What Price for Genuine Free Will?

[Tournesol]

I am fully aware of Bell’s theorem, I think you are the one who does not understand. Bell’s inequality and the experimental results of QM shows that the universe must behave non-locally, which simply means that space-like separated events can remain ENTANGLED with each other, such that what happens on one side of the universe can be quantum mechanically entangled instantaneously with another event on the other side of the universe, ie apparent superluminal effects (but no useful information is transferred at superluminal speeds). Read Bell’s work and Aspect’s work closely and you will understand. It has NOTHING to do with indeterminism.

It has everything to do with determinism by local hidden variables.

In fact Bell was a supporter of Bohm’s hidden variables ideas, Bell did not believe the quantum world was fundamentally indeterministic.

But the Aspect experiment produced the opposite result to what he
was hoping for. Nature is the ultimate arbitor, not famous scientists.

Einstein was demonstrably wrong only in believing in a local reality. The results of QM show that the world cannot be both real and local,

Cannot be determined and local

however it can be real and non-local.

determined non-locally. Or just plain indetermined.

And this is what Bell himself believed. In fact no matter what interpretation of QM you adopt, the world must be non-local. So non-locality is here to stay. But nobody has EVER proven that the world is not deterministic at a quantum level, and nobody has ever proven that non-local hidden variables theories do not work.

Debatable
http://www.arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0206/0206196.pdf

 

[moving finger]

It has everything to do with determinism by local hidden variables.

As I said, it has nothing to do with indeterminism.

Nature is the ultimate arbitor, not famous scientists.

And nature shows that the quantum world is non-local, but it is not necessarily indeterministic. The latter agrees with Bell’s, Bohm’s and Einstein's beliefs.

Cannot be determined and local

To Einstein, “real” was his way of saying “determined”

determined non-locally. Or just plain indetermined.

But not necessarily indetermined, which is what many followers of Bohr mistakenly assume

http://www.arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant...206/0206196.pdf[/QUOTE]

The cited paper claims to show that some experimental results do not agree with a very particular non-local hidden-variables theory, but the paper does not show that non-local hidden variables theories in general do not work.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

As I said, it has nothing to do with indeterminism.

Of course it does. It rules out the form of determinism, local determinism,
that most determinists believe in.

And nature shows that the quantum world is non-local, but it is not necessarily indeterministic. The latter agrees with Bell’s, Bohm’s and Einstein's beliefs.

Or necessarilly deterministic.

To Einstein, “real” was his way of saying “determined”

It's a True Scotsman approach.

But not necessarily indetermined, which is what many followers of Bohr mistakenly assume

Works both ways. Determinists assume it proves the existence of non-local
determinism.

The cited paper claims to show that some experimental results do not agree with a very particular non-local hidden-variables theory, but the paper does not show that non-local hidden variables theories in general do not work.

But Bohm's is the only fully worked out on. It looks like the determinists
are clutching at straws.

 

[moving finger]

It rules out the form of determinism, local determinism, that most determinists believe in.

And as I said, this has nothing to do with indeterminism.

Or necessarilly deterministic.

I never said it was necessarily deterministic. Unlike followers of Bohr who say the world is necessarily indeterministic.

It's a True Scotsman approach.

What on Earth does that mean?

Works both ways. Determinists assume it proves the existence of non-local determinism.

I disagree. It proves only that the world is non-local. It may be deterministic, it may be indeterministic, there is no way we can ever know.

It looks like the determinists are clutching at straws.

Not at all, some of us are keeping an open mind and not being blinkered by jumping to conclusions.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

http://atheism.about.com/od/logicalfallacies/a/notruescotsman.htm

 

[moving finger]

It's a True Scotsman approach.

Not at all. Read about Einstein's work and his beliefs yourself. You'll start to understand then.

MF

 

[moving finger]

Free will is not free!

...like almost everyone, I feel I make real choices in life and want a rational bases for a belief in Genuine Free Will, GFW

Discussions on "free will" are notoriously difficult, usually because most participants take sides before they even agree what they are talking about (ie participants declare "I do/do not believe in free will" before there is any agreement on the definition or meaning of "free will").

Therefore, rather than debate whether "free will" (whatever the definition) really exists, I think it is much more instructive to ask :

what do people really mean when they say that they believe they act with "free will", and are they justified in having this belief?

I humbly suggest that what most people (who claim to believe in "free will") mean when they say they act with "free will" is that they believe "their actions are not entirely constrained by external factors".

I say "entirely" constrained because I believe most of us would agree that our actions are usually some way constrained to a greater or lesser extent by external factors (eg I cannot willingly hold my breath for more than a minute or two, no matter how much I "want" to), but belief in "free will" would imply that not all of the external constraints on our actions are necessarily absolute.

This is where it becomes useful to look closely at how we define the "person" (or better still, the agent) which we are claiming has this "free will".

Paraphrasing Dennett, one can externalise everything by making oneself really, really small. Conversely, an agent can subsume many (potentially external) constraints within itself by making itself a sufficiently finite size.

What we call our "self" is not an infinitesimal point in space. It has finite physical and logical boundaries and, most importantly, it includes within those boundaries many of the causes and effects of our decisions; in fact the personal decision-making process is based on what I like to call self-referential causal loops.

If we can identify the external "cause" of a particular decision (ie an external constraint on our "free will") then we know that we are not in fact deciding freely. But for many of our decisions we are unable to unambiguously identify the "causes" of those decisions, simply because those causes are internalised in a complex and self-referential way within our decision-making selves.

Thus, it is not the case that our "free will" decisions are uncaused; neither is it the case that our "free will" decisions are unconstrained. It is simply the case that the decisions which we choose to call our "free will" decisions are largely caused and constrained by internal self-referential causal loops, of which we have (most of the time) incomplete awareness - and this is what leads us to say that we act with "free will".

Some may call "free will" illusion. I do not. "Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe.

"Free will" is not an illusion. But it is important to understand exactly what it is, and also what it is not.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

All quite good until this pioint...

Some may call "free will" illusion. I do not. "Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe.

"Free will" is not an illusion. But it is important to understand exactly what it is, and also what it is not.

..where you suddenly decide that "free Will" is just a feeling. Feeling free when
you are not actually free is just as much an illusion as feeling like a million dollats when you are a pauper.

 

[moving finger]

All quite good until this pioint...

why thank you!

..where you suddenly decide that "free Will" is just a feeling. Feeling free when you are not actually free is just as much an illusion as feeling like a million dollats when you are a pauper.

Two things here.

One.
I did not say that "free will" is "just" a feeling. You may consider it is “just” a feeling, but I do not.

When we say that we act with "free will" then we are indeed acting such that our actions are not entirely constrained by external factors. This is consistent with the definitions I have suggested above. In this sense we act freely.

But our actions, no matter how free we think we might be, are never unconstrained, and they are never uncaused. It is simply the fact that many of the constraints and causes are internal to ourselves that allows us to believe that we act freely, even though all may be determined.

Two
Are you suggesting that all feelings are illusions?

When I feel happy, am I deluding myself that I am happy?

I think not.
When I feel happy, I am happy.
When I feel free, I am free.
Both are indeed feelings. But neither is an illusion.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

When we say that we act with "free will" then we are indeed acting such that our actions are not entirely constrained by external factors. This is consistent with the definitions I have suggested above. In this sense we act freely.

But our actions, no matter how free we think we might be, are never unconstrained, and they are never uncaused. It is simply the fact that many of the constraints and causes are internal to ourselves that allows us to believe that we act freely, even though all may be determined.

But if determinism is true, eveything that goes on causally inside us
is the ultimate product of factors that went on outside us, before
we were born even. The external/internal distinction is no good
in combination with determisnim.

 

[moving finger]

But if determinism is true, eveything that goes on causally inside us is the ultimate product of factors that went on outside us, before
we were born even.

Yes, agreed. If determinism is true than everything, including all of our actions, is determined (possibly also even determined at a quantum level).

But this does NOT mean that we do not have free will, as I have pointed out above. It depends critically on what one means by free will.

If we define free will as (A) "acting without being totally constrained by external factors" then this is compatible with determinsim (because most of our decisions are based on internalised constraints, not on external factors).

But if you wish to define free will as (B) "acting without any constraints at all" then this is incompatible with determinism.

The external/internal distinction is no good in combination with determisnim.

Only if you insist on the definition (B) above.

If you insist on (B), then your only hope for rescuing free will is that determinism turns out to be false (eg Libertarianism)

MF

 

[Tournesol]

we define free will as (A) "acting without being totally constrained by external factors" then this is compatible with determinsim (because most of our decisions are based on internalised constraints, not on external factors).

But the internal factors, if determinism is true, are ultimately external.

Your version of events is like saying that Lincoln was killed by a bullet,
not by a gun or John Wilkes Booth.

 

[strid]

Can you say this...

There is determination to a certain extent... But nothing is 100% ficed and rigid... You sould see it more as probabilirties...

So if I'm singing a song, its not that it is pre-determined. There are those who would say that it IS pre-detremined... maybe that the environment I am in, unconciously reminds me about this specific song and uncously makes me want to sing it.
But i would prefer seeing this as probababilities. The enviorment and all that unconcsious stuff sets up probabliites for me singing. It is still me who sings by free will but there is a specific probability for me CHOOSING to sing.

So when I enter a room where it is dark, there is say 90% probabilitythat I will turn on the light. There is a probability, but it is not pre-determined that i will turn on the light.

 

[Billy T]

...You need to understand that spacelike separation has nothing to do with correlation, it has to do only with direct causation, and the two are quite different.

I understand this difference.

I think at this point we should just agree to disagree on the randomness of my series. I.e. I will admit that if everything in a deterministic universe is already "entangled" with everything else, then my space like separation, does not prevent there from being a direct correlation in the decays between two spacelike separated radioactive sources.

Also in a deterministic universe, even if not entangled, the decay a B at time T2 could have many factors, none from events at A prohibited from direct causation by speed of light limit, unless entangled, but both the near simultaneous decay at A & B could have common cause(s) in the past.

Thus to one like you who thinks the universe is determined by the past, it is logically possible that my sequence is not random. I would need to rely upon the many experimental tests that have demonstrated that radio active decays are not influenced by external events (like magnetic or electrical forces and the only other two known forces are too short range).

Thus I accept that the sequence I construct from space like decays only is demonstrable random, (Even for a single source - for example assign A if interval from last decay is twice average and assign B if it is less than half average. This would have a bias towards either A or B, but with a little adjustment in the "half interval," the difference in long run between the number of A & Bs could be made very small.

