Study Favors Q-Mind - Support for quantum consciousness?

[.Scott]

This is a slippery issue. Which systems would rationally be considered conscious? Searle's Chinese room? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chinese_room ... Or the China brain? http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_brain

What I'm getting at, is that nobody agrees on what would "rationally be considered conscious". Functionalists think that the population of China would become a conscious system if they organised themselves in such a way as to mimic the actions of neurons in a brain. Similarly, proponents of information theory think that any system with high integrated information will be conscious.

It doesn't really need to be reconciled. If different people want to look for different things, all that needs to be done is for each to describe their objective in distinctive terms.

Personally, I am convinced that other people are conscious because they have the same basic brain design as I do, they report their own conscious experience, and it reflects what I experience in myself. I would be convinced of an entity having "human consciousness" if it was shown that internally it was using equivalent mechanisms and processing the same basic symbols, and externally behaved as if was a human. Of course, since that mechanism has yet to be identified, I don't expect to see non-human examples of human consciouness any time soon.

 

[DiracPool]

We do not understand quantum mechanics. We do not understand consciousness.
To some this means that the two are connected.
Personally I think no two subjects are further apart.

Lol. Chalmers recognized this too and dubbed it the "Law of the minimization of mystery." From: http://www.imprint.co.uk/chalmers.html , " The attractiveness of quantum theories of consciousness may stem from a Law of Minimization of Mystery: consciousness is mysterious and quantum mechanics is mysterious, so maybe the two mysteries have a common source." When I learned of Smolin's idea that the big bang was a "blowthrough" from a black hole in another universe a couple years back I instantly thought of Chalmers' remark. I even mentioned it in a post here on PF at the time. The black hole singularity is mysterious and the big bang singularity is mysterious, therefore they must be related. A classic example of the law of minimization of mystery, which is really all this quantum consciousness and "information integration" stuff is, IMHO

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi DiracPool. You're correct about Chalmers, but I disagree with his conclusion that you mention. The problem with classical mechanics has been recognized by many. The problem is that it's a separable type of physics which leads to all sorts of logical dilemas. It's one of the primary reasons we don't have a theory to explain conscious phenomena. Basically, the question is how can 'information' be integrated when each neuron works only by what neurotransmitters and electrical charges operate on it? Neurons interact as described first by Hodgkin and Huxley which is to say they interact because of what happens to the neuron locally. They would do what they do (in principal) regardless of whether or not you test them in vivo or in vitro. The fundamental problem has been recognized by Hillary Putnam, Tim Maudlan, Mark Bishop, Stapp, Longinotti, Sevush, Hameroff, and many others. Some of these people don' t see the connection but some do. Quantum mechanics is a nonseparable theory which should at least get around the logical dilema produced by a separable one. However, there are lots of other problems.

Chalmers recognizes the problem also, but was responding in a disparaging way as he did. The problem is, he doesn't understand how classical phyisics works very well. To defend computationalism (classical descriptions of mind) he wants to define what a computer is or what it can be. Per Chalmers, if something doesn't meet the definition of a computer, it can't be consicious. By doing this, he sidesteps the problem of separability. There are other ways people have proposed to get around this problem, but they require classical mechanics to violate separability. Classical mechanics has to become holistic or nonseparable in some way.

Putnam, H., & Putman, H. (1988). Representation and reality (Vol. 454).
Maudlin, T. (1989). Computation and consciousness. The journal of Philosophy
Bishop, J. M. (2009). A cognitive computation fallacy? Cognition, computations and panpsychism. Cognitive Computation (or just about anything by Bishop)
Stapp, H. P. (1995). Why Classical Mechanics Cannot Naturally Accommodate Consciousness But Quantum Mechanics Can.
Longinotti, D. (2009). Computationalism and the Locality Principle. Minds and Machines
Sevush, S. (2006). Single-neuron theory of consciousness. Journal of theoretical biology
Chalmers, D. J. (1996). Does a rock implement every finite-state automaton?. Synthese
Chalmers, D. J. (2012). The Varieties of Computation: A Reply. Journal of Cognitive Science

 

[Pythagorean]

The problem is that it's a separable type of physics which leads to all sorts of logical dilemas. It's one of the primary reasons we don't have a theory to explain conscious phenomena. Basically, the question is how can 'information' be integrated when each neuron works only by what neurotransmitters and electrical charges operate on it?

This thread has slowly been derailed by a (more interesting) discussion and I think it would be worthwhile to split it into a new thread. Consciousness is a subject that does require a careful combination of philosophy and science to discuss. I would also really appreciate it if you cited your claims more thoroughly in-line so it's easier to separate actual cited assertions from personal assertions (I see this particular claim comes from Stapp). I don't think the community that studies consciousness (including philosophers and scientists) has a consensus that there is a problem with separability. It's still a controversial and contentious topic. I do think that many philosophers of mind like Chalmers and Dennet tend to be lacking the appropriate scientific background. Many of the dilemmas brought against classical physics (especially in defense of quantum physics) are short-sighted [1][2].

