Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

[Luca Bevil]

Given the Tsutsuji post just added, it would seem that the first (oil+technetium removal) stage was uncorectly designed/dimensioned and picks up too much radioactive material.

I am hoping it can be skipped and/or fixed in a few days.

It is now critical to have that kind of recirculation in place before contaminated water inventory becomes unmanageable, with sore consequences.

 

[etudiant]

Quoting from tsutsuji's informative and comprehensive post: ' said in the press conference is the possibility that radioactive particles may combine with oil to form something similar to "salad dressing" '.

What this makes clear is that nothing about this cleanup is easy.
The removed oil will apparently be intensely contaminated, so that facility too will generate a serious waste stream.
In effect, the processes only buy time and hopefully allow the plant to get pumped out, with the radioactivity moved to a mountain of contaminated cartridges, spent co-precipitation agent and perhaps waste oil.

 

[clancy688]

Someone here computed that in basements of reactors and turbine buildings contain 1/2 of Chernobyl core (amount of cesium and iodine), so yes there is change problem but also there would be thousands of radioactive filters to store somewhere...

That someone would be me.

According to http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/betu11_j/images/110603a.pdf" TEPCO pdf, there's ~140 PBq C137 and C134 each and ~430 PBq I131 flowing around in all basements.
I wouldn't trust the iodine numbers, since they added up measurements which lie one month (=four half times) apart, but the Cesium should be correct...

 

[SteveElbows]

Any real news on what is happening at Fukushima?

I don't know what news you are expecting, but I think its quite possible that you will remain frustrated for a long time. It is always possible that a major new event may happen, but we can see now that months can pass without anything drastic happening. They may learn something new & important about the state of one or more reactors, but don't hold your breath waiting for this, it could take years.

I was hoping I may learn something from TEPCOs report on the first 5 days of the disaster, which NHK mentioned a few days ago. Well I've seen Japanese version of this, and computer translated bits of it, and I struggle to see what new information it contains. It does not seem to add much to the picture we already had, although I have to wait for proper translation to be sure. ( http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11061805-e.html )

Next week there is IAEA conference, where we might learn a few new details, but there is every chance we won't learn much from this either, since we already saw reports that were sent to IAEA about what TEPCO and NISA etc think happened.

Given that we already know that very bad things happened, I am not really sure why some people are expecting some smoking gun evidence to emerge, or have felings that massive new events must be happening that are getting covered up. Certainly there are many questions, and I expect more answers at some point, but our impatience does not tell us anything, and I haven't seen any radiation monitoring data that makes me think anything noteworthy has happened in recent weeks. Sometimes there is weak evidence that something may have happened, but so far good evidence never comes along to back it up, so I assume its just people clutching at straws in a desperate bid to find something new.

 

[NUCENG]

It is a bit more difficult.



Yes, corrective measures must be taken in a specified timeframe.
But, what are "corrective measures"?
http://pbadupws.nrc.gov/docs/ML0536/ML053620142.pdf" gives some definitions.

One of the "corrective measures" specified there is that the nuclear operator company has three years to make a statement that this problem is no safety risk.
Bingo, safety restored!

And most times the regulatory authority will not be able to check if that statement is correct.
One of the reasons is that the NRC is way understaffed to be able to perform its control duties. (Thanks to NUCENG for pointing this out!)

So it can take decades to have safety problems corrected.

They just make sure the problem is "being addressed" in a bureaucratically correct manner.
And, so it all is in order, no need to complain...

For example, there are reports stating that still about a dozen NPPs in USA have that old highly-flammable insulation used in Browns Ferry.
The operators state that this is safe and just use smoke generators instead of candles when checking insulation tightness.

And the NRC just has no time / manpower to check this and demand some real remedial action.

This bureaucracy phenomenon is well-known in other countries also.
So safety upgrades are often being installed in a "reasonable" timeframe of up to almost two decades, if at all.


This problem is well-known for long time, probably some decades.
It will be addressed by the nuclear industry in reasonable time, whatever this means. (see above)

Corrective Actions are actions to bring the condition into compliance plus actions to address the extent of condition (fix it all not just the current example) plus measures to prevent recurrence.

Compensatory measures may be taken in the interim while corrective actions are being performed. Compensatory measures for fire protection might be to station a fire watch in an area until the condition is corrected.

