LHC - the last chance for all theories of everything?

[John86]

No sorry you are wright. This doesn't work very well in biological systems. I used the human brain merely as a metaphore.

But is this inference proces purely materialistic of nature ?.

 

[Fra]

But is this inference proces purely materialistic of nature ?.

I am not sure what you mean, if you mean if it's materialistic - as opposed to say something spiritual or divine :) Then yes it's materialistic.

However, what does "materialistic" mean? Usually that means it's made of matter, but in the reconstruction I envision matter is also emergent and I reall don't see a firm starting platform, this is exactly why the evolution appears as the ratioanl solution.

There is also a difference between the observers own inference system, and inference systems existing in it's environment (other obserers, or particles etc): From the point of view of any given observer, the inference system of the environment is reflected in it's own emergent inference system.

I picture a mutual selective pressure where at a certain level of equilibirum, the inference systems reach a maximum of consistency, this corresponds to the case where all observers are in maximum agreement about the "laws of physics". But du to intrinsic limitations of complexity, there can never be perfect consistency - this "residual inconsistecy" - manifests as interactions between the observers that are described by the locallly objective laws.

I used the human brain merely as a metaphore.

Ok, then it's great question. But of course, the inference system of the environment, is always inherently uncertain as inferred from the instrinsic perspective of one observer.

So, in my view, the evolving laws means that, not only like QM where we have set laws, and a state of the system (wave function) which evolves, we have both a state of the system, AND a "state" of the inference systems (state of laws) but these laws are not predictable from the inside view, there are only expecations - which gives an arrow of change - and the only way to find out the real future is to act as per the expectations, and also face the feedback.

In a well equilibrated system, one expects a layers of effective objective laws ot have been stabilised, realtive to which we have a time evolution probably like what we have in the current standard model - thus the standard model and QM, corresponds to steady state of effectively stable laws. The residual mutual uncertaints that are irreducible cause interactions that are descried by effectivelt(not fundamentally) fixed laws.

This is exactly how human science also works, but we have not yet translated this logic to physical interactions. I am convinced there is more insight to collect there.

In the end, "material properties" are properties of inferred inference systems, I'm stills struggling but for sure there is a close link with inertial mass and complexity of the inference system. This will also PROBABLY be strongly related to gravitational mass since the inference systems ability to take control of the environment and thus INCREASE it's own complexity(mass) will increase with it's own starting complexity(mass). I see great potentials on howto develop this into something nice.

The phenomenology of interactions would be expected when we can find the steady states of the effective laws. In there we should also hopefilly find some things that are currently "parameters". The parameters are explain as the ones required for a steady state.

/Fredrik

 

[tom.stoer]

But is this inference proces purely materialistic of nature ?.

That's a very good question to step in again. Usually we distinguish (in an ontological sense) between physical objects (like electrons, photons, ...) and the corresponding laws (quantum mechanics, quantum field theory like QED, ...).

As far as I understand the idea of the mathematical universe everything is simply an entity, element, ... of a (consistent) mathematical framework. Therefore the ontologoical difference between physical objects and laws of physics does no longer exist.

@Dmitry67: Am I right?

Now back to the context of evolving laws due to inference processes.

@Fra: is there an ontological difference between objects and laws? are the objects somehow "materialistic" whereas the laws are "super-materialistic", i.e. is there a different level of existence forthe laws? or does the difference between objects and laws no longer makes sense?

If there is no difference between objects and laws then there should be no difference between evolution of laws and interaction of particles.

Tom

 

[Fra]

@Fra: is there an ontological difference between objects and laws? are the objects somehow "materialistic" whereas the laws are "super-materialistic", i.e. is there a different level of existence forthe laws? or does the difference between objects and laws no longer makes sense?

If there is no difference between objects and laws then there should be no difference between evolution of laws and interaction of particles.

Tom

Yes, there is no distinct principal difference! The difference is merely the stability and decidability. Laws are the most stable structures in this evolving view, and they correspond to different levels in a hiearchy.

This is the unification. Nothing escapes the inference framework. Not even the inference system itself. However inference has two extremes: deductive logic or deterministic predictions, or free evolution. I'm exploiting the range in between.

/Fredrk

 

[Fra]

If there is no difference between objects and laws then there should be no difference between evolution of laws and interaction of particles.

In here is also IMO the key to understanding the difference between (as smolin also pointed out about the validity of the current logic of eternal law in subsystems).

The same interaction can appear either described by effective laws, seen from an outside observer controlling/monitoring the environment, or as unpredictable evolution (the inside view).

The key I think is to see that these two pictures are not in contradiction, they are two sides of the same coin and I think one key is the scaling of the complexity of the inference system - this is why from the point of a more massive infrence system, things that to a small inference system appear unpredictable are effectively predictable.

One can think of this also as a sort of deeper "renormalisation" picture. The distinguishable laws are dependent of the complexity. But the scale itself is not objective.

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

One can think of this also as a sort of deeper "renormalisation" picture. The distinguishable laws are dependent of the complexity. But the scale itself is not objective.

Clarification:

One key question in my approach is, How does the inference systems themselves change as we scale the complexity of the inference systems?