I.e. I will cease to argue with you on this aspect, but think you need to do better in defining "choice" also.

For me, if the future is determined completely by the past, then nothing I would call "choice" is possible. In my example of you making a left turn (as opposed to a right one) you have the illusion of a choice, but that, like everything else, was fixed before you were born in a deterministic universe. Thus it is not a choice, it is an inevitability. That follows from what I understand the words "deterministic universe" to mean. Is that not what you understand also by these words? (Perhaps this is our communication difficulty?)

LaPlace put this well long ago. We don't know the future (epistemic problem) but in your system of beliefs, it is defined by the past. You can have the illusion of choice, but no choice can made. I.e. turning right, instead of the left you did, was not a choice as the right turn was no more possible than your walking to the moon.

If you are going to define "choice" as you have (2 inputs with one output) then turning left instead of walking to the moon was a choice, but that is not what choice means to me. There must be a selection by an agent between at least two alternatives, not uniquely following a path determined years ago, before you were born.

I admit I have only given partial definitions of "free will" and "real choices" by telling examples of things they are not. You have yet to do this, so until you do, stop asking me for more positive definitions.

Tell me what constitutes a "choice" in a universe where exactly everything that happens in 2008 (including your left turn) has already been decided.

 

[Billy T]

..."Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe...

I think I understand your position, but it is one i would call an illusion of free will. You seem to be claiming that the internalized factors that compelled (determined) you to make a left turn in 2008 would be your "free will" at the time when you "decided" to make the left turn. I claim that you as a physical body governed by the laws of nature in a completely deterministic universe, only think you are making a choice. In fact that left turn was determined before you were born.

We can agree to let me refer to this as inevitable act, producing what I call the "illusion of choice" and let you call it "a choice" because some of the deterministic factors which produced this act were "internalized" to use your term.
I.e. I am willing to drop the discussion if you like, but I would add your "already determined free will future acts" to the list of things I have already given as not "genuine free will." Except for this negative list, I admit I have difficulty defining what "genuine free will" is.

 

[Billy T]

Can you say this...

There is determination to a certain extent... But nothing is 100% ficed and rigid...

The thing that makes the exchange with Moving Finger interesting is that he is:
(1) well informed, logical etc. and
(2) is claiming that the universe is deterministic (although at times his seems not so sure about this at the quantum level).

Tournesol has made more explicit the point I was making earlier about his "free choice" even being determined before he was born - by only externalities that during his life became internalized.

BTW - his "handel" is well chosen - from the Rubiant (Fitzgerald's second translation if memory serves be correctly) "The moving finger writes and having writ, moves on. / Not all you piety nor wit, can lure it back to cancel half a line of it." (Not exact also from memory.) It is my second most favorite poem. filled with determinism.

My favorite poem is "Invictus," which has just the opposite idea, concluding with: I am the captain of my ship, I am the master of my soul. (no quotes this time as from memory that is rough version.)

When I was younger, Kiplin's "IF" was important to me. - I have done most of it by now. (Fortunately, I had the good sense to "make one heap of all you winnings and lose it on one turn of pitch and toss ..." when I took all my earnings as a paper boy ($50) an bought a fraction of my father's investment in what turned out to be a dry oil well in West Virginia where I lived at age 12. (I did not even have money for my share of pipe recovery costs, so it was a total loss of "all my winings.")

 

[moving finger]

But the internal factors, if determinism is true, are ultimately external.

If determinism is true then everything is determined, by definition.
If you wish to define "free will" as "acting without any constraints whatsoever" then this kind of free will is incompatible with determinism, and there is no getting away from that.

Your version of events is like saying that Lincoln was killed by a bullet,
not by a gun or John Wilkes Booth.

If determinism is true then Lincoln's manner and time of death was predetermined at the moment of the big bang.

You clearly do not like the idea of determinism - what do you propose as an alternative?

Libertarianism is a nice airy-fairy feel-good idea, but it is groundless (in the sense that it is not supported by any coherent rational theory or experimental evidence).

MF

 

[moving finger]

Can you say this...

There is determination to a certain extent... But nothing is 100% ficed and rigid... You sould see it more as probabilirties...

So if I'm singing a song, its not that it is pre-determined. There are those who would say that it IS pre-detremined... maybe that the environment I am in, unconciously reminds me about this specific song and uncously makes me want to sing it.
But i would prefer seeing this as probababilities. The enviorment and all that unconcsious stuff sets up probabliites for me singing. It is still me who sings by free will but there is a specific probability for me CHOOSING to sing.

So when I enter a room where it is dark, there is say 90% probabilitythat I will turn on the light. There is a probability, but it is not pre-determined that i will turn on the light.

What you have described is basically Libertarianism - ie that the mind is capable of initiating some uncaused or unconstrained actions (ie "YOU" are not ruled by the laws of physics). This was also the basis of Descartes' view of Dualism (that there is a "thinking self" and a "physical self"; the physical self is subject to the laws of physics but the thinking self is somehow free and not subject to laws).

Problem is there is no coherent rational theory or any experimental evidence to support the idea that such an uncaused "thinking self" exists.

MF

 

[moving finger]

... spacelike separation has nothing to do with correlation, it has to do only with direct causation, and the two are quite different.

I understand this difference.

Good. Then you should understand that two spacelike separated radioactive sources can nevertheless be correlated – ie the combined output from those sources is not necessarily random.

I think at this point we should just agree to disagree on the randomness of my series.

Billy T, with respect, you are simply being blind to the obvious. Spacelike separation (I agree) DOES imply no direct causal influence; but it does NOT imply no correlation. That is a very simple truth that (I am sorry) you seem to wish to ignore.

Also in a deterministic universe, even if not entangled, the decay a B at time T2 could have many factors, none from events at A prohibited from direct causation by speed of light limit, unless entangled, but both the near simultaneous decay at A & B could have common cause(s) in the past.

In a 100% deterministic universe, if the entire universe was within causal contact at some stage in the past (ie the moment of the Big Bang) then ALL (all, not some) of the subsequent events in that universe WILL NECESSARILY BE CORRELATED. Think about it. Each and every event, no matter how far it is TODAY from other events in terms of spacelike separation, can be traced back along a pure deterministic line to the Big Bang, where all the universe arises in a common cause.

It’s a bit like a family tree. I may be on the other side of the world from and totally out of touch with my long-lost cousin, but we can both trace a link back in the past to common ancestors. Determinism acts just the same way. If the universe originated in a singularity and is 100% deterministic, then all today’s events can be traced back 100% deterministically to a common source in the past – hence ALL events are correlated today and forevermore.

The ONLY way to argue uncorrelated events is to postulate EITHER the universe is not 100% deterministic, OR not all parts of the universe arose from a common source (in causal contact) in the past (or both). You cannot derive randomness in any other way, I am sorry.

it is logically possible that my sequence is not random. I would need to rely upon the many experimental tests that have demonstrated that radio active decays are not influenced by external events (like magnetic or electrical forces and the only other two known forces are too short range) .

It makes no difference whether radioactive events are influenced by external factors or not! I would hope (really) that someone with a PhD in physics could see this. The ONLY important factors are (a) is the world 100% deterministic? and (b) did everything arise from some common source in the past? If the answers to (a) and (b) are both “yes” then it necessarily follows that EVERYTHING we see is correlated with everything else, whether there is direct causal contact in the present day or not.

Thus I accept that the sequence I construct from space like decays only is demonstrable random, (Even for a single source - for example assign A if interval from last decay is twice average and assign B if it is less than half average. This would have a bias towards either A or B, but with a little adjustment in the "half interval," the difference in long run between the number of A & Bs could be made very small.

I.e. I will cease to argue with you on this aspect, but think you need to do better in defining "choice" also.

You seem not to like my definitions (which is cool), yet you do not propose alternative definitions of your own. I define choice as taking 2 or more inputs and producing 1 output. If you disagree, then please do offer (what you consider to be) a better definition.

For me, if the future is determined completely by the past, then nothing I would call "choice" is possible.

Implicit in your argument is the assumption that you are referring to “free choice” or “unconstrained choice” as opposed to “constrained choice”. In a deterministic universe, then it is a simple fact that all choices are constrained. I can still make choices in such a universe, and a computer can still make choices, it is simply the case that our choices are constrained, by determinism.

In my example of you making a left turn (as opposed to a right one) you have the illusion of a choice,

No, in this case I have the illusion of a free (unconstrained) choice. But I do not have the illusion of choice, I know that I choose, and I do choose. What is debatable is simply whether my choice is constrained or unconstrained.

but that, like everything else, was fixed before you were born in a deterministic universe. Thus it is not a choice, it is an inevitability.

It is still a choice, I am sorry. I choose between two possibilities. I agree my choice may be pre-determined, but that does not make it “not a choice”.

That follows from what I understand the words "deterministic universe" to mean. Is that not what you understand also by these words? (Perhaps this is our communication difficulty?)

Our communication difficulty (I believe) is based on different definitions. You still have not defined what you mean by free will.

LaPlace put this well long ago. We don't know the future (epistemic problem) but in your system of beliefs, it is defined by the past.

No. If the world is deterministic then the future is defined by the past (and also the past by the future by the way). I am open-minded as to whether the world is deterministic or not.

You can have the illusion of choice, but no choice can made. I.e. turning right, instead of the left you did, was not a choice as the right turn was no more possible than your walking to the moon.

If the universe is deterministic then my choices are pre-determined and constrained, yes.

If you are going to define "choice" as you have (2 inputs with one output) then turning left instead of walking to the moon was a choice, but that is not what choice means to me

Clearly.

There must be a selection by an agent between at least two alternatives, not uniquely following a path determined years ago, before you were born

But there ARE two alternatives in the mind of the agent. The agent can model the situation and can foresee what will happen with (a) and with (b), even if the agent is operating deterministically. The choice that the agent subsequently makes may well be determined, but in my book that would simply be a “constrained choice”.

I admit I have only given partial definitions of "free will" and "real choices" by telling examples of things they are not. You have yet to do this, so until you do, stop asking me for more positive definitions

I beg your pardon? I have given VERY clear and concise definitions of both free will and choice in this thread. If we provide clear and unambiguous definitions about what these terms “mean”, then ( I hope you would agree) we should not need to explain what these terms “do not mean”.
You choose not to accept the definitions I offered (on the other hand, in your definition of choice, maybe you did not in fact “choose”?), but that does not mean that I have not defined these terms. You are the one that seems to refuse to define what you are talking about. I wonder why?

