This webpage title poses the question: Can Mind Arise from Plain Matter?

[baywax]

I like the whole slime mold analogy. But its just a metaphor for a much more complex and distant cousin, the brain. Today our brain cells even have the gall to turn off their p52 gene and refuse to die for any cause, even if it is to build a stalk to facilitate wide spread sporulation. The mutation that turns off the p52 gene also starts a whole other group of "immortal cells" known as cancer.

If mutations are caused by micro states/environments like em radiation or chemical abrasion, then would that be an example of upward causation?

 

[pftest]

That doesn't bother me.

Alright. I got the impression you were a materialist, so the idea of everything being conscious to some degree (not just brains) seemed to conflict with that.

 

[Pythagorean]

I am a materialist in the sense that I think everything we can ever experience can be explained in terms of physical events.

I don't find that restrictive on reality at all though. Physical interactions are rich, complex, and majestic.

 

[Q_Goest]

Hi Pythagorean,

Here are some experiments that seem to suggest that top-down causation doesn't exist:



Personally, I don't think there's such a thing as top-down causation. I tend to agree with Dennit that nobody's really running the wheelhouse ...

The second youtube video is pertinent to this discussion. Note around 4:15 the guy states, "[counsiousness and brain activity are] different aspects of the same physical process. ... so your consciousness IS your brain activity." Let's call this the standard computational explanation (SCE) and it follows nicely from the exclusion argument per Yablo. The mental experience is what Yablo is calling x*. The physical activity is x which causes y. So Yablo concludes y is not caused by x*. He says x* can't influence y. x causes y, not x*. x* doesn't cause anything and can't be the cause of anything physical. Only physical things can create physical causes.

We then get the SCE: "The two are the same, so there's no problem!" The thing that is causing you to flinch in pain and to tell people you are in pain, per the SCE, isn't the mental state x*, it's the physical state x that causes the flinching and talking y. And the reason pain (x*) corresponds to the physical event where x causes y, is because the physical state x has come about to try and prevent pain. The reaction to pain is due to the physical change in state from x to y, not because of any mental state x* which causes y.

So far, this seems reasonable. x causes y, and x* = x, so x* doesn't need to produce physical state y because x already did that. In fact, x* just drifts off by itself, analogous to a shadow that never enters the causal chain. The paradox arises because we have excluded x* from doing any causal work but we still want to claim that there is a reliable correlation between our mental states and our reporting of them. The SCE still wants to claim that when physical state x reports x*, that the cause of y is x and not x*.

To understand this properly, we have to make a clear distinction between x and x*, the physical state and the mental state.
1) The physical state is what happens, it is the behavior and what is spoken. The physical state includes anything that is objectively measurable.
2) The mental state is how something feels. It includes the qualia that we experience such as the color red or the feeling of pain or the smell of a rose. The mental state includes anything that is only subjectively measurable.

The paradox therefore, is that the mental states, x*, can't be reliably reported by x. Here, the term "reliably reported" means that there is a reliable, 1 to 1 correlation between the physical state and the mental state which is everything the SCE wants to claim. The paradox arises because the SCE wants to claim that x not only correlates with x*, but that once x causes y, it has also provided a reliable report of x*. But if x causes y which provides a reliable report of x*, then x* has entered the causal chain of events and has influenced something physical.

The SCE attempts to get around this paradox by suggesting that "[counsiousness and brain activity are] different aspects of the same physical process. ... so your consciousness IS your brain activity." If the two are the same, then we should be able to objectively measure mental states, but remember that things defined as mental states are these subjectively measurable phenomena that are not things that regard the physical movement of matter. These phenomena may be supervenient on the physical comings and goings of physical matter, but they are not the physical movements themselves. Mental states are additional phenomena that are not explained by explaining the measurable interactions between neurons, chemicals, molecules, atoms, or subatomic particles. The description of those physical movements will never tell us ANYTHING about what it is like to experience the color red, pain, or the smell of a rose. So the attempt to get around the paradox by the SCE fails and mental states can not be reliably reported unless the mental states can enter the causal chain.

That's a real problem for anyone that wants to challenge mental causation. This issue hasn't been taken up in the literature to the extent I've done so here, though there are similar ideas that have been published. If mental states are reliably reported by physical states, then we have to accept that somehow mental states enter the causal chain, and thus we may have a case for downward causation. Whether or not it really is downward causation requires another discussion that is out of the scope of this thread.

 

[apeiron]

The paradox therefore, is that the mental states, x*, can't be reliably reported by x. Here, the term "reliably reported" means that there is a reliable, 1 to 1 correlation between the physical state and the mental state which is everything the SCE wants to claim. The paradox arises because the SCE wants to claim that x not only correlates with x*, but that once x causes y, it has also provided a reliable report of x*. But if x causes y which provides a reliable report of x*, then x* has entered the causal chain of events and has influenced something physical.

