Why the bias against materialism?

Fliption · Sep 22, 2003

Ok, a mock dialogue:

Materialist: So what really is the difference between your beliefs and mine?
Idealist using Fliption's definition: Well, I believe that the things produced by the mind are what really exist, and the physical things are just secondary.
Materialist: You believe that what is what really exists?
Idealist: The things produced by the mind.
Materialist: What things that are produced by the mind? You mean electrical stimuli?
Idealist: No, not the physical things produced by the brain, the phenomenal things produced by the non-physical mind.
Materialist: There is no non-physical mind.
Idealist: Oh, then I guess the difference isn't that you believe the things in the mind don't "really exist", but rather that there are no things produced in the mind.
Materialist: That's right, in fact I don't think there is a mind, except for the physical organ called the "brain".

But you didn't do this in the thread with Hynogogue. Why? The reason is because you DO understand what is being referred to when we speak of things of the mind. Pretending you don't is much like you pretending you can't disagree with the crazy street man who is seeing pink unicorns just because you don't know what a pink unicorn is. You do know what one is, just like you know what a mind is. The whole point is to communicate; not state truths.

Firstly, even if this dialogue you wrote actually happened, it didn't prevent the materialist from making his conclusion. So it's not biased IMO. So it seems the only way there can be a problem according to you is if we actually come across a materialist who was raised in a cave and doesn't know what is meant by "the mind". Not likely considering he would need to know what it refers to in order to deny it! Also, it doesn't seem to be a big problem anyway seeing as how both parties eventually understood one another in your dialogue.

So, you see, the difference was not (as the Idealist using Fliption's definition believed) what importance or what status (really existing or just emerging from what really exists) was placed on phenomenal events, but rather the difference was whether one believed that there were phenomenal events ITFP.

Ok now I can see the distinction in this version. But I don't see them as contradicting positions at all. I just see one as a more extreme position of the other. Kinda like the relationship between a republican and a libertarian. I just think of these things as different versions of idealism/materialism. I hope this point hasn't been a sticking point for you. There are people who believe that nothing physical exists. There are people who believe that nothing non-physical exists. And there are people who believe that both non-physical and physical exists. And some people who claim to be materialists say they believe the latter. I've seen this in these very forums. So whether something physical or non-physical exists or not is not the understood distinction between the 2 views, necessarily.

Yes, but when (in my mock dialogue) the Materialist was confronted with the idea of "things that exist inside the mind", he was at a complete loss, since there are no such things in his paradigm. The fact that the implication of "non-physical thoughts" exists in the Idealist's original definition made his original definition biased and unintelligible by his Materialist aquaintance.

A pink unicorn is not in your paradigm either but that doesn't prevent you from using those 2 words as the distinction between your view and the street guy's view. Whats the difference?

I disagree. A person who believes that something exists "in the mind" (no matter what status they give such a thing) is an Idealist, and is believing in something non-physical, since there are obviously no "purple cows" in my physical brain.

This doesn't contradict anything I said. So maybe you aren't disagreeing with me? I wouldn't deny that an idealists believes in non-physical things. I just deny that this is the criteria in the definition of idealism. For example, let's assume a person claimed that everyone that walked out of a certain building within the next hour is smarter than everyone else in the world. Now if only midgets walked out in that hour, you wouldn't say that this person believed that midgets were the smartest people in the world. No, because their view is that the people who walked out of that certain building in that hour were the smartest. That these people just happen to be midgets shouldn't be part of the criteria for identifying these people. The same for "non-physical". An idealists isn't going to believe in every non-physical thing you can imagine. So what's the difference between the non-physical things they believe in and the ones they don't? The difference is that the ones they do believe in are products of the mind. Thats the true distinction between the 2 views.

No, I think you are making a valid point. However, for the purpose of this discussion, I think I can re-define "physical" as: Composed of wavicles and/or having effect on spacetime.

And then what happens if 4 thousand years from now our conception of these words change? I am not scientifically educated enough to continue to ask these questions but I don't think the issue I addressed goes away just because you and I can't imagine it. Could we have ever imagined black holes 3 thousand years ago?

Thus, something that is produced "inside consciousness" cannot be physical, since it is not composed of wavicles (wave/particles) and has no effect on spacetime.

Agreed. But this is just a casual observation. Kinda like all those people being midgets.

I will answer your question with a question: How do you "come across" something that doesn't interact with energy or spacetime? After all, as humans, our only way of percieving anything about the world is through our five senses, and they only percieve effects of energy and spacetime.

So, really, your hypothetical scenario becomes rather moot, when confronted with the fact (fact according to Materialists that is) that one can never become conscious of something without using one of his five physical senses.

But you see how you are using a materialists philosophy to make assumptions and then procede to define the terms accordingly?

I don't quite understand your problem with my response. I said that they would have to show that an intermediary, that was neither physical nor non-physical, exists (which is logically impossible, but is absolutely vital to the Idealistic approach*) and that they would have to get around the homunculan problem as well. Neither of these seem to "beg the question" as you say; they appear to be perfectly rational objections to me.

Well as I pointed out earlier and Hynogogue did the same thing in the other thread, the first issue is not a problem with Idealism. It is a problem with Dualism. A materialist who isn't a dualists also has problems here because the only thing you can really know are your subjective interpretations. Even the materialists' Almighty Brain is merely a subjective creation. So to get from the subjective to an Objective reality that we are certain has the features a, b and c is quite a leap, philosphically. To then assume that the subjective doesn't really exists and only the assumed Obective exists in order to avoid the problems of dualism opens its own can worms.

I still don't understand the "homunculan" problem. But it seems like it is a logical flaw that you think exists and not something someone can do anything about. Am I right?

Mentat · Sep 23, 2003

Originally posted by sascha
But, Mentat, there still is a problem with what you say: If for you the only way of understanding "checking one's thoughts" is to mean "the brain checks on it's own thoughts (which is illogical, because it introduces a split)", then there is no way in which logic can make sense to you, since in pure logic there is only one thought checking on other thoughts -- and thus in your terminology 'the brain checking the brain'... Or what?

Why should one thought ever "check on" another? I don't see the necessity (logical or scientific) why a "thought" (which doesn't really even exist) should "check on" another thought, nor can I see what it even means for one thought to check on another.

Mentat · Sep 23, 2003

Originally posted by Fliption
I've placed these 2 paragraphs above together because my comment addresses them both. I did see you comment on Hypnagogues words and I saw the agreement. This agreement is exactly what I've been trying to get here. The whole reason you were able to make that agreement was because you understood what he meant by the words and phrases that he was using. And that is the only objective that language has. To allow for communication. So the words worked. This is what I've been trying to do here for the last 40 pages. I've pointed out that the whole point in using certain words was to allow for a definition that everyone understood and a clear distinction could be made. Whether these concepts actually exists or not is not relevant. Maybe I've just done a poor job of trying to get this because Hypnagouge seemed to accomplish it so easily.

My sincere apologies, but I must once again re-iterate that a definition that requires reference to non-physical products of physical interactions in the brain will never be accepted (at least not by me). Hypnogague never tried to define the terms, we just worked around definitions (basically assuming we knew what we were talking about), which isn't really good philosophy (which is why I fully agree with you about making definitions first) but worked for the time.

Also, when I agree with Hypnogague that certain terms could be used, that didn't refer to anything, but help one to understand, I still made it clear that these words were not to be taken as referring to something.

Also, for the whole "existence" discussion, I just don't understand how you think you can disagree with anyone if you aren't willing to accept the words that the other side uses? For example, if a guy on the street tells you to watch out for the Pink Unicorn in your path, you will likely disagree with him that a pink unicorn even exists. Not to mention you see nothing in front of you. So, pink unicorns don't exists, yet you are using the word.

As Mr. Robin Parsons has said before, "it confirms nothing about the existence of anything except the words being used". Yes, the words exist, but they don't refer to anything.

The existence of the pink unicorn(and all it's droppings) IS the distinction between your 2 views. How can you disagree with this man if you aren't even willing to use the word of the very thing that separates your view? IMO, you can't. Which is what I've been saying. You cannot disallow these key words without completely crippling idealisms ability to argue it's point.

But this situation (with the pink unicorn) is very different from our problem. If someone says, "Watch out for the Pink Unicorn", I just disagree that such a thing exists. However, if we are having a philosophical discussion about the processes of the brain and consciousness, then I would mention not only that there is no such thing as a Pink Unicorn, but also that neither of us ever thought of one.

I could be slow but I've read this several times and I don't see a difference. It's probably me but maybe there's a typo?

Sorry, no typo. This is the central problem between us, and as small as the difference may seem, it is the deciding factor of which one of us is correct. The difference between Materialism and Idealism, is not a distinction between opinions on the status of things that exist "inside consciousness", but a distinction between opinions on whether there is such a thing as "inside consciousness" or not.

IOW, if I take the definition of Materialist to mean "believes things that exist inside consciousness to be secondary" then I allow for a Materialist that believes there is such a thing as "inside consciousness" when, in fact, no Materialist can believe this.

Mentat · Sep 23, 2003

Originally posted by Fliption
But you didn't do this in the thread with Hynogogue. Why? The reason is because you DO understand what is being referred to when we speak of things of the mind. Pretending you don't is much like you pretending you can't disagree with the crazy street man who is seeing pink unicorns just because you don't know what a pink unicorn is. You do know what one is, just like you know what a mind is. The whole point is to communicate; not state truths.

I know that, but this is a serious discussion about philosophies of the mind. One cannot use terms that apply to normal human speech, since normal human speech has evolved from an Idealistic standpoint. Materialism is a very new meme, compared to Idealism. I don't know why this is the case, but it is. Thus, I have to speak entirely from the Materialistic standpoint, and resist the urge to use common terms that refer to Idealistic concepts.

That's why I choose my definition above all the others I've seen, because it can be used with a person who refuses to refer to anything outside of the Materialistic paradigm until such a thing is proven to exist. So, we don't refer to any of those things (thus keeping ourselves intelligible to the die-hard Materialist) and simply say "He doesn't believe consciousness is anything but a physical working of the brain".

Firstly, even if this dialogue you wrote actually happened, it didn't prevent the materialist from making his conclusion. So it's not biased IMO.

The Materialist did not make his conclusion until the Idealist modified the definition to mine.

So it seems the only way there can be a problem according to you is if we actually come across a materialist who was raised in a cave and doesn't know what is meant by "the mind".

Yes, and that's the point, since you are not supposed to be attacking a person who believes in Materialism, you are supposed to be attacking Materialism itself. Of course, you are not necessarily attacking Materialism either, but you are trying to define it, and you must thus do so in a completely unbiased manner (even unbiased to typical human common sense, which I posit has (by its very nature) Idealistic tendencies entrenched in it).

Not likely considering he would need to know what it refers to in order to deny it! Also, it doesn't seem to be a big problem anyway seeing as how both parties eventually understood one another in your dialogue.

Only after the Idealist changed his definition to mine.