We know that replacing and removing individual components of the brain can either do absolutely nothing to the conscious experience or have a notable effect on concsiousness - depending on the magnitude of the change. For instance, placing an electrode in the brain may or may affect the conscious experience in subtle ways depending on what the electrode is doing and where it is placed [3], but removing a whole hemisphere from the brain can change the conscious experience (as well as cognitive abilities) in a dramatic way. Likewise, we can incapacitate certain brain structures and see a relative loss in consciousness (i.e. we lose components of visual consciousness when we ablate the visual cortex [4]) - so removing a brain component does indeed, remove a component of consciousness.

Many philosophers argue that separability means that you could replace each component with one that does the exact same job as the neuron or astrocyte it's replacing, one at a time, until you're a robot and it shouldn't affect your conscious experience and this this is so surprising and shocking that it must be wrong. Yet, in the neuromedical fields, we continue to replace different components of the nervous system with machines and, as we'd expect, the effects on consciousness support an integrated information framework (again, not arguing for Tonini's implementation of IIT).

I suppose, since we haven't replaced every part of the brain yet, it is possible that we could one day precisely replace a component of the brain and find that consciousness is lost (or at least, appears to be lost in the subject)... then we may be able to argue for a seat of consciousness. But research tends to indicate a more global view - at least two brain regions that tend to dominate what gets perceived subjectively from all the stimulus processing that is happening unconsciously [5]. (Note that the prior reference only pertains to visual consciousness).

[1] http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v440/n7084/full/440611a.html
[2] http://journals.aps.org/pre/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevE.61.4194
[3] http://books.google.ca/books?id=eSrIZf3HdTEC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false
[4] http://www.jneurosci.org/content/29/21/6917.full
[5] http://www.mpg.de/8425992/seat-of-consciousness

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Pythagorean, Threads like this naturally tend to meander a bit so I'm trying not to get too far off topic. My only intention was to address the point Chalmers makes regarding minimizing mystery. The less detail on that one, the less we get off topic. I would readily go along with the paradigm of mind that claims the interactions between neuron interactions are classical in nature meaning that brains do not seem to exploit any of the special features of quantum mechanics as explained by Koch for example. In fact, so would the neurologist Steven Sevush (mentioned above) who proposes a single neuron theory of consciousness.

Regarding my list of references, what I've found from reading philosophers, biologists and physicists is that they never use the same language. In fact, they generally don't read each other's papers. Separability as it pertains to classical mechanics is a topic analogous to specialized topics in biology or chemistry. Although some philosophers, biologists and others might be aware of "separability", they don't all use the same terminology. However, you'll find these people all seem to have an intuitive understanding of separability and would largely agree with it if they were to see the definition: “Intuitively, a separable process is one which is wholly determined by what happens locally – by what is happening at each spacetime point where that process is going on. … More precisely, a physical process will be said to be spatio-temporally separable in spacetime region R if and only if it is supervenient upon an assignment of qualitative intrinsic physical properties at spacetime points in R.” (Healey) We could use any term (Longinotti calls it 'locality' instead) but I'll stick with separability because I think that's the best word for it.

Chalmers denies seperability when he comes up with definitions surrounding what a computer is. He claims a system requires "conterfactual sensitivity" but doesn't use the term "separability" at all. Similarly, many philosophers use the term "counterfactual" to reference the need for a system to be together and functional in order for phenomenal consciousness to emerge. The reason they do that is because there's an obvious problem if the parts aren't connected, even if the parts undergo identical physical states when disconnected.

Take your example - we remove a part of a brain and replace it with a microchip. How does the microchip 'know' it is part of the brain and not doing something else entirely? There are no 'special signals' that tell the brain or the microchip that they are even connected and functioning. The component parts of a computer or a brain don't have information about what the other component parts are doing. The information they have is what is acting on them at some point in time. Having that information is sufficient for a computer to function. It's also sufficient for us to interpret the results. But each chip or switch in a computer is in it's 'own little world' so to speak. These are component parts of a system which act together to produce what we recognize as a 'computation'. This concept is counterintuitive to many and takes some thinking about.

DeMarse wrote an interesting paper about a living neuronal network connected to a computer such that the neurons were 'trained' to fly an aircraft straight and level. Note that the aircraft in this case was nothing more than a flight simulator that was on the computer. However, I don't see any way the neuronal network could know it was flying straight and level or doing barrel roles. It couldn’t know if it was flying an aircraft simulator or operating an industrial plant converting oil to gasoline. The reason it couldn’t know that is because the neuronal network (and in fact, each of the individual neurons) are separable. They act only according to what happens locally, just like transisters in a computer. The point is, none of the component parts of a classical system can do this integration of information necessary without having some physical way to distinguish the difference between separable parts. But classical mechanics has no need for this special signal that can distinguish between the system being together or being apart and there would be no way to know if it existed. The special signal would be a ghost that somehow was able to distiguish between the two states but couldn't even make itself known because everything would happen the same way regardless of whether it was there or not.

So to return to the original point and to try and keep from getting off topic, there are logical dilemas with asserting classical mechanics is the basis for conscious phenomena, and one of those dilemas regards separability. Many people seem to recognize it but don’t use the same terminology because they don’t work in the same areas and read the same papers. But it seems fairly obvious from reading those papers that they are all talking about the same problem but using different terminology. A bit like the tower of babble I guess.