I would say it is better to think of x as the basic process of awareness - the brain~mind activity that animals have too. So really the story is y~x.

Then the extra x* issue is self-awareness. The ability to introspect "objectively" on conscious states.

Introspection is of course a learned socialised habit, not an innate "hardware" feature.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lev_Vygotsky
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Herbert_Mead

And also x* would not be epiphenomenal. Except in a certain sense.

The socialisation of the human brain through the self-regulatory mechanism of language is in fact a good example of downward causation - constraint exerted from a cultural level to the individual level.

Society teaches you to mind your manners, pursue certain goals, think in particular ways. The causality is from the global scale to the local so that you in your own head are negotating your needs vs the social needs.

See http://www.dichotomistic.com/mind_readings_JCS%20freewill%20article.html

That is of course why Sautoy was reacting with such feigned horror to the notion he had no freewill and his brain was deciding up to 10 seconds ahead of time. Society demands we be in control of our bodies. That is society's need - even if it is a fiction and leads to naive statements about the nature of consciousness.

(The length of the readiness potential in the precuneus is of course due to the task demand. The subject is being asked to "be random", so has to "load up" a preconscious intention, then sit on it long enough for it to appear to come after a decent "out of the blue" interval. The person is attentively conscious that "nothing has happened, nothing has happened" for long enough that the urge can be allowed to bubble up towards attentive execution. Note that the task demand could have been "feel the urge and then stop it". What would your interpretation of the "instant of consciousness" been then?)

Anway, the point is that x* examples like seeing the red of redness are pretty epiphenomenal because they are a fairly pointless and unnatural activity. The task demand now is just attend to the fact of some aspect of things, but not for any other reason except to note it is something that you are not in total control of. Some aspects of your conscious states are just wired in during development and indeed, part of your species genetic legacy. So they are very much bottom-up as you the individual are concerned, in your very moment to moment conscious way.

Of course, viewed over sufficient time (developmental and genetic) you will be able to see the top-down aspects of the causality involved in seeing redness. There was the evolutionary pressures (primates who added a third retinal pigment probably as an aid to picking out ripe fruit). And there were the more immediate developmental constraints. Does a newborn baby "see red"? Given the state of their cortexes at birth, plainly not. A world of red things is what is necessary to then constrain their neural development.

So the problem with physicists and philosophers is that they take an overly reductionist and mechanical approach to explaining anything. The only timescales they can see are the right here, right now ones of the smallest moments. But systems exist in thick time. They are multiscale in time. And if we want to talk about things or processes like consciousness, we have to respect that essential aspect of systems.

The study of timing issues - as with this "random decision of left or right" - is indeed rewarding and instructive. But I have to wonder why people are using youtube clips as their sampling of what is a huge literature.

 

[pftest]

The second youtube video is pertinent to this discussion. Note around 4:15 the guy states, "[counsiousness and brain activity are] different aspects of the same physical process. ... so your consciousness IS your brain activity." Let's call this the standard computational explanation (SCE) and it follows nicely from the exclusion argument per Yablo. The mental experience is what Yablo is calling x*. The physical activity is x which causes y. So Yablo concludes y is not caused by x*. He says x* can't influence y. x causes y, not x*. x* doesn't cause anything and can't be the cause of anything physical. Only physical things can create physical causes.

We then get the SCE: "The two are the same, so there's no problem!"

Maybe you already mentioned this in your own post but i wasnt sure:

Two things are said here:
1. It is said that "mind = brain".
2. It is said that x is not x* (and that only x can cause y).

These two statements contradict each other.
If mind truly is brain, then x*=x and x* can cause y.

The socialisation of the human brain through the self-regulatory mechanism of language is in fact a good example of downward causation - constraint exerted from a cultural level to the individual level.

But this example involves mind so we do not know if this is downward causation or not. If mind is as fundamental as some physical interaction then any causation mind does is still the usual upward causation.

 

[apeiron]

But this example involves mind so we do not know if this is downward causation or not. If mind is as fundamental as some physical interaction then any causation mind does is still the usual upward causation.

That is a problem for people trying to argue the mind is dualistically fundamental, not me.

It would be another incoherence resulting from taking that stance.

 

[Pythagorean]

I must admit, I only remember the experiments itself, not the introductory or commentary of the videos. I don't agree with the statement that consciousness IS brain activity. I'll go more into that later.

So far, this seems reasonable. x causes y, and x* = x, so x* doesn't need to produce physical state y because x already did that. In fact, x* just drifts off by itself, analogous to a shadow that never enters the causal chain. The paradox arises because we have excluded x* from doing any causal work but we still want to claim that there is a reliable correlation between our mental states and our reporting of them. The SCE still wants to claim that when physical state x reports x*, that the cause of y is x and not x*.

