Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

In summary: RCIC consists of a series of pumps, valves, and manifolds that allow coolant to be circulated around the reactor pressure vessel in the event of a loss of the main feedwater supply.In summary, the earthquake and tsunami may have caused a loss of coolant at the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, which could lead to a meltdown. The system for cooling the reactor core is designed to kick in in the event of a loss of feedwater, and fortunately this appears not to have happened yet.
  • #1,191
Gilles said:
Gentlemen, I read that on a French forum



and now the translation (sorry for the possible broken English)


and the screen shot

[PLAIN]http://www-laog.obs.ujf-grenoble.fr/~henri/Fukushima.gif

what's your opinion?

How do you say "I very much doubt it." in French?
 
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Engineering news on Phys.org
  • #1,192
"information irrationnelle délibérément mise en avant pour modeler une audience réceptive" ... Just an educated guess
 
  • #1,193
TCups said:
"They"? Most of us think "they" have a breech in containment. High level waste in the basements of Turbine Buildings doesn't happen normally. Do you mean, by "primary leak", a leak in the reactor vessel (RV) or a leak in the Primary (Drywall) containment, or both?

.

When I referred to PRIMARY COOLANT, I was writing about primary coolant which is a common term when referring to the coolant that passes through the reactor and is used as steam in the Boiling Water Reactor. Sorry if there was any misunderstanding. I have a tendency to use terms that originated with the pressurized water reactors that use a Steam Generator to create steam. That Loop of hot water, steam and condensate is usually referred to as the Secondary. I have heard technicians use PRIMARY for the water in the reactor loop even when it is a BWR. Perhaps another term is better?
 
  • #1,194
|Fred said:
"information irrationnelle délibérément mise en avant pour modeler une audience réceptive" ... Just an educated guess

The original video was over 9 minutes long and I have been through it almost frame by frame. I will have to look back when I have more time. The glowing red stuff did not appear to be in the region of the reactor. One new observation, though. Take a look at the long, rectangular box-like structures with rods sticking out the end . . .

hmmmm. . .
 

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  • #1,195
tcups said:
how do you say "i very much doubt it." in french?
Oh Sheeeeeeet! What I see is a GLOW without smoke. How do you get a glow like that without smoke? I know that Blast Furnaces can get molten metal red hot, but that was not a blast furnace. How do we explain the red hot glow?

Fuel Rods can glow if they heat up enough, expecially if they are not sitting in a pool of water.
 
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  • #1,196
Joe Neubarth said:
When I referred to PRIMARY COOLANT, I was writing about primary coolant which is a common term when referring to the coolant that passes through the reactor and is used as steam in the Boiling Water Reactor. Sorry if there was any misunderstanding. I have a tendency to use terms that originated with the pressurized water reactors that use a Steam Generator to create steam. That Loop of hot water, steam and condensate is usually referred to as the Secondary. I have heard technicians use PRIMARY for the water in the reactor loop even when it is a BWR. Perhaps another term is better?

Then, I, too believe there was a steam-like continuous leak of primary coolant from near the top of the primary (dry wall) containment going on for hours before the darker smoke started appearing. And this screen shot is taken near the top of the reactor containment atop Bldg 3.

If so, it does not necessarily mean a complete melt down of the core with breech of the reactor vessel (at least at the time of the photo), and does not preclude leakage of highly contaminated water from the plumbing circulating in the basement of Turbine Bldg 3, either.
 

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  • #1,197
AntonL said:
I did and found this - US deploys two nuclear experts to Japan - You need a team, each assigned to subtasks, reactors, cooling, SFP, data collection etc etc

All I want to say is that nuclear accident management need to be rethought and taken out of the control of the operator. It would be of interest if the big nuclear nation have a national emergency manual that structures the accident management that takes immediate effect with military like precision.
Yes - there needs to be a team of experts, but considering that this event is unprecedented, at least by scale, for an LWR, there will be no experts with direct experience. The event is well beyond design basis, so there could be no plan.

One outcome of the Fukushima accident will be a re-assessment of how a utility responds to such an event (multiple failures), particularly at multi-site plants.