To refresh your memory, my definitions are :

free will is the ability of an agent to anticipate alternate possible outcomes dependent on alternate courses of action and to choose which course of action to follow and in so doing to behave in a manner such that the agent’s choice appears, both to itself and to an outside observer, to be reasoned but not consistently predictable (post #47)

A choice between two or more alternatives is the equivalent of simply taking two or more inputs and producing one output. (post #49)

Tell me what constitutes a "choice" in a universe where exactly everything that happens in 2008 (including your left turn) has already been decided

Read the definition above. The difference between us is that you seem to assume that “choice” necessarily implies “unconstrained choice”, whereas I do not.

..."Free will" is a very real feeling that we do have, and when we understand precisely what this "free will" is in the way I have described above, then we can clearly see that "free will" is very real, and we are justified in believing that we act with "free will", even in a deterministic universe...

I think I understand your position, but it is one i would call an illusion of free will.

And that is exactly what I predicted – that many people would prefer to call this an "illusion".
But free will as I have defined it here is 100% compatible with determinism, hence is not an illusion, even in a deterministic universe.
I do not accept that you can make the conclusion that free will is an illusion, unless and until you provide an alternative definition of free will (which you seem reluctant to do) which can be shown to be incompatible with determinism – hence your conclusion is invalid.

You seem to be claiming that the internalized factors that compelled (determined) you to make a left turn in 2008 would be your "free will" at the time when you "decided" to make the left turn

No. I am claiming that anyone who defines free will as I have done above is correct in believing that they act with free will. You seem to have a different definition of free will, but as long as you insist on keeping the definition “secret” then (with respect) it is irrelevant whether you think free will is an illusion or not.
What you are in effect saying is that “something that I cannot/will not define, is an illusion”, which is pretty meaningless really, don’t you agree?

I claim that you as a physical body governed by the laws of nature in a completely deterministic universe, only think you are making a choice

We are going round in circles, aren’t we. Depends on one’s definition of choice, and you clearly believe that choice implies unconstrained choice, whereas I do not. Period.

In fact that left turn was determined before you were born

If the universe is deterministic, yes I agree.

We can agree to let me refer to this as inevitable act, producing what I call the "illusion of choice" and let you call it "a choice" because some of the deterministic factors which produced this act were "internalized" to use your term.

I would prefer to say that it is a constrained choice; or that in a deterministic universe, we cannot make unconstrained choices.

I.e. I am willing to drop the discussion if you like, but I would add your "already determined free will future acts" to the list of things I have already given as not "genuine free will." Except for this negative list, I admit I have difficulty defining what "genuine free will" is.

If you do not accept the definition of free will that I have provided already some time ago, then with respect I don’t think we can make any further progress in this debate unless and until you provide an alternative definition of free will that you are happy with.

The thing that makes the exchange with Moving Finger interesting is that he is:
(1) well informed, logical etc. and
(2) is claiming that the universe is deterministic (although at times his seems not so sure about this at the quantum level).

Why, thank you!
Just to clarify this – I am intuitively inclined to believe that the universe is 100% deterministic even at a quantum level, however my scientific training tells me to remain open-minded on this, because it has not been proven that QM is either deterministic or indeterministic (even though the Schroedinger equation is 100% deterministic in configuration space). This is why I very often preface my arguments with “if the universe is 100% deterministic”.

However, IF QM is indeterministic (ie random) then I still do not see how this can be a source of the naïve type of free will that most people seem to want to have (but cannot define).

BTW - his "handel" is well chosen - from the Rubiant (Fitzgerald's second translation if memory serves be correctly) "The moving finger writes and having writ, moves on. / Not all you piety nor wit, can lure it back to cancel half a line of it." (Not exact also from memory.) It is my second most favorite poem. filled with determinism.

Well done! Except that it says NOTHING of determinism, but everything about the impossibility of changing the past

The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
The Rubôayôat of Omar Khayyôam, translated by Edward Fitzgerald (1953)

MF

 

[moving finger]

My favorite poem is "Invictus," which has just the opposite idea, concluding with: I am the captain of my ship, I am the master of my soul. (no quotes this time as from memory that is rough version.)

It matters not how strait the gate,
How charged with punishments the scroll,
I am the master of my fate:
I am the captain of my soul
William Ernest Henley. 1849–1903

Billy T, I believe it is such a shame that you cannot see how all of this is entirely compatible with determinism, as long as one accepts the definition of free will that I have given.

To understand where freedom comes from, one needs to understand that the "I" in the poem is not an infinitesimal dimensionless point in space. "I" comprises a finite volume within the deterministic universe. As such, many of the causes and effects that make the "I" what it is, the constraints of "I", are internally contained within the "I". Thus the "I" to which we refer is not simply a powerless cork bobbing on the ocean of determinism, it is a PART of that deterministic ocean, intertwined and convoluted with the causes and effects of the rest of the universe. Within the "I" there are multiple, hidden and ambiguous self-referential causal loops which (because of their self-referential nature) absolutely prohibit the possibility of determining cause and effect relationships by anyone interacting within the same universe.

Thus I believe that such an "I" is indeed the captain of it's fate, EVEN THOUGH THE FATE IS PRE-DETERMINED. I know it seems very difficult to understand, but it is understandable, as long as you realize that the "I" is part and parcel of the deterministic universe, and part and parcel of the fate it talks about.

The poem says nothing about whether "I" can unconstrainedly choose the future; ideas about "freedom of choice" are interpretations that the naive amongst us read into the poem. The processor controlling a ship's motion can still be said to be the "captain of the fate of the ship", even if the processor is acting deterministically. At the end of the day, it is the instructions from the processor which cause the ship to move in one way or another (regardless of whether these instructions are predetermined or not).

Where I believe most people (naively) go wrong is in thinking dualistically; thinking in terms of, on the one hand, an absolutely separate "I" which is not subject to physical laws, and on the other "the rest of the deterministic universe". To most people who think about this in a naive fashion, this is the only way to make sense of freedom of will within a deterministic universe. In part, I blame the traditional 3rd part objective scientific reductionist way of looking at problems.

MF

 

[Billy T]

...The ONLY way to argue uncorrelated events is to postulate EITHER the universe is not 100% deterministic, OR not all parts of the universe arose from a common source (in causal contact) in the past (or both). You cannot derive randomness in any other way, I am sorry.

I do the first alternative, but agree with you that the randomness provided by quantum mechanics, does not provide (as many quite important philosophers seem to think) anything I would call "genuine free will" - If that is the only type of free will that I can have, I hope you will welcome me into you camp, which you do state very well.

...It makes no difference whether radioactive events are influenced by external factors or not! I would hope (really) that someone with a PhD in physics could see this. The ONLY important factors are (a) is the world 100% deterministic? and (b) did everything arise from some common source in the past? If the answers to (a) and (b) are both “yes” then it necessarily follows that EVERYTHING we see is correlated with everything else, whether there is direct causal contact in the present day or not.

My answers are, no & yes. The first being less defensible than your "open mind" about determinism and QM.

...You seem not to like my definitions (which is cool), yet you do not propose alternative definitions of your own. I define choice as taking 2 or more inputs and producing 1 output. If you disagree, then please do offer (what you consider to be) a better definition.

I like yours definition but it is of "constrained choice," and too constrained for me to call "choice." It is what I would call "inevitable act," if the uncertainty of QM is only epistemic (hidden variables exist etc.), which you seem strongly inclined to. Thus I understand you, and admit that my refusal to define GFW makes it hard for you to understand/ discuss with me. (I am like the judge who refused to define pornography. He knew it when he saw it. I am in a worse position than him. - I only know what GFW is not and "inevitable acts" are in my growing list of the "its not")

...Implicit in your argument is the assumption that you are referring to “free choice” or “unconstrained choice” as opposed to “constrained choice”. In a deterministic universe, then it is a simple fact that all choices are constrained. I can still make choices in such a universe, and a computer can still make choices, it is simply the case that our choices are constrained, by determinism.

I am not sure I would accept “unconstrained choice” as GFW. Some might argue that QM uncertainty has removed the "constraints." I hope you can see why I add the "genuine" in front of FW, trying to avoid / contrast with / "QM's FW" that some accept as FW.

No, in this case I have the illusion of a free (unconstrained) choice. But I do not have the illusion of choice, I know that I choose, and I do choose. What is debatable is simply whether my choice is constrained or unconstrained...

I will grant you that as you have defined it, you do make a "choice" - even one that is "100% compatible with determinism," but I want my "choice" to be something more, which is hard to define.

...I would prefer to say that it is a constrained choice; or that in a deterministic universe, we cannot make unconstrained choices.

I would admit that even with my undefined GFW, almost all my choices are still constrained to a high degree. We really don't disagree much. You are perhaps a little more logically consistent and certainly better able to clearly state / define your position than I am.

...Why, thank you! ...Well done! Except that it says NOTHING of determinism, but everything about the impossibility of changing the past
The Moving Finger writes; and having writ,
Moves on: nor all your Piety nor Wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a Line,
Nor all your Tears wash out a Word of it.
The Rubôayôat of Omar Khayyôam, translated by Edward Fitzgerald (1953)

I agree on this being only about the past, but in your deterministic universe, as you yourself have noted, it is almost as valid to view the past as the future with time reversed {the whole "movie" is in the can - it could be played either way, but if we play it "backwards" the second law of thermodynamics (hope I got the number correct) would become "The entropy of a closed system tends to decrease." }
When I said Omar K's poem reflected determinism, I was really thinking more about the section (but remember it so poorly that I did not mention it) where he goes in the tent to decourse with the learned men, but always comes out the same door he went in.

I know a very short poem, I think we both can like:

One ship sails East, and another sails West,
with the very same winds that blow.
Tis the set of the sail, and not the gale,
which determines the way they go.

I have enjoyed our exchanges, but think we have come to the end of this subject.
Thanks for stating the poems and for expressing your view so clearly. - Wish I could do the same, but like your intuition about QM being deterministic (which I definitely do not share) I feel intuitively that there is some means in a deterministic processor (the human brain) to simulate something that is neither deterministic nor chance. - I admit there is currently no logical support for this view / hope/ intuition, but it is shared by Roger Penrose, among others. (See chapter 14 of http://www.edge.org/documents/ThirdCulture/d-Contents.html
which has a lot of other free chapters I think you will like also.

 

[moving finger]

... EITHER the universe is not 100% deterministic, OR not all parts of the universe arose from a common source (in causal contact) in the past (or both).