I wouldn't say x* = x. I would say, instead that x* is a different frame of reference of x (which means there would be a transform operation involved: x* = T(x). This fits the analogy of the shadow in that way. One may argue that a shadow is somehow causal, but we generally put the blame on the owner of the shadow as being the cause and the shadow itself being the effect (the owner is blocking the sun's photons from hitting the concrete sidewalk, what we call a shadow isn't a substance, it's a lack of 'substance': namely, photons.)

To understand this properly, we have to make a clear distinction between x and x*, the physical state and the mental state.
1) The physical state is what happens, it is the behavior and what is spoken. The physical state includes anything that is objectively measurable.
2) The mental state is how something feels. It includes the qualia that we experience such as the color red or the feeling of pain or the smell of a rose. The mental state includes anything that is only subjectively measurable.

in 1), did you mean to include "what is spoken" as x? You had elsewhere defined it as y, which I would have agreed more with.

Subjective experience may by far be the most difficult thing to figure out how to measure , but is it truly impossible? I can't find the paper right now (I will look harder after this post, or maybe somebody else knows the study that I'm referring to) that showed how dogs stored smells was very similar to how we stored notes. In the way we can detect octaves, the dog can detect an extra enzyme on an aroma.

Between humans, we can share the experience of red, and neurologists can measure brain activity in several test subjects imagining or observing red.

The more qualia we begin to map out in terms of neurological activity, the more chances we have of discovering emergent properties, and explaining (which we already can in terms of core physics) why some members of our species don't experience red like we do.

If you were a neuroscientist and a musician, wouldn't it be enriching for you to play different kinds of music on many different types of subjects while using something like an fMRI? Or even to do experiments in the qualia, red (given that you're not colorblind).

If we get a firm physical grasp of how we can experience the color red, and then we can physically altar someone who is colorblind to be able to experience red (using what we've discovered) have we not made the case?

What if we observed physically similar phenomena. Could we make a particular kind of weather pattern experience the color red? No probably not, but that's not suprising because it's not the same physical phenomena, it's just similar (hypothetically of course). It can never be the same physical phenomena without actually having the components of the brain.

The paradox therefore, is that the mental states, x*, can't be reliably reported by x. Here, the term "reliably reported" means that there is a reliable, 1 to 1 correlation between the physical state and the mental state which is everything the SCE wants to claim. The paradox arises because the SCE wants to claim that x not only correlates with x*, but that once x causes y, it has also provided a reliable report of x*. But if x causes y which provides a reliable report of x*, then x* has entered the causal chain of events and has influenced something physical.

I find no reason to believe the transform x* = T(x) has a 1 to 1 correlation with x. The transform could map n-dimensional space to m-dimensional space for all we know. You'd also have to define "reliable". We can report emotions to each other in a way that's vaguely consistent using language. In the same we, most of us agree on what the color red is (and the failure of a colorblind person to do so can be explained physically). There's always some confidence less than 100% in our report, but that goes with any observation. Of course, when reporting emotions, our confidence is considerably lower than when reporting something like length.

The SCE attempts to get around this paradox by suggesting that "[counsiousness and brain activity are] different aspects of the same physical process. ... so your consciousness IS your brain activity." If the two are the same, then we should be able to objectively measure mental states, but remember that things defined as mental states are these subjectively measurable phenomena that are not things that regard the physical movement of matter.

I personally don't agree that consciousness is brain activity. I only demand that consciousness results from brain activity. If you can stop all brain activity, you stop consciousness. I don't mean to say that consciousness exists in all brain activity; just that if you shut the whole thing down, you'll be sure to nail it.

These phenomena may be supervenient on the physical comings and goings of physical matter, but they are not the physical movements themselves. Mental states are additional phenomena that are not explained by explaining the measurable interactions between neurons, chemicals, molecules, atoms, or subatomic particles. The description of those physical movements will never tell us ANYTHING about what it is like to experience the color red, pain, or the smell of a rose. So the attempt to get around the paradox by the SCE fails and mental states can not be reliably reported unless the mental states can enter the causal chain.

In physics, we have lots of things that aren't the physical movements themselves. They are a summation or a statistical abstract of the system. We chose such parameters, not because they're inherent to the system (though they may be) but because they're relevant to the way in which we view the system and our process of understanding it in a categorical way (because stereotyping makes learning faster, if flawed).

That's a real problem for anyone that wants to challenge mental causation. This issue hasn't been taken up in the literature to the extent I've done so here, though there are similar ideas that have been published. If mental states are reliably reported by physical states, then we have to accept that somehow mental states enter the causal chain, and thus we may have a case for downward causation. Whether or not it really is downward causation requires another discussion that is out of the scope of this thread.

