North Korea about to launch ICBM test and/or space satellite

[Count Iblis]

I don't think the US tested any devices designed to down missiles. The reason is that a successful launch would have led to the satellite going into orbit. So, if it falls short for any reason, it could in theory just not make it into orbit and then fall back impacting in some residential area.


Instead the conventional ABM systems were on standby to attempt to shoot down any debris from a failed launch attempted if they would threaten to hit Japan.

 

[Count Iblis]

It looks like the West suffered a huge setback at the UNSC. China and Russia urged restraint, to them the launch was no big deal.

 

[Phrak]

Dispersing at altitude above a city could be far more effective than a parcel post. You want to expose a large population.

This is ineffective without a twofold delivery system, as discovered by Aum Shinrikyo, famous for their 1995 sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system. Cities generate an updraft.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

I don't think the US tested any devices designed to down missiles. The reason is that a successful launch would have led to the satellite going into orbit. So, if it falls short for any reason, it could in theory just not make it into orbit and then fall back impacting in some residential area.

It would have never deployed the satellite. Also, the trajectory would be determined by the timing of the LASER shot.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

It looks like the West suffered a huge setback at the UNSC. China and Russia urged restraint, to them the launch was no big deal.

That's okay. Now its even less of a big deal.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

Instead the conventional ABM systems were on standby to attempt to shoot down any debris from a failed launch attempted if they would threaten to hit Japan.

Source?

 

[russ_watters]

It is easiest to hit before the boost stage. I don't know the publically stated limitations beyond that; nor do we have anyway to know if the claimed limitations are true. Our true abilities here are certainly most highly classified.

I would guess that the publically stated limitations are those of the National Missile Defense program.

There are two important reasons why the publicly available information about our ABM capabilities is probably pretty close to accurate:

1. Technical reality: these systems are big and it is extremely difficult to hide them and keep them secret. You can't launch an interceptor ballistic missile from Kwajalein and have it fly 2500 miles and not expect people to notice.
2. Politics: ABM is a strategic deterrence issue. It can't do it's primary job (preventing an attack) if people don't know it exists.

There are actually quite a handful of ABM technologies under development by the US, most of which have gotten very little press. This year, Boeing will be testing their Airborne Laser (a 747 with a nose-mounted turret), capable of shooting down ballistic missiles at a range of somewhere around 300 miles. That's the one I'm most excited about. It makes scud-type missiles obsolte.

For this specific incident, however, the only ABM defense we have in service that is any good happens to be very good and it almost certainly was deployed by both the US and Japan to protect Japan had the trajectory looked suspect: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-161_Standard_missile_3 [edit] a source of the claim about what we had in the area, requested by Ivan from someone else:

So if the North Koreans moved toward a launch, the U.S. military should have time to weigh the options. The U.S. Navy has at least two ships in the region that may be prepared to track and intercept a missile, including the USS John S. McCain, configured for ballistic missile defense; Japan also has two Aegis destroyers equipped with the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3). A reconfigured SM-3, incidentally, was used in the shoot-down of a disabled spy satellite by a Navy cruiser last year. So the bottom line seems to be: If we have a fair amount of warning, the odds may be pretty decent that we can shoot something down.

Not completely certain of what we had there, just highly likely we had some good ABM defense ready if it was deemed needed.

The SM-3 is the best we have so far for the simple reason that it is mature technology: basically all that was done to make it was to add an additional booster to an existing SAM and change some software in it and the ship-based radar that controls it...and add the exo-atmospheric "kill vehicle" (warhead with guidance). In the case of the radar, the software change was simply the removal of an artificially inserted range limitation.

 

[russ_watters]

Iraq did have chemical weapons, although not during either of the Gulf Wars (IIRC). They also did attack Israel with Scuds (analogous to DPRK threatening Seoul), but these were neutralized quickly.

This is a minor side issue, but the post-war analysis indicates that the Patriot missile largely failed in its stated mission (shooting down scuds), it succeeded in its real mission (keeping Israel out of the war).