Ok now I can see the distinction in this version. But I don't see them as contradicting positions at all. I just see one as a more extreme position of the other. Kinda like the relationship between a republican and a libertarian. I just think of these things as different versions of idealism/materialism. I hope this point hasn't been a sticking point for you. There are people who believe that nothing physical exists. There are people who believe that nothing non-physical exists. And there are people who believe that both non-physical and physical exists. And some people who claim to be materialists say they believe the latter. I've seen this in these very forums. So whether something physical or non-physical exists or not is not the understood distinction between the 2 views, necessarily.

Fine, it may not be the understood distinction, but it is the true distinction. Materialism and Idealism are completely opposite sides of the issue, so there can be no middle ground (believing that there are both non-physical and physical things but calling yourself a Materialist is just looking for such a middle ground). Now, I can believe that there are things that are non-physical, but still argue for a purely Materialistic Philosophy of the Mind, and my argument would change not at all (since I would still not believe that a non-physical thing could interact with a physical one, even if I believe that there are non-physical things).

Does that make sense (I want to make sure, since I'm in a hurry and have to get off-line soon)?

A pink unicorn is not in your paradigm either but that doesn't prevent you from using those 2 words as the distinction between your view and the street guy's view. Whats the difference?

I've covered this already: I'm not debating philosophy of the mind with the man on the street corner.

Besides, if I didn't have the (rather Idealistic) common human tendencies entrenched in my brain - which would allow me to be a complete Materialist - then I would be completely lost at the very mention of a Pink Unicorn.

This doesn't contradict anything I said. So maybe you aren't disagreeing with me? I wouldn't deny that an idealists believes in non-physical things. I just deny that this is the criteria in the definition of idealism. For example, let's assume a person claimed that everyone that walked out of a certain building within the next hour is smarter than everyone else in the world. Now if only midgets walked out in that hour, you wouldn't say that this person believed that midgets were the smartest people in the world. No, because their view is that the people who walked out of that certain building in that hour were the smartest. That these people just happen to be midgets shouldn't be part of the criteria for identifying these people. The same for "non-physical". An idealists isn't going to believe in every non-physical thing you can imagine. So what's the difference between the non-physical things they believe in and the ones they don't? The difference is that the ones they do believe in are products of the mind. Thats the true distinction between the 2 views.

But there are no products of the mind! I keep telling you that, but it doesn't seem to sink in (no offense). The Materialistic view is NOT just that the things produced by the mind are not real, but that there is no such thing as something produced by the mind. Indeed, "something produced by the mind" is a connection of words that fails to perform the duty of words which is to convey meaning (in the eyes of the Materialist).

And then what happens if 4 thousand years from now our conception of these words change? I am not scientifically educated enough to continue to ask these questions but I don't think the issue I addressed goes away just because you and I can't imagine it. Could we have ever imagined black holes 3 thousand years ago?

It doesn't matter if these things change in the future, we can still use this as our definition of "physical".

Agreed. But this is just a casual observation. Kinda like all those people being midgets.

Well, with regard to the "midgets"...I want to make clear that I agree that the Idealist may not believe in all things that are non-physical, but rather just in the non-physical things that s/he believes are produced in the mind. But I maintain that the Materialist position on philosophies of the mind is the position that nothing is "produced in the mind".

But you see how you are using a materialists philosophy to make assumptions and then procede to define the terms accordingly?

Not really. Can you show me exactly how I did that?

Well as I pointed out earlier and Hynogogue did the same thing in the other thread, the first issue is not a problem with Idealism. It is a problem with Dualism. A materialist who isn't a dualists also has problems here because the only thing you can really know are your subjective interpretations. Even the materialists' Almighty Brain is merely a subjective creation. So to get from the subjective to an Objective reality that we are certain has the features a, b and c is quite a leap, philosphically. To then assume that the subjective doesn't really exists and only the assumed Obective exists in order to avoid the problems of dualism opens its own can worms.

Actually, it is the next step (IMO) in scientific progress. The step has been made (whether we like it or not), and Solipsism (for example) is not scientifically possible.

sascha · Sep 23, 2003

Mentat, I know you don't see why one thought should ever "check on" another. Yet logic is exactly about that: the correct interrelation between nothing but thoughts. If that does not exist in your system, it is not my problem.

Fliption · Sep 24, 2003

Originally posted by Mentat

Fine, it may not be the understood distinction, but it is the true distinction.

There is no such thing as a "true" distinction when we are talking about man made concepts. You cannot intuit what words mean Mentat. They mean whatever the people who use them say they mean. This is why I think you should stop pontificating and start reading some established(unbiased)philosophy. You are taking a word that has an established meaning and making it your own simply because you have used it to label yourself in the past and may have used it incorrectly.

I still do not understand how you think you can distinguish between you and an opposite view if you aren't willing to use the words that the opposite view uses to make the very claims that you disagree with. As I said before you cannot claim there is no mind if you do not know what is meant by using the word "mind".

But there are no products of the mind! I keep telling you that, but it doesn't seem to sink in (no offense). The Materialistic view is NOT just that the things produced by the mind are not real, but that there is no such thing as something produced by the mind. Indeed, "something produced by the mind" is a connection of words that fails to perform the duty of words which is to convey meaning (in the eyes of the Materialist).

It has sunk in Mentat but it is irrelevant! Will this ever sink in?

"something produced by the mind" does convey meaning to a materialists! How else can you deny it if you don't know what it means? This is the distinction! Let's just go with your extreme (and made up imo) view of materialism. Then the distinction between your view and Idealism is that "the mind exists". You claim it doesn't, they claim it does. This IS the distinction. The distinction is not physical versus non-physical because there are many non-physical things the idealists would never entertain.

Having said that, now I'll go the next step. Whether you want to accept it or not, there are many proclaimed materialists who are willing to enter into discourse on the things a mind produces. For those materialists we can now say the distinction is not only whether a mind exists but also whether the things produced by the mind are primary over those things outside the mind. It is this extra step that you have been unwilling to entertain. Fine. Ignore it. Forget I said anything about it. This definition is for those that hold the acedemic view of materialism. Besides, even If you ran across such an Idealists, you would never be able to have a philosophical discussion with him/her. You would have to go find one of the acedemic materialists to do that for you. You woudln't even be able to disagree with this idealists because you don't know what they're talking about.

Well, with regard to the "midgets"...I want to make clear that I agree that the Idealist may not believe in all things that are non-physical, but rather just in the non-physical things that s/he believes are produced in the mind. But I maintain that the Materialist position on philosophies of the mind is the position that nothing is "produced in the mind".

So then, as I said above, this is the distinction between your view of materialism and your view of idealism and not whether or not something is physical. But the distinction between less extreme views of materialism and idealism is as I have explained it, which encorporates not only the existence of the mind but mind stuff as well.

Let's see where we are now.

Can we not agree that this quote from you is the dsintinction between the 2 views and not whether something is physical?

If not then I think we ought to wrap this one up. It is obvious we aren't going to make any progress here. The sad part is that your definition doesn't allow us to come to any common terms to even discuss materialism vs idealism(which I have yet to do). I think you'll find that this language barrier is exactly why these topics on this forum are so philosophically pathetic. Because everyone is using the same word and means 5 different things.

It seems now that you think the point of our disagreement centers around what is to me simply 2 different derivations of materialism. While I think the materialism that you claim is simply the more extreme version you aren't willing to concede that other materialists who have different beliefs from you are actually using the term correctly. Your definition cannot accommodate these differences but mine can. Anyway, I say we end this one because I don't think there is anything else I can say that I haven't already said and vice versa. And I see that you are participating in many threads here and I shouldn't make the seemingly impossible task of thinking through all these topics and responding in 1 hour any harder than it already is; especially when no progress can be made.

Mentat · Sep 24, 2003

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, I know you don't see why one thought should ever "check on" another. Yet logic is exactly about that: the correct interrelation between nothing but thoughts. If that does not exist in your system, it is not my problem.

You are dead wrong. Logic is not about thoughts checking on each other. You should take a look at Tom's "Logic" thread.

Mentat · Sep 24, 2003

Originally posted by Fliption
There is no such thing as a "true" distinction when we are talking about man made concepts. You cannot intuit what words mean Mentat. They mean whatever the people who use them say they mean. This is why I think you should stop pontificating and start reading some established(unbiased)philosophy. You are taking a word that has an established meaning and making it your own simply because you have used it to label yourself in the past and may have used it incorrectly.

I use it the way I do because both the dictionary of Philosophy (I think it was called the "Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy") and a book on opposing Philosophies that I read in my high school library (back when I was in public school) have said that the Materialistic position is the position that nothing but the physical exists (which is already implied by the name anyway) and that the Idealistic standpoint is that there is something else.

I still do not understand how you think you can distinguish between you and an opposite view if you aren't willing to use the words that the opposite view uses to make the very claims that you disagree with. As I said before you cannot claim there is no mind if you do not know what is meant by using the word "mind".

That's why I'm not currently debating that there is no mind. I'm debating that there isn't anything non-physical about consciousness (or any other brain-function), which is what the Materialistic approace is. Thus, we can use the definitions that I proposed (perhaps refined somewhat, but they fit into both the references on this particular subject that I have read) and debate only whether there is or is not a non-physical aspect to the mind and consciousness.

It has sunk in Mentat but it is irrelevant! Will this ever sink in?

"something produced by the mind" does convey meaning to a materialists! How else can you deny it if you don't know what it means? This is the distinction! Let's just go with your extreme (and made up imo) view of materialism. Then the distinction between your view and Idealism is that "the mind exists".

What?! Is that what you've taken from what I said? That's not the distinction, the distinction is that Idealists believe that there is something non-physical to the mind.

You claim it doesn't, they claim it does. This IS the distinction. The distinction is not physical versus non-physical because there are many non-physical things the idealists would never entertain.

But that's completely irrelevant, since if I say "consciousness is a non-physical process" I have not admitted the truth of the existence of [i[]all[/i] non-physical things, merely the belief that consciousness is non-physical.

Having said that, now I'll go the next step. Whether you want to accept it or not, there are many proclaimed materialists who are willing to enter into discourse on the things a mind produces. For those materialists we can now say the distinction is not only whether a mind exists but also whether the things produced by the mind are primary over those things outside the mind. It is this extra step that you have been unwilling to entertain. Fine. Ignore it. Forget I said anything about it. This definition is for those that hold the acedemic view of materialism. Besides, even If you ran across such an Idealists, you would never be able to have a philosophical discussion with him/her. You would have to go find one of the acedemic materialists to do that for you. You woudln't even be able to disagree with this idealists because you don't know what they're talking about.

You are missing the point, and I think it's caused by the fact that (somehow) you have taken my defintions to mean that the difference between Materialism and Idealism is that one believes in the mind and one does not. The difference is that one believes in a non-physical mind and the other does not.

Look, Fliption, I don't think we should quit this thread just yet. I think that a few clarifications need to be made, which I thought I had made clear a long time ago:

1) IMCO, the difference between Materialistic Philosophies of the Mind and Idealistic ones is that the Materialist doesn't believe in anything non-physical (including a non-physical consciousness), while the Idealist (In Philosophies of the Mind) believes that consciousness is non-physical.

