Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[Tournesol]

Epistemic means to do with knowledge and ontic means to do
with being. It looks like you are trying to makes these words do the work
of "phenomenal" and "noumenal".

BTW, how can a quale have an unknowable hinterland ?

 

[moving finger]

Epistemic means to do with knowledge and ontic means to do
with being. It looks like you are trying to makes these words do the work
of "phenomenal" and "noumenal".

I am not trying to “make them do” anything. This is what the words mean. Look them up yourself.

BTW, how can a quale have an unknowable hinterland ?

What is an “unknowable hinterland” when it’s at home?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

"We make inferences about ontic qualities from our observations of epistemic qualities, but we can never know an ontic quality directly, we can only infer."

The stuff we do not know, but can only infer, is the hinterland of which I spoke.

 

[moving finger]

The stuff we do not know, but can only infer, is the hinterland of which I spoke.

then all ontic qualities are in this hinterland of which you spoke

MF

 

[Tournesol]

Where "ontic" means "noumenal"

 

[Doctordick]

FYI, it is possible for two people who understand the distinction to
disagree.

Now I also remember this post. However, in this post you seem to be displaying a complete lack of logic. If if it is possible for a person to understand the distinction between logical thought and intuitive comprehension, why in the world would would they see no value in being aware of the difference? This post was probably very important in my decision to ignore your posts. I hope that I have misunderstood you.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

grandmother.

egg.

suck.

Which now means we have another way of saying "personal opinion" ...
and no way of saying "really real". Great.

Does that mean we should't pay any attention to you when you claim
to know what is really real ? Well, yes, it does.

Nope. I have already explained that they are not: "The point of 'qualia' is to put a problem on the table."

That is the Easy Problem. Now: what about the relationship of of those
"strinking" colours to brain-states ?

No one is doing that.

Well it seemed to me that was what you were doing and this particular post seemed to confirm it. Essentially it is quite clear that we have great difficulties communicating.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Doctordick]

I'm not aware of any evidence that brain causes consciousness, can you give some examples?

In absolutely every case that I have ever seen or heard of, when the brain was removed, consciousness also seemed to have vanished. Actually, the event happens quite often in war circumstances.

Keep it up -- Dick

 

[moving finger]

In absolutely every case that I have ever seen or heard of, when the brain was removed, consciousness also seemed to have vanished. Actually, the event happens quite often in war circumstances.

Keep it up -- Dick

ahhhhh...the problems of interpreting correlations.

reminds me of the joke about the man investigating where fleas have their auditory organs. First he trained a flea to jump at the sound of a pistol. Then he pulled one leg off the flea... and lo and behold the flea still jumped when he fired the pistol. He pulled off a second leg...the flea still jumped when he fired the pistol... this continued until the man pulled off the flea's last leg... he fired the gun again, and amazingly the flea did not jump!

"Aha!" said the man "I conclude from this that fleas hear through their legs!"

MF

 

[Les Sleeth]

ahhhhh...the problems of interpreting correlations.

reminds me of the joke about the man investigating where fleas have their auditory organs. First he trained a flea to jump at the sound of a pistol. Then he pulled one leg off the flea... and lo and behold the flea still jumped when he fired the pistol. He pulled off a second leg...the flea still jumped when he fired the pistol... this continued until the man pulled off the flea's last leg... he fired the gun again, and amazingly the flea did not jump!

"Aha!" said the man "I conclude from this that fleas hear through their legs!"

Good one!

 

[loseyourname]

Jesus Christ. The evidence that the brain is the seat of and cause of human consciousness is nearly as strong as the evidence that a flower is what causes you to see an image of a flower. It's much stronger than any evidence that a flea hears with its legs. The only evidence we have that consciousness can exist without a brain is from OBEs and, frankly, that is fairly scant and poorly documented evidence. It seems that when Canute asks for evidence of anything, what he really wants is conclusive, irrefutable, indubitable proof. They are not the same thing.

 

[moving finger]

The evidence that the brain is the seat of and cause of human consciousness is nearly as strong as the evidence that a flower is what causes you to see an image of a flower. It's much stronger than any evidence that a flea hears with its legs.