And yes, it is nearly certain that Iraq had chemical weapons in 1991. Less certain is when, exactly, they were gotten rid of and where they went.

How much damage, realistically, could DPRK inflict before its artillery units were neutralized by air strikes?

I am not sure how tough SK's air force is, but the difficulty here is that NK could probably launch attacks quickly, but the US would take days or even weeks to get even a small air force mobilization for air cover.

 

[russ_watters]

Regarding the issue of NK's motives and the prudence of our response:

Kim Il is widely held to be pretty much insane, and he certainly talks a good game. But if you look at his actual record, his batting average is so good that you can't ignore the possibility that his is purposeful insanity. That he's not really insane, but rather is manipulating the world with his show of insanity. He has been highly successful at creating bargaining chips with his threats, broken promises, and shows of defiance.

I fear that the world response will end up being what it always is with Kim: negotiate and give concessions in exchange for promises we know he'll never keep (CNN has a commentary that says we should do that: http://www.cnn.com/2009/POLITICS/04/05/cirincione.north.korea/index.html ). A smart gambler knows that when you find yourself a sucker who will never call your bluff, you should keep bluffing. Kim has been running the table for decades. That CNN commentary holds the contradictory view that this launch isn't a big deal, but because of it, we should go back to negotiating with him. But i suspect that that's exactly what is going to come of this.

 

[russ_watters]

I would understand that a materialized threat would be Japan actually nuked. So I would interpret any action against a perceived threat as a preemptive strike.

The dictionary definition of the word "preemptive" is a little broad and the implications imply something that doesn't really work in reality. The way you use it implies that an attack has to be completed before a response can be considered an after-the-fact response. But the political/military reality of the situation doesn't work that way. A bomb going off is not a singluar event, it is the final part in a chain of events that constitute an attack. A fueled rocket on the pad with an announced launch pending can be an attack in progress. The difficulty with Kim is knowing whether it is an attack or if it is posturing. History is littered with examples of this reality in action, and the Cold War was particularly replete with cat-and-mouse games between the USSR and the US.

Had anyone had real intelligence that implied a real potential for attack, no one would have hesitated to strike while the missile was on the ground and no one would have faulted that response.

 

[russ_watters]

Didn't see this before i posted about the ABL...

I can't help but wonder if we didn't take it out with a LASER.

I speculated to a colleague at work that this would be a great target for its first full-scale test. I'd love to believe we did, but I highly doubt it. And I think it went too far for the ABL to have been a likely cause of the failure.

 

[signerror]

I am not sure how tough SK's air force is, but the difficulty here is that NK could probably launch attacks quickly, but the US would take days or even weeks to get even a small air force mobilization for air cover.

They have planes in South Korea. Not sure how much this is worth:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Osan_Air_Base

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunsan_Air_Base

The closest carrier is in the South China Sea, which admittedly is pretty far away (days?)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/where.htm

 

[BobG]

True, the sea is in the east, but why send it over Japan and cause commotion, when they could have sent it over China, or Russia and avoid world condemnation?

The obvious reason to launch to the East is the Earth's rotation. You really have to want that particular orbit to launch to the West. In practice, the largest inclinations satellites have is about 98.6 degrees (or, as some call it, 81.4 degrees retrograde).

Of course, for the altitude that NK claimed (490 miles or 104 minutes), 98.6 degrees is a very common inclination. That's the altitude and inclination that gives you a sun synchronous orbit.

For a nation's first satellite launch, launching due East at a low altitude of 200 to 300 miles would be a very significant accomplishment. At the lower end of that altitude (and especially anything lower), the satellite's orbit would decay within weeks, but it would still be a major step.

A long range missile that takes several days to be fueled is not a practical weapon. The North Koreans need to develop long range solid fuel missiles that can carry a nuclear warhead. Also, they need to develop thermonuclear devices.

While a few Hiroshima sized bombs would do huge damage, they won't win a war for North Korea.

