Were Historical Shifts in Philosophy Right or Wrong Turns?

[Mentat]

Then you are not a pyrrhonist, since they are sceptical of everything, and you
are inconsistent because you claim to be a pyrrhonist.

A pyrrhonist is skeptical of all things in turn. Read; don't assume. A Pyrrhonian skeptic would never encourage defending or combating both sides of an argument at the same time.

I never claimed to prove any contingent facts about bachelors or anything else. I was explaing the commone word "fact" in terms of other common
words. OTOH , I could simply call you bluff about not knowing whta facts are.

I know what facts are, in that I have a definition for them.

As to your explanation of "fact", all you did was explain semantic necessity (i.e. a thing is what it is defined to be because it is defined to be that).

You are right. It was an 'if'. Still hypotheticla, though.

This is the statement I was referring to. There is no "if" or "would" in it:

You said...
Quite. For relativists, true means true-for-such-and-such-a-commnnity.
So relativism is true-for-relativists. But I'm not a relativist , so it isn't
true-for-me!

Hurrah !

Well, before you party too much, I would remind you that relativism doesn't allow anything to assert itself as absolutely true, so my statement is obvious.

I have demonstrated that there is only one consistent way of using
the word 'truth', which is the global, non-relativist one.

The very fact that there are relativists in the world, and that they have a different definition of truth, belies this (since it is no longer "consistent" in any way).

Besides, why should truth be consistent?

Since it
is global, it is not just my game

Yes it is. Yours is the game of post-Kantian philosophy, which is (by its own confession) the game of establishing "global truths".

 

[Mentat]

I'm sorry to say it, Mentat, but I really can't lend you any further creedence at this point. Again, I haven't read any Wittgenstein firsthand, nor any Rorty, but as you've presented them, as long as we can make up our own language rules and the statements we make within those rules are internally consistent, regardless of whether or not they are consistent with reality, that game is just as good as any other.

Consistent with "reality"? What's that?

I know this is just the kind of argument that has been irritating philosophers since Socrates (he used it, and it irritated his fellow thinkers), but it is relevant, and necessary. Why are you so tied to the concept of absolute reality and absolute knowledge of it, and how can you be sure that you are not simply playing one side of a game?

You certainly haven't made a case that this is true, but I suppose under your own framework, you don't have to. As long as you don't contradict yourself, you're doing fine. All that's fine for debate, but I can't see the viability of this system for forming beliefs. Humans hold beliefs; this statement should not be contentious.

A "belief" is nothing more than a disposition to hold to one side of a language-game or another. It has no more substance than the insistence on being "white", whenever one plays chess. Even Hume would substantiate this view of belief, except he still held onto the concept of an absolute reality (which is where you get Solipsism).

They also hold these beliefs for a certain reason and I do not think that reason is only that they do not contradict other beliefs that they hold.

What about William James' pragmatism, and the limiting factors on living opportunities? It is clearly not just Wittgensteinians that are suggesting some form of this concept.

You can present a perfectly consistent set of religious beliefs (or historical beliefs or whatever) to me, but that isn't reason enough to believe them. There needs to be some amount of correspondence with empirical observation, whether personal or learned from others. In fact, I would guess that there are animals out there that don't have any language, but nonetheless hold beliefs. How the heck is linguistic analysis going to explain these?

They don't have to. An animal that had beliefs, but no language-game whatsoever, could never communicate the fact that it had beliefs, and so they will never need to be dealt with.

Heck, just let me take the history example and show you why I find this idea of extended fideism (I use the term to refer to any system of statements that wants to be considered unassailable from outside, not just theisms) to be rather ridiculous. Let's just imagine, for the sake of argument, that I come up with an alternate account of the conquests of Napoleon. In fact, based on my interpretations of documents I've found, I've developed a perfectly consistent theory that postulates that Napoleon was, in fact, a robot with superhuman strength. Forget how I come to this conclusion. Just assume for the moment that I've been able to develop this idea and that no statement I make within this new system of history is in conflict with any other. You can't criticize my interpretations of the historical documents, as non-mainstream as they are, because I am just playing a different language game than the other historians. As far as I can see, according to your framework, I'm done. I can now hold the belief that Napoleon was a robot and my belief is just as good as any other.

To play a different language-game than history is the same as not dealing with history at all. Science fiction writers write alternate-hisory novels all the time (Robert Silverberg's Roma Eterna are among my favorites), but they don't claim to be playing the "history" game, they claim to be playing the "speculative fiction" game.

