Are Qualia Real? Debate & Discussion

[Les Sleeth]

It can't be absolutely private unless there is no possible way of communicating it in the widest sense of "possible'; you have not shown this, only that it cannot be communicated with the means at that happen to be at our disposal.

It is a simple proposition, and hardly worthy of all this intellectual sparring. All I mean is the actual, exact moment of the experience is an internally private moment for that moment. I've never said a person is incapable of communicating some sense of the experience, which would be a silly statement to make since people constantly communicate about their experiences. However, I don't buy your point about communication in the slightest (explained below).

We have an idea about the limits we operate under in this world But those limits are relative to this world and therefore not absolute. We don't know what the limits are for other species or our remote descendents. That being the case, we are in no position to assert inefability as an intrinisc property of qualia per se, rather than something that arises partly out of limitations of communication.

As of now, there is no known species capable of that so it is pointless to speculate. Why not keep it real and talk about what we know and are interested in, which is humanity? If some species could share my consciousness with me, and exprience what I do in the moment of the experience, then obviously my experience loses the trait of privacy. That and that alone is what destroys privacy.

But it doesn't follow that communication eliminates privacy, even if, say, by some psychic means I could transfer my experience into your consciousness and you would then experience exactly what I did. That does not cancel the fact that I experience privately in the first place, plus I can choose not to communicate.

As ever, I have no problem with the common-sense issues of ineffability. I am just trying to find out what you think justifies the word "absolutely".

As I stated above, I mean the actual, exact moment of the experience is an internally private moment for that moment.

You seem to be saying that all communication is based on concepts and there is something about concepts that is inherently incompatible with qualia

In incompatible, just completely different processes. A concept of something is not and can never be equivalent to the experience of the same thing.

IOW

a) all communication is necessaily conceptual

b) all concepts are necessarily incapable of capturing phenomenal feels

c) therefore, it is absolutely impossible to communicate phenomenal feels.​

(b) is quite doubtful, since it is plausible that we at least partly think with
the aid of mental images, which obviously *do* have phenomenal feels. (How do you plan a new recipe without "tasting", in an imaginary way, the dish
you are aiming for ?)

I don't think all communication is necessarily conceptual, I just thought we were talking about concepts versus experience. But even so, if, for instance, you were to empathically pick up on what I am experiencing, it is not itself a precise recreation of my experience in your consciousness . . . it is just a "sense" of it. More importantly, the communication ihappens after the fact of my experience which occurred in private.

You example of "tasting in an imaginary way" to get around my assertion that "all concepts are necessarily incapable of capturing phenomenal feels" doesn't do it. Again, I've never said some sense cannot be communicated or sensed by another. I am saying the actual, exact moment of the experience is an internally private moment for that moment, and that experience is a different animal than concepts or imagination and not fully/equivalently replicated by either.

Now, it's true that we can stimulate an experience with memory or mental imaging, like if we were to recall the experience of some taste, but that doesn't change the fact that the image is the image, and the experience is the experience . . . two different things even if one can bring on the other.

 

[Tournesol]

It is a simple proposition, and hardly worthy of all this intellectual sparring. All I mean is the actual, exact moment of the experience is an internally private moment for that moment. I've never said a person is incapable of communicating some sense of the experience, which would be a silly statement to make since people constantly communicate about their experiences.

So you meant soemthing else by "absolutely private".

As of now, there is no known species capable of that so it is pointless to speculate. Why not keep it real and talk about what we know and are interested in, which is humanity?

If we are interested in what consciousness is, we need to know which
features are absolute and necessary, and which contngent and relative.

If some species could share my consciousness with me, and exprience what I do in the moment of the experience, then obviously my experience loses the trait of privacy. That and that alone is what destroys privacy.

Which tells us something about qualia; privacy is not a charactersitics of qualia per se, but exists in relation to various other factors.

In incompatible, just completely different processes. A concept of something is not and can never be equivalent to the experience of the same thing.

Is that an absolute ?

I don't think all communication is necessarily conceptual, I just thought we were talking about concepts versus experience. But even so, if, for instance, you were to empathically pick up on what I am experiencing, it is not itself a precise recreation of my experience in your consciousness . . . it is just a "sense" of it.

Whether it is or not is of course contigent on my empathic abilities.

 

[moving finger]

There is no way to prove they exist from third person methods alone, but many philosophers argue that we can know about them from the first person. I'm wondering who here thinks these are real and who thinks they are a delusion. For those who think they aren't real, do you at least admit that it seems like they are, but just feel that this intuition is wrong? And for those who do believe in them, do you think science will ever be able to account for their existence and/or specific (intrinsic) properties?

Pardon my question, but I'm having trouble understanding exactly what you mean by the question : "are they real?"
Can you first please define exactly what you mean by "real"?

I guess the question is not the same as
1 Do sensory experiences have subjective properties?
(to which I hope all conscious and perceptive agents would answer "yes"?)

Does it mean
2 Do these subjective properties have a physical embodiment?
(to which I hope all conscious and perceptive agents would also answer "yes"? - otherwise how could the subjective properties have any interaction with our physical consciousness?)

Or does it mean
3 Does the physical embodiment of these subjective properties exist independently of the conscious substrate, and identical in all brains/consciousnesses?
(to which I would answer "no")

Perhaps someone can clarify whether it is question 1, 2, 3 above, or another question, that is being asked?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

What do you mean by "conscious substrate" ?

 

[selfAdjoint]

Does it mean
2 Do these subjective properties have a physical embodiment?
(to which I hope all conscious and perceptive agents would also answer "yes"? - otherwise how could the subjective properties have any interaction with our physical consciousness?)

