Japan Earthquake: Nuclear Plants at Fukushima Daiichi

[MadderDoc]

What, if anything, could have been a _technical_ rationale of Tepco of letting firefighters risk their lives to splash water to the top of Unit 3 in the days following March 16th 2011?

 

[zapperzero]

What, if anything, could have been a _technical_ rationale of Tepco of letting firefighters risk their lives to splash water to the top of Unit 3 in the days following March 16th 2011?

The real and present danger of pool dry-out of course. We've been over this before, if from a different angle - the firefighting helicopters found multi-Sievert/h fields above unit 3, suggesting either massive gas/particulate releases (unlikely, for a variety of reasons) or shine from a mostly empty pool.

Of course, I don't see TEPCO ready to admit that yes, they almost lost Tokyo.

 

[zapperzero]

Then of course, it could be the measured PCV pressure readings in unit 3 which are erroneously too high during this period, rather than the RPV's pressure readings too low.

Common sense would suggest that whichever is closest to atmospheric is true, fwiw.

 

[MadderDoc]

The real and present danger of pool dry-out of course. We've been over this before, if from a different angle - the firefighting helicopters found multi-Sievert/h fields above unit 3, suggesting either massive gas/particulate releases (unlikely, for a variety of reasons) or shine from a mostly empty pool.

Those high radiation fields were measured, I believe, on March 16th, on which day there was massive steam release from the building -- Tepco evacuated their own people temporarily out of fear that the PCV was leaking, and videos were taken from helicopters showing steam sources to be consistent with that fear. Otoh, there does not seem to have been any cause on that day to think the pool was even boiling.

Therefore I do not find it readily credible that Tepco the next day should have thought the danger of dry-out of the pool of unit 3 was real and present to a degree of imminence that the brave people of the civil forces should think they had cause to be willing to risk their lives in desperate measures to splash just some water into it.

 

[MadderDoc]

Common sense would suggest that whichever is closest to atmospheric is true, fwiw.

Please explain.

 

[zapperzero]

Those high radiation fields were measured, I believe, on March 16th, on which day there was massive steam release from the building -- Tepco evacuated their own people temporarily out of fear that the PCV was leaking, and videos were taken from helicopters showing steam sources to be consistent with that fear. Otoh, there does not seem to have been any cause on that day to think the pool was even boiling.

Therefore I do not find it readily credible that Tepco the next day should have thought the danger of dry-out of the pool of unit 3 was real and present to a degree of imminence that the brave people of the civil forces should think they had cause to be willing to risk their lives in desperate measures to splash just some water into it.

They weren't expecting that water to make it into the PCV, no? So what else is left? A fire (for which there is no evidence whatsoever) or a pool that is _believed_ to be emptying fast.

 

[MadderDoc]

They weren't expecting that water to make it into the PCV, no? So what else is left? A fire (for which there is no evidence whatsoever) or a pool that is _believed_ to be emptying fast.

But you can't just assume that they did have a technical rationale relating to conditions of the plant. It is well known that people may act out of a variety of motivations. For what we know there was as little evidence that the pool was emptying fast, as there was of a fire.

 

[zapperzero]

Please explain.

I'd expect that one vent path or another eventually opened and remained open, so I'd intuitively go for the lower number, when asked to estimate which of the three readings of our steaming teapot is correct.

Moreover, the three sensor readings track each other pretty nicely - except at the initial two peaks, where the RPV pressure is shown as highest (which makes sense, as it could probably still hold pressure at those times). What seems more likely? That the RPV pressure is over-, then under-reported by the same instrument, or that the other two are consistently over-reported?

 

[zapperzero]

But you can't just assume that they did have a technical rationale relating to conditions of the plant.

Why not? Everything else, including the aborted decision to abandon the site, was based on a technical rationale.

It is well known that people may act out of a variety of motivations. [/ quote]

I don't really buy the "they did this to be seen doing something" idea anymore. Something WAS being done, quite arduously and visibly in fact. Trucks and pumps were moving in, power lines were being repaired etc etc.

For what we know there was as little evidence that the pool was emptying fast, as there was of a fire.

No. There was a simple calculation as to how long it takes for the pool to boil after the pump stops. There was also an elevated and increasing, but rather uniform radiation field around Unit 3 (on the ground), which at least to some must have said"gamma shine".

 

[MadderDoc]

Why not? Everything else, including the aborted decision to abandon the site, was based on a technical rationale.