This is exactly the same question as to ask, how a physical systems perceives physical laws as the systems get lower and lower mass. Ie. what "laws of physics" does say a proton "see" or a quark "see" and thus act according to?

I think this is a key to the unification. Since the logic of the action of these microconstitutiens are I think constrained by the relative simplicity or low complexity of their inference system.

Gravity I picture here beeing related to the fact that the running of the "complexity scale" is actually related to the physical process of a system loosing or gaining mass (by controling or loosing control of it's environment)

So all interactions, including gravity, really does have a very logical connection here. With some stretch of imagination this is how I probably with some strong biaos of mine interpreted some of Frank Wilzceks ponderings about what symmetry really is.

One can also picture here a plausible way to expect something like asymptotic freedom as we scale down the complexity of the inference system (which is what happens inside the collisions in a high energy experiment), since some interactions themselves become less distinguishable from the inside poitn of view - thus their mutual interacting get weaker.

As far as I see, it's not hard at all to imagine how this inference reasoning connects to many open questions in physics. That's one of the motivators for me. It's really exicting and promising, and it has IMHO a very higg level of coherence in the reasoning, which is very important for me. But indeed it's also currently at least very fuzzy.

/Fredrik

 

[tom.stoer]

Usually we distinguish (in an ontological sense) between physical objects (like electrons, photons, ...) and the corresponding laws (quantum mechanics, quantum field theory like QED, ...).

As I am not sure if everybody understands my reasoning correctly I would like to comment on this remark. Therefore I use a very simply, unrealistic example, namely a universe with only finitely many, structureless, massive bodies interacting via V(r) ~1/r. There are no humans (therefore no measurement, no minds/brains etc.).

1) you have the bodies
2) you have a representation of the bodies, their masses m_i and coordinates r_i; these representations are equivalent to the trajectories
3) you have the physicals laws; in my example there is just one law, namely an Hamiltonian H(r_i, p_i); m-dependence suppressed.
4) initial conditions for the movement of the bodies; these are not contained in 3)
5) in addition you can think about a sheet of paper on which you can write H, draw the trajectories etc.; This is certainly different from (2) and (3); I would say that physical laws "exist" even if there is no sheet of paper or computer monitor to display it.
6) you can introduce god into that theory; he may know about all bodies, laws, trajectories and initial conditions

Note that the existence of (3) is different from the existence of the bodies, simpy because (3) applies for all bodies you can think about, whereas (1) applies on to the bodies which exist in a physical sense. In a universe with three bodies you can still think about applying H to a fictitious fourth body.

As far as I understand the discussion here the aim is to collapse at (1) - (4) into one framework where the differences between them disappears or become irrelevant (just as the difference between the Earth and the moon is irrelevant in the context of Newtonian physics; they are two special cases of massive bodies, nothing else). As this would be a ToE it would certainly contain (5) and (6) as well.

But I think this is where most people will have problems with. It is by no means clear that a physical body and its mathematical representation (in some appropriate framework) are identical! We haven't found such a framework; we cannot even guess how it would look like. I have tried to describe a very simple universe,but still most of iús would agree that the sentence

(M_moon, R_moon) IS the moon

is wrong. It is a representation of the moon.

I have one final question rearding MUH: We discuss very complex issues like universes with different physical laws. Let's discuss one rather simple problem, namely two universes looking absolutely identical, except for the fact that in one universe the solar system is missing. Are these too universes two different mathematical frameworks, or are they on such framework in two different occurences? Does the MUH imply that all those universes (w/ or w/o solar system; w/ or w/o you and me, with other planets) exist? Does the possibility that I am able to write some equations specifiying the movement of a 10th planet in our solar system create universes where this planet exists?

 

[Dmitry67]

As far as I understand the idea of the mathematical universe everything is simply an entity, element, ... of a (consistent) mathematical framework. Therefore the ontologoical difference between physical objects and laws of physics does no longer exist.

@Dmitry67: Am I right?

correct

 

[Dmitry67]

1) you have the bodies
2) you have a representation of the bodies, their masses m_i and coordinates r_i; these representations are equivalent to the trajectories
3) you have the physicals laws; in my example there is just one law, namely an Hamiltonian H(r_i, p_i); m-dependence suppressed.
4) initial conditions for the movement of the bodies; these are not contained in 3)
5) in addition you can think about a sheet of paper on which you can write H, draw the trajectories etc.; This is certainly different from (2) and (3); I would say that physical laws "exist" even if there is no sheet of paper or computer monitor to display it.
6) you can introduce god into that theory; he may know about all bodies, laws, trajectories and initial conditions

This is what Max Tegmark calls a 'baggage'. If you try to get rid of ALL words in this toy universe, you will see that the difference between 2 and 3 will dissapear. 1 is a mere label (definition of a 'body'). 5 does not make any sense. "I would say that physical laws "exist" even if there is no sheet of paper or computer monitor to display it." - correct.

But I guess the your idea to discuss some 'toy' universes is a very good one; we don't know OUR TOE, so it easier to discuss simpler universes. For example, "Game of Life" is a perfect example. So, in the Universe "Game of Life", what is a difference between structures (bodies) and laws? When I was young boy, I discovered that game and played a lot with figures on the chessboard. Does that game require a chessboard?