We are talking about enforcement discretion for a condition believed to be a violation of regulatory requirements. If a company sits on its hands for three years and then declares it not required, that violation still needs to be closed out by the regulators. You seem to pick that option out of context to insinuate that is all that will be done. If NRC believes the licensee is deliberately stalling corrective actions, they can whthdraw enforcement discretion or apply enforcement action for violations of requirements for prompt and effective corrective action programs. So BINGO right back at ya.

"And most times the regulatory authority will not be able to check if that statement is correct." Opinion based on nothing.

Your comment about under staffing is interesting. Are you trying to imply that the nuclear industry is making staffing decisions? Could you please cite your sources? Neither the President not the Congress can make a budget, and the threats of government shutdowns and defaults make long-term planning challenging. That is politics and a failure in leadership. THat is why the NRC staff requested the extension - so they can give adequate review to ensure plant safety.

Similarly the fact that fire protection is still an open sore is as much the fault of NRC as the industry. Internal disagreements within NRC are sometimes as close to warfare as this thread. And before you jump to conclusions, these battles are the engineers dilemna: "Better is the enemy of good enough."

And in spite of all my criticisms at the end of the day this flawed system still has established a record of continuous improvement in safety, reliability and production without building new plants and that record isn't threatened by your unsupported claims and opinions. There have been over 3500 US reactor years since the Browns Ferry Fire and we are still seeking ways to improve on that.

 

[Orcas George]

Where did you find the 1 mm thickness data ?

In the linked video; the wording was "approximately 1mm", also in other reports. This was from the guy doing the presentation; later on he said "I'm told it is really thick." This is in the English translation of the audio, so caveat emptor.

The absorption towers displaying these radiation levels are the oil and technetium removing towers, at the entrance of the system. Three possibilities were mentioned during the NISA's press conference on June 18th ( http://www.ustream.tv/recorded/15456089 ) :

* To do without the oil and technetium absorption tower (starting directly with the cesium removal towers) ;
* Use of silica sand to filter oil
* Changing the location of the radiation sensor

Call my cynical but I think I know where this story is heading...

If my understanding is correct, most of the oil is removed by the Toshiba oil separator mentioned in http://mdn.mainichi.jp/mdnnews/news/20110616p2a00m0na013000c.html before the water enters the Kurion-made facility. There is hardly any technetium in the water so there is no harm in bypassing the oil and technetium removal tower

This is something that I almost know a little about (I use a RO system to desalaniate seawater which is one reason I'm concerned about all the radiation dumped into the Pacific.) We have a really tricky engineering problem here. They need a very efficient oil separator before Areva's reverse osmosis system or they will destroy the membrane. The percentage of oil allowed in has to be very close to zero at these volumes. I don't imagine that oil and Zeolite interact well together. They must not remove the oil separator tower from the system. They do not have time to clean a water treatment system of radioactive oil.

 

[mrcurious]

Tepco did not fail to anticipate current circumstances, they failed to implement. Safety standards for the current crisis were rejected in favor of a less severe tsunami projection. Your anger at them not being prepared is noted but to use an American phrase, that horse has left the barn.

Last resort solutions are all that are available to them at this point. Judgement might be better directed on how effective they implement not why they are necessary, which is a question for post crisis analysis where answers can be more complete.

 

[Luca Bevil]

I don't know what news you are expecting, but I think its quite possible that you will remain frustrated for a long time. It is always possible that a major new event may happen, but we can see now that months can pass without anything drastic happening. They may learn something new & important about the state of one or more reactors, but don't hold your breath waiting for this, it could take years.

I was hoping I may learn something from TEPCOs report on the first 5 days of the disaster, which NHK mentioned a few days ago. Well I've seen Japanese version of this, and computer translated bits of it, and I struggle to see what new information it contains. It does not seem to add much to the picture we already had, although I have to wait for proper translation to be sure. ( http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/11061805-e.html )

Next week there is IAEA conference, where we might learn a few new details, but there is every chance we won't learn much from this either, since we already saw reports that were sent to IAEA about what TEPCO and NISA etc think happened.

Given that we already know that very bad things happened, I am not really sure why some people are expecting some smoking gun evidence to emerge, or have felings that massive new events must be happening that are getting covered up. Certainly there are many questions, and I expect more answers at some point, but our impatience does not tell us anything, and I haven't seen any radiation monitoring data that makes me think anything noteworthy has happened in recent weeks. Sometimes there is weak evidence that something may have happened, but so far good evidence never comes along to back it up, so I assume its just people clutching at straws in a desperate bid to find something new.