US utilities (especially those with BWRs with Mk I containment) began reviews of their plant designs and emergency operating procedures (EOPs), within a couple of days of the event. They did not wait to be told by the NRC or INPO.


It is worrisome that the utility had to resort to water canons and air drops (mostly ineffective) to ensure water in the SFPs. The reactor damage is much more complicated, because most of the potential damage is inaccessible within containment, especially when they have core damage and contamination of the containment systems.
 
  • #1,198
AntonL said:
Kyodo news article

http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/03/81133.html"

does not make good reading

However, water is found in the basements of all 4 reactors, if the basement are linked via cable tunnels then it could be a common source of water.
 
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  • #1,199
|Fred said:
Reactor 1's turbine building basement just got flooded with highly radioactive water just like n°3 did yesterday..
reported at 00:30 (Japan Standard Time) on the 26th of April

Source? Link? Please add verifiable source on all such statements,
 
  • #1,200
Joe Neubarth said:
Oh Sheeeeeeet! What I see is a GLOW without smoke. How do you get a glow like that without smoke. I know that Blast Furnaces can get molten metal red hot, but that was not a blast furnace. How do we explain the red hot glow?

Please note Joe your post was different "Oh Sheeeeet " only when I choose to quote it.

If I didn't think it would upset a lot of people right now, I would crack a joke because many of us are getting more serious and agitated then we should be. Newcomers aren't the only one's that are starting to jump at ghosts.

It seems to me that speculation is starting to be speculated upon and that media information(re: speculation) (even from credible sources) is being re-posted as if it is current information.

My suggestion is that when posting information or a link to that information you include a date when that information was made available to the public. I've encountered a number of posts that imply new information that is in fact dated.

Given the size of this particular thread people are unlikely to attempt to read all previous posts.
 
  • #1,201
NHK now hints that steam may be escaping from PCV while commenting the latest video.

//www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/25_30.html said:
Footage of the No. 3 reactor building shows its roof and the upper section of the building's
southern wall blown away by a hydrogen blast

Vapor can be seen wafting from gaps in the wreckage near a pool for spent nuclear fuel rods.
Faint steam can be seen rising from twisted steel framework over what could be the upper part
of the containment vessel.

Friday, March 25, 2011 19:10 +0900 (JST)
 
  • #1,202
AntonL said:
Rethink your post http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/basic-ref/teachers/03.pdf" all the water that has been pumped into the reactors for the last 14 days has been boilded away, partly released to atmospher intentionally, partly unintenyionally and some condensed in the dry well and torus.

Yes, but a rudimentary heat exchange can be set up, especially if these military hoses are reinforced for use as heat exchangers (as most are). They were only inputting the system initially, with no exchange or output beyond venting (I am assuming it was thought of, but not able to be put in action)From the diagrams it looks as if there are more valves beyond the one they used to flush the system with initially, and an external heat exchange could be set up using existing plumbing (Barring that all the ductwork for the cooling system isn't compromised; is that what you are suggesting?) It isn't the best scenario, but it could work until a better system could be set up, no? Plus it could help dissolve some of those salts building up, by using the freshwater. Also, what about dilute acetic acid to dissolve some of the carbonates, etc? It has a high boiling point (in fact raises the boiling point of water in solution), and makes an excellent solvent without eroding steel or zirconium in dilute enough solutions. (though it can be corrosive to others--Be kind, remember, I am a Biochem major). The only problem I can conceive of, is that it might erode some of the concrete, but it wouldn't have to be used long term, just enough to decalcify. Please advise! I am open to criticism, I want to learn :)
 
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  • #1,203
KateB said:
Yes, but a rudimentary heat exchange can be set up, ...
--Be kind, remember, I am a Biochem major). ... I want to learn :)
Kate no offence meant, we should be all kind and loving to each other. Just to illustrate the
enormity of the cooling problem.

Unit 1 is currently generating the heat of 2000 kettles (1000W) boiling away continually and
Unit 2 and 3 about 4000 kettles each, the same tomorrow , the day after slowly getting less
and less and be about a half the amount in 2 month time.
 