I did not say that there is no evidence either for or against the brain being the “seat of consciousness”.

My joke was meant to show that post #183 in this thread is based on invalid reasoning, ie that the demonstration of a correlation implies a necessary causal relationship. To conclude a causal relationship exists, one needs to demonstrate more than simple correlation.

MF

 

[Fliption]

Jesus Christ. The evidence that the brain is the seat of and cause of human consciousness is nearly as strong as the evidence that a flower is what causes you to see an image of a flower. It's much stronger than any evidence that a flea hears with its legs. The only evidence we have that consciousness can exist without a brain is from OBEs and, frankly, that is fairly scant and poorly documented evidence. It seems that when Canute asks for evidence of anything, what he really wants is conclusive, irrefutable, indubitable proof. They are not the same thing.

How can this possibly be true when the paradigm that produces such evidence doesn't even know how to define consciousness?

 

[hypnagogue]

Jesus Christ. The evidence that the brain is the seat of and cause of human consciousness is nearly as strong as the evidence that a flower is what causes you to see an image of a flower. It's much stronger than any evidence that a flea hears with its legs. The only evidence we have that consciousness can exist without a brain is from OBEs and, frankly, that is fairly scant and poorly documented evidence. It seems that when Canute asks for evidence of anything, what he really wants is conclusive, irrefutable, indubitable proof. They are not the same thing.

The causal story behind subjective experience is more subtle than all that. I don't think anyone seriously denies that a properly functioning human brain is necessary for human subjective experience, but the question of whether the physical account is sufficient is much more problematic. If physicalism is false, then it certainly follows that the physical aspects of the brain are not sufficient to cause/account for subjective experience.

 

[loseyourname]

The causal story behind subjective experience is more subtle than all that. I don't think anyone seriously denies that a properly functioning human brain is necessary for human subjective experience, but the question of whether the physical account is sufficient is much more problematic. If physicalism is false, then it certainly follows that the physical aspects of the brain are not sufficient to cause/account for subjective experience.

Who said "physical aspects" of the brain? If there are non-physical aspects to the brain that are responsible for the arisal of consciousness, it is still the brain that is responsible.

 

[loseyourname]

I did not say that there is no evidence either for or against the brain being the “seat of consciousness”.

My joke was meant to show that post #183 in this thread is based on invalid reasoning, ie that the demonstration of a correlation implies a necessary causal relationship. To conclude a causal relationship exists, one needs to demonstrate more than simple correlation.

MF

Dick didn't present a deductive argument. He didn't say "We only see consciousness associated with brains, therefore consciousness must be a product of the brain." That would be an invalid argument, a non-sequitur. What he presented was an inductive argument, and a perfectly good one with strong evidence.

 

[loseyourname]

How can this possibly be true when the paradigm that produces such evidence doesn't even know how to define consciousness?

What paradigm produces this evidence? It seems to me that the evidence is simply everyday experience. The only examples we have from everyday experience of conscious entities are organisms that possesses a certain level of brain development. The only contrary evidence comes from OBEs, which is far less common and reliable.

 

[moving finger]

Dick didn't present a deductive argument. He didn't say "We only see consciousness associated with brains, therefore consciousness must be a product of the brain." That would be an invalid argument, a non-sequitur. What he presented was an inductive argument, and a perfectly good one with strong evidence.

The post I referred to was in response to the question

Question:

I'm not aware of any evidence that brain causes consciousness, can you give some examples?

Answer:

In absolutely every case that I have ever seen or heard of, when the brain was removed, consciousness also seemed to have vanished.

The answer given, when taken in context with the question asked, therefore carries with it the implication that the answer supplied is supposed to be an example where "brain causes consciousness" - which is erroneous.

MF

 

[loseyourname]

It's an example of evidence that the brain causes consciousness. How can you possibly not see that? There is nothing erroneous unless he states that it is conclusive evidence, which he does not do.

