The typical and the exceptional in physics

[Ken G]

Now the question is - can we come up with model that gives correct prediction but does not contradict realism? And pilot wave theory does that.

It is impossible to contradict realism, because realism is untestable. All one could ever contradict is a prediction, and pilot wave theory does not contradict any predictions that quantum mechanics does not contradict. I agree that when our technology becomes able to test predictions that pilot theory makes that go beyond quantum theory, then it becomes an interesting physical theory, but that it doesn't contradict realism is of no interest within the "science" subroutine. It does not surprise me at all that any scientific theory can be dressed up suitably to get it to satisfy any philosophical doctrine, what bothers me is that dressing up our science to get it to fit preconceived notions seems very opposite to the spirit of science. But if someone says "I like to picture a pilot wave when I do quantum mechanics because it allows me to picture a classical world", then there can be no objection whatsoever.

 

[Ken G]

This is strawman argument. We do not require that our ontologies are true reality. Ontolgies are only good approximations of reality that simplify our current and future models as they are reusable in different models.

So you are fine with saying "one can picture that matter is made of atoms to help motivate the correct application of our theory of matter" instead of saying "matter is made of atoms"? Because that's what I'm talking about.

 

[vanhees71]

If it comes to ontological interpretations of quantum theory, you cannot scientifically disproof the one or the other by observation/experiment, and that's why this question is not science but philosophy. There are many things in philosophy, very important for our existence, that cannot be scientifically evaluated like ethics. Science is not comprehensive concerning human experience. This one shouldn't forget as a scientist both concerning science and all the other realms of the human endeavors. It is important to know the restrictions and the strengths of science. The restriction is that science only deals with the description of phenomena that are reproducible and can be objectively observed, i.e., that are not due to some errorneous experiences of our brain like dreams or conscious prejudices. All that counts for science is observable by anybody leading to the same (often even accurate quantitative) results given (with sufficient precision) a certain situation. This situation can just be found in nature (as is the case for all astronomical observations, where we just observe "what's out there" without the possiblity for us to manipulate anything) or it can be "men made" in the sense that we can setup particularly simple situations (sometimes with an astonishing precision), and this we call an experiment.

In this way one finds patterns in the phenomena, which can be described mathematically in models or even theories (there are many models but a very few theories; fundamental theories in common use in contemporary physics are just general relativity and quantum theory and effective theories valid in restricted realms of applicability like relativistic and non-relativistic classical mechanics and field theories). That this is the case is already a remarkable observation and one of the key results of physics. These theories lead to the development of technologies and with them new possibilities to measure things which are far away from the everyday experience of the environment around us, and it is not surprising that many things, particularly concerning quantum theory, seem to be quite bizarre to us, because they refer to things outside of our everyday experience (like single elementary particles like electrons interacting with other particles or superfluid helium etc.).

That seems to trigger all kinds of speculation concerning the "ontology", and there are as many ontic interpretations of QT as there are physicists, and of course these must be in accordance with the observational facts, which are in a sense summarized in the fundamental theory of QT. These interpretations can thus not be scientifically distinguished and are thus not part of science. The only thing you need for a physical theory not to be just an abstract mathematical game but a "summary of observed phenomena" is a connection between the mathematical formalism and what's observed in the lab or elsewhere in nature. In this sense the mathematical objects of the theory are only epistemic, i.e., mere descriptions of what's observable given the information about the situation in which you make these observations. There is not more but also not less to science than that.

 

[Simon Phoenix]

What's so wrong about freeing the constraints from what science has never been, and let it be what it demonstrably actually is?

Well, when I'm describing my primary goal as one of 'understanding' why the world as it is - of course I'm not suggesting that one should mindlessly fixate on one particular ontology :-)

I guess the philosophical question is whether there is some 'underlying' reality to which our theories (and pictures, if you like) get closer and closer as we develop them. In terms of QM we don't even have a good way of describing that underlying reality (if it does indeed exist) and as far as predictions go we don't even 'need' to develop such a picture.