In light of this distinction, I ask you: if a person is playing a game very much like backgammon, but is using chess-pieces, and insists that he's playing "chess"...is he?

Is this really what you want the pursuit of knowledge to become?

It's what it already is. The very fact that you want to institute empiricism as an absolute framework for truth, while others want to institute "God says so" for that purpose, proves it.

 

[loseyourname]

Consistent with "reality"? What's that?

Frankly, I think that phrase is fairly self-explanatory. If what you really mean to ask is how I intend to demonstrate a correspondence with reality, the answer is through observation. It isn't the best technique for every kind of knowledge, but it works for most things. When Aristotle made the claim that a rotating projectile let go of would leave in a line perpendicular to a tangent line, he was wrong. He was wrong because when this is actually done, we can observe that the projectile moves in a tangent line. He wasn't correct according to the rules of his rational language game and wrong according to the rules of the empirical language game. He was simply wrong, because his statement was not consistent with reality.

Why are you so tied to the concept of absolute reality and absolute knowledge of it, and how can you be sure that you are not simply playing one side of a game?

I'm tied to absolute reality because I think it is ridiculously arrogant and anthropomorphic to suggest that a statement can be true simply we can convince ourselves of it. Reality is what reality is; we may know it or not (a collection of tautological statements, I know, but you get my point).

I'm actually not tied to the idea of any kind of absolute knowledge. It is what I would like to strive for, but whether or not it is attainable is a different question altogether.

A "belief" is nothing more than a disposition to hold to one side of a language-game or another.

Really? What about my belief that I am sitting here typing at my computer right now? Will you not distinguish between this belief and the belief that stalks of wheat are imbued with demigod spirits that will grow only if you castrate yourself after seeding? Is each really just a disposition explained by reference to linguistics?

Let's face it, Mentat. You're tied to an absolute frame of reference as much as anyone else is. The only difference is that your frame is linguistic analysis, whereas my frame is empirical reality.

Even Hume would substantiate this view of belief, except he still held onto the concept of an absolute reality (which is where you get Solipsism).

Hume's views on how humans acquire beliefs have no contemporary relevance except as history. His conception of atomism is completely wrong. Perhaps the most thorough refutation of the Humean framework for acquiring beliefs is to be found in Dennett's multiple drafts model.

What about William James' pragmatism, and the limiting factors on living opportunities?

James only presents situations where he feels it is best to hold a belief. I happen to disagree with him, but if he thinks he'll self-destruct if he doesn't profess a belief one way or another in things that he has no way of demonstrating, I'm willing to let him be. The fact remains that he presents no reason whatsoever to favor one belief over another and so doesn't give any reason to hold any particular belief.

They don't have to. An animal that had beliefs, but no language-game whatsoever, could never communicate the fact that it had beliefs, and so they will never need to be dealt with.

The communication isn't what's relevant. It's the holding of the belief. We're talking here about how beliefs are acquired. A human needn't communicate with another human, or even have the capacity to do so, to acquire a belief. Presumably, a deaf mute living alone in a desert could independently come to the conclusion that the liquid he found in the prickly plant kept him alive.

To play a different language-game than history is the same as not dealing with history at all. Science fiction writers write alternate-hisory novels all the time (Robert Silverberg's Roma Eterna are among my favorites), but they don't claim to be playing the "history" game, they claim to be playing the "speculative fiction" game.

That isn't the point. The problem comes when we have two conflicting claims of truth, not with fictional accounts. If people of faith were willing to admit that their language games were fictional, then we would have no issues, would we? As it is, we have some pretty basic conflicts. Christianity claims that a spiritual teacher born in Judea in the first century was divine. Judaism claims that Christians are incorrect. Only one of these claims can be true. You're willing to say they're playing different language-games and I'm not. I'm pretty sure they're talking about the same guy and they both mean the same thing when they use the word "divine."

It's what it already is. The very fact that you want to institute empiricism as an absolute framework for truth, while others want to institute "God says so" for that purpose, proves it.

I didn't say I wanted to institute empiricism as the absolute framework by which to judge all claims. I just said that some verification and/or falsification, or at least the possibility of it, should be forthcoming if one is going to claim that something is true. I recognize that empirical confirmation will not always be the way to go. The most obvious example I can think of in which empiricism is useless is mathematical conjecture.