Or does it mean
3 Does the physical embodiment of these subjective properties exist independently of the conscious substrate, and identical in all brains/consciousnesses?
(to which I would answer "no")

I think it is interpreted to mean "qualia are capable of causal actions." Philosophers seem to be able to abstract everything from the world except cause.

 

[moving finger]

I think it is interpreted to mean "qualia are capable of causal actions." Philosophers seem to be able to abstract everything from the world except cause.

Interesting. I hope StatusX drops in and let's us have his thoughts, it was his original post and poll after all (and I see no point in having a poll unless all the participants agree on the definition of the thing being polled!).

I would argue that all qualia have a physical embodiment (even if it just a neural pattern in the brain), therefore in that sense they must be also capable of "causation" (ie that pattern can have causal effects on other patterns and on behaviour); but I do not believe the neural pattern for "red" for example is unique, it will vary from one individual to another, and neither does that pattern have any meaning or relevance outside of the individual neural context, therefore I am not sure what the question "are qualia real" is really asking?

 

[moving finger]

What do you mean by "conscious substrate" ?

in the case of humans, I mean the neural patterns that give rise to ("cause" if you like) the emergent phenomenon of human consciousness

MF

 

[Tournesol]

but I do not believe the neural pattern for "red" for example is unique, it will vary from one individual to another, and neither does that pattern have any meaning or relevance outside of the individual neural context,

Meaning it varies above and beyond the variation of neural substrate -- so that
even twins or clones could have radically different qualia ?

If you do think that -- why ?

therefore I am not sure what the question "are qualia real" is really asking?

Surely the idea that qualia have a high degree of independence from their physical basis would weigh in favour of their reality.

 

[Tournesol]

in the case of humans, I mean the neural patterns that give rise to ("cause" if you like) the emergent phenomenon of human consciousness

MF

If the 'conscious substrate' is by definition what causes qualia, it immediately
follows that they can't exist independently -- there is no question about it.

 

[Steve Esser]

Hi Steve. Can you talk a little bit more about this coordinating aspect? As you said something needs to be added to make the human system distinguishable from the rest of the world.

What is the nature of this coordinating aspect? Why does it not appear everywhere in the world?

Hi. I was off-line for the last week and I'm trying to catch up.
I don't have my own detailed theory of this, and everything I'm saying here is extremely speculative (A discussion of a detailed causal model which ends up with something like this characteristic is the subject of Gregg Rosenberg's book in the other thread). I have "backed into" some thoughts about what a new theory of causality should feature by looking at what is missing from the conventional view. Complex systems like humans resist reduction to simple microphysical causation. Such systems seem to take advantage of a coordinating causal property. I do think the potential to utilize such a property must be everywhere in the world, but only certain evolutionary causal paths will lead to systems which end up featuring the coordination aspect to a high degree.

 

[StatusX]

Sorry, I haven't checked this thread in a while.

Pardon my question, but I'm having trouble understanding exactly what you mean by the question : "are they real?"
Can you first please define exactly what you mean by "real"?

I think it comes down to the question: "When we have explained every physical function of the brain, have we explained all there is to subjectivity?" A physicalist would have to say yes, but I think there is more.

I guess the question is not the same as
1 Do sensory experiences have subjective properties?
(to which I hope all conscious and perceptive agents would answer "yes"?)

I'm not sure what you mean by subjective here.

Does it mean
2 Do these subjective properties have a physical embodiment?
(to which I hope all conscious and perceptive agents would also answer "yes"? - otherwise how could the subjective properties have any interaction with our physical consciousness?)

Again, you'll have to elaborate. Are you saying the experiences are physical objects or processes? Or that they can affect physical processes? If so, I would have to disagree, although the second issue is a very difficult and subtle one. If you are saying they can be correlated to a physical process in a one-to-one mapping, I would agree.

Or does it mean
3 Does the physical embodiment of these subjective properties exist independently of the conscious substrate, and identical in all brains/consciousnesses?
(to which I would answer "no")

And one more time, I think we have very different terminology. From what you've said since this post, I have the feeling you equate qualia with neural patterns. They are correlated, of course, but I would argue they are not the same thing. Qualia are the sensations we experience that are totally private. No one knows what the color red looks like to you, even though they can know the corresponding neural patterns. Physics is only capable of explaining structure (ie, geometry, patterns, organization) and function (cause and effect, behavior, etc.). The qualia debate centers around the idea that qualia are not completely accounted for by structure and function. Even if we explain every neural pattern, every action you could perform in response to a sensation, we don't know what it's like for you to be experiencing it.

 

[moving finger]

I think we have very different terminology. From what you've said since this post, I have the feeling you equate qualia with neural patterns. They are correlated, of course, but I would argue they are not the same thing. Qualia are the sensations we experience that are totally private. No one knows what the color red looks like to you, even though they can know the corresponding neural patterns. Physics is only capable of explaining structure (ie, geometry, patterns, organization) and function (cause and effect, behavior, etc.). The qualia debate centers around the idea that qualia are not completely accounted for by structure and function. Even if we explain every neural pattern, every action you could perform in response to a sensation, we don't know what it's like for you to be experiencing it.

I think we both believe that qualia are real. The real question that needs to be addressed is why you can never know what my exerience of red is like.

Two possible and different answers to the question :

(1) Because "you" are not "me", and "you" never can be "me". And since qualia are totally subjective (ie do not exist outside the "eye of the beholder"), you can never know what my experience of red is like (just as Nagel can never know "what it is like to be a bat"). The only reason qualia are usually considered "outside" the realm of normal scientific investigation (and the whole reason they have acquired this mystical status) is because scientific investigation is normally based on 3rd person objective data, not on 1st person subjective data.

or

(2) Because qualia have some kind of separate objective existence which is currently not explained by physics. This would be the stance taken by someone who persists in thinking in terms of a dualistic "me" and "the rest of the world", and believes everything can be reduced to objective entities outside of oneself (ie the true scientific dualism stance, where there is always a "measurer" and an objective thing that is "measured").

