Japan Earthquake: nuclear plants Fukushima part 2

In summary, there was a magnitude-5.3 earthquake that hit Japan's Fukushima prefecture, causing damage to the nuclear power plant. There is no indication that the earthquake has caused any damage to the plant's containment units, but Tepco is reinforcing the monitoring of the plant in response to the discovery of 5 loose bolts. There has been no news about the plant's fuel rods since the earthquake, but it is hoped that fuel fishing will begin in Unit 4 soon.
  • #1
Greg Bernhardt
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Part 1 can be found here:
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=480200


Magnitude-5.3 earthquake hits Japan's Fukushima
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/09/19/japan-fukushima-nuclear-plant/2835493/

A magnitude-5.3 earthquake has hit the Japanese prefecture that is home to the nuclear power plant crippled in the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami.

The U.S. Geological Survey says the quake struck early Friday at a depth of about 13 miles under Fukushima Prefecture and about 110 miles northeast of Tokyo.

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center did not issue an alert.
 
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  • #2
What is the reason for thread closure, please?
 
  • #3
zapperzero said:
What is the reason for thread closure, please?

Not closed, moving to part 2. After 14k posts it becomes a system performance issue.
 
  • #4
Greg Bernhardt said:
Not closed, moving to part 2. After 14k posts it becomes a system performance issue.

If that is the case, can it get pinned?

Although long, it is probably THE best resource on the web for the events there and it would be a waste for it to drop down the page list.
 
  • #5
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130921/index.html On 17 September, Tepco found 5 loosened bolts in the bottom plates of the tank, which is being dismantled. That could be the leakage cause. They also found resin deformation and rust in different locations, which might also have been causal. There is no way to directly inspect the other 300 or so tanks, and it is impossible to replace them immediately. For that reason, Tepco is reinforcing the monitoring.
 
  • #6
Bandit127 said:
If that is the case, can it get pinned?

Although long, it is probably THE best resource on the web for the events there and it would be a waste for it to drop down the page list.

How about editing Borek's first message in the Fukushima pin at https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3323700&postcount=1 ?
 
  • #8
Bandit127 said:
If that is the case, can it get pinned?

seconded
EDIT: also, is it possible to post an archive of it somewhere, now that it is closed and the archive would no longer need to be updated? I'd hate for it to someday go the way of the unit 3 explosion thread...
 
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  • #9
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6TxqAGZOX7s

Gregory Jaczko conference in Tokyo today.
 
  • #12
a.ua. said:
will soon begin fuel fishing in Unit 4
http://photo.tepco.co.jp/date/2013/201309-j/130925-02j.html

Sorry for the wholly unscientific questions, but ... Assuming fuel removal goes well at the Unit 4 pool, does TEPCO then still have to build a similar structure(s) for Unit 3 or otherwise reconstruct the fuel removal equipment to remove the pool contents? What about Unit 1 and 2's building integrity/removal equipment for the fuel pools?
Thanks.
 
  • #13
mscharisma said:
Sorry for the wholly unscientific questions, but ... Assuming fuel removal goes well at the Unit 4 pool, does TEPCO then still have to build a similar structure(s) for Unit 3 or otherwise reconstruct the fuel removal equipment to remove the pool contents?

Yes, Units 3 and 1 will need something similar - after debris is removed, surfaces (the floor, for example) decontaminated and repaired.

Repair - new layers of concrete - in this case will also work as shielding - a lot of beta contamination by now seeped into concrete and is impossible to remove.

What about Unit 1 and 2's building integrity/removal equipment for the fuel pools?

Unit 2 is physically intact but very contaminated - IIRC, close to 1000 rem/h on the refueling floor.
 