 

[Mentat]

Frankly, I think that phrase is fairly self-explanatory. If what you really mean to ask is how I intend to demonstrate a correspondence with reality, the answer is through observation. It isn't the best technique for every kind of knowledge, but it works for most things. When Aristotle made the claim that a rotating projectile let go of would leave in a line perpendicular to a tangent line, he was wrong. He was wrong because when this is actually done, we can observe that the projectile moves in a tangent line. He wasn't correct according to the rules of his rational language game and wrong according to the rules of the empirical language game. He was simply wrong, because his statement was not consistent with reality.

So "reality" = "observed phenomena"? Doesn't that presuppose that that which we observe is the best possible determinant of what is "real"?

I'm tied to absolute reality because I think it is ridiculously arrogant and anthropomorphic to suggest that a statement can be true simply we can convince ourselves of it. Reality is what reality is; we may know it or not (a collection of tautological statements, I know, but you get my point).

Ok, but didn't we invent the word "truth"? Rocks don't ponder the nature of "reality" or "truth" or "knowledge"; we do. So, don't we retain the right to define "truth" as we wish? And, if we can do that, then we should be able to define anything as we wish, so long as we can agree.

IOW, what's wrong with anthropocentricism if we are the only ones who philosophize ITFP?

I'm actually not tied to the idea of any kind of absolute knowledge. It is what I would like to strive for, but whether or not it is attainable is a different question altogether.

And do you admit that it's possible to go on living without thinking about "absolutes" or "truth"? Doesn't that make that pursuit your particular game, that not everyone has to play?

Really? What about my belief that I am sitting here typing at my computer right now? Will you not distinguish between this belief and the belief that stalks of wheat are imbued with demigod spirits that will grow only if you castrate yourself after seeding? Is each really just a disposition explained by reference to linguistics?

Why not? Hear me out (or, "see" me out...whatever :shy:)...if the term "sitting" meant what the term "standing" is generally accepted as meaning, and the term "typing" meant what the term "worshiping" is generally accepted as meaning, then the belief that you were "sitting here typing at your computer" would not hold up in argument, would it? Indeed, one could even say it would be a "false" statement.

Let's face it, Mentat. You're tied to an absolute frame of reference as much as anyone else is. The only difference is that your frame is linguistic analysis, whereas my frame is empirical reality.

In this argument I am defending a frame of reference. That means that I, for the purpose of this particular "game" am playing this "side", while you play the other "side".

Hume's views on how humans acquire beliefs have no contemporary relevance except as history. His conception of atomism is completely wrong. Perhaps the most thorough refutation of the Humean framework for acquiring beliefs is to be found in Dennett's multiple drafts model.

Point taken.

James only presents situations where he feels it is best to hold a belief. I happen to disagree with him, but if he thinks he'll self-destruct if he doesn't profess a belief one way or another in things that he has no way of demonstrating, I'm willing to let him be. The fact remains that he presents no reason whatsoever to favor one belief over another and so doesn't give any reason to hold any particular belief.

And yet you believe that beliefs should have "reasons", and do not substantiate this belief.

The communication isn't what's relevant. It's the holding of the belief. We're talking here about how beliefs are acquired. A human needn't communicate with another human, or even have the capacity to do so, to acquire a belief. Presumably, a deaf mute living alone in a desert could independently come to the conclusion that the liquid he found in the prickly plant kept him alive.

Could he?

It doesn't matter, I know that you are simply talking about the aquisition and nature of the beliefs themselves, and not the communications thereof, but that assumes a priori that my aforementioned definition of belief is wrong. You see, in Wittgensteinian tradition, I have defined "belief" as "the disposition to hold one side of an argument".

Think of this, how strong does one ever hold a belief that he never has to defend? What does it mean for that belief to be a "strong" one, if he never has to defend it?

That isn't the point. The problem comes when we have two conflicting claims of truth, not with fictional accounts. If people of faith were willing to admit that their language games were fictional, then we would have no issues, would we? As it is, we have some pretty basic conflicts. Christianity claims that a spiritual teacher born in Judea in the first century was divine. Judaism claims that Christians are incorrect. Only one of these claims can be true. You're willing to say they're playing different language-games and I'm not. I'm pretty sure they're talking about the same guy and they both mean the same thing when they use the word "divine."

And I'm pretty sure the guy who plays backgammon with chess pieces is playing with "actual" chess pieces. That doesn't change the fact that he isn't playing "chess".

An historian who wrote an alternate history (other than the commonly accepted one) and substantiated his claims differently (perhaps in terms of interpretation of a text, or the dismissal of some archaeological find, or down-right religious argument, or whatever) he would be playing a different game. If he looked at the same information as they did, and reasoned on it as they did, but came to a different conclusion, then he would be playing the same game, but making a different legal move, and might win.