I think many people agree that methematics can perfectly describe the reality. But (they think) the formulas are dead until you "incarnate" them into something, until you fill them with some substance. But for TOE, there should be no magical substances, because TOE by definition must describe everything.

TOE is different from any theories we had because TOE ends the reduction: "bodies-molecules-atoms-hardrons-quarks-strings.." so the most fundamental entities can not be "made of something". If they are not "made of something" they are just "described by formulas". I don't see any possible void where the difference between the ultimate description of reality and reality can hide.

 

[Dmitry67]

I have one final question rearding MUH: We discuss very complex issues like universes with different physical laws. Let's discuss one rather simple problem, namely two universes looking absolutely identical, except for the fact that in one universe the solar system is missing. Are these too universes two different mathematical frameworks, or are they on such framework in two different occurences? Does the MUH imply that all those universes (w/ or w/o solar system; w/ or w/o you and me, with other planets) exist? Does the possibility that I am able to write some equations specifiying the movement of a 10th planet in our solar system create universes where this planet exists?

So, the laws are identical, but initial conditions are different?

If Universe is infinite, all combinations must happen. But MUH is much easier to be accepted if you accept MWI (eliminating the problem of initial conditions of matter in our universe) and if there is a mechanism to generate all possible Universes with all possible parameters of the Standard Model (eternal inflation?).

MUH will be in big trouble if MWI would be proven wrong or if there are some fundamental initial conditions (God Had choice when created our Universe). This is a good news because it is a falsifiable prediction.

Max Tegmark wrote:

common feature of much string theory related model building is that there is a “landscape” of
solutions, corresponding to spacetime configurations involving different dimensionality, different types of fundamental particles and different values for certain physical “constants” , some or all of which may vary across the landscape. Eternal inflation transforms such potentiality into reality, actually creating regions of space realizing each of these possibilities. However, each such region where inflation has ended is generically infinite
in size, potentially making it impossible for any inhabitants to travel to other regions where these apparent laws of physics are different. If the MUH is correct and
the Level IV multiverse of all mathematical structures (see Section V) exists, this historical trend is completed: even the “theory of everything” equations that physicists
are seeking are an environmental accident, telling us not something fundamental about reality, but instead which particular mathematical structure we happen to inhabit,
like a multiversal telephone number. In other words, this would entail a crushing complete
defeat of fundamental physical laws. However, contrary to how it may at first appear, it would not constitute a victory for initial conditions in the traditional sense.

There is nothing “initial” about specifying a mathematical structure. Whereas the traditional notion of initial conditions entails that our universe “started out” in some particular state, mathematical structures do not exist in an external space or time, are not created or destroyed, and in many cases also lack any internal structure resembling time. Instead, the MUH leaves no room for “initial conditions”, eliminating them altogether. This is because the mathematical structure is by definition a complete description of the physical world. In contrast, a TOE saying that our universe just “started out” or “was created” in some unspecified state constitutes an incomplete description, thus violating both the MUH and the
ERH.

 

[Fra]

As I am not sure if everybody understands my reasoning correctly I would like to comment on this remark.

If you were referring to me then I defeinitely think I see your position. It's just that I don't share it so to speak. My arguments serve to try to convey why your position is questionable from my point of view, and what the weaknessess are. But it doesn't mean I don't see your position.

But indeed, I also see what the weaknesses of my view are - from your point of view.

Somehow I think this mutual understanding is as far as we can get until you agree to join the dark side ;-)

I feel I have tried the structural realist side. It was the side I am coming from and my own reasoning and experience has lead my onto another path because the realist/axiomatic view has IMO serioust problems, some of that I think you posted about as well, and it's not cast in stone but it would take extraordinary arguments or input the revise this position.

6) you can introduce god into that theory; he may know about all bodies, laws, trajectories and initial conditions

This is one of the things I objected to before. The birds view supposedly justifies the realism. But as long as the complete birds view is inaccessible, which it is for several reasons it seems to be only a mental construct to justify a (from my point of view) "flawed" reasoning.

But I think you know my position there already no need to repeat.

But I think this is where most people will have problems with. It is by no means clear that a physical body and its mathematical representation (in some appropriate framework) are identical! We haven't found such a framework; we cannot even guess how it would look like.

Maybe I mix up your comments on the evolving law idea, and Dmitrys view, so I am not sure to whom this was addressed.

If the comment applies to my view, then it's true that many has problems with it. It's like having the ground under you removed. But that we cannot even guess is not fair I think. I think the latest discussions has hinted at least conceptually how the framwork could look like. At least to speak for myself, I have a much better guess even if it's currently immature how this evolving framework is going to solve problems, than ideas howto make progress starting from the QFT framework and GR without changing anything.

The most common and most natural objection to the somewhat inference approach is I think that it renders everything apparently subjective, and that it would be hard to do science without an objective basis. I've tried to explain how this is not a problem once you see the whole picture.

But as far as I know, compare to string theory and the other large competing approaches, it seems that almost nooone is working seriously on this. Wether it's because no one has any ides or simply because the ideas are suppressed by the community is another discussion.