2) Your definition (again, IMO) is biased, because it makes reference to supposed non-physical things under the assumption that "they'll understand what I mean", even though, as far as the Materialistic paradigm is concerned you have not referred to anything, but have simply used words in your definition for the mistaken purpose of expressing a concept when in fact no concept was expressed or made reference to.

3) The debate on Materialism and Idealism is obviously not resolved, but there are two logical errors with an Idealistic approach (unless that Idealistic approach is Solipsistic in nature, in which case you are not really discussing anything with "me" anyway

) to consciousness, and I have pointed them out, and no one has been able to get by them yet.

Iacchus32 · Sep 24, 2003

Originally posted by Mentat
You are dead wrong. Logic is not about thoughts checking on each other. You should take a look at Tom's "Logic" thread.

But what does logic involve if it doesn't involve the process of thinking? Indeed, if there was nothing to think about, where would the logic be? So all I ask is that you think about -- and process -- what I'm saying here.

sascha · Sep 24, 2003

Mentat, I am not astonished that you believe I am dead wrong, and that you don't see the acts of thinking occurring in logic, but only that which is thought about. Yet I have some nice quotations from Tom, which show who is dead wrong here, by being deeply one-eyed:

"Logic is the study of the prescriptive laws of reasoning"

Do you realize that following a prescriptive law is possible only if one thought -- i.e. the thought of the required law -- applies this law to what it must control, i.e. to another thought?

And another of Tom's tidbits:

"Deductive validity is no safeguard against false conclusions. In fact, ... the truth of the statements in an argument cannot be determined by logic, and so logicians typically restrict their attention to analysis of validity."

Fliption · Sep 24, 2003

Mentat this whole discussion has been one big evolving semantic mess.

I'm going to try to stop the cycle of non-productive circular argument and start from the beginning. I have in no way suggested a biased definition. Firstly, I claimed that the difference between the 2 views was that an idealists believes that "things of the mind" have a primary existence and therefore cause the things outside the mind to exists. And a materialist claims that the things outside the mind are primary and causes the thinks inside the mind to exists. You then said that this asssumed a non-physical thing called "the mind" so I wasn't allowed to go in this direction. Now it seems you are no longer denying the existence of a mind. You're just saying that it is physical and not non-physical. Great! Considering this new information I don't understand why my original distinction cannot work. Since the distinction of what is primary and what is secondary is not dependent on whether the mind is physical or not.

Here is where I get my info:

You are missing the point, and I think it's caused by the fact that (somehow) you have taken my defintions to mean that the difference between Materialism and Idealism is that one believes in the mind and one does not. The difference is that one believes in a non-physical mind and the other does not.

This last sentence implies that there is such a thing as a physical mind. The reason that I have interpreted your belief as being that one view believes in mind and the other does not is because you have been disallowing the use of the word "mind" by claiming it must be referring to a non-physical thing. For example...

2) Your definition (again, IMO) is biased, because it makes reference to supposed non-physical things under the assumption that "they'll understand what I mean", even though, as far as the Materialistic paradigm is concerned you have not referred to anything, but have simply used words in your definition for the mistaken purpose of expressing a concept when in fact no concept was expressed or made reference to.

The concept you are referring to that I used is "mind". So you can see how I am even more confused as to why my definition is not the better one.

The problem with your definition is that it does not provide the same distinction to everyone. I have tried to illustrate and show this and you seemingly agreed with me. I haven't seen any good reason that refuted anything I said. I've seen basic dictionaries make similar attempts as you but then they go on to say things like 'this doesn't mean that materialistic don't believe in "love" because they do'. So they're full of contradictions.

Originally posted by Mentat
The debate on Materialism and Idealism is obviously not resolved, but there are two logical errors with an Idealistic approach (unless that Idealistic approach is Solipsistic in nature, in which case you are not really discussing anything with "me" anyway ) to consciousness, and I have pointed them out, and no one has been able to get by them yet. [/B]

This is a pet peeve of mine. When people continually keep referring to their argument totally ignoring the counter arguments to it. LifeGazer used to do this. I have explained to you at least 3 times and Hynagogue in another thread explained the same thing to you once. Your first logical error is not an error with Idealism. It is a problem with dualism. It is as much a problem for a materialist as an idealist.

The second logical problem makes no sense. I cannot agree with it or refute it if I don't know what it means. I suspect I am not the only one.

Mentat · Sep 27, 2003

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, I am not astonished that you believe I am dead wrong, and that you don't see the acts of thinking occurring in logic, but only that which is thought about. Yet I have some nice quotations from Tom, which show who is dead wrong here, by being deeply one-eyed:

"Logic is the study of the prescriptive laws of reasoning"

Do you realize that following a prescriptive law is possible only if one thought -- i.e. the thought of the required law -- applies this law to what it must control, i.e. to another thought?

The required law is not a thought, it is thought about but it itself is not a thought. A law is a pattern of behavior that has been observed to hold true. Thus, we think about laws, but we are not applying the thought to new circumstances, we are applying the law itself and (of course) resultant thoughts thereof.

And another of Tom's tidbits:

"Deductive validity is no safeguard against false conclusions. In fact, ... the truth of the statements in an argument cannot be determined by logic, and so logicians typically restrict their attention to analysis of validity."

What does this have to do with thoughts checking on thoughts? What Tom was saying was that Deductive validity is only that which can be attained by proposing two propositions and then seeing which logically follows - and that this is in no way a determined "truth", merely a valid deduction.

Mentat · Sep 27, 2003

Originally posted by Fliption
Mentat this whole discussion has been one big evolving semantic mess.

I'm going to try to stop the cycle of non-productive circular argument and start from the beginning. I have in no way suggested a biased definition. Firstly, I claimed that the difference between the 2 views was that an idealists believes that "things of the mind" have a primary existence and therefore cause the things outside the mind to exists. And a materialist claims that the things outside the mind are primary and causes the thinks inside the mind to exists. You then said that this asssumed a non-physical thing called "the mind" so I wasn't allowed to go in this direction. Now it seems you are no longer denying the existence of a mind. You're just saying that it is physical and not non-physical. Great! Considering this new information I don't understand why my original distinction cannot work. Since the distinction of what is primary and what is secondary is not dependent on whether the mind is physical or not.

Ok, let me break it down for you again...I said your definition was biased, not because it implies a mind, but because it implies a non-physical mind. The very fact that it refers to things that exist within the mind, as though these also existed in the Materialistic paradigm, jumps the gun of neutral defining before debating.

Anyway, I was trying to clarify before: I do not/have not deny(ied) the existence of the mind. All I'm saying is that a Materialist is incapable of believing in a non-physical mind.

btw, the distinction of what is primary and what is secondary is entirely dependent on whether the mind is physical or not, since, if the mind is physical then everything (or, rather, everything that pertains to philosophies of the mind (thoughts, consciousness, etc)) is physical, and there is thus no such thing as the primary/secondary distinction at all. However, if the mind is not physical (as the Idealist philosopher of the mind believes) then - and only then - the distinction of primary and secondary existence is a factor.

This last sentence implies that there is such a thing as a physical mind. The reason that I have interpreted your belief as being that one view believes in mind and the other does not is because you have been disallowing the use of the word "mind" by claiming it must be referring to a non-physical thing.

The concept you are referring to that I used is "mind". So you can see how I am even more confused as to why my definition is not the better one.

I was not referring to the word "mind", but to the phrase "things that exist only inside the mind" or "...only inside consciousness". These are non-sequitors in the Materialist paradigm, and thus make any definition that uses them biased.

Remember, if I ever refer to "mind" derogatorily, it's because it was used in a context that implies a non-physical nature.

The problem with your definition is that it does not provide the same distinction to everyone. I have tried to illustrate and show this and you seemingly agreed with me. I haven't seen any good reason that refuted anything I said. I've seen basic dictionaries make similar attempts as you but then they go on to say things like 'this doesn't mean that materialistic don't believe in "love" because they do'. So they're full of contradictions.

But a Materialist does believe in "love". They just don't believe that the word refers to something non-physical. They believe that the word "love" only refers to a particular rush of hormones, or (alternately, since there are different kinds of love) an innate tendency toward taking care of another being (called "imprinting" in Biology).

This is a pet peeve of mine. When people continually keep referring to their argument totally ignoring the counter arguments to it. LifeGazer used to do this. I have explained to you at least 3 times and Hynagogue in another thread explained the same thing to you once. Your first logical error is not an error with Idealism. It is a problem with dualism. It is as much a problem for a materialist as an idealist.

But (and take note of this, please, because I was attempting to imply this before, but am stating it directly now that I've figured out how) this is only a problem for the Materialist that has not rid him/herself of all Idealistic dispositions.

The Materialist that is completely rid of Idealistic tendencies of thought (which have somehow become natural to humans over the course of time) can avoid the dualistic problem.

Besides, my first objection is to the idea that a non-physical entity interacts with a physical one. This is not logically possible, and only the Idealistic PoV requires it.

The second logical problem makes no sense. I cannot agree with it or refute it if I don't know what it means. I suspect I am not the only one.

Would you like me to try again?

The whole point of the kind of philosophies that we are discussing is to determine how one becomes conscious. Now, if one believes that the mind is something "within" the brain, instead of a process of many parts of the brain, then they fall into the homunculan problem. The homunculan problem is the problem of determining how it is that the "inner mind" can make sense of the information that is being related to it by the brain. The only way to account for that is to say that the "inner mind" is conscious. But, the whole point of this philosophy was to determine how something is conscious (as I said in the first sentence), and so we thus have to figure out how this "inner mind" is conscious. So, now we postulate (since it is our opinion that conscious beings have "inner minds" (that is, after all, how we arrived at the problem of describing the consciousness of the "inner mind" ITFP)) that the "inner mind" has an "inner inner mind". Well, obviously our problem is only getting worse, since now this "inner inner mind" must also be conscious (or else it would be useless in processing and understanding the information given it by the "inner mind"), and we must thus postulate an "inner inner inner mind", and this cycle will continue ad infinitum.

Maybe I haven't made it any clearer, but I'm trying as hard as I can. If it helps at all, remember that this has been a philosophical Achilles' heel for Idealistic philosophies of the mind for many centuries, and is a real problem (I didn't make it up).

Basically, all it says is that, for Idealists:

1) The way a human is conscious, is not through just the brain, but through an "inner mind" (or "inner observer") which "makes sense" of the input from the brain. This is, in fact, how all things are conscious.

2) The "inner mind" must (logically) be conscious, otherwise it would have no use at all for the input from the brain, and would be useless to philosophies of the mind.

3) According to #1 the "inner mind" (in order to be conscious) must have, within it, an "inner inner mind" (not a techincal term, I know, but it illustrates the point that this next postulate is of a mind within the "inner mind").

4) This "inner inner mind" must also (logically) be conscious, according to #2.