  • #1,204
sorry to have brought trouble with my post. I saw the video well before, too, but I hadn't noticed this orange fleck before I read the french thread (which is BTW rather chilling). It may well be just a piece of any orange painted material, but it seems to glow - may be hit by the sun too. I was just interested in knowing your opinion. It is difficult to identify where the shot is located - somewhere around R1 I guess, just after we see the untouched roof of R2 and then R3 and R4. I thought too that it could be a spent fuel rod ejected by the explosion.. does a single rod become heated to a few thousands degrees without cooling?
 
  • #1,205
Gilles said:
does a single rod become heated to a few thousands degrees without cooling?

If left in open space? Then it cools on itself, radiating and heating air around. Highly doubtful it will get that hot.
 
  • #1,206
AntonL said:
Kate no offence meant, we should be all kind and loving to each other. Just to illustrate the
enormity of the cooling problem.

Unit 1 is currently generating the heat of 2000 kettles (1000W) boiling away continually and
Unit 2 and 3 about 4000 kettles each, the same tomorrow , the day after slowly getting less
and less and be about a half the amount in 2 month time.

I think I understand what you are saying. The pressure values generated by the extreme energy release would exceed the ability of any set-up using hoses? A good knowledge base of the internal workings of the reactors would be handy ;). I was going off of the pressure and heat values I had seen earlier in the posts, at around (even below) 1 ATMs and temperatures around 150 degrees C and below. (page 64) I had assumed (incorrectly, it appears) that these were values that were within the cooling systems that could be handled by my (now silly) assumption of a rudimentary external heat exchange ... Thanks for your feedback.
 
  • #1,207
Gilles said:
sorry to have brought trouble with my post. I saw the video well before, too, but I hadn't noticed this orange fleck before I read the french thread (which is BTW rather chilling). It may well be just a piece of any orange painted material, but it seems to glow - may be hit by the sun too. I was just interested in knowing your opinion. It is difficult to identify where the shot is located - somewhere around R1 I guess, just after we see the untouched roof of R2 and then R3 and R4. I thought too that it could be a spent fuel rod ejected by the explosion.. does a single rod become heated to a few thousands degrees without cooling?
If your referring to my post suggesting dates, I was not thinking of you. Many new people have joined this discussion which has been a very balanced treatment of the issues so far. I have been following this and other threads and have read every post here. I simply had the fear that the quality of this discussion could drop if posters didn't start monitoring themselves. Dating the information might also ease (unwarranted) fears for those who have family ties in Japan and see this thread as a quality source of information.
 
  • #1,208
M. Bachmeier said:
If your referring to my post suggesting dates, I was not thinking of you. Many new people have joined this discussion which has been a very balanced treatment of the issues so far. I have been following this and other threads and have read every post here. I simply had the fear that the quality of this discussion could drop if posters didn't start monitoring themselves. Dating the information might also ease (unwarranted) fears for those who have family ties in Japan and see this thread as a quality source of information.
I do agree,

Maybe it is time to ask site administrators to put a sticky "PLEASE READ THIS FIRST" with above plea
especially as search engines now bring this forum into their top pagers
 
  • #1,209
AntonL said:
Kyodo news article

http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2011/03/81133.html"

does not make good reading

AntonL said:
However, water is found in the basements of all 4 reactors, if the basement are linked via cable tunnels then it could be a common source of water.

In my opinion this water may come from reactor 2.

My reason is I have investigated past status reports and found that unit 2 has possibly been subjected to too much water injection.
Data extracted sea water injection
18th 35m#/h, 21st 20m3/h, 22nd & 23rd 11m3/h, 23rd & 24th 12m3/h,
fresh water 25th 01:07 20m3/h
and the temperature a constant around 105 degrees C
since temperature readings were reported from 22nd

The required amount of water for latent heat evaporation cooling for unit 2 is 6.3m3/hour as per my calculation

So have Tepco, relying on level and pressure gauges that could be damaged, pumped too much water into Unit 2, leaving no room for steam generation so the water is now being squeezed out and valves or pipe joints are failing and being near 100 degree C no boiling takes place.