I do the first alternative, but agree with you that the randomness provided by quantum mechanics, does not provide (as many quite important philosophers seem to think) anything I would call "genuine free will" - If that is the only type of free will that I can have, I hope you will welcome me into you camp, which you do state very well.

I agree with you that randomness (or indeterminism) does not provide us with any source of “free will” (or genuine free will – still don’t know what that is). It does seem a very tempting “solution” to the free will problem in the face of relentless determinism, but indeterminacy provides us with no more “free will” than does tossing a quantum coin.

(a) is the world 100% deterministic? and (b) did everything arise from some common source in the past?

My answers are, no & yes. The first being less defensible than your "open mind" about determinism and QM.

OK. I agree it may be the case that the world is not 100% deterministic (but as we have agreed, this has no real bearing on the free will debate).

I also agree it is possible that not everything arose from a common source at some point in the past, in which case there may be uncorrelated events.

However I would still maintain that nobody has demonstrated either that quantum mechanics is indeterministic (only that it is indeterminable, which is not the same), and neither has it been demonstrated that there are any uncorrelated events (only that the correlations, if there, must be below the limits of detectability).

You seem not to like my definitions (which is cool), yet you do not propose alternative definitions of your own. I define choice as taking 2 or more inputs and producing 1 output. If you disagree, then please do offer (what you consider to be) a better definition.

I like yours definition but it is of "constrained choice," and too constrained for me to call "choice." It is what I would call "inevitable act," if the uncertainty of QM is only epistemic (hidden variables exist etc.), which you seem strongly inclined to.

I agree. Your “inevitable act” is essentially the same as my “constrained choice” (and I guess an “evitable act” would be an “unconstrained choice”).

Thus I understand you, and admit that my refusal to define GFW makes it hard for you to understand/ discuss with me. (I am like the judge who refused to define pornography. He knew it when he saw it. I am in a worse position than him. - I only know what GFW is not and "inevitable acts" are in my growing list of the "its not").

If I may (and I apologise in advance if I am mistaken), I suspect I know why you do not want to define what you call GFW – and it is for the same reason that Penrose often does not like defining the things that he discusses in his books. Penrose argues that it is not wise to attempt to propose a definition of things that we poorly understand (in this particular case he is talking about consciousness, but in the same book he also debates the meaning of free will but omits to define it). Penrose instead suggests that we rely “on our subjective impressions and intuitive common-sense as to what the term means”. And I think this is EXACTLY the same sort of woolly thinking that many “philosophers” indulge in when they discuss free will.
I should point out that Penrose is a mathematician and not a scientist, so perhaps he can be excused for his rather vague and woolly thinking on philosophical and scientific matters. My view is entirely the opposite. It is precisely because we do not fully understand something that we must define it rigorously and unambiguously to begin with, before we can start to debate it. There is a very real danger that reliance on “our subjective impressions and intuitive common-sense” will lead us into blind alleys and self-deluding false trails, because there is no guarantee that either our subjective impressions or our intuitive common-sense are either consistent or correct. Our subjectivity and our common-sense have evolved to solve everyday problems relating to survival and reproduction, not to solve deep philosophical questions of the mind. Frankly, I am amazed that a distinguished mathematician such as Penrose can hold such irrational views.

I am not sure I would accept “unconstrained choice” as GFW.

and I am not sure we can usefully debate GFW unless and until you define what you mean by GFW.

Some might argue that QM uncertainty has removed the "constraints." I hope you can see why I add the "genuine" in front of FW, trying to avoid / contrast with / "QM's FW" that some accept as FW.

Not really, at least not until you define what GFW means.

No, in this case I have the illusion of a free (unconstrained) choice. But I do not have the illusion of choice, I know that I choose, and I do choose. What is debatable is simply whether my choice is constrained or unconstrained... .

I will grant you that as you have defined it, you do make a "choice" - even one that is "100% compatible with determinism," but I want my "choice" to be something more, which is hard to define.

Hard to define, or impossible to define?
If the former, then let’s continue to try and define it.
If the latter, then GFW is a will-o-the-wisp.
I guess you want some kind of unconstrained (but NOT random or indeterministic) choice?

I would admit that even with my undefined GFW, almost all my choices are still constrained to a high degree.

I don’t know, because I don’t know what you mean by GFW.

We really don't disagree much. You are perhaps a little more logically consistent and certainly better able to clearly state / define your position than I am.

I would like to explore a little more what we mean by an “unconstrained choice”, and how it is essentially different from a “constrained choice”, and why this would matter (if at all) to a finite “I” which exists within (and not separate from) a deterministic universe.

I agree on this being only about the past, but in your deterministic universe.

Not mine. Though I am intuitively inclined to believing the universe is deterministic, if pushed into a corner I would fall back on my scientific training which tells me to remain open-minded on this question, since we simply do not know. Belief in determinism (or indeterminism) is (I think) a matter of faith rather than science.

as you yourself have noted, it is almost as valid to view the past as the future with time reversed {the whole "movie" is in the can - it could be played either way, but if we play it "backwards" the second law of thermodynamics (hope I got the number correct) would become "The entropy of a closed system tends to decrease." }.

This is another tricky question – the direction of the arrow of time. If the universe is 100% deterministic and if time is symmetric (as it appears to be at the quantum level) then why is time asymmetric at the macro level?

When I said Omar K's poem reflected determinism, I was really thinking more about the section (but remember it so poorly that I did not mention it) where he goes in the tent to decourse with the learned men, but always comes out the same door he went in.

Ahhh, ok. Apologies.

I know a very short poem, I think we both can like:

One ship sails East, and another sails West,
with the very same winds that blow.
Tis the set of the sail, and not the gale,
which determines the way they go.

Yes, I like that one!
To me it evokes exactly what we mean by free will in humans! Each human has a “set of the sails” internally within himself/herself, and it is this set of the sails which determines their actions. I would say that “the set of the sails” is in itself determined (but we cannot trace the source of this determinism), whereas believers in GFW (whatever that is) would presumably say that the “set of the sails” is somehow not determined (but also not random!).

I have enjoyed our exchanges, but think we have come to the end of this subject.

I have enjoyed it also, but (with respect) we still have much to discuss – I still don’t know what you mean by GFW!

I feel intuitively that there is some means in a deterministic processor (the human brain) to simulate something that is neither deterministic nor chance. - I admit there is currently no logical support for this view / hope/ intuition, but it is shared by Roger Penrose, among others. (See chapter 14 of http://www.edge.org/documents/Third...d-Contents.html .

Yep, I have read a lot of Penrose. I respect him as a mathematician, but I’m afraid he is not a terribly good philosopher, see my above comments on his ideas. And he also doesn’t like defining things that he doesn’t understand.

Take care, Billy T. If you find what you are looking for (but I doubt you will) please let me know.

May your god go with you,

MF

 

[Billy T]

...I would like to explore a little more what we mean by an “unconstrained choice”, and how it is essentially different from a “constrained choice”, and why this would matter (if at all) to a finite “I” which exists within (and not separate from) a deterministic universe.

Several times you have stated that "I", the maker of choices, is finite and/or that the unknown, but deterministic factors, making the choice are internal in contrast to external ones. Even more frequently you have asked for a definition of GFW.

I am going to attempt to at least partially define GFW by stealing from you. GFW is the same as your choice, except that the "I" making the choice is not "finite" (nor infinite); however, "I" does not exist outside of space/time or precede space/time or succeed space/time as some religions teach. This choice making "I" is an information process, not a finite volume of biological material. (As stated more fully in attachment to first post of this thread.)

Like your internalized factors that constitute "you," my informational "I" has memory, ideas (biases), preferences, etc. which if more fully understood would make most of the choices predictable with high probably of being correct. Clearly, as I think we both agree, the finite material "you" can make only constrained choices because all these choices result from physical processes, but an informational (only) "I" would not necessarily be constrained by physical laws. - This assertion seems both obvious and highly questionable.

"Obvious" in that if "I" is only part of a simulation of the physical world that is clearly incomplete (For example, "I" is totally unaware of the EM waves surrounding the physical body in which this simulation is executing.) That is, the "I" is not perceiving everything that exists in the physical world. Likewise, "I" may perceive things that do not exist, and be strongly influenced by them.

This is because the "I" is not living in the physical world, but in a world that is constructed in a physical world simulation of itself, (which evolutionary selection has caused to be reasonable accurate in all factors likely to affect the survival of the simulation machine). Consequently, the "I" may live in a world that is not deterministic even if the physical world is deterministic. Obviously, if the "I" lives in a non deterministic world, then the "I" also could be non deterministic. (Sharp as you are, you will no doubt note that my "non" etc. is still just more of my old telling what GFW is not, but keep reading I do try to be more positive.)

It is a "highly questionable" assertion because there seems to be no middle ground between "deterministic" and "random" and we both agree "random" is not a source of any form of FW - only a guarantee that the indeterminate nature of reality is fundamental, not just epistemological.

My fundamental problem is in trying to define this MG, "Middle Ground." Every computer simulation program I know of is completely deterministic, even the random number generator is at best tied to the time it is activated etc. (I don't know much about computer programs - just guessing.)

I am sure that I can not have my GFW in any system of physical processes, yet I want it and do seem to experience it, but admit (as I do in the attachment to first post) that this may be only illusion. (To bad the MG company just went bankrupt - not a good omen for my view! ) Thus the only hope is if "I" is part of a non deterministic / non random simulation, built in part on this MG.

I once asked you if you would welcome me into your camp, if the only FW I could have was the one built on the indeterminism of quantum mechanics. I am coming to join you in part because I now believe choice is well defined by the selection of one act after consideration of the consequence of alternatives that at least appear possible to the "I". The choice is "genuine" if at least two of the alternatives were possible, not just the one inevitable act was possible. (We both agree that there is no FW in a deterministic world, but I have already granted that as you define it, you do make a choice, even in a deterministic world.) Making such a "genuine choice" is the exercise of GFW and its definition, although it is like giving a definition of a unicorn - no evidence of the existence of GFW until at least one GFW choice can be demonstrated.

Because of my ignorance, I can only postulate that the "necessary for GFW existence" MG is possible. Fortunately for me, it will be very hard for you to show it is not. (I share this "asset" with those who postulate a "soul".) Perhaps it is only in this domain of unresolvable believes that genuine choice occurs.

Perhaps also we are at a stand off. - You lean towards determinism, even in QM, but can't prove it, so you like to say: "No one has shown that QM is not deterministic" (throwing the essentially impossible burden of proof on others).
I lean towards GFW, but can't prove it. I say: "No one has shown that a MG is impossible (to my knowledge) and thus I throw the burden of proof on to others. If my hunch is correct, your's is wrong. If your hunch is correct, mine is wrong. Neither of us (as I see it) can demonstrate our position to be correct. I.e. we are at a stand off. Would you agree?