5) Again, according to #1, this new "inner inner mind" must (in order to be conscious) have an "inner inner inner mind".

This process will continue in infinite regress, which signals to logicians and philosophers alike that it is wrong.

Mentat · Sep 27, 2003

Originally posted by Mentat
1) The way a human is conscious, is not through just the brain, but through an "inner mind" (or "inner observer") which "makes sense" of the input from the brain. This is, in fact, how all things are conscious.

btw, I meant here "This is, in fact, how all conscious things are conscious. That may have been obvious, but I wanted to leave no room for misunderstanding (if that's possible).

sascha · Sep 27, 2003

Mentat, do you realize that you are merely trying to find excuses in ever new pirouettes? When you say "... we think about laws, but we are not applying the thought to new circumstances, we are applying the law itself and (of course) resultant thoughts thereof", you say that we do e.g. not think when we apply the law of excluded middle (to quote just an example). So the law applies itself, or what?

And the next tidbit of Tom's means that doing logic, as you can advocate it, allows to express only logical validities, not truths -- as need for example to clarify the relation between thoughts and laws, etc. But I understand that you cannot see the connection.

Fliption · Sep 27, 2003

Originally posted by Mentat
btw, the distinction of what is primary and what is secondary is entirely dependent on whether the mind is physical or not, since, if the mind is physical then everything (or, rather, everything that pertains to philosophies of the mind (thoughts, consciousness, etc)) is physical, and there is thus no such thing as the primary/secondary distinction at all. However, if the mind is not physical (as the Idealist philosopher of the mind believes) then - and only then - the distinction of primary and secondary existence is a factor.

Why must the word 'secondary' imply another type of existence to you? Why can it not be used to describe the "effects" rather than the "cause"? If you look at it like this rather than as "physical" or not then all your objections of the definition go away and you have a much more functional definition for philosophy purposes as a result.

It seems you're denying the definition that isn't dependent on "physicality" by relying on the physicality distinction. This to me is just another example of assuming the conclusion.

But (and take note of this, please, because I was attempting to imply this before, but am stating it directly now that I've figured out how) this is only a problem for the Materialist that has not rid him/herself of all Idealistic dispositions.

Certainly this is true. But surely you can see that the same applies to an Idealists who has rid themselves of Materialistsic dispositions? Must Idealists be dualists?

Also, a materialists who has rid themselves of idealistic dispositions avoids your problem #1 but they open up a whole new can of philosophical worms; as I said the first time you mentioned these 2 points.

Besides, my first objection is to the idea that a non-physical entity interacts with a physical one. This is not logically possible, and only the Idealistic PoV requires it.

Why? Why musts an Idealists be a dualists?

The whole point of the kind of philosophies that we are discussing is to determine how one becomes conscious. Now, if one believes that the mind is something "within" the brain, instead of a process of many parts of the brain, then they fall into the homunculan problem. The homunculan problem is the problem of determining how it is that the "inner mind" can make sense of the information that is being related to it by the brain. The only way to account for that is to say that the "inner mind" is conscious. But, the whole point of this philosophy was to determine how something is conscious (as I said in the first sentence), and so we thus have to figure out how this "inner mind" is conscious. So, now we postulate (since it is our opinion that conscious beings have "inner minds" (that is, after all, how we arrived at the problem of describing the consciousness of the "inner mind" ITFP)) that the "inner mind" has an "inner inner mind". Well, obviously our problem is only getting worse, since now this "inner inner mind" must also be conscious (or else it would be useless in processing and understanding the information given it by the "inner mind"), and we must thus postulate an "inner inner inner mind", and this cycle will continue ad infinitum.

Ok, I think I understand that. I hate to say it but it seems like it just backs the debate up one more step. In order for this point to work, it seems you are assuming that consciousness is a complex thing that requires parts and an explanation. What this point is essentially claiming is that Idealism doesn't answer the question of consciousness. It merely begs the question and makes you go back one more step and ask the same question. But I don't think Idealism is attempting to explain consciousness. The idealistic assumption is that consciousness is the fundamental substance of existence(as opposed to matter) so no more explanation is required. You find infinite regress because you are looking at it materialistically. An idealists can ask the same questions of matter.

So if I've understood this correctly, it is no different then the old argument about god that I see here all the time. If people use god as an explanation for existence then the next question is simply "Then how do you explain god?" i.e. god explains nothing. But this argument can be made against most anything. "Consciosness"(and god in the previous example) seems more vulnerable than "matter" because you materialisitcally perceive those things to be more complex and made up of matter.

sascha · Sep 28, 2003

Mentat, maybe it is time to realize that this discussion is getting a bit boring. There is no point in insisting so doggedly on something as fallible as 'materialism'! Let me recapitulate briefly, to show you why.

The title and basic question of this thread is "Why this bias against materialism?"

Long ago I showed that in fact materialism itself introduces a bias, by its postulates for approaching matter, which influence how matter is being understood. But postulates are always a form of prejudice. Some may gradually be overcome (e.g. primitive forms of atomism, in later forms of QT), but this does not warrant that all of them are overcome.

Moreover these postulates are conceptual, not material -- contradicting the postulate that everything must be material.

Moreover they lead to no totally secure conclusion: in the end, they are subject to undecidability (e.g. as the crux of the continuum hypthesis, the indeterminism of QT, the floating character of RT, etc.).
So it is perfecly reasonable to refuse this biased world view. Refusing it is therefore not a bias, as the thread question accusingly claims.

But one could also argue from the other side than the systematic buildup: from the side of the result.
The argument that this biased world view actually works is not totally conclusive: being able to do things with this world view does not imply having understood fully what one is moving. Any ape can move matter but does not need to know the ultimate reason why it happens. He can imagine reasons, but they would be secure only once he can prove them with absolute certainty. Yet undecidability makes the absolute certainty impossible. The certainty remains relative, partial, pragmatic, provisional.

On the other hand, all you are asking for is that others should accept this relative, partial, pragmatic, provisional view as if it were an absolute. In other (somewhat metaphorical) words, you chose to look through a piece of green glass, see the world as green, and ask everybody else to adopt the same view, i.e. to take the same piece of glass for looking at the world -- merely because indeed everything can be seen through it (also e.g. consciousness) and still appears somehow recognizable.

The argument is that the only alternative to the green glass (the materialist world view) is an even worse piece of glass (the idealist world view). This argument is perfectly well understandable. But one should not agree with it, because its authors have projected their categoreal problems into the realm of ideas, calling the 'opponent' idealism. In fact, the attack is donquichottesque, a result of psychological projection. (There is ample literature on that.)

You are so proud of the 'materialist' capacity to talk 'realistically' about the world (supposed to be only material), in what I call the language of manipulability (objects and their predicates). But at the very end of that line there is a snag, which you do not seem to even know of: The welcome structure that a concept can be predicated of the property which is its intensional content (e.g. 'is round' referring to 'roundness') has its shadow in the other fact that "is a property" can be predicated of the property denoted by "being a property" (the property of being a property is a property), which leads into one version of Russell's paradox, in this case of the property of being a non-self-predicable property, which is the intensional content of the concept represented by "is a non-self-predicable property". So the property of being a non-self-predicable property both falls and does not fall under the concept of being a non-self-predicable property -- or on the other side it both falls and does not fall under the concept of being self-predicable. The proposed solutions till now are of mere avoidance, while ever-more epicycles are necessary to take into account the newly arising borderline areas (this is what your growing number of words is documenting). The structure of the problem corresponds to what Goedel has shown on (in)completeness. (There is ample literature on the the problems of predication theory.)

So what is all this insistence supposed to be??

Mentat · Sep 29, 2003

Originally posted by sascha
Mentat, do you realize that you are merely trying to find excuses in ever new pirouettes? When you say "... we think about laws, but we are not applying the thought to new circumstances, we are applying the law itself and (of course) resultant thoughts thereof", you say that we do e.g. not think when we apply the law of excluded middle (to quote just an example). So the law applies itself, or what?

No, we apply the law, not the concept of the law, but the law itself. A law is based on the patter-recognition abilities of the brain (which I have already brought up numerous times before, as essential to conscious thought), and the brain can apply these laws to similar circumstances, if it recognizes the pattern. Thus, as I said before, it is not applying some non-physical thought to the situation, but is applying a remembered pattern.

And the next tidbit of Tom's means that doing logic, as you can advocate it, allows to express only logical validities, not truths -- as need for example to clarify the relation between thoughts and laws, etc. But I understand that you cannot see the connection.

Could you restate this part of the post, please? I don't see why the fact that Deductive logic can only express validities and not absolute "truths" should have anything to do with the relationship between "thought" and "laws".

Mentat · Sep 29, 2003

Originally posted by Fliption
Why must the word 'secondary' imply another type of existence to you? Why can it not be used to describe the "effects" rather than the "cause"? If you look at it like this rather than as "physical" or not then all your objections of the definition go away and you have a much more functional definition for philosophy purposes as a result.

No, I'm sorry, but I cannot (having taken the completely Materialistic side of the argument) accept the existence of any so-called "effects". I have been saying throught my entire participation in this thread that the problem of communication is not what status to give to the "effects" of physical processes in the brain, but is instead a disagreement on whether there are "effects" at all. I have been saying that there are no such effects of physical processes, but there are only the physical processes themselves. So, when someone refers to the "effects" as being secondary, they have assumed the existence of these "effects", which is a step that the Materialist will not take.

It seems you're denying the definition that isn't dependent on "physicality" by relying on the physicality distinction. This to me is just another example of assuming the conclusion.

Not really, Fliption. I'm not realying on the physicality distinction in order to deny your definition. I would be just as happy to use your definition if it fit logically, but I don't think it does (as I've said before). My argument against your definition is simply that it makes reference to the status of "..." (nothing). It doesn't make reference to the status of anything, as far as the pure Materialist is concerned, and is thus useless to the pure Materialist since it's not referring to anything.

Trying to define the status of "effects of physicality", to a Materialist, would be like trying to define "nothingness". It just doesn't have meaning.

Certainly this is true. But surely you can see that the same applies to an Idealist who has rid himself of Materialistsic dispositions?

Not at all, and Idealistic philosopher of the mind is either a dualist or a solipsist.

Must Idealists be dualists?

No, they can be Solipsists.

Seriously, if they believe that there is a physical brain, and are still Idealists, then they must believe that there is a physical brain, and a non-physical mind...dualism.

Also, a materialists who has rid themselves of idealistic dispositions avoids your problem #1 but they open up a whole new can of philosophical worms; as I said the first time you mentioned these 2 points.

What "can of worms"?

Why? Why musts an Idealists be a dualists?

Let's clarify again that when we refer to "Idealists" in this thread, we are referring to Idealistic philosophers of the mind. IOW, a person can be an Idealist in other matters, but not in the matter of philosophies of the mind, and would thus be irrelevant to this discussion, since we are talking about the philosophies of the mind for the time being.

Anyway, an Idealist philosopher of the mind must be a dualist because s/he believes that there is a non-physical mind. If there is a non-physical mind and a physical brain, then they must correspond somehow...again, dualism.