Hi Steve for me critical are now news (hopefully good news) about the working of the water processing plant.

It does not seem to be flowing smoothly (to say the least) I do not see much of contingency backup planning, other than saying that the plant has to work, and overspilling of highly radioactive water would be definitely a drammatic problem.

 

[Orcas George]

It does not seem to be flowing smoothly (to say the least) I do not see much of contingency backup planning, other than saying that the plant has to work, and overspilling of highly radioactive water would be definitely a drammatic problem.

The contingency is to dump the water into the Pacific, which is terrible but not much different than what has been (and may still be) going on. It would be a big step backwards but better than flooding the plant grounds and making everything inaccessable.

They have been working on turning the harbor into an ersatz storage pool so they must have that in the back of their minds as well.

The goal at this point is to avoid irreversable steps. I'm pretty sure that they will be able to get some form of treatment working if they keep their cool; it probably will not work as well as advertised but may be "good enough".

Let's say that I am not as enamored of the nuclear power option as I used to be...

 

[Luca Bevil]

The contingency is to dump the water into the Pacific, which is terrible but not much different than what has been (and may still be) going on. It would be a big step backwards but better than flooding the plant grounds and making everything inaccessable.

They have been working on turning the harbor into an ersatz storage pool so they must have that in the back of their minds as well.

The goal at this point is to avoid irreversable steps. I'm pretty sure that they will be able to get some form of treatment working if they keep their cool; it probably will not work as well as advertised but may be "good enough".

Let's say that I am not as enamored of the nuclear power option as I used to be...

Well I for one never was... :-)

that personal opinion apart, discharging radioactive water into the Pacific is not feasible, Corea and China would be raising too harsh protests, maybe if nothing else proves possible they will try with the megafloat as a temporary storage...

it could may be fail later on, but an accident will be in any case more tolerable than a deliberate act...

probably building another more stable facility would have been a safer and more stable option than makeshift containers...

do you think they ruled that out till now because of costs or because of time constraints ?

 

[robinson]

What is the date for water to start going into the ocean? If they can't fix the problem?

 

[Luca Bevil]

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/18_18.html

TEPCO says the contaminated water could overflow from storage facilities in about one week, unless the system resumes operating.

TEPCO says depending on the cause of the problem, it may slow the decontamination process from the originally-planned 1,200 tons per day.

Saturday, June 18, 2011 22:12 +0900 (JST)

Time is running short... desperately so

 

[Quim]

The contingency is to dump the water into the Pacific, which is terrible but not much different than what has been (and may still be) going on. It would be a big step backwards but better than flooding the plant grounds and making everything inaccessable.

IMO it would be better to flood the Fukushima site and have the Japanese pay the cost of their series of blunders, rather than trashing the Pacific.

There seems to be more than a little insensitivity to the consequences of dumping large amounts of radioactive contaminants into the Pacific.

Case in point:

And no, I don't care about the whales glowing in the dark. They can use a break from Japanese "marine biology research" anyway.

This is no trivial matter and it is certainly no joking matter, and you, the guys of the industry had better get out front on this or you are sealing the doom for the NPP industry.

Zapperzero's post has been gnawing on me ever since I first read it, but I am trying to avoid contentious issues so I hoped somebody else would challenge that "joke."

If TEPCO starts dumping quantities of radioactive waste into the Pacific it is likely to generate more ill will towards your industry than some of you seem able to imagine.

And I for one, don't see one iota of difference between dumping it in the harbor or the open ocean. If they can't clean up the water they have how are they going to clean up that amount of water? The answer is that they won't. They will try to let the publicity die down and they will issue confusing press releases and generally spew fog. In the meantime the harbor waters will be finding paths to the open ocean for the next 150 years (five half lives of cesium.)

 

[Borek]

IMO it would be better to flood the Fukushima site and have the Japanese pay the cost of their series of blunders

Care to elaborate? "Fukushima site" is already flooded - water filled up every basement, there is no other place at "Fukushima site" that could hold water. It will soon start to leak to the Pacific, so what you wrote doesn't make sense to me.

 

[Quim]

Care to elaborate? "Fukushima site" is already flooded - water filled up every basement, there is no other place at "Fukushima site" that could hold water. It will soon start to leak to the Pacific, so what you wrote doesn't make sense to me.