sources regarding reactor - http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110325-5-3.pdf"

my calculation is based on the attached slide
Po = 2380 MW Thermal (Unit 2 an 3) 1380MW (unit 1)
and assuming 80% station load at time of shutdownList of links to some of the data
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20110318008/20110318008-4.pdf
http://www.meti.go.jp/press/20110322010/20110322010-3.pdf (first temperature readings)
http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110324-2-4.pdf (reactor 4 temperature gauge not working after black smoke)
http://www.nisa.meti.go.jp/english/files/en20110325-5-3.pdf (first fresh water injection)
 

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  • #1,210
AntonL said:
I do agree,

Maybe it is time to ask site administrators to put a sticky "PLEASE READ THIS FIRST" with above plea
especially as search engines now bring this forum into their top pagers
It's worse, I found paraphrasing and reproduction of content of this thread, thought I was not recording my search history, so can't point.

This is a terrible thing(nuclear fear) upon a bad thing(big earthquake) upon a terrible x 10 thing(tsunami).

Which means this discussion needs to try to stay as clean as possible. God knows there's enough disinformation and lack of reported facts. This thread has become a valuable source of information and we should try to protect its integrity.
 
  • #1,211
I thought sharing this PDF might better illustrate the functions and structures at Fukushima.
 

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  • #1,212
| http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/25_10.html
The company says 3.9 million becquerels of radioactive substances per cubic centimeter were detected in the water that the workers were standing in. That is 10,000 times higher than levels of the water inside a nuclear reactor in operation.
The level of radioactive cerium-144 was 2.2 million becquerels. Also, 1.2 million becquerels of iodine-131 was measured. These substances are generated during nuclear fission inside a reactor.
(updated at 17:04 UTC, Mar. 25)
 
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  • #1,213
After the explosions I suggested on another forum that if they wanted close up pictures that they could fly a miniature helicopter with a camera on it over the reactor if they really wanted close up clear photos of a site like Reactor Three. Those cameras are available from the US military and well as other sources.

The fact that they have not done so tells me that they do not want to. They could see the spent fuel rod tank without having to risk a single person's life.

For that matter, instead of having firemen standing and tending their hoses, they could have put a hose on a hook that was positioned by helicopter (a big one this time) that could have directed a stream of water on the reactor compartment or the fuel rod pool. I have not seen that done. Instead we saw photos of men standing out in the open holding hoses. Not too bright.
 
  • #1,214
Joe Neubarth said:
After the explosions I suggested on another forum that if they wanted close up pictures that they could fly a miniature helicopter with a camera on it over the reactor if they really wanted close up clear photos of a site like Reactor Three. Those cameras are available from the US military and well as other sources.

The fact that they have not done so tells me that they do not want to. They could see the spent fuel rod tank without having to risk a single person's life.

For that matter, instead of having firemen standing and tending their hoses, they could have put a hose on a hook that was positioned by helicopter (a big one this time) that could have directed a stream of water on the reactor compartment or the fuel rod pool. I have not seen that done. Instead we saw photos of men standing out in the open holding hoses. Not too bright.

Just because they haven't released photos doesn't mean they haven't taken them. And I think they probably know more about cooling a reactor than you do. For instance, radiation levels were pretty high at one point in the air over the plant so maybe a helicopter could not stay there very long.
 
  • #1,215
fusefiz said:
| http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/25_10.html
The company says 3.9 million becquerels of radioactive substances per cubic centimeter were detected in the water that the workers were standing in. That is 10,000 times higher than levels of the water inside a nuclear reactor in operation.
The level of radioactive cerium-144 was 2.2 million becquerels. Also, 1.2 million becquerels of iodine-131 was measured. These substances are generated during nuclear fission inside a reactor.
(updated at 17:04 UTC, Mar. 25)

Implications? Is water cooling still an option in this scenario? I would think with the explosivity of extreme temps and water, as well as the much higher and more dangerous particles possibly contaminating ground water for miles, that an alternative, assuming there is one, needs to be assessed. IS there an alternative? What about cooling the exterior areas with LN2, without coming into contact with RCV? Too hot still?
Edit: what about LN2, Solid N2 slurry?
 
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  • #1,216
| http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/asia/26japan.html?_r=3&hp=&pagewanted=all

A senior nuclear executive who insisted on anonymity but has broad contacts in Japan said that there was a long vertical crack running down the side of the reactor vessel itself. The crack runs down below the water level in the reactor and has been leaking fluids and gases, he said.