 

[katelynndevere]

In repsonse to the OP, I voted yes, and that they are physical. I am what some high-minded posters would dismiss as a physicalist. My position stems not from any compicated philosophical deduction, but from the fact that I experience physical pain when I stub my physical toe against a physical rock.
I am with Searle in his fourth axiom: brains cause minds. Brains are physical, or if they're not, then the substrate in which my consciousness exists is such an exact simulation of the interaction of a physical body and environment, that it makes no difference, rendering argument redundant.
I know this is not really adding anything to the thread's debate, but it seems to have begun to repeat itself, anyway.

 

[loseyourname]

There is another and equally valid interpretation of the evidence, which is that the brain is mediating between some general consciousness and the individual.

That's another interpretation, but I wouldn't call it an equally valid interpretation. In cases where that happens, we generally see a separation between phenomena and the illusory creator of the phenomena. If we only see consciousness associated with brains and we've never seen a conscious entity that did not have a brain, what reason is there to think that it is possible to have a conscious entity without a brain? You could make the argument you just made about the brain being a mediator with regard to a flashlight. Even though we only see the light associated with the filament, its entirely possible that the filament is simply a mediator and the light in fact has a non-physical source that cannot be detected. Fine. Great hypothesis. What possible reason is there to believe that?

That, my friend, is a huge load of crap. Study more broadly please! I mean study outside your area of interest before you stick your inflated foot in your mouth.

So what is a piece of evidence that consciousness can exist without a brain? Your meditation certainly isn't, unless you've ever managed to meditate without your brain being present, or if you've managed to leave your body, in which case I acknowledged your experience as a valid piece of evidence that needs further investigation.

[By the way, Sleeth, I'm tired of your constant patronizing. I'm in my god-damn early 20's. I've read about as much as is physically possible for a person my age to read. I'm knowledgeable in a great many areas, I'm fairly athletically inclined, and I'm double-majoring with an additional minor. I consider myself to be a fairly well-rounded person that regularly impresses his peers with the breadth of his knowledge, especially considering how young I am. Quit telling me to go study outside of my area of interest when you don't even have any clue what it is that I am studying at the moment. Every other person on this forum seems to be capable of having a discussion with me without insulting my education. I make a great effort to formulate clear and valid arguments, to cite sources when I can, and to not come to any premature conclusions regarding the truth of particular philosophical hypotheses that are far from proven either way. You seem to be the only poster here that cannot appreciate this.]

Physicalists . . .they are EVERY bit as dogmatic and pre-committed as any born again creationist I've encountered. Both employ the same exact tactic: look only at what supports your belief, and ignore everything which might undermine what you've already decided is true. That's some truth-seeking effort there.

This seems to be your great pet peeve with every single thing that is posted here whether or not it is relevant. I said nothing about physicalism and even made it explicit that I was not at ruling out the possibility that non-physical aspects of brain activity are what create consciousness. Read more carefully before you go flying off the handle with the noontime physicalism rants. Tomorrow you'll be giving the rationalism rant, I suppose, even though I'm not a rationalist either. If this forum conducted formal debates, you'd have been kicked off numerous times for argumentum ad hominem.

 

[loseyourname]

It's amazing to me how belligerent and insulting people get in this debate. You'd think we were discussing abortion or gay marriage here. This is philosophy, for Christ's sake. Make an argument and defend it. If it has flaws, fix them. Consider alternative ideas and explore the arguments of those who have come before you. It's as simple as that. This is not a life and death situation here and there is no need for us to insult each other. You never heard Aristotle refer to Thales as an uneducated, narrow-minded fool. He just pointed out the flaws in his arguments and put forth his own. I'd like to think we can do the same.

 

[Paul Martin]

Who said "physical aspects" of the brain? If there are non-physical aspects to the brain that are responsible for the arisal of consciousness, it is still the brain that is responsible.

Suppose a primitive person, completely unacquainted with modern technology, found a radio playing music on the beach. What could he conclude about the source of the music? What caused it?

Obviously the radio causes the music. Case closed. (The position of the physicalists).

If there are non-physical aspects to the radio that are responsible for the music, it is still the radio that is responsible. (This seems to be your position, Loseyourname, where EM radiation could be considered "non-physical" by our primitive person.)

We can't rule out the possibility that there is an equivalent of a radio station to explain consciousness. Yes, it violates Occam, but so do many modern discoveries.