:-) That is some statement but even if assumed it doesn't follow that this one would have to be.

I don't really buy the "they did this to be seen doing something" idea anymore. Something WAS being done, quite arduously and visibly in fact. Trucks and pumps were moving in, power lines were being repaired etc etc.

Now I didn't suggest Tepco did anything to be seen doing something. Perhaps they did, as I said people are known to act from a diversity of motivations, including this one.

There was a simple calculation as to how long it takes for the pool to boil after the pump stops.

Yes, and no doubt Tepco did the calculation, only the result must've shown that the pool ought to be days from boiling and many days from fuel exposure. You also never heard a Tepco official say the Unit 3 pool was drying out fast. Nor was it expressed at the next level of the foodchain, NISA, who rather thought at the time that the Unit 4 pool was the one in need of urgent attention.

If Tepco really thought the situation of the unit 3 pool was so desperate, then why did they clear the ground at unit 4 for a concrete pump asap, while it took them days to not even make a passageway at unit 3 such that the rescue teams could approach the pool?

There was also an elevated and increasing, but rather uniform radiation field around Unit 3 (on the ground), which at least to some must have said"gamma shine".

To be sure the dose rate was high around unit 3 after the explosion. That just puts some seriousness to the question, what was Tepco's technical rationale for letting people go in there to splash water onto the building.

 

[MadderDoc]

I'd expect that one vent path or another eventually opened and remained open, so I'd intuitively go for the lower number, when asked to estimate which of the three readings of our steaming teapot is correct.

Moreover, the three sensor readings track each other pretty nicely - except at the initial two peaks, where the RPV pressure is shown as highest (which makes sense, as it could probably still hold pressure at those times). What seems more likely? That the RPV pressure is over-, then under-reported by the same instrument, or that the other two are consistently over-reported?

Thanks for expounding your thoughts. There were actually two RPV sensors in good agreement with each other, making the two parties even :-), perhaps we could assume the average.

 

[jim hardy]

Yes, and no doubt Tepco did the calculation, only the result must've shown that the pool ought to be days from boiling and many days from fuel exposure.

i think there's somewhere a tabulation of how much water was added to respective pools.

I had assumed unit 3 pool leaked , because of degree of damage to building from explosion and later videos showing what looked like rebar bent into pool.

My memory is notorious for dyslexia-like cross-connects so i won't venture a guess at how much water was added to unit 3 pool compared to others.
Were i organized i could find those numbers.

Low pool level of course means too little water to provide full shielding above fuel in pool.


This post not much of a contribution i know .
But i was among those thinking at the time #3 pool level was low and gamma backscatter was reason for high fields on ground. Lots of makeup water compared to others would support that.

 

[MadderDoc]

i think there's somewhere a tabulation of how much water was added to respective pools.

I have a note of a tabulation from Tepco, saying that as of the morning of April 1, 90 tons had been applied to SFP1, 4802 tons to SFP3, and 1278 tons to SFP4. There was no figure for SFP2 in that source according to my note. The figure for Unit 3 would have included helicopter dumps and much building splashing.

In the equidistant periods 2-22 April, and 1-21 April for SFP3 and SFP4, respectively, the concrete pump was used for injection at both units, and there was spent 963 minutes pumping to SFP3, and 2301 minutes to SFP4, which can be at least an indicator for the relative demand between those two units. (Edit: I see I've made another note, estimating the pumping rate of the concrete pump to be about 50t/h)
I am quite sure I very recently saw a more recent accounting for the injections to the pools with graphs and all. I'll see if I can dig it up.
Edit: I found that document i was thinking of , but it includes only accounting for unit 4, sorry. It indicates that the volumes referred to above were not sufficient to maintain the level of that pool.
It has also this tabulation of the decay heat n MW, of the pools as of March 11th 2011, and October 17th.
Unit 1 SFP 0.18 0.14
Unit 2 SFP 0.62 0.43
Unit 3 SFP 0.54 0.39
Unit 4 SFP 2.26 1.15
Common pool 1.13 1.12

I had assumed unit 3 pool leaked , because of degree of damage to building from explosion and later videos showing what looked like rebar bent into pool.

Perhaps it did/does, but my point is that Tepco at the time of all that display of bravery at unit 3 do not seem to have had any observation to indicate that the pool was leaking, boiling, nor drying out. Tepco also never said anything to that effect, nor did NISA. The rest of the world were excused to think that such desperate measures as shown in the telly would imply a critical situation, but Tepco never said there was a critical situation with the spent fuel pool of unit 3. All they said was the rather obvious, that if the spent fuel pools were to be not served with water, they might eventually dry out and bad things could happen.

