- #106
TheStatutoryApe
- 296
- 4
russ_watters said:You're not being very clear: you state what the law/Constitution requires, but don't state what you think the violations are - perhaps by stating the criteria you mean to imply all criteria were violated? Let me make it clear - there are two separate issues:
1. Was Padilla eligible for long-term detention based on the Constitutional criteria for suspending the writ of habeas corpus?
2. Was the President authorized to make that call based on Congress's war authorization?
I'm guessing that your post is meant to imply you think the answer to both questions is "no".
In the courts, the answer to #2 was what went back and forth, with the last decision being a "no" answer. Your first link says in the first sentence on page 4 that because the answer to #2 was "no", they declined to addresses question #1. Despite being more important and broader, it is putting the cart before the horse: you have to have the right signature on the paperwork before you decide if the content of the paperwork is correct.
Your second link answers "yes" to #2 and therefore addresses #1: It states explicitly that Padilla "clearly and unmistakably" qualifies for detention under the Constitutional criteria. How could it be otherwise? Fighting a war against the US government on American soil is absolutely an invasion or rebellion (with the difference between the two simply being the motivation).
Again, it is my opinion that by the criteria of the Constitution, Padilla's detention was legal. This is physical justice (as explained in my discussions of the multiple definitions of "justice"). The answer to #2 is debateable and I don't have a firm yea or nea opinion on it, but only comment that when the (potential) violation is almost literally a matter of who'se signature is on the piece of paper authorizing the detention, it is an injustice of paperwork and not an injustice of action. And I care much more about action than paperwork.
I may need to make another thread for this point, but a recent counter-example in Philly has me pretty annoyed: 30 years ago we had a guy essentially execute a cop and he'd been on death row until a few days ago. An appeals court ordered a new sentencing hearing due to the potential that the jury had been confused by their orders on sentencing. You see, mitigating circumstances don't require a unanamous vote, but aggravating circumstances do and the way their orders were worded, it was potentially confusing (though no evidence of confusion existed and interviews with the foreman recently show there was no confusion). So for a weak wording of procedure that was moot anyway, justice is not going to be carried out: after 30 years of appeals, the DA is no longer going to pursuse it. More often it seems, it is the paperwork justice that prevents physical justice from being carried out. And that annoys me.
You are still making the same mistake. It was not a matter of whose signature was on the paper. One way or another it will be the President as the President is the Commander-in-Chief. Congress has the constitutional authority to suspend habeas corpus under certain circumstances; the President, in the role of Commander-in-Chief, then has the authority to detain militarily based on that authorization. There was never any question as to whether it should have been the President or Congress who "signed" to have Padilla detained. The question was whether or not the authorization existed and, if so, whether or not that authorization was itself constitutional. If the answer to either of those questions was "no" then Padilla's eligibility for detention was completely irrelevant as one can not be eligible for illegal detention. So the answer to question #1 was necessarily contingent upon the answer to #2, it was not just a matter of dotting "i"s and crossing "t"s before getting to the meat of the matter.
The reasonings in the decisions necessarily, though perhaps somewhat indirectly, go to the constitutionality of holding Padilla indefinitely under military detention regardless of any authorization. The wording in the constitution ("The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it." -- Article I, Section 9) would seem to be a recognition of the difficulty in maintaining such civil niceties in cases where the civil system is not capable of functioning. Typically the terms "invasion" and "rebellion" do not conjure the idea of a couple people attempting to make and plant bombs but something more along the lines of large scale societal break down. The earliest precedent noted in this case is Ex Parte Milligan from the Civil War Era. The decision in Milligan was that the military detention and trial of persons arrested in areas where the civil system was functional was not constitutional and this was despite both the war and the congressional authorization for suspension of habeas corpus...
"If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the theatre of active military operations, where war really prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power. Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined to the locality of actual war."
In Ex Parte Quirin the prisoners had already been tried and convicted before a military commission. The court only made the decision that the military commission was lawful and constitutional and that the prisoners, who were all admitted agents of an enemy nation with only one having a tenuous claim of citizenship that was rejected by the court, had received a proper trial under the appropriate authority. They basically affirmed a conviction and denied habeas corpus as being moot. There were no decisions regarding indefinite detention. Indefinite detention without charge or trial is what habeas corpus is primarily concerned with. Note that the prisoners in Quirin were arrested charged and convicted within approximately one month to two months.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld was heavily relied upon in the Fourth Circuit decision of Padilla's case. The Hamdi decision specifically says that US citizens may not be held indefinitely without habeas corpus. A US citizen must, at the least, be charged and allowed to challenge their status as enemy combatants. Hamdi was also captured and detained by the military in Afghanistan while in a combat zone. Considering the Hamdi case was only decided one year before the Padilla case made it to the Fourth Circuit it would seem that the issue of indefinite detention was more or less solved by Hamdi before hand. Remember that the government released Padilla to be tried in a Civil Court before the SCOTUS could get its hands on the case? That is probably because Hamdi had only three dissenting opinions and two of those three dissented because they believed that the President can only detain US citizens with a general suspension of habeas corpus due to invasion or rebellion and Congress's AUMF was unconstitutional as applied to citizens. Only one Justice actually supported the government's position in Hamdi.