...This is another tricky question – the direction of the arrow of time. If the universe is 100% deterministic and if time is symmetric (as it appears to be at the quantum level) then why is time asymmetric at the macro level?

I don't think the second law implies that time is "asymmetric" in a deterministic world either and think I have some understanding as to why it would appear to be that may help you. I think it has to do with the way humans tend to group (equally?) probable events into categories and then note the probability of these categories.

In other threads I have illustrated this in two different ways (One had to do with shaking a box containing 100 white and 100 black marbles that holds exactly 100 on each level (Shaking is of steadily decreasing amplitude so only levels one and two are populated with marbles when the box cover is removed.) We are surprized to open the box and find all the white marbles on top level, but this configuration is just as probable as any other, most of which would not surprize us. The other example was when I was trying to discourage my wife for playing the far from zero sum state lottery. The only bet I ever made on the six required numbers was: 1,2,3,4,5,6. She said: "That number will never win. - You are being silly." - She was correct, at least in the second statement. - She still enjoys playing the lottery, carefully choosing her numbers, including current birthdays etc.

That is, I think the increase of entropy with time is the way humans establish the collections of possible events into categories, more than anything else.

...Take care, Billy T. If you find what you are looking for (but I doubt you will) please let me know. May your god go with you, MF

thanks. If I do, I will (assuming I have not been baned from posting here). I don't think much about God anymore. He is on my list of things that are too likely to be beyond rational consideration. If he exists, I suspect however, that it is I who must go with him, rather than the way you put it.

PS - As I look back at your post, I realize I did not comment on "why it would matter" - I don't think it does if "you" are a finite collection of biological material as you seem to think you are. It is not very important even if "I" am my MG simulation because GFW is seldom exercised, even if it exists, and very rarely, if at all, in daily decisions of behavior in the physical world. Perhaps only in which set of "hunches" / beliefs we chose to believe in, when the alternatives are not excluded from the realm of possibility by logic. (I am not as logical as you, but much more that many others, who perhaps make greater use of their GFW, if it exists.)

 

[moving finger]

Several times you have stated that "I", the maker of choices, is finite and/or that the unknown, but deterministic factors, making the choice are internal in contrast to external ones. Even more frequently you have asked for a definition of GFW.

I am going to attempt to at least partially define GFW by stealing from you.

That’s cool. Knowledge should be shared and built upon.

Like your internalized factors that constitute "you," my informational "I" has memory, ideas (biases), preferences, etc. which if more fully understood would make most of the choices predictable with high probably of being correct. Clearly, as I think we both agree, the finite material "you" can make only constrained choices because all these choices result from physical processes, but an informational (only) "I" would not necessarily be constrained by physical laws. - This assertion seems both obvious and highly questionable.

I would say that such an informational “I” is still constrained by deterministic laws – the laws relating to whatever medium in/on which the information processing is supposed to be taking place. Either this, or it is operating partly or wholly “indeterministically” – but I can assure you that you do not want to go there (but if you do want to go there I will gladly follow, and show you why indeterminism cannot endow the kind of free will you want).
And (unless you can explain how something can be neither determinsitic nor indeterministic) I think we are stuck between the two horns of this dilemma.

"Obvious" in that if "I" is only part of a simulation of the physical world that is clearly incomplete (For example, "I" is totally unaware of the EM waves surrounding the physical body in which this simulation is executing.) That is, the "I" is not perceiving everything that exists in the physical world. Likewise, "I" may perceive things that do not exist, and be strongly influenced by them.

Its not clear to me how anything can “perceive things that do not exist” (unless you mean it is having a delusion) – can you elaborate please?

This is because the "I" is not living in the physical world, but in a world that is constructed in a physical world simulation of itself, (which evolutionary selection has caused to be reasonable accurate in all factors likely to affect the survival of the simulation machine). Consequently, the "I" may live in a world that is not deterministic even if the physical world is deterministic.

We have the same problem again. I am not insisting that the world (even the physical world) is deterministic (though that is my intuition), but what I am saying is that your only alternative to determinism is indeterminism, and I do not see how indeterminism can have anything to do with free will.

Obviously, if the "I" lives in a non deterministic world, then the "I" also could be non deterministic. (Sharp as you are, you will no doubt note that my "non" etc. is still just more of my old telling what GFW is not, but keep reading I do try to be more positive.)

By “non-deterministic”, do you mean indeterminsitic?
If not, what do you mean?

It is a "highly questionable" assertion because there seems to be no middle ground between "deterministic" and "random" and we both agree "random" is not a source of any form of FW - only a guarantee that the indeterminate nature of reality is fundamental, not just epistemological.

Hey, we think alike!
So we are rather stuck with this problem – you want to define “non-deterministic” as being neither deterministic nor indeterministic (random). Good luck!

My fundamental problem is in trying to define this MG, "Middle Ground." Every computer simulation program I know of is completely deterministic, even the random number generator is at best tied to the time it is activated etc. (I don't know much about computer programs - just guessing.)

Yep, you are right. It is possible to make a hardwired RNG, and whether this is ultimately deterministic or not then depends on whether one believes QM is indeterministic, or simply indeterminable.

I am sure that I can not have my GFW in any system of physical processes, yet I want it and do seem to experience it, but admit (as I do in the attachment to first post) that this may be only illusion.

Most people’s feeling of free will is born of intuition – the intuition that there is “me”, and there is “the rest of the universe”, and that somehow “me” can operate (make choices) according to “my” own rules, independently of the rest of the universe. It is turning this intuition into a logical and coherent understanding of what is actually going on that is the tricky part.

(To bad the MG company just went bankrupt - not a good omen for my view! ) Thus the only hope is if "I" is part of a non deterministic / non random simulation, built in part on this MG.

I once asked you if you would welcome me into your camp, if the only FW I could have was the one built on the indeterminism of quantum mechanics.

QM may be indeterministic, but I don’t think this has any bearing on free will.

I am coming to join you in part because I now believe choice is well defined by the selection of one act after consideration of the consequence of alternatives that at least appear possible to the "I".

I agree 100%.

The choice is "genuine" if at least two of the alternatives were possible, not just the one inevitable act was possible.

Ahhhh, now this is the tricky part. Are you saying “in order for me to have free will, it must have been possible for me, in exactly the same circumstances, to have done otherwise than what I actually did”?

If you are saying this is how you define free will, then we have a problem, because such aview is clearly not compatible with determinism. Hence most people who believe in this kind of free will try to invoke some kind of indeterminism in their choices in order to be able to say “I could have done otherwise”. I agree that indeterminism means that “things could have turned out differently”, but I do NOT agree that indeterminsim endows free will (and I have yet to see anyone show how it can endow free will). All indeterminism does is to make our choices indeterminate, not to make them free.

(We both agree that there is no FW in a deterministic world,

Sorry? I do not agree. It depends on how one defines free will.

but I have already granted that as you define it, you do make a choice, even in a deterministic world.)

Yep.

Making such a "genuine choice" is the exercise of GFW and its definition, although it is like giving a definition of a unicorn - no evidence of the existence of GFW until at least one GFW choice can be demonstrated.

If you wish to define your GFW in terms of “the ability to have done otherwise” then I am afraid that you will find your GFW is impossible (or a best it results in random choices, not in free will choices). Unless you can work out what this MG is.

Because of my ignorance, I can only postulate that the "necessary for GFW existence" MG is possible. Fortunately for me, it will be very hard for you to show it is not. (I share this "asset" with those who postulate a "soul".) Perhaps it is only in this domain of unresolvable believes that genuine choice occurs.

I cannot show anything about GFW until you define GFW and its associated MG, that is what I have been trying to explain. As long as you keep the definition a secret then it is rather pointless for me to try and show that GFW is either possible or impossible, n’est ce pas?

To try to suggest that the solution is to be found in defining something like your MG, which you agree you have no idea how it might work, how it would be related to determinism or indeterminism, etc, is equivalent to me saying “ahhh, well, I have no idea how free will works, but intuitively it feels right therefore if I cannot explain it, maybe it’s just that a miracle happens, or maybe it’s the fairies at the bottom of my garden that do it for me”…… I’m sorry, I’m trying not to make fun, but I do want you to see that you need to be rational in proposing a solution. Suggesting that there is something called a MG which is neither determinism nor indeterminism, and yet you cannot say what it is, is rather like hoping for a magic potion.

Perhaps also we are at a stand off. - You lean towards determinism, even in QM, but can't prove it, so you like to say: "No one has shown that QM is not deterministic" (throwing the essentially impossible burden of proof on others).

Where free will is concerned, I think the question of whether the world is deterministic or not is irrelevant. Invoking indeterminism does not endow free will, thus defining free will in terms of indeterminism does not work. Whether the quantum world is determinsitic or not does not affect my arguments.

I lean towards GFW, but can't prove it.

I disagree. You cannot DEFINE it (along with MG). Until you define it, neither you nor I can either prove or disprove it.

I say: "No one has shown that a MG is impossible (to my knowledge) and thus I throw the burden of proof on to others. If my hunch is correct, your's is wrong. If your hunch is correct, mine is wrong. Neither of us (as I see it) can demonstrate our position to be correct. I.e. we are at a stand off. Would you agree?

Not really. If your position is that you postulate this MG as the source of free will, the onus is on you to explain how it fits with the rest of the world. If you cannot do that, it’s not a terribly useful or credible proposal (about as useful as me saying free will is granted to me by the tooth fairy).

...Take care, Billy T. If you find what you are looking for (but I doubt you will) please let me know. May your god go with you, MF

thanks. If I do, I will (assuming I have not been baned from posting here). I don't think much about God anymore. He is on my list of things that are too likely to be beyond rational consideration. If he exists, I suspect however, that it is I who must go with him, rather than the way you put it.

I put it that way deliberately, because IMHO most people carry their gods around with them.

MF

 

[Billy T]

You are too good for me, MF. I can't argue with you in your logical fashion. I am reduced to either completely joining you with your definition of FW (and of choosing) which are compatible with determinism or trying to breath life into my "tooth fairy" of a middle ground, MG, between determinism and randomness.

