Vitalist nonsense versus Science.

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
Not sure I quite understand you here but I think I agree. To explain consciousness requires crossing the epistemilogical and metaphysical boudaries of science, not simply producing a new scientific theory. (If that's what you meant). I suspect you see this as a argument aagainst any such 'non-scientific' theory, and from a scientific perspective it is. However it may yet be the only way to an understanding.

Or, it may be indicative that so many philosophers of the mind have been asking the wrong questions for all these years (centuries? millenia?). Yes, you're right that, in order to answer the philosophical questions that people constantly ask about consciousness - thus creating the "hard problem", where no problem would otherwise exist - you need to leave the realm of science. But then, when you think about it, if I asked those same questions about...anything, I would have to leave the scientific method. Yet I ask you, is it truly logical to ask "what is it that causes a hurricane to arise from counter-acting winds, when I can imagine such a physical process with no hurricane actually occurring" and calling it the "hard problem" of meteorology?

Until science can define consciousness there is no secure footing from which anybody can argue that it has a scientific explanation.

Of course this is true, but what makes you think they haven't already defined it as thoroughly as they've defined everything else?

Ok. As far as I can see he leaves out consciousness from his explanations. I find his writing convoluted in the extrame so I may have misinterpreted him. However I don't seem to be alone in concluding this.

You are certainly not, and perhaps this is indicative that there is something really wrong with his theory...but then, nobody seemed to want to agree with Copernicus or Galileo or Darwin. Dennett could be wrong, or everyone else could be wrong...again.

 

[confutatis]

Or, it may be indicative that so many philosophers of the mind have been asking the wrong questions for all these years (centuries? millenia?). Yes, you're right that, in order to answer the philosophical questions that people constantly ask about consciousness - thus creating the "hard problem", where no problem would otherwise exist - you need to leave the realm of science. But then, when you think about it, if I asked those same questions about...anything, I would have to leave the scientific method. Yet I ask you, is it truly logical to ask "what is it that causes a hurricane to arise from counter-acting winds, when I can imagine such a physical process with no hurricane actually occurring" and calling it the "hard problem" of meteorology?

That is an interesting observation, but isn't Dennett also wrong in indirectly asserting that such a thing as "consciousness" exists and is capable of being scientifically explained? Isn't "consciousness" itself a nonsensical entity/phenomenon which can't possibly exist? As far as I can tell, the really hard problem is to explain how something which can't possibly exist arises out of physical processes. That is not even a hard problem, it's an impossible one.

Here's my criteria for accepting an explanation of "consciousness" as meaningful and possibly true:

- 'X' is a computer that can communicate with humans in English
- X is programmed to never lie, but because of that it often fails to answer a question
- X knows the meaning of some 50,000 words, including the word "consciousness"
- when asked "X, are you conscious?", X gives an answer

A truly meaningful explanation of consciousness must allow us to understand how it's possible to buid a machine that knows how to answer the question "are you conscious" without lying (nevermind what the answer is, it's beside the point). Dennett's theory spectacularly fails that. And so do all theories.

Chalmers is right, but for the wrong reasons.

 

[TENYEARS]

Mentat, long time no talk kid. Little story. When I was in sixth grade a teacher of mine did an experiment relating to what is now still called a supernatural pheno. The class was slowly eliminated one by one until it was only me. I was extremely focused and I knew I could do it and did because I believed I could so I tried extremely hard. I was two rounds past what my teacher said was beyond statistcal probability when I realized I was the only one left with all eyes on me. Being aware of that ended the next round quite quickly. It was not that I was any smarter than the other kids, but it was that I belived that I could so much so that it boardered I knew I could. It was strange that with that in mind I went two rounds past statistical deviation. Of course the teacher could have been wrong, science is not math, the writer of the comparative results could have been off in the analysis calculations and and and so it will always be with the word proof.

Conciousness extends beyond the skin. Science will prove this to be the case, and a new science will be formed. This is not that far off and it will be in your life time.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by confutatis
That is an interesting observation, but isn't Dennett also wrong in indirectly asserting that such a thing as "consciousness" exists and is capable of being scientifically explained? Isn't "consciousness" itself a nonsensical entity/phenomenon which can't possibly exist? As far as I can tell, the really hard problem is to explain how something which can't possibly exist arises out of physical processes. That is not even a hard problem, it's an impossible one.

But what is it that makes you think consciousness doesn't exist?? Is not your very contemplation of this subject a reflection of your conscious ability to think?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
Mentat, long time no talk kid.