A long range missile that takes days to fuel is not a practical defensive weapon. It was this same fact that made the US so nervous when the USSR deployed Korolev's liquid fuel ICBMs at the start of the cold war. In the case of the USSR, ICBMs that could be launched in less than an hour became the staple of their nuclear force; the same as the US. But it's very provocative to deploy missiles that are only effective as an offensive weapon.

Even though they were only used as ICBM's for a short time, Korolev's ICBMs weren't a total waste for the USSR. Those were the rockets that launched Sputnik and most of the USSR's other early satellites.

 

[misgfool]

The dictionary definition of the word "preemptive" is a little broad and the implications imply something that doesn't really work in reality. The way you use it implies that an attack has to be completed before a response can be considered an after-the-fact response. But the political/military reality of the situation doesn't work that way. A bomb going off is not a singluar event, it is the final part in a chain of events that constitute an attack. A fueled rocket on the pad with an announced launch pending can be an attack in progress.

I think that it is best to stick with the dictionary definitions. Just in case someone would try to redefine words to fit his/her rhetoric.

Had anyone had real intelligence that implied a real potential for attack, no one would have hesitated to strike while the missile was on the ground and no one would have faulted that response.

Yes, it would have been a justified preemptive strike. But having such intelligence is rare in today's world. And no offense, but the reliability of US intelligence has suffered a quite severe dent during this decade.

 

[Count Iblis]

Yes, it would have been a justified preemptive strike. But having such intelligence is rare in today's world. And no offense, but the reliability of US intelligence has suffered a quite severe dent during this decade.

I think it is more the way the intelligence was politicized to make propaganda that has backfired. If there had been reliable intelligence suggesting that Saddam had active WMD programs that were a threat, then you could imagine that Bush would be informed by the CIA about this unexpected news, and that the Bush adminstration would become really woried and would think hard about what to do about it.

Instread, the dynamics was reversed. It was Bush asking intelligence officials to find evidence that Saddam was somehow involved in 9/11, even though all the evidence pointed to this not being the case.

Any intelligence that, pulled out of the context, could somehow be misinterpreted as suggesting that Saddam was a threat, would be welcome news to the Bush administration.

Yellowcake from Niger? Great news! This is what we so desperately needed. Let's open the champagne bottle!

 

[mheslep]

There are two important reasons why the publicly available information about our ABM capabilities is probably pretty close to accurate:

1. Technical reality: these systems are big and it is extremely difficult to hide them and keep them secret. You can't launch an interceptor ballistic missile from Kwajalein and have it fly 2500 miles and not expect people to notice.

Well the sea launched RIM can hide launch capability and event, if not flight.

2. Politics: ABM is a strategic deterrence issue. It can't do it's primary job (preventing an attack) if people don't know it exists.

There are actually quite a handful of ABM technologies under development by the US, most of which have gotten very little press. This year, Boeing will be testing their Airborne Laser (a 747 with a nose-mounted turret), capable of shooting down ballistic missiles at a range of somewhere around 300 miles. That's the one I'm most excited about. It makes scud-type missiles obsolte.

Press widely reports Gates is about the kill, or at least seriously cut, the airborne laser unfortunately.

For this specific incident, however, the only ABM defense we have in service that is any good happens to be very good and it almost certainly was deployed by both the US and Japan to protect Japan had the trajectory looked suspect: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RIM-161_Standard_missile_3 [edit] a source of the claim about what we had in the area, requested by Ivan from someone else: Not completely certain of what we had there, just highly likely we had some good ABM defense ready if it was deemed needed.

The SM-3 is the best we have so far for the simple reason that it is mature technology: basically all that was done to make it was to add an additional booster to an existing SAM and change some software in it and the ship-based radar that controls it...and add the exo-atmospheric "kill vehicle" (warhead with guidance). In the case of the radar, the software change was simply the removal of an artificially inserted range limitation.

 

[misgfool]

Instread, the dynamics was reversed. It was Bush asking intelligence officials to find evidence that Saddam was somehow involved in 9/11, even though all the evidence pointed to this not being the case.

