Why the bias against materialism?

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
If you are still saying this then you have not understood anything I've said. I am not trying to proclaim any truths here. You keep insisting that I am. I do not know how to convey that all I'm doing is assigning words. I can only type it, I can't make you understand it.

And yet again I must explain to you that, in your attempt to "assing words" you have commited a logical error: Your definition of Idealism uses terms that only exist in the Idealist paradigm. The definition is biased in itself, as it makes no sense in a materialistic paradigm. I think that a "fair" (accurate, good...) definition is supposed to have no biases, and will thus (at least) make sense in both paradigms.

Again, the definitions don't proclaim truths about what is and what isn't. It is only assigning words so that we can identify the view. If you do not believe theses things really exists then that is a disagreement with Idealism. Not it's definition.

BUT THAT'S THE POINT! Your definition directly implied the existence of these things and (the definition itself) is thus utterly biased, and logically unusable. Surely you can see this, I've said it enough times.

Mentat, I didn't understand the point of much of that but it is clear you don't understand complexity theory. Everytime I discuss things with you, you seem to deny what I think is common scientific knowledge and concepts. Even FZ is talking about this one!(as noted by Cjames)

I probably don't know complexity theory by that name. You'd have to tell me what it postulates, instead of referring to it by the name, before I can know whether I understand it (or agree with it) or not.

First of all Zero never made any points at all that were productive or thoughtful. He rarely does. But all of this that you've said is the same mistake as above. Your trying to make the definition claim truths. It is not. You are supposed to disagree with the views after the definitions are set. And btw, these definitions are not made up by Heusdens or myself. Again, you find yourself in disagreement with established academia...( Quamtum Physics, Philsophy, complexity theory...whats next?heheh)

The difference is that I'm not at all intimidated by the fact that these may be long-standing definitions. I say that - from my observations of your post - they are biased (or, at least, the one for Idealism) is, and are thus logically unusable, unless you can show otherwise.

Thus, I'm not trying to find the truth before establishing the definitions, I just don't approve of the definitions that you've chosen since they are, themselves, biased. In fact, correct me if I'm wrong, but doesn't a biased definition commit the same sin as you accuse me of (proclaiming a "truth" that only exists in one of the paradigms)?

See complexity theory. Read Read Read. I thought this was common knowledge. I just assumed you wouldn't deny it's relevance. Sorry I brouht it up because I think I confused you as noted below.

Ok, I will look up complexity theory. In the meantime, could you give a brief explanation of it's postulates (I'll probably recognize them, and just don't know the theory by it's proper name (that's happened before)).

Here you have totally confused the dicussion of definitions with the discussion of materialism vs idealism itself. I thought I made the switch clear. The emergent properties has nothing to do with the definition discussion. It was an actual rebuttal to materialism. So it's supposed to be biased! Good call!

But your definition contained reference to the emergent properties! It is thus biased toward the Idealistic PoV, and makes no sense in a materialistic paradigm. As I said before (above somewhere), a definition that is biased commits the same sin that you keep pointing out: it proclaims truths.

Mentat I think the best way to move forward is for you to tell us what the philosophical view of materialism means. If this cannot be done then I think we shouldn't call ourselves materialists anymore until we can define it.

Here's one definition (from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary):
1 a : a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter


It doesn't really touch on the philosophical issues, raised in the debate between idealism and materialism, but I looked it up in the "Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy", and didn't even get a definition (just a bunch of results of belief in materliasm, and reasons for such a belief to have come about in the first place, and the problems that face it...but not definitions).

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption

First of all Zero never made any points at all that were productive or thoughtful. He rarely does. But all of this that you've said is the same mistake as above. Your trying to make the definition claim truths. It is not. You are supposed to disagree with the views after the definitions are set. And btw, these definitions are not made up by Heusdens or myself. Again, you find yourself in disagreement with established academia...( Quamtum Physics, Philsophy, complexity theory...whats next?heheh) [/B]

Nice personal attack!

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Mentat

Here's one definition (from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary):
1 a : a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter

Let's start over with this, shall we? This seems to be a reasonable definition.

Why is there a bias against this idea? It seems pretty straightforward, and practical. Basically, it says, "What you see is what you get", which, from a logical standpoint, is really all you can say about any situation, isn't it?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zero
Let's start over with this, shall we? This seems to be a reasonable definition.