As to the subject of Materialism and Idealism altogether (not just restricted to philosophies of the mind), it becomes not a matter of what status is given to occurances "inside consciousness" (since such a thing makes no sense to a Materialist), but rather a matter of whether anything non-physical exists(as my definition indicates). Thus, philosophy of the mind is both an example of where Materialism and Idealism contend with each other (and I believe, currently, that Materialism must win, since dualism (which is the only alternative to Solipsism, if you take the Idealistic stance) is logically impossible) and an issue that will be raised every time someone puts forth the idea that the distinction between Idealism and Materialism is what status is given to phenomenological events (you are not the first, as you have said before; it is an old mistake (IMO)).

Ok, I think I understand that. I hate to say it but it seems like it just backs the debate up one more step. In order for this point to work, it seems you are assuming that consciousness is a complex thing that requires parts and an explanation. What this point is essentially claiming is that Idealism doesn't answer the question of consciousness. It merely begs the question and makes you go back one more step and ask the same question. But I don't think Idealism is attempting to explain consciousness. The idealistic assumption is that consciousness is the fundamental substance of existence(as opposed to matter) so no more explanation is required.

But, that's the point of what I've posted just above this quote (which you've hopefully read): The subject of Idealism vs. Materialism is NOT resolved by saying that Idealists believe the fundamental substance is "consciousness", since there is a logical flaw in postulating that something exists "in consciousness" in the first place (since it would be non-physical, and thus incapable of interacting with the physical brain). So, the resolution comes instead (IMO) from saying "The Idealist believes in something non-physical. The Materialist does not".

You find infinite regress because you are looking at it materialistically. An idealists can ask the same questions of matter.

Not exactly, they'd still have to contend with the issue of non-physical things interacting with physical ones (unless they are Solipsists, but I'd really rather not address that issue, since Solipsism is a philosophy that negates philosophizing, and is utterly worthless for rational debate (for the obvious reason that a Solipsist has no one to argue with

)), while the Materialist has completely avoided that logical flaw.

So if I've understood this correctly, it is no different then the old argument about god that I see here all the time. If people use god as an explanation for existence then the next question is simply "Then how do you explain god?" i.e. god explains nothing. But this argument can be made against most anything. "Consciosness"(and god in the previous example) seems more vulnerable than "matter" because you materialisitcally perceive those things to be more complex and made up of matter.

I didn't understand this last sentence, but I think I get what you are saying. I disagree, however, since the idea consciousness (as anything other than a physical process, of course) is inherently flawed, while the idea that all is physical is not (AFAIK).

Fliption · Sep 29, 2003

[

Originally posted by Mentat
No, I'm sorry, but I cannot (having taken the completely Materialistic side of the argument) accept the existence of any so-called "effects". I have been saying throught my entire participation in this thread that the problem of communication is not what status to give to the "effects" of physical processes in the brain, but is instead a disagreement on whether there are "effects" at all. I have been saying that there are no such effects of physical processes, but there are only the physical processes themselves. So, when someone refers to the "effects" as being secondary, they have assumed the existence of these "effects", which is a step that the Materialist will not take.

Not really, Fliption. I'm not realying on the physicality distinction in order to deny your definition. I would be just as happy to use your definition if it fit logically, but I don't think it does (as I've said before). My argument against your definition is simply that it makes reference to the status of "..." (nothing). It doesn't make reference to the status of anything, as far as the pure Materialist is concerned, and is thus useless to the pure Materialist since it's not referring to anything.

Trying to define the status of "effects of physicality", to a Materialist, would be like trying to define "nothingness". It just doesn't have meaning.

Please take a moment and really think about what I'm saying Mentat. I never said that "effects" are non physical. You keep assuming this because you are preoccupied with "physical" as the distinction, when I'm suggesting to you that it isn't. Do you believe that a physical process can be the effect of another physical process? If you say 'yes', then you DO believe in "effects". Therefore, to you the materialist, the physical processes that you call consciousness are the effects of other physical processes. An Idealists would simply reverse the order of those 2 processes. Whether it is physical or not is not the distinction. It isn't even relevant. Once we rid ourselves with this pre-occupation with the "physical" concept, then we can accept this definition.

Not at all, and Idealistic philosopher of the mind is either a dualist or a solipsist.

Seriously, if they believe that there is a physical brain, and are still Idealists, then they must believe that there is a physical brain, and a non-physical mind...dualism.

When did we assume that we are only talking about non-solipsist idealism here?

What "can of worms"?

This is a topic for another thread. This one is too long. For starters I suggest reading the thread by hypnagogue on the existence of an Objective reality. Hynogoue and Heusdens have a great dialogue around the can of worms that you seem to ignore.

Anyway, an Idealist philosopher of the mind must be a dualist because s/he believes that there is a non-physical mind. If there is a non-physical mind and a physical brain, then they must correspond somehow...again, dualism.

But when did we assume that Idealists believe in physical brains?

(and I believe, currently, that Materialism must win, since dualism (which is the only alternative to Solipsism, if you take the Idealistic stance) is logically impossible) and an issue that will be raised every time someone puts forth the idea that the distinction between Idealism and Materialism is what status is given to phenomenological events (you are not the first, as you have said before; it is an old mistake (IMO)).

Logically Impossible? Then how did you do you conclude that a physical brain exists when all you have ever seen is a subjective, conscious representation of it? Who's making the leap in logic?

So, the resolution comes instead (IMO) from saying "The Idealist believes in something non-physical. The Materialist does not".

But then this means different things to different people and no meaningful conversation can be had. I'll reference most of the threads in this forum(including this one) as evidence.

Not exactly, they'd still have to contend with the issue of non-physical things interacting with physical ones (unless they are Solipsists, but I'd really rather not address that issue, since Solipsism is a philosophy that negates philosophizing, and is utterly worthless for rational debate (for the obvious reason that a Solipsist has no one to argue with )), while the Materialist has completely avoided that logical flaw.

I think you use the phrase "logical flaw" too carelessly. But then everyone thinks the opponent view has logical flaws.

Just because you think solipsism is meaningless to discuss means it is illogical? What if it's actually true?

I didn't understand this last sentence, but I think I get what you are saying. I disagree, however, since the idea consciousness (as anything other than a physical process, of course) is inherently flawed, while the idea that all is physical is not (AFAIK). [/B]

Inherently flawed? Whether it is flawed or not depends completely on how one defines the word "physical". This has been my COMPLETE point. There is nothing "inherent" in definitions. They are arbitrary concepts assigned by man for the purposes of communication. People who do not define "physical" the same way you do will not see this flaw that you see. Whatever it is.

Overall I think your pre-disposition to focus on "physical" is getting in your way of understanding my point about it's inability to serve as a good basis for distinction.

Mentat · Oct 1, 2003

Originally posted by Fliption
Please take a moment and really think about what I'm saying Mentat. I never said that "effects" are non physical.

You didn't have to say those words, you just have to look at the meaning of the word "effect". If there are both physical processes, and their effects, then their effects are not physical processes. (Deductive Logic, I think).

You keep assuming this because you are preoccupied with "physical" as the distinction, when I'm suggesting to you that it isn't. Do you believe that a physical process can be the effect of another physical process? If you say 'yes', then you DO believe in "effects".

Yes, I believe that a physical process can be the effect of another physical process, however that is not really relevant. My problem with your using the term "effect" is that these "effects" must be the results of the physical processes in the brain. But if they are the effects of the physical processes, then they themselves are not the physical processes, but something else.

Therefore, to you the materialist, the physical processes that you call consciousness are the effects of other physical processes. An Idealists would simply reverse the order of those 2 processes. Whether it is physical or not is not the distinction. It isn't even relevant. Once we rid ourselves with this pre-occupation with the "physical" concept, then we can accept this definition.

Not true, and attempt to say that there is an "effect of physical processes" is against the rule of Materialism (that all things be physical). The Materialist cannot assume that there is anything other than the physical brain function to consciousness. Where would such a process occur (not in the brain, since we already said that they are only "effects" of what happens in the brain)? In another part of the body? That would defy most of the scientific study that's been done in the fields of cognitive science and neurology.

When did we assume that we are only talking about non-solipsist idealism here?

Sorry, I made that assumption when I assumed that you believed you were conversing with someone other than yourself . Seriously, we can consider Solipsism, if you want, but must either agree that it cannot be true or that I don't exist.

This is a topic for another thread. This one is too long. For starters I suggest reading the thread by hypnagogue on the existence of an Objective reality. Hynogoue and Heusdens have a great dialogue around the can of worms that you seem to ignore.

Fine, I'll try. I've a throbbing headache and inflamation of the throat, right now, so I don't think I'll be doing that today, but maybe tomorrow.

But when did we assume that Idealists believe in physical brains?

That's a completely other matter, since any Idealist that doesn't believe in a physical brain is (I think) a Solipsist.

Logically Impossible? Then how did you do you conclude that a physical brain exists when all you have ever seen is a subjective, conscious representation of it? Who's making the leap in logic?

You and I both are. You think that I have only seen a subjective conscious representation of it. I don't make that assumption at all, but instead only believe that I've processed the light coming from an actual brain or picture thereof.

I think you use the phrase "logical flaw" too carelessly. But then everyone thinks the opponent view has logical flaws.

Just because you think solipsism is meaningless to discuss means it is illogical? What if it's actually true?

Fliption, please. It's not that we can't have a meaningful conversation, we can't have a conversation at all. There is no point in continuing any discussion of any kind, when it is even possible that Solipsism is true, since I'd merely be talking to myself (which is in itself something of a non-sequitor to the Solipsist, since one doesn't ever talk (outputting of information through any external media)).

I'm sorry, I just don't see the point of discussing anything that deals with the possibility of Solipsism being true, since in that case you don't even exist, and have nothing to offer me that is not already in my mind.

Inherently flawed? Whether it is flawed or not depends completely on how one defines the word "physical". This has been my COMPLETE point. There is nothing "inherent" in definitions. They are arbitrary concepts assigned by man for the purposes of communication. People who do not define "physical" the same way you do will not see this flaw that you see. Whatever it is.

The flaw is only "inherent" since it is a flaw in the use of concepts, not in the use of words. You are right, unbiased definitions which use only neutral words cannot be inherently flawed, but the use of biased terms makes them inherently flawed (doesn't it?).

Fliption · Oct 1, 2003

I have no idea why you cannot see what I'm saying. I can tell from this response that you have not understood me.

Physical processes can result from other physical processes. You said so yourself... So why can't you accept that consciousness is a physical process that results from another physical process? I do not understand why you cannot see this point. It seems basic to me. That's why I asked that you think about what I was saying before you responded. Maybe you've been at this too long and now cannot see the forest for the trees?

Originally posted by Mentat
You didn't have to say those words, you just have to look at the meaning of the word "effect". If there are both physical processes, and their effects, then their effects are not physical processes. (Deductive Logic, I think).

How can you say that the effects of physical processs cannot be physical processes themselves when you claim that they can be below? Right here...