The severity of the radiation burns to the injured workers are consistent with contamination by water that had been in contact with damaged fuel rods, the executive said.

“There is a definite, definite crack in the vessel — it’s up and down and it’s large,” he said. “The problem with cracks is they do not get smaller.”

But Michael Friedlander, a former nuclear power plant operator in the United States, said that the presence of radioactive cobalt and molybdenum in water samples taken from the basement of the turbine building raised the possibility of a very different leak.

Both materials typically occur not because of fission but because of routine corrosion in a reactor and its associated piping over the course of many years of use, he said.

The aggressive use of saltwater to cool the reactor and its storage pool for spent fuel may mean that more of these highly radioactive corrosion materials will be dislodged and contaminate the area in the days to come, posing further hazards to repair workers, Mr. Friedlander added. Whichever explanation is accurate, the contamination of the water in the basement of the turbine building poses a real challenge for efforts to bring crucial cooling pumps and other equipment back online.

“They can’t even figure out how to get that out, it’s so hot” in terms of radioactivity, the senior nuclear executive said.


(Published: March 25, 2011)
 
  • #1,217
M. Bachmeier said:
It's worse, I found paraphrasing and reproduction of content of this thread, thought I was not recording my search history, so can't point.

This is a terrible thing(nuclear fear) upon a bad thing(big earthquake) upon a terrible x 10 thing(tsunami).

Which means this discussion needs to try to stay as clean as possible. God knows there's enough disinformation and lack of reported facts. This thread has become a valuable source of information and we should try to protect its integrity.

Agree - maybe an administrator should do some censoring and delete inappropriate posts - should be seriously considered
 
  • #1,218
@TCups

I have read every post in this thread and have seen no reply to your "Primary Containment explosion" theory which addresses the following:

There is no question in my mind that Hydrogen escaping from the SFP's (or by some path out of the reactor core) could (and did) explode once it mixed with relatively dry air above the SPFs. However, I believe there would be insufficient Oxygen available within the Primary Containment for a Hydrogen explosion to occur there for the following reasons.

Consider the reaction which produces the Hydrogen;

Zr + 2 H2O = ZrO2 + 2 H2

In this reaction, all of the Oxygen in a water molecule is "fixed" on the surface of the fuel cladding in the form of zirconium oxide.

When Hydrogen burns (explodes), there is one molecule of Oxygen for each molecule of Hydrogen;

2 H2 + O2 ---> 2 H2O

The only other source for Oxygen within the RPV / Primary Containment might be the release of air entrained or dissolved in the cooling seawater or Oxygen released directly from the core via radiolysis of the surrounding water/steam.

The radiolysis source is questionable since it occurs at twice the temp of a redox reaction (between water and zirconium) and the heat source in the core is decay heat not fission generated.

The seawater source is more problematic...

Flamable/explosive gases such as Hydrogen have something called UEL or Upper Explosive Limit.

See;
[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flammability_limit]

"Upper Explosive Limit (UEL): Highest concentration (percentage) of a gas or a vapor in air capable of producing a flash of fire in presence of an ignition source (arc, flame, heat). Concentrations higher than UEL are "too rich" to burn."

From the table at the same link, Hydrogen's UEL in % by volume of air is 75%. Air is composed of about 21% by volume Oxygen. I expect that these figures are at STP for dry air and would need to be adjusted for the temperature and pressure in the Primary Containment. Additionally, the presence of steam in the same space as the Hydrogen and Oxygen inhibits their reaction. Thus, when the Hydrogen mixes with relatively dry air above the SPFs it can explode... but perhaps not while it is within the steamy Primary Containment.

Maybe one of our Nuclear Engineers can address your theory from this perspective.

.
 
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  • #1,219
More than likely TEPCOs saltwater injection was via the reactor feed system which begins in the Turbine Bldg. There may have been a back flow at some time (on 2-3 inches of water) during the set up and change over. If they created a direct patch to either the Reactor Vessel or the Dry Well, then they also created a return path from those points. Just a plumber's theory.
 