Why is there a bias against this idea? It seems pretty straightforward, and practical. Basically, it says, "What you see is what you get", which, from a logical standpoint, is really all you can say about any situation, isn't it?

Well, sure, except for the fact that some people believe in a mind's eye (whether I do or don't is irrelevant, but I will be arguing against it, since my current position is materialistic), and thus "what they see" includes things that - according to a materialistic approach to neurology (such as taken by Le Doux or Dennett) - don't ever exist.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Mentat
Well, sure, except for the fact that some people believe in a mind's eye (whether I do or don't is irrelevant, but I will be arguing against it, since my current position is materialistic), and thus "what they see" includes things that - according to a materialistic approach to neurology (such as taken by Le Doux or Dennett) - don't ever exist.

Yes, but we CAN say that their vision exists as electrochemical brain activity, can't we?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zero
Yes, but we CAN say that their vision exists as electrochemical brain activity, can't we?

No. A materialist, in my experience, does not accept that the phenomenological world can be "looked at" at all. It is not "produced" by brain activity, it is brain activity, and there are no "emergent properties" that exist as a "picture in the mind". So, actually, yes we can say that their supposed vision (along with their supposed "picture") exist as electrochemical brain activity, but it may be slightly misleading to do so (especially if they miss the "as" part, and assume that we mean "as a result of").

You know, I just thought of another reason why "pictures in the mind" (no matter how they are "produced") may be illogical. Think of the monitor, that you are looking at now. Do you think that there is a place inside the computer, where these words are displayed as words? I'm no expert on computers (I know about enough to get by), but I really doubt it. It has always been explained to me that the information is in binary code, and that the display on the monitor is just a translation of that code.

So, the display on the monitor (the picture) is not for the benefit of the computer at all; since the computer doesn't process in "pictures", but in binary code. It's only for the benefit of the humans who look at the monitor, that this code is ever translated into a picture or text (like the text you are reading now).

Our brains are organic computers, so doesn't it stand to reason that there would be no purpose in our having actual "pictures" in our minds, if there was no "observer" inside the mind to watch them (like the observers that are reading this text)? And there cannot be such an observer, for it (the observer) would then have to be conscious (otherwise the "picture" would mean nothing to it) which would mean that it also had an inner "observer", and so on ad infinitum.

 

[Mentat]

BTW, the above idea about why "pictures in the mind" may be illogical is not entirely original, it's just the illustration that I thought of, which I decided to share. Daniel Dennett explains much the same principle, using the primitive AI robot, "Shakey", as his example. But, of course, his explanation is much longer and more detailed than mine.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Mentat
No. A materialist, in my experience, does not accept that the phenomenological world can be "looked at" at all. It is not "produced" by brain activity, it is brain activity, and there are no "emergent properties" that exist as a "picture in the mind". So, actually, yes we can say that their supposed vision (along with their supposed "picture") exist as electrochemical brain activity, but it may be slightly misleading to do so (especially if they miss the "as" part, and assume that we mean "as a result of").

You know, I just thought of another reason why "pictures in the mind" (no matter how they are "produced") may be illogical. Think of the monitor, that you are looking at now. Do you think that there is a place inside the computer, where these words are displayed as words? I'm no expert on computers (I know about enough to get by), but I really doubt it. It has always been explained to me that the information is in binary code, and that the display on the monitor is just a translation of that code.

So, the display on the monitor (the picture) is not for the benefit of the computer at all; since the computer doesn't process in "pictures", but in binary code. It's only for the benefit of the humans who look at the monitor, that this code is ever translated into a picture or text (like the text you are reading now).

Our brains are organic computers, so doesn't it stand to reason that there would be no purpose in our having actual "pictures" in our minds, if there was no "observer" inside the mind to watch them (like the observers that are reading this text)? And there cannot be such an observer, for it (the observer) would then have to be conscious (otherwise the "picture" would mean nothing to it) which would mean that it also had an inner "observer", and so on ad infinitum.

I see what you mean...we agree that there are no 'emerging properties', but the way I said it may be misleading. For instance, when I say that the image on my computer screen 'exists', I mean that there are photons traveling from the monitor to my eyes, which are interpreted as images. In fact, a materialist should define an image as being an object or objects reflecting light to a viewing medium(film, monitor, eye, etc.) The object is real, the viewing medium is real, the image is not real, except as defined by the photons traveling from one to the other.
Am I making sense?