I will try to define this MG, but fear it a not very successful effort: It (MG) is the realm (which you no doubt will claim is of zero measure, non existent) of logical space not contained in either the realm of deterministic logic nor the realm of randomness (indeterminant logic?). I had not noticed that I was avoiding "indeterminant" by using "non determinant", but would like to continue and maintain that they are not identical, but again I can not satisfy you with a precise discription of how they differ. I fear that you have backed me into a small space, which I concede may not even exist with only the weak claim remaining to me that you can not show it does not exist, just as you can not show the tooth fairy does not exist.

I am not even tempted to mutter some words about "fuzzy logic" as surely all implementations of it are deterministic, certainly if they make use of common computer codes for generation of random numbers and even if they make use of what you called "hard wired" random sources, if the world is deterministic.

I don't think you are as generous with me as I have been with you. I grant you many different possibilities (Most important being that the universe may be deterministic as you think, and if it is, then we agree there is only "choice" as you define it. I grant this "universe may be deterministic" possibility because I can not show it is not true. Why will you not grant me possibility of some non zero realm for the MG, again for same reason I granted to you possibility of a deterministic universe, because you can not (I assume) show that it a space of zero measure.

I know, before you tell me, that there is a big difference. - You can define what I am granting and I can not define MG on which I tried to define my GFW. Thus I will not ask for this grant exactly in that form. Instead I ask, in fully definable terms:

Can you demonstrate that "determinism" and "randomness" are not only mutually exclusive, as any reasonable definitions of them would insure, but also that together (jointly) they are inclusive of all logically possible space / events?

 

[moving finger]

You are too good for me, MF. I can't argue with you in your logical fashion. I am reduced to either completely joining you with your definition of FW (and of choosing) which are compatible with determinism or trying to breath life into my "tooth fairy" of a middle ground, MG, between determinism and randomness.

I will try to define this MG, but fear it a not very successful effort: It (MG) is the realm (which you no doubt will claim is of zero measure, non existent) of logical space not contained in either the realm of deterministic logic nor the realm of randomness (indeterminant logic?). I had not noticed that I was avoiding "indeterminant" by using "non determinant", but would like to continue and maintain that they are not identical, but again I can not satisfy you with a precise discription of how they differ. I fear that you have backed me into a small space, which I concede may not even exist with only the weak claim remaining to me that you can not show it does not exist, just as you can not show the tooth fairy does not exist.

Billy T, I have a lot of respect for your position. It shows how open-minded and receptive you are that you accept your MG may not have much meaning. I agree with the above.

I am not even tempted to mutter some words about "fuzzy logic" as surely all implementations of it are deterministic, certainly if they make use of common computer codes for generation of random numbers and even if they make use of what you called "hard wired" random sources, if the world is deterministic.

And as I have said, even invoking indeterminism (IMHO) does not help. The kind of free will that most people want (what I actually call naive free will, because it tends to be based on intuition rather than any rational argument) is (IMHO) impossible. Naive free will is incompatible with determinism, and yet it also does not find its roots in indeterminism. It requires something like your MG. I wish that I could offer a more constructive solution - but I am afraid that such naive free will simply does not exist.

I don't think you are as generous with me as I have been with you. I grant you many different possibilities (Most important being that the universe may be deterministic as you think, and if it is, then we agree there is only "choice" as you define it. I grant this "universe may be deterministic" possibility because I can not show it is not true.

Sorry, Billy T, but I am not insisting the universe be deterministic (I thought I explained that in my last post?). My concept of free will does not require determinism, neither does it require indeterminism. Thus as far as free will is concerned I am not too bothered whether the universe is deterministic or not (though as I have said, my intuition is for determinism).

Why will you not grant me possibility of some non zero realm for the MG, again for same reason I granted to you possibility of a deterministic universe, because you can not (I assume) show that it a space of zero measure.

Billy T, I am not saying that this MG does not exist. I am also not saying the tooth fairy does not exist. What I am saying is that if you want anyone to take the idea seriously you need to come up with some idea of how it works, how it relates to the rest of reality. I can't really help you there (partly because I am happy with my own concept of free will, which does not require MG).

I know, before you tell me, that there is a big difference. - You can define what I am granting and I can not define MG on which I tried to define my GFW. Thus I will not ask for this grant exactly in that form. Instead I ask, in fully definable terms:

Can you demonstrate that "determinism" and "randomness" are not only mutually exclusive, as any reasonable definitions of them would insure, but also that together (jointly) they are inclusive of all logically possible space / events?

I need to think about this. It's a good question!

I'll get back to you,

MF

 

[Billy T]

Billy T, I have a lot of respect for your position. ...

It is mutual. Perhaps because we agree on several aspects of this problem. You are 100% correct, safe, and happy in you position and I am not. You liked my poem about what determines the course of sailing ships. So I will put it in nautical terms (which I hope you know):
I think we both are quite familiar with the "storms" common in this "sea" and, although not moving on parallel "courses", have somewhat similar ones. With your definitions, you are very secure on a "broad reach" and in no danger of loosing your "way". With my GFW and MG, I have my sails set "tighter to the wind", in a more ambitious "tack", but I am in real danger of "luffing" and losing my "way".

And as I have said, even invoking indeterminism (IMHO) does not help. The kind of free will that most people want (what I actually call naive free will, because it tends to be based on intuition rather than any rational argument) is (IMHO) impossible. Naive free will is incompatible with determinism, and yet it also does not find its roots in indeterminism. It requires something like your MG. I wish that I could offer a more constructive solution - but I am afraid that such naive free will simply does not exist.

We agree completely here. I go even further. Even with the indeterminism of quantum mechanics, the "free will" possible is not worth having. I prefer yours. That is why I have asked you to "welcome me into your camp" if you can show that my essential MG does not exist.

Sorry, Billy T, but I am not insisting the universe be deterministic...

I know that. - That is why I only granted that it may exist as it has not been proven (as you like to point out) that QM's indeterminate nature is not just epistemic. I think if you reread my comments you will see that I have never said you believe in a deterministic universe, only that your lean towards that view.

I have been so impressed with the success of QM and tend naturally in most cases (GFW excepted ) to give little ontological status to variables that are not necessary (Hidden or otherwise). I think you have read first post of my only other thread: Time does not exist - math proof, but want to note here, as I have several times elsewhere, that the math proof only shows that the variable "t" is not required for a complete description of the universe. Thus unlike you, I believe QM is correct and tend to go along with the Copenhagen school, but I do not like the fact that "observations" are some how an ad hoc addition to the QM theory. I also have spoken up against "feel good words" and offended and annoyed some by doing so. - I must just be by nature a guy who is hard to please.

Billy T, I am not saying that this MG does not exist. I am also not saying the tooth fairy does not exist. What I am saying is that if you want anyone to take the idea seriously you need to come up with some idea of how it works, how it relates to the rest of reality. I can't really help you there (partly because I am happy with my own concept of free will, which does not require MG).

I can't help me either. Possibly because my MG does not in fact exist, but I prefer to think that it is a combination of my ignorance and lack of cleverness that is restraining me for arguing my hope more persuasively.
On the question of being taken seriously about my view that the possibly of my GFW (still not well defined, but more desirable to me than yours which is) is open, I don't really care. It was an unexpected possibility that fell out of my revision of what we are and how we perceive. I would like my view of perception, which differs from the one generally accepted by cognitive scientists, to be taken seriously. That is why I devised three separate "proofs" that the conventional view of perception "emerging" after many stages of neural transforms is wrong. I notice that you are active in the thread about Libet's experiments - I have read many of his papers, but that was about a dozen years ago. Based on some of his methods, I have even designed a non invasive experiment that can test a prediction of my theory. (I lack the commuter skills to implement it.)

This is not the place to go into details, but it involves a dot of light steadily moving against a background grid and a brief random sound. The subject indicates by moving a marker (all this in a computer display) where the dot was when the sound was perceived. (The grid helps him to be accurate and makes the time required to mark it unimportant.) I predict that his perception of the dot is "real time", not delayed by neural processing, but obviously the new sound will be. Hence, the indicated position will have the dot farther along than it actually was when the sound occurred. (I am trying to show that, as claimed in the attachment to first post, that humans do not perceive the emergent result sensor transforms, but do use the senses to construct a "real time simulation" which they perceive instead and correct to conform to external reality when necessary. If "I" am also only a subroutine in this simulation, (and my postulated MG is real) then I can have my GFW as "I" am only constrained by the simulation, not the laws of physics, which only apply to material objects, energy etc., not information in the abstract. Libet often used a similar approach and I have borrowed from it.

I need to think about this. It's a good question! I'll get back to you, MF

I hope you will (and fail to bar my MG) At least you have taught me how necessary to have well defined and mutually accepted definitions if one is really going to be convincing. Few here are as careful or logical as you, me included. If you can bar my MG, I will change my concept of free will to yours and try to be happy with it.

 

[Billy T]

...Sorry, Billy T, but I am not insisting the universe be deterministic ...

woops - I did literally accuse you of this: My "...grant that the universe may be deterministic as you believe" I fail to type at end : "it may be." Sorry I did not make this implied phrase explicit. I have on several occasions indicated that you were "open minded" and that you were "leaning towards" a deterministic QM (an certainly a capable and stanch defender of this possibility. Einstein would be proud of you.

I can now see how my omission of these last three implied words, required you to state you did not believe or assume a deterministic universe.

 

[moving finger]

I have been so impressed with the success of QM and tend naturally in most cases (GFW excepted ) to give little ontological status to variables that are not necessary (Hidden or otherwise). I think you have read first post of my only other thread: Time does not exist - math proof, but want to note here, as I have several times elsewhere, that the math proof only shows that the variable "t" is not required for a complete description of the universe. Thus unlike you, I believe QM is correct and tend to go along with the Copenhagen school, but I do not like the fact that "observations" are some how an ad hoc addition to the QM theory.

The Copenhagen school is fine for making predictions, but IMHO it does not provide a very satisfying account of what is actually going on (Bohr would say we have no right to ask what is actually going on). Neither Einstein nor Schroedinger were happy with the consequences of Copenhagen : The ugly “wave/particle duality” and “collapse of the wavefunction”.

I also have spoken up against "feel good words" and offended and annoyed some by doing so. - I must just be by nature a guy who is hard to please.

I also dislike “feel good words”, which is why I am such a stickler for rational argument and rigorous definitions of terms. I know this does sometimes offend people, but I make no apologies, because I feel sorry for the kind of people who submit irrational posts based on gut feelings and intuition.

I can't help me either. Possibly because my MG does not in fact exist, but I prefer to think that it is a combination of my ignorance and lack of cleverness that is restraining me for arguing my hope more persuasively.
On the question of being taken seriously about my view that the possibly of my GFW (still not well defined, but more desirable to me than yours which is) is open, I don't really care.