I was among those thinking at the time #3 pool level was low and gamma backscatter was reason for high fields on ground. Lots of makeup water compared to others would support that.

It is a natural thought when someone is seen desperately spraying water to a pool, that it must be because he thinks the level in the pool is critically low. And I think that also comes close to what the fire-fighters thought they were doing, while they were bombarding the steam plume they could see over the building with water from their spray cannons.

But my question is, what did Tepco think these men were doing. Tepco, unlike the fire-fighters, cannot be assumed to have not realized from the helicopter observations and videos on March the 16th, that there was water in the pool and it was not boiling.

 

[gnasch]

I remember reading shortly after the helicopter water drops that japanese officials put this into the context of "calming the americans", presumably upon the impression of Mr. Jaczko going ballistic over the pools and recommending an 80 km evacuation radius. No source remembered though.

 

[zapperzero]

I have a note of a tabulation from Tepco, saying that as of the morning of April 1, 90 tons had been applied to SFP1, 4802 tons to SFP3, and 1278 tons to SFP4. There was no figure for SFP2 in that source according to my note. The figure for Unit 3 would have included helicopter dumps and much building splashing.

This would support the idea that they thought SFP3 was drying fast, no?

Tepco, unlike the fire-fighters, cannot be assumed to have not realized from the helicopter observations and videos on March the 16th, that there was water in the pool and it was not boiling.

The helicopters "saw" a 7.5 Sv/h field at 90 meters above the unit and a smoking or steaming pool filled with rubble. These are not encouraging observations.

 

[SteveElbows]

The interim report is suitable vague when it comes to the initial observations of reactor 3 pool. It talks of how observations showed that unit 4 pool looked ok, and it says they were supposed to observe reactor 3 pool as well, but makes no mention of what those observations showed.

Page 272 onwards:

http://icanps.go.jp/eng/120224Honbun04Eng.pdf

There certainly is at least one document that goes into full detail about the time & volume of spraying to the pools, but I cannot lay my hands on it right now.

Personally if I were them I would have started these operations as soon as possible, so as to leave more wiggle room and reduce the chances that other events could get in the way of water spraying by the time it was absolutely necessary.

I know that many months ago some attention was paid to why video of one of the firefighter missions showed someone spraying the wrong side of the building. I don't have a wonderful explanation for this, although I wouldn't read too much into it, especially as the ground between units 3 & 4 was not very hospitable at the time.

 

[MadderDoc]

I remember reading shortly after the helicopter water drops that japanese officials put this into the context of "calming the americans", presumably upon the impression of Mr. Jaczko going ballistic over the pools and recommending an 80 km evacuation radius. No source remembered though.

Mr Jaczko's technical rationale was that the SFP4 had run dry by March 16th, and this he based on the information he had coming in through a chain of liaison in which he thought at the other end was a direct link to Tepco. Mr Jaczko would seem to have had an impeccable technical rationale - however based on flawed intelligence it was. Tepco on March 16th appears to have evaluated -- based on observations from helicopter -- that the water level of the SFP4 was but 2-3 meter below normal, leaving ample water above the top of the fuel.

 

[zapperzero]

Personally if I were them I would have started these operations as soon as possible, so as to leave more wiggle room and reduce the chances that other events could get in the way of water spraying by the time it was absolutely necessary.

That's common sense, business-as-usual thinking. In crisis mode, with limited resources and very limited information on which to base predictions, the emphasis shifts to rapid, decisive reaction to emerging events. Firefighter logic.

 

[MadderDoc]

This would support the idea that they thought SFP3 was drying fast, no?

Yes, one could say that, but be wary of supportive evidence for your ideas, cherish rather evidence that is suitable to demolish their opposites.

The helicopters "saw" a 7.5 Sv/h field at 90 meters above the unit and a smoking or steaming pool filled with rubble. These are not encouraging observations.

According to the WHO, the measured dose rate from the helicopters involved in the water dump operations was 4.13 milliSv/h at 1000ft (300m), and 87.7 milliSv/h at 300ft (90m). As regards what could be seen from helicopters, we can get some indication from the published video sequences that were shot on March 16th. They appear to show a water surface in the pool, and steam plumes originating from areas close to the pool gates on either side of the reactor well. That was probably also what a human observer would have seen from the helicopter, only more clearly.