How've you been?

Little story. When I was in sixth grade a teacher of mine did an experiment relating to what is now still called a supernatural pheno. The class was slowly eliminated one by one until it was only me. I was extremely focused and I knew I could do it and did because I believed I could so I tried extremely hard. I was two rounds past what my teacher said was beyond statistcal probability when I realized I was the only one left with all eyes on me. Being aware of that ended the next round quite quickly. It was not that I was any smarter than the other kids, but it was that I belived that I could so much so that it boardered I knew I could. It was strange that with that in mind I went two rounds past statistical deviation. Of course the teacher could have been wrong, science is not math, the writer of the comparative results could have been off in the analysis calculations and and and so it will always be with the word proof.

Conciousness extends beyond the skin. Science will prove this to be the case, and a new science will be formed. This is not that far off and it will be in your life time.

If you're right, I'm sure it will make for an interesting new paradigm of discovery.

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by Mentat
But what is it that makes you think consciousness doesn't exist?? Is not your very contemplation of this subject a reflection of your conscious ability to think?

Strange as this may sound, I don't understand your question. What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"? Is consciousness something that gets added to thought? On the other hand, if all thought is conscious, what is the sense in adding "conscious" to "thought"?

What needs to be clearly delineated is where "consciousness" differs from "ability to think". To a good extent my computer is perfectly capable of thinking, but I suspect you don't believe my computer is capable of thinking in a conscious manner. Can you explain why?

 

[TENYEARS]

Confused us, why did you choose such a name, probably for the same reason you ask such questions. He was not enlightened. These are good questions, but you must answer them. If you have not, have you asked them yet? To think of them on your own means there is is a smell in the air, so follow your nose.

Mentat, you are making good progress or are you realizing what is already there?

Keep the ball rolling, you never know what you may stumble into.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by confutatis
Strange as this may sound, I don't understand your question. What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"? Is consciousness something that gets added to thought? On the other hand, if all thought is conscious, what is the sense in adding "conscious" to "thought"?

Consciousness is a collection of thought.

You say that consciousness must be differentiated from the ability to think. I say it's much more synonymous than it appears.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
Mentat, you are making good progress or are you realizing what is already there?

This is an interesting statement, TENYEARS. What's the difference?

 

[confutatis]

Originally posted by Mentat
Consciousness is a collection of thought.

You say that consciousness must be differentiated from the ability to think. I say it's much more synonymous than it appears.

I wish you would address what I consider the only relevant issue: do computers think, and if so are they conscious in any sense?

If computers do not think, then we're not computers and this whole algorithmic/mechanistic view of consciousness is nonsense. If computers do think, then how can we know if they are conscious?

Imagine a practical scenario where a computer claims to be conscious, and imagine how you would react to it. I suspect you don't accept that the ability to claim to be conscious is any evidence for consciousness. So what constitutes evidence?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by confutatis
I wish you would address what I consider the only relevant issue: do computers think, and if so are they conscious in any sense?

If computers do not think, then we're not computers and this whole algorithmic/mechanistic view of consciousness is nonsense. If computers do think, then how can we know if they are conscious?

Imagine a practical scenario where a computer claims to be conscious, and imagine how you would react to it. I suspect you don't accept that the ability to claim to be conscious is any evidence for consciousness. So what constitutes evidence?

You want my opinion? What would constitute evidence of consciousness, for me, would be if the computers processing routines were working in a Selectionist manner, producing Multiple Drafts of each sub-experience by interaction between the discreet processing units.

But that's just because I like Dennett's approach.

Aside from this, if the computer could think (and there's no reason, IMO, to say it couldn't), then it would conscious. It might not be sentient, or even have a particularly high level of consciousness, but it would be conscious to some degree.

 

[TENYEARS]

There are many forms of enlightening experiences, some if scientifically observable would prove that which is argued about. There is one experience or form of enlightenment in which there is not nessecarily a socalled supernatural experience, and yet I say without question this expereince can be better than all of them. There is a member on the forum who I believe had this experience before your eyes. If you continue, be honest in your observations, do not settle on answers truly assault the questions there can only be one result maybe it could be this experience or one of the others for you.

What I said was a riddle, if you answer it you will become enlightented. That's why to read logic is no good, until you yourself have had an experience. Then and only then would the perspective of anothers experience like some of the philos, scientists, saints, etc... be of help. Unless of course you realize that what you read although your mind connects the dots, it is a two dimensional experience to you. In order for it to become the real thing, you must go into a state in which you know that the two dimensional experience is not the experience. This in itself if realized is a step on the path when it appears that there is none.