Let's just assume a classical world view, for the moment. There is something we call an electric field and we have a very good mathematical framework for describing this. Is it just fancy maths or is there really something there? Well whenever we put a test charge in this field we can see it responds to 'something' - it feels a pull or a push. Furthermore, this pull or push is precisely described by this mathematical model. The mathematical model is a very faithful model of something that actually happens. I think it's stretching things a bit to describe the maths as being essentially divorced from the reality here. There really is something that behaves to all intents and purposes as if it were the physical analogue of our mathematical model.

Of course we may need to adjust that picture in the light of new evidence (Newton's gravitational 'force' being replaced by a bending of the fabric of spacetime is a prime example of a very radical revision of our picture of things).

I just don't think 'science' is only about building successful epicycles.

 

[atyy]

If it comes to ontological interpretations of quantum theory, you cannot scientifically disproof the one or the other by observation/experiment, and that's why this question is not science but philosophy. There are many things in philosophy, very important for our existence, that cannot be scientifically evaluated like ethics. Science is not comprehensive concerning human experience. This one shouldn't forget as a scientist both concerning science and all the other realms of the human endeavors. It is important to know the restrictions and the strengths of science. The restriction is that science only deals with the description of phenomena that are reproducible and can be objectively observed, i.e., that are not due to some errorneous experiences of our brain like dreams or conscious prejudices. All that counts for science is observable by anybody leading to the same (often even accurate quantitative) results given (with sufficient precision) a certain situation. This situation can just be found in nature (as is the case for all astronomical observations, where we just observe "what's out there" without the possiblity for us to manipulate anything) or it can be "men made" in the sense that we can setup particularly simple situations (sometimes with an astonishing precision), and this we call an experiment.

In this way one finds patterns in the phenomena, which can be described mathematically in models or even theories (there are many models but a very few theories; fundamental theories in common use in contemporary physics are just general relativity and quantum theory and effective theories valid in restricted realms of applicability like relativistic and non-relativistic classical mechanics and field theories). That this is the case is already a remarkable observation and one of the key results of physics. These theories lead to the development of technologies and with them new possibilities to measure things which are far away from the everyday experience of the environment around us, and it is not surprising that many things, particularly concerning quantum theory, seem to be quite bizarre to us, because they refer to things outside of our everyday experience (like single elementary particles like electrons interacting with other particles or superfluid helium etc.).

That seems to trigger all kinds of speculation concerning the "ontology", and there are as many ontic interpretations of QT as there are physicists, and of course these must be in accordance with the observational facts, which are in a sense summarized in the fundamental theory of QT. These interpretations can thus not be scientifically distinguished and are thus not part of science. The only thing you need for a physical theory not to be just an abstract mathematical game but a "summary of observed phenomena" is a connection between the mathematical formalism and what's observed in the lab or elsewhere in nature. In this sense the mathematical objects of the theory are only epistemic, i.e., mere descriptions of what's observable given the information about the situation in which you make these observations. There is not more but also not less to science than that.

But you are the one promoting ontology! If you don't care about ontology, you would not object to collapse.

 

[vanhees71]

I object to collapse because it violates fundamental principles, but we have discussed this again and again. There's no value of repeating the obvious argument again and again.

 

[atyy]

I object to collapse because it violates fundamental principles, but we have discussed this again and again. There's no value of repeating the obvious argument again and again.

Your fundamental principles are ontological. Collapse clearly does not affect the locality of the Hamiltonian, nor does collapse allow superluminal signalling.

 

[Ken G]

What I mean that science doesn't do ontology goes well beyond the strawman argument that science only approximates, it questions what an approximation even is. If I approximate curvature of spacetime near the Earth by invoking Newton's force of gravity, I have two schemes that make very closely the same predictions, but their ontologies are not even remotely close. So that's what "approximation" means in science, it never means that our ontologies are nearly the correct ones-- I wouldn't even know how to give that phrase meaning.

So for example, when Galileo challenged Ptolemy's ontology, he really should have said words to the effect that "by invoking the Copernican model, we better predict the following observations, and we also achieve the following conceptual unifications. Hence, we achieve greater predictive and conceptual power in the framework of the Copernican picture than the Ptolemaic picture." It's much more memorable to say "Eppur si muove", but it's really not good science-- as we discovered a few hundred years later with the next revolution in thought about motion.