As to the Jews and Christians, I'd probably get very involved in this if I even started discussing it, so I won't go there.

I didn't say I wanted to institute empiricism as the absolute framework by which to judge all claims. I just said that some verification and/or falsification, or at least the possibility of it, should be forthcoming if one is going to claim that something is true.

Fine. That is your opinion. You are attempting to establish a rule for certain language-games, which you think would be benefitted by the addition/permission of this rule. That's perfectly good philosophy, as long as you recognize it for what it is: rule-setting for a game.

I recognize that empirical confirmation will not always be the way to go. The most obvious example I can think of in which empiricism is useless is mathematical conjecture.

Different games, right?

 

[loseyourname]

So "reality" = "observed phenomena"? Doesn't that presuppose that that which we observe is the best possible determinant of what is "real"?

I didn't equate the two. I just said that observing reality is the best method we have of learning about it, in my cases. I have qualified that. I don't really think mathematical truths are "real" in the same sense that rocks are, but they are still real.

Ok, but didn't we invent the word "truth"? Rocks don't ponder the nature of "reality" or "truth" or "knowledge"; we do. So, don't we retain the right to define "truth" as we wish? And, if we can do that, then we should be able to define anything as we wish, so long as we can agree.

We invented the word "rock" as well. That doesn't mean we can change what a rock is by altering our intention of the word. It's the word that changes, not the concept it originally referred to. And yeah, sure, we can define anything in any way so long as we can agree. I have no problem with that. What I have a problem with is claiming that people who are all speaking English, using the same words, actually mean different things and can both be correct when they make conflicting statements. Heck, I can't even think of anyone that still takes this idea seriously. Michael Martin, at least, has given a very thorough refutation of the theistic conception of language-games designed to insulate their claims from any form of criticism.

IOW, what's wrong with anthropocentricism if we are the only ones who philosophize ITFP?

If you want your philosophy to be empty of all objective content, go for it.

And do you admit that it's possible to go on living without thinking about "absolutes" or "truth"? Doesn't that make that pursuit your particular game, that not everyone has to play?

Of course. I didn't say everyone had to seek "truth." The thing is, when people make statements and claim that these statements are true, I want them to be meaningful statements. When Martin claims that God does not exist and theists refute him by saying that they are playing a different language game and that, in their game, God does exist, of what value is that? What game are they playing exactly? One in which they've redefined the word "God" to entail existence? That's just flat out stupid. I can invent a new language-game and claim that animism was correct and that we really should castrate ourselves to ensure a good harvest. I can even define all of my terms so that this statement is necessarily true. Do you really think that means that an agricultural scientist can then no longer make any attempt at refuting my claim? The simple fact that two games exist doesn't mean that neither is more correct than the other.

Why not? Hear me out (or, "see" me out...whatever :shy:)...if the term "sitting" meant what the term "standing" is generally accepted as meaning, and the term "typing" meant what the term "worshiping" is generally accepted as meaning, then the belief that you were "sitting here typing at your computer" would not hold up in argument, would it? Indeed, one could even say it would be a "false" statement.

Fine. That isn't what those terms mean. I'm typing my posts in English, as are you, and the way in which we have posted historically leads me to believe that you are speaking the same language as me. If you were literally speaking a language in which "sitting" meant what I mean by "standing," I'd just have to translate for you and we'd be fine. People do it all the time.

In this argument I am defending a frame of reference. That means that I, for the purpose of this particular "game" am playing this "side", while you play the other "side".

You should know that you can't defend a certain game against another game without stepping into some common meta-game in which we are playing by the same rules.

And yet you believe that beliefs should have "reasons", and do not substantiate this belief.

Are you kidding me? I've been substantiating this belief for the last three pages!

It doesn't matter, I know that you are simply talking about the aquisition and nature of the beliefs themselves, and not the communications thereof, but that assumes a priori that my aforementioned definition of belief is wrong. You see, in Wittgensteinian tradition, I have defined "belief" as "the disposition to hold one side of an argument".

Fine, but that isn't what a belief is. When Wittgenstein's mother used the word and he learned it from her, that isn't what she meant. This isn't an a priori assumption. It's drawn from observing the way the term is used by people who speak the English language, along with dictionary definitions that are commonly accepted.

Think of this, how strong does one ever hold a belief that he never has to defend? What does it mean for that belief to be a "strong" one, if he never has to defend it?

I've never once had to defend my belief that my name is Adam, yet I'd say I hold it pretty strongly.