So I certainly have ideas on this framework, and I will also keeping searching for it independently of wether most others aren't motivated. The price I pay is of course, that I am on my own, an this is constrained to beeing a sidetrack along with alternative professional carriers. But I think that is a reasonable price ot pay. It would not make sense for the public to invest in all small possibilities. That some minor approaches are suppressed is somehow how the world works.

New ideas doesn't necessarily come out of the mainstream work. So the fact that there aren't much "almost mainstream" ideas on how this framework is like is not one bit discouraging or surprising for me.

/Fredrik

 

[Dmitry67]

Fra, it was difficult for me to formulate the question about your approach, because everything looked so fuzzy. But now I have one:

So, everything is subjective. Say, there are observers O1, O2, ON, ... etc

Is view of different observes consistent? Or is the notion of self-consistency applicable? If yes, then to what extent? For example, in the macroscopic realism approach all views are consistent on the macroscopic level. But in MWI, view of observers in different branches is not macroscopically consistent (in different branches, but consistent in the same branch). Is it possible that O1 is observing the dead cat, O2 - alive cat, and O3 denies the existence of observers O1 and O2? Are there any invariants in your approach?

 

[tom.stoer]

@Fra: I am sorry for the confusion. I did NOT address you, neither with the comment that not everybody is clear about the problems, nor with the problems people have about the approaxches just discussed.

Why I was posting this was mainly because I found one aspect which seems to be common to both, Fra and Dmitry67, namely the fact that the differences between objects, representation of objects and laws for the objects fades away. In that sense both approaches are even more radical than evolving law, multiverses etc. Therefore I think that even people who could basically agree would refuse to agree to the more radical implications.

 

[Fra]

Dmitry, we concluded previously that we differ quite a bit, so my response to the below questions are relative to my reasoning.

Is view of different observes consistent?

Note that an "inconsistency" requires an inference system, and in the deductive inference inconsistency usually means you can make two deductions which shows a contradiction, say something beeing both true and false at the same time. Such inference system is "inconsistent".

But in my view, the inference system itsel is evoling, and always uncertain! An inconsistency of the type above in this case, simply is an "observation" that decreases the confidence in the inference system in question, which effectively is why it evolves.

Is view of different observes consistent?

Also for this to even have meaning in my view, the observers must be interacting.

In this respect I think Rovelli phrased it well in his RQM paper that the only way for two observers to relate their measurements is to communicate - ie. to interact.

So given that requirement, then a certain form of consistency or consensus between the observer is emergent, as a result of the interaction.

This means that in my view

- observers that aren't interacting, does not even have the notion of mutual consistency defined since it is only defined throught the interaction.

- even observers that are communicating, can be inconsistent transiently, but mutual inconsistency always means off-equilibrium and thus interaction forces.

The main difference from the standard notion of consistency as defined by say a symmetry transformation, is that in my view this transformation itself is not given, it's emergent, and without interactions the transformation itself is undefined.

But in MWI, view of observers in different branches is not macroscopically consistent (in different branches, but consistent in the same branch).

I'm not much into MWI, but certainly if the observers are in different non-interacting branches the notion of consistency has no meaning; which also means that any INconsistency is IMO simply unphysical because hte physical event realising the "inconsistency" will never happen.

Is it possible that O1 is observing the dead cat, O2 - alive cat, and O3 denies the existence of observers O1 and O2? Are there any invariants in your approach?

Sure, that's possible. but wether it's a stable state or likely to be observered is another question :)

In my view, it's not so much a question of what's possible, but more of what's probable to
be observed. In general inconsistencies means interaction forces, which means off-equilibrium.

Are there any invariants in your approach?

There are subjectively EXPECTED invariants, that is reflected in the action of the observer. But these invariants are not universal, global or objective and are generall subject to evolution as real interactions take place.

/Fredrik

 

[friend]

Note that an "inconsistency" requires an inference system, and in the deductive inference inconsistency usually means you can make two deductions which shows a contradiction, say something beeing both true and false at the same time. Such inference system is "inconsistent".

But in my view, the inference system itsel is evoling, and always uncertain! An inconsistency of the type above in this case, simply is an "observation" that decreases the confidence in the inference system in question, which effectively is why it evolves.

In this respect I think Rovelli phrased it well in his RQM paper that the only way for two observers to relate their measurements is to communicate - ie. to interact.

So given that requirement, then a certain form of consistency or consensus between the observer is emergent, as a result of the interaction. /Fredrik

Fredrik, your "theory" or "view" seems to lack any faith in reason or logic. And I see an inconsistency in what reasoning you so far present.

What you are suggesting is that there is no system of logic applicable to all of reality independent of observation. But isn't that what we are forced to assume, unless we are to think there is something in reality that is inherently illogical. That doesn't sound like a very plausible scientific premise to build any kind of theory on. I think the scientific expectation that all things are reasonable means we have to start with the assumption that all things are logically consistent with each other. The only question after that is how does that dictate the math we are to use.

Can consistency "emerge" from an illogical basis? That seems to be what you are saying. But I think that is impossible. Consistency can only be derived from a logical system - and not from a system of contradictions. If different Observers see everything to be logical arbitrarily close or distant from each other, then the entire universe must be everywhere and always a consistent set of facts.

