What is the Hard Problem of Consciousness & Why is It Difficult?

[loseyourname]

Yes, I don't like his use of the idea of 'bare differences' either. However it does seem to me that science defines differences circularly. It has to do this because it has nothing that is fundamental on which to ground its definitions so has to define things by their relationship to other things. This is not just a problem for science, to be fair. I suppose one could call it the human condition.

Physical quantities aren't defined in a circular manner at least according to my understanding of the word "circular." They are generally defined as mathematical expressions that dictate the manner in which they interact. I suppose you mean that any quantity x is defined by its relationship to quantities y, z, and so on, while quantity y is defined by its relationship to quantities x, z and so on. In that sense I suppose they are defined circularly, although I didn't infer from the book that Rosenberg intended that sense (in fact, I would just use the physicist's language and say they are defined relative to a certain frame of reference and that there exists no absolute frame of reference). I also can't see how reference to a grounding ontology would necessarily alleviate the condition of this particular type of circular definition.

To be fair, string theorists do seem to be attempting to develop a theory of the intrinsic nature of fundamental units of reality, although it doesn't seem that they can say much about these units other than that they have the intrinsic properties of being strings that vibrate. They also have the problem of their ideas not necessarily being amenable to empirical investigation, although they may come up with a way around the difficulties they've had.

 

[Zantra]

Are you kidding me? He looks like Kate Winslet crossed with Jack Black.

ROFL you are SO dead on with that description

 

[Math Is Hard]

ROFL you are SO dead on with that description

whatever! I still think he's cute!

I am reading about "functionalism" now. From what I understand, functionalism says that we can learn what we need to know about the mind by observing behavior. It seems like a 'black box' point of view. We don't need to know how the machinery functions, just how the outputs (behavior) correspond to the inputs (stimuli). It seems like this is skirting the whole "mind-body interaction" issue.
Is this the scientific point of view then? - should we give up on understanding how a physical event causes a mental event and solely focus on which physical event causes which physical action(s) from the body?
I apologize if I sound naive or unclear. I am a beginner.

 

[honestrosewater]

The thoughts of another beginner:

If "x is not y" and "x is not x" have different meanings, "x" and "y" must have meaning by virtue of something other than the statement, "x is not y". How can a system tell the difference between "x is not y" and "x is not x" if it can't tell the difference between "x" and "y"?

How is replacing "x" and "y" with "on" and "off" different from replacing "x" and "y" with "this" and "this"?

If "this is not this" and "this is not this" have different meanings, "this" and "this" must have meaning by virtue of something other than the statement, "this is not this". How can a system tell the difference between "this is not this" and "this is not this" if it can't tell the difference between "this" and "this"?

If "on is not off" and "on is not on" have different meanings, "on" and "off" must have meaning by virtue of something other than the statement, "on is not off". How can a system tell the difference between "on is not off" and "on is not on" if it can't tell the difference between "on" and "off"?

If it's like something for a person to see this, how is it not like something for a Life cell to be on? What is the flippin difference? Is it just a difference of complexity?

 

[Canute]

The situation seems to me to be something like this. We cannot show that anything has an inherent exitence (as a thing-in itself). There are therefore two options. The first option breaks down into two views; a) things do have an absolute existence as things in themselves but we will remain forever ignorant of what these things are, and be forever unable to prove that they exist (the scientific view) or - b) most things do not have an absolute existence (are 'bare differences) but at least one thing does and from this all the rest arise as epiphenomena or appearances (Rosenberg's view?). The second option, the 'middle way' view, is to say that we have a muddled notion of what 'existence' means, and this leads to all these problems.

Strangely the view closest to latter view seems to be Self-Adjoint's, who (correct me if I'm wrong SA) argues that things do not have any substance underlying their external or conceptual appearances. This is what people mean when they say that 'emptiness' is at the heart of everything.

 

[saltydog]

'emptiness' is at the heart of everything.

Nothing is everything? I'm missing out. I realize I'm a stranger in a strange land over here but that's just not happening with me. I tend to believe in Karl Popper: "we approach the truth asymptotically".

Can you explain, briefly, what "nothing is everything" means, or has someone already done so in an earlier post that I missed?

Thanks,
Salty

 

[Canute]

Yes, if you read it like that it's a nonsensical phrase. However in this context the term 'emptiness' does not mean nothing.

 

[saltydog]

Yes, if you read it like that it's a nonsensical phrase. However in this context the term 'emptiness' does not mean nothing.

I find "emptiness is at the heart of everything" very interesting and well, I went through them again (the above posts) and it's still not happening for me but that's ok. I'm a neophyte about these things I know. But I do have an idea about it I may post as a separate link. Please tolerate my ignorance everyone. I don't wish to behave inappropriate here . . .

 

[loseyourname]

I find "emptiness is at the heart of everything" very interesting and well, I went through them again (the above posts) and it's still not happening for me but that's ok. I'm a neophyte about these things I know. But I do have an idea about it I may post as a separate link. Please tolerate my ignorance everyone. I don't wish to behave inappropriate here . . .

He's referring to the possibility that all of reality is built up through relational structures of differences, but without any grounding material substance that holds the differences. I still think that it sounds pretty nonsensical myself even when it is put that way, but there are those who consider it a possibility. Well, I shouldn't say that. Some kind of non-material substance can hold the differences, but it certainly seems like something has to.