 

[tsutsuji]

There certainly is at least one document that goes into full detail about the time & volume of spraying to the pools, but I cannot lay my hands on it right now.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3813126&postcount=12587

 

[zapperzero]

According to the WHO, the measured dose rate from the helicopters involved in the water dump operations was t(300m), and 87.7 milli Sv/h at 300ft (90m). As regards what could be seen from helicopters, we can get some indication from the published video sequences that were shot on March 16th. They appear to show a water surface in the pool, and steam plumes originating from areas close to the pool gates on either side of the reactor well. That was probably also what a human observer would have seen from the helicopter, only more clearly

I took the 7.5 Sv/h figure from a NRC transcript. I posted the transcript here earlier.

EDIT: The WHO numbers are for the water spraying mission on the 17th.
www.u-tokyo-rad.jp/data/whositrep.pdf

 

[MadderDoc]

I took the 7.5 Sv/h figure from a NRC transcript. I posted the transcript here earlier.

The transcript has the figure as 375 R/h actually. Quaint unit that, Roentgen per hour. Still, (assuming this is gamma) 3.75 Sv/h is a very high dose rate. which could call for a reality check.

At the time Tepco disagreed with NISA over which unit was mainly responsible for the emissions showing up as high dose rates up to 10 mSv/h at the site boundary. NISA thought it was coming from Unit 2, while Tepco thought unit 3 was the culprit. Taken at face value, the 3.75 Sv/h figure could indicate Tepco was right. The steam emission did also visually appear to be more violent from unit3.
http://192.168.168.11/fuk/20110316_0935%20satellite/20110316_0935_Digitalglobe_zoom_thumb.jpg

EDIT: The WHO numbers are for the water spraying mission on the 17th.
www.u-tokyo-rad.jp/data/whositrep.pdf

Yes, that's right. Unit 3 did not steam quite as much that day.

 

[zapperzero]

The transcript has the figure as 375 R/h actually. Quaint unit that, Roentgen per hour. Still, (assuming this is gamma) 3.75 Sv/h is a very high dose rate. which could call for a reality check.

My bad. My treacherous memory doubled it and I don't know why :P.

 

[MadderDoc]

My bad. My treacherous memory doubled it and I don't know why :P.

Oh well, 3.75 or 7.5 Sv/h, still we are in the same heavy weight league.

On the assumption that Tepco thought this was shine from exposed fuel in a drying out pool, they would necessarily also have thought that any steam from the pool would be emanating from the depth of it. In fact Tepco did state on the afternoon of March 16th, that they had found that all that steam from the building was coming from the pool, and not from the reactor.

Let's assume this was Tepco's honest appraisal of the situation, not a lie. So, what could have made Tepco come to that conclusion -- except their helicopter observations on that day, their videos of the scene. So, here is a sample crop from one of these videos, I do hope everybody can see the steam column gushing out from the depth of the water-drained pool.

"He set to work to exercise himself in crimestop. He presented himself with propositions -- 'the Party says the Earth is flat', 'the party says that ice is heavier than water' -- and trained himself in not seeing or not understanding the arguments that contradicted them. It was not easy. It needed great powers of reasoning and improvisation. The arithmetical problems raised, for instance, by such a statement as 'two and two make five' were beyond his intellectual grasp. It needed also a sort of athleticism of mind, an ability at one moment to make the most delicate use of logic and at the next to be unconscious of the crudest logical errors. Stupidity was as necessary as intelligence, and as difficult to attain." (George Orwell)

 

[SteveElbows]

Well let's face it, we know that the pools received too much attention in one way or another, for several different reasons, including the NRC guy in Japan taking time to believe it was possible for the 4 pool to exist with the outer building in the state it was. We can suggest that TEPCO might also have been keen to distract from issues of containment leakage at reactors other than 2, where the (incorrectly) presumed s/c explosion and radiation levels on that day forced them to say something. But as I recall they clung for a while to the story that containment was still intact at the other reactors. Some part of this was kind of fair enough in vague unscientific message terms since it was reasonable to get across a message that containment at the reactors was not utterly destroyed by explosions, since this had been a previous fear. But obviously they took it further than that, and even to this day we see news of containment damage released in understated fashion, and not focussed on very much in many of the lengthy official reports. They talk more of how to repair it than of the few areas of known damage we have now seen. I have to say it was surreal at times to see helicopter images showing steam escaping from some interesting places, and to have virtually no official or media commentary on what we were seeing.