In both case, qualia "exist" and qualia are "real'. The difference seems to be that you wish (for some reason that you may care to explain?) to ascribe some kind of independent and objective physical existence to these qualia, whereas I suggest that, whilst they are undoubtedly "real", they are nevertheless 100% subjective, and have no independent existence outside of the particular mind that is generating them.

MF

 

[StatusX]

In both case, qualia "exist" and qualia are "real'. The difference seems to be that you wish (for some reason that you may care to explain?) to ascribe some kind of independent and objective physical existence to these qualia, whereas I suggest that, whilst they are undoubtedly "real", they are nevertheless 100% subjective, and have no independent existence outside of the particular mind that is generating them.

First of all, I don't believe they are objective or physical. I believe they exist, and are not explained by physics. This simple statement is contrary to the physicalist position, that every last existing thing can be explained by physics. When you talk about existing independent of the mind, I get the image of a huge expanse somewhere full of all the things that really exist. This isn't necessary at all. If we're talking about them they are real. If you have an idea, it is real. If you close your eyes tightly and see little spots, they are real. All these things exist. The issue is whether qualia are beyond physics to explain, and if so, whether there is any method that can explain them.

 

[moving finger]

First of all, I don't believe they are objective or physical. I believe they exist, and are not explained by physics. This simple statement is contrary to the physicalist position, that every last existing thing can be explained by physics. When you talk about existing independent of the mind, I get the image of a huge expanse somewhere full of all the things that really exist. This isn't necessary at all. If we're talking about them they are real. If you have an idea, it is real. If you close your eyes tightly and see little spots, they are real. All these things exist. The issue is whether qualia are beyond physics to explain, and if so, whether there is any method that can explain them.

Ok, we seem to agree on a couple of things.
Qualia are real.
There is no current scientific theory which seems to adequately describe qualia.

Where we perhaps differ then (excuse my presumption) is that you seem to believe they are beyond physical explanation (please correct me if I am wrong); whereas I believe (though we cannot currently explain them) that we will be able to explain them (without invoking any new science) as soon as we have a full understanding and explanation of human consciousness.

I do not believe there is any "missing science" or anything else special needed. If you wish to label me then by your definition I am a "physicalist" since I believe that everything including qualia can ultimately be explained by physics - but that does NOT mean that qualia are "physical" (it depends on your definition of "physical" - and I think people who responded to your poll may differ in the way they define physical).

In my belief, the only obstacle to fully understanding qualia is that the tools of present-day science are largely based on 3rd person objective measurements; and qualia (since they are subjective) can never be fully understood from this standpoint.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

I think we both believe that qualia are real. The real question that needs to be addressed is why you can never know what my exerience of red is like.

There is nothing in the (original) definition of qualia that requires them to be
absolutely private.

Two possible and different answers to the question :

(1) Because "you" are not "me", and "you" never can be "me". And since qualia are totally subjective (ie do not exist outside the "eye of the beholder"), you can never know what my experience of red is like (just as Nagel can never know "what it is like to be a bat"). The only reason qualia are usually considered "outside" the realm of normal scientific investigation (and the whole reason they have acquired this mystical status) is because scientific investigation is normally based on 3rd person objective data, not on 1st person subjective data.

It is not clear whether you are appealing to some intrinsic selfhood or
just to the shear complexity of the total description of a person.
If you accept physicalism, then eveything that makes up a person
can, in princinple, be described physically. Another person might notbe able to grasp the description but a hyperintelligent computer or alien could. So,
if the only troublesome characteristic of qualia is their inefability, and that is
entirely due to their subjective privacy, then a physicalist could justly conclude htat they don't exist, since their subjective privacy is not an absolute but down to the limitations of human onlookers in grasping very complex physcial descriptions.

(2) Because qualia have some kind of separate objective existence which is currently not explained by physics. This would be the stance taken by someone who persists in thinking in terms of a dualistic "me" and "the rest of the world", and believes everything can be reduced to objective entities outside of oneself (ie the true scientific dualism stance, where there is always a "measurer" and an objective thing that is "measured").

Somebody who thinks ebverything is objective thinks just that -- that
everything is objective including himself. And if we make the reasonable
assumptions that:

a) physics deals in quantities and extrinsic relations

b) qualia are intrinsic and quaitative

we can account for the ineffeability (in the sense of *physical* incommunicability) of qualia without apealing to intrinsic subjectivity or selfhood (whatever they may mean).

In both case, qualia "exist" and qualia are "real'. The difference seems to be that you wish (for some reason that you may care to explain?) to ascribe some kind of independent and objective physical existence to these qualia, whereas I suggest that, whilst they are undoubtedly "real", they are nevertheless 100% subjective, and have no independent existence outside of the particular mind that is generating them.

Unicorns have no exitence "except in the mind" because they can only seem
to exist. Qualia, notoriously, *are* seemings, and cannot be dismissed that
way. What does it mean "to exist in the mind" ? If the mind is the brain,
then what exists in the mind exists, objectively in the brain...unless it is mere
illusion, but that doesn't work either.

 

[Doctordick]

Fredrick brought the "Proof proves nothing" thread to the top with a recent post. Of course, considering the fact that a Proof is defined as something that "proves" something, I was curious as to what Architeuthis Dux's definition of "proof" and "prove" was. From what I read, it appears the posters would rather work without definition than clarify what they are talking about. I didn't get very far before I gave up; however, I did come across a comment from one whose judgment I tend to at least take seriously.