Koch, C., & Hepp, K. (2006). Quantum mechanics in the brain. Nature
Healey, R. (1994). Nonseparable processes and causal explanation. Studies In History and Philosophy of Science
DeMarse, T. B., & Dockendorf, K. P. (2005). Adaptive flight control with living neuronal networks on microelectrode arrays. In Neural Networks, 2005. IJCNN'05. Proceedings. 2005 IEEE International Joint Conference on (Vol. 3, pp. 1548-1551). IEEE.

 

[Pythagorean]

Thanks for your reply, Q_Goest. There is some evidence in neuroscience for support of this:

The special signal would be a ghost that somehow was able to distiguish between the two states but couldn't even make itself known because everything would happen the same way regardless of whether it was there or not.

As we know from Libet's, and follow-up experiments on free-will, when we have the subjective feeling that we've made a conscious decision about something, it turns out that the physical neural activity that precedes it can be used to predict the decision making. This evidence supports the idea that separability can still be unviolated (the physical components of the system still obey classical physics) but places no constraints on the (presumably) weakly emergent result (consciousness). Of course, this means no ethereal free will - it means that our actions do not evade cause and effect and are a product of our biology and our environment (which, in terms of evidence from human behavioral biology, isn't surprising). The "ghost", then, would not make choices, but experiences the choice-making process of the system.

Proponents like Tononi suggests that it is the complexity of the information (encoded in the states of the system) that result in the phenomenological experience, and cites some split-brain research [1].

such patients do indeed experience the left half of the visual field independently of the right side, but then the surgery has created two separate consciousnesses instead of one. Mechanistically then, underlying the unity of experience must be causal interactions among certain elements within the brain. This means that these elements work together as an integrated system, which is why their performance, unlike that of the *camera, breaks down if they are disconnected.

Tononi later says:

It is worth remarking that the last example also shows why specific qualities of consciousness, such as the “redness” of red, while generated by a local mechanism, cannot be reduced to it. If an achromatopsic subject without the r connections lacks precisely the “redness” of red, whereas a vegetative patient with just the r connections is essentially unconscious, then the redness of red cannot map directly to the mechanism implemented by the r connections. However, the redness of red can map nicely onto the informational relationships specified by r, as these change dramatically between the null context (vegetative patient) and the full context (achromatopsic subject).

Of course, Tononi's proposal does not violate locality in terms of physics, since (presumably Einstein's) locality has nothing to say about the relationship between information and consciousness. It does say that consciousness itself is a nonseparable phenomena, but if we accept that consciousness doesn't cause anything, then the theory is consistent with the observation.

[1] http://www.nature.com/nrn/journal/v6/n8/full/nrn1740.html

 

[testingus]

I just mean that there's no evidence that microtubules are performing the computations underlying the cognitive processes with which consciousness experience is associated with, and that there's no evidence that microtubules have a high level of global information integration across large networks of the brain.

Thanks madness for your points.

When you say "there's no evidence" for microtubules performing computations, I wonder what you mean. Brain function depends on neuron information processing, on this I think we can agree. For each neuron to function incoming signals must be "interpreted" to determine if a neuron will fire (i.e. the integrate and fire notion). What does this integration? It must be the internal components of the neuron. Ion channel opening and closing is well accepted, but placement of ion channels (which determines synaptic strength), as well as ion channel function is regulated by the cytoskeleton and associated proteins [1].

I'll concede the point that there is no evidence for a high level of global information integration across the brain, however there is evidence for neural synchrony. If neuron's are synchronized an argument could be made that their internal workings are also synchronized. Additionally, while there is currently no evidence (that I know of) it doesn't rule out the possibility.

Priel, A., Tuszynski, J. A., & Cantiello, H. F. (2006). The dendritic cytoskeleton as a computational device: an hypothesis. In The Emerging Physics of Consciousness (pp. 293-325). Springer Berlin Heidelberg.

 

[testingus]

Quantum mechanics is a nonseparable theory which should at least get around the logical dilema produced by a separable one. However, there are lots of other problems.

Q_Goest, could you elaborate on the problems with quantum theories of consciousness. Thank-you.

 

[madness]

When you say "there's no evidence" for microtubules performing computations, I wonder what you mean. Brain function depends on neuron information processing, on this I think we can agree. For each neuron to function incoming signals must be "interpreted" to determine if a neuron will fire (i.e. the integrate and fire notion). What does this integration? It must be the internal components of the neuron. Ion channel opening and closing is well accepted, but placement of ion channels (which determines synaptic strength), as well as ion channel function is regulated by the cytoskeleton and associated proteins [1].

What I mean is that there is no correspondence (or "isomorphism") between the content of conscious experience and the information processing properties of microtubules. On the other hand, it does appear that there is such an isomorphism between electrical activity of populations of neurons and conscious experience. Importantly, the electrical activity occurs at the same timescale as conscious experience, while ion channel regulation by microtubules occurs at a much longer timescale.

 

[DiracPool]

When you say "there's no evidence" for microtubules performing computations, I wonder what you mean. Brain function depends on neuron information processing, on this I think we can agree. For each neuron to function incoming signals must be "interpreted" to determine if a neuron will fire (i.e. the integrate and fire notion). What does this integration? It must be the internal components of the neuron. Ion channel opening and closing is well accepted, but placement of ion channels (which determines synaptic strength), as well as ion channel function is regulated by the cytoskeleton and associated proteins [1].