Then again, maybe I just lie.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
There are many forms of enlightening experiences, some if scientifically observable would prove that which is argued about. There is one experience or form of enlightenment in which there is not nessecarily a socalled supernatural experience, and yet I say without question this expereince can be better than all of them. There is a member on the forum who I believe had this experience before your eyes. If you continue, be honest in your observations, do not settle on answers truly assault the questions there can only be one result maybe it could be this experience or one of the others for you.

What I said was a riddle, if you answer it you will become enlightented. That's why to read logic is no good, until you yourself have had an experience. Then and only then would the perspective of anothers experience like some of the philos, scientists, saints, etc... be of help. Unless of course you realize that what you read although your mind connects the dots, it is a two dimensional experience to you. In order for it to become the real thing, you must go into a state in which you know that the two dimensional experience is not the experience. This in itself if realized is a step on the path when it appears that there is none.

Then again, maybe I just lie.

It is not a lie if you believe it, TENYEARS.

 

[TENYEARS]

Belief is always a lie no matter what you believe.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by confutatis
What is the difference between my "conscious ability to think" as compared to my "ability to think"?

If you are conscious of a thought, you will be aware of it directly or indirectly. You will hear words in your mind, or see symbols that you manipulate in your mind, or experience an emotion related to a wordless thought, etc. You will not be aware of an unconscious thought, by definition. (And yes, they do exist.)

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by TENYEARS
Belief is always a lie no matter what you believe.

Do you really believe what you just said?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
If you are conscious of a thought, you will be aware of it directly or indirectly. You will hear words in your mind, or see symbols that you manipulate in your mind, or experience an emotion related to a wordless thought, etc. You will not be aware of an unconscious thought, by definition. (And yes, they do exist.)

Define "unconscious thought".

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
Define "unconscious thought".

Some neural activity that plays a similar functional role to what we think of as conscious thought, but which nonetheless occurs unconsciously.

For instance, there have been scientists/mathemeticians/thinkers who have unsuccessfully tried to solve difficult problems in their waking lives, only to have the solution spontaneously present itself to their conscious awareness in a dream. This suggests that their brains were processing information relevant to the problems while they slept (and perhaps subconsciously while they were awake), unbeknowst to them. Hence, they were having at least some 'unconscious thoughts'-- those thoughts that led to the solution.

This is one of the more striking examples of unconscious thought, although in reality we probably have such unconscious thoughts (judgments, reactions, deductions) all the time. There is much that goes on in the brain that does not reveal itself to consciousness, even when it comes to the higher cognitive functions.

 

[Canute]

Hypno

For once I completely disgree with you. You have arbitrarily redefnined 'thoughts' to suit your argument. I think just about Just about everyone would normally say that a thought that one is not having is not a thought.

 

[hypnagogue]

I think the usual notion of 'thought' can embody two roles: the experiential role (how it feels) and the functional role (what it does). The same can be said for other 'higher' cognitive functions, such as memory. Thus there is a sense in which we can talk about thought and memory without referring to our conscious experiences of them at all. Obviously we do not take everything into account if we refer to conscious thought and conscious memory without referring to their experiential components; but it appears that we can still take into account their functional roles in the brain without explicitly referring to their experiential contents. That is to say, although it is obviously nonsensical to speak of the occurence of an experience in the absence of subjective experience of it, it is not necessarily nonsensical to speak of the occurence of a physical brain function in the absence of subjective experience of it, even if that physical function is sometimes subjectively experienced.

From a strictly functional point of view, there are certain cognitive functions in the brain that appear to perform very similar operations regardless of whether or not they are explicitly represented in consciousness. Thought is one such operation. If a thinker has a solution to a vexing problem suddenly presented to him in a dream, his brain must have been performing some kind of 'search' for a feasible solution to the problem during his unconscious sleep. Such an unconscious 'search' plays a similar functional role as what we think of as conscious thought, although there may be important differences (for instance, thought guided by conscious attention may use a method of search functionally distinct from subconscious thought in certain ways). However, in both cases what we have are neural mechanisms that are dedicated to searching (using whatever methods) for an answer to a given problem. In this sense both neural mechanisms can be seen as fulfilling the general functional role of 'thought,' even though one is experienced consciously and one is not.