 

[Simon Phoenix]

If it comes to ontological interpretations of quantum theory, you cannot scientifically disproof the one or the other by observation/experiment

I would certainly say that we can't currently distinguish between the various interpretations (any of the various ontic, epistemic or some mix of the two). But is it true to say that in principle we cannot? Maybe there's something in the structure of QM, some future Bell that will ring, that will allow us to subject some of the different interpretations to experimental test. I'd like to think so - but in the meantime it's "keep the philosophy quiet whilst I do this calculation".

 

[zonde]

So you are fine with saying "one can picture that matter is made of atoms to help motivate the correct application of our theory of matter" instead of saying "matter is made of atoms"? Because that's what I'm talking about.

Sort of. I would say that "one can picture that matter is made of atoms to greatly simplify different theories about matter (in chemistry and physics)".
Hmm, how would look alternative formulations of these theories without some element that takes place of atoms. Just thinking.

 

[Ken G]

Is it just fancy maths or is there really something there? Well whenever we put a test charge in this field we can see it responds to 'something' - it feels a pull or a push. Furthermore, this pull or push is precisely described by this mathematical model. The mathematical model is a very faithful model of something that actually happens. I think it's stretching things a bit to describe the maths as being essentially divorced from the reality here. There really is something that behaves to all intents and purposes as if it were the physical analogue of our mathematical model.

Of course we may need to adjust that picture in the light of new evidence (Newton's gravitational 'force' being replaced by a bending of the fabric of spacetime is a prime example of a very radical revision of our picture of things).

I just don't think 'science' is only about building successful epicycles.

The goal of science is unification of its concepts, so epicycles are generally regarded as science going in the wrong direction. But making unification the goal is simply because we wish to understand, not because there is some unified "thing" there that we are understanding. Remember that when Kepler's laws replaced epicycles, the excitement was because the laws were better unified (ellipses have only two free parameters). This gave the promise that a simple dynamical theory might underpin them, which was then discovered by Newton. That's all great, this is science doing what it tries to do-- all without ever mentioning anything except models and predictions. The mistake is in the incorrect inference that since Newton's laws are so successful, they must represent, or even approximate, some other set of laws that "rule" what actually happens. Laws that rule is an obvious anthropomorphism, and anthtropomorphisms are the clearest form of epistemology. This is the great irony-- whenever we see ontological language, it never takes long for that language to get anthropomorphic, which is the clear sign that it is really epistemology disguised as ontology. Even the concept of a "pull or a push" is anthropomorphic. There's no problem in building these pictures, they help us understand-- let us merely recognize that our goal is understanding, so we will build pictures, and we will try to make those pictures as anthropomorphic as possible. But there's no need to pretend we are not doing that, to pretend we are talking about "what really is."

Thus, if someone says let's picture a pilot wave so we can maintain a classical view of quantum mechanics, on the grounds that classical pictures gibe best with our daily experiences, I say more power to them-- but I also notice the explicitly epistemological character of that language. It's the same for the epistemological character of the thermal interpretation, or any interpretation of quantum mechanics. It's only when the language gets ontological that I say, don't you see the contradiction in making choices about your approach to thinking about reality and calling those choices the reality itself?

 

[Ken G]

Sort of. I would say that "one can picture that matter is made of atoms to greatly simplify different theories about matter (in chemistry and physics)".

And I can agree with that, this is using atoms for what they are meant to be in science. Some people find that unsatisfying, because they want atoms to be more than that, but this comes at the cost of making science less than what it should be.

Hmm, how would look alternative formulations of these theories without some element that takes place of atoms. Just thinking.

The hardest thing is to think outside the paradigm, without having an observational mandate to do so! Even Einstein needed the Michelson-Morley experiment. But it's certainly true that any new theory of matter must be able to explain why the old one worked so well. What amazes me is how easily we discard the ontological thinking of past generations, at the same time that we cling so tightly to our own.