If you think your theory somewhere can have inconsistencies in it, then your theory is so vague and speculative that it would be impossible to write any mathematics to describe it. I think you need to come to your senses and appologize for your incomprehensible musings.

 

[qsa]

friend, do you think this website can support DR Max Tegmark's theory

http://www.qsa.netne.net

 

[friend]

friend, do you think this website can support DR Max Tegmark's theory

http://www.qsa.netne.net

Obviously we have no choice but to describe reality with mathematics; there is no other language capable of describing it. But there are things in reality that have properties that are discovered through experiment, mass and charge of an electron, for example. These "inherent" properties are the 30 or so constants inserted by hand into the Standard Model. However, it is hoped that eventually we will find some mathematical explanation for these inherent properties, and so they too will be derived mathematically from some more basic theory. So ultimately I think all of reality can be derived from a pure mathematical/logical basis. We just haven't found that basis yet.

Everything having a mathematical basis does not mean that every mathematical system describes reality. It might describe a subset of what we know because it may serve as an approximation in some limited realm. For example, the system of whole numbers can be used to count apples in a basket. But that does not mean that reality is limited by this narrow subset of mathematics.

So the question is what mathematics can we trust will lead to a theory of everything. I suppose we will not be sure until it reproduces something familiar to physicists, like the basic formulation of QM or GR.

 

[Fra]

Friend, I certainly respect your position that you don't see any possible way howto make sense of of the reasoning I advocate.

There is a certainly a clear kind of logic in my approach, but it seems you do not see it, or you see it as inconistent, that's because I don't believe in rigid axiomatic deductive inference - that systems seems not flexible enough to efficiently describe nature.

I guess we will see in the future if we are able to overcome all problems and solve all open problems in physics without radically finding a more flexible framework.

What you are suggesting is that there is no system of logic applicable to all of reality independent of observation. But isn't that what we are forced to assume, unless we are to think there is something in reality that is inherently illogical.

Let's just note for a fact, that the logic system we are all talking about here ARE in fact inferred from interactions - human laboratory interactions with nature. Even mathematics and logic are produced by humans as a result of contemplation and study of nature.

So what I am suggesting is not really as insane as it may first seem, if you see it in the right way.

Maybe you you then say that Earth and nature and the laws of nature was here long before humans - yes of course it was, but at a lower level even matter was once not here, instead it was maybe emergent from a great chaos?

I think the scientific expectation that all things are reasonable means we have to start with the assumption that all things are logically consistent with each other. The only question after that is how does that dictate the math we are to use.

What I suggest is not all that different to what you say. The difference is wether the logic system is fixed and eternal, or if it's emergent?

At human level for example, are we creating the laws of physics or are we discovering them?

I'm saying there is no clear difference.

Can consistency "emerge" from an illogical basis? That seems to be what you are saying. But I think that is impossible. Consistency can only be derived from a logical system - and not from a system of contradictions.

I think I have tried to explain all this already, but I'm sorry to not be able to be more clear but this isn't easy stuff. And there are for sure many unsolved problem as well.

But the problem even in Your approach, from a scientific point of view is, when a given "logic system" or say "theory" is proving WRONG, it when it's falsified - HOW do you find a new theory without starting from scratch? - This is where my main point is, here my view contains a rational scheme for howto infere the new inference system from the old system given detection of slight inconsistency.

This even develops the scientific method in the area where popper left a whole - the logic of hypothesis generation? Hypothesis TESTING is the easyl part.

If you think your theory somewhere can have inconsistencies in it, then your theory is so vague and speculative that it would be impossible to write any mathematics to describe it. I think you need to come to your senses and appologize for your incomprehensible musings.

I don't see what I need to apologize for, except that I am sorry that I don't have more progress made. I rather see adding my point of view in here as part of an intellectual discussion in the search for the framework what can solve the real problems in physics.

As I said before, the real argument is when solution on open problems are on the table. Until them I have to admit I find the competing arguemtns far more inconsistent, simply consistency doesn't lead to uniqeuness. The evolving logic system solves to a larger extent the question of "why these laws".

/Fredrik

 

[Dmitry67]

Fra, do all observers share the same verson of mathematics? Is it possible that for some observers 2+2=5?

 

[qsa]

Dmitry, do you think this website can support DR Max Tegmark's theory

http://www.qsa.netne.net

I hope you got the private message I sent you

 

[Fra]

Fra, do all observers share the same verson of mathematics? Is it possible that for some observers 2+2=5?

I am not sure what you mean here, you probably need to provide an example so I can interpret this.

A fundamental thing in my view is that in a certain sense all observers share what I call a natural or rational action. There is a way of "counting evidence", and from each inside view this framework is in a certain same the same. The reason for this expectation is that any observer not implementing a rational action (the meaning of this is a different discussion so I'll leave that) will be exposed to forces that selects for a particular change.

My view would contain a reconstruction of a kind a new probabilistic framework, where the "probability" rather than frequentists intrepretation is a sort of "inside count" of evidence. Then from such a picture, there is a "natural action" which is closely relate to the principle of minimum information divergence, also related to max ent principles and principle of least action.

I'm basically looking for a deeper way to infere a transition amplitude a la path intergral, where the action itself is defined through a recursive flow. So the action S is not hardcoded, it's itself evolving.