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Mentat
BTW, the above idea about why "pictures in the mind" may be illogical is not entirely original, it's just the illustration that I thought of, which I decided to share. Daniel Dennett explains much the same principle, using the primitive AI robot, "Shakey", as his example. But, of course, his explanation is much longer and more detailed than mine.

Thinking of my last post, an 'image of the mind' is illogical, because images are defined as the transfer of photons...

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zero
I see what you mean...we agree that there are no 'emerging properties', but the way I said it may be misleading. For instance, when I say that the image on my computer screen 'exists', I mean that there are photons traveling from the monitor to my eyes, which are interpreted as images. In fact, a materialist should define an image as being an object or objects reflecting light to a viewing medium(film, monitor, eye, etc.) The object is real, the viewing medium is real, the image is not real, except as defined by the photons traveling from one to the other.
Am I making sense?

And yet what the mind makes out of the image is real. Otherwise what's the point in "creating" the image in the first place?

 

[Royce]

Originally posted by Zero
Thinking of my last post, an 'image of the mind' is illogical, because images are defined as the transfer of photons...

The transfer of photons is not an image but information. Information gives order to the transfer of photons. Those ordered photons strike our eye casing electrochemical information bearing signals to go to our brains. The ordered electrochemical responses in our brain cause the mind to perceive the information as a image. Only at the perception phase did that information become unreal or did it finally become the real image that the information was transfering from one media to another?

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Royce
The transfer of photons is not an image but information. Information gives order to the transfer of photons. Those ordered photons strike our eye casing electrochemical information bearing signals to go to our brains. The ordered electrochemical responses in our brain cause the mind to perceive the information as a image. Only at the perception phase did that information become unreal or did it finally become the real image that the information was transfering from one media to another?

What I'm tyhinking is that there is no such thing as an 'image' to begin with, if that makes any sense. There are objects, eyes, and photons. At no point is there an 'image'.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zero
What I'm tyhinking is that there is no such thing as an 'image' to begin with, if that makes any sense. There are objects, eyes, and photons. At no point is there an 'image'.

What about the image on a stop sign? Why even bother to stop, once your mind "interprets" what that image means?

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
What about the image on a stop sign? Why even bother to stop, once your mind "interprets" what that image means?

?This doesn't make any sense, and has nothing to do with what this thread is about, does it?

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zero
?This doesn't make any sense, and has nothing to do with what this thread is about, does it?

What is a stop sign? If not an image (that conveys information) of what's been painted on to it? What's the difference between that and an image on your computer screen? The mind still interprets the information the same way.

And, where one uses paint as a medium, the other uses photons on your computer screen.

 

[Fliption]

Originally posted by Mentat
Your definition of Idealism uses terms that only exist in the Idealist paradigm. The definition is biased in itself, as it makes no sense in a materialistic paradigm. I think that a "fair" (accurate, good...) definition is supposed to have no biases, and will thus (at least) make sense in both paradigms.

BUT THAT'S THE POINT! Your definition directly implied the existence of these things and (the definition itself) is thus utterly biased, and logically unusable. Surely you can see this, I've said it enough times.

Yes I see exactly what you are saying, but you are saying it because you are not understanding me. And that is why I keep saying that! You're going to have think a little more practical here. The definition I was suggesting makes it possible to differentiate the 2 views so they can disagree with each other and KNOW what they're disagreeing about! There is no bias. Your point is unreasonable and not practical as I hope to show.

I probably don't know complexity theory by that name. You'd have to tell me what it postulates, instead of referring to it by the name, before I can know whether I understand it (or agree with it) or not.

If you don't believe in holistic/emergent properties where the sum is greater than the parts then you don't know what it is. Type it in a search engine. Thats what I did.

The difference is that I'm not at all intimidated by the fact that these may be long-standing definitions. I say that - from my observations of your post - they are biased (or, at least, the one for Idealism) is, and are thus logically unusable, unless you can show otherwise.

Well I'm certainly glad I'm not the one having to dismiss established topics to keep my point of view.

Intimidation is not the point. The point is that maybe you ought to take the time to read and understand established works before you criticize or disagree with them. It's good to question things but we have to be a bit responsible I think. Our self-perceived strengths are usually also our greatest weakness.