I have to leave. I'll respond to the rest of this later.

 

[Mentat]

I didn't equate the two. I just said that observing reality is the best method we have of learning about it, in my cases. I have qualified that.

You said that Aristotle's predictions did not correlate with "reality". Before that, you had discussed a specific prediction and showed how it didn't correlate with "observed phenomena". That you used the terms interchangeably was what made me think you were equating them.

We invented the word "rock" as well. That doesn't mean we can change what a rock is by altering our intention of the word. It's the word that changes, not the concept it originally referred to. And yeah, sure, we can define anything in any way so long as we can agree. I have no problem with that. What I have a problem with is claiming that people who are all speaking English, using the same words, actually mean different things and can both be correct when they make conflicting statements.

Well, when you put it that way, of course it sounds foolish. I'm not saying that two people, using the same words, but making contradictory statements, are both "right". I don't like the word "right", nor the "concept" to which it's connected. A person who makes a claim, and believes it with all his heart, is "right" to himself, yes? What about other like him? ... That's all I'm saying.

If you want your philosophy to be empty of all objective content, go for it.

I'm just asking why it should always be related to "objective content"? Isn't that just one approach?

Of course. I didn't say everyone had to seek "truth." The thing is, when people make statements and claim that these statements are true, I want them to be meaningful statements.

Meaningful in which game? Don't get me wrong, I understand pretty much where you're coming from. But there has been no good refutation of the language-game concept thus far.

When Martin claims that God does not exist and theists refute him by saying that they are playing a different language game and that, in their game, God does exist, of what value is that? What game are they playing exactly? One in which they've redefined the word "God" to entail existence? That's just flat out stupid. I can invent a new language-game and claim that animism was correct and that we really should castrate ourselves to ensure a good harvest. I can even define all of my terms so that this statement is necessarily true. Do you really think that means that an agricultural scientist can then no longer make any attempt at refuting my claim? The simple fact that two games exist doesn't mean that neither is more correct than the other.

I didn't say that, did I? They are not "equally correct" so much as "correct for me" and "correct for you". That's not a perfect way of phrasing it, but...

Anyway, as to the animism thing, can you really define all of your terms so that it is necessarily true? Remember, if you step out of the realm of personal opinion, and into the realm of what is objectively good for harvests, you have begun playing agriculture's game.

It is the same with creationists who try to ground the Genesis account in science.

Fine. That isn't what those terms mean.

That isn't what those terms mean, to us.

You should know that you can't defend a certain game against another game without stepping into some common meta-game in which we are playing by the same rules.

I'm not defending a game against another game. I'm playing the language-game of philosophical debate. That the game requires the discussion of many other games does not change the fact that it is its own game. Trivial Pursuit isn't any less a game because it discusses objective realities.

Are you kidding me? I've been substantiating this belief for the last three pages!

Apologies.

Fine, but that isn't what a belief is.

Says who?

This isn't an a priori assumption. It's drawn from observing the way the term is used by people who speak the English language, along with dictionary definitions that are commonly accepted.

Fine, but that only further solidifies the concept that language-games can only be played as it is commonly accepted that they ought to be played.

I've never once had to defend my belief that my name is Adam, yet I'd say I hold it pretty strongly.

Hi, Adam. My name's Michael.

But what does it mean for you to hold a belief strongly if you've never had to defend it? Could it be that the disposition to hold that position strongly, if countered, that is exactly what your "belief" is? IOW, could it be that the disposition on your part, to defend that your name is Adam, is precisely equivalent to the "belief" that that is your name?

 

[loseyourname]

You said that Aristotle's predictions did not correlate with "reality". Before that, you had discussed a specific prediction and showed how it didn't correlate with "observed phenomena". That you used the terms interchangeably was what made me think you were equating them.

In cases where empirical claims are made, they should be verified empirically. In such cases, the best way to get at the reality of the matter is to make an observation under whatever controlled circumstances we can establish. In Aristotle's case, he should have simply swung a rock around his head and let go. He would have quickly seen that he was wrong, as logical as his claim seemed to him.

Well, when you put it that way, of course it sounds foolish. I'm not saying that two people, using the same words, but making contradictory statements, are both "right". I don't like the word "right", nor the "concept" to which it's connected. A person who makes a claim, and believes it with all his heart, is "right" to himself, yes? What about other like him? ... That's all I'm saying.