Were they to bring in Earth moving equipment they could in a few days time create a gully surrounded by a berm lined with something to reduce the leakage into the ground.

That would be the short term emergency action needed.
Then they could work on a mid term solution.
Then they could work on a long term solution.

 

[ManuBZH]

If it was so trivial to make a big water-proof hole, they would have obviously done it.
As it takes weeks to make simple water/radiation-proof storage tanks, I highly doubt that's an easy task at all...

 

[zapperzero]

If it was so trivial to make a big water-proof hole, they would have obviously done it.
As it takes weeks to make simple water/radiation-proof storage tanks, I highly doubt that's an easy task at all...

Obviously nothing. It really is trivial. Dig, drop in pre-assembled metal section, weld to previous section, pour some concrete, cover with dirt, rinse, repeat. Three months of doing this would have produced quite a big water-proof hole.

It does not "take weeks to make simple water/radiation proof storage tanks". It's irrelevant either way. The tanks installed on-site have been bought from inventory, not manufactured since the accident.

That being said, I understand why TEPCO would want to solve the issue and start recirculating water and so I understand why they have chosen to expend effort in other ways.

EDIT: if you wanted to go all Russian about it, you could even "store" it in an open trench somewhere.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lake_Karachay

 

[MJRacer]

(snip)
This is something that I almost know a little about (I use a RO system to desalinate seawater which is one reason I'm concerned about all the radiation dumped into the Pacific.) We have a really tricky engineering problem here. They need a very efficient oil separator before Areva's reverse osmosis system or they will destroy the membrane. The percentage of oil allowed in has to be very close to zero at these volumes. I don't imagine that oil and Zeolite interact well together. They must not remove the oil separator tower from the system. They do not have time to clean a water treatment system of radioactive oil.

I would agree. Oil would foul both the ion-exchange towers and the RO membranes. By bypassing parts of the system, they risk rendering the entire system non-functional. I have seen that happen in a municipal water treatment facility, where there was an accumulation of errors followed by attempts to "fix" them by bypassing parts of the treatment. The result was great damage to the system with markedly reduced treatment effectiveness.

One of the things that puzzles me is why they have the ion-exchange towers ahead of the flocculation (they call it co-precipitation). All the water treatment systems I am familiar with (the ones I operated, the ones I helped design and those operated and designed by others that I became familiar with) always had the flocculation step before sand filters, carbon filters, ion-exchange or RO. The reason for this is that it reduces fouling of the downstream processes. The term "salad dressing" I would interpret as the formation of an emulsion of oil with hot particles. I would use flocculation followed by filtration before the ion-exchange step. The problem is that flocculation would create a floc bed that would probably become highly radioactive and so would create operating difficulties. Second, filtration of the floc with sand or anthracite filters (which are normally periodically back-washed) would be impractical when treating radioactively contaminated water. The filter beds would become hot and back-washing would create more highly concentrated water that would, in turn, then have to be treated again.

Unfortunately, the filtration step is an essential component of flocculation. There is no point to flocculation, unless one filters the effluent from the flocculation step. Filtration by disposable membrane or DE might be an alternative, but installing that capacity at Fukushima would take some time. However, dealing with the emulsion otherwise is not going to be easy and bypassing the oil separation towers is risky. Although I have compared flocculation with the co-precipitation step, as a caveat I want to say that they might not, in fact, be equivalent. In other words, doing the co-precipitation step before the ion-exchange may not be an option. Unfortunately, the amount of detailed information that has been released about the co-precipitation step is small. It is hard for me to tell exactly what they are doing in that step.

In summary, it would appear to me that they are throwing the proverbial "kitchen sink" at the problem. They appear to be using every means of treating water that is available, but, in general terms, the technology being used is fairly standard. What is special about the various steps is in the details. The only water treatment technology that seems to be missing is a flocculation followed by filtration step after oil separation and before ion-exchange, assuming that the co-precipitation step is significantly different that it would not be technically recommended to simply do that step before ion-exchange.

 

[Atomfritz]

If it was so trivial to make a big water-proof hole, they would have obviously done it.
As it takes weeks to make simple water/radiation-proof storage tanks, I highly doubt that's an easy task at all...

I doubt the local geology will allow for the installation of a second "Lake Karachay"...
(After Mayak stopped ducting its effluents into Techa River because of high Ob River contamination they used a local lake, Karachay, as nuclear effluent dump.
At the boundary of the lake the radiation is about 600 Roentgens/hr.)