 

[ddd123]

Thus, if someone says let's picture a pilot wave so we can maintain a classical view of quantum mechanics, on the grounds that classical pictures gibe best with our daily experiences, I say more power to them-- but I also notice the explicitly epistemological character of that language. It's the same for the epistemological character of the thermal interpretation, or any interpretation of quantum mechanics. It's only when the language gets ontological that I say, don't you see the contradiction in making choices about your approach to thinking about reality and calling those choices the reality itself?

I may agree with you, but not everybody does, on this purely philosophical point. If you go look at the philosophical debate on this, it's really not going to work to tell them "don't you see that..."

You have realist philosophies that still go on with logical positivism as if it wasn't already demolished, because they want to keep the intrinsically descriptive quality of language and act "as if" because they don't see an alternative. You'll see things like Tarski's t-schema to justify the ontology of assertions ('snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white). You don't want to go there, unless you want to go there and do philosophy. Otherwise you just learn to be scientifically agnostic and avoid the point, unless you find a clever way of addressing these things scientifically like PBR did.

 

[Demystifier]

But you are the one promoting ontology! If you don't care about ontology, you would not object to collapse.

I think I understand the position of @vanhees71 , as well as your position, so I believe I can explain his position in a way you can understand.

There is a consistent way to protest against collapse without caring about ontology. To do this, the most important thing is to define words one is using. So let us give the definitions:

Definition 1:
Wave-function is a mental tool used by people who understand QM.

Comment: A 100 years ago wave functions did not exist.

Definition 2:
Wave-function update is a mental act by a person who understands QM. In this act, an old wave function is replaced by a new wave function, with intention to better represent the new knowledge acquired by new measurement results.

Definition 3:
Wave-function collapse is any sudden change of wave function which cannot be described by a Schrodinger-like equation and cannot be classified as a wave-function update.

Comment: From those definitions it follows that collapse and update are mutually exclusive.

Now we need the rules for using the wave function (according to the minimal ensemble interpretation):
Rule 1: $|\psi|^2$ is probability density.
Rule 2: If no results of measurements are known, $\psi$ should be considered as changing with time according to a Schrodinger-like equation.
Rule 3: When results of measurement are known, the wave function should be updated.

Comment: The rules are not the axioms. The purpose of the rules is to provide a practical user manual.

Observation 1: From rules and definitions above it follows that wave function collapse should never be used.
Observation 2: Nothing of the above depends on ontology.

 

[Ken G]

I may agree with you, but not everybody does, on this purely philosophical point. If you go look at the philosophical debate on this, it's really not going to work to tell them "don't you see that..."

I should have reframed that as "tell my why this is not a blatant contradiction in logic." That offers the possibility that perhaps they can provide a reason that it isn't, that I am simply not seeing-- because it sure looks like a blatant contradiction to me!

You have realist philosophies that still go on with logical positivism as if it wasn't already demolished, because they want to keep the intrinsically descriptive quality of language and act "as if" because they don't see an alternative. You'll see things like Tarski's t-schema to justify the ontology of assertions ('snow is white' is true if and only if snow is white). You don't want to go there, unless you want to go there and do philosophy. Otherwise you just learn to be scientifically agnostic and avoid the point, unless you find a clever way of addressing these things scientifically like PBR did.

It's a tricky business, I will agree. All too often these kinds of arguments seem to embed their perspective in an implicit way, like a sleight of hand, disguising that what emerges as a conclusion was slipped in secretly. Of course all logic involves theorems that stem from postulates, so we all assume what we prove, but the sin is in hiding the key assumption so it seems like the theorem follows from a smaller set of assumptions than what is actually required. I regard PBR as a classic example of that-- they argue for the necessity of regarding the wavefunction as ontic by producing contradictions in certain types of epistemic thinking about it, but they embed a key ontic assumption when they assert that systems have attributes. So they assume an ontic playing field, and then "prove" that epistemic views can't play on that field. This should not be too surprising. So in my opinion, all QT is used to do in PBR is provide a suitably complex and subtle milieu to make it possible to conceal the sleight of hand there, like any good magician does.