Nicely put. With a bit of background added it would make a useful 'sticky'.

So I had to read the post he appeared to be referring to. It was interesting and I think brings up some issues which should be mentioned here although I can't resist making a few comments first:

In his Essay on Radical Empircism he writes, “Nothing shall be admitted as fact except what can be experienced at some definite time . . . everything real must be experienceable somewhere, and every kind of thing experienced must somewhere be real. "

That appears to presume "what is experienced" is "fact". How come psychologists don't tell schizophrenics that?

If we accept that experience is the most direct route to knowing reality, and reality is the "truth," then experience gives us truth while reason becomes the process of interpreting, calculating, and devising applications from what area of the truth (i.e., reality) has been experienced.

So truth is what experience leads us to. Doesn't that sort of define (or at least presume the identity of) experience as truth itself; what I have chosen to call our unexamined squirrelish" comprehension of the universe? My only complaint here is that his definition presumes the result of this "direct route" is a valid definition of reality, essentially making his impressions true by definition. A little circular at best

Further, if one understands experience as one thing, and reason as another, then one must accept that each realm has its own methods of validation.

It seems to me that Les is talking about the same dichotomy I was trying to communicate in my "crackpot post" about thought. The only question that then arises is exactly what is Les referring to as a "method of validation" for one's experience? From my paradigm, experience (which I refer to as "squirrel conclusions") provides no possibility of validation. So that becomes the crux of our differences: i.e., he presumes the mental image created by his experience is absolutely valid and cannot be questioned whereas my whole work is directed to questioning that presumption.

The concept of "proof," then, is understood to be a validation process for the realm of reason. A proof is not required to give us truth but rather to provide a test for the logical interconnections and conclusions used in interpreting, as well as predicting where to look for, experience.

Now this (from my perspective) is in exact agreement with everything I have presented.

That (finally) brings me to the reason why I have posted this to the "Are qualia real?" thread. After reviewing the above, it seems that the correct answer is clearly "yes!"

In wikipedia, qualia are defined as:

...the properties of sensory experiences by virtue of which there is something it is like to have them. These properties are, by definition, epistemically unknowable in the absence of direct experience of them; as a result, they are also incommunicable. The existence or lack of these properties is a hotly debated topic in contemporary philosophy of mind.

There is no way to prove they exist from third person methods alone, but many philosophers argue that we can know about them from the first person. I'm wondering who here thinks these are real and who thinks they are a delusion. For those who think they aren't real, do you at least admit that it seems like they are, but just feel that this intuition is wrong? And for those who do believe in them, do you think science will ever be able to account for their existence and/or specific (intrinsic) properties?

I mean for this to be a way to see who stands where, so I've made the voting public. I'd like people to take this oppurtunity to make some arguments for and against qualia. Obviously, anyone can deny the most convincing argument for their existence and still hold a perfectly consistent world view. But try to be open minded, and argue specifically why this intuition should both exist and be wrong.

I looked the word up and it is defined to be "the properties of sensory experience". It seems clear to me that the meaning of the word "qualia" is no more than a tag used to reference the set of particular experiences. Exactly what Les is talking about when he discusses the realm of experience and what I am talking about when I refer to "squirrel" thought. I hold they are simply epistemically unknowable as they amount to an unexamined interpretation of our experiences and Les holds that they are our experiences themselves. We only differ with regard to our definition of "real".

Les divides our awareness into two divisions which he calls "experience" and "reason" while I use the terms "squirrel" and "logic". He presumes our "experiences" are one with reality while I make much of the fact that our experiences are an interpretation of reality and not reality itself. His qualia are essentially tags for aspects of reality itself while my paradigm hold qualia as tags for the threads which tie reality to our conscious awareness. When we reason about reality, we do this with concepts produced we know not how, through some mechanism I simply give the reference tag "squirrel thought". Les merely doesn't think about the issue; there is no room in his paradigm for a quale to be invalid. For something which cannot be directly communicated and can be known only through direct experience, Les's position amounts to, if he can't know it, it doesn't exist. Do electrons exist Les?

It is very clear that some drugs induce experiences (qualia?) which are not experienced in the absence of the drugs and certainly some mentally disturbed people experience things not known to us. I think it is a rather extreme step to presume all experiences are invariably real. By the way, if Les is right, his picture fits into my paradigm anyway: the threads (which are being referred to as qualia) simply become direct contacts with reality.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[hypnagogue]

It is very clear that some drugs induce experiences (qualia?) which are not experienced in the absence of the drugs and certainly some mentally disturbed people experience things not known to us. I think it is a rather extreme step to presume all experiences are invariably real.

You seem to have a strange criterion for judging the 'reality' of qualia. It seems that you are implying that a quale is only real if it is a feature of a veridical perception; is that the case? If so, it does not seem to be relevant to the discussion. The qualitative experiences of a drug user should not come to bear here any more or any less than the qualitative experiences of a cognitively normal subject. What is at issue is the reality of the qualitative experiences themselves, not whether or not they accurately represent features of the external world.

 

[moving finger]

There is nothing in the (original) definition of qualia that requires them to be
absolutely private.

I never said there was. Qualia are either absolutely private (as you call it), or they are not, regardless of the "definition" of qualia. You seem to think they are not absolutely private; I believe they are. Simple.

It is not clear whether you are appealing to some intrinsic selfhood or just to the shear complexity of the total description of a person.

Neither. I am referring to the fact that traditional science is based on a 3rd person objective epistemology, whereas qualia are clearly (at least to my mind) 1st person subjective and emergent properties of consciousness. I do not think it is possible to reach a full understanding of 1st person subjective and emergent properties of consciousness using an approach based on a 3rd person objective epistemology (and in this I believe I agree with Dennett).