Any intelligence that, pulled out of the context, could somehow be misinterpreted as suggesting that Saddam was a threat, would be welcome news to the Bush administration.

Fact is that the president used false intelligence or intelligence falsely to justify a war. I would describe that as a total failure in the intelligence community. And I can't remember the CIA stepping up and saying that the president is intentionally using false intelligence.

 

[mheslep]

Former speaker Newt Gingrich from Sunday shows:

...We have been talking about this since the Clinton administration, and they have been building nuclear weapons and building better and better missiles while we keep talking.

And one morning, just like 9/11, there’s going to be a disaster, and people are going to look around and say, “Gosh, why didn’t anyone think of that?” Well, I’m telling you the time to think about it’s before the disaster, not afterwards.

http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000003093570

 

[misgfool]

Former speaker Newt Gingrich from Sunday shows:

There should be a fallacy for this kind of argumentation. Mr Gingrich only has to provide the evidence, nothing more, nothing less. Otherwise decisions are based on faith, yes the same thing as religious faith, and we know where that road goes. Or at least we should know.

Additionally there are probably million other unknowns in the world and there is simply not enough resources to deal with every contingency.

"For what can war, but endless war, still breed?"
- John Milton

 

[Hurkyl]

Otherwise decisions are based on faith, yes the same thing as religious faith, and we know where that road goes. Or at least we should know.

:raise eyebrow:

 

[mheslep]

There should be a fallacy for this kind of argumentation. Mr Gingrich only has to provide the evidence, nothing more, nothing less.

I would hazard that Gingrich's point is not in the first instance about NK, but given that we do indeed have evidence of threats from NK, his comments are directed at the rather large pile of rationalizations offered in response to that evidence, such as this:

Additionally there are probably million other unknowns in the world and there is simply not enough resources to deal with every contingency.

 

[Wellesley]

The obvious reason to launch to the East is the Earth's rotation. You really have to want that particular orbit to launch to the West. In practice, the largest inclinations satellites have is about 98.6 degrees (or, as some call it, 81.4 degrees retrograde).

Of course, for the altitude that NK claimed (490 miles or 104 minutes), 98.6 degrees is a very common inclination. That's the altitude and inclination that gives you a sun synchronous orbit.

For a nation's first satellite launch, launching due East at a low altitude of 200 to 300 miles would be a very significant accomplishment. At the lower end of that altitude (and especially anything lower), the satellite's orbit would decay within weeks, but it would still be a major step.

Would it effect the orbit that much if NK launched it slightly in a Northeasterly direction? For example, launching it from the northern border, and overfly the La Perouse Strait? It doesn't matter now, but looking at the map, one can certainly see why Japan was threatened with a rocket overflying their country.
http://geolounge.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/300px-sea_of_japan_map.png

Fact is that the president used false intelligence or intelligence falsely to justify a war. I would describe that as a total failure in the intelligence community. And I can't remember the CIA stepping up and saying that the president is intentionally using false intelligence.

What does this have to do with North Korea's 'attempted' launch?

 

[LowlyPion]

I would hazard that Gingrich's point is not in the first instance about NK, but given that we do indeed have evidence of threats from NK, his comments are directed at the rather large pile of rationalizations offered in response to that evidence, such as this:

I think Gingrich is just playing Cheney's unctuous self-serving game of predicting the US now less safe with Obama. Buying a lottery ticket for the future as it were, so he can say I told you so if things go badly with North Korea. Unfortunately I think the cynical model of these people's statements seems to explain them better than their arguments.

 

[BobG]

Would it effect the orbit that much if NK launched it slightly in a Northeasterly direction? For example, launching it from the northern border, and overfly the La Perouse Strait? It doesn't matter now, but looking at the map, one can certainly see why Japan was threatened with a rocket overflying their country.
http://geolounge.com/wp-content/uploads/2007/10/300px-sea_of_japan_map.png

Yes, it would if it was a real satellite launch attempt. The launch azimuth depends on the desired inclination and the latitude:

$$sin(Az) = \frac{cos(\iota)}{cos(\phi)}$$

It's slightly more complicated than that, since there's already an eastward velocity equal to the velocity of the launch site due to the Earth's rotation that has to be subtracted out, but the key is that you only have two possible directions to choose from (unless you only care about saving fuel and launch due East).