 

[ddd123]

I should have reframed that as "tell my why this is not a blatant contradiction in logic." That offers the possibility that perhaps they can provide a reason that it isn't, that I am simply not seeing-- because it sure looks like a blatant contradiction to me!

Of course the other camp has a reason, which you will find, with each of your counter-arguments, more and more refined and subtly contradictory! :)

I regard PBR as a classic example of that-- they argue for the necessity of regarding the wavefunction as ontic by producing contradictions in certain types of epistemic thinking about it, but they embed a key ontic assumption when they assert that systems have attributes. So they assume an ontic playing field, and then "prove" that epistemic views can't play on that field.

This is interesting, but can you formalize this objection?

 

[Ken G]

The PBR proof requires that systems have attributes, does it not?

 

[RockyMarciano]

I think I understand the position of @vanhees71 , as well as your position, so I believe I can explain his position in a way you can understand.

There is a consistent way to protest against collapse without caring about ontology. To do this, the most important thing is to define words one is using. So let us give the definitions:

Definition 1:
Wave-function is a mental tool used by people who understand QM.

Comment: A 100 years ago wave functions did not exist.

Definition 2:
Wave-function update is a mental act by a person who understands QM. In this act, an old wave function is replaced by a new wave function, with intention to better represent the new knowledge acquired by new measurement results.

Definition 3:
Wave-function collapse is any sudden change of wave function which cannot be described by a Schrodinger-like equation and cannot be classified as a wave-function update.

Comment: From those definitions it follows that collapse and update are mutually exclusive.

Now we need the rules for using the wave function (according to the minimal ensemble interpretation):
Rule 1: $|\psi|^2$ is probability density.
Rule 2: If no results of measurements are known, $\psi$ should be considered as changing with time according to a Schrodinger-like equation.
Rule 3: When results of measurement are known, the wave function should be updated.

Comment: The rules are not the axioms. The purpose of the rules is to provide a practical user manual.

Observation 1: From rules and definitions above it follows that wave function collapse should never be used.
Observation 2: Nothing of the above depends on ontology.

It seems to me that all the definitions rules and assumptions depend on ontology, unless you assume from the onset there is a version of QM that is devoid of any ontology to begin with, but I can't see how since that would be starting with the conclusion as a premise..

 

[Demystifier]

It seems to me that all the definitions rules and assumptions depend on ontology

Why do you think so?

 

[ddd123]

The PBR proof requires that systems have attributes, does it not?

As I understand it, PBR theorem attacks realist but with epistemic wave function camps. Not non-realist camps. So of course they must assume an underlying ontology AND an epistemic wave function, which they disprove under certain assumptions.

 

[Simon Phoenix]

The mistake is in the incorrect inference that since Newton's laws are so successful, they must represent, or even approximate, some other set of laws that "rule" what actually happens. Laws that rule is an obvious anthropomorphism

I think I take a different view. That there are 'laws' of nature is an inescapable conclusion. There is something making them there damned apples drop on our heads. I want to know two things (a) what are those laws? (b) why are they like they are? I may never get a fully correct, or complete, answer to those questions - and I admit that they may not even be answerable questions in all cases, maybe the best I'll get is an approximation - but why not shoot for the moon instead of trying merely to throw something over the garden fence?

Perhaps a better way of stating the role of science, in line with Popper's approach, is to suggest that part of the job of science is actually to reject certain ontologies. Atoms exist - and we can even 'see' the pesky little critters - but atoms are themselves only an approximate conglomerate of a deeper picture.

 

[RockyMarciano]

Why do you think so?

When you say "people who understand QM", you are introducing some specific form of understanding QM, even if it is the so called minimalist one, you are then assuming this particular understanding of QM doesn't have an implicit ontology, but certainly the minimal interpretation has some ontology about the probabilistic basis underlying nature or about considering observables certain objects inherited from classical physics just to giv some examples.

 

[vanhees71]

(a) is a scientific question and now answered by General Relativity as the best description of gravity. (b) is not answered by science. You are free to believe anything you like about it and never get disproven by science.