If you accept physicalism, then eveything that makes up a person can, in princinple, be described physically.

Yes, agreed, if one defines physicalism to include both 3rd person objective and 1st person subjective phenomena.

Another person might notbe able to grasp the description but a hyperintelligent computer or alien could.

Only insofar as that "hyperintelligent computer or alien" could replicate the entire consciousness and related subjective phenomena of the person under study and thereby replicate the qualia within (and restricted to) the model of consciousness - but they would never be able to study qualia as a 3rd person objective phenomenon.

So,
if the only troublesome characteristic of qualia is their inefability, and that is
entirely due to their subjective privacy, then a physicalist could justly conclude htat they don't exist, since their subjective privacy is not an absolute but down to the limitations of human onlookers in grasping very complex physcial descriptions.

This depends on your definition of physicalism. If you restrict physicalism to the study of 3rd person objective phenomena only, then this kind of physicalism can never hope to fully explain qualia simply because qualia are not 3rd person objective phenomena.

But if you allow (as I do) physicalism to encompass the physical description of all phenomena including 1st person subjective phenomena then physicalism can explain qualia.

Somebody who thinks ebverything is objective thinks just that -- that everything is objective including himself.

I'm not sure what you are trying to say here. Are you suggesting that there is no such thing as a purely subjective phenomenon?

Qualia, notoriously, *are* seemings, and cannot be dismissed that way. What does it mean "to exist in the mind" ? If the mind is the brain, then what exists in the mind exists, objectively in the brain...unless it is mere illusion, but that doesn't work either.

If you wish to debate the meaning of "existence" then we could discuss solipsism... it may be the case that everything is in the mind.

I am not "dismissing" qualia. I am saying qualia do exist. Where we differ is that you seem to think qualia require some metaphysical explanation, whereas I do not.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

Neither. I am referring to the fact that traditional science is based on a 3rd person objective epistemology, whereas qualia are clearly (at least to my mind) 1st person subjective and emergent properties of consciousness. I do not think it is possible to reach a full understanding of 1st person subjective and emergent properties of consciousness using an approach based on a 3rd person objective epistemology (and in this I believe I agree with Dennett).

Because there is something inherently and ontologically subjective about qualia ?

Yes, agreed, if one defines physicalism to include both 3rd person objective and 1st person subjective phenomena.

Only insofar as that "hyperintelligent computer or alien" could replicate the entire consciousness and related subjective phenomena of the person under study and thereby replicate the qualia within (and restricted to) the model of consciousness - but they would never be able to study qualia as a 3rd person objective phenomenon.

Because qualia are inherently, metaphysically private, and not as a
resul of communication problems? What makes that true ?

This depends on your definition of physicalism. If you restrict physicalism to the study of 3rd person objective phenomena only, then this kind of physicalism can never hope to fully explain qualia simply because qualia are not 3rd person objective phenomena.

I'm not sure what you are trying to say here. Are you suggesting that there is no such thing as a purely subjective phenomenon?

Pretty much. AFAICS, all the evidence for the subjectivity of experience could be explained epistemologically by the limitations of human communication,
with no residue of ontological privacy.

I am not "dismissing" qualia. I am saying qualia do exist. Where we differ is that you seem to think qualia require some metaphysical explanation, whereas I do not.

I am quite unable to see why not. The existence of anything ontologically subjective and/or any failure of epistemologically objective explanations (such as physics) need metaphysical explanation.

Any argument to the effect that it is possible or advisable to expand phsyics
to include the subjective is likewise metaphysical.

 

[Doctordick]

You seem to have a strange criterion for judging the 'reality' of qualia.

Before we can discuss the reality of qualia, we must first define what is meant by the term qualia and what is meant by the word reality. It is only after those two definitions are understood that it is possible to determine if "reality" is a quality which is possessed by "qualia".

It seems that you are implying that a quale is only real if it is a feature of a veridical perception; is that the case?

"veridical"? Why didn't you use the word truthful or valid? You think maybe "veridical" makes it more sophisticated? I've never heard it used enough to deduce any relevant specialized connotations; but I am not perhaps as well read as you. If you spent any time looking at anything I have posted, you should be aware that I make no judgments as to what is or is not real. In fact the whole thrust of my arguments on this forum pertains to the proper handling of that very issue without making a judgment as to veracity of any particular specific case.

If so, it does not seem to be relevant to the discussion.

The question was, "who here thinks these are real and who thinks they are a delusion?" But that question was qualified by the statement, "I'd like people to take this opportunity to make some arguments for and against qualia. So it seems to me that my points were right on the issue as they point out exactly where the term "qualia" is used and why the concept is valuable; an issue I don't find very well clarified in the thread.

The qualitative experiences of a drug user should not come to bear here any more or any less than the qualitative experiences of a cognitively normal subject. What is at issue is the reality of the qualitative experiences themselves, not whether or not they accurately represent features of the external world.

The point was that the connection between qualia and reality is not a determinable issue; however, a rational person would have to admit that the possibility exists. In order to competently handle the issue it is important to know what one is talking about.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Les Sleeth]

Part One

That appears to presume "what is experienced" is "fact". How come psychologists don't tell schizophrenics that?

Before responding to your main points, I have to say you have created a bit of a straw man in representing my position. I don’t think it was intentional, but nonetheless I preparing you to hear me say several times that you’ve not characterized my stance accurately.