P.S.L I see Zapperzero had the same thought about the same time...

Surprise: I am not linked to any industry, I am not working for any industry. And I find your accusations mildly insulting.

I also don't know how Quim comes to thinking that Borek is a nuclear industry professional.
He appears just to be neutral for me.
But, I prefer green hair. It just looks better. :)

 

[zapperzero]

The only water treatment technology that seems to be missing is a flocculation followed by filtration step after oil separation and before ion-exchange, assuming that the co-precipitation step is significantly different that it would not be technically recommended to simply do that step before ion-exchange.

Co-precipitation is just what it says on the tin - salts are formed and precipitated out of solution, in the hopes that the radioactive alkali will precipitate along with the normal ones. Not something you need to do with regular water .

I have wondered myself why no flocculation - perhaps they don't expect to see fine particulates or heavy metals in significant quantities? I understand those are the main targets for flocculation?

 

[zapperzero]

I doubt the local geology will allow for the installation of a second "Lake Karachay"...

It's awful to think about, but they already have a lake nearby. They are drawing water from it to cool the reactors, in fact. It would be possible, I'm afraid, to dump it back in. There's no emoticon for horror, or I would have used it :P. Although I'm not sure polluting the ocean is the better alternative.

 

[ManuBZH]

It's awful to think about, but they already have a lake nearby. They are drawing water from it to cool the reactors, in fact. It would be possible, I'm afraid, to dump it back in. There's no emoticon for horror, or I would have used it :P. Although I'm not sure polluting the ocean is the better alternative.

To be precise, they are taking water from Sakagarbagea dam, here:
http://metalwings05.fc2web.com/dam/07_fukushima/sakagarbagea/index.html

 

[MiceAndMen]

Adding to NUCENG's comment - I believe the water treatment system is based on current AREVA technology used in their waste treatment streams either in their reprocessing plants or remediation programs. What we don't know is what access AREVA has had to the TEPCO site, or what information has been provided by TEPCO to AREVA concerning the contaminated water.

No, we do know this. From AREVA themselves:

For three weeks, AREVA has sent radioactive effluent treatment specialists to Japan to participate in work groups with Tepco. Backed by large teams in France, Germany and the United States, they proposed a method based on a co-precipitation concept.

http://us.arevablog.com/2011/04/19/...contamination-process-for-the-fukushima-site/

They had hands-on access to the site for 3 weeks prior to making their proposal.

 

[MJRacer]

Co-precipitation is just what it says on the tin - salts are formed and precipitated out of solution, in the hopes that the radioactive alkali will precipitate along with the normal ones. Not something you need to do with regular water .

I have wondered myself why no flocculation - perhaps they don't expect to see fine particulates or heavy metals in significant quantities? I understand those are the main targets for flocculation?

On co-precipitation, I would assume that the process shares some similarities chemically with flocculation. Some equate flocculation with coagulation/precipitation, while others distinguish between coagulation and flocculation. It can get to be very technical and, in my experience, has a lot of trial and error aspects to it (hence jar tests). In that regard, flocculation may interfere with their co-precipitation and/or the co-precipitation would be too specific to do before ion-exchange as it is not intended to remove oil emulsions. On flocculation, you are right that particulates and heavy metals are removed by it, but flocculation can be a pretty broadband treatment method. It is very effective and fairly cheap per liter, so it is also very cost effective. It makes the job of subsequent more expensive treatment methods more effective and cheaper (by reducing fouling). A further thought is that the "salad dressing" may be partially the result of the oil separation step using air flotation. In short, this is a mess that is compounded by lack of time and sheer scale.

 

[MiceAndMen]

In Japan, Germany etc there are many discussions about this interesting phenomenon of fraternalization of the nuke industry and the authorities.
People work for one side, then change their side at early retirement.
There is much money at work to which motivates people working at the regulatory to be "cooperative".
If they cooperate well they might be thanked with a well-paid leisure job.
They get much money without really have to work.
They just have to do lobby working at their former colleagues in the regulatory authority.
So these know well: "Cooperate and you'll have good income without having to work later.

This has been happening in Japan and the US as well. In the US it is known as the "revolving door", and people rotate between private industry and the agencies that are supposed to regulate them. One does not regulate too strongly lest he make enemies that would preclude a nice paycheck in the future.