  • #14
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130926/1145_minaoshi.html As a follow-up of the stack crack problem, the NRA instructs Tepco to revise the assumed maximum earthquake. Before the accident, the stack had been assessed as being safe under the assumed maximum earthquake. For that purpose, Tepco will make plans to investigate active faults. If the assumed maximum earthquake is revised, all earthquake safety assessments, for example of reactor buildings, have to be done again.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130926/1145_saikai.html Water treatment facility ALPS's hot testing has been started again today. It had been suspended as a consequence of a leak, which had been caused by corrosion. The test is starting on the line where corrosion countermeasures have been implemented. The other two lines will be started one after another, starting in mid-November. The resulting treatment capacity will be 500 ton/day. Under the government funded plans, the treatment capacity will be brought to 1500 ton/day within next fiscal year. However there is still no decision taken concerning what to do with the resulting tritiated water.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130926/1145_tunk.html (26 September 2013) Tepco found a gap between bottom plates on the location where loose bolts had been found. The gap was found by using a chemical that makes bubbles and by watching the bubbles being sucked into the gap.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/en/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130920_09-e.pdf (20 September 2013) Investigation of the Inside of Tank No.5 in H4 Area

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130830_10-j.pdf (30 August 2013) H4 area tank leakage (36 pages, Japanese)

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130926_04-j.pdf After a qualification test on 20 September, on 24 September a robot measured water level inside unit 2 suppression chamber. The results are currently being assessed.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130912_11-j.pdf (12 September 2013) Qualification test for the suppression chamber inner water level measurement robots. The robots are equipped with ultrasonic sensors. The test is performed at unit 5. There are two kinds of robots : a fixed type and a moving type.
 
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  • #16
When following the various events and "informations" about this disaster since the very beginning, it's astounding to try to list the number of "inconsistencies" (or lies?) that have been explained by the various actors, Tepco being the number one but the government being a close number two...

Two examples:

-Tepco revised recently their assessment of the daily volume of groundwater flowing into the plant from the mountains, the volume that they had to pump and consequently the volume of contaminated groundwater that flows everyday directly to the sea: 800 m3 should come from the mountains, 400m3 are pumped and stored, and 400m3 would consequently flow directly to te sea. Well. The problem is that Tepco also confirmed that before the accident, they were pumping between 850 and 1200m on a daily basis to avoid inputs of groundwater inside the basements of the buildings because of the way the plant was erected: the 30m hill above see level was transformed to the platform 10m high that we know (probably to lower the energy required to pump in the seawater used for cooling the reactors, making it vulnerable to high amplitude tsunamis as we know). So how could it be 800 m3 today if the volume pumped before the accident was already 850 to 1200 m3?

- Tepco apparently confirmed recently that reactors 5 and 6 are pumping 6000 m3 every hour to cool the reactors INTO THE PORT, and rejecting them OUTSIDE OF THE PORT... Tsutsuji, could you confirm this info from the links given here (in japanese)?

http://fukushima-diary.com/2013/09/...ima-port-to-discharge-to-outside-of-the-port/

If true, how can it be possible (we know it's not!) to say that contaminated water is enclosed into the port (Tepco didn't say it, but Abe did!) ??

EDIT: the link to this document from August 2013 is said to refer to a coolant volume à 7000 m3/h (which is huge?) for 5 and 6 but i didn't find the data in the document (i don't read japanese, even if numbers are the same!). But page 58 seem to show a map with arrows to represent the various flows, but i don't understand all the details (is there a kind of dam between side of the port toward reactors 5 and 6 and the other ones, like this red line between the two sides of the port seems to suggest?)

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130821_10-j.pdf
 
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  • #17
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130927/index.html The "International Research Institute for Nuclear Decommissioning", a foreign specialist research group, had a meeting in Tokyo on 27 September. Englishman Adrian Simper said the consequences of a frozen soil wall must be carefully studied before taking the decision to build one or not. Tepco vice president Aizawa said that as a frozen wall could be the "trump card" to solve the issue, careful steps such as making an experiment, will be taken. Also opinions were expressed saying that removing the contaminated water from the trenches and repairing the drain system have the highest priority. Adrian Simper said that no countermeasure is devoid of counter effect or uncertainty, so that risk and uncertainty have to be discussed.

http://irid.or.jp/cw/ Request for Information for Contaminated Water Issues (English)