 

[Jeebus]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
From a strictly functional point of view, there are certain cognitive functions in the brain that appear to perform very similar operations regardless of whether or not they are explicitly represented in consciousness. Thought is one such operation. If a thinker has a solution to a vexing problem suddenly presented to him in a dream, his brain must have been performing some kind of 'search' for a feasible solution to the problem during his unconscious sleep. Such an unconscious 'search' plays a similar functional role as what we think of as conscious thought, although there may be important differences (for instance, thought guided by conscious attention may use a method of search functionally distinct from subconscious thought in certain ways). However, in both cases what we have are neural mechanisms that are dedicated to searching (using whatever methods) for an answer to a given problem. In this sense both neural mechanisms can be seen as fulfilling the general functional role of 'thought,' even though one is experienced consciously and one is not.

If one 'search' of a problem is done while conscious and the other problem 'search' is done while unconscious—do you think the two possibilites for that 'search' would alter in opinions? This, of course is a purely subjective opinion.

 

[Canute]

Hypno

Two objections. First I stand by my point about the definition of a 'thought'. It is perfectly possible to redefine the meaning to include hypothetical unconscious processes, but this contradicts everyday usage.

Secondly I still think that you're making assumptions. The fact that solutions to problems sometimes appear out of the blue does not even prove that we have an unconscious mind. After all if these processes are hidden from consciousness then it may be that they are entirely physical, deterministic mechanical brain functions, and it doesn't seem proper to call these thoughts or assume an unconscious mind that has them.

Neither does the fact that solutions to problems sometimes seem to appear spontaneously prove that we were processing the variables when we weren't looking. That's what we assume, but theoretically the solution could have appeared simply because we hadn't been thinking about the problem for a while and so came back to it with a new mind-set and fresh perspective, able to see instantly what we couldn't before. It's difficult to prove that anything at all was happening prior to our awareness of having the solution. (Not sure about that point but it seems correct).

I would say that 'unconscious thoughts' is an oxymoron. Even if it isn't it seems a rather empty phrase, since no such thing has ever been proved to exist, or ever will be.

 

[TENYEARS]

Mentat, No.

hypnagogue/Canute, you are out of your minds, don't go to far, you may not come back.

 

[hypnagogue]

I think we'll just have to disagree on this one.

Originally posted by Canute
Two objections. First I stand by my point about the definition of a 'thought'. It is perfectly possible to redefine the meaning to include hypothetical unconscious processes, but this contradicts everyday usage.

I don't think it's redefining terms. If what I am proposing as 'unconscious thought' really does serve the same general functional role in the brain as 'conscious thought,' then the only major difference between the two is whether or not they are represented in conscious experience. Hence if you define thought as a process of which we are aware, I don't see the contradiction in naming a similar process of which we are not aware, so long as I always refer to it as unconscious thought. In doing so I have not redefined 'thought,' I merely have defined a new phenomenon which is similar in the relevant ways to 'thought' as you define it except for the experiential aspect; but, I have made it explicit that it does not include this experiential aspect.

Secondly I still think that you're making assumptions. The fact that solutions to problems sometimes appear out of the blue does not even prove that we have an unconscious mind. After all if these processes are hidden from consciousness then it may be that they are entirely physical, deterministic mechanical brain functions, and it doesn't seem proper to call these thoughts or assume an unconscious mind that has them.

That's exactly what I think an 'unconscious thought' is: just a physical information processing mechanism in the brain. I do not think subjective experience can be coherently identified as literally 'being' a purely physical neural mechanism, for all the familiar reasons regarding the incommensurability between the ontologies of two. However, the philosophical problems of such an identity do not apply for cognitive processes that are not associated with subjective experience, because in this case there is nothing for the physical processes to be incommensurable with. The functional role of thought, devoid of the experiential aspect, can be seen as a physical, algorithmic process without any inherent contradictions. (This is why eg the notion of a 'zombie' is not logically incoherent.)

Neither does the fact that solutions to problems sometimes seem to appear spontaneously prove that we were processing the variables when we weren't looking. That's what we assume, but theoretically the solution could have appeared simply because we hadn't been thinking about the problem for a while and so came back to it with a new mind-set and fresh perspective, able to see instantly what we couldn't before. It's difficult to prove that anything at all was happening prior to our awareness of having the solution. (Not sure about that point but it seems correct).