To be fair, it is not just a problem in the nuclear power industry. It also exists in the financial industry where "regulatory capture" is pervasive and results in watered-down regulation at best and policy disaster at worst.

The problem exists in just about every industry where lobbyists ply their trade.

 

[Orcas George]

IMO it would be better to flood the Fukushima site and have the Japanese pay the cost of their series of blunders, rather than trashing the Pacific.

I agree that trashing the Pacific is a very serious matter and that the media and industry are too nonchalant about it. I live on an island, my wife trained as a marine biologist, I understand bioaccumulation better than the media ("oh, the sea is so big!)", and will contend that the scope of this disaster to the ocean is far more severe with long term consequences to a wide range of species -- including humans -- from the contamination of the ocean alone. At the risk of getting too political, this incident proves to me that nuclear power is not a solution to other very serious environmental and resource issues that we face. Imagine the consequences if this had happened to one of the reactors on Lake Erie or on top of the Ogallala Aquifier. We can live without electricity, we can't live without safe water and we are seeing how difficult it is to get radiation out of water.

Now for the "however."

First off, the people should not be punished for anything. If the Indian Point reactor went south on us I wouldn't be in favor of dumping the waste on the streets of New York just because New Yorkers happen to be citizens of the country that built the reactor. I don't even think that TEPCO officials should be punished; the problem is with the design and not the people. I have not seen any evidence that this incident is anything other than what you expect to happen when a nuclear plant melts down (or "partially melts down" or "has an oopsie" or whatever the politically correct term is.)

But, back to technical issues, the conseqences of flooding the plant grounds are that it will become nearly impossible to mitigate this problem. We have to get the rods in the spent fuel pools into safe, long term storage and that won't happen if the grounds are contaminated with the highly radioactive stuff they are trying to deal with. We can't just hope that there are no large aftershocks for the next 30 years, or that a roofless building that exploded will be able to handle typhoon-force winds.

So it is not even a matter of trade offs; but if push comes to shove the choice that leaves us with any options at all is to dump it into the sea. I hope there are options before that, like "load up a supertanker" but eventually that probably means "radioactive supertanker at the bottom of the sea." If we let the grounds flood and have to abandon the plant it will all go to the sea anyway.

But again, it is a horrible choice. Nobody really wants to think about what has already happened; when they pick up heavily contaminated seawater 30 kilometers from the plant site you are in a place that we should never have had the slightest odds of getting to. (IAEA report March 24).

It is true that it is difficult to discuss such choices. It is like deciding to amputate somebody's leg after a screw up in the hospital has sickened them. You need to discuss the option without forgetting how horrible the consequences are for the person and absolving the hospital from blame.

 

[NUCENG]

I remember only one action of this kind where NRC ordered a plant to shut down.
It was when a whistleblower revealed that the operators in the control room were sleeping, playing video games etc, but not caring for the reactor.

N: Obviously you haven't done your homework.

You read this between the lines.

N: Now there's a great citation. Clearly that carries the argument.

In Japan, Germany etc there are many discussions about this interesting phenomenon of fraternalization of the nuke industry and the authorities.
People work for one side, then change their side at early retirement.
There is much money at work to which motivates people working at the regulatory to be "cooperative".
If they cooperate well they might be thanked with a well-paid leisure job.
They get much money without really have to work.
They just have to do lobby working at their former colleagues in the regulatory authority.
So these know well: "Cooperate and you'll have good income without having to work later."

N: So Japan and Germany have a problem. And yet you hold up Chairman Jaczko as a hero. How did he get there?

In fact, I doubt that it is always for this reason.
In fact, the comments of some Commissioners regarding the extension of the discretion period from three to eight years remind me of a typical soviet style communist party sycophancy.

N: No evidence, no sense, but call it a communist plot. That always works.

As most national nuclear laws around the world are similar to the masterprint of the american system, I suspect it is like here in Germany.

N: Suspicion, another great source citation.

In the wake of the final shutdown of many German reactors it came at light that thousands of safety improvements etc, not only regarding flammable insulation foam, have been delayed by reactor operators for up to 17 years after having been ordered by the authorities.

N: Proving a Geman problem, if it is even true.

Just an example, the Brunsbüttel BWR at the Northern Sea.
It has been offline for some years now.
There had been a hydrogen explosion ripping open some tubes of the primary circuit and spraying radioactive steam.
But the reactor operator didn't consider this an important thing and insisted to operate the reactor until next planned shutdown about half a year later while just letting the leaking water flow into the sump (wetwell).