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130927/2049_senmon.html A national specialist council was convened on 27 September. They released a plan with additional countermeasures addressing risk associated with contaminated water issues. It includes equipping the basements with pumps to control water levels, and preparing the method to quickly transfer water into another facility in the case a leak occurs in a storage tank. Secondary countermeasures are also requested to prepare for the case when primary countermeasures are not working smoothly. The plan is still being discussed. As member(s) said "the ground water flow is still unknown", it was decided to create a specialist team to address ground water flow and the spread of contamination. The specialist council will perform an onsite surveys and review available technology from Japan and abroad. They plan to reach conclusions on risk and responses by the end of this year.

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/20130927_01.html The 7th contaminated water treatment countermeasure committee, 27 Septembre 2013

http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130927/130927_01a.pdf Agenda
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130927/130927_01b.pdf Participants
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130927/130927_01c.pdf Study of countermeasures for contaminated water problem risk elimination
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130927/130927_01d.pdf Points to be discussed toward the within-this-year reach of conclusions
http://www.meti.go.jp/earthquake/nuclear/pdf/130927/130927_01e.pdf Onsite progress status concerning the contaminated water problem​

The NRA has its own Fukushima Daiichi contaminated water working group. Here is their last meeting :

http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi_wg/20130912.html The 6th special nuclear facility study committee, contaminated water countermeasure working group, 12 September 2013

http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi_wg/data/0006_99.pdf Agenda
1-1 http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi_wg/data/0006_01.pdf Basic principles as regards the contaminated water problem
1-2 http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi_wg/data/0006_02.pdf Outline of the basic principles as regards the contaminated water problem
1-3 http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi_wg/data/0006_03.pdf The 1st contaminated water countermeasure onsite adjustment meeting
2 http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi_wg/data/0006_04.pdf Points made by the nuclear regulation agency at the contaminated water countermeasure onsite adjustment meeting
3 http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi_wg/data/0006_05r.pdf Contaminated water leakage at H4 tank area (Tepco)
4 http://www.nsr.go.jp/committee/yuushikisya/tokutei_kanshi_wg/data/0006_06.pdf Seawater and groundwater contamination eastwards of turbine buildings : nuclide concentration status and response (Tepco)​
 
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  • #18
jlduh said:
- Tepco apparently confirmed recently that reactors 5 and 6 are pumping 6000 m3 every hour to cool the reactors INTO THE PORT, and rejecting them OUTSIDE OF THE PORT... Tsutsuji, could you confirm this info from the links given here (in japanese)?

http://fukushima-diary.com/2013/09/...ima-port-to-discharge-to-outside-of-the-port/

The "about 6000 m³/hour" data can be found in the press conference transcript at http://genpatsu-watch.blogspot.com/2013/09/20139261730-8.html below timing 00:54:55 when Mr Ono replies to a question about the unit 5-6 silt fence breakup.

The 7000 m³/h data is from page 60 of the following document :

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130821_10-j.pdf

Page 58/78

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  • #20
Again, great thank you Tsutsuji for the confirmations and the translation of the map!

So do others here come to the conclusion that through the pumping of 6000/7000 m3/h into the port for cooling reactors 5 and 6, there is inevitably contamination that is therefore rejected directly into the sea at the point of the extreme left blue arrow on the map? It may be one of the reasons why they have erected this wall with tubes along reactors 1 to 4...
 
  • #21
jlduh said:
So do others here come to the conclusion that through the pumping of 6000/7000 m3/h into the port for cooling reactors 5 and 6, there is inevitably contamination that is therefore rejected directly into the sea at the point of the extreme left blue arrow on the map?

As I recall the regular checking of seawater does not show much contamination there.
 
  • #22
  • #23
jlduh said:
- Tepco apparently confirmed recently that reactors 5 and 6 are pumping 6000 m3 every hour to cool the reactors INTO THE PORT, and rejecting them OUTSIDE OF THE PORT... Tsutsuji, could you confirm this info from the links given here (in japanese)?

http://fukushima-diary.com/2013/09/...ima-port-to-discharge-to-outside-of-the-port/

If true, how can it be possible (we know it's not!) to say that contaminated water is enclosed into the port (Tepco didn't say it, but Abe did!) ??