  • #1,221
We see hundreds of people on this forum trying to put together the pieces of the puzzle that are the bits of the information that have been released. It is a shame that in this crisis they are not being more transparent.
 
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  • #1,222
On the 25th at 03:13AM JST there was a press conference open to the international press as it was translated in English, Unfortunately very few reporter were there, and the stream that I was watching cut off after 6 minutes.. (too boring for the cameraman I guess -_- )

None the less I toke a few screen grab, the topic was the design of the BWR used in fukushima , specification , and way of predicted leaking of the RCV under pressure.

Shame they did not record the full conference, we might have glance a few more informations

The BWR Mark 1 made by GE used in Fukushima is the enhanced one with a bigger drywell (on the right)
[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/ijHsci.jpg
Design spec
Leakage ref to the containment vessel
[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/ijLcum.jpg
Bolted top with flange allowing leakage
[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/ijLGOE.jpg
[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/ijGD7G.jpg
 
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  • #1,223
fusefiz said:
| http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/26/world/asia/26japan.html?_r=3&hp=&pagewanted=all

A senior nuclear executive who insisted on anonymity but has broad contacts in Japan said that there was a long vertical crack running down the side of the reactor vessel itself. The crack runs down below the water level in the reactor and has been leaking fluids and gases, he said.

The severity of the radiation burns to the injured workers are consistent with contamination by water that had been in contact with damaged fuel rods, the executive said.

“There is a definite, definite crack in the vessel — it’s up and down and it’s large,” he said. “The problem with cracks is they do not get smaller.”

But Michael Friedlander, a former nuclear power plant operator in the United States, said that the presence of radioactive cobalt and molybdenum in water samples taken from the basement of the turbine building raised the possibility of a very different leak.

Both materials typically occur not because of fission but because of routine corrosion in a reactor and its associated piping over the course of many years of use, he said.

The aggressive use of saltwater to cool the reactor and its storage pool for spent fuel may mean that more of these highly radioactive corrosion materials will be dislodged and contaminate the area in the days to come, posing further hazards to repair workers, Mr. Friedlander added. Whichever explanation is accurate, the contamination of the water in the basement of the turbine building poses a real challenge for efforts to bring crucial cooling pumps and other equipment back online.

“They can’t even figure out how to get that out, it’s so hot” in terms of radioactivity, the senior nuclear executive said.


(Published: March 25, 2011)
Ouch! Crack(s) in the RPV is a problem. At this point though, the drywell should be flooded to the extent possible.

Co and Mo (and Tc-99) would come from activated corrosion products, which is normal. Usually, these products are filtered from the water (condensate polishers), or they deposit on the fuel. This does not indicate fuel failure (cladding breach).

The release of Xe, Kr, Cs, I, . . . isotopes would be expected from failed fuel rods, but that could mean small or tight leaks. These elements are gaseous or volatile, so they readily come out of failed fuel.

The indication of Ce-144 is a more serious indication of breached fuel. If Np-239 was measured in the water, that too would indicate fuel washout.

I also just realized that the cladding is probably liner (barrier) cladding, and it's possible that breached cladding could split open through reaction (oxidation of the liner) with the coolant, especially if the cladding temperature approached operational temperatures. I'm not sure that anyone has done an experiment on BWR fuel degradation in seawater, so this is likely uncharted territory.
 
  • #1,224
here are the result of the water analysis found in the basement of the Turbine unit 1 ( source nisa)

[PLAIN]http://k.min.us/imbXPu.jpg
 
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  • #1,225
"Drywell head is predicted to unseat at 27 psig" (page 5, upper part)
http://www.osti.gov/bridge/purl.cov...F5E975EF06A9A903D0D15E6?purl=/5630475-EX87x5/

"Just a few square inches are enough to relieve pressure"
"Due to the large surface of the drywell head, leaks are easy"

If that is true - then there is a SERIOUS flaw in the BWR 1 (and otherrrs?) design - and a quite plausible documentation for TCups theory.


Found also this detail diagram of drywell head fastening:
http://www.ansn.org/Documents/Training/PSA%20Level%202%20(Probabilistic%20Safety%20Assessment)/M5%20%20Containment%20Perform.ppt#292,17,Example: BWR Drywell Head Seal
 
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