 

[RockyMarciano]

The goal of science is unification of its concepts, so epicycles are generally regarded as science going in the wrong direction. But making unification the goal is simply because we wish to understand, not because there is some unified "thing" there that we are understanding. Remember that when Kepler's laws replaced epicycles, the excitement was because the laws were better unified (ellipses have only two free parameters). This gave the promise that a simple dynamical theory might underpin them, which was then discovered by Newton. That's all great, this is science doing what it tries to do-- all without ever mentioning anything except models and predictions. The mistake is in the incorrect inference that since Newton's laws are so successful, they must represent, or even approximate, some other set of laws that "rule" what actually happens. Laws that rule is an obvious anthropomorphism, and anthtropomorphisms are the clearest form of epistemology. This is the great irony-- whenever we see ontological language, it never takes long for that language to get anthropomorphic, which is the clear sign that it is really epistemology disguised as ontology. Even the concept of a "pull or a push" is anthropomorphic. There's no problem in building these pictures, they help us understand-- let us merely recognize that our goal is understanding, so we will build pictures, and we will try to make those pictures as anthropomorphic as possible. But there's no need to pretend we are not doing that, to pretend we are talking about "what really is."

I'm not sure I'm getting your point here. If we wish to understand, surely we want to understand something, don't we? . If the goal of science is unification of its concepts it must mean those concepts are referred to something with features that point to a unique substrate? When you say "model and test", you mean model and test what?. Or are you just against a bad use of the word "reality" that you prefer to substitute by "ever perfectible model"?

 

[zonde]

And I can agree with that, this is using atoms for what they are meant to be in science. Some people find that unsatisfying, because they want atoms to be more than that, but this comes at the cost of making science less than what it should be.

I think I can agree with position that atoms is something more than just a thinking tool. Say if we believe that future models can modify our concept of atoms but they will never get completely rid of them then we believe they represent something real. For me it is unthinkable how we could describe human DNA without concept of atoms. And it is unthinkable that we could replace human DNA model with something completely different.

What amazes me is how easily we discard the ontological thinking of past generations, at the same time that we cling so tightly to our own.

Can you give some examples so that it is easier to understand what you have on mind?

 

[Demystifier]

When you say "people who understand QM", you are introducing some specific form of understanding QM, even if it is the so called minimalist one, you are then assuming this particular understanding of QM doesn't have an implicit ontology, but certainly the minimal interpretation has some ontology about the probabilistic basis underlying nature or about considering observables certain objects inherited from classical physics just to giv some examples.

For a human physicist, it is probably impossible to think about nature without having some implicit notion of ontology in mind. But for practical purposes, it is not necessary to be explicit about ontology. The minimal ensemble interpretation does not deny that some ontology exists. It merely refrains from saying anything explicit about it. If you want to say something explicit about ontology (which is legitimate and, in some cases, even desirable), you must step out of the minimal ensemble interpretation.

 

[Demystifier]

(b) is not answered by science.

That is not true. In some cases, science (especially physics) can say why a law is such and such. In other words, some laws can be derived from other (more fundamental) laws. E.g. the Ohm law can be derived from the general laws of electrodynamics.

 

[RockyMarciano]

For a human physicist, it is probably impossible to think about nature without having some implicit notion of ontology in mind. But for practical purposes, it is not necessary to be explicit about ontology. The minimal ensemble interpretation does not deny that some ontology exists. It merely refrains from saying anything explicit about it.

Ok, but since you admit that it has an implicit ontology that it's simply moreless hidden from view, it gives atyy some motives to say that vanhees71 is actually defending that hidden ontology, and exploiting the advantage of feeling free to criticize other more explicit ontologies in the safety that his own is hidden in a more implicit model.

 

[Demystifier]

Ok, but since you admit that it has an implicit ontology that it's simply moreless hidden from view, it gives atyy some motives to say that vanhees71 is actually defending that hidden ontology, and exploiting the advantage of feeling free to criticize other more explicit ontologies in the safety that his own is hidden in a more implicit model.