I don't see how water in the port can be prevented from mixing with the ocean. The tides move water in and out regularly, right?
 
  • #24
tsutsuji said:
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130928/index.html Multinuclide removal facility ALPS, which had been restarted at 00:00 AM on 27 September, was shutdown at 10 PM on the same day, when a waste liquid flow was found to be low. Tepco will insert a camera in the pipe to see if it is clogged.

A plastic pad got stuck in a drain apparently. Hopefully now all is well.
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/29/plastic-pad-clogs-fukushima-water-cleaning-system/

Regarding the pumping rate to Units 5 and 6, I have a naive question (actually a sanity check). 6,000 m3 an hour? That's 6,000 tons (or to use a "unit" favoured by the BBC just over 2 olympic swimming pools) an hour. I thought units 1 - 4 were only adding 500 t a day to the water storage and therefore only consuming that amount. Is that a typo by Tepco?
 
  • #25
Bandit127 said:
A plastic pad got stuck in a drain apparently. Hopefully now all is well.
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/09/29/plastic-pad-clogs-fukushima-water-cleaning-system/

Pictures are available in http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_130929_03-j.pdf

Bandit127 said:
Regarding the pumping rate to Units 5 and 6, I have a naive question (actually a sanity check). 6,000 m3 an hour? That's 6,000 tons (or to use a "unit" favoured by the BBC just over 2 olympic swimming pools) an hour. I thought units 1 - 4 were only adding 500 t a day to the water storage and therefore only consuming that amount. Is that a typo by Tepco?

I am afraid you are comparing data that cover different things.

The 6000 m3/hour of seawater cover the cooling of both the cores and the spent fuel pools of units 5 and 6, using thermal exchangers to cool fresh water in the secondary circuits. The flow rate in each secondary circuit must be a fraction of those 6000 m3/hour, depending on the efficiency of each thermal exchanger.

The water added to storage is quite unrelated to the amount poured into the reactors. The water added to storage is mostly related to the ground water level and the size of the cracks in the basement walls, through which ground water infiltrates into basements.
 
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  • #26
Too bad the ALPS design did not include screens over the fluid ports.
Then again, this is a one of a kind design that probably did not get the kind of production engineering that would normally apply. Afaik, it is the only high volume full spectrum radioactive metal ion remover ever built.
When it works, it should leave only tritium contamination, a problem that can be reasonably solved by dumping it offshore for sea water dilution.
 
  • #27
nikkkom said:
I don't see how water in the port can be prevented from mixing with the ocean. The tides move water in and out regularly, right?

See no major technical problems in the implementation plan for the complete closure of the port. It would be a desire, facilities exist.

Another thing that completely closing the port they turn it into a radioactive lake.
But the little Japanese trick, an additional net inflow and outflow of dirty water
 
  • #28
Surely that is somewhat tendentious.
The huge cooling flow for reactors 5 and 6 is purely for heat management, the sea water that comes in is not contaminated, only heated a few degrees and flushed out. As Tsutsuji-san pointed out, it is processed through a secondary heat exchanger and never gets into the reactor.
The flows into (and out of) reactors 1-4 are quite different, mostly because they are makeshifts to keep damaged reactors cool. Obviously the flow paths are wrong, else we would not be having steam bubbling up from the wreck of reactor 3 while pouring in hundreds of tons of water per hour. Unfortunately, it is as good as we can do with the damaged structure that we have.
Imho, it is only through a miracle of Japanese grit that this disaster did not get much worse. We can be grateful that the long term contamination will be moderate, sort of as if Tokyo was shifted to Denver. Clearly the Japanese government is prevaricating about those effects, but it is unworthy of you to speak of 'little Japanese trick'. The actual work done is very impressive.
 