But your definition contained reference to the emergent properties! It is thus biased toward the Idealistic PoV, and makes no sense in a materialistic paradigm. As I said before (above somewhere), a definition that is biased commits the same sin that you keep pointing out: it proclaims truths.

No, the definition does not make any claims to truth. If emergent properties are a key component of the idealist view, then we MUST be able to assign a word to it. Whether it is true or not is irrelevant at the stage of assigning words. I've said this many times.

Here's one definition (from the Merriam-Webster Dictionary):
1 a : a theory that physical matter is the only or fundamental reality and that all being and processes and phenomena can be explained as manifestations or results of matter

Ugh. Not good. Let's try to make this a little practical and see if it helps.


Zero definition of materialism

Materialist: "I believe in that which can be shown to exist"
Idealist: "Hey so do I!"
Materialist: "No you don't. You believe that "love" can be shown to exists right?"
Idealist: "Absolutely! Here gimme a kiss and I'll show you"
Materialist: "Get off me man! That's just your brain doing it's thing. Love does not exists"
Idealist: "Yes it does my friend."

Thoughts:
So we can see that the definition of materialism is the exact same definition that the idealist would claim for himself. No one is going to say that they believe in things that cannot be shown to exists. But the problem is that now we have to define what it means to be "shown to exist". A third person listening in would have no way of knowing which things the materialist believes in and which things the idealists believes in. The definition does not allow this distinction.


Heusdens definition of materialism

Materialist: "I believe that what exists independent, outside and apart from consciousness is the primary existence."

Idealists: "I disagree with you. I believe what exist outside of consciousness is secondary."

Thoughts:
Right away an observer has the criteria for deciding which things a materialist believes in and which an idealist believes in. All the observer has to do is ask the question "Does the thing exists outside of consciousness?" Color for example does not so a materialists does not believe color actually exists. The debate between the 2 views can now move forward productively.

Clearly this definition is better. You have somehow convinced yourself that this definition is biased. I can hear you saying now that by claiming matter(things outside of consciousness)is primary, it implies there is something else that is secondary. Again I must say that this is pure semantics. Believing that these things are secondary is the same as saying that they are useful concepts but they owe their entire existence to the thing that is primary. We must agree that using concepts like love and mind to describe the results of a process is practical for communication. Whether it actually exists or not is not relevant for the definition. The materialist can claim that these things are simply words used to describe what is intrinsically the perceived results of material processes. But if we don't use these words then we have no way of expressing the idealist view.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Fliption
Zero definition of materialism

Materialist: "I believe in that which can be shown to exist"
Idealist: "Hey so do I!"
Materialist: "No you don't. You believe that "love" can be shown to exists right?"
Idealist: "Absolutely! Here gimme a kiss and I'll show you"
Materialist: "Get off me man! That's just your brain doing it's thing. Love does not exists"
Idealist: "Yes it does my friend."

Thoughts:
So we can see that the definition of materialism is the exact same definition that the idealist would claim for himself. No one is going to say that they believe in things that cannot be shown to exists. But the problem is that now we have to define what it means to be "shown to exist". A third person listening in would have no way of knowing which things the materialist believes in and which things the idealists believes in. The definition does not allow this distinction.

Although I find your representation of my viewpoint to be intentionally simplistic, it does bring up an important point. The key distinction falls in defining what counts as appropriate evidence.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zero
I see what you mean...we agree that there are no 'emerging properties', but the way I said it may be misleading. For instance, when I say that the image on my computer screen 'exists', I mean that there are photons traveling from the monitor to my eyes, which are interpreted as images. In fact, a materialist should define an image as being an object or objects reflecting light to a viewing medium(film, monitor, eye, etc.) The object is real, the viewing medium is real, the image is not real, except as defined by the photons traveling from one to the other.
Am I making sense?

Perfect sense, IMO.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
And yet what the mind makes out of the image is real. Otherwise what's the point in "creating" the image in the first place?

But the mind doesn't "make" anything "out of the image". If it did, who would be there (inside the mind) to see it? You see how this constantly leads to infinite regress?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zero
What I'm tyhinking is that there is no such thing as an 'image' to begin with, if that makes any sense. There are objects, eyes, and photons. At no point is there an 'image'.