In there, my basic conjecture is that there is a rational and natural way to count evidence, and the so constructed "information state" contains a natural action! No need to postulate wicked string actions, the action is a natural action in the inference system.

This of statistical mechanics, where the microstructure defines a natural measure of missing information (entropy). Now picture this idea much more genralised, where the microstructure is not a baggage but rather is a result of evolution, and also the microstructure is more complex, like a system of related structures, defined by transformations, like a complex memory system. Then such a complex microstructure-system implies a much more complex "natural action" also for changes. This is what I'm trying to work out.

A space of differential changs are defined, and on that space a natural information divergence measure is defined. That defines a transition amplitued for each possibility. But as the microstructure is not one simple space, but an evolved system of spaces, and the microstructure is not based on continuous probabilit but on "counting evidence" (basically a combinatorical approach) interesting new logic emerges. Quantum logic superposition are expected gets natural explanation here. quantum logic is simlpy (at times) more FIT than classical logic.

When I have worked this out, I will produce some papers for sure. Until then I constrain my reasoning here to general IMO sound arguments.

When I get to the point of publishing something concrete one can talk about "theory", and it will be more readily subject to critics. To me it's simple, either this will produce new insights or it will not. If not, it's a failure.

/Fredrik

 

[Dmitry67]

But what value your "theory" might have if we don't agree that all observers share the same logic? Then your theory can be valid for observer Fra but not be me

 

[Fra]

But what value your "theory" might have if we don't agree that all observers share the same logic? Then your theory can be valid for observer Fra but not be me

Of course, the theory will be the same for me and you, and all scientists on earth. This is explained by the emergent objectivity. The basis for our expectations are massive enough, and we are well equilibrated enough to be exactly in consistenct _for all practical purposes_.

I never said that everything is totally subjective in an uncontrolled way, that would make little sense. This makes sense only if complemented with a mechanism for emergent objectivity. This emergence, is a physical process, but if we are talking about the laws of subatomic physics for example, not doubt all of us will be in agreement.

The supposed value of this approach, is that it will explain the choice of the emergent physical laws. In particular interesting is this to me when you consider the case where the observers are not you and me, bu say a proton an a neutron for example. I think this scheme will constrain the possible mutual actions of these systems.

The predictive power here, is that the insight of the "inside perspecitve" will allow us humans from an external perspecitve defined by a laboratory frame to constrain how the actions of microphysics is like, what symmetries we have etc. So this should eventually (when it's mature) give clear predictions.

The idea is to use the zero end of the complexity scale, to constrain the possible actions. And then see what happens as the complexity scale grows. This complexity scaling is also given a physical interpretation as generation of mass.

This is why the laws of physics emerge along with massive observers(matter).

Sure, maybe I will fail in this vision, but that's my loss, I'm not eating anyones elses investments :) Unfortunately the same can not be said about some other approaches.

/Fredrik

 

[ConradDJ]

I think many people agree that mathematics can perfectly describe the reality. But (they think) the formulas are dead until you "incarnate" them into something, until you fill them with some substance. But for TOE, there should be no magical substances, because TOE by definition must describe everything.

TOE is different from any theories we had because TOE ends the reduction: "bodies-molecules-atoms-hadrons-quarks-strings.." so the most fundamental entities can not be "made of something". If they are not "made of something" they are just "described by formulas". I don't see any possible void where the difference between the ultimate description of reality and reality can hide.

Hi Dmitry --

The difference between a “reality” and a “description” of that reality is that a reality is assumed to exist and to be well-defined “in itself”, while a description requires a context in which what is described has meaning, in some sense – i.e. makes a definable difference to something else.

To me, the fundamental point of both Relativity and QM is that we don’t have a base-level “reality” that’s well-defined in itself, without requiring any frame of reference or any context of interaction to define it. What’s physical about the physical world is not that it’s “made of something”, but that it’s observable – that it provides reference-frames and interaction-contexts that make everything in it physically meaningful.

Of course both Relativity and QM are mathematical theories. And in both cases, we can certainly ignore the questions about what makes things observable and why observing something makes a difference to the ways in which its description is determinate.

If we look only at the mathematics, lo and behold, everything looks well-defined – because it’s easy for us to convince ourselves that logic and mathematical structures “exist” in some absolute sense. We live in a physical environment that gives us lots of distinct identifiable objects, so counting makes sense, “A=A” makes sense. The physical world has a very clear and simple geometry, so the concept of a point or an interval or a vector makes sense. Even something as paradoxical as a “continuum” of points makes intuitive sense to us, because of the way our world is physically structured. We can hardly imagine a world in which these ideas don’t make sense.

However, we’ve learned that in the early stages of our universe, the physical conditions did not exist that would make any of these basic concepts meaningful. We tend to assume that this doesn’t matter – that the basic structure of the world will turn out to be well-defined mathematically, and that the mathematical structure is all physics cares about anyway.

That’s a reasonable point of view, but not necessarily correct. The other point of view is that the context of relationships that let's things be defined and observed, that let them make a definite difference to each other, is important and can’t be neglected. As Fredrik says, this is not necessarily “subjective” – we’re not talking about “conscious” observers. We’re talking about the aspects of physical structure that provide a context of meaningful definition for other aspects of physical structure.