Yes, I believe that a physical process can be the effect of another physical process, however that is not really relevant.

If it isn't relevant then why deny it in the previous quote? I'm completely lost.

My problem with your using the term "effect" is that these "effects" must be the results of the physical processes in the brain. But if they are the effects of the physical processes, then they themselves are not the physical processes, but something else.

Of course they are something else. They are different physical processes. What's so hard about this?

Not true, and attempt to say that there is an "effect of physical processes" is against the rule of Materialism (that all things be physical). The Materialist cannot assume that there is anything other than the physical brain function to consciousness. Where would such a process occur (not in the brain, since we already said that they are only "effects" of what happens in the brain)? In another part of the body? That would defy most of the scientific study that's been done in the fields of cognitive science and neurology.

And I don't know where any of this came from since I never said anything of the sort.

Sorry, I made that assumption when I assumed that you believed you were conversing with someone other than yourself . Seriously, we can consider Solipsism, if you want, but must either agree that it cannot be true or that I don't exist.

Now I'm really confused Mentat. If the distinction between Materialism and Idealism is the belief in physical versus non physical, then why would an Idealists who does not believe that anything physical exists be a solipsist? Why would the belief in only non-physical things mean that I am the only mind that exist?

You and I both are. You think that I have only seen a subjective conscious representation of it. I don't make that assumption at all, but instead only believe that I've processed the light coming from an actual brain or picture thereof.

You are the only person I have ever met that denies the problem of Objective knowledge.

Fliption, please. It's not that we can't have a meaningful conversation, we can't have a conversation at all. There is no point in continuing any discussion of any kind, when it is even possible that Solipsism is true, since I'd merely be talking to myself (which is in itself something of a non-sequitor to the Solipsist, since one doesn't ever talk (outputting of information through any external media)).

So I ask again, this means it isn't true?

I'm sorry, I just don't see the point of discussing anything that deals with the possibility of Solipsism being true, since in that case you don't even exist, and have nothing to offer me that is not already in my mind.

So if I don't see the point in a meaningless materialistic view of the world, does that mean I don't have to argue against it?

The flaw is only "inherent" since it is a flaw in the use of concepts, not in the use of words. You are right, unbiased definitions which use only neutral words cannot be inherently flawed, but the use of biased terms makes them inherently flawed (doesn't it?).

Definitions of words cannot be "inherently" flawed. Like Zero's original definition. There is nothing wrong with that definition if everyone agrees with it. But everyone doesn't. That definition cannot be used to distinguish 2 opposing views and allow for philosophical discussion. Your definition is better but it has the same weakness eventually.

Mentat · Oct 2, 2003

Originally posted by Fliption
I have no idea why you cannot see what I'm saying. I can tell from this response that you have not understood me.

Physical processes can result from other physical processes. You said so yourself... So why can't you accept that consciousness is a physical process that results from another physical process? I do not understand why you cannot see this point. It seems basic to me. That's why I asked that you think about what I was saying before you responded. Maybe you've been at this too long and now cannot see the forest for the trees?

Maybe. The problem is I constantly get the same feeling you are getting (that you are not understanding me).

How can you say that the effects of physical processs cannot be physical processes themselves when you claim that they can be below?

Wait a minute, I'm not saying that the effects of a physical process cannot be physical processes. I'm saying that if I say there is process A, which is the collection of physical processes of the brain (electrochemical transmissions through neurons and synapses), then I say that process B is an "effect" of process A, then I imply that process B is something other than process A.

Of course they are something else. They are different physical processes. What's so hard about this?

The fact that it all has to be processes of the brain. It is one thing to say that this or that collection of physical processes in the brain are necessary for one to think of a purple cow, and quite another to imply the existence (any kind of existence) of a purple cow; no matter what status you give its existence (primary, secondary, infinitesimal, whatever).

And I don't know where any of this came from since I never said anything of the sort.

Well, that part of the post was directed at the idea that there are A (=electrochemical processes of the brain) and B (=phenomenological events). If you separate one from the other than where does the other occur?

Now I'm really confused Mentat. If the distinction between Materialism and Idealism is the belief in physical versus non physical, then why would an Idealists who does not believe that anything physical exists be a solipsist?

What do you mean? Anyone who doesn't believe that anything physical exists (i.e. that reality is just their own thoughts) must be a Solipsist. How can you believe that everything is just a thought of your own mind and yet not be a Solipsist?

Why would the belief in only non-physical things mean that I am the only mind that exist?

I don't understand. If I only believe in the non-physical, then I have no physical body, thus I need no home, no environment, no planet, no Universe, since I am not a living replicating being, but an immaterial mind.

You are the only person I have ever met that denies the problem of Objective knowledge.

And?

So I ask again, this means it isn't true?

Probably. I can't say for sure, since I cannot experience anything outside of my own experience. Thus, I cannot state with 100% accuracy that you definitely exist, much like you cannot state with 100% accuracy that I definitely exist. However, there is still no point in debating the possibility that we are not debating at all.

So if I don't see the point in a meaningless materialistic view of the world, does that mean I don't have to argue against it?

It's not about what I think of Solipsism, it's about that Solipsism itself. As I said above, any debate with a Solipsist might just as well not have happened, since you don't really exist, as far as s/he's concerned.

Definitions of words cannot be "inherently" flawed. Like Zero's original definition. There is nothing wrong with that definition if everyone agrees with it. But everyone doesn't. That definition cannot be used to distinguish 2 opposing views and allow for philosophical discussion.

That's the point. According to you, the definition is unusable...I call that "flawed".

Fliption · Oct 2, 2003

Originally posted by Mentat
Wait a minute, I'm not saying that the effects of a physical process cannot be physical processes. I'm saying that if I say there is process A, which is the collection of physical processes of the brain (electrochemical transmissions through neurons and synapses), then I say that process B is an "effect" of process A, then I imply that process B is something other than process A.

Ok, I can agree with all of this. So if we can agree one process (let's say Process A) can cause another process(process B), then why can't a distinction between 2 views be made based on this? In other words, why can't Person X claim that Process A causes Process B and then Person Y claim that Process B causes process A? Why is this not an acceptable distinction?

The fact that it all has to be processes of the brain.

And processes of the brain are merely the effects of processes of evolution, sex(of the parents), digestion, etc. depending on what level you want to look at it. But this really isn't relevant so don't let this comment bog you down.

The fact that it all has to be processes of the brain. It is one thing to say that this or that collection of physical processes in the brain are necessary for one to think of a purple cow, and quite another to imply the existence (any kind of existence) of a purple cow; no matter what status you give its existence (primary, secondary, infinitesimal, whatever).

Great! The first part is all I'm saying! That it takes a collection of processes for one to think of a purple cow. The existence of that purple cow has no place in the definition discussion. Let's keep the philosophical discussion of Materialism versus Idealism separate from the discussion about the definition/distinction of the 2 views. This is part of the confusion I think.

What do you mean? Anyone who doesn't believe that anything physical exists (i.e. that reality is just their own thoughts) must be a Solipsist. How can you believe that everything is just a thought of your own mind and yet not be a Solipsist?

What? Why does a person who doesn't believe in anything physical believe that everything is just a thought of their own mind? You talk of these things as if they are synonymous. I don't see it.

I don't understand. If I only believe in the non-physical, then I have no physical body, thus I need no home, no environment, no planet, no Universe, since I am not a living replicating being, but an immaterial mind.

But if one non-material mind can exists, why can't 2? Why does the belief in nothing physical limit the number of non-physical minds?

HINT: By defining solipsism the way you are, you are using my definition of Materialism/Idealism which says that the distinction between the 2 views is a belief of what's inside the mind versus outside. So you're right, the extreme Idealists using this definition is a solipsists. But if you insist on the distinction being "physical" or "non-physical" then an Idealists and a solipsist are 2 different things.

That's the point. According to you, the definition is unusable...I call that "flawed".

Flawed, yes. Inherently flawed, no. That is the point. The usefulness is contingent on whether everyone can agree to the terminology to allow for proper communication. Otherwise, it is not flawed. "Inherent" implies an attribute that is separate from anything else. It's kinda like saying liver inherently taste bad.(Although I probably wouldn't argue against this too much )

Mentat · Oct 3, 2003

Originally posted by Fliption
Ok, I can agree with all of this. So if we can agree one process (let's say Process A) can cause another process(process B), then why can't a distinction between 2 views be made based on this? In other words, why can't Person X claim that Process A causes Process B and then Person Y claim that Process B causes process A? Why is this not an acceptable distinction?

Because person X, the Materialist does not believe that A causes B, s/he believes that A is B.

Forgive me if that sounded angry, I was just trying to stress the point.

Anyway, as to that whole part about the "effects" also being physical, that still leads to the homonculan problem, which I still don't think I've explained well enough to you.

Great! The first part is all I'm saying! That it takes a collection of processes for one to think of a purple cow. The existence of that purple cow has no place in the definition discussion. Let's keep the philosophical discussion of Materialism versus Idealism separate from the discussion about the definition/distinction of the 2 views. This is part of the confusion I think.

I'm sorry, my dear fellow, but that first point is not all you were saying. If it were all you were saying than we wouldn't be speaking of the "effects of physical processes", since the logical Materialist cannot believe in such effects.

To put the homunculan problem simply: What would be the point of a monitor screen inside your PC?

What? Why does a person who doesn't believe in anything physical believe that everything is just a thought of their own mind? You talk of these things as if they are synonymous. I don't see it.

My apologies, I simply assumed we were still on the subject of philosophies of the mind. A person can be an Idealist in some manners and a Materialist in others. However, in order for them to be an Idealist in the matter of philosophies of the mind, they must believe there is some non-physical aspect to thought.

But if one non-material mind can exists, why can't 2? Why does the belief in nothing physical limit the number of non-physical minds?

Because, Solipsism is only a philosophy of mind. It is not a philosophy of anything else, and doesn't need to be, because all that exists is the individual's mind. Thus, Idealists can believe in many non-physical minds floating about, but if they are dealing directly with the philosophy of the workings of the mind, and choose to believe that nothing is physical, then they choose Solipsism, and nothing else can exist.

HINT: By defining solipsism the way you are, you are using my definition of Materialism/Idealism which says that the distinction between the 2 views is a belief of what's inside the mind versus outside.

Fliption, please pay attention to what I'm actually saying. If the distinction between the Materialistic view and the Idealistic view were the belief about what's "inside the mind" versus what's "outside the mind", then the Materialist would believe that there is something "inside the mind" (otherwise the very distinction on which his belief system hinges would be unintelligible to him).

And, btw, when I define Solipsism the way I do I am merely showing the most extreme example of an Idealistic philosophy of the mind. If the distinction between Materialistic and Idealistic philosophies of the mind is (as I still hold) the distinction between whether there is something non-physical to it or not, then Solipsism follows as the most extreme example of Idealism (it holds that there is nothing but the non-physical to it ("it" being the workings of the mind)).