Good man! Don't lose that, I need someone on the materialist side .

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
What about the image on a stop sign? Why even bother to stop, once your mind "interprets" what that image means?

There is no "image" on a stop sign. There's the paint and the metal, the photons and the neurons.

 

[sascha]

Yes, we can say that vision exists as electrochemical brain activity. Just like we can say eating exists as ink etc. in recipes and menu cards, etc.. The descriptions can go into any desired detail. But that's not the whole story -- at least for those who don't want to acquiesce with reading recipes and menu cards etc., but instead really want to eat.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Fliption
Yes I see exactly what you are saying, but you are saying it because you are not understanding me. And that is why I keep saying that! You're going to have think a little more practical here. The definition I was suggesting makes it possible to differentiate the 2 views so they can disagree with each other and KNOW what they're disagreeing about! There is no bias. Your point is unreasonable and not practical as I hope to show.

Alright. BTW, I apologize if my previous post came off as sort of hostile (or, in any way, out of form), I just got caught up in writing, and didn't get to proofread before posting.

If you don't believe in holistic/emergent properties where the sum is greater than the parts then you don't know what it is. Type it in a search engine. Thats what I did.

Ok, I'll try that (and, perhaps, post some results). However, I feel it only right to inform you that people like Le Doux and Dennett (materialists who study the processes of the mind) have postulated that there are no such "emergent properties", and have explained (rather aptly, IMO) why this should be the case (just see my illustration (a few posts back, I guess) about the computer image. I came up with it from the information I gathered in these two Materialists' books).

Well I'm certainly glad I'm not the one having to dismiss established topics to keep my point of view.

Ever since discussing with Manuel_Silvio, I have detested the very concept of "established topics". Just the idea that such a thing exists is closed-minded, IMO. Of course, I appreciate (as did Manuel) that long-standing arguments are not to be taken lightly (inspite of my tendency to do so, from time to time), but that doesn't mean that there is such a thing as an "established topic".

Intimidation is not the point. The point is that maybe you ought to take the time to read and understand established works before you criticize or disagree with them. It's good to question things but we have to be a bit responsible I think. Our self-perceived strengths are usually also our greatest weakness.

I don't think I have any strength, or special ability, for challenging these "established topics". I just think that there may be some flaw, and am trying to point out a possible candidate. I have not had time (not just as far as lifetime goes, but also time within each day) to read very much on the different "Philosophies of the Mind", but I am continuing to learn, and do recognize the need for education (especially for someone like me, who likes to question).

No, the definition does not make any claims to truth. If emergent properties are a key component of the idealist view, then we MUST be able to assign a word to it. Whether it is true or not is irrelevant at the stage of assigning words. I've said this many times.

I disagree (note: I understand, but I disagree). As I've said before, I've no problem with your assigning words to what you call "emergent properties" (even though I am positing that there is no such thing (IOW, "emergent properties" is about as useful a collection of words for describing something as the word "nothing")), however, you cannot (or, rather, shouldn't) use them as part of your definition of Idealism (except to say that Idealists believe that there is such a thing as an "emergent property").

Ugh. Not good. Let's try to make this a little practical and see if it helps.


Zero definition of materialism

Materialist: "I believe in that which can be shown to exist"
Idealist: "Hey so do I!"
Materialist: "No you don't. You believe that "love" can be shown to exists right?"
Idealist: "Absolutely! Here gimme a kiss and I'll show you"
Materialist: "Get off me man! That's just your brain doing it's thing. Love does not exists"
Idealist: "Yes it does my friend."

Thoughts:
So we can see that the definition of materialism is the exact same definition that the idealist would claim for himself. No one is going to say that they believe in things that cannot be shown to exists. But the problem is that now we have to define what it means to be "shown to exist". A third person listening in would have no way of knowing which things the materialist believes in and which things the idealists believes in. The definition does not allow this distinction.

Erm...I probably shouldn't counter this, since it's not my main dispute with you, but I think you may be wrong. After all, the Materialist could tell the Idealist that the proposed kiss needn't be an indication of love, and thus "love" would still fall under the category of "things that cannot be shown to exist".

However, as I said, you may or may not be right about this and it probably makes no difference, as far as my main dispute with you goes.

Heusdens definition of materialism

Materialist: "I believe that what exists independent, outside and apart from consciousness is the primary existence."