Another reason for doing something at the pools is that there weren't very many other visible things to do at that point, and given the cascading nature of events at the plant I do not blame them too much for being pro-active on these fronts. It would not surprise me if US & PR factors influenced the decision, but that's not likely the whole story. Part of it might be to do with a broader shock & realisation amongst a range of experts, politicians, managers of one sort or another, as to the potential for spent fuel pools to cause big problems in a situation like this. Woken noisily to these problems by the reactor 4 explosion , and faced with reactors that have already melted, paying more attention than was strictly necessary to the pools seems understandable.

Also I do not know if the amount of debris in reactor 3 pool would have caused some additional concern about certain possibilities despite the observation of water.

 

[MadderDoc]

<.>
I know that many months ago some attention was paid to why video of one of the firefighter missions showed someone spraying the wrong side of the building.

Actually, Steve, there is no evidence that the fire-fighters sprayed to the side of the building where the pool is, on any of their missions. It may seem strange to us, however the fire-fighters would have thought their target was somewhere there in the middle, where the steam was coming from.

I don't have a wonderful explanation for this, although I wouldn't read too much into it, especially as the ground between units 3 & 4 was not very hospitable at the time.

Yeah. Like when you drop a penny in a dark lane, then head for the nearest street light to look for it. "Because the light conditions are so much better there."

 

[SpunkyMonkey]

Actually, Steve, there is no evidence that the fire-fighters sprayed to the side of the building where the pool is, on any of their missions. It may seem strange to us, however the fire-fighters would have thought their target was somewhere there in the middle, where the steam was coming from.

Exactly, here the firemen were, reportedly watering the fuel pool.

They seemed to think it was around the NW corner or near the middle of the floor. Why were they so poorly informed? So there those fearless men were risking their health/lives to merely water debris.

Lot's o great analyses going on here, esp re the valve. Am I correct in my impression that it seems the valve was of a type that should have allowed the RPV to re-pressurize if there wasn't a hole in it already? If so, this would seem consistent with the massive RPV pressure collapse on Mar 13 as marking time of melt-through, and exactly fitting the model of Ott et al.

 

[jim hardy]

Hmmm it's interesting to look at Doc's valve drawing
https://www.physicsforums.com/attachment.php?attachmentid=46822&d=1335800918
and ask what would that device do under reverse pressure difference, as if RPV found a path to atmosphere but torus remained pressurized?

Not suggesting that happened, just want to understand what the valve would do.

Looks like with pilot in right position which is command to open , 'outlet' pressure would come up through "main valve piston vent" in lower right and pressurize top of piston driving valve smartly shut.
With pilot in left position, both sides of piston see 'inlet' pressure,
so if ( 'outlet' pressure X seat area product) exceeded 'inlet' pressure by enough to overcome spring plus weight of parts the valve would conduct fluid.

So reversing differential across valve appears to reverse its logic. It'll close when commanded open and vice versa.

Now under stress THAT would be one confusing symptom !

I might try the arithmetic early in the day but not at this hour. Please excuse the old guy, i run out of mental steam anymore.. If my logic is faulty please call me out...

old jim

 

[elektrownik]

Bad source of information but data looks legit. What could be the source of I131 ?
http://fukushima-diary.com/2012/05/iodine-131-measured-in-kawasaki-yokohama-chiba-and-gunma/
http://fukushima-diary.com/2012/05/iodine-131-measured-in-yamanashi/
http://fukushima-diary.com/2012/05/iodine-131-measured-in-tokyo/

 

[zapperzero]

if RPV found a path to atmosphere but torus remained pressurized?

Certainly an intriguing idea. It would make for a nice explanation if the hardened vent rupture disk was found to be intact, eventually.

 

[Sorai]

Bad source of information but data looks legit. What could be the source of I131 ?
http://fukushima-diary.com/2012/05/iodine-131-measured-in-kawasaki-yokohama-chiba-and-gunma/
http://fukushima-diary.com/2012/05/iodine-131-measured-in-yamanashi/
http://fukushima-diary.com/2012/05/iodine-131-measured-in-tokyo/

Probably medical waste. Iodine-131 is detected regularly in sewage sludge. Here is a paper with the concentrations detected in Tokyo between 1983 and 1994:

https://www.jstage.jst.go.jp/article/jhps1966/33/2/33_2_163/_pdf

The main text is in Japanese, but the abstract and a table with the values detected are in English. Some of the references seem to include studies conducted in other cities.