You are looking at the issue from the wrong scale. You are never going to find consciousness at the level of the neuron or microtubule. Perceptual pattern recognition, introspective reports of qualitative experience, brain patterns of self-awareness related to first person versus 3rd person identity are decidedly mesoscopic and macroscopic effects. Consciousness arises from the collective action of 100's of million of neurons all acting cooperatively in the formation of a near limit cycle chaotic attractor at several scales of neurodynamic function. There is the primary cortex which spans several cms and oscillates or phase-locks at 40 hz, there is inter-areal phase coherence in the beta range at 12-25 hz, and there is hemisphere-wide synchrony in the alpha-theta range roughly 10 hz. We can distinguish topological patterns in the EEG tracings at each of these scales and tease out topographic maps over the geography of cortex and compare that to psychophysiological questionaires.

So, from what we know now, consciousness is a property of classical electromagnetic phase coherence that operates through a roughly 3 level hierarchy. That's about all we know right now. Is there some quantum mechanical "aspect" to conscious experience? Almost certainly. But you're not going to find it in any contemporary discourse on the matter, because the vast majority if not all quantum treatments of the consciousness issue invariably eschew a discussion of the functional anatomy of the human brain and especially its differences from that of other mammals and vertebrates in general.

 

[testingus]

...ion channel regulation by microtubules occurs at a much longer timescale.

Can you please provide sources for this. Thank you.

 

[testingus]

You are looking at the issue from the wrong scale.

I am no expert here but, does not the brain (and biology in general) operate using scale free dynamics? See:

Boonstra, T. W., He, B. J., & Daffertshofer, A. (2013). Scale-free dynamics and critical phenomena in cortical activity. Frontiers in physiology, 4.

Quote from article, "Multiple experiments have identified neural processes without a preferred timescale in the avalanche-like spatial propagation of activity in cortical slices and in self-similar time series of local field potentials."

You are never going to find consciousness at the level of the neuron or microtubule.

This is just your opinion. I'm not saying you are wrong, but to simply rule this out because it seems unpalatable would be unscientific.

Perceptual pattern recognition, introspective reports of qualitative experience, brain patterns of self-awareness related to first person versus 3rd person identity are decidedly mesoscopic and macroscopic effects. Consciousness arises from the collective action of 100's of million of neurons all acting cooperatively in the formation of a near limit cycle chaotic attractor at several scales of neurodynamic function. There is the primary cortex which spans several cms and oscillates or phase-locks at 40 hz, there is inter-areal phase coherence in the beta range at 12-25 hz, and there is hemisphere-wide synchrony in the alpha-theta range roughly 10 hz. We can distinguish topological patterns in the EEG tracings at each of these scales and tease out topographic maps over the geography of cortex and compare that to psychophysiological questionaires.

I completely agree with you here. All I'm suggesting (in a devil's advocate position) is that if "Consciousness arises from the collective action of 100's of million of neurons all acting cooperatively" then the collective action of 100's of millions of subneural components (including the cytoskeleton) can only add to the richness and complexity of this process. At some point the quantum threshold is reached. Are quantum effects trivial? That's the debate! Accordingly Koch and Hepp suggest that there isn't even a mechanism to suggest how this would work. What the OP is putting forward is that there is a feasible quantum mechanism (see Craddock et al. in OP) that could support quantum computation in microtubules.

Koch, C., & Hepp, K. (2006). Quantum mechanics in the brain. Nature, 440(7084), 611-611.

Is there some quantum mechanical "aspect" to conscious experience? Almost certainly.

Again this is opinion, and seems to contradict your earlier stance.

But you're not going to find it in any contemporary discourse on the matter, because the vast majority if not all quantum treatments of the consciousness issue invariably eschew a discussion of the functional anatomy of the human brain and especially its differences from that of other mammals and vertebrates in general.

I don't think even Hameroff, the proponent of the infamous Orch OR, suggests divorcing the quantum treatment from standard neuroscience so I'm not sure where this argument is going.

 

[atyy]

@testingus, just a comment about Orch-OR - it is not standard quantum mechanics, and in fact violates quantum mechanics, so the "quantum effects" in Orch-OR should be taken with a pinch of salt. Orch-OR violates quantum mechanics because it relies on Diosi-Penrose collapse. As long as quantum mechanics holds exactly, Orch-OR cannot be said to be "favoured" by any evidence. However, if the violation of quantum mechanics is small, then Diosi-Penrose collapse can be consistent with current evidence. Tests of Diosi-Penrose collapse are discussed in http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.2868 and http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.6460 (the latter is not in a peer-reviewed journal, but I am including it, because the authors have many papers about collapse models in peer-reviewed journals).

 

[testingus]

@testingus, just a comment about Orch-OR - it is not standard quantum mechanics, and in fact violates quantum mechanics, so the "quantum effects" in Orch-OR should be taken with a pinch of salt. Orch-OR violates quantum mechanics because it relies on Diosi-Penrose collapse. As long as quantum mechanics holds exactly, Orch-OR cannot be said to be "favoured" by any evidence. However, if the violation of quantum mechanics is small, then Diosi-Penrose collapse can be consistent with current evidence. Tests of Diosi-Penrose collapse are discussed in http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.2868 and http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.6460 (the latter is not in a peer-reviewed journal, but I am including it, because the authors have many papers about collapse models in peer-reviewed journals).