Yes, I agree with that. I don't think that vanhees71 is always consistent about ontology. But he is consistent in that he does not care too much about ontology, and it is OK to be inconsistent about something you don't really care about. If I want to clear up some ontological questions, I will not discuss them with vanhees71. And he is probably fine with that. He is much better in technical questions (certainly better than me and atyy together), and he knows it.

 

[RockyMarciano]

Perhaps we could all agree that measurements exist? Because I honestly think that is the only ontology a physicist needs.

 

[Demystifier]

Perhaps we could all agree that measurements exist? Because I honestly think that is the only ontology a physicist needs.

Not necessarily:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1112.2034

 

[RockyMarciano]

Not necessarily:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1112.2034

Hmm, logically it may be possible but maybe you can agree that Ockham's razor would favor a more economic ontology without a divide between what's hiden and not hidden.

 

[Demystifier]

Hmm, logically it may be possible but maybe you can agree that Ockham's razor would favor a more economic ontology without a divide between what's hiden and not hidden.

Maybe.

 

[Ken G]

As I understand it, PBR theorem attacks realist but with epistemic wave function camps. Not non-realist camps. So of course they must assume an underlying ontology AND an epistemic wave function, which they disprove under certain assumptions.

Yes, that seems fair, but I would have said that realist epistemology is doomed from the start, even in classical physics. The basic problem is that if you say "atoms are real but what we mean by atoms in science isn't," the contradiction can be exposed by asking "but when you use the concept of atoms in science, don't you mean atoms in science?" If they say no, you simply show where they used the atoms-in-science in their approach to atoms, and if they say yes, you simply show that the initial statement is self-contradictory. Either way, it's a contradiction, the theory being applied is just the distraction that takes the eye off the magician's hand.

 

[Ken G]

I'm not sure I'm getting your point here. If we wish to understand, surely we want to understand something, don't we?

Would you say you understand logic? I mean, does it make sense that if A implies B and B implies C, then A implies C? So what is the "something" you understand there? The something is a way of thinking. That's what we always understand-- whenever we understand anything, what we understand is a way of thinking. But there is no ontology of logic, logic isn't a "thing" to understand. It's also not a single entity-- we can mean logic with the axiom of choice, or logic without the axiom of choice, and we can allow for fuzzier notions or use a black-and-white version. If those are all different "things" to understand, then which is the one that's real? Or if "things" don't have to be real, how to you tell a real thing from a nonreal thing? These are the problems with ontology. But for science, the problem with ontology is more basic-- attributes of systems are not testable, attributes of models of systems are testable. We test maps, not territories, so what we need for science are maps, not territories. So you ask, but if it's a good map, what is it a good map of? And I say, I could only answer that with yet another map, so the good simple map substitutes for the more complicated and less understood map.

If the goal of science is unification of its concepts it must mean those concepts are referred to something with features that point to a unique substrate?

Why must it mean that? If you regard that as a hypothesis you intend to test, you are being scientific, but good luck testing it. If you regard that as a self-evident truth, I say self-evidence is not the kind of evidence science uses. I know what you are saying, you are saying that if a law of physics works in almost all places and almost all times, what is it that unifies the effectiveness of the law, it must be a unique substrate. But I say that we wouldn't call it a law if it didn't have that property, and we don't need a reason for it to have that property-- we don't test the reasons models work, we just test models.

When you say "model and test", you mean model and test what?

Test the model against the observations. All you need is to be able to know a model when you see one, and an observation when you see one, and a correct prediction when you see one. That's it, no "things" necessary, except for the pictures we use along the way-- those are always our "things", they are always pictures. But the irony is, pictures are not generally regarded as themselves things, so we are still left with no things.

. Or are you just against a bad use of the word "reality" that you prefer to substitute by "ever perfectible model"?

I say the way the word "reality" gets used in science is "that which we are using science to understand." So what are we using science to understand? We are trying to understand a successful mode of thinking, a mode that is powerful and unifying, passes a load of objective tests, and helps us make good decisions by developing expectations that are borne out. No ontology necessary, indeed whenever ontology appears, science stumbles and has to pick itself up again later-- as it has done so many times before.