 

[katelynndevere]

That, my friend, is a huge load of crap. Study more broadly please! I mean study outside your area of interest before you stick your inflated foot in your mouth. All it means when you say, "the only evidence we have that consciousness can exist without a brain" is that you have decided a priori what is acceptable to consider as evidence. Well gee whiz, I could decide to ignore what contradicts my pet theory too, and then get to act all indignant because someone isn't relying on the limited facts I've chosen as worthy.

Physicalists . . .they are EVERY bit as dogmatic and pre-committed as any born again creationist I've encountered. Both employ the same exact tactic: look only at what supports your belief, and ignore everything which might undermine what you've already decided is true. That's some truth-seeking effort there.

That, Mr sleeth, is offensive. Unlike loseyourname, I have declared myself a physicalist. I have not, however, stated that all other positions are 'a huge load of crap'. I have resisted the temptation to describe your foot or your ego as inflated. I have not dismissed your opinion as a 'pet theory'. My position is deserving of more respect than that, fyi, and I have read widely, outside my area of interest, and more than you can possibly imagine. I still think I'm right, whilst reserving the right to change my position later, if presented with convincing evidence or argument. I'm allowed to say what I think without being told it's a huge pile of crap, I think.

Your excessive punctuation and capitalization suggest that you are sneering and shouting. It demeans your argument, even if you're correct.

 

[hypnagogue]

loseyourname is right; there's no reason for this discussion not to be civil. Let's please make every effort to conduct ourselves calmly, patiently, and with respect. Offending posts will be edited or deleted.

edit: And, let's please stay on topic. Consider this thing about dogmatic physicalists a dead issue; any further response here, from either side, will be deleted. If the relevant parties wish, they can continue that discussion via PM.

 

[hypnagogue]

Who said "physical aspects" of the brain? If there are non-physical aspects to the brain that are responsible for the arisal of consciousness, it is still the brain that is responsible.

Well, it seems to me that the word "brain" picks out that physical bundle of neurons in our heads. Accordingly, it seems that saying "the brain causes consciousness" is an endorsement of physicalism. If you provisionally widen the scope of the term "brain" to refer to whatever nonphysical aspects (if any) might be attendant with those physical neurons, then "brain causes consciousness" becomes a less problematic statement. Even then, we'd have to rule out the radio receiver picture of the brain that Paul Martin brings up. I don't subscribe to such a view myself, but it's not clear to me that it can be easily ruled out.

 

[moving finger]

It's an example of evidence that the brain causes consciousness.

my friend, it is an example of correlation, not an example of cause.

Please try to understand the difference.

The error is in claiming the statement is evidence of cause when it is only evidence of correlation. It's very simple logic.

To say that the post "is evidence that brain causes consciousness" is equivalent to saying that the experiment done by the agent in my little joke is "evidence that fleas hear through their legs".

Neither one is evidence of "cause".

Both are evidence only of "correlation".

There is a world of difference.

MF

 

[hypnagogue]

moving finger, what would you consider evidence of causation?

 

[moving finger]

moving finger, what would you consider evidence of causation?

Hypnagogue, I am not the one who is claiming "evidence of causation". I am claiming evidence of correlation.
I respectfully suggest that the best person to explain what they mean by "evidence of causation" is the person who uses the term.
Can you explain what you consider to be evidence of causation?
MF

 

[loseyourname]

Hypnagogue, I am not the one who is claiming "evidence of causation". I am claiming evidence of correlation.
I respectfully suggest that the best person to explain what they mean by "evidence of causation" is the person who uses the term.
Can you explain what you consider to be evidence of causation?
MF

Correlation, views in every single instance that has ever been verified. The correlation has to work both ways. Whenever we see brains with a certain level of developmental complexity, there is consciousness. Wherever we see consciousness, we find brains associated with it. There are no example of fully developed human brains without consciousness, and there are no examples (outside of possible OBEs) of consciousness without brains. That's about as good as we can do to establish causation, wouldn't you say? Heck, that evidence is stronger than the evidence that you are capable of causing your arm to move. There are plenty of instances of arms moving without the person wanting them to and people who want to move their arms but can't. Nonetheless, I would imagine that you accept a causal connection between your will to move your arm and your arm moving, don't you?

