- #106
Mentat
- 3,960
- 3
Originally posted by Jeebus
We could, of course, discount for these purposes the role of
mental qualities in sensing things. But that would undermine the
very distinction between being conscious of something by sensing it
and being conscious of that thing by having a thought about it. If
our awareness of our conscious states involves no characteristic
mental qualities, it is indistinguishable from our being conscious
of those states by our having thoughts of some suitable sort about
them.
We could or can conclude, then, that we are aware of our conscious
mental states not by sensing them, but by having thoughts about
them. To have a convenient label, I shall refer to the thoughts in
virtue of which we are conscious of our conscious mental states as
higher-order thoughts.
Just a hypothesis on consciousness, I suppose.
Basically this is correct, but I would modify it somewhat, in light of Dennett's reasoning on the matter. You see, it's true that we only ever subjectively experience things (it doesn't make sense to "objectively experience something"...if it's your experience, it's subjective), but the process of subjective experience, is purely a neuronal/synaptic activity, which requires 1) having had previous input from the objective reality, and 2) having remembered it.