Idealists: "I disagree with you. I believe what exist outside of consciousness is secondary."

ARE YOU KIDDING ME?? I think it's been said WAY too many times, for me to need to say it again: To say that something "exists inside of consciousness" is a completely Idealistic assumption. The true materialist cannot believe that something "exists within consciousness", since such things would not be material.

I again apologize for getting a bit "worked up", but I don't think I should edit this paragraph any further - as it may lose its "flavor".

Thoughts:
Right away an observer has the criteria for deciding which things a materialist believes in and which an idealist believes in. All the observer has to do is ask the question "Does the thing exists outside of consciousness?" Color for example does not so a materialists does not believe color actually exists. The debate between the 2 views can now move forward productively.

Not at all! To ask "does the thing exist outside of consciousness" is a non-sequitor to a materialist, since nothing exists "inside of consciousness". There is no phenomenological "world", as such things (again) would have to be immaterial.

Clearly this definition is better. You have somehow convinced yourself that this definition is biased. I can hear you saying now that by claiming matter(things outside of consciousness)is primary, it implies there is something else that is secondary. Again I must say that this is pure semantics. Believing that these things are secondary is the same as saying that they are useful concepts but they owe their entire existence to the thing that is primary.

No, no, no, it's not about their existing in a "secondary" form (or existing as "useful concepts that owe their existence to the material interactions"). Since you probably still don't see the bias, I will spell it out: If something immaterial exists as a result of something material, then the materialist viewpoint (that all things are material)is wrong, since the things that "owe their existence to" material interactions would not themselves be material!

Am I wrong?

We must agree that using concepts like love and mind to describe the results of a process is practical for communication. Whether it actually exists or not is not relevant for the definition. The materialist can claim that these things are simply words used to describe what is intrinsically the perceived results of material processes. But if we don't use these words then we have no way of expressing the idealist view.

And here you arrive at what I already posted some time ago: There is no grey area, from which to form a definition. You are trying to remain completely unbiased, but your attempt is in vain (AFAICS (as far as I can see)).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by sascha
Yes, we can say that vision exists as electrochemical brain activity. Just like we can say eating exists as ink etc. in recipes and menu cards, etc.. The descriptions can go into any desired detail. But that's not the whole story -- at least for those who don't want to acquiesce with reading recipes and menu cards etc., but instead really want to eat.

I believe, sascha, that you may have missed my point. I'm not saying information is as good as tangible things (if anything, I'm saying quite the opposite), I'm saying that, since there are no such "tangible things" in the brain, then (according to the materialist view) there are no such things at all in the mind.

 

[sascha]

I was answering Zero's proposal to take the description for the thing. This does not necessarily mean only "information". For someone believing in cognitive theory, this theory is not just information, it is believed to be fact -- in fact, the only relevant fact.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Mentat
There is no "image" on a stop sign. There's the paint and the metal, the photons and the neurons.

Yeah, and I would like to see you explain that to the cop when he pulls you over for running the stop sign!

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by sascha
Yes, we can say that vision exists as electrochemical brain activity. Just like we can say eating exists as ink etc. in recipes and menu cards, etc.. The descriptions can go into any desired detail. But that's not the whole story -- at least for those who don't want to acquiesce with reading recipes and menu cards etc., but instead really want to eat.

I think this is the confusing part. What myself and Mentat are trying to say (I think) is that something like 'vision' is a word that describes a process, not something with a reality beyond the process. 'Seeing' doesn't exist, but objects, photons, and eyes do.

 

[Iacchus32]

Originally posted by Zero
I think this is the confusing part. What myself and Mentat are trying to say (I think) is that something like 'vision' is a word that describes a process, not something with a reality beyond the process. 'Seeing' doesn't exist, but objects, photons, and eyes do.

And yet our ability to see, means just about everything in terms of our ability to "interpret" the real world.

You're just trying to sneak us past the notion that they eye itself has no functionality, and hence no purpose, nor would it allow us to keep from tripping over our big fat feet in the dark -- i.e., if we didn't have them.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
And yet our ability to see, means just about everything in terms of our ability to "interpret" the real world.

You're just trying to sneak us past the notion that they eye itself has no functionality, and hence no purpose, nor would it allow us to keep from tripping over our big fat feet in the dark, i.e., if we didn't have them.