So you're right, the extreme Idealists using this definition is a solipsists. But if you insist on the distinction being "physical" or "non-physical" then an Idealists and a solipsist are 2 different things.

Not at all. See my above comment, and remember that Solipsism is only a philosophy of mind, while Idealism has many different applications (the part that relates to philosophies of mind, being the one that we are discussing right now).

Flawed, yes. Inherently flawed, no. That is the point. The usefulness is contingent on whether everyone can agree to the terminology to allow for proper communication. Otherwise, it is not flawed. "Inherent" implies an attribute that is separate from anything else. It's kinda like saying liver inherently taste bad.(Although I probably wouldn't argue against this too much )

Alright, I can drop the term "inherent", and hold that it is merely "flawed".

Fliption · Oct 3, 2003

I have been trying to wipe the slate clean and start over with a new example. Just when I think we can't help but make progress, you keep going back and inserting things from the prior discussion. Please let's stick with the example and explain to me why it doesn't follow.

Originally posted by Mentat
Because person X, the Materialist does not believe that A causes B, s/he believes that A is B.

No, this was not our assumption. Remember, we both agreed that physical processes can be caused by other physical processes. They are different processes from each other. One of them is the effect of the other. I fully expected this assumption to be used when I asked my question about process A and B. SO given this as an assumption, my earlier question still stands. Why can't a distinction between 2 views be made on which process causes the other? Given the assumption that we're talking about, it doesn't make sense to say that the Materialist believes process A is process B. The assumption establishes them as separate processes as I've already explained.

I hope you aren't going to respond to this by now claiming that there is no physical process that causes the physical process of consciousness. I hope we aren't going to disagree that the physical process of consciousness is caused by more basic physical process in the brain. Are we?

Anyway, as to that whole part about the "effects" also being physical, that still leads to the homonculan problem, which I still don't think I've explained well enough to you.

Well Mentat the only way to avoid this problem is for the entire universe to be one big, non-reductive process with no cause. You're saying that we cannot claim a physical process is created by other more basic physical processes?

I'm sorry, my dear fellow, but that first point is not all you were saying. If it were all you were saying than we wouldn't be speaking of the "effects of physical processes", since the logical Materialist cannot believe in such effects.

I keep getting lost with your words Mentat. First you agree that physical processes can cause other physical processes and then you turn right around and keep saying things like above. Just for clarification, a physical process that is caused by another physical process I'm calling an "EFFECT". That's been my terminology. You seem to be using this word differently. For purposes of progressing, please use it this way.

To put the homunculan problem simply: What would be the point of a monitor screen inside your PC?

So are you claiming that processes cannot cause other processes?

However, in order for them to be an Idealist in the matter of philosophies of the mind, they must believe there is some non-physical aspect to thought.

I disagree, obviously.

Because, Solipsism is only a philosophy of mind. It is not a philosophy of anything else, and doesn't need to be, because all that exists is the individual's mind. Thus, Idealists can believe in many non-physical minds floating about, but if they are dealing directly with the philosophy of the workings of the mind, and choose to believe that nothing is physical, then they choose Solipsism, and nothing else can exist.

I do not understand this distinction you keep making about "philosophy of mind" as if it's relevant to my point. Solipsism is hardly limited to an opinion on mind since it clearly is making a statement about all of reality. If somehow this "philosophy of mind" point is relevant (and I don't see how) then let's drop it and refer to the definition of Materialism and Idealism as a whole.

Fliption, please pay attention to what I'm actually saying. If the distinction between the Materialistic view and the Idealistic view were the belief about what's "inside the mind" versus what's "outside the mind", then the Materialist would believe that there is something "inside the mind" (otherwise the very distinction on which his belief system hinges would be unintelligible to him).

This is why I have tried to change the terminology for you to show you that your being entirely too picky and missing the point. I have been trying to step you through slowly how we can drop this "inside the mind" terminology and pick up terminolgy like "as a result of the process of consciousness".

You and I can agree that there is a process called Consciousness, right? I hope we can. You and I can agree that the purple cow is a result of or a representation of this process, right? You believe that the purple cow does not exists, therefore you are a materialist. If I believe that the purple cow does exists then I am an Idealist. Notice that the distinction between our 2 views is a belief about the results of a process called "consciousness". Notice how I was able to distinguish between the 2 views and there is no reference to physical or non-physical? Notice that whether or not "the process of consciousness" itself is a physical process or not doesn't interfere with our ability to discern the 2 views. As long as both views recognize the process.

Earlier I was using the word "mind" and you would claim that it doesn't work because "inside the mind" doesn't mean anything to a materialist. So I've tried to change the approach to use "physical processes" to get us past that point and show how the definition can work to distinguish the 2 views. Whether the "mind" was non-physical or not is not relevant and never was but I never could get you past that point. So as I said above, replace the word "mind" with the name of whatever physical process you think creats the purple cow and see how the distinction works.

And, btw, when I define Solipsism the way I do I am merely showing the most extreme example of an Idealistic philosophy of the mind. If the distinction between Materialistic and Idealistic philosophies of the mind is (as I still hold) the distinction between whether there is something non-physical to it or not, then Solipsism follows as the most extreme example of Idealism (it holds that there is nothing but the non-physical to it ("it" being the workings of the mind)).

So you're saying that a solipsist believes in nothing but the non-physical? How does this tie to the belief that a solipsist mind is the only mind that exists? This was my original question and you still haven't linked the two.

Mentat · Oct 10, 2003

Originally posted by Fliption
No, this was not our assumption. Remember, we both agreed that physical processes can be caused by other physical processes. They are different processes from each other. One of them is the effect of the other.

Fine, this is true. Physical processes can be produced by others, but if thought was a physical process that was produced by other physical processes in the brain, then you would have a full-blown homunculun regression.

I fully expected this assumption to be used when I asked my question about process A and B. SO given this as an assumption, my earlier question still stands. Why can't a distinction between 2 views be made on which process causes the other?

Because the homunculun regression will come up either way. The truth is, Materialism can also fall into the dualistic problem, but only Idealism can ever fall into the "non-physical/physical" problem.

Given the assumption that we're talking about, it doesn't make sense to say that the Materialist believes process A is process B. The assumption establishes them as separate processes as I've already explained.

But I never agreed that we should assume there to even be a process B. If there is, you have infinite regress, so I don't see myself accepting that assumption in the near future

.

I hope you aren't going to respond to this by now claiming that there is no physical process that causes the physical process of consciousness. I hope we aren't going to disagree that the physical process of consciousness is caused by more basic physical process in the brain. Are we?

Consciousness is caused by more basic physical processes in the brain, but so are many subsonscious activities (even ones as simple as breathing). Nothing occurs from just one "piece" of the brain working alone, there needs to be cooperation.

Well Mentat the only way to avoid this problem is for the entire universe to be one big, non-reductive process with no cause. You're saying that we cannot claim a physical process is created by other more basic physical processes?

No, I'm not. I'm saying that consciousness (including any kind of "thought") cannot be a physical process that is caused by other physical processes in the brain.

I keep getting lost with your words Mentat. First you agree that physical processes can cause other physical processes and then you turn right around and keep saying things like above. Just for clarification, a physical process that is caused by another physical process I'm calling an "EFFECT". That's been my terminology. You seem to be using this word differently. For purposes of progressing, please use it this way.

Yes, but the "effect" can be physical or non-physical and it will still fall into infinite regress. That is why I was using it somewhat differently from you: I have been aware of the homunculun problem from the beginning (I added the non-physical/physical distinction due to having read "Consciousness Explained", and it is a real problem, but I guess it's no longer relevant if you want the "effect" to be physical (now you've got the problem of why these physical "effects" don't take up space - not to mention the homunculun problem which I believe is completely insurmountable after having taken your approach)).

I do not understand this distinction you keep making about "philosophy of mind" as if it's relevant to my point. Solipsism is hardly limited to an opinion on mind since it clearly is making a statement about all of reality.

Wrong. Solipsism doesn't describe any reality except that which exists "in the mind", since it's primal principle is that there is nothing else.

If somehow this "philosophy of mind" point is relevant (and I don't see how) then let's drop it and refer to the definition of Materialism and Idealism as a whole.

I can't do that. The discussion of philosophies of the mind is an essential step, since one can constantly refer to things that occur "inside the mind" or "within consciousness", unless the point is cleared up from the get-go.

This is why I have tried to change the terminology for you to show you that your being entirely too picky and missing the point. I have been trying to step you through slowly how we can drop this "inside the mind" terminology and pick up terminolgy like "as a result of the process of consciousness".

But there can be no "resultant" or "emergent" properties. There can be no monitor in the PC. It would fall into infinite regress, and what would be its purpose be anyway?

You and I can agree that the purple cow is a result of or a representation of this process, right?

NO!

That's the whole point, I don't believe a purple cow results from any process of the mind, just as I don't believe an actual cow has any representation in your brain when you see one with your eyes. There are electrochemical processes and nothing else (unless you leave the Materialistic paradigm, and I can't (currently) do that).

You believe that the purple cow does not exists, therefore you are a materialist.

What purple cow?

If I believe that the purple cow does exists then I am an Idealist. Notice that the distinction between our 2 views is a belief about the results of a process called "consciousness". Notice how I was able to distinguish between the 2 views and there is no reference to physical or non-physical?

But you did it wrong (no offense), and so of course you were able to do it without reference to the non-physical/physical distinction.

Earlier I was using the word "mind" and you would claim that it doesn't work because "inside the mind" doesn't mean anything to a materialist. So I've tried to change the approach to use "physical processes" to get us past that point and show how the definition can work to distinguish the 2 views. Whether the "mind" was non-physical or not is not relevant and never was but I never could get you past that point.

Because the homunculun problem is a reflexively expressed problem in my mind. It does not go away, even if I don't express it "out loud" all the time.

So you're saying that a solipsist believes in nothing but the non-physical? How does this tie to the belief that a solipsist mind is the only mind that exists?

Because, if only some singular mind exists, then there are no physical realities.

Fliption · Oct 10, 2003

Originally posted by Mentat
Fine, this is true. Physical processes can be produced by others, but if thought was a physical process that was produced by other physical processes in the brain, then you would have a full-blown homunculun regression.

I do not understand why you keep bringing up this homunculun problem. I am trying to accommodate your materialistic assumptions by claiming that the mind, consciousness etc is nothing special and is nothing more than physical processes. These physical processes are no different then the physical process of an automobile working. The process of an automobile working is of course dependent on the less complex processes involving fuel consumption, lubrication, frictionless revolution and shock absorbtion of wheels, etc etc. What is wrong with this comparison? Why does this homunculun problem only a problem when I'm talking about the brain and no other physical process? It seems you are the one glorifying consciousness.

Because the homunculun regression will come up either way. The truth is, Materialism can also fall into the dualistic problem, but only Idealism can ever fall into the "non-physical/physical" problem.

Perhaps this is getting close to a response of what I've written above but I don't understand exactly what you mean.

But I never agreed that we should assume there to even be a process B. If there is, you have infinite regress, so I don't see myself accepting that assumption in the near future .