What if qualia are classification schemes that our brain uses to integrate and store sensory data? The definition of mind is vague, of course. If you would include all of the brain's activities and function as mind, then I'd think you'd be taking it too far. I was always under the impression that "mind" was only the part that you're aware of.

For instance, we don't notice that the floor is pushing up on our feet as we sit here reading posts. That stimulus isn't being directed the the higher functions of the brain that we associate with mind. It's being handled by lower function until the point where you begin to ponder "hey... the floor is pushing up on my feet".

In the same way, short of us pondering it, the color red isn't brought to our mind's attention when we observe it. One of our memory functions classifies light (with a particular range of frequencies) and files it away and compares it to similar observations in the future. We can view the resulting discussion, later some day, on physics forums, as a result of many different brain functions all fulfilling their "duties" in exactly the way the neurons allow them to.

That is, there may be no single decision-making process in the brain that we can wrap together in a tidy bow and call "mind". And there's no reason for me to believe our experience as an individual encompasses a significant fraction of all the things our brain is doing at once.

 

[Pythagorean]

Trying to get a better grasp of the idea of downward causation a bit, I ran across this:
http://www.ctnsstars.org/conferences/papers/The%20physics%20of%20downward%20causation.pdf

 

[pftest]

That is a problem for people trying to argue the mind is dualistically fundamental, not me.

It would be another incoherence resulting from taking that stance.

Thats exactly why mind-examples of downward causation are disqualified as examples of downward causation. They depend on a metaphysical assumption so such examples are simply begging the question: "mind uses downward causation, because my metaphysics assumes it uses downward causation".

Now of course it may be true that mind is a higher level force using downward causation, but to support this it would be better to use a purely physical example that such a thing is possible. Otherwise downward causation becomes yet another new unknown power imbued on the mind but not found anywhere else in the natural world.

Btw what do you mean with "dualistically fundamental"? Panpsychism, neutral monism, idealism, and other metaphysics with mind as a lower level causal power are not forms of dualism.

 

[apeiron]

Thats exactly why mind-examples of downward causation are disqualified as examples of downward causation.

You have the wrong end of the stick so far as my own approach goes.

I've said often enough that I don't accept "consciousness" as any particular level - global or local. I stick close to the neuroscience facts as they have been uncovered over the past 150 years.

Therefore I find it meaningful to talk about local and global scales of causality in interaction. For example, the contrast between local impressions and global ideas, or local automaticisms and global attentive states. Stuff which we can actually pin down to mechanisms and pathways and neural network models.

The totality of local~global interaction is the system.

"mind uses downward causation, because my metaphysics assumes it uses downward causation".

The history of it is the other way round. I started with the cognitive neuroscience and went looking for the meta-level of theory that would be best suited to modelling the mind. It was obvious that the prevailing computationalism didn't have a hope of cutting it.

I found people who knew what they were talking about in theoretical biology. They had been through the same issues in the 1960s, so have had more time to think all this through.

I see it as more of an issue of mathematics than metaphysics now. Hierarchy theory, category theory, dissipative structures, scalefree nets, generative neural nets - these are maths models.

It becomes a philosophy of science issue of course when you have to ask why are so many people still stuck in a mechanical, reductionist, atomistic, mindset?

After all, it is not as if this approach to mind science has had any success :zzz:

 

[pftest]

You have the wrong end of the stick so far as my own approach goes.

I've said often enough that I don't accept "consciousness" as any particular level - global or local. I stick close to the neuroscience facts as they have been uncovered over the past 150 years.

Therefore I find it meaningful to talk about local and global scales of causality in interaction. For example, the contrast between local impressions and global ideas, or local automaticisms and global attentive states. Stuff which we can actually pin down to mechanisms and pathways and neural network models.

The totality of local~global interaction is the system.

Those examples (impressions, ideas, attentive states) involve mind, just like the language and culture examples. If you say that these can all be pinned down to mechanisms, pathways, then try and pick a different example than a human brain (or any organism).

If it is all just mechanisms then there must be purely physical systems which are capable of downward causation. The mathematics should work not just on brains and organisms.

 

[Ferris_bg]

Some aspects from the integrated information theory of consciousness:

There are two main lessons to be learned from the study of consciousness in sleep. The first is that, during certain phases of sleep, the level of consciousness can decrease and at times nearly vanish, despite the fact that neural activity in the thalamocortical system is relatively stable. The second is that, during other phases of sleep, vivid conscious experience is possible despite the sensory and motor disconnection from the environment and the loss of self-reflective thought.

Why, then, does consciousness fade during certain phases of sleep and return during others?
An intriguing possibility is that the level of consciousness during sleep may be related to the degree of bistability of thalamocortical networks.