Correlation is evidence of causation, period. Whether or not you find the evidence compelling, you cannot honestly try to tell me that it isn't evidence. A court of law would laugh in your face.

Well, it seems to me that the word "brain" picks out that physical bundle of neurons in our heads. Accordingly, it seems that saying "the brain causes consciousness" is an endorsement of physicalism. If you provisionally widen the scope of the term "brain" to refer to whatever nonphysical aspects (if any) might be attendant with those physical neurons, then "brain causes consciousness" becomes a less problematic statement. Even then, we'd have to rule out the radio receiver picture of the brain that Paul Martin brings up. I don't subscribe to such a view myself, but it's not clear to me that it can be easily ruled out.

In going off of the only two well-articulated anti-physicalist views that I know of, the brain still causes consciousness. In Chalmers' model, it is the brain as information-processing unit. Granted, he speculated that any information-processor, not just brains, might be conscious, but human consciousness is without doubt a product of the brain. In Rosenberg's model, consciousness is an intrinsic property of the material substance from which all things are constituted, but again, human consciousness is a product of the intrinsic properties of human brain material (note: I don't mean matter by this, as matter is something physical - this is simply a substance in the Aristotelian sense; perhaps I shouldn't even refer to it as material, but I do for lack of a better word). In either case, it seems that both men, though anti-physicalist, grant that the human brain is the source of human consciousness.

 

[hypnagogue]

Hypnagogue, I am not the one who is claiming "evidence of causation". I am claiming evidence of correlation.

You're claiming that the brain/mind link is evidence of correlation, but you're also claiming that it's not evidence of causation. To meaningfully make the latter claim, you have to have some idea of the criteria by which we could count something to be a cause. What are those criteria?

I respectfully suggest that the best person to explain what they mean by "evidence of causation" is the person who uses the term.

Agreed, but insofar as you refute that claim, you must have your own interpretation of what it means, upon which you base your refutation.

Bear in mind that I'm not taking any stance on your view by asking these questions; I'm just asking you to make your reasoning more explicit. It would be very clarifying if you could present an example of something that could, in your view, count as evidence for causation. Perhaps you deny that anything could count as evidence for causation? I can't tell from what you've said here thus far.

Can you explain what you consider to be evidence of causation?

That's a difficult question. As a first pass, I might say something like X causes Y if X is a necessary and sufficient condition for Y. We could produce evidence that X is necessary for Y by accumulating many observations that show that Y never occurs if X does not also occur. We could produce evidence that X is sufficient for Y by varying other circumstances in the vicinity and repeatedly observing that Y occurs whenever X occurs.

It seems that procuring evidence for sufficiency is more subtle and difficult than procuring evidence for necessity. In the case of p-consciousness and the brain, it seems impossible (prima facie) to gather empirical evidence for the sufficiency of brain events to produce p-consciousness if we propose that one of the factors that is relevant to the existence of p-consciousness is a non-physical aspect of nature.

 

[learningphysics]

That's another interpretation, but I wouldn't call it an equally valid interpretation. In cases where that happens, we generally see a separation between phenomena and the illusory creator of the phenomena. If we only see consciousness associated with brains and we've never seen a conscious entity that did not have a brain, what reason is there to think that it is possible to have a conscious entity without a brain? You could make the argument you just made about the brain being a mediator with regard to a flashlight. Even though we only see the light associated with the filament, its entirely possible that the filament is simply a mediator and the light in fact has a non-physical source that cannot be detected. Fine. Great hypothesis. What possible reason is there to believe that?

The brain is constantly having its atoms replaced. Yet there is a single stream of consciousness (or is there?). Why is this? What accounts for this? It seems natural to hypothesize something that is permanent, fixed.

As I've mentioned before in this thread... this all comes down to the question: what is having the experience... what is the "conscious entity"?

When we examine what exactly we are referring to when we refer to a "conscious entity" then we can figure out if such an entity can be created by a brain.

 

[loseyourname]

Mill's Methods

Philosopher John Stuart Mill devised a set of five careful methods (or canons) by means of which to analyze and interpret our observations for the purpose of drawing conclusions about the causal relationships they exhibit.