Difficult to prove, yes, but there are good reasons for believing it nonetheless. The alternative is to suppose that the solution spontaneously occurs ex nihilo, and to me that is not a satisfying proposition. It is readily demonstrable that conscious thought involves the utilization of certain general but differentiated neural mechanisms, so I do not think it's a stretch to posit such mechanisms performing their functions as usual even though they happen in this instance to not be a content of consciousness.

Numerous scientific studies involving phenomena such as unconscious priming, in addition to common sense concerns such as 'why do thoughts appear to bubble up randomly from nowhere?' all point to the general conclusion that it is very difficult, if not impossible or incoherent, to account for the performace of consciousness without taking into account brain activities which themselves are not all privilege to conscious access.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Jeebus
If one 'search' of a problem is done while conscious and the other problem 'search' is done while unconscious—do you think the two possibilites for that 'search' would alter in opinions? This, of course is a purely subjective opinion.

I don't see why that wouldn't be possible. In fact such a phenomena may account for eg the situation where a person struggles to accept a certain idea even though he cannot pinpoint exactly why.

In cases of brain lesioned patients it's not uncommon to see internal conflicts like this occurring. For instance, I recall reading about a patient who had some kind of dissociation of conscious control of one of his hands. This led to the very strange occasion where he was buttoning up his shirt with his consciously controlled hand only to have it unbuttoned by the hand he could not control!

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think we'll just have to disagree on this one.

You're probably right - but I'll have another shot at it.

I don't think it's redefining terms. If what I am proposing as 'unconscious thought' really does serve the same general functional role in the brain as 'conscious thought,' then the only major difference between the two is whether or not they are represented in conscious experience...snip

You seem to be saying that a thought is just a function. In this case thoughts do not need explaining and computers can think. I didn't think that your position.

That's exactly what I think an 'unconscious thought' is: just a physical information processing mechanism in the brain. I do not think subjective experience can be coherently identified as literally 'being' a purely physical neural mechanism, for all the familiar reasons regarding the incommensurability between the ontologies of two. However, the philosophical problems of such an identity do not apply for cognitive processes that are not associated with subjective experience, because in this case there is nothing for the physical processes to be incommensurable with.

I agree. But on this view thoughts of which we are conscious are quite different things to thoughts of which we are not conscious. One type can be reduced to brain and one cannot. Doesn't this not suggest that they should have different definitions?

The functional role of thought, devoid of the experiential aspect, can be seen as a physical, algorithmic process without any inherent contradictions. (This is why eg the notion of a 'zombie' is not logically incoherent.)

Oh dear. It seems I disagree with you about zombies as well. Still I agree with the main point here. But you are talking about is the fundctional role of thought, not what a thought is. When you say 'it can be seen as' what that means is 'it can be defined as'. I agree that the functional role of thoughts 'can be seen' in this way, (although it is a conjecture), but I don't agree that thoughts can be seen this way. In any case surely there is a clear difference in causal effect, (aka function), between thoughts that are conscious and those that are not. Unconscious thoughts never cause us to write them down for instance. This is a function that unconscious thoughts cannot have.

Difficult to prove, yes, but there are good reasons for believing it nonetheless. The alternative is to suppose that the solution spontaneously occurs ex nihilo, and to me that is not a satisfying proposition.

Nor me. It's not what I was suggesting. I was suggesting that there may just be a 'timeout' in our reasoning when we are not consciously considering a problem, thus allowing ourselves to get out of the rut that has so far prevented us from finding a solution. IOW we may find sudden solutions simply because we stopped thinking about the problem for a while.

(Although I'm not disagreeing that unconscious brain processes occur, but just suggesting that these are not thoughts).

It is readily demonstrable that conscious thought involves the utilization of certain general but differentiated neural mechanisms, so I do not think it's a stretch to posit such mechanisms performing their functions as usual even though they happen in this instance to not be a content of consciousness.

I agree.

Numerous scientific studies involving phenomena such as unconscious priming, in addition to common sense concerns such as 'why do thoughts appear to bubble up randomly from nowhere?' all point to the general conclusion that it is very difficult, if not impossible or incoherent, to account for the performace of consciousness without taking into account brain activities which themselves are not all privilege to conscious access. [/B]

I agree with that also. I'm arguing only that those processes cannot be called thoughts unless you radically redefine 'thoughts'.

When you offer someone 'a penny for your thoughts' you do not expect them to say that they have no idea what they are.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
I agree. But on this view thoughts of which we are conscious are quite different things to thoughts of which we are not conscious. One type can be reduced to brain and one cannot. Doesn't this not suggest that they should have different definitions?