To start, it is not my opinion that “what is experienced is fact.” What I believe is that experience is the avenue for knowing reality. We certainly can experience our own delusions (of course, that is a “real” experience of delusionality). My point is that even if experience is corruptible (in terms of accurate perception) it is still the absolute best means we have for acquiring knowledge. Each person can work with their consciousness to improve objectivity, be more attentive, etc. and thereby improve one’s experiential abilities. If every time I see a person of color I start thinking he is inferior, that is going to interfere with my direct experience; but if I keep my mind still, interact with people, observe -- experience them – without the colorations of my thoughts, then I am more likely to “know” what they are really like (as opposed to knowing, over and over again, what my mind thinks they are like).

So truth is what experience leads us to. Doesn't that sort of define (or at least presume the identity of) experience as truth itself; what I have chosen to call our unexamined comprehension of the universe?

I would not define experience as truth. Personally, I limit my use of the word “truth” to the degree a statement corresponds to how reality actually is (the correspondence theory of truth). So it seems to me truth is a mental thing, and not really an experiential thing (relying again on my division of consciousness into mentality and experience). So the identity of experience, to me, is not truth, but rather as I stated above, the best avenue we have to access reality.

My only complaint here is that his definition presumes the result of this "direct route" is a valid definition of reality, essentially making his impressions true by definition. A little circular at best.

Not so! I do not think experience defines reality. Reality has nothing to do with my definitions anyway . . . it is what it is regardless of my interpretations.

I am not saying that experience instantly reveals the nature of reality! I am saying it’s the direct route to knowing reality. It might require a lot of experience with some aspect of reality before certainty is attained, it might require one to work with one’s mind to make it more objective and so able to experience neutrally, etc. But in a healthy, clear experiencing consciousness, reality can be reflected quite nicely; and THEN if we want to think about it, we have the best material with which to think.

The only question that then arises is exactly what is Les referring to as a "method of validation" for one's experience? From my paradigm, experience (which I refer to as "squirrel conclusions") provides no possibility of validation. So that becomes the crux of our differences: i.e., he presumes the mental image created by his experience is absolutely valid and cannot be questioned whereas my whole work is directed to questioning that presumption.

You’ve misrepresented me again. What I said was that experience and intellect each have different validation standards. Validation for what the taste of a particular cookie “is like” is to experience the taste; validation for my concept of the cookie’s ingredients might be to read the box, or I might rely on my experience with past cookie tastes to analyze it. You aren’t going to know taste with intellect, and you can’t think about ingredients by only tasting. Two different realms.

That (finally) brings me to the reason why I have posted this to the "Are qualia real?" thread. After reviewing the above, it seems that the correct answer is clearly "yes!" I looked the word up and it is defined to be "the properties of sensory experience". It seems clear to me that the meaning of the word "qualia" is no more than a tag used to reference the set of particular experiences.

In the context of the consciousness debate, I don’t think qualia generally refers to a “set of particular experiences.” The term usually refers to one specific aspect of experience (subjectivity) which so far is unexplained by physical processes of the brain. Using the cookie tasting example above, if consciousness were just a computer, it might indeed be able to analyze the ingredients by taste. But how do you account for that part of us which appreciates the taste?

For the most part, I don’t like relying on qualia as the definition for consciousness (I prefer self awareness), but if we are to use it, then I think there could be a lot more depth to it than most people talk about if we were to exchange the term qualia for appreciation. Now, as a most fundamental trait of consciousness, we might allow that appreciation is the basis of joy in the sense of appreciating to the point of happiness; in the same way we might also say we can “appreciate to the point of” being interested, compassionate, passionate, loving, kind, able to take pleasure in things, caring . . .

Isn’t that “base” ability to appreciate what makes life worthwhile? Does it seem that the deeper the appreciation of life, the more human a person becomes? Ponder an inattentive, joyless, loveless, bored, cruel, careless, unfeeling, apathetic, pleasureless existence. Isn’t that our zombie?

Exactly what Les is talking about when he discusses the realm of experience and what I am talking about when I refer to "squirrel" thought. I hold they are simply epistemically unknowable as they amount to an unexamined interpretation of our experiences and Les holds that they are our experiences themselves.

You put a lot of value on “examination” and I put more value on appreciation. That’s the primary difference I see between us as humans. Go ahead and run your consciousness that way, I don’t care one iota. I find I can think just fine giving appreciation the top priority, and life is more fun on top if it.

The main thing that I object to is your apparent assumption that mental examination is the lone way to be reflective. Like so many others I’ve debated here, you haven’t taken the time or made the effort to learn just how far the experiential side of a human can be developed, so you judge my statements from your own limited perspective. I don’t think there is any way for me to transfer my understanding about this into your head, and so I also don’t see any way all you intellect addicts are going to “appreciate” where I’m coming from.

(continued in the next post)

 

[Les Sleeth]

Part Two

(continued from above)

We only differ with regard to our definition of "real". . . . Les divides our awareness into two divisions which he calls "experience" and "reason" while I use the terms "squirrel" and "logic". He presumes our "experiences" are one with reality . . .

When did I ever say experience is reality or that they are necessarily one with reality? Geez!

“Real,” to me is simply a concept that refers to what exists, and, I’d add, what is possible to exist. So if something doesn’t exist and cannot exist, then it isn’t and can never be real. That’s it, not anything more, and not anything less. Realness has nothing at all to do with my experience except that I am something that exists, and I know it (unlike the vast majority of dumb creation). Experience isn’t what makes something real, experience is what allows me to be intimate with and eventually know realness.

. . . I make much of the fact that our experiences are an interpretation of reality and not reality itself.

I would agree to the extent that our senses carry information, and so we are dependent on their physical “interpretation,” if you will, of our environment. If my eyes see red differently than yours, for instance, then obviously we can apply the interpretation metaphor. In that way reality is an indirect experience.

However, one thing you (and few others) ever mention is the possibility of consciousness experiencing itself. That is a direct experience, and doesn’t require interpretation to know.