Thank-you atyy. I understand that Diosi-Penrose collapse is not standard quantum mechanics, but I don't think it violates quantum mechanics. The collapse mechanism is an addition to try and resolve so-called wavefunction collapse by giving it a objective mechanism. In standard QM no such mechanism is given leading to multiple interpretations of how this takes place (Copenhagen, von Neumann-Wigner, etc.), if it takes place at all (Multiple Worlds, Multiple Minds etc.).

The original post (OP) wasn't concerned with Orch OR per se, but rather a feasible mechanism to support quantum computations in the brain. While the Diosi-Penrose mechanism is questionable, other authors have pointed out that quantum mind via quantum computation in microtubules could be achieved with decoherence, rather than Objective Reduction (see Rosa et al.).

Rosa, L. P., & Faber, J. (2004). Quantum models of the mind: Are they compatible with environment decoherence?. Physical Review E, 70(3), 031902.

 

[DiracPool]

I don't think even Hameroff, the proponent of the infamous Orch OR, suggests divorcing the quantum treatment from standard neuroscience so I'm not sure where this argument is going.

I never said that Hameroff et al. suggested "divorcing the quantum treatment from standard neuroscience." Why divorce yourself from something you don't really even address. It took me 7 years to master the connectional neuroanatomy of the brain, why take the time to do that when you can just wave your quantum de-coherence wand and solve the problem in one fell swoop?

 

[atyy]

I understand that Diosi-Penrose collapse is not standard quantum mechanics, but I don't think it violates quantum mechanics. The collapse mechanism is an addition to try and resolve so-called wavefunction collapse by giving it a objective mechanism. In standard QM no such mechanism is given leading to multiple interpretations of how this takes place (Copenhagen, von Neumann-Wigner, etc.), if it takes place at all (Multiple Worlds, Multiple Minds etc.).

Diosi-Penrose violates quantum mechanics because it is not a pure interpretation, the only known fully workable one of which is a flavour of Copenhagen. Some flavour of Many-Worlds would be a pure interpretation, but there is consensus even among proponents that technical details remain to be worked out. Simply put, Diosi-Penrose and standard quantum mechanics give different predictions, which are in principle experimentally testable.

 

[testingus]

Diosi-Penrose violates quantum mechanics because it is not a pure interpretation, the only known fully workable one of which is a flavour of Copenhagen. Some flavour of Many-Worlds would be a pure interpretation, but there is consensus even among proponents that technical details remain to be worked out. Simply put, Diosi-Penrose and standard quantum mechanics give different predictions, which are in principle experimentally testable.

Thank-you for the clarification.

 

[testingus]

I never said that Hameroff et al. suggested "divorcing the quantum treatment from standard neuroscience." Why divorce yourself from something you don't really even address. It took me 7 years to master the connectional neuroanatomy of the brain, why take the time to do that when you can just wave your quantum de-coherence wand and solve the problem in one fell swoop?

My mistake. Could you then please explain what you meant by "...the vast majority if not all quantum treatments of the consciousness issue invariably eschew a discussion of the functional anatomy of the human brain". Thank-you.

 

[DiracPool]

My mistake. Could you then please explain what you meant by "...the vast majority if not all quantum treatments of the consciousness issue invariably eschew a discussion of the functional anatomy of the human brain". Thank-you.

Well, I'm not going to do an exhaustive survey of the literature, but if you look into it yourself, I'm sure you will find a conspicuous paucity in quantum treatments of consciousness of the functional neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of brain function. This has been my experience in debating the quantum consciousness advocates, they try to reduce a very complex networked hierarchy of spatio-temporal brain relations to a naive "flat" reductionist model. What's left on the sidewalk in these treatements is what distinguishes human consciousness from from that of an ape, a rat, a toad, or a cockroach. There's no provision for that in the "Q-mind" or other quantum treatments of consciousness as far as I'm aware.

If you want to know how the brain creates consciousness, I suggest you start here:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12874778

 

[testingus]

...they try to reduce a very complex networked hierarchy of spatio-temporal brain relations to a naive "flat" reductionist model.

Can't the same criticism be made against standard neuroscientists for reducing the very complex networked hierarchy of spatio-temporal molecular interactions in a single neuron to a simple "on/off" switch?

If you want to know how the brain creates consciousness, I suggest you start here:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/12874778

Thanks for the article. I'm reading it now. From this I believe that you are suggesting that the brain creates consciousness through synchronized oscillations? One question, how are the synchronized oscillations across the brain generated? The following two articles suggest that molecular level, and maybe even quantum effects, are what give rise to this synchrony.

Plankar, M., Brežan, S., & Jerman, I. (2013). The principle of coherence in multi-level brain information processing. Progress in biophysics and molecular biology, 111(1), 8-29.

Craddock, T. J., Priel, A., & Tuszynski, J. A. (2014). Keeping time: Could quantum beating in microtubules be the basis for the neural synchrony related to consciousness?. Journal of integrative neuroscience, 13(02), 293-311.

Also note that the second article by Craddock et al. makes explicit use of the mechanism mentioned in the OP.

 

[DiracPool]

Can't the same criticism be made against standard neuroscientists for reducing the very complex networked hierarchy of spatio-temporal molecular interactions in a single neuron to a simple "on/off" switch?