So you're saying that everything in the universe is just one big process and cannot be reductively separated? This just doesn't make sense to me.

You said this...

Consciousness is caused by more basic physical processes in the brain, but so are many subsonscious activities

Then you said this...

I'm saying that consciousness (including any kind of "thought") cannot be a physical process that is caused by other physical processes in the brain.

Tell me why these don't contradict one another. I'm not trying to be difficult, I really just don't understand your point. These 2 quotes seem like contradictions so I cannot grasp what your trying to say.

Yes, but the "effect" can be physical or non-physical and it will still fall into infinite regress. That is why I was using it somewhat differently from you: I have been aware of the homunculun problem from the beginning (I added the non-physical/physical distinction due to having read "Consciousness Explained", and it is a real problem, but I guess it's no longer relevant if you want the "effect" to be physical (now you've got the problem of why these physical "effects" don't take up space - not to mention the homunculun problem which I believe is completely insurmountable after having taken your approach)).

Here I don't think you've understood what I'm saying. I'm not claiming the existence of any effects and trying to called them physical. It seems you think I am because you're asking me "why don't they take up space?". I'm just restating what you've told me. I'm saying let's assume consciousness is nothing but a physical process. Do you not agree with this?

Wrong. Solipsism doesn't describe any reality except that which exists "in the mind", since it's primal principle is that there is nothing else.

To claim there is nothing else but what is in my mind is making statements about reality, Mentat.

I can't do that. The discussion of philosophies of the mind is an essential step, since one can constantly refer to things that occur "inside the mind" or "within consciousness", unless the point is cleared up from the get-go.

But I'm not using that terminology anymore. I've moved from that terminology several posts ago. My position isn't changing but I'me having to jump through semantic hoops to get you to see that you're definition doesn't work. So I'm not using things like "inside the mind" anymore.

NO!
That's the whole point, I don't believe a purple cow results from any process of the mind, just as I don't believe an actual cow has any representation in your brain when you see one with your eyes. There are electrochemical processes and nothing else (unless you leave the Materialistic paradigm, and I can't (currently) do that).

I just do not understand this point. It seems like a semantic nightmare.

What purple cow?

You tell me Mentat. You're the one that initially brought it up. Why would you do that if it communicates nothing?

Because, if only some singular mind exists, then there are no physical realities.

Ahh but see you reversed it. This definition is not what you said an idealist believes. Of course, if a person believes they are the only mind to exists then you could conclude that they also believe there is nothing physical.But the definition is flipped in that example.

You said that an idealists believes there is nothing physical. So you have to begin with this belief! Not the belief that "I am the only mind". If you start with that belief then you're using my definition of ldealism.

I'm trying to get you to make the connection from the belief that nothing is physical(first!) to one that says "I am the only mind". You'll notice that if you reverse your statement above, it is no longer true. It would read

"Because, if there are no physical realities then only some singular mind exists. This is not necessarily true.

If you go back to how this discussion started, you'll see that this is the more relevant order.

Esoteric · Oct 10, 2003

“Scientific reasoning,” Alfred North Whitehead wrote, is itself — and must be — “completely dominated by the presupposition that mental functionings are not properly part of nature.” The assertion that they are part of nature is self-refuting, because it robs all thoughts and statements of any possible rational validity or truth."

oppinions?.

Zero · Oct 11, 2003

Originally posted by Esoteric
“Scientific reasoning,” Alfred North Whitehead wrote, is itself — and must be — “completely dominated by the presupposition that mental functionings are not properly part of nature.” The assertion that they are part of nature is self-refuting, because it robs all thoughts and statements of any possible rational validity or truth."

oppinions?.

It sounds like wishful thinking to me...

sascha · Oct 11, 2003

I guess what Whitehead means is that if thinking were fully determined by nature, thinking about nature would be self-limited, because the mental instance could only experience being fully determined. In other words, being determined (in this case by nature) excludes being 'above' that thing, i.e. non-determined. What do you mean, Zero, by "wishful thinking" in this respect?

I guess there can only be much misunderstanding in these questions as long as the will (required for the act of thinking to be reasonable) as a subjectively necessary element is mixed up (con-fused) with the contents of thinking, which have to relate to each other in an objective way. The brain is an inevitably necessary condition too, but this does not mean that it is 100.00% causal -- unless one remains in the mentioned conceptual mixup, as is widely the case in the current mainstream of philosophy of mind too (which can't account for the will, it simply disregards it). So that's precisely where the interpretations of empirical facts are clashing, also in this debate.

For whoever believes the will is irrelevant: try empirically to think clearly about something without directing your will so the result will be reasonable.

What Whitehead says, on the other hand, accounts for the self-limitedness of many positions in the current debate, who can't see their own 'blind spot', precisely because they let themselves be determined by aspects of what they would like to talk about.

Zero · Oct 12, 2003

Here we go with the blah blah blah about 'will' not being accounted for. Again, the entire point of the arguments agaist reality is hoping for a special exemption for people.

Loren Booda · Oct 12, 2003

Be a Material Conservative. You can't take it with you, and most don't have it to begin with.

Zero · Oct 12, 2003

I'll say again; 'will' is like 'propulsion'...we don't claim that a rocket's movement is apart from the workings of the rocket, so why do we treat the actions of the brain as apart from the brain itself?

Mentat · Oct 13, 2003

Originally posted by Fliption
I do not understand why you keep bringing up this homunculun problem. I am trying to accommodate your materialistic assumptions by claiming that the mind, consciousness etc is nothing special and is nothing more than physical processes. These physical processes are no different then the physical process of an automobile working. The process of an automobile working is of course dependent on the less complex processes involving fuel consumption, lubrication, frictionless revolution and shock absorbtion of wheels, etc etc. What is wrong with this comparison? Why does this homunculun problem only a problem when I'm talking about the brain and no other physical process? It seems you are the one glorifying consciousness.

Oh boy. Forgive me if I get a little impatient, it's been a long day...somebody actually misused the Exercise in "nothing" semantics - that's never happened before - and then somebody else reiterated the same misunderstanding of another topic on at least three different threads...anyway, I'll try to remain good-spirited in my response

.

Alright, you can't see why I keep bringing up the homunculun problem. Here's why: every time you mention a process that occurs in the brain, as a result of the processing functions of the brain, and call it (this new process, which is an effect of the brain's electrochemical processes) "consciousness", you introduce the idea of a "mind's eye". It's inevitable, because what good would it do me to have an inner display of "qualia" of there was no viewer on the inside to "see" them? And if there is such a viewer (no matter what form he takes) then you have infinite regress.

Perhaps this is getting close to a response of what I've written above but I don't understand exactly what you mean.

I mean that I still like my definitions of Materialism and Idealism, since either of them could fall into the dualistic problem (which the problem that your definition focuses on) but only one can fall into the non-physical/physical problem.

So you're saying that everything in the universe is just one big process and cannot be reductively separated? This just doesn't make sense to me.

I wasn't making a statement about everything in the Universe, just the things in the brain.

You said this...

Then you said this...

Tell me why these don't contradict one another. I'm not trying to be difficult, I really just don't understand your point. These 2 quotes seem like contradictions so I cannot grasp what your trying to say.

Alright, I see what the problem is, and apologize. No, they are not contradictory, but I may have slightly mis-stated the second one. You see, a particular thought or a particular "picture in the mind" (or anything of this nature, which I refer to as phenomenological events, hypnagogue prefers the term "qualia", it doesn't really matter, as long as you understand what I'm saying) does not exist, either physically or non-physically; there's just no such thing. Now, consciousness itself (being aware and self-conscious, and all that) is a physical process of the brain, but when one refers to an individual thought they fall into logical error, which means that we should eliminate the idea of an individual thought and replace it with Dennett's model (or another that does the same job better, I suppose).

Thus, what I'm saying is that phenomenological events don't exist. In fact, when I refer to "phenomenological events" I'm using words to describe...absolutely nothing - except, of course, a misconception that is commonly engrained in the human mind, of the actual processes of the mind.

Here I don't think you've understood what I'm saying. I'm not claiming the existence of any effects and trying to called them physical. It seems you think I am because you're asking me "why don't they take up space?". I'm just restating what you've told me. I'm saying let's assume consciousness is nothing but a physical process. Do you not agree with this?

Oh. I agree that we should just assume that consciousness is nothing but a physical process, but I don't think that we have quite the same vision. In my (currently Materialistic) concept, there are no thoughts at all, merely the question/answer "game" of the different neurons and sets thereof in the brain.

So, basically, my concept of "consciousness as nothing but a physical process" is: Look at the brain, see the neurons and synapses, there is nothing else.

To claim there is nothing else but what is in my mind is making statements about reality, Mentat.

Yes, statements about reality, but reality would only be that which went on in your mind, and thus every statement about reality (to the Solipsist) is merely (only, and nothing but) a statement about their own mind (since nothing else exists).

But I'm not using that terminology anymore. I've moved from that terminology several posts ago. My position isn't changing but I'me having to jump through semantic hoops to get you to see that you're definition doesn't work. So I'm not using things like "inside the mind" anymore.

It doesn't matter if you've changed the terminology in these particular posts. The matter still stands that your definitions from before require a distinction between that which occurs "inside the mind" and that which occurs outside the mind, which is the wrong distinction (a logically non-existent one). My definitions, OTOH, have been rooted in the distinction between belief in only the physical or something else. The only reason we are still discussing philosophies of the mind, instead of tackling the big picture (the whole paradigms of Materialism and Idealism) is because of your definitions (and all those like it which come from a (IMO) misconception about the issue at hand).

I just do not understand this point. It seems like a semantic nightmare.

In many senses, it is. However, I can attempt to simplify it for you: Materialist belief on philosophies of the mind = there are electrochemical activities involving synapses and neurons, and, in order for this to become conscious it also requires...nothing. It doesn't require anything, because those synaptic activities are consciousness.

You tell me Mentat. You're the one that initially brought it up. Why would you do that if it communicates nothing?

To illustrate the confusion that is brought up from assuming that there is such a thing as a phenomenological event.

Ahh but see you reversed it. This definition is not what you said an idealist believes. Of course, if a person believes they are the only mind to exists then you could conclude that they also believe there is nothing physical.But the definition is flipped in that example.

You said that an idealists believes there is nothing physical. So you have to begin with this belief!

What?? I never said an Idealist believe there is nothing physical. I said a Solipsist believes there is nothing physical. An Idealist believes that there is something non-physical (the amount of things that are non-physical is greater than or equal to 1).

Not the belief that "I am the only mind". If you start with that belief then you're using my definition of ldealism.

I'm trying to get you to make the connection from the belief that nothing is physical(first!) to one that says "I am the only mind". You'll notice that if you reverse your statement above, it is no longer true. It would read

"Because, if there are no physical realities then only some singular mind exists. This is not necessarily true.

Actually, it is. If there are no physical realities, and yet I'm still conscious of something, then my mind must exist, while nothing else does.

Why the bias against materialism?

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