In order to see how each of the five methods work, let's consider their practical application to a specific situation. Suppose that on an otherwise uneventful afternoon, the College Nurse becomes aware that an unusual number of students are suffering from severe indigestion. Ms. Hayes naturally suspects that this symptom results from something the students ate for lunch, and she would like to find out for sure. The Nurse wants to find evidence that will support a conclusion that "Eating ?xxxx? causes indigestion." Mill's Methods can help.

Why don't we use Mill's methods here and see if we have any evidence of causation?

Method of Agreement

Suppose that four students come to Ms. Hayes with indigestion, and she questions each about what they had for lunch. The first had pizza, coleslaw, orange juice, and a cookie; the second had a hot dog and french fries, coleslaw, and iced tea; the third ate pizza and coleslaw and drank iced tea; and the fourth ate only french fries, coleslaw, and chocolate cake. Ms. Hayes, of course, concludes that "Eating coleslaw caused the indigestion."

This is an application of Mill's Method of Agreement: investigation of the cases in which the effect occurred revealed only one prior circumstance that all of them shared. Our customary notion here is that similar effects are likely to arise from a similar cause, and since everyone who fell ill had eaten coleslaw, it was probably the cause.

So let us get together a group of conscious entities and figure out something that they all have in common. All humans, needless to say, are not the same. Some lose legs, some lose fingers, some lose eyes, some lose hair, some lose the ability to speak coherently. All of these people are nonetheless conscious. In fact we see that every conscious human has in common one thing: a functioning brain.

Method of Difference

On the other hand, suppose that only two students arrive at the Nurse's office. The two are roommates who ate together, but one became ill while the other did not. The first had eaten a hot dog, french fries, coleslaw, chocolate cake, and iced tea, while the other had eaten a hot dog, french fries, chocolate cake, and iced tea. Again, Ms. Hayes concludes that the coleslaw is what made the first roommate ill.

This reasoning applies Mill's Method of Difference: comparison of a case in which the effect occurred and a case in which the effect did not occur revealed that only one prior circumstance was present in the first case but not it the second. In such situations, we commonly suppose that, other things being equal, different effects are likely to arise from different causes, and since only the student who had eaten coleslaw became ill, it was probably the cause.

We can use this method as well. Take a human that is conscious. Take a human that is not conscious. What is the difference. The only examples we have of humans that are not conscious are humans that do not have a certain level of brain function. There's our second piece of evidence.

Joint Method of Agreement and Difference

Now put these two situations together by assuming that eight students come to Ms. Hayes: four of them suffered from indigestion, and with each of these four there is another who did not. Each pair of students had exactly the same lunch, except that everyone in the first group ate coleslaw and no one in the second group did. The Nurse arrives at the same conclusion.

This situation is an example of Mill's Joint Method of Agreement and Difference: the first four students are evidence that everyone who got ill had eaten coleslaw, and the four matching pairs are evidence that only those who got ill had eaten coleslaw. This is a powerful combination of the first two methods, since it tends to support our notion that genuine causes are necessary and sufficient conditions for their effects.

We've already done this. All humans that are conscious have a certain level of brain function and all humans that are not conscious do not have a certain level of brain function.

Method of Concomitant Variation

Change the situation again. Suppose that the Nurse sees five students: the first ate no coleslaw and feels fine; the second had one bite of coleslaw and felt a little queasy; the third had half a dish of coleslaw and is fairly ill; the fourth ate a whole dish of coleslaw and is violently ill; and the fifth ate two servings of coleslaw and had to be rushed to the hospital. The conclusion is again that coleslaw caused the indigestion.

This is an example of Mill's Method of Concomitant Variation: the evidence appears to show that there is a direct correlation between the degree to which the cause occurred and the degree to which the effect occurred. This conforms to our ordinary supposition that effects are typically proportional to their causes. In effect, this is a sophisticated version of the Joint Method, one in which we notice not just the occurrence or non-occurrence of the causal terms, but the extent to which each of them took place.

Well, we have this one too. Brains function in degrees. When we lose some functionality, we may still be conscious, but we do eventually reach a certain level beneath which we are no longer conscious due to brain functionality.