Who are you talking about in particular? There is no such thing as a "standard neuroscientist" in the same way there is no such thing as a "standard physicist." Each member of the community focuses on a different aspect or scale of the science and many have differing views and models. There certainly are those who focus on single neuron function, but there are many more, especially these days with the advances in non-invasive imaging, that focus more on systems neuroscience. I don't know very many in the field that are "...reducing the very complex networked hierarchy of spatio-temporal molecular interactions in a single neuron to a simple "on/off" switch" That is somewhat of an outdated concept.

From this I believe that you are suggesting that the brain creates consciousness through synchronized oscillations? One question, how are the synchronized oscillations across the brain generated?

If you read the article I posted that you said you were reading, it should be patently evident. Basically you have a situation in the cortex where various regions destabilize their oscillations through aperiodic feedback in order to maintain a high dimensional "background attractor" that puts the brain in a "ready" state to receive sensory input. Once that input arrives, the entire hemisphere of the cortex converges on a learned attractor that represents the stimulus memory, formed through the selective strenghening of "Hebbian" synapses. This is a cyclic process that works similarly to a Carnot cycle and that effectively yields a system whereby "frames" of percepts roll out of the cortex like frames in a movie reel. There is also evidence that binding in the cortex is achieved through 40 hz thalamocortical oscillations. However, there is likely no sensory specific information that is manipulated through this latter means.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4169877/pdf/nihms457171.pdf
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16513196

The following two articles suggest that molecular level, and maybe even quantum effects, are what give rise to this synchrony.

As I've mentioned here before, you are always going to be able to dig up countering or alternative views on most any subject, especially when it comes to the brain and mind connection. All you can do is do the research and come to your own conclusions.

 

[testingus]

Who are you talking about in particular?

I wasn't referring to anyone in specific. I was referring to Hopfield type neural networks consisting of binary ("on/off") neurons. As far as I know this is how most classical neural networks are considered. I'm happy to be enlightened.

If you read the article I posted that you said you were reading, it should be patently evident...

Yes, my last post was written before I completely read the article. I have been muddling through it as it is not my area of expertise, but I am here to learn. Thank-you for the synopsis.

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4169877/pdf/nihms457171.pdf
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16513196

Thanks for these articles. The first article discusses cortical neurodynamics expressed at the classical level by neural networks (are these binary?) and at the quantum level by dissipative quantum field theory. I have to say that I'm now a little confused. Previously you have stated:

You are looking at the issue from the wrong scale. You are never going to find consciousness at the level of the neuron or microtubule.

There's no provision for that in the "Q-mind" or other quantum treatments of consciousness as far as I'm aware.

Are these statements specific to consciousness, and not other cognitive processes like memory? If so, why? Or is it specifically quantum effects in microtubules that is the issue?

All you can do is do the research and come to your own conclusions.

This is most certainly true. That is why I am here, I'm trying to get perspective on these matters. You seem to be well versed in this field, and I would love to hear your thoughts on the previously posted articles by Plankar et al. and Craddock et al. The paper Capolupo et al. seems of a similar nature, but I may not be grasping the finer points. Thank-you.

 

[Pythagorean]

I wasn't referring to anyone in specific. I was referring to Hopfield type neural networks consisting of binary ("on/off") neurons. As far as I know this is how most classical neural networks are considered. I'm happy to be enlightened.

Please, allow me! Binary neurons are only used when you have a lot of neurons in the hopes of reducing computational cost in the interest of time. However, the most "realistic" neurons that are based on the actual conductance and channel phsyiology of the nerve cell, are not binary, they are continuous functions - smooth differential equations dictate the shape of the electrical waveform based on influx and eflux of sodium, calcium, potassium, etc. The canonical mode is the Hodgkin-Huxle model:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hodgkin–Huxley_model

You can see the electrical activity follows naturally from well-known physical laws (electrochemical potential and Kirchoff's current law, chiefly).

 

[testingus]

... the most "realistic" neurons that are based on the actual conductance and channel phsyiology of the nerve cell, are not binary, they are continuous functions - smooth differential equations dictate the shape of the electrical waveform based on influx and eflux of sodium, calcium, potassium, etc.

Thank-you Pythagorean. So more complex networks drop this level of detail because it becomes too computationally complex? In the words of DiracPool, I wonder "What's left on the sidewalk in these treatments"? I guess we can't fault the quantum fellows then for not incorporating the complexity of the functional neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of brain. There has been some recent theoretical work suggesting that quantum effects in ion channels can affect action potential timing [Bernroider et al. 2012], which I suspect would be important to overall brain function. There may be more quantum effects that play a crucial role, maybe even related to microtubules. Do you care to comment?

Bernroider, G., & Summhammer, J. (2012). Can Quantum Entanglement Between Ion Transition States Effect Action Potential Initiation?. Cognitive Computation, 4(1), 29-37.

 

[atyy]

Thank-you Pythagorean. So more complex networks drop this level of detail because it becomes too computationally complex? In the words of DiracPool, I wonder "What's left on the sidewalk in these treatments"? I guess we can't fault the quantum fellows then for not incorporating the complexity of the functional neuroanatomy and neurophysiology of brain. There has been some recent theoretical work suggesting that quantum effects in ion channels can affect action potential timing [Bernroider et al. 2012], which I suspect would be important to overall brain function. There may be more quantum effects that play a crucial role, maybe even related to microtubules. Do you care to comment?