Why would the level of consciousness reflect the degree of bistability of thalamocortical networks?
A possible answer is offered by the integrated information theory of consciousness, which states that the level or quantity of consciousness is given by a system's capacity to generate integrated information. According to the theory, the brain substrate of consciousness is a complex of neural elements within the thalamocortical system that has a large repertoire of available states (information), yet cannot be decomposed into a collection of causally independent subsystems (integration). In this view, integrated information would be high during wakefulness because thalamocortical networks have a large repertoire of global firing patterns that are continuously available on a background of tonic depolarization. During early NREM sleep, by contrast, the ensuing bistability would reduce this global repertoire...

You can read more http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/hardware/a-bit-of-theory-consciousness-as-integrated-information" (Koch, Tononi).

 

[apeiron]

In this view, integrated information would be high during wakefulness because thalamocortical networks have a large repertoire of global firing patterns that are continuously available on a background of tonic depolarization.

Globally integrated states = local~global integration = bottom-up~top-down integration.

This is basic neuroscience. Why does the brain have so many more top-down connections than bottom up? Why did the human brain scale in powerlaw fashion so that "top-down" regions like prefrontal expand much more than "bottom-up" ones like thalamus? You cannot study brain architecture without this staring you in the face.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

To the extent that this thread involves the "Mind-Body Problem", I don't think there is a problem. The mind is conceptually different than the brain, but is nevertheless physical in the sense that patterns, information and entropy are aspects of the physical sciences. Patterns can, in principle, be transferred between suitably compatible objects which can support the necessary dynamics. If we could reverse engineer the brain (with its input and output organs), build several copies and locate them in different places; we ought to be able to transfer the information content of one's brain to anyone of these locations electromagnetically.

A dead brain obviously does not support a mind even if perfect anatomy is preserved. The mind is the information/entropy in the patterns of the electromagnetic field of a living brain which is supported by the architecture of the brain.

It is the mind, acting through the architecture of the body that indeed creates facts in the world, facts that cannot be predicted or explained by science as we know it.

http://www.newdualism.org/papers/H.Morowitz/Morowitz-1987.htm

 

[apeiron]

If it is all just mechanisms then there must be purely physical systems which are capable of downward causation. The mathematics should work not just on brains and organisms.

Read some phase transition literature. Ising models, Benard cells, etc. Check out vortexes and turbulence.

The point of the systems approach is that it ends up not being "all just material". Yes, it should all be "physical" in the widest sense, but that involves the dichotomy of substance and form.

If you prefer to identify mind with form and brain with substance, then that does work as an approximate ontology. But I have to keep reminding you that this is a dichotomistic rather than a dualistic ontic framework that I am using here.

All systems require both substance and form to be physically real. They can never be reduced completely to either one or other axis of being. Though for modelling reasons, we may chose to emphasise one or other aspect.

And the big mistake you and so many others here are making is to think of "mind" as a simple state - just experiencing, as some put it. Qualia. Raw awareness. Whatever. Mental experience in fact does not have that raw simplicity.

Anyway, I was chucking out a lot of old references and came across a couple that a little randomly illustrate the variety of systems thinking out there.

http://www.cns.bu.edu/Profiles/Grossberg/Gro2000TICS.pdf

THE COMPLEMENTARY BRAIN - Unifying Brain Dynamics and Modularity
The present article reviews evidence that the brain’s processing streams compute
complementary properties. Each stream’s properties are related to those of a complementary stream much as a lock fits its key, or two pieces of a puzzle fit together...Accumulating evidence suggests that these stages realize a process of hierarchical resolution of 'uncertainty. ‘...According to this view, the organization of the brain obeys principles of uncertainty and complementarity, as does the physical world with which brains interact, and of which they form a part.

http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg17523555.500-the-topdown-universe.html?full=true

PHYSICISTS are masters at describing the flickering subatomic world, at predicting how particles whizz about and bump into each other. But when they zoom out and consider the Universe as a whole, the laws governing atoms don't quite fit.
They have been struggling with this problem for years, assuming that if they got the right theory everything would fall into place, but maybe they are deluding themselves. Perhaps we simply shouldn't expect the laws of the microworld to explain the world on the largest scale.
Thomas Banks of Rutgers University and the University of California in Santa Cruz believes that we simply can't build everything from the bottom up; some large-scale aspects of the cosmos may be just as fundamental as the laws that govern particles. Indeed, the action of the cosmos could even change the properties of individual particles: we could be living in a top-down Universe.

 

[apeiron]

The mind is conceptually different than the brain,

Only if you choose to conceive of it that way. I chose to conceive of it as a dichotomy - brain~mind - and go from there.

This is the difference between a reductionist/atomistic approach and a systems/semiotic one.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Only if you choose to conceive of it that way. I chose to conceive of it as a dichotomy - brain~mind - and go from there.