I kind of doubt it was a real attempt at a functional satellite. One low Earth orbiting communications satellite isn't going to do much good. They would only see the satellite about 4 times a day, for around 12 minutes at a time. It could transmit propoganda, but it couldn't be used effectively for real satellite communications.

From where their launch site is located (on the nipple along the coast), they're going to launch over somebody else's territory no matter which direction they launch. That's a bad idea since even the US, ESA, and Russia have failed launches and nobody likes to be pelted with flaming debris (okay, that rocket barely got off the pad - any debris falling on Japan would be far less spectacular).

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62-L-_3tdG8

The melted cars belonged to the people that launched the satellite. Talk about a bad day.

 

[Wellesley]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62-L-_3tdG8

The melted cars belonged to the people that launched the satellite. Talk about a bad day.

Nice video, and thanks for the clarification!

 

[russ_watters]

I think that it is best to stick with the dictionary definitions. Just in case someone would try to redefine words to fit his/her rhetoric.

You misunderstood: I'm not arguing against the dictionary definition (I don't do that - I'm the most pedantic person you've ever met), I was arguing against the word usage.

Yes, it would have been a justified preemptive strike. But having such intelligence is rare in today's world. And no offense, but the reliability of US intelligence has suffered a quite severe dent during this decade.

And that's exactly the point Ivan and several others were making: since you can't know with any kind of certainty that the missile had a satellite on top as claimed, vs a warhead, prudence demands deploying defensive systems to engage it (which we surely did) and if necessary, shoot it down.

 

[russ_watters]

Well the sea launched RIM can hide launch capability and event, if not flight.

I don't see your point or perhaps that just doesn't make sesnse: the flight is a demonstration of the capability.

Press widely reports Gates is about the kill, or at least seriously cut, the airborne laser unfortunately.

That would be very disappointing considering it is about ready for it's first full operational test and fills a clear need in even a conventional anti-missile defense. Like I said, it can take out scuds, but I can imagine it taking out rockets launched by terrorists toward a neighboring country or even surface to air missiles aimed at our airplanes in a battle zone.

The strategic ABM defense is on shaky theoretical ground, but there is a clear need for a tactical ABM defense.

Thanks for pointing that out, though, I hadn't heard of its impending demise (heads to google...).

 

[misgfool]

You misunderstood: I'm not arguing against the dictionary definition (I don't do that - I'm the most pedantic person you've ever met), I was arguing against the word usage.

So what word would you use instead of preemptive?

And that's exactly the point Ivan and several others were making: since you can't know with any kind of certainty that the missile had a satellite on top as claimed, vs a warhead, prudence demands deploying defensive systems to engage it (which we surely did) and if necessary, shoot it down.

What Ivan and many others suggested, was destroying it on the ground. I think that requires offensive systems. What I would like to know is, what motive would Kim have to send one (1) missile to another country?

 

[mheslep]

That would be very disappointing considering it is about ready for it's first full operational test and fills a clear need in even a conventional anti-missile defense. Like I said, it can take out scuds, but I can imagine it taking out rockets launched by terrorists toward a neighboring country or even surface to air missiles aimed at our airplanes in a battle zone.

Yes Gates killed it yesterday, at least no more expansion.

We will cancel the second Airborne Laser Prototype Aircraft. We'll keep the existing aircraft and shift the program to an R&D effort. The ABL program has significant affordability and technology problems, and the program's proposed operational role is highly questionable. We will terminate the Multiple Kill Vehicle program because of its significant technical challenges and the need to take a fresh look at the requirement.

The strategic ABM defense is on shaky theoretical ground, but there is a clear need for a tactical ABM defense.