I'm not trying to sneak anything past anything... I wish Mentat were around to help me get my point across, but I'll press on regardless. I think(correct me if I am wrong) that you and some others are objectifying the concept of processes as somehow separate from the physical workings of those processes. Claiming consiousness as distinct from the electrochemical reactions of the brain is like saying that fire is distinct from the combustion of something flamable. I seems that you would claim that an running automobile engine is made of two parts; the engine and the 'running', which exists on a different plane of existence from the engine.

 

[sascha]

You say "something like 'vision' is a word that describes a process, not something with a reality beyond the process. 'Seeing' doesn't exist, but objects, photons, and eyes do". The trouble with this idea is that if it were completely true, you would have no influence over the process. The objects, photons, eyes etc. would do all of it. But in fact you can consciously control what you want to look at, i.e. you can look or not look (this is called "intentionality"). The idea which you and Mentat are exposing is contradictory with the facts as soon as one takes all of them into account. Of course one can choose to look at and thus 'see' (sic!) only part of the facts, but then this comes close to what Iacchus32 seems to address in saying you "sneak" us past something. We are not saying the engine is different from its running, but that you forget part of the engine and running.

 

[Zero]

Originally posted by sascha
You say "something like 'vision' is a word that describes a process, not something with a reality beyond the process. 'Seeing' doesn't exist, but objects, photons, and eyes do". The trouble with this idea is that if it were completely true, you would have no influence over the process. The objects, photons, eyes etc. would do all of it. But in fact you can consciously control what you want to look at, i.e. you can look or not look (this is called "intentionality"). The idea which you and Mentat are exposing is contradictory with the facts as soon as one takes all of them into account. Of course one can choose to look at and thus 'see' (sic!) only part of the facts, but then this comes close to what Iacchus32 seems to address in saying you "sneak" us past something. We are not saying the engine is different from its running, but that you forget part of the engine and running.

Actually, it is you that is trying to sneak something in. You are trying to claim some sort of special exception for consciousness, when in fact it is the 'running' that our brain-as-engine does. It is simply another process, and our control over it makes no difference at all.

I think that is certainly a source of your bias against materialism, isn't it? That it doesn't treat human intellect as some sort of special case? That tends to be the reason why people choose to ignore 'cold' facts, because they often don't feed people's self-centered need for meaning.

 

[sascha]

I am not talking about your consciousness that is doing something, I am talking about your capacity of a willful choice, which is not explained in the machine model you present. Of course control makes all the difference, because there the machine idea is not applicable any more. Machines don't make and control themselves. You need a meta-machine (programmer, manufacturer, power, etc.) for that.
If the intellect were fully controlled by some mechanism, it would not be able to think freely, i.e. choose what it wants to think and check whether that corresponds. If your mind is under the control of something, then this is a good reason for me to stop communicating with you, because then what you think and say would be determined by that. There is nothing interestring in that, and nobody needs to lose his time with zombies.
So in what you say the problem is only shifted away into words. But of course any words can be uttered and believed in.
The real trouble is that the machine metaphore does not operate in categories that allow to think things like consciousness and personal identity in a noncompromised way. I have hinted at this many times. The Cartesian Split has some logical drawbacks which you still seem to ignore. Hard luck, buddy.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
Yeah, and I would like to see you explain that to the cop when he pulls you over for running the stop sign!

LOL!

The policeman believes that there is an image there just as much as you do.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Iacchus32
And yet our ability to see, means just about everything in terms of our ability to "interpret" the real world.

You're just trying to sneak us past the notion that they eye itself has no functionality, and hence no purpose, nor would it allow us to keep from tripping over our big fat feet in the dark -- i.e., if we didn't have them.

Yes, but our "ability to see" is nothing more than our brain's ability to process incoming photonic emissions. This does nothing to prove your point.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Zero
I'm not trying to sneak anything past anything... I wish Mentat were around to help me get my point across, but I'll press on regardless.

I got your back now .

I think(correct me if I am wrong) that you and some others are objectifying the concept of processes as somehow separate from the physical workings of those processes. Claiming consiousness as distinct from the electrochemical reactions of the brain is like saying that fire is distinct from the combustion of something flamable. I seems that you would claim that an running automobile engine is made of two parts; the engine and the 'running', which exists on a different plane of existence from the engine.

Good illustration, btw.