It is very clear that some drugs induce experiences (qualia?) which are not experienced in the absence of the drugs and certainly some mentally disturbed people experience things not known to us. I think it is a rather extreme step to presume all experiences are invariably real. By the way, if Les is right, his picture fits into my paradigm anyway: the threads (which are being referred to as qualia) simply become direct contacts with reality.

Similar to Hypnagogue’s response, I’d say it doesn’t matter what stimulates experience. The experience triggered by a drug is a real experience of a drug! There are real experiences of hallucinations, real experiences of phosphenes, real experiences of dreams, real experiences of paranoia . . . those are part of what exist, or reality, and so I say all experience is of some aspect of reality or another. The issue then becomes recognizing what we are experiencing. I have high confidence in my ability to experience a close facsimile of external reality (via my senses), and my own internal reality when my mind is quiet.

His qualia are essentially tags for aspects of reality itself . . .

I suppose qualia (triggered by the senses) might be called “tags” signaling the intrusion of sense data into consciousness. But that isn’t really what we’ve been talking about is it? What’s under discussion is how/why could/would a brain/physical processes create, in my words, appreciation? Do we need it to survive? If not, then we have no natural selection basis for the theory. Can you demonstrate any physical process (such as AI) which can produce appreciation? No? Well, then we have no experimental evidence for the theory. And if you say, “someday we will,” then I say, do it first before making the big claims. Until then I am skeptical physicalness is what is producing qualia.

. . . while my paradigm hold qualia as tags for the threads which tie reality to our conscious awareness.

Your “threads” are you linking conscious experiences to your intellect so you can think about them. There’s nothing contrary to what I’ve been saying there.

For something which cannot be directly communicated and can be known only through direct experience, Les's position amounts to, if he can't know it, it doesn't exist. Do electrons exist Les?

This is about where you start to get irritating, but I’ll try to keep it nice. Show me where I have ever in my over 1600 posts here said or implied “if he can't know it, it doesn't exist.” I have, in fact, repeatedly stood against that sort of solipsistic nonsense. What I have said is that experience is how we come to know if something exists.

When Pluto’s existence was predicted from perturbations in Jupiter’s orbit, or when Einstein predicted light being curved by gravity, was that considered “known” before Pluto or the bending of light was observed? You might say it was likely or logically indicated or even highly probable, but the empirical standard demands observation of what’s been hypothesized before you get to slap the label of “known” on it. Right now the speed of gravity is predicted to be C. As apt as that is to be true, is the scientific community ready to say it is known? No, and in fact, recent experiments indicating it’s true are being treated as inconclusive.

Let’s take your silly electron example. We can observe something happening on the subatomic level, but it is indirect. We also can observe how the behavior of, say, electricity or plasmas conform to the atomic model, and so there is more supportive information. Whatever is causing those behaviors we’ve labeled an “electron.” But is it a little sphere that revolves around an atomic nucleus, or is it something that the orbit model accounts for adequately? We don’t know for sure because we can’t stop an electron and examine it. On a practical level, however, we do know enough about the aspect of reality we call an electron to predict and work with it, and for those people trying to create things, that’s all they really need isn’t it?

Les merely doesn't think about the issue; there is no room in his paradigm for a quale to be invalid.

Les does think, and better than you in his opinion. Is it me who is unclear, or is it possible you just might not know everything there is to know about consciousness. In this thread I have tried to be up front as possible about something which in the past I’ve been more diplomatic about. You can reject my testimony if you want, I’m okay with that. But you can’t say you “know” anything about my testimony if you are inexperienced with what I am going to describe.

You are correct in suggesting that there is no room in my understanding for qualia to not be real. Unlike you, my conviction isn’t based on something theoretical or because I’ve “reasoned” it so. I am not willing to question or doubt something I’ve become so experienced with simply because someone is stuck at the theoretical stage. In fact, the main part of my assertion in this thread has been that whatever the nature of consciousness is, it won’t be revealed through reason; rather, one must learn to experience their own consciousness in its natural state to know it.

Its “natural state” is discovered through the experiential side of consciousness I’ve been talking about. The “experiential side” can be developed in a very specific way by learning to bring the mind to a complete stop. Still. Unmoving. No thoughts, no dreams, no imagination, no intellection. Perfect stillness. Do you think you can do it?

What do you believe would happen to your consciousness and the resulting perception of reality if you could get your mind to be still? Is it remotely possible that you will experience your own consciousness in a way you cannot possibly understand until you can shut your mind up? Will reality appear more clear, brighter, and absent your prejudices always being in the way?

I say, this “pure” conscious experience gives one new information, reveals more about the nature of consciousness, and opens the door to new consciousness abilities. One discovers a new way of reflecting, a new way of understanding, a new way of knowing, and a new way of being. Of course, you just don’t know whether I am describing an aspect of reality do you. You might study the long history of people who’ve become accomplished at this skill, but then that might get in the way of your devotion to theorizing.

In case there is any confusion, I am not trying to put thinking and experiencing at odds. They are a team, already so for all human beings. The issues I am raising are 1) which deserves top priority, 2) is there cognitive value in learning to still the mind, and 3) can the most basic underlying nature of consciousness ever be understood unless one learns to experience it uncluttered by the dominance of mental dynamics which seem to obscure all but mental activity itself?

 

[Tournesol]

The point was that the connection between qualia and reality is not a determinable issue

Why is that ?

 

[Tournesol]

The only question that then arises is exactly what is Les referring to as a "method of validation" for one's experience? From my paradigm, experience (which I refer to as "squirrel conclusions") provides no possibility of validation.