I don't see conscious and unconscious thought as two different animals as much as I see them as the same kind of animal, just in different contexts. One context involves awareness and the other does not, and that awareness does not necessarily inhere to the processes of thoughts themselves.

Why do thoughts sometimes randomly pop into your head, with no prompting from conscious effort? It could be the case that the informational content of such thoughts was formed subconsciously, and that pre-existing information then made its way into conscious awareness (by whatever means are usually responsible for information in the brain being made accessible to consciousness). It just depends on if you want to define 'thought' as the informational process, or as the informational process in conjunction with awareness of it.

I should note that the same could be said for, say, color-- information in the brain that codes for light wavelengths can exist in some parts of the brain without being available to conscious access. I would, however, refuse to grant the notion of 'unconscious colors' on the same grounds that you refuse to grant the notion of 'unconscious thoughts.' I admit that this might be an inconsistency on my part. However, my reason for such discrimination is that, for me, the notion of 'color' is dominated by its experiential aspect (what it looks like) whereas the notion of thought is dominated by its informational/functional aspect (what it refers to/what it does). This said, I again emphasize that both have informational/functional aspects in brain processing that can exist independently of consciousness and both can have experiential aspects.

I don't think we fundamentally disagree on concepts so much as terminology. In any case, if you take the strict stance that thought must include an experiential component by definition, then of course I agree that 'unconscious thought' is a contradiction in terms.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
Some neural activity that plays a similar functional role to what we think of as conscious thought, but which nonetheless occurs unconsciously.

For instance, there have been scientists/mathemeticians/thinkers who have unsuccessfully tried to solve difficult problems in their waking lives, only to have the solution spontaneously present itself to their conscious awareness in a dream. This suggests that their brains were processing information relevant to the problems while they slept (and perhaps subconsciously while they were awake), unbeknowst to them. Hence, they were having at least some 'unconscious thoughts'-- those thoughts that led to the solution.

This is one of the more striking examples of unconscious thought, although in reality we probably have such unconscious thoughts (judgments, reactions, deductions) all the time. There is much that goes on in the brain that does not reveal itself to consciousness, even when it comes to the higher cognitive functions.

And what exactly is the difference between a collection of "unconscious thoughts" and a conscious one?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
I think the usual notion of 'thought' can embody two roles: the experiential role (how it feels) and the functional role (what it does).

I think this ad hoc distinction is at the heart of common misconceptions about consciousness...these misconceptions pile up and evolve into "the hard problem". Had you ever questioned whether such a distinction exists at all?

The same can be said for other 'higher' cognitive functions, such as memory. Thus there is a sense in which we can talk about thought and memory without referring to our conscious experiences of them at all. Obviously we do not take everything into account if we refer to conscious thought and conscious memory without referring to their experiential components; but it appears that we can still take into account their functional roles in the brain without explicitly referring to their experiential contents. That is to say, although it is obviously nonsensical to speak of the occurence of an experience in the absence of subjective experience of it, it is not necessarily nonsensical to speak of the occurence of a physical brain function in the absence of subjective experience of it, even if that physical function is sometimes subjectively experienced.

And what separates those that are subjectively experienced from those that aren't? Remember, if there is a dead-end in a line of reasoning, then you may have made a wrong turn somewhere down the line.

From a strictly functional point of view, there are certain cognitive functions in the brain that appear to perform very similar operations regardless of whether or not they are explicitly represented in consciousness. Thought is one such operation. If a thinker has a solution to a vexing problem suddenly presented to him in a dream, his brain must have been performing some kind of 'search' for a feasible solution to the problem during his unconscious sleep. Such an unconscious 'search' plays a similar functional role as what we think of as conscious thought, although there may be important differences (for instance, thought guided by conscious attention may use a method of search functionally distinct from subconscious thought in certain ways).

In what ways?

However, in both cases what we have are neural mechanisms that are dedicated to searching (using whatever methods) for an answer to a given problem. In this sense both neural mechanisms can be seen as fulfilling the general functional role of 'thought,' even though one is experienced consciously and one is not.

What if one simply doesn't remember that they consciously thought of it? What if some searches seem more successful than others to the "search mechanism" of the brain, and so the brain works on that possibility more, and that constant re-visiting is conscious thought?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Canute
You seem to be saying that a thought is just a function. In this case thoughts do not need explaining and computers can think. I didn't think that your position.