Bernroider, G., & Summhammer, J. (2012). Can Quantum Entanglement Between Ion Transition States Effect Action Potential Initiation?. Cognitive Computation, 4(1), 29-37.

But if you go from a (somewhat) specific proposal like Orch-OR to just non-specific "There may be more quantum effects that play a crucial role" then there is nothing to discuss. Action potential and synchrony in the brain depend on chemistry which depends on quantum mechanics.

 

[testingus]

But if you go from a (somewhat) specific proposal like Orch-OR to just non-specific "There may be more quantum effects that play a crucial role" then there is nothing to discuss. Action potential and synchrony in the brain depend on chemistry which depends on quantum mechanics.

Maybe I am being a bit too loose with the term "quantum effects". What I mean when I write this is "non-trivial" quantum effects which take advantage of entanglement, superposition, coherence etc., as opposed to "trivial" quantum effects like van der Waals forces, and hydrogen bonds.

What I seem to be gathering from these posts is that:
a) There is no objection to the notion that biology depends on chemistry which depends on trivial quantum effects.
b) There is some support for non-trivial effects in brain function (superposition in ion channels (see Bernroider et al. 2012) or dissipative quantum field theory descriptions of neurodynamics (see Capolupo et al. 2013 courtesy of DiracPool )).
c) There is staunch disagreement with the Orch OR theory of consciousness.

The OP was interested in "Why is quantum computing in microtubules considered woo?". It is clear that it is considered woo due to point c). The disagreement with Orch OR stems from:
a) The reliance on Diosi-Penrose collapse, which is not a proven form of quantum mechanics, although it can be tested. Additionally, Rosa and Faber suggest that quantum computation in brain microtubules may make use of decoherence as opposed to objective collapse circumventing this issue.
b) The lack of connection with functional neuroanatomy and neurophysiology, and the difference in scales between neural oscillations and quantum phenomena, however the work of Craddock et al., Plankar et al., and Capolupo et al. suggest ways in which this may be reconciled.

So while the notion of quantum computing in microtubules being related to brain function is lacking in a complete description of how this would work, and is not experimentally verified at this point, I think I can say that it is not “woo” which implies a psuedo-scientific non-testable hypothesis.

 

[Pythagorean]

The reason it's considered woo is because neither mainstream neuroscientists nor mainstream quantum physicists find it's premises valid (and we've discussed some of the issues with in this thread).

 

[testingus]

The reason it's considered woo is because neither mainstream neuroscientists nor mainstream quantum physicists find it's premises valid (and we've discussed some of the issues with in this thread).

What classifies some one as the "mainstream"? Roger Penrose was a prominent physicist, and I dare say mainstream, until the Emperor's New Mind. Walter Freeman is a well known neuroscientist, but advocates for dissipative quantum brain dynamics.

Please note I am specifically discussing quantum computation in microtubules, not necessarily Orch OR. To say something is "woo" (i.e. pseudo-science) because it is not popular is not very scientific. I've listed the two cogent criticisms brought up against Orch OR in this thread. These are both valid concerns. The first is open to experimental verification. The second shows that Orch OR is not consistent with "mainstream" neuroscience, but does not necessarily rule out quantum computation in microtubules (as separate from the Orch OR mechanism and theory) being related to brain function, (see the papers cited). If there are other arguments listed in this thread that I have missed that are brought up against quantum computation in microtubules related to brain function (not Orch OR) please feel free to state them explicitly.

 

[atyy]

I wouldn't consider Orch-OR unscientific, just subjectively unlikely on current data. But let's be clear, the only motivation for Orch-OR or decoherence as an explanation for consciousness is the hard problem, right?

 

[Pythagorean]

What classifies some one as the "mainstream"? Roger Penrose was a prominent physicist, and I dare say mainstream, until the Emperor's New Mind. Walter Freeman is a well known neuroscientist, but advocates for dissipative quantum brain dynamics.

It's a good question; it's a matter of sociology than science. I don't know that esteem really matters so much as consensus and authority. Stuart Hameroff's vocal associations of quantum mind with spirituality and Brahman philosophy probably doesn't help the case for quantum mind.

Please note I am specifically discussing quantum computation in microtubules, not necessarily Orch OR. To say something is "woo" (i.e. pseudo-science) because it is not popular is not very scientific. I've listed the two cogent criticisms brought up against Orch OR in this thread. These are both valid concerns. The first is open to experimental verification. The second shows that Orch OR is not consistent with "mainstream" neuroscience, but does not necessarily rule out quantum computation in microtubules (as separate from the Orch OR mechanism and theory) being related to brain function, (see the papers cited). If there are other arguments listed in this thread that I have missed that are brought up against quantum computation in microtubules related to brain function (not Orch OR) please feel free to state them explicitly.

I agree. To say something is woo at all is not really scientific, it's more of an administrative function for science, guided by social factors (basically, in the name of brevity, we don't want to spend too much energy on every pet theory because we're not going to be alive long enough to learn everything). Of course we can't prove a negative, so there can always be an exceptions to the criticisms.