Method of Residues

Finally, suppose that Ms. Hayes, during prior investigations of student illness, has already established that pizza tends to produce a rash and iced tea tends to cause headaches. Today, a student arrives at the Nurse's office complaining of headache, indigestion, and a rash; this student reports having eaten pizza, coleslaw, and iced tea for lunch. Since she can account for most of the student's symptoms as the effects of known causes, Ms. Hayes concludes that the additional effect of indigestion must be caused by the additional circumstance of eating coleslaw.

This pattern of reasoning exemplifies Mill's Method of Residues: many elements of a complex effect are shown to result, by reliable causal beliefs, from several elements of a complex cause; whatever remains of the effect must then have been produced by whatever remains of the cause. Notice that if we suppose the truth of all of the causal relationships involved, this method becomes an application of deductive reasoning.

This one we can use as well. People with legs but without a certain level of brain functionality can move their legs but are not conscious. People with functioning eyes but without a certain level of brain functionality can see and respond to stimuli in a mechanical manner, but are not conscious. Note here that consciousness seems to depend only on the level of brain functionality. No other bodily organ matters and it doesn't seem necessary to be in the path of certain radio waves or anything like that. If there is anything else to it, we have yet to detect it.

Nonetheless, several of you are convinced that there is something more to it, that the brain is only a conduit that receives signals from a source of consciousness outside of the body. Perhaps you can tell us what that is and apply Mill's methods to your hypothesis and see how well you can establish evidence of causation.

 

[loseyourname]

The brain is constantly having its atoms replaced. Yet there is a single stream of consciousness (or is there?).

The same can be said of the heart, yet we have a constant flow of blood. No mystery there. The same can be said of the Amazon, yet we have one river. No mystery there. There is a problem of personal identity that has always been tricky in philosophy, but it is not necessary to postulate a permanent, immaterial source of identity for the bloodstream or the Amazon. Same thing for the brain and any effects associated with the brain.

By the way, the brain is the only part of the body that never regenerates any cells once it is fully developed. It is the single most permanent part of the human body.

 

[hypnagogue]

Correlation is evidence of causation, period.

Not necessarily. If we find that B always accompanies C, it could be because there is some sort of causitive link between the two. However, it could also be that they are both caused by A. In that case, although they are always correlated, one does not cause the other.

In going off of the only two well-articulated anti-physicalist views that I know of, the brain still causes consciousness. In Chalmers' model, it is the brain as information-processing unit. Granted, he speculated that any information-processor, not just brains, might be conscious, but human consciousness is without doubt a product of the brain. In Rosenberg's model, consciousness is an intrinsic property of the material substance from which all things are constituted, but again, human consciousness is a product of the intrinsic properties of human brain material (note: I don't mean matter by this, as matter is something physical - this is simply a substance in the Aristotelian sense; perhaps I shouldn't even refer to it as material, but I do for lack of a better word). In either case, it seems that both men, though anti-physicalist, grant that the human brain is the source of human consciousness.

Chalmers proposes that phenomenality is an aspect of information, and Rosenberg proposes that phenomenality is the intrinsic basis of the physical. In both cases, phenomenality does not arise from the physical, but (in some sense) sits along side it. Surely, both accept that the structure and function of the physical brain conditions the nature of a system's p-consciousness, but I don't think either view can be fairly portrayed as saying that consciousness arises from, or is a product of, the brain. In fact, insofar as both accept the logical possibility of zombies, both would claim that we could have a physical brain (in a world distinct from ours in its non-physical aspects, but identical to ours in its physical aspects) but still not have p-consciousness.

So perhaps Chalmers and Rosenberg might say that the physical brain causes p-consciousness to take the particular form it does, but neither would say that the physical brain produces p-consciousness, in the sense that the latter supervenes on the former. On these views, saying that the physical brain causes p-consciousness is like saying one electron causes another electron. Obviously, that's nonsensical; what we mean to say is something like "electron A caused electron B's path to diverge." Likewise, if we attribute causal responsibility from the physical brain to p-consciousness on Chalmers' or Rosenberg's views, it would have to be a causal relation of change, not of creation or production.