But is there anything "wrong" with that position?

I agree. But on this view thoughts of which we are conscious are quite different things to thoughts of which we are not conscious. One type can be reduced to brain and one cannot. Doesn't this not suggest that they should have different definitions?

Unless they are one and the same, and the illusion of consciousness (as I've postulated in other threads) is, at it's heart, this very distinction. Then they could both be reduced to the brain.

Oh dear. It seems I disagree with you about zombies as well. Still I agree with the main point here. But you are talking about is the fundctional role of thought, not what a thought is. When you say 'it can be seen as' what that means is 'it can be defined as'. I agree that the functional role of thoughts 'can be seen' in this way, (although it is a conjecture), but I don't agree that thoughts can be seen this way. In any case surely there is a clear difference in causal effect, (aka function), between thoughts that are conscious and those that are not. Unconscious thoughts never cause us to write them down for instance. This is a function that unconscious thoughts cannot have.

Key point: Couldn't the impelling force to "write them down" or to re-stimulate our visual cortex so that we might "see" them again, or any other such desire to be sure that it's saved for later, be the only thing that differentiates "unconscious" and "conscious" thought? If so, it is merely a matter of "getting more attention" (in terms of more constant re-stimulation, for whatever reason), which Calvin has already accounted for in his Hexagon theory.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Mentat
I think this ad hoc distinction is at the heart of common misconceptions about consciousness...these misconceptions pile up and evolve into "the hard problem". Had you ever questioned whether such a distinction exists at all?

The distinction is one of definitions. I know for a fact that I subjectively experience, axiomatically. I also know that the definition of computation has no compelling relation to subjective experience. We may redefine our notion of computation such that it can conceptually account for subjective experience, but then we are no longer in the realm of materialism.

We may not redefine subjective experience, since it is a brute fact and not some abstract concept that we arbitrarily create. It is a given, even more so than it is a given that (say) the moon objectively exists. It is the most fundamental given for human beings that there is. I can easily change my notion of computation to include some unseen properties, but I cannot change my notion of subjective experience such that it no longer has the properties I observe it to have. If I do this, I am no longer talking about subjective experience, for the same reason that if I redefine 'moon' to mean "a white circle" I am no longer talking about a massive rock that orbits the earth.

And what separates those that are subjectively experienced from those that aren't? Remember, if there is a dead-end in a line of reasoning, then you may have made a wrong turn somewhere down the line.

What separates them in the objective sense? I don't know, but then again no one knows right now. What separates them in the subjective sense? Well, one kind is subjectively experienced and one is not.

In what ways?

A thought guided by attention may have more of a propensity for, say, a depth first search as opposed to a breadth first search. (Just a random example-- don't take that literally.) Anyway, don't worry, because I realize that such a difference could be explained entirely in a reductive sense. Attention is not synonymous with experience and so can be subsumed under the easy problems.

What if one simply doesn't remember that they consciously thought of it?

Certainly a possibility. Seems to be a bit implausible in a normally functioning brain, but it is possible in principle.

What if some searches seem more successful than others to the "search mechanism" of the brain, and so the brain works on that possibility more, and that constant re-visiting is conscious thought?

No dice. Let's keep this one to M&E.

 

[Canute]

Hypnogogue

I agree that we are only arguing about terminology. But still I think it's important to do this. (I'm still annoyed with er, what's his name, for hijacking 'intentional' to mean something completely different to what everyone else has always meant for so long). There is a danger of embodying errors and contradictions in the definition of things when it comes to consciousness. In fact that seems to be half of the problem with it.

You obviously know this and your point about 'red' is a good one. As you guessed I do feel that it's inconsistent to treat 'red' as any different to something more obviously computational in origin. After all 'red' must be computational in origin even if it doesn't feel like we have to 'work out' the colour of things.

Mind you, if everybody in the trade suddenly decided to define thoughts as 'any mental process contributing to overall mental function' or something like that, then I'd have to go along with it. Then we would have to have two different words for conscious and unconscious thoughts, presumably 'C-thoughts' and 'U-thoughts'. But at the moment it seems to me that when people say thoughts they mean conscious ones.

I don't see conscious and unconscious thought as two different animals as much as I see them as the same kind of animal, just in different contexts. One context involves awareness and the other does not, and that awareness does not necessarily inhere to the processes of thoughts themselves.

Hmm. If thoughts are qualia then is it the 'absent qualia' problem in disguise that we are discussing?

