [E-G] = time, just as that which is intermediate between black and white = grey. Now by "between" it means that time [E-G], after the moment A, must first reach some B before C, thus time must always be "between" the two moments A (begin) and C (end), for there is nowhere else for it to be since it is neither at A nor C. Thus the reason I stated: That which is intermediate between moments IS TIME.. fyi--this argument derived from my understanding of concept of time of Aristotle.

Edit: From another thread I made this claim:

If, following Aristotle on time, we consider that "that which is intermediate between existents is space", then perhaps "that which is intermediate between moments of existents is space-time" ? To which the reply by Plastic Photon: And if 'is intermediate between existents' is taken to mean 'on a closed interval', time never ends, thus, space-time never end

 

[Doctordick]

Hi again Anssi. Now that you mention it, some of those LaTex symbols do get small. I guess I don’t notice it because I know what is intended. Sorry about that.

You mean, we shouldn't burden ourselves unnecessarily by how we have chosen to describe reality thus far?

If by, “how we have chosen to describe reality thus far”, you mean your world view, then you understand exactly what I meant.

There are a few other minor details which will have to be cleared up sooner or later but for the moment, I would like to get over to that symmetry issue as I think you understand enough of my attack to understand it. At the moment, I have defined the knowledge on which any explanation must depend as equivalent to a set of points in an (x, tau, t) space: i.e., a collection of numbers associated with each t index which I have referred to as B(t). Any explanation can be seen as a function of those indices (the explanation yielding a specific expectation for that set of indices at time t. The output of that function is a probability and may be written

$$P(x_1,\tau_1,x_2,\tau_2,x_3,\tau_3,\cdots,x_n,\tau_n,t)$$
​

Now, the thoughts we need to go through here are subtle and easy to confuse but I think you have the comprehension to follow them. Suppose someone discovers a flaw free solution to the problem represented by some given collection of ontological elements. That means that their solution assigns meanings to those indices used in P. But, if we want to understand his solution, we need enough information to deduce the meanings he has attached to those indices. It is our problem to uncover his solution from what we come to know of the patterns in his assignment of indices. The point being that the solution (which has to contain the definitions of the underlying ontological elements) arises from patterns in the assigned indices. And the end result is to yield a function of those indices which is the exact probability assigned to that particular collection implied by that explanation.

But the indices are mere labels for those ontological elements. If we were to create a new problem by merely adding a number a to every index, the problem is not really changed in any way. Exactly the same explanation can be deduced from that second set of indices and it follows directly that

$$P(x_1+a,\tau_1+a,x_2+a,\tau_2+a,x_3+a,\tau_3+a,\cdots,x_n+a,\tau_n+a,t)$$
​

must yield exactly the same probability. That leads to a very interesting equation.

$$P(x_1+a,\tau_1+a,x_2+a,\tau_2+a,\cdots,x_n+a,\tau_n+a,t)-P(x_1+b,\tau_1+b,x_2+a,\tau_2+b,\cdots,x_n+b,\tau_n+b,t)=0$$
​

Simple division by (a-b) and taking the limit as that difference goes to zero makes that equation identical to the definition of a derivative. It follows that all flaw free explanations must obey the equation.

$$\frac{d}{da}P(x_1+a,\tau_1+a,x_2+a,\tau_2+a,x_3+a,\tau_3+a,\cdots,x_n+a,\tau_n+a,t)=0$$
​

Let me know if you have any problems with that. I will be out of town for the next few weeks but I will try to get to the forum when I get access to the web but don't expect quick responses.

Have fun -- Dick