Ultimately, as you know, mathematics is based on undefined elements – points and lines, for example – and logical operations like “=”, also undefined except for their formal properties. Physics is different – everything in physics has physical meaning because there’s a context of other physically observable regularities to which it can make an observable difference.

Even if each of these regularities is describable mathematically – and I assume that’s the case – the functionality of such a system of mutually-defining types of structure is something entirely different from the formal self-consistency of a mathematical system.

I don’t think Tegmark’s point of view has any real merit – except that it demonstrates the difficulty we have in conceptualizing the difference between “physical” and “mathematical” -- as obvious that difference is to us in ordinary life. The world he describes is the world of all possible mathematical structures... and so? By claiming this is the physical world, all he’s doing is making explicit the common assumption that we can safely ignore the aspects of physical structure that make things observable.

 

[ConradDJ]

Also for this [consistency] to even have meaning in my view, the observers must be interacting.

In this respect I think Rovelli phrased it well in his RQM paper that the only way for two observers to relate their measurements is to communicate - ie. to interact.

So given that requirement, then a certain form of consistency or consensus between the observer is emergent, as a result of the interaction.

This means that in my view

- observers that aren't interacting, does not even have the notion of mutual consistency defined since it is only defined through the interaction.

- even observers that are communicating, can be inconsistent transiently, but mutual inconsistency always means off-equilibrium and thus interaction forces.

The main difference from the standard notion of consistency as defined by say a symmetry transformation, is that in my view this transformation itself is not given, it's emergent, and without interactions the transformation itself is undefined.

I'm not much into MWI, but certainly if the observers are in different non-interacting branches the notion of consistency has no meaning...

Fredrik – I just want to underline this point, with which I completely agree.

Rovelli points to this “emergent” agreement among observers as what’s most remarkable about the structure of the world as described by QM. But as I’ve said before, he doesn’t go further to tell us what’s involved here – what the structures are that make this work.

I think you’re right that there’s a parallel between what scientists do in observing things and developing a coherent picture of the world, and what happens in the world itself at a basic level. What’s “physical” about our world, I argued in the post above, is precisely that it develops a coherent “picture” of itself through physical communications among all its participants.

It seems reasonable to me that your quest for an internal inference-logic would play a role here – just because the “picture” intercommunicated among things is not precisely well-focused to begin with, being limited by the discrete quantum nature of interaction.

But it seems to me the most basic issue has to do with the existence of observation-contexts (“measurement situations”) in which any information at all can be conveyed – since without some sort of primitive information-exchange, inference has no data to work with.

 

[Dmitry67]

Ultimately, as you know, mathematics is based on undefined elements – points and lines, for example – and logical operations like “=”, also undefined except for their formal properties. Physics is different – everything in physics has physical meaning because there’s a context of other physically observable regularities to which it can make an observable difference.

Mathematical entities are abstract. They are not reducted to the simpler entities; but it is wrong to say that they are undefined! They are defined using the relationships between them.

This is exactly what we expect from TOE. If some theory would say that time consists of timions, and strings constist of vibrions, then by definition it would not be TOE - it would be just a another step towards the understanding the structure vibrions and timions.

In TOE the ultimate entities MUST (it is not a justified hope - there is just no alternatives) be abstract, defined (exactly like in mathematics) based on the relationship with them.

 

[ConradDJ]

Mathematical entities are abstract. They are not reducted to the simpler entities; but it is wrong to say that they are undefined! They are defined using the relationships between them...

In TOE the ultimate entities MUST (it is not a justified hope - there is just no alternatives) be abstract, defined (exactly like in mathematics) based on the relationship with them.

I get your first point... my old geometry teacher gave us points and lines as undefined elements, but it probably does make more sense to think of them as inter-defined, in terms of each other. However what makes them "abstract" is that there is no requirement that anything actually be observed by anything else -- i.e. that any information about anything be communicated. We are happy to stay in the realm of abstract definitions, where an interaction is just an instance of an equation -- nothing actually "happens" and no information is exchanged.

In a mathematical system, what counts as a "point of view"? Surely it's true that in the physical world that there are points of view, and information in fact gets exchanged between them. To quote Rovelli, "Physics is about the descriptions systems give of other physical systems."

So my point is just that the kind of inter-definition you're talking about is something quite different from the mutually-defining observation-contexts that we know exist in the physical world. You don't have to be in a mathematical system to "see" it -- in fact there's no meaning to being in it, and the "seeing" is a purely mental activity.

This is not to say that observation-contexts may not someday be modeled in some sort of mathematical system. But envisioning them abstractly, "from the outside", will still be something purely mental, derived from an actual experience of physically being-there, participating with things.

Again, I don't mean to deny the rationality of a viewpoint that says -- whether things are observable has nothing to do with the basic physics. But QM has clearly called this into question, at least. So it's also reasonable to try to understand physical observation-contexts and how they differ from mathematical contexts of definition.