With respect, I do not see how can one be content with an undefined concept?
The Libertarian concept of free will seems (IMHO) to suffer from the same problem – Libertarians like to think there is “something” which somehow endows free will onto humans, but cannot define or specify exactly what this “something” is.

This is not the place to go into details, but it involves a dot of light steadily moving against a background grid and a brief random sound. The subject indicates by moving a marker (all this in a computer display) where the dot was when the sound was perceived. (The grid helps him to be accurate and makes the time required to mark it unimportant.) I predict that his perception of the dot is "real time", not delayed by neural processing, but obviously the new sound will be. Hence, the indicated position will have the dot farther along than it actually was when the sound occurred. (I am trying to show that, as claimed in the attachment to first post, that humans do not perceive the emergent result sensor transforms, but do use the senses to construct a "real time simulation" which they perceive instead and correct to conform to external reality when necessary. If "I" am also only a subroutine in this simulation, (and my postulated MG is real) then I can have my GFW as "I" am only constrained by the simulation, not the laws of physics, which only apply to material objects, energy etc., not information in the abstract. Libet often used a similar approach and I have borrowed from it.

I don’t understand this at all. I need to study your ideas again I think. Or can you e-mail me the details?
I’ve been mulling over your “MG” the last few days. If I take the accepted definition of determinism (this defines the “deterministic space”), and I then take the negation of determinism – which to me seems to be “indeterminism” – which defines the “indeterministic space”, then the problem I have is there seems to be “no space left over” – ie there seems (to me) to be nothing left which is neither deterministic nor indeterministic, there is no “room” for this middle ground.

Definition of Determinism : The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving deterministically if it has only one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature.
Definition of Indeterminism : The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving indeterministically if there is more than one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature.

Do we accept the above two definitions? If yes, then they seem to be perfect “mirrors” of each other, defining the whole space of possibilities, with no space “left over” for anything else to get a toe-hold?

If we could somehow define the “properties" of this middle ground, we might be able to specify where it fits in relation to determinism and indeterminism. In the absence of a definition of middle ground I simply cannot see how it fits in.
MF

 

[Billy T]

The Copenhagen school is fine for making predictions, but IMHO it does not provide a very satisfying account of what is actually going on (Bohr would say we have no right to ask what is actually going on). Neither Einstein nor Schroedinger were happy with the consequences of Copenhagen : The ugly “wave/particle duality” and “collapse of the wavefunction”.

I agree with you, Einstein, Bohr & Schroedinger - i.e. QM is good for predicting experimental results (when the math can be solved) but what, if anything, it is stating about "reality" is very likely beyond human comprehension (too strange for us who have basically experienced only a classical world).

I also dislike “feel good words”, which is why I am such a stickler for rational argument and rigorous definitions of terms.

I think the "feel good words" can be defined as: Accepted "explanations" that are in fact false. Transformer secondary current being caused by magnetic field lines cutting thru it is the best classical example of "feel good words" I know of.
At the other extreme, where your ideas are usually found, at least those I have read here, is based on solid definitions and logical consequences.
Humans also have feeling, intuitions, emotions, hopes, etc. which are essentially impossible to define. My GFW & MG fall into this group.

...I don’t understand this {an experiment I proposed to test my conclusion that perception is not the result of many stages of neural transformations of sensory data, as cognitive scientists believe, but a real time simulation of the physical world} all. I need to study your ideas again I think. Or can you e-mail me the details?

Try study of attachment "free will - out of Africa." Ask questions about any parts of it you don't understand or disagree with.

I’ve been mulling over your “MG” ... Definition of Indeterminism : The universe, or any self-contained part thereof, is said to be evolving indeterministically if there is more than one possible state at time t1 which is consistent with its state at some previous time t0 and with all the laws of nature.
Do we accept the above two definitions? If yes, then they seem to be perfect “mirrors” of each other, defining the whole space of possibilities, with no space “left over” for anything else to get a toe-hold?...

I will accept your definitions, provided you allow the possibility that one can refine the definition of "indeterminism" to contain two "mirror parts" - one called "random decisions" and the other called "agent decisions." I quickly admit that this subspace called "agent decisions" has never been shown to exist (may have non zero measure) and is only defined (by being a non-random subdivision of the indeterminism space). I.e. we are not really making progress - I am just being agreeable in accepting your definitions, rather than arguing about them or offering my own. But it does show another way to frame the same old question is: Do genuine agents exist?

A main point of my attachment, is the frank admission that if the agent is material, then it is not "genuine" because all its decisions are caused by physical processes. (Part of a "genuine" agent's decisions have no causes, other than possibly self referencing loops. - Just guessing - I don't know the logic possible in my MG.)

Furthermore, I find it hard to believe that there are any significant QM processes going on in the human brain. (Some people hold hope that QM processes occur in "microtubes" / very fine "hairs" / that are attached to cells - but I am not interested in any "chance free will" made possible by QM "observations" forcing mixed state wavefunctions into Eigen states. I like your free will as developed by evolution better, so have not followed their progress on "microtubes.") That is I suspect the human brain is a deterministic computer, even if QM does not have hidden variables etc. Thus, from this and prior paragraph, if GFW is to exist, it can only exist in a non material form - either a "soul", which I don't want to turn to for my desired GFW, or in a simulation of the real world - the only world "we" actually experience and "live" in. - See attachment.

In the "Has determinism ever bothered you?" thread you say:

I agree one can separate software from hardware, but I do not agree that this is a good analogy for the concept of “self”. Let us imagine a “gedanken” experiment – Einstein’s brain. Let us imagine that some incredibly advanced alien race had managed to analyse the way that Einstein’s brain worked to the finest detail, such that they could reproduce his brain, in it’s entirety, on one of their computers as a program (in hardware plus software). ...

I anticipated this argument more than 10 years ago in paper about visual perception that had a brief philosophical speculative termination (My ideas about the possibility of GFW fell out unexpectedly from my revision of perceptual theory presented in this paper. - Ref 1 of the attachment to my first post here.)

Basically I claim that in any complex neural system, the physical connections are important but more important for thoughts are the ionic and neurotransmitter fluxes. These dynamic variables can not be recovered from a dead brain. I went so far as to postulate a "biological uncertainty principle" which basically states that the more carefully one measures the dynamic activity of a complex living brain, the more this activity is disturbed by the measurement process. I illustrated this with two types of measurement I have made on monkey.
(1)Simple EEGs make essentially no disturbance, (None directly, but he does not like being restrained for the measurement.) but provide only very gross information about brain activity (good for studies of epilepsy spreading, which is called "kindling." - Our monkey were part of an epilepsy therapy study.)
(2)In dwelling micro electrodes (very sharp chemically etched point is only part without enamel insulation) tell much more about the disturbed activity of a few dozen cells near the electrode tip.
Thus I do not believe your "thought experiment" is possible even with great advance in technology. - I believe that my "biological uncertainty principle" is true for complex brains, but admit it does not have the mathematical proof that the physical one does.

 

[moving finger]

I agree with you, Einstein, Bohr & Schroedinger - i.e. QM is good for predicting experimental results (when the math can be solved) but what, if anything, it is stating about "reality" is very likely beyond human comprehension (too strange for us who have basically experienced only a classical world).

Perhaps we need to “let go” of the classical world.

Humans also have feeling, intuitions, emotions, hopes, etc. which are essentially impossible to define. My GFW & MG fall into this group.

I have a deep suspicion of anything that is “impossible to define” – this rings warning bells in my ears (suggesting that there is something amiss……)

Try study of attachment "free will - out of Africa." Ask questions about any parts of it you don't understand or disagree with.

OK, I will. Thanks.

I will accept your definitions, provided you allow the possibility that one can refine the definition of "indeterminism" to contain two "mirror parts" - one called "random decisions" and the other called "agent decisions."

Hmmmm. Are these “agent decisions” deterministic or indeterministic? I think you see the problem……

But it does show another way to frame the same old question is: Do genuine agents exist?

What is a “genuine agent”? Is such an agent operating deterministically, or indeterministically, or “something else”? If something else, then what?

Furthermore, I find it hard to believe that there are any significant QM processes going on in the human brain. (Some people hold hope that QM processes occur in "microtubes" / very fine "hairs" / that are attached to cells - but I am not interested in any "chance free will" made possible by QM "observations" forcing mixed state wavefunctions into Eigen states.

I agree with you. Your references are (I believe) to Roger Penrose, who is a great mathematician but (forgive me) a poor scientist and poor philosopher.

I suspect the human brain is a deterministic computer, even if QM does not have hidden variables etc.

I agree

Thus, from this and prior paragraph, if GFW is to exist, it can only exist in a non material form - either a "soul", which I don't want to turn to for my desired GFW, or in a simulation of the real world - the only world "we" actually experience and "live" in. - See attachment.

Hmmmmmm.

I agree one can separate software from hardware, but I do not agree that this is a good analogy for the concept of “self”. Let us imagine a “gedanken” experiment – Einstein’s brain. Let us imagine that some incredibly advanced alien race had managed to analyse the way that Einstein’s brain worked to the finest detail, such that they could reproduce his brain, in it’s entirety, on one of their computers as a program (in hardware plus software). ...

I anticipated this argument more than 10 years ago in paper about visual perception that had a brief philosophical speculative termination (My ideas about the possibility of GFW fell out unexpectedly from my revision of perceptual theory presented in this paper. - Ref 1 of the attachment to my first post here.)

Basically I claim that in any complex neural system, the physical connections are important but more important for thoughts are the ionic and neurotransmitter fluxes. These dynamic variables can not be recovered from a dead brain.

OK, I agree. After death I agree that many of the important synaptic junctions will change. But in my “gedanken experiment” I did not specify whether the aliens analysed Eintein’s “live brain” or his “dead brain”. It is after all a gedanken experiment.

I went so far as to postulate a "biological uncertainty principle" which basically states that the more carefully one measures the dynamic activity of a complex living brain, the more this activity is disturbed by the measurement process.

Agreed this would be a limitation in practice, but I suggest not a limitation in principle?

Thus I do not believe your "thought experiment" is possible even with great advance in technology. - I believe that my "biological uncertainty principle" is true for complex brains, but admit it does not have the mathematical proof that the physical one does.

OK, I agree you may be right here. Thus in practice it may be impossible to make a “copy” of a brain. But in principle?

MF

 

[Billy T]

... Are these “agent decisions” deterministic or indeterministic? ...What is a “genuine agent”? Is such an agent operating deterministically, or indeterministically, or “something else”? If something else, then what?