Meaning what ?
That naive, unreflective experience ("squirrel") experience cannot be validated by any means ?
That nothing (including sophisticated, reflective thought) cannot balidate naive, unreflective experience ("squirrel") experience?
That naive, unreflective experience ("squirrel") experience cannot be validate itself ?

So that becomes the crux of our differences: i.e., he presumes the mental image created by his experience is absolutely valid and cannot be questioned whereas my whole work is directed to questioning that presumption.
Now this (from my perspective) is in exact agreement with everything I have presented.

That of course depends on what you mean by "valid". You can be certain that
you have the exprience *as* of a round, blue object without anything
round and blue actually being in fornt of you. Hence the importance
of "veridical".

I hold they are simply epistemically unknowable as they amount to an unexamined interpretation of our experiences

If we don't know (however naively) our own qualia, how can we
know anything, empirically ?

 

[Les Sleeth]

If we don't know (however naively) our own qualia, how can we know anything, empirically ?

Good point.

 

[Doctordick]

Les, I read your long post and found nothing to disagree with. I think you just don't understand what I am trying to get across. Perhaps if you read my comment in the "Knowledge..." thread. I hope we do a better job of communicating.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[moving finger]

Because there is something inherently and ontologically subjective about qualia ?

Qualia by definition are subjective experiences.

Because qualia are inherently, metaphysically private, and not as a
resul of communication problems? What makes that true ?

Qualia by definition are subjective experiences.

Pretty much. AFAICS, all the evidence for the subjectivity of experience could be explained epistemologically by the limitations of human communication,
with no residue of ontological privacy.

Whether qualia are purely epistemic, or whether they are ontic, I do not think is something that could ever be answered by science.

I am quite unable to see why not. The existence of anything ontologically subjective and/or any failure of epistemologically objective explanations (such as physics) need metaphysical explanation.

Any argument to the effect that it is possible or advisable to expand phsyics
to include the subjective is likewise metaphysical.

I think that depends on one's defiinitions of physical and metaphysical (there are many definitions to choose from) and one's interpretations of those definitions

MF

 

[Tournesol]

Qualia by definition are subjective experiences.

Does not answer the epistemological/ontological
question

Whether qualia are purely epistemic, or whether they are ontic, I do not think is something that could ever be answered by science.

I have already given reasons -- scientific or not -- for coming down on the epistemic side, ie the logical possibility of a language that could communicate
qualia.

I think that depends on one's defiinitions of physical and metaphysical (there are many definitions to choose from) and one's interpretations of those definitions

I mean the kind of definition whereby

"qualia are physical"

and

"qualia are non-physical"

are both metaphysical claims.

 

[moving finger]

I have already given reasons -- scientific or not -- for coming down on the epistemic side, ie the logical possibility of a language that could communicate
qualia.

OK, that is your opinion. However I stand by my previous post, I do not think it ever will be possible to demonstrate unequivocally whether qualia are either epistemic or ontic, since they are by definition subjective.

I mean the kind of definition whereby

"qualia are physical"

and

"qualia are non-physical"

are both metaphysical claims.

if I allow you your definition, how can I dsiagree?

MF

 

[Tournesol]

OK, that is your opinion. However I stand by my previous post, I do not think it ever will be possible to demonstrate unequivocally whether qualia are either epistemic or ontic, since they are by definition subjective.

The question was whether they are epistmically or ontologically subjective.
Everything that is, is ontically, just as everything that is known, is known epistemically.

 

[moving finger]

The question was whether they are epistmically or ontologically subjective.

my position remains the same - all we can ever know is epistemic qualities. we can never "know" ontic qualities. At best, we can only surmise ontic qualities, based on our knowledge of epistemic qualities.

The question "are qualia epistemically subjective or ontically subjective" can therefore never be answered with certainty.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

we can only know epsitemic qualities (like "true" , "provable", "widely believed"..)
and not know ontic qualities (like "massive" , "round", "red"..) ?

Are you quite sure ? Or are you one of the people who thinks we "know"
mental items, like concepts and ideas, instead of things.

 

[moving finger]

we can only know epsitemic qualities (like "true" , "provable", "widely believed"..)
and not know ontic qualities (like "massive" , "round", "red"..) ?

Are you quite sure ? Or are you one of the people who thinks we "know"
mental items, like concepts and ideas, instead of things.

By whose definition is a quality like "red" deemed ontic?

The only way you have of knowing the colour of an object is via your senses, and your knowledge of that colour is then an epistemic quality. You have no direct knowledge of the ontic quality, but instead you simply assume that your epistemic perception of the colour red translates directly to an ontic property of the object. Your assumption may be incorrect.

MF

 

[Tournesol]

By whose definition is a quality like "red" deemed ontic?

The only way you have of knowing the colour of an object is via your senses, and your knowledge of that colour is then an epistemic quality. You have no direct knowledge of the ontic quality, but instead you simply assume that your epistemic perception of the colour red translates directly to an ontic property of the object. Your assumption may be incorrect.

MF

So you are on of those people. You are using "epistemic" to mean
"mental" or "internal" and "ontic" to mean "physical" or "external".

BTW, how do we know there are such things and minds or senses ?

 

[moving finger]

So you are on of those people. You are using "epistemic" to mean
"mental" or "internal" and "ontic" to mean "physical" or "external".

BTW, how do we know there are such things and minds or senses ?

epistemic in my book means (in a nutshell) what we know or can know about something.
ontic (also in a nutshell) means what something "is", it's true nature.

What we know is epistemic. We make inferences about ontic qualities from our observations of epistemic qualities, but we can never know an ontic quality directly, we can only infer.

Example : The world is epistemically indeterminable, but that does NOT imply (as most followers of Bohr would have us believe) that it is necessarily ontically indeterministic.

MF