  • #29
I'm sorry if hurt you.
Devil's translator,I say it's cunning, it's not trick.
Water from the port (a dirty place) falls into the ocean through the reactors 5 and 6. (In this case the heat exchanger reactors is a cleaner place.)
Thus speeding up the inflow of clean water out of the sea through the main gate of the port.
 
  • #30
Not hurt, more surprised. As the coolant intakes were always there, it seems incorrect to speak of a 'trick' now.
Your point about the port flushing action of this flow is well taken however. It, along with the volume of ground water, is another murky element in determining the actual contaminant flows from the site.
Imho the lack of objective clarity about the situation is hugely detrimental to the nuclear industry's future.
Having survived a beyond worst case accident with minimal loss of life, even factoring in the evacuations, the industry should be shouting the facts from the rooftops, not parsing out fragments of disconnected data. It was an axiom in the aerospace industry that if you can't hide it, paint it red! That way you are in charge of the narrative and can manage the disclosure, rather than some third party.
The nuclear industry by contrast has abdicated its information role to the government, which allows the government to push the onus onto the nuclear industry. So the nuclear industry gets blamed for the lack of transparency. The gradual loss of confidence in the industry's integrity will take years to restore, as the players are discovering now that the restart requests are getting slow rolled..
 
  • #32
tsutsuji said:
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20130930/index.html The gum pads found obstructing the pipe in ALPS had been laid at the bottom of the feet of a ladder during a past inspection. The employees had forgotten to remove them at the end of the inspection.

Perhaps this work might be run under operating theatre rules, where all the pads and tools are counted before and after the work. Hospitals in the US adopted this procedure after the lawsuit costs arising out of similar operating room mistakes became intolerable.
 
  • #33
http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20131001/1520_mizu.html By mistake rain water from a dam surrounding a tank area was transferred to the wrong temporary tank, which resulted into a 4 ton overflow. Tepco is currently analysing the overflowed water's radioactivity.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/nu/fukushima-np/handouts/2013/images/handouts_131001_07-j.pdf Japanese language handout with picture of the overflow.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20131002/index.html The overflowed water has 390 Bq/litre of all beta. This is a comparatively high concentration in reference to the 30 Bq/litre strontium standard allowing sea release.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20131001/1050_amamizu.html Tepco is submitting a procedure for approval by the NRA, defining how to deal with rain water inside the tank area dams. Under the submitted plan, one of the conditions allowing to release the water into the exhaust water ditch is that all beta except tritium is below 10 Bq/litre. If it is above, the water is put back into the tanks. There is also a criteria for cesium concentration. However, as the measurement of tritium takes time, there is no plan to set a criteria for tritium.

http://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/genpatsu-fukushima/20131001/0443_kiteiihan.html The NRA Agency is blaming Tepco for failing to contain 200 tons of contaminated soil (resulting from the H4 area tank leakage) inside metal containers, as required by Tepco's internal regulations. Tepco said they ran out of metal containers. Instead, the contaminated soil is in bags stored on, and covered by waterproof sheets. "No entry" warning signs are also missing. The NRA Agency is worrying that contamination might spread if the contaminated Earth is washed away by rain and wind.
 
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  • #34
http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/2013/1231126_5117.html Leakage (about the size of a pencil) was seen at the roof plate of B area, A group, tank No. 5.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/2013/1231127_5117.html The leaked water at B area, A group, tank No. 5. has 200,000 Bq/litre of all beta.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/2013/1231129_5117.html We can't rule out that the leaked water could have flowed to the sea.

http://www.jiji.com/jc/c?g=soc_30&k=2013100300070 The probable causes for the roof plate leakage are as follows : only a few bolts were tightened. The tank was over-filled. 5 tanks were filled together, using a water level gauge located on the western-most tank. The leaked tank is the eastern-most one, and the land is inclined from west to east, so that the leaked tank is lower.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/2013/1231121_5117.html The dam of H8 area has overflowed with rain water because of the typhoon.

http://www.tepco.co.jp/cc/press/2013/1231123_5117.html The water inside the H8 area dam has 15 Bq/l of all beta.
 
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