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DrChinese said:I like what you have to say about "if locality is true, there must exist a certain kind of hidden variables which determine the outcomes on each side". That is a great way to frame the argument about local reality. And I agree about the importance of getting EPR and Bell straight, which is why I try to stay close to their words on the subject where possible.
But I disagree about Bell not finding something wrong with EPR. There is something wrong with EPR, and Bell showed it to us!
The thing I said that you liked ("if locality is true, there must exist a certain kind of hidden variables which determine the outcomes on each side") is simply a summary of the EPR conclusion. So I don't see how/why you claim to like this statement, given that you think "there is something wrong with EPR."
EPR said both of the following:
a) Either QM is incomplete, or there is not simultaneous reality to non-commuting observables.
In other words, either QM is incomplete, or it is complete. (Either the two quantities whose simultaneous values are restricted by the HUP are both simultaneously real, or they aren't. If they are real, orthodox QM is incomplete; if they aren't simultaneously real, QM is complete, at least in so far as those two variables are concerned.)
b) They believed that there IS simultaneous reality to non-commuting observables because a more complete specification of the system is possible.
Yes, they argued that there "IS simultaneous reality to non-commuting observables"... but not merely because they felt a more complete specification of the system is possible. That's not a *reason* to believe in the simultaneous reality of those two properties, it's just another way of saying that one believes in the simultaneous reality of those two properties. To believe that a more complete specification of the system is possible is simply to deny the completeness doctrine, specifically, to deny the orthodox view that the uncertainty principle is ontological rather than epistemic.
The *actual reason* EPR believed in the simultaneous reality of these properties is because he saw that to *not* believe in them would violate the assumption of reality. If you think that x and p are not simultaneously real for the distant particle, then, in order to explain the perfect correlations between the particle here and the one there, you *must* posit some kind of non-local mechanism by which the measurement here *causes* the particle there to assume the appropriate, correlated value for the property in question. Completeness entails non-locality (given the predicted correlations). Or equivalently, locality entails in-completeness. Specifically, locality entails that both x and p for that distant particle were already (simultaneously) definite/real before any measurement was made here.
a) was supported by the logic presented. Clearly, b) was not rigorously supported and was an ad hoc assumption. Some people never accepted b) anyway, so it may not be material to them. Maybe that is your opinion too.
Hogwash. You can't be analyzing what's wrong with their argument until you've understood it.
On the other hand, some people did accept b) - but Bell saw a problem with that. He formulated his paper ("On the EPR Paradox") mathematicially assuming there WAS simultaneous reality to such observables, and found that was incompatible with QM itself.Fine, but you miss what's essential if you just say "some people did accept b)". That's true, but what's important is that people accepted "b)" (which as I noted above is just equivalent to your "a)") *because it was a requirement of locality. The whole point of EPR in so far as it relates to Bell's Theorem is this: given the perfect correlations predicted by QM, the *only* way to respect locality is to deny the completeness doctrine and add local hidden variables to account (locally, duh) for the outcomes. That's the only way you can possibly have a local theory.
Bell later proved that even this way of trying to have a local theory couldn't work. You can't reproduce the QM predictions with a hidden variable theory that respects locality. But this isn't "too bad for hidden variables". To say that is to simply *forget* why we should have believed in hidden variables in the first place, namely: because having them is the only way to have a local theory. That's what EPR showed.
Think of it this way: EPR and Bell both showed that a certain theory (or class of theories) was non-local. EPR pointed out the orthodox QM was nonlocal, and noted what, in principle, would have to be done to construct a local theory. Bell showed that the kind of theory needed to respect locality in the face of the EPR argument, also doesn't work -- such a theory cannot be made to agree with QM/experiment. Conclusion: locality is false. The only way to save it doesn't work.
Hardly a result that EPR envisioned.
No doubt. But that doesn't mean their *argument* is wrong. It means one of the premises of that argument turns out to be untenable. This is elementary logic. "Locality" and "Locality --> InCompleteness" are not the same proposition. EPR accepted the first and proved the second, and hence believed in the conclusion "InCompletness".
Later, Bell proved that this conclusion "InCompleteness" plus the original "Locality" premise entails a contradiction with experiment. So, just considering Bell, either "Incompleteness" or "Locality" must fail. But if "InCompleteness" fails, that means we are upholding the orthodox Completeness doctrine, and that means, per EPR, that we are denying "Locality". So... again... you can't save "locality" by denying "InCompleteness". The two arguments together prove absolutely that "Locality" is false.
(Well, not absolutely... You could always say something completely bonkers, like that we're all deluded when we think that the experiments in question even had definite outcomes. Of course, that would be even crazier than clinging to the various "loopholes" in those experiments that are clung to by fans of local hidden variable theories.)
I would definitely say that EPR took locality as an axiom.
You mean, they took it as a premise in their argument for "InCompleteness"? No doubt. Yet you seem ignorant of the role this premise actually played in the argument.
Bell definitely did not, as he was explicit in this regard.
Excuse me? Are you saying that you don't think "Locality" is a premise of Bell's Theorem? The whole point of the theorem is to show that a certain class of LOCAL theories are inconsistent with the QM predictions.
Or maybe you just mean that, in a broader sense, Bell was willing to consider that possibly "Locality" might be false. That's certain true, although he only thought that because his theorem, combined with the EPR argument, *proved* that "Locality" is untenable.