 

[madness]

Please note I am specifically discussing quantum computation in microtubules, not necessarily Orch OR.

I wouldn't be shocked if there were quantum computation in microtubules, or some other subcellular processes. I would be very surprised if this was directly to consciousness, however, since as far as we know microtubules are not performing any cognitive functions.

 

[testingus]

I wouldn't consider Orch-OR unscientific, just subjectively unlikely on current data. But let's be clear, the only motivation for Orch-OR or decoherence as an explanation for consciousness is the hard problem, right?

Any theory of consciousness will eventually encounter the 'hard problem', however it is not the only motivation. From what I've read the rationale for a quantum description is to address the following:

1) The nature of subjective experience and how conscious experience arises from the combined action of neuronal, synaptic and molecular processes. (This is the hard problem aspect).
2) How spatially distributed brain activities bind together to produce the unity of consicous perception, known as the Binding Problem. (DiracPool gave a couple of references addressing this at both the neural and quantum levels.)
3) What is the critical level of complexity required by a system to have consciousness. (This may be a spectrum, and I think this is what is attempted by Tononi's IIT, however the question of scale, and the enhancement of IIT by subneural components remains open).
4) How a system based on the deterministic laws of classical physics accounts for non-computable processes such as consciousness. (The non-algorithmic nature of consciousness is brought up by Penrose's Goedel argument. Some have argued for this type of behavior at the edge of chaos (see Stuart Kaufmann and the article below specifically for the role in quantum biology)).
5) How can a system based on deterministic laws account for concepts such as free will. (This starts into the realm of philosophy, "Is there such thing as free will?" etc. If it's pure determinism, then no. If QM theories are truly random than is it really free will? Some thing at the edge might account for this. Is it orchestrated?)
6) How can a neural level of consciousness account for the rudimentary 'consciousness' observed in single cell organisms.

Vattay, G., Kauffman, S., & Niiranen, S. (2014). Quantum biology on the edge of quantum chaos. PloS one, 9(3), e89017.

 

[testingus]

It's a good question; it's a matter of sociology than science. I don't know that esteem really matters so much as consensus and authority. Stuart Hameroff's vocal associations of quantum mind with spirituality and Brahman philosophy probably doesn't help the case for quantum mind.

I agree. Associations with 'new age', 'eastern' or 'spiritual' philosophies naturally puts skeptical scientists on edge. That's not to say that there isn't parallels, however, it doesn't win an argument by saying it jives with what the mystics have been saying all along. That being said, it does raise the question of 'pre-conceived belief' systems in science. Is materialism really better than the alternative when it comes to understanding the world around us. Does materialism cause us to leave important aspects "on the sidewalk"? I don't know, and am wary to enter this type of discussion. This is a question for philosophers.

I agree. To say something is woo at all is not really scientific, it's more of an administrative function for science, guided by social factors (basically, in the name of brevity, we don't want to spend too much energy on every pet theory because we're not going to be alive long enough to learn everything). Of course we can't prove a negative, so there can always be an exceptions to the criticisms.

All we can really do is follow where the evidence points, regardless of what it means socially or philosophically.

 

[testingus]

I wouldn't be shocked if there were quantum computation in microtubules, or some other subcellular processes. I would be very surprised if this was directly to consciousness, however, since as far as we know microtubules are not performing any cognitive functions.

Of course the natural follow up question is, what is meant by cognitive function? Single cell slime mold can use tendrils composed of bundles of microtubules to forming patterns which, seek food, and solve problems such as escaping a maze (Adamatzky 2012). This relates to point 6) brought up in the previous post of the reason for looking at subneural processes as the rudiments of consciousness/cognitive processing.

If each neuron possesses highly integrated subneural components, and these neurons are highly integrated to form the brain, all this means is that the brain, cognition and consciousness, are way more complex than previously surmised. Would a single cell be as conscious as a human? No. But rudimentary cognition in single cells may provide the basis.

Adamatzky A. (2012). Slime mould computes planar shapes. Int. J. Bio-Inspired Comput. 4, 149–154

 

[madness]

Of course the natural follow up question is, what is meant by cognitive function?

In this particular context, it means the functional/computational operations with which conscious experience is associated. Consciousness doesn't just exist as a thing in and of itself, it exists as the subjective feeling associated with some functional processes occurring within the brain. Since microtubules don't carry out the compuations underlying these cognitive processes, they are probably not involved in conscious experience.

Single cell slime mold can use tendrils composed of bundles of microtubules to forming patterns which, seek food, and solve problems such as escaping a maze (Adamatzky 2012). This relates to point 6) brought up in the previous post of the reason for looking at subneural processes as the rudiments of consciousness/cognitive processing.

I don't expect that single cell organisms have a rudimentary level of consciousness as you claim. Of course I cannot prove that they don't, however.

If each neuron possesses highly integrated subneural components, and these neurons are highly integrated to form the brain, all this means is that the brain, cognition and consciousness, are way more complex than previously surmised. Would a single cell be as conscious as a human? No. But rudimentary cognition in single cells may provide the basis.

I don't know of any evidence that these heirarchical processing are integrated in a way which is relevant for conscious experience (e.g., that they have a high level of integrated information). We would more typically view subcellular processes are performing the necessary support roles to allow neurons and circuits to function correctly.