 

[MadderDoc]

Exactly, here the firemen were, reportedly watering the fuel pool.

They seemed to think it was around the NW corner or near the middle of the floor. Why were they so poorly informed? So there those fearless men were risking their health/lives to merely water debris.

The video you link to would be from the daytime of March 18th, the last day of the attempts to reach the steam plume with water cannons trucks, in turns, from a position in the crossroad NW of the NW corner of the building. It would have been clear to everybody involved that the ~+100 meter distance up to the plumes meant that little water could hit the target.

During the night between March 18th and 19th, the Tokyo Fire Department Hyper Rescue Unit took over, they laid out a hose from the shallow quay at the ocean NE of unit 1 all the way up to the NW corner of unit 3, where they stationed a fire truck with a high extension spray tower. From that position and with that equipment they would have been able to hit the position of the billowing steam more efficiently -- and with the hose laid out they could pump to the top of the building continuously, rather than in the refill cycles of the water cannon trucks.

I am not sure how I would go on about informing the fire department -- called in an emergency to stop a spent fuel pool from boiling dry -- that they should direct their attention to a part of the building which was not steaming.

Edit: Some of the fire-fighters participated in a press-conference after the mission. If I get it right, this firefighter had been asked the question, what was the worst thing about the mission. I think he starts out something like 'My comrades, they.. ' then, well, it speaks for it self.

Lot's o great analyses going on here, esp re the valve. Am I correct in my impression that it seems the valve was of a type that should have allowed the RPV to re-pressurize if there wasn't a hole in it already? If so, this would seem consistent with the massive RPV pressure collapse on Mar 13 as marking time of melt-through, and exactly fitting the model of Ott et al.

Well, not quite, but it was a question posed by that model, that made it seem imperative to know the function of the safety relief valve better. This valve is first of all, a safety valve, it will relieve pressure automatically such as to keep the vessel at a safe level in a pressure band at about 7-8 MPa overpressure relative to the pressure sink, the suppression chamber.

However, the same valve can also be used as a relief valve, to depressurise the vessel intentionally. In that mode, using power and compressed air, the valve is kept internally reconfigured such as to keep the vessel within a pressure band at about 0.35 MPa relative to the suppression chamber.

Ott et al. is about melt down, with following RPV damage, and thus, in principle, the unconditional depressuring of the vessel to become equal with the PCV.

Depressuring by way of relief mode, otoh, would firstly, hinge on the continuous activation of the valve to be in relief mode. (If you loose power, or you have insufficient air pressure, the valve falls back to safety mode.) And secondly, depressuring to become equal with the PCV/suppression chamber would not be the expected behaviour in relief mode, since pressure can be relieved through the valve only above a certain minimum level of overpressure.

I am sure you can see the utility of all this, to make distinctions and judgements of the status of the RVP during events. I am not sure, though, that the toolkit is sharp enough to decide whether RPV damage caused depressuring, or it was the other way around. It might have been the depressuring by relief valve that lost them the last bit of the water inventory remaining in the RPV, thus allowing melted fuel to damage the RPV.

 

[Rive]

I am not sure how I would go on about informing the fire department -- called in an emergency to stop a spent fuel pool from boiling dry -- that they should direct their attention to a part of the building which was not steaming.

By giving them the necessary data?

Sorry, I see no problem here. If there is no immediate danger then every emergency team would ask for maps, floorplans and targets first before moving even a finger.

If they have aimed the plumes then they did it for a reason.

Of course it's possible that the reason was some stupid people who had given them false data, but that's not the point of my post. Firemen are not stupid (the stupid ones dies).

 

[MadderDoc]

If they have aimed the plumes then they did it for a reason.

Yes, possibly. According to officialdom nothing really was achieved, nor could have been achieved, except for more human radiation exposure. In my book this would put the acts of the firefighters in the helpless category, and that of their superiors in the bandit-like. I must apologize if I have come over by my expression, as implying that either of them were stupid, or acting stupidly, I didn't mean to.

 

[SteveElbows]

Exactly, here the firemen were, reportedly watering the fuel pool.

They seemed to think it was around the NW corner or near the middle of the floor. Why were they so poorly informed? So there those fearless men were risking their health/lives to merely water debris.

Actually that's the one example of footage where it always looked to me like they were trying to spray the right part of the building (but mostly falling short).

I haven't seen the fireman footage of spraying the NE part of the building for ages, anyone got a link to that?