 

[selfAdjoint]

The situation seems to me to be something like this. We cannot show that anything has an inherent exitence (as a thing-in itself). There are therefore two options. The first option breaks down into two views; a) things do have an absolute existence as things in themselves but we will remain forever ignorant of what these things are, and be forever unable to prove that they exist (the scientific view) or - b) most things do not have an absolute existence (are 'bare differences) but at least one thing does and from this all the rest arise as epiphenomena or appearances (Rosenberg's view?). The second option, the 'middle way' view, is to say that we have a muddled notion of what 'existence' means, and this leads to all these problems.

Strangely the view closest to latter view seems to be Self-Adjoint's, who (correct me if I'm wrong SA) argues that things do not have any substance underlying their external or conceptual appearances. This is what people mean when they say that 'emptiness' is at the heart of everything.

I did not say they have no "substance" or "ontological reality" or however you want to call it. I said that science has not found any, and as the mainsteam of it is currently configured, isn't looking for any. But if there is any such thing, it will be found by scientists probing deeper, not by people trying to derive it from their mental exxperiences.

Some current theories (not the standard ones yet, but scientific, not crank) have proposed some underlying reality with everything else being relationships within that reality. The realitiy might be a cellular mechanism underlying spacetime, or spin foams underlying spacetime, or whatever. Or a truly relational theory might have space and time just relations between things, which have prior reality. Theorizing beyond current data is a legitimate function within science.

If the ultimate TOE ever comes about, and there is truly some reality underlying what we can measure, then that reality will have its place in it.

 

[Canute]

Self-Adjoint

I don't really want to keep arguing, and maybe we should just agree to disagree. But this seems an odd post to me. You say science is not looking for any 'ultimate' or 'true' reality. I agree with this, and there seems to be general agreement on it, since it's a inevitable consequence of the way science is done. But then you say that eventually a scientific TOE will tell us all about this ultimate reality. What is going to change between then and now that will allow science to do this? Plato, Kant and most other philosophers and many physicists say it will never happen, and their arguments seem unassailable to me.

Despite the inability of science to tell us anything about what is real (fundamental, absolute) you say that in the end science will tell us all about it, and that exploring ones own inner experiences is a waste of time in this respect, even though the only thing whose existence we can be sure of are our own experiences. It's not easy to see how you reach these conclusions.

Doesn't it seem likely that if there is an underlying reality, which of course there must be, and if all the things which we study scientifically exist in dependence upon this thing, exist relative to it, as you say is possible, then this 'underlying reality' cannot be just another scientific entity. Otherwise that would have to exist relative to something else, and so on ad infinitum. Turtles on turtles again.

I'd say that Alan Guth's attempts to develop a theory of ex nihilo creation, and Stephen Hawking conclusion that physics cannot be completed, suggest that it is no good us waiting for science to tell us about reality. On the evidence we'll be waiting forever.

You seem completely opposed to any idea that we can know anything beyond science. Yet we know that what we want to know about reality is beyond science, for this is the only reason that metaphysics exists. How then can you justify your position?

He's referring to the possibility that all of reality is built up through relational structures of differences, but without any grounding material substance that holds the differences. I still think that it sounds pretty nonsensical myself even when it is put that way, but there are those who consider it a possibility.

It does sound pretty nonsensical from many perspectives. But most people (all people?) who have ever claimed to know anything about this have asserted that what is ultimate transcends the difference between material and immaterial. This is no proof of anything of course, but it's suggestive. What is also suggestive is that if this is not true then we are left with a choice between ex nihilo creation and an infinite regression of physical substances as an explanation of the origins of the universe, or of the ontology of mind and matter, and both these views seem to contradict reason to most people. The question is therefore considered undecidable. So, to be fair, although the idea seems nonsensical so do the alternatives.

 

[selfAdjoint]

I don't really want to keep arguing, and maybe we should just agree to disagree.

Yes, I think that's best. This post is only for clarification.

But this seems an odd post to me. You say science is not looking for any 'ultimate' or 'true' reality. I agree with this, and there seems to be general agreement on it, since it's a inevitable consequence of the way science is done.

No, only of the contigent current state of science, mostly driven by the kind of data available.

But then you say that eventually a scientific TOE will tell us all about this ultimate reality. What is going to change between then and now that will allow science to do this?

One path would be for theorists to develop a true TOE, which is falsifiable through experimental predictions, but also of its necessary nature makes statements about what reality is. That is, its logical structure is to be such that you can't have the experimental predictions without the assertions about reality. Quantum mechanics almost behaves this way (asserting "reality is quantized" and making excallent experimental predictions), but not quite, because the split between its unitary physics and the highly nonlinear projection to real probabilities undercuts it's assertion.

Plato, Kant and most other philosophers and many physicists say it will never happen, and their arguments seem unassailable to me.

As to the philosophers, who cares? They disagree with each other and form no constraint on physics development. As to the many physicists, name three since 1950. No sorry, we weren't going to dispute anymore, but obviously I am skeptical of this statement. Maybe start a new thread ?

 

[Canute]

Yeah that might be interesting. To answer your question I'd have to root around a bit to check my facts, but Stephen Hawking comes to mind. Does Scroedinger count as post-1950? Karl Pribram probably qualifies as well, and Franco Varella, but I'm not quite sure of them. And Greg Rosenberg of course, if he counts as a scientist. I'll think about it and try and get some more sorted. It's quite an interesting little research project.