I wouldn't even go that far. The 'man who mistook his wife for a hat' had the most heartful belief that his wife was, in fact, a hat. He was wrong, in any sense of the word. He wasn't "right to himself." I want to establish a clear difference between the belief that a claim is correct and that claim actually being correct. There are gray areas, of course. Some claims are simply meaningless in that they lack any factual truth value. Many religious claims fall into this category. When a person makes the claim that Jesus was divine, there is no conceivable way to verify and/or falsify that claim. We might, in principle, confirm whether or not Jesus had the power to make water into wine, or that Jesus was resurrected three days after dying, but proving or disproving these claims would neither prove nor disprove his divinity. It is simply an article of faith - either faith that he was or faith that he wasn't. This holds true for all human beings. You can't ever know whether or not I am divine. As such, it is essentially meaningless to claim that I am. There are other cases where a claim might be verifiable and/or falsifiable, but not empirically. Take Canute's claim that physicalism is inconsistent. There exists no sensible object called "physicalism" that has the property of being consistent or inconsistent. We must test this claim using other methods.

The key point here is that Aristotle, the Christian theologian, and Canute are all playing the same language-game. When they make these claims, they are each making the further claim that what they say is true, in the same sense all three times. It may very well be that there does exist some language-game in which "x is true" simply means "it is my heartfelt belief that x is true." In many, if not all, cases, that second fact is certainly the reason the original claim is being made, but that alone does not make the claims identical.

I'm just asking why it should always be related to "objective content"? Isn't that just one approach?

It's the only approach useful for philosophical discourse, indeed for any discourse that intends to make interpersonal progress toward the truth. The approach you are advocating is just opinion-sharing. It is gradeschool philosophy.

Meaningful in which game? Don't get me wrong, I understand pretty much where you're coming from. But there has been no good refutation of the language-game concept thus far.

There has also never been any clear demonstration that language-games actually exist. They might be useful as theoretical constructs that intend to explain why different people come to different conclusions when presented with the same evidence, but there are other theories that explain this equally well.

Anyway, as to the animism thing, can you really define all of your terms so that it is necessarily true? Remember, if you step out of the realm of personal opinion, and into the realm of what is objectively good for harvests, you have begun playing agriculture's game.

It is the same with creationists who try to ground the Genesis account in science.

And the same with anybody who claims that Jesus was a real historical person that did the things the bible says he did. The same for anyone who claims that Mohammed really was the last prophet of God. The same for anyone who claims that Joseph Smith was really visited by the angel Moroni and given the book of Mormon. These are all factual, historical claims. I find it hard to think of any religious claims that are not, in fact, claims made pursuant to a language-game that is not solely religious.

That isn't what those terms mean, to us.

That isn't what those terms mean to anyone that has ever used them, so far as I know. "Sitting" means that the rear end of a person is somehow in contact with a surface that keeps his body from falling. I'm guessing that you have never encountered a different usage of this term either, and so when I make the claim that I am sitting, it should be immediately clear to you what I mean by that, and you should immediately be able to think of a way to verify or falsify my claim (visit me and see for yourself, ask for a photo, whatever).

I'm not defending a game against another game. I'm playing the language-game of philosophical debate. That the game requires the discussion of many other games does not change the fact that it is its own game. Trivial Pursuit isn't any less a game because it discusses objective realities.

I still can't see that you've given any evidence to believe that there exists such a thing as the philosophical language-game, that can be distinguished from science or theology. There are small differences in the usage of certain terms and, in these cases, I will grant that it is necessary to make a translation before a claim can be evaluted. Other than that, what's the big deal? When a scientist claims that his hypothesis is true, he means exactly the same thing that the philosopher and theologian do when they claim that their hypotheses are true.

Fine, but that only further solidifies the concept that language-games can only be played as it is commonly accepted that they ought to be played.

It also solidifies my claim that we are all playing the same language-game. In our case, it is English. We can, however, easily translate this into most other languages without losing much meaning. The concepts to which we refer are all the same and can be commonly understood using any language. There are small exceptions, of course (perestroika, for instance, really doesn't have any good English translation, but we can still get the gist).

Hi, Adam. My name's Michael.

What a pair of boringly common biblical names, eh? I think I'll name my son Empedocles.

But what does it mean for you to hold a belief strongly if you've never had to defend it? Could it be that the disposition to hold that position strongly, if countered, that is exactly what your "belief" is? IOW, could it be that the disposition on your part, to defend that your name is Adam, is precisely equivalent to the "belief" that that is your name?

That would be the behaviorist view, but is Skinner even still taught in psychology courses as anything but history? I suppose that was the commonly held academic view of belief up until about a couple of decades ago, but it's hardly a widely held view at this point.