This is the difference between a reductionist/atomistic approach and a systems/semiotic one.

The brain is the hardware. The mind is the software that can be implemented on different but compatible "machines". This is a systems approach.

 

[apeiron]

The brain is the hardware. The mind is the software that can be implemented on different but compatible "machines". This is a systems approach.

No, that is the information theoretic approach. Dualistic in spirit.

I agree this does get weasely. You can define form in terms of the marks on the infinite tape of a Turing machine. Yet you still (dichotomistically) need the hardware of some minimal gate apparatus (some local substance). So even a Turing machine based proof of universal computation cannot rid itself of its substantive aspects in the final analysis.

If you want to argue it out, you will have to get down to the "limits of computation" issues on this. Maxwell's demon, Bennett/Landauer on erasure, and all that.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

No, that is the information theoretic approach. Dualistic in spirit.

If you want to argue it out, you will have to get down to the "limits of computation" issues on this. Maxwell's demon, Bennett/Landauer on erasure, and all that.

According to Morowitz article (post 50) such dualism is contrary to the second law of thermodynamics. I'm simply saying that the brain is a physical object hosting dynamic electromagnetic processes involving concepts of energy, force, information and entropy as with any set of such dynamic physical processes. The brain is simply much more complex than any other physical object we know of. It's a product of evolution from (relatively) simple systems.

 

[apeiron]

According to Morowitz article (post 50) such dualism is contrary to the second law of thermodynamics. .

I'm struggling to see your point. I agree with Morowitz. Dualism would be in violation of the second law. Which is exactly why I argue for dichtomism. A systems modelling perspective. And I gave a bunch of cites from precisely the people (Rosen, Pattee, Salthe, etc) who in theoretical biology were reacting to Maxwell's Demon, the symbol grounding problem, etc.

The justification for taking dichotomies seriously is because of the second law. It is the approach that arises out of it. Can I be any plainer?

I'm simply saying that the brain is a physical object hosting dynamic electromagnetic processes ...

It makes me nervous when you talk about brain activity as electromagnetic. You don't mean that too literally do you?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

The justification for taking dichotomies seriously is because of the second law. It is the approach that arises out of it. Can I be any plainer?

Perhaps I don't follow what you mean by dichotomy in this context. If you mean structure hosting dynamic processes I agree with you. I don't really see a dichotomy. All living things and many machines we build are objects which host dynamic processes subject to the second law. Besides, it's well known that living systems exist by maintaining a state of disequilibrium with the surrounding environment in terms of having lower entropy. This is paid for by releasing heat from metabolism into the environment raising the entropy of the organism -environment system.

It makes me nervous when you talk about brain activity as electromagnetic. You don't mean that too literally do you?

Of the four fundamental interactions, what else would describe the dynamic activity of the brain which is electro-chemical in nature. All ordinary chemistry is mediated by the EMF. What else would it be: gravity, the strong and weak forces? You must be aware of this.

 

[apeiron]

Perhaps I don't follow what you mean by dichotomy in this context. If you mean structure hosting dynamic processes I agree with you.

There you go. Structure~process. You are talking dichotomies. Stasis~flux, synchronic~diachronic, existence~persistence. More ways of getting down to it.

And even more basic is the dichotomy of local~global. So as you say, something must be local - the constructing contents (and we could think of them as the fast-changing, and so the "processes"). And something must be global. The overall constraining context, the slow-changing structural view.

Of the four fundamental interactions, what else would describe the dynamic activity of the brain which is electro-chemical in nature. All ordinary chemistry is mediated by the EMF. What else would it be: gravity, the strong and weak forces? You must be aware of this.

By the same argument, all ordinary chemistry is mediated by atoms and so I could say the brain is a physical object hosting dynamic atomic processes.

Why bring up EM unless you think it is somehow of some causal significance here? I never look at the brain and think there is a flashing array of EM signals. Or that magnetism has anything to do with anything much. It is not as if neurons conduct electrical pulses is it? Just waves of ionic potential as a bunch of ions step sideways across a membrane for a second.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

By the same argument, all ordinary chemistry is mediated by atoms and so I could say the brain is a physical object hosting dynamic atomic processes.

Why bring up EM unless you think it is somehow of some causal significance here? I never look at the brain and think there is a flashing array of EM signals. Or that magnetism has anything to do with anything much. It is not as if neurons conduct electrical pulses is it? Just waves of ionic potential as a bunch of ions step sideways across a membrane for a second.