SecDef agrees with you, he's growing theater ABM a bit, not strategic.

...Fourth, to better protect our forces and those of our allies in theater from ballistic missile attack, we will add $700 million to field more of our most capable theater missile defense systems; specifically, the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, THAAD, and the Standard Missile 3 programs.

http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4396

 

[mheslep]

...Unfortunately I think the cynical model of these people's statements seems to explain them better than their arguments.

That's convenient. It allows one to ignore anything they actually say and attribute to them instead whatever you care to invent. Not original, but very convenient.

 

[Gokul43201]

How much damage, realistically, could DPRK inflict before its artillery units were neutralized by air strikes?

From what I've heard from Korean friends, DPRK can essentially raze Seoul before it is stopped.

Seoul is less than 50 miles from the DMZ. An Artillery shell will get there in under 2 minutes. A No-dong in less than a minute.

 

[russ_watters]

So what word would you use instead of preemptive?

Defense.

The point of that part of my post was to explain that the line between preemption of an imminent attack and defending against an in progress attack is somewhat vague. Hurkyl was arguing that we were already on the "defense" side of the line and I was explaining why he might think that. I tend to think "preemptive" applies until the missile leaves the launch pad (ie, as long as the attack is reversable), but I can see the functional problem with that: knowing that defense against an in-flight ballistic missile is still a dicey proposition means that if you have good intel that it carries a warhead, then you should destroy it on the ground. The "cat and mouse" game I referred to was taking provokative but still reversable actions that might provoke a defensive response due to the inability to respond defensively after the point of no return has been passed. It is a dangerous poker game that during the cold war occasionally resulted in shot-down aircraft due to the risk that they might release a weapon.

Hurkyl, are you worried about the moral/political implications of "preemtive"? Typically, the international community views preemptive war favorably if the "imminent" part of imminent threat can be shown to a reasonable certainty. I'd even say that the utility (if not complete acceptance) of preventative war has been borne out: Israel took a little heat over the Osirak attack, but not much and nothing came of it. One must conclude the attack to be an unqualified success.

What Ivan and many others suggested, was destroying it on the ground.

Suggested we consider, yes. That's prudence.

I think that requires offensive systems.

Well I would say an offensive attack uses offensive weapons, a defensive attack uses defensive weapons, and a preemptive attack uses preemptive weapons. And often, those are the same weapons.

What I would like to know is, what motive would Kim have to send one (1) missile to another country?

Though I argued for the possibility that he is completely sane and just screwing with us, many movers and shakers in the world community seriously consider the possibility that he really is insane. If he really is an insane megalomaniac, then megalomania alone is enough of a reason to send a single nuke to Tokyo.

 

[russ_watters]

SecDef agrees with you, he's growing theater ABM a bit, not strategic.

I guess where we differ then is that it seems to me that the ABL is both - and perhaps a better performing than THAAD due to the fact that it is moving (reducing atmospheric heating/blooming).

One of the criticisms of the ABL was operational cost (perhaps $100k an hour), but I don't know that I agree that that is an issue. The 1991 Iraq war lasted 864 hours, so having one in the air all the time would cost $86 million. The war cost $61 billion, so that's about .1% of the cost of the war. To me, that seems reasonable if it did a good job.

The SM-3 is both also...

 

[Hurkyl]

Hurkyl, are you worried about the moral/political implications of "preemtive"?

No, just the connotative, since "preemptive" tends to imply that you are taking action before a predicted threat appears, and this is to be contrasted with taking action in response to a threat after it has appeared.

 

[misgfool]

The point of that part of my post was to explain that the line between preemption of an imminent attack and defending against an in progress attack is somewhat vague.

Yes yes, and every country in the world which has won a war described their actions as defensive. Russ don't try to fool us, we (europeans) have been fighting for thousands of years. We know all excuses in the book. Or at least show some imagination and figure out new ones.

If he really is an insane megalomaniac, then megalomania alone is enough of a reason to send a single nuke to Tokyo.

And you think that, he believes, that there will be no repercussions?