The nuclear authorities had to battle for three months until, with the help of the federal government, they finally got the reactor operator company agree to shut down the reactor.

In the aftermath of this accident it was revealed that this accident easily could have mutated into an uncontrollable LOCA if some piping cracked by the explosion would have severed the main cooling water circuit.

But the real reason why the authority was unable to allow to restarting the plant was the public pressure in sight of the fact that the NPP piled up more than 400 unremedied violations in a dozen years.

N: And that applies to a US plant how? What part of prompt and effective corrective action program do you not understand?

Jaczko fruitlessly opposed the extension of the discretion period to eight years.
As there is not always the possibility of enforcement after the end of the discretion period, as Jaczko clearly indicates, there can be easily more than ten years from the finding of a violation to when the NRC can order the plant operators to do something about.

N: Your post belongs on the "Other Political Thread, there is not one citation, not one ounce of anything more than uninformed opinion masquerading as conclusions. Your anti-American ravings are getting tiresome. I have been trying to answer a legitimate question about what the term enforcement discretion. You chime in with nothing but hot air. Go away little boy, you bother me!

 

[Quim]

you could even "store" it in an open trench somewhere.

I find that idea far far preferable to dumping high level radioactive waste into the Pacific Ocean.

 

[Atomfritz]

To be precise, they are taking water from Sakagarbagea dam, here:
http://metalwings05.fc2web.com/dam/07_fukushima/sakagarbagea/index.html

Thank you for the information. This dam is about a dozen kilometers away from the plant.

One or two miles southwest of the reactors there are also a few dams. Northwest, in about 2-3 miles there also is a dam. Maybe agricultural only and not connected to the normal grid.

It's awful to think about, but they already have a lake nearby. They are drawing water from it to cool the reactors, in fact. It would be possible, I'm afraid, to dump it back in.

Dams shouldn't be used for radioactive water/sludge storage, as dams are prone to all possible damages like earthquakes. See the Bellona.org documentation about the Mayak complex and its problems with keeping the radioactive water halfway safe.
The only lake that is probably not a dam and appears possibly large enough to dissipate such quantities of radwaste water is directly at the plant area border.
See this picture:

It could be a very convenient last alternative to pump the water in there before contaminating the ocean.
And it could be implemented very quickly, just laying tubes along the red line.

So this could buy quite some time for mankind to save the oceans.

 

[jim hardy]

thanks to the poster who has reverse osmosis experience. Sorry i forgot to note your name...

that technology does a beautiful job of turning municipal water into ultra-pure boiler grade water, but it seems to me a bit on the sensitive side for handling sludge.

Wouldn't an old fashioned moonshine still scaled up to industrial size capture the oil and sludge and most of the contamination too before handing the water to your equipment ?

Perhaps a line of old fashioned package boilers, say surplus WW2 Liberty Ship power plants, should serve as sacrificial distillation pre-cleaners for your high tech stuff . When you can no longer get close to them pick 'em up with a long crane and cart them away.

old jim

 

[etudiant]

It would be truly stupid to allow the site to be flooded, if only because there are a couple of thousand tons of nuclear fuel in it even apart from the corium in the damaged reactors, thus making the accident that much worse.
It may however become necessary to dump at least some of the water into inadequate storage facilities, whether tanks, megafloats or available oil tankers,, because the treatment facility is late and the facility is one good storm away from overflowing.
That said, I'm puzzled by the Kurion columns. We have close to 300 Petabequerels of cesium in the water, as Clancy688s post above documented. Also, we need to change out the cesium cartridges when their activity exceeds 4 millisieverts, according to the TEPCO conference reported by tsutsuji.

The plan was for about a monthly cartridge change, so only a dozen cartridge sets over the expected 1 year cleanup. If the columns have the claimed effectiveness of cutting cesium to 0.1% of the original level or better, that means that dozen sets will together contain nearly 300PBqs of radioactivity, held in cartridges producing a 4 millisievert radiation level of exposure when briefly handled.
This seems wildly implausible. What am I missing?

 

[MJRacer]

http://www.new.ans.org/pubs/magazines/download/a_726

http://www.businesswire.com/news/ho...ion’s-Ion-Specific-Media-based-materials-Mile

A couple of interesting articles on Kurion's technology. Here are some quotes:

"A key aspect of the ISM (Ion Specific Media) is that they are inorganic as compared with conventional organic media."

