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Tournesol
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Billy T said:Although, I continue to think time does not have any ontological status, that it is only a almost unavoidable "natural assumption" that man holds when understanding a sequence of events, I do not object to considering the separation of events that one follows another by a "dimension." I prefer to term it a parameter, because the "t" parameter has uses other than in the equations of physics, where thinking of it as a dimension is at least awarkward. For example a table of life insurance premiums, is often arranged as a funtion of age, or "time since birth," but this is just an index or parameter that indicates the probability of death in the next year etc. Nothing more, certainly not that there is something with ontological status existent about this probability.
The metaphysical argument can be put succinctly:
1. something (eg a clock) can have contradictory properties at different times
-- eg it can display 1 o'clock and 12'o' clock.
2. If time doesn't exist, it must have contradictory proeprties at the same time.
3. This cannot be , so , by reductio, time exists.
Probability can be empiriacally observed with sufficient sample size, as the Life insurance companies do or computed in ome idealized cases (for example the probability of rolling only even numbers with n "honest" dice. This does not give "probability" ontological status any more that time has it .
But according to QM, it does have ontological status. You are giving
an argumetn that time is not necessarily real, nto an argument that it is
actually unreal.
Fortunately we do not imbelish probability with properties, like many do for time (It flows steadly, what ever that could possibly mean? or Time flows from the past into the future. Time can not be stopped. etc.)
There are a number of open questions about the best way to characteise
time, but there is no definite and specific case against time unless you can show that none of those characteristics is required.
I do not object to time being called a "dimension" because in my view they are not real either, but since there are three (or now 10 or 12) of them instead only the one unique dimension of time, you can invert all the equations of physics for only any single one of them. If you then set all the resulting inverted equations equal, you can not claim to have shown, as I have for the unique "t" variable or dimension, that the universe can be described without reference to "dimension." Time is a unique dimension (an any particular reference frame) and can be totaly eliminate for physics or any other use.
This confuses time-as-a-measurement with time as a dimension. Replacing
the real existence of time-as-a-dimension with really existing clocks is
hopeless, because we need time-as-a-dimension to make sense of how
a clock works. Likewise, replacing a temporal sequence with a causal
sequence fails because causal relations embed temporal relations.
He also would not have argued that probability, regardless of how evaluated, had ontological status just because it has an empirical value or can be calculated.
Probability has validity because it represents something that is going
on. It may not represent it literally, but there are still objective facts
that underpin calculations of probability. So, it is not a case
of "does time exist" but "what is the best way to characterise time".
Most concepts have no ontological status, the unicorn be a stellar example.
Most do.
For another, less obvious, example, "beauty" does not exist. This does not prevent you from saying "She is beautiful." just as the lack of there being any real thing corresponding to what we call time prevents me from saying "It is time to stop now or I will be late." (At least three temporal reference in only one sensentence!)
Beauty may not literally exist, but there is still some substance
to statements about aesthetics. As usual , the question is how to characterise them.
I anxiously await your continuation, especially the part that "time passing may be an illusion" and agree that there are a "bundle of issues here." No doubt, by mentioning fact that beauty and probability concepts also lack ontological "reality" I have made the bundle heavier for you to lift.
Your argument is basically that "statements about time cannot be taken seriously on the crudest and most literal reading, therefore they have ot be disposed of entirely". The problem is to find the right non-crude reading.
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