Why do thoughts sometimes randomly pop into your head, with no prompting from conscious effort?

Don't know, and to be honest I'm not yet compeletely convinced that they do. But if we knew this then at least Buddhist meditation might become a lot easier to practice.

The key sticking point for me is that if thoughts can be unconscious brain processes then it seems to follow that computers can have thoughts and can think. There is a grave danger that a lot of issues will become muddled if we accept this terminology and it becomes commonplace for people to talk of unconscious machines having thoughts.

But I'm happy to agree to differ. As far as I know it's a priori impossible to prove that the definition of a term is incorrect.

 

[hypnagogue]

Originally posted by Canute
Hmm. If thoughts are qualia then is it the 'absent qualia' problem in disguise that we are discussing?

No, I don't think so, because if we agree to define thought only in terms of a conscious though, our discussion basically disappears and we agree.

The key sticking point for me is that if thoughts can be unconscious brain processes then it seems to follow that computers can have thoughts and can think. There is a grave danger that a lot of issues will become muddled if we accept this terminology and it becomes commonplace for people to talk of unconscious machines having thoughts.

Completely agree. For this reason it is probably better to stick with your definition of thought.

 

[Canute]

Originally posted by Mentat
But is there anything "wrong" with that position?

If you don't mind redefining what 'thinking' is then no. However currently it is accepted that computers do not think, since thinking implies consciousness. If thinking is redefined so it does not imply consciousness then my pocket calculator can think, and an abacus can think with a bit of help.

Unless they are one and the same, and the illusion of consciousness (as I've postulated in other threads) is, at it's heart, this very distinction. Then they could both be reduced to the brain.

I think I've said all I can on this one. If consciousness was identical to brain states there'd be no explanation for why science is trying so hard to explain it.

Key point: Couldn't the impelling force to "write them down" or to re-stimulate our visual cortex so that we might "see" them again, or any other such desire to be sure that it's saved for later, be the only thing that differentiates "unconscious" and "conscious" thought? If so, it is merely a matter of "getting more attention" (in terms of more constant re-stimulation, for whatever reason), which Calvin has already accounted for in his Hexagon theory.[/color] [/B]

The very fact that you have to use the word 'illusion' shows that even you think conscious thoughts are different to unconscious processes. How do you explain this difference? The difference cannot be explained as an illusion. One cannot have an illusion of being conscious when in reality one is not.

Many people argue that our 'sense of self' and/or normal perception of reality is an illusion. But this is an illusion in the sense of a misperception or misinterpretation of the meaning of our experiences, not a suggestion that they don't exist. If they don't exist then they cannot be an illusion.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by hypnagogue
The distinction is one of definitions. I know for a fact that I subjectively experience, axiomatically. I also know that the definition of computation has no compelling relation to subjective experience. We may redefine our notion of computation such that it can conceptually account for subjective experience, but then we are no longer in the realm of materialism.

We may not redefine subjective experience, since it is a brute fact and not some abstract concept that we arbitrarily create.

Fine, but you still haven't defined "subjective experience" in the first place...so how could you "re"-define it?

What separates them in the objective sense? I don't know, but then again no one knows right now. What separates them in the subjective sense? Well, one kind is subjectively experienced and one is not.

And what does it mean to experience a thought? What does it mean to have a thought without experiencing it? I can't understand the distinction because the terms being contrasted have not been properly defined.

A thought guided by attention may have more of a propensity for, say, a depth first search as opposed to a breadth first search. (Just a random example-- don't take that literally.) Anyway, don't worry, because I realize that such a difference could be explained entirely in a reductive sense. Attention is not synonymous with experience and so can be subsumed under the easy problems.

How do you know that? If the amount of attention your CPU pays to a particular spatial firing (or spatiotemporal one, for that matter) is what produces (in retrospect) the illusion that you "exerienced" that one any more than you "experienced" another one, then you still don't have an explanation for "experiencing one thought while not experiencing another", but you have made it a moot issue (btw, "experience" is always in scare-quotes because I still don't have a working definition of it from your side of the debate).

Certainly a possibility. Seems to be a bit implausible in a normally functioning brain, but it is possible in principle.

Is it not also possible in principle that one never experienced the thought, but remembers doing so? (Much like I remember flying over my town, but never really did so...it was a dream)

No dice. Let's keep this one to M&E.

Well, the afore-quoted was just a more blunt statement of the possibility that I'd been hinting at within the rest of the post (and some previous posts).