"Because of strong molecular bonds, however, isotopes remain captured during thermal treatment, eliminating concerns over volatilization of isotopes such as cesium."

"The company’s development program includes the ability to manufacture its media using patent pending sorbent impregnated porous glass microspheres. As a result, during vitrification the media self-supplies the glass frit required for vitrification, ..."

"Kurion has developed an MVS (Modular Vitrification System) that is simple enough to allow generators to safely perform this process onsite. Granted eight patents, the MVS employs a mechanically passive, first-principles, single-use melter internally integral to the customer’s waste container and achieves high volume reduction ..."

"The self-contained system utilizes nonintrusive inductive energy as its heat source to avoid electrodes, thermocouples, and probes normally associated with vitrification processes and that create secondary wastes along with maintenance, safety, and cost concerns. In addition, because the MVS does not rely on high temperatures to ensure glass conductivity and heating as required of joule-heated melters, it is uniquely capable of utilizing low-temperature glass formations to stay below the volatilization temperatures of off-gassing isotopes such as cesium."

"Aside from a small footprint and negligible off-gas, the MVS has the ability to keep the stainless steel waste canister relatively cool while processing. Kurion’s unique proprietary process keeps the waste canister exterior more than 500°C cooler than does the interior process, plus it doubles as a secondary containment."

 

[MJRacer]

thanks to the poster who has reverse osmosis experience. Sorry i forgot to note your name...

that technology does a beautiful job of turning municipal water into ultra-pure boiler grade water, but it seems to me a bit on the sensitive side for handling sludge.

Wouldn't an old fashioned moonshine still scaled up to industrial size capture the oil and sludge and most of the contamination too before handing the water to your equipment ?

Perhaps a line of old fashioned package boilers, say surplus WW2 Liberty Ship power plants, should serve as sacrificial distillation pre-cleaners for your high tech stuff . When you can no longer get close to them pick 'em up with a long crane and cart them away.

old jim

They are planning on using distillation after RO. They call it vapor condensation. That's why I called it the "kitchen sink" approach (except for flocculation).

See http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/press/corp-com/release/betu11_e/images/110609e8.pdf

 

[GJBRKS]

The plan was for about a monthly cartridge change, so only a dozen cartridge sets over the expected 1 year cleanup. If the columns have the claimed effectiveness of cutting cesium to 0.1% of the original level or better, that means that dozen sets will together contain nearly 300PBqs of radioactivity, held in cartridges producing a 4 millisievert radiation level of exposure when briefly handled.
This seems wildly implausible. What am I missing?

The monthly change was named with regards to the oil separating part ,not the cesium filters

These oil filters are somehow accumulating radioactivity where they are not supposed to ,

but the oil needs to be filtered out to avoid damaging the cesium filters.

There are 4 parallel installed processing lines

 

[Orcas George]

TEPCO says it may have absorbed larger-than-expected amounts of radioactive materials along with oil. The utility is now working on measures to solve the issue.

TEPCO says the effort will require time. In addition, depending on the situation, it may have to reconsider the working of the entire system and examine the effect of radioactivity emitted from nearby pipes.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/19_03.html

They need to not panic; messing around with the system will wreck it. They should call in some other filtration professionals (Parker Racor) and brainstorm. Perhaps a big prefilter unit that they can remotely backflush with several in reserve. These things are sitting in warehouses; if it gets fried just bury it with the other radioactive junk. They won't get the GPH they desire but if they can keep the water level from rising while somebody works out plan 'B' that would be good.

RO systems are very finicky since you are pushing stuff at great pressure through rubber it can easily get plugged up or holed. Oil is fatal. The technology really isn't for handling mixed dirt and sludge and oil. They need to get that stuff out first which is a dilemma because the filter to do that will get the most radioactive stuff in it. However a radioactive filter that you can stack somewhere is probably better than radioactive water.

My diesels have filters that separate water from diesel using centerfuge action plus a hydrophrobic membrane. I would be shocked if they didn't have filters like that in the system somewhere.

They will get it fixed if they keep their cool. On the reverse situation diesels will be instantly wrecked if any water gets into the injectors, so the we have really good technology for separating oil and water and particles. I'm convinced there is a part number that will solve this problem, at least in the short term (they may have to change out a machine every day or so.) The important part for now is to get the water cleaned, if they fill up a junkyard with hot equipment we can yell at them later.