Because I believe that the EMF, in the complex configurations it assumes within the brain's dynamic and structural constraints is what we call mind. You're taking a very narrow view of the EMF in terms of flashing lights, etc. The EMF and gravity are the long range forces and define much of the entire macroscopic world of our direct experience. It's the patterns of the EMF that differentiate inert matter from living (and thinking) matter. The strong nuclear force holds the atomic nucleus together, countering the repulsive EMF between protons. Therefore the strong force is key to stable structures. However, ordinary interactions take place between the electron shells of atoms. So when you compare ordinary atomic interactions to electromagnetic interactions, you're talking about the same thing. Also, every electric field is associated with a magnetic field according to Maxwell's Laws. These fields are very weak in the brain but they do the job. The magnetic field doesn't interact because of the non metallic structure of the brain. You are correct that electric potentials are largely carried by ionic transfers, but free electrons seem to play a role at synapses.

 

[apeiron]

Because I believe that the EMF, in the complex configurations it assumes within the brain's dynamic and structural constraints is what we call mind.

It's the patterns of the EMF that differentiate inert matter from living (and thinking) matter.

Also, every electric field is associated with a magnetic field according to Maxwell's Laws. These fields are very weak in the brain but they do the job.

free electrons seem to play a role at synapses.

Crank alert! Or can you cite the relevant experimental evidence in the reputable literature?

 

[WaveJumper]

Of the four fundamental interactions, what else would describe the dynamic activity of the brain which is electro-chemical in nature. All ordinary chemistry is mediated by the EMF. What else would it be: gravity, the strong and weak forces? You must be aware of this.

I've seen this amazing line of reasoning coming out from some of the most prominent physicists. And it never stopped to amaze me how it is considered a rational belief that it will one day be explained how our ordered macro world will somehow appear out of the 4 fundamental forces. Why not call quits to the idea that getting down to the bits will get you the big picture and instead seek a more plausible solution?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Crank alert! Or can you cite the relevant experimental evidence in the reputable literature?

I think you should re-consider that statement. Action potentials, ion channel activity, synaptic neurotransmitters are all electrochemical processes. All electrochemical processes are manifestations of the EMF. What else would you consider to be the mediating force to be: gravity? The strong nuclear force? the weak nuclear force? Or perhaps some mysterious "mind" force?

You've mostly promoted your own personal theories on this and other threads including the GR-QM divide. Here's a reference on basic neurophysiology. I'm just saying that what we call mind is basic physics iterated over a large and complex system. I'll dig up some more references. There's nothing I've said that isn't accepted science except perhaps the free electron transmission across synaptic clefts. I'll find that reference,

The concept of "mind" is a essentially a philosophical construct. There is nothing aphysical about how brain function produces mind. Brain function requires energy just like any other physical process.

http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih2/addiction/guide/lesson2-1.htm

EDIT: Here's a reference regarding quantum tunneling at synaptic clefts. Hammeroff and others have proposed this. The idea is also supported by Roger Penrose. However it is controversial. As far as this thread is concerned, it doesn't matter. The well known transmission of neurotransmitters across synaptic clefts is still an electrochemical process.

http://arxiv.org/vc/quant-ph/papers/0207/0207093v2.pdf

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I've seen this amazing line of reasoning coming out from some of the most prominent physicists. And it never stopped to amaze me how it is considered a rational belief that it will one day be explained how our ordered macro world will somehow appear out of the 4 fundamental forces. Why not call quits to the idea that getting down to the bits will get you the big picture and instead seek a more plausible solution?

What is your more plausible solution to the "Mind-Body Problem"?.

 

[WaveJumper]

What is your more plausible solution to the "Mind-Body Problem"?.

I don't see it that black and white. The 'problem' area isn't strictly mind-body but in a wider sense "experience-objective reality". The relationship between personal experience and objective reality isn't as clear as some would like to believe. Until better evidence comes along, I will adopt a more humble attitude and agree with Einstein that reality is stranger than we can imagine. Whether systems science has anything worthwhile to say on the topic is debateable, but i'd say such an approach has much more potential. Or even more likely, we will never have complete knowledge of anything at all, just better models of phenomena.

BTW, suppose it were possible that we one day managed to explain everything. Would you not doubt the existence of an outside reality?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Also every electric field is associated with a magnetic field according to Maxwell's Laws. These fields are very weak in the brain but they do the job. The magnetic field doesn't interact because of the non metallic structure of the brain.

Apeiron:

Do you really need a reference for Maxwell's Laws of electromagnetism?

 

[SW VandeCarr]

I don't see it that black and white. The 'problem' area isn't strictly mind-body but in a wider sense "experience-objective reality". The relationship between personal experience and objective reality isn't as clear as some would like to believe. Until better evidence comes along, I will adopt a more humble attitude and agree with Einstein that reality is stranger than we can imagine. Whether systems science has anything worthwhile to say on the topic is debateable, but i'd say such an approach has much more potential. Or even more likely, we will never have complete knowledge of anything at all, just better models of phenomena.