By agreeing to accept your definitions of deterministic and indeterministic, I gave up the "Middle Ground" concept, or accepted that there is zero space between these two domains for MG.

Thus the "agent" is indeterministic and non-random. That is, the agent exhibits "purposeful behavior" which can not be completely predicted, because it is not deterministic. (I am not confusing predictably with indeterminate, as some do.) I am, in essence, (if I am not talking nonsense - a real possibility), trying to claim that there is some currently unknown form of logic, which can be implementable in a deterministic computation facility (complex brains only at the present level of technology) that is not deterministic and yet not entirely random.

"Fuzzy logic" is close to the idea, but not actually what I want as it is entirely repetitive if simulaneously implemented in two or more identical computers. (That is, by looking only at one computer's results, you can predict exactly what the other is producing - a form of predictability, but neither's future acts can be predicted.)

That is, I don't think all human agents fail to be identical only because the "agent logic" is running in different brains and subject to different environments. If it were possible to have cell-by-cell identical development from the moment of conception in the womb and always thereafter plus completely identical environments, I suspect that you would (at least) lean to the idea that these "more than genetically identical" twins would have the same personality, but I would not. I would think that the "agent programs" in each would make different choices, despite these identical circumstances. This is another way for me to say that "agent programs" are not just some current form of "fuzzy logic." Identical currently-known fuzzy-logic programs running simultaneously in identical brains and subjected to identical inputs, would have the same personality.

That is, the "agent logic" I postulate exists is unique, but how this is achieved may well be a random selection. Probably the general structure is universal in humans, much like N. Chompski's genetic human language facility is.

...Agreed this would be a limitation in practice, but I suggest not a limitation in principle?...OK, I agree you may be right here. Thus in practice it may be impossible to make a “copy” of a brain. But in principle? MF

Neither of us can be certain if my "biological uncertainty principle" for complex brains is "true in principle," but I would argue for this along the following lines: There is a good possibility that the human brain is a chaotic system. By that I mean that one neurotransmitter molecule attaching to the cell wall of a neuron can tip the balance and cause a "action potential" to travel down it axion. The neurotransmitters released by this impulse in several hundred other synaptic junctions, then tips the balance in some of them etc. The brain is a fantastic amplifier of small events.

For example; a single Brownian motion controlled neurotransmitter event in Einstein's brain may have made him either (1) first speculate that the velocity of light is a constant. - When he did. If he had lived, See (2), he probably would have done so soon later. or (2) alternatively make him decide he needed a break and some exercise, which could have caused him to go for a bicycle ride. (That unfortunately for physic, gets him killed by a drunk man driving his Packard car up onto the side walk.)

Almost everything important in my life has seemed to have been the result of chance, beginning with my "choice" of parents and birth country. Firestone accidently dropped some latex with sulphur in it on a hot stove. But as he, or someone else, observed: "Chance favors a prepared mind."

 

[moving finger]

Thus the "agent" is indeterministic and non-random. That is, the agent exhibits "purposeful behavior" which can not be completely predicted, because it is not deterministic. (I am not confusing predictably with indeterminate, as some do.) I am, in essence, (if I am not talking nonsense - a real possibility), trying to claim that there is some currently unknown form of logic, which can be implementable in a deterministic computation facility (complex brains only at the present level of technology) that is not deterministic and yet not entirely random.

Beats me then. I have no idea what this might be. (I don’t want to sound flippant, but there is a possibility that what you are looking for might be akin to some miraculous magic-pill which cures baldness – sounds nice, but doesn’t actually exist)

"Fuzzy logic" is close to the idea, but not actually what I want as it is entirely repetitive if simulaneously implemented in two or more identical computers. (That is, by looking only at one computer's results, you can predict exactly what the other is producing - a form of predictability, but neither's future acts can be predicted.)

Agreed – except the future acts of one could be predicted by the other?

That is, I don't think all human agents fail to be identical only because the "agent logic" is running in different brains and subject to different environments.

Hmmmm. I do.

If it were possible to have cell-by-cell identical development from the moment of conception in the womb and always thereafter plus completely identical environments, I suspect that you would (at least) lean to the idea that these "more than genetically identical" twins would have the same personality, but I would not.

Although one might guarantee identical “nature” (ie genes), in practice it would be impossible to guarantee the “nurture” was identical.

I would think that the "agent programs" in each would make different choices, despite these identical circumstances.

OK. I do not. I think my mechanism is fairly clear. How does your mechanism work?

Neither of us can be certain if my "biological uncertainty principle" for complex brains is "true in principle," but I would argue for this along the following lines: There is a good possibility that the human brain is a chaotic system.

Agreed. But chaotic systems are still deterministic.

By that I mean that one neurotransmitter molecule attaching to the cell wall of a neuron can tip the balance and cause a "action potential" to travel down it axion. The neurotransmitters released by this impulse in several hundred other synaptic junctions, then tips the balance in some of them etc. The brain is a fantastic amplifier of small events.

Agreed. But still deterministic.

For example; a single Brownian motion controlled neurotransmitter event in Einstein's brain may have made him either (1) first speculate that the velocity of light is a constant. - When he did. If he had lived, See (2), he probably would have done so soon later. or (2) alternatively make him decide he needed a break and some exercise, which could have caused him to go for a bicycle ride. (That unfortunately for physic, gets him killed by a drunk man driving his Packard car up onto the side walk.)

Agreed. But still deterministic.

Almost everything important in my life has seemed to have been the result of chance, beginning with my "choice" of parents and birth country.

Agreed. But what you call chance may simply be your epistemic horizon (ie your lack of knowledge). It could all have been deterministic.

I grant you that the world may not be deterministic, but I still do not see how introducing indeterminism endows free will.

MF

 

[Billy T]

We are getting so agreeable the it is becoming predictable and perhaps uninteresting. You made 10 comments in your last reply, most starting with: "Agreed..." and the few that did not were ideas I agree with. E.G. It also "beats me" how GFW could work. Etc. That is, in 9 of your 10 we have the same view. Even in the other one, now quoted:

...OK. I do not. I think my mechanism is fairly clear. How does your mechanism work?

we don't actually disagree - I just have a different less well defended opinion. I readily admit (and have done so in several prior posts) that your position is "air tight," secure etc. and that my efforts to support the possibility of GFW are failures by comparison - only hopes expressed.

The reason I have not yet joined you in "your camp," as I have oft put it, is that neither you nor I have been able to firmly crush this hope (wish I could to end the uncertainty) - All either of us can muster is to say that because it is not well defined, it is too slippery to squash. If money were involved, mine would be bet on your ideas, not mine, but I do feel an attraction to my hope and since I lack the knowledge of what may exist in some logical structures and I do know of at least a self reflexive logic loop that I don't know how to analyse logically ("This sentence is false.") I can not abandon this ill defined hope.

I have twice in the past offered to stop our discussion and do so again. If we do, perhaps I can spend some time reading posts the the philosophy subgroup concerned about logic, epistemology, etc. and subsequently better formulate how the non-deterministic, yet non-random, "purposeful" logic an agent with my GFW must have, might work. Again I say I have enjoyed our exchanges. Your clear logic and knowledge have helped me to understand better my hope for GFW.

There is one lose end in our exchanges concerning your question about entropy. As I recall, you were some what at a loss as to why it does not decrease in closed system. (I think it can, just that it is very rare because of the way humans define the states or categories.) To illustrate this, I described a box with 100 white and 100 black marbles and used it to show that this law of physics (thermodynamics) has a great deal to due with the way we humans collect equally probable individual configurations into groups. (I also illustrated it with my only bet in Brazil's popular lottery - I bet on the numbers 1,2,3,4,5 & 6 (six are required from the 60 available) in a failed effort to get my wife to refrain from making weekly bets in this less than 50% payout game.)

You never commented on my idea that "entropy increase" is mainly, if not entirely, to due to the way humans assemble/define categories. - Only two of the equally probable outcomes have all marbles of one color in the same layer, (the "vertically divided" category) but millions of arrangements are in the "well mixed" category, so of course we are surprized if after shaking the closed box, the vertically divided category is observed when the box lid is lifted, but not surprized when one equally probable member of the "well mixed" categories is observed. If box is shaken and then observed enough times, there will be steps in the long chain of observations where entropy did decrease. (I know that the entropy of the system including the shaking mechanism has increased, but any believer in determinism and the ergotic theorem and chaos will probably understand what I am trying to state. - How we define our categories has a lot to do with the increase of entropy in simple systems like my box of marbles or lottery results.)

 

[moving finger]

I have twice in the past offered to stop our discussion and do so again.

OK

Your clear logic and knowledge have helped me to understand better my hope for GFW.

Thank you, I’m pleased.

There is one lose end in our exchanges concerning your question about entropy. As I recall, you were some what at a loss as to why it does not decrease in closed system. (I think it can, just that it is very rare because of the way humans define the states or categories.)

Agreed. If I said that it does not then I apologise – that is an error. The 2nd law is obviously a purely statistical law hence it does not say that entropy cannot decrease.

To illustrate this, I described a box with 100 white and 100 black marbles and used it to show that this law of physics (thermodynamics) has a great deal to due with the way we humans collect equally probable individual configurations into groups. (I also illustrated it with my only bet in Brazil's popular lottery - I bet on the numbers 1,2,3,4,5 & 6 (six are required from the 60 available) in a failed effort to get my wife to refrain from making weekly bets in this less than 50% payout game.)

You never commented on my idea that "entropy increase" is mainly, if not entirely, to due to the way humans assemble/define categories. - Only two of the equally probable outcomes have all marbles of one color in the same layer, (the "vertically divided" category) but millions of arrangements are in the "well mixed" category, so of course we are surprized if after shaking the closed box, the vertically divided category is observed when the box lid is lifted, but not surprized when one equally probable member of the "well mixed" categories is observed.

Agreed. Though I believe there are some (however) who would claim that this kind of “information entropy” is not in fact a proper measure of entropy (for precisely the reason that it depends on how one defines information).

If box is shaken and then observed enough times, there will be steps in the long chain of observations where entropy did decrease. (I know that the entropy of the system including the shaking mechanism has increased, but any believer in determinism and the ergotic theorem and chaos will probably understand what I am trying to state. - How we define our categories has a lot to do with the increase of entropy in simple systems like my box of marbles or lottery results.)

Poincare’s return. Boltzmann (I believe) had suggested that the low entropy past of our world may have been caused by such a statistical variation. However as I noted above, I believe some may disagree that statistical information measures are true measures of entropy.

MF