 

[Dmitry67]

ConradDJ, so what you are saying is that mathematical structure is different from reality, because it is 'dead'. In order for any mathematical structure to become reality, there must be some magic process used, a process, which 'incarnates' the formulas into reality (or how hawking called it "breathing fire into formulas"). I just wanted to confirm that my version of your vision is correct before I answer.

 

[qsa]

ConardDJ, I don't know what Dmitry has in store for you, but you can look at it this way. We can write this equation x^2+y^2=r^2 and then draw a circle that represents it, wow! We have already breathed life into our equation. Now complicate your equation and as its solution complicated structure resembling particles interacting gravity doing its job and you start plotting them. as your model is so sophisticated (a 22nd century physics) early life begins to appear...and so on. When you look at your 3D computer screen(probably made by sony-just trying to be funny-!) you see people are doing their thing( not unlike how nurbs mathematics generate one hell of a realistic scene. Do they feel alive and real? You bet. for us are in a computer or we exist because of the imperativeness of the existence of math, that is a secondary question and I think with our power of science at that time the question should answered relatively easy.

 

[friend]

What I suggest is not all that different to what you say. The difference is wether the logic system is fixed and eternal, or if it's emergent?

But the problem even in Your approach, from a scientific point of view is, when a given "logic system" or say "theory" is proving WRONG, it when it's falsified - HOW do you find a new theory without starting from scratch? - This is where my main point is, here my view contains a rational scheme for howto infere the new inference system from the old system given detection of slight inconsistency.

Fredrik

dude, either something exists or it does not. For what observer is that ever going to change? If things exist, then you can count them. For what observer is that ever going to change?

The trouble here is that abstractly, we can consider the possibility that something does not exist. Our logic has both true and false values. But in reality there is no state of non-existence. There is no physical entity that does not exist. What we are left with is a logical conjunction of all the little pieces that do exist. If anyone of them did not exist, then that would make the whole thing a false description.

The question is how do you manipulate a conjunction of propositions you can count into mathematical formulas that describe physics? Every mathematical formula asserts that given some input a particular outcome results. And this is exactly what the logical operation of "material implication" does, if a premise is true (or given) then a conclusion results. So the trick is to somehow represent a conjunction in terms of implication and to describe implication in mathematical terms to see if you get something that looks like physics.

I've seen this done. But it is not on the arXiv yet. If you want to see the math, just PM me.

 

[Dmitry67]

Rereading your post...

Ultimately, as you know, mathematics is based on undefined elements – points and lines, for example – and logical operations like “=”, also undefined except for their formal properties. Physics is different – everything in physics has physical meaning because there’s a context of other physically observable regularities to which it can make an observable difference.

So, physical structures are different from the purely mathematical ones, because they are physical? :)

So my question, as you could probably quess, how you can tell a physical system from a purely mathematical one? (this question is not so easy as it sounds)

 

[qsa]

When a complex molecule is simulated on a computer with mathematical modeling, you can see how it vibrates and responds to environment, it looks alive. The algorithms that produced those molecules (however crude) are mathematical containing line, points, vectors, surfaces, probabilities, you name it. What we conjecture, that by a similar process we the “physical” become alive because of computation. The only difference is we can see the simulation of ourselves by ourselves without a computer screen. And this simulation is real because math is the only thing that is real = fact, what else could be? It will always exist regardless. Everything else is considered to be subjective by definition because of not being “scientific”. In another word, I can tell you what math is but can you tell me what physical is really, hay, and don’t explain it using mathematics ok, I’ll be really mad!

 

[qsa]

When a complex molecule is simulated on a computer with mathematical modeling, you can see how it vibrates and responds to environment, it looks alive. The algorithms that produced those molecules (however crude) are mathematical containing line, points, vectors, surfaces, probabilities, you name it. What we conjecture, that by a similar process we the “physical” become alive because of computation. The only difference is we can see the simulation of ourselves by ourselves without a computer screen. And this simulation is real because math is the only thing that is real = fact, what else could be? It will always exist regardless. Everything else is considered to be subjective by definition because of not being “scientific”. In another word, I can tell you what math is but can you tell me what physical is really, hay, and don’t explain it using mathematics ok, I’ll be really mad!

 

[Fra]

I think I've tried to convey and motivate the ideas behind evolving INDUCTIVE inference system and law, as constrast to fixed, external realist type of DEDUCTIVE inference. There is no point for me in repeating more or less the same arguments over and over again. If what I already said doesn't make sense, I'm afraid just echoing it again probably won't help, so I'll try to fade out my voice of this discussion for now at least :)

/Fredrik

 

[member 11137]

A very interesting discussion indeed : what is the physical reality of a mathematical object? And what is its ability to represent the reality? The strange point here is that any mathematical tool or object has at least one real representation : ink on the paper. And why should mathematical tools not also have a 3D representation? (e. g. the cubes of my theory).
Other point since the discussion here seems to be very general: do we really know what a mass is? It is usualy unserstood as a synonym of energy. But do we know what energy is? I mean we do not really progress in labeling things of which we in fact ignore the signification. I mean we have to propose a personal and courageaus representation of the nature if we want to progress. E. g.: Could it be that a mass is not describing the property of an object but is in reality just a natural tool to avoid discontinuity of the topologic background of our universe? a kind of propagating surgery kit? Who knows?
Best regards.