BTW, suppose it were possible that we one day managed to explain everything. Would you not doubt the existence of an outside reality?

As far as the Mind-Body Problem is concerned, I said that brain function is basic physics iterated over a large complex system. It's not an either/or situation. Chemicals like dopamine, norepinephrine, acetylcholine,and serotonin act as individual molecules at microscopic receptor sities, but collectively produce powerful macroscopic effects in mood, mental acuity and memory. There's no issue here. There's no divide between the macroscopic and microscopic except in the way are constrained to describe and understand reality.

Before we understand 'everything' we have understand ourselves and that may take a higher level of cognition than we presently possess.

 

[arithmetix]

Hi People
Of course there is mental causation, if you include telepathy. How often have you been thinking about sex, for instance, while not looking at the person you're thinking of, only to surprise a look on their face that tells you they were sharing your thoughts? This is a difficult question to experiment about for reason of probable embarrassment of the parties involved, who may well not even know one another.
And again, I knew a group of guys who would play rhythms into a particular poker machine, and who assured me that the justice of their rhythms caused the machine to spit out coins, which it certainly did. Is this mental causation?
It seems to me that the motivating force behind phenomena such as these lies rather deeper within me than do my momentary thoughts, and that experiments are difficult to construct for that reason. Perhaps processes deeper than 'mental' processes are involved.
But surely, everybody knows that things sometime do happen because we have thought them into happening... but it's very easy to be shy of reporting such experiences because of the often scornful attitude of others, who fear to admit that they, too, have at least been very suspicious.

 

[Pythagorean]

Crank alert! Or can you cite the relevant experimental evidence in the reputable literature?

Given that the majority of experimental evidence in neuroscience is based in chemistry and a lot of the theory is based on electrical engineering, both of which rely solely on the electromagnetic force (as does just about everything you experience) SW is taking a standard reductionist view.

I often consider whether gravity may have a significant effect or not, but there would be no experimental basis for that yet that I know of. Intuitively, it seems that for the most part, no, but I'm not so sure when it comes to questioning how turbulence or precipitation would effect chemical reactions.

apeiron, exactly what did you study in your 15 years that you keep referring to and from what academic perspective? The article you posted that you authored was extremely philosophical, yet you want to hold high scientific standards (on a rather trivial subject).

 

[apeiron]

I think you should re-consider that statement. Action potentials, ion channel activity, synaptic neurotransmitters are all electrochemical processes. All electrochemical processes are manifestations of the EMF.

Look at what you actually said.

Because I believe that the EMF, in the complex configurations it assumes within the brain's dynamic and structural constraints is what we call mind.

If so, then holding a cell phone to your head ought to screw your mental state. It actually takes a big jolt of EMF to impact the brain. Use some common sense. Do you think electric current flows through the brain?

Also, every electric field is associated with a magnetic field according to Maxwell's Laws. These fields are very weak in the brain but they do the job.

What job? Cite the literature.

free electrons seem to play a role at synapses.

C'mon, if you fall for Hameroff you really are being suckered. And I could tell you stories about how little neuroscience Penrose knows.

Electrical synapses still just transact ions. Show me the literature that says otherwise.

http://science.education.nih.gov/supplements/nih2/addiction/guide/lesson2-1.htm [/url].

Don't insult me. I've written books on the brain. I wrote a column for Lancet Neurology. I've written on neuroscience for the New Scientist.

 

[pftest]

Read some phase transition literature. Ising models, Benard cells, etc. Check out vortexes and turbulence.

Could you be a bit more specific about how these involve downward causation? Let's take phase transition or turbulence as an example. I am not saying DC doesn't exist, I am just looking for examples and to understand how it works and what it means for mind.

If you prefer to identify mind with form and brain with substance, then that does work as an approximate ontology. But I have to keep reminding you that this is a dichotomistic rather than a dualistic ontic framework that I am using here.

All systems require both substance and form to be physically real. They can never be reduced completely to either one or other axis of being. Though for modelling reasons, we may chose to emphasise one or other aspect.

My interest lies in the origin of mind: when and where did it first exist. Suppose mind is "form" (which is the configuration/organisation of the substance right?), when did the earliest "form" first exist?

The newscientist article (http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg17523555.500-the-topdown-universe.html?full=true) talks about downward causation that is "as fundamental as the laws that govern particles". If all downward causation is "as fundamental as...", then a causal mind is still a fundamental mind.

And the big mistake you and so many others here are making is to think of "mind" as a simple state - just experiencing, as some put it. Qualia. Raw awareness. Whatever. Mental experience in fact does not have that raw simplicity.

Our experiences may not be simple, but they exist, agree? Or are you saying that you have left the whole phenomenal part of mind out of your story?