Entanglement spooky action at a distance

[sudhirking]

Lol
because there are things smaller than elctrns
and they fall to the ground because the build of up of the ground contains more gracvity on a scale than comparred to he single electron.

 

[RandallB]

… that uses my theory of everything
however i am self taught and i am only a freshman

PS what is a PF Mentor

Ready to publish - Impressive.
Just curious is that a Freshman in HS or Collage?
Whatever level, you must agree that logically a reasoned discussion cannot happen if you’re the only one that knows anything about the unpublished ideas you wish to reference.

As to the PF Mentors, the very top “sticky” thread in the forum directed you to the Guidelines you need to read Before Posting. If you finishing reading those you see the Mentors mentioned about a dozen times.
Also, if you may not know what a PM is. Top right of the screen just below your name and time of last login. Is a count and link to any Unread Private Messages.
That will be where the Mentors can contact you if you don’t follow the guidelines.

Welcome to the forums, follow the guidelines and respect others opinions and you can learn a lot here. I you do publish something like on a website let me know in a PM, rather than in a post (read the guidelines).
RB

PS:
Normally advertisements are not acceptable in these posts, but IMO I think one is worthwhile here: Once you do see that you will learn a lot here – becoming a PF Contributor to give a bit of finical support is a worthwhile thing to do.

 

[DrChinese]

Lol
because there are things smaller than elctrns

Extensive experiments indicate that electrons act as point particles (i.e. they have no size) and certainly are NOT larger than quarks. Quarks also appear to be point particles but they are harder to analyze due to the effects of the strong nuclear force - so it is possible they have a very small size. Theory says they don't, and experiments have confirmed this within the limits mentioned.

Without extensive knowledge of the experiments that have been performed by scientists to date, you will have a difficult (actually impossible) time coming up with a "theory of everything". In fact, you will have a hard time coming up with a "theory of anything". Because any new theory must pass numerous very difficult hurdles in order to be accepted. These include an ability to explain already run tests, and the ability to make better predictions than existing theory in one or more areas.

There are forum guidelines, as RandallB pointed out, regarding posts regarding personal theories. These guidelines apply to everyone here, and there are plenty of recognized physicists in this crowd (I am not one of them though). The "rightness" of your theory won't matter if you haven't bothered to learn the basic science first. I commend your interest in original research and hope you can add to our knowledge some day.

 

[peter0302]

Lol
because there are things smaller than elctrns
and they fall to the ground because the build of up of the ground contains more gracvity on a scale than comparred to he single electron.

You have no idea what you're talking about, I'm sorry.

 

[Dragonfall]

What can we say about entangled pairs and their gravitational attraction? I know there's no quantum gravity yet, but take a guess.

Will no one hazard a guess?

 

[peter0302]

Their gravitaitonal attraction to what - each other? Undetectable. To the Earth? Sure - they theoretically fall to the Earth at 9.8 m/s2 like everything else. Of course we're usually talking about light which moves too fast in a lab to notice any gravitational influences. What is the question?

 

[RandallB]

Will no one hazard a guess?

Nothing
Not a Guess. I’m absolutely positive – IMO.

 

[Dragonfall]

What is the question?

The question is: how do you describe gravity of a system consisting of two entangled particles? How does it differ from the description of a system consisting of two non-entangled particles?

 

[wawenspop]

The question is: how do you describe gravity of a system consisting of two entangled particles? How does it differ from the description of a system consisting of two non-entangled particles?

I suggest that the field behaviours of the particles must obey relativity transformations in G and E fields, whereas the correlation of states is unaware of relativistic considerations because it is relieved of the responsibility of keeping the laws of physics the same in any (euclidean) reference frame and the combined entangled wave function needs, and has no relativistic correction - its FTL anyway.

 

[peter0302]

The question is: how do you describe gravity of a system consisting of two entangled particles? How does it differ from the description of a system consisting of two non-entangled particles?

I don't think you understand entanglement. Entanglement means that some property of the particle is defined by reference to the other. When that property is unamibuously measured in one, its value for the other is known.

The "gravity of a system consisting of two entangled particles" should be no different than in non-entangled particles.

Now I'll hazard a guess as to what you're getting at. If we have a neutron that decays into a proton and an electron, for example, the proton and electron are going to be entangled in their momentum, and they obviously are going to have different masses and charges, but they're technically not entangled in their mass and charge. The reason for this is that mass and charge are commuting observables. We can know mass and charge without changing them, so the HUP does not apply. When we talk about entanglement variables - position, momentum, spin, etc. - these are non-commuting observeables - which means that the order in which you observe them affects the results.

Gravity being solely a function of mass, there would be no special gravitational results observed in entangled particles versus non-entangled particles.

 

[ueit]

Sorry for the big delay, I was in vacation with almost no internet connection available.

You won't find a no-go theorem because it is very well possible. What I'm claiming is that I don't see how one could ever *demonstrate* a superdeterministic theory to be superdeterministic, even if it were. I'm claiming that the only way to PROVE that a theory is superdeterministic is to follow through the complicated relationship between "thing that apparently makes the choice of the measurement" and the emitted pair of photons.

I disagree. The superdeterministic character of the theory is only a consequence of the fact that the theory contains a (local) field that does not decreases quickly with distance (as the classical EM field does). The mechanism proposed by the theory can be verified statistically in different ways, not necessarily using EPR experiments. For example one can replace the resultant, pseudorandom field produced by all particles in the universe with a random field that has the same statistical properties (like the probability of the field to have a certain amplitude in a certain time interval). Then, one could model the dynamics of an atom or molecule in this random field and calculate the emission spectra. Because both the properties of the random field and the motion of the particles composing the atom/molecule are calculated using the proposed mechanism, a correctly predicted spectra is a proof of the theory. It is true that the theory predicts correlations between the emitted photons and the absorbers, and these cannot be verified so easily, but this is not a problem of the theory but of the experimentalist.

Because *anything* could be used to set up the measurement angles (and that "everything" might be outside of the lightcone of the emitting atom at the event of emission, so your "in the field of the detectors" won't hold: take as an example remote starlight from opposite directions which decides the detector angles: when the emitting atom is emitting the pair of photons, this starlight is still on its way and couldn't have reached (or anything else at c couldn't have reached yet) the emitting atom). Even if a theory were superdeterministic, you wouldn't be able to demonstrate it, as it would involve a complicated follow-up which is FAPP impossible.

It is not a theory's fault that you are not able to exactly describe your experimental setup. Using a computer simulation with a small number of particles (adding if you want some atoms that do not absorb photons but only randomize the "detectors" by colliding with them) is IMHO the way to go.

Well, my point is that it won't be doable to demonstrate it. Even if we have it (without knowing).

We could demonstrate it as I pointed above.

I know that I cannot prove the claim that QM does or doesn't apply to the human brain. But the point is, *it doesn't matter* for the results.

But it does. The experimental result is say the choice of tea over coffee. It is easy to perform the experiment. Now I want you to calculate the QM prediction for the experimental result.

You can put the Heisenberg cut just anywhere, and it will yield in the majority of cases, the right result.

IF you can calculate the result.

So QM results do not NEED a detailed follow-up through a complicated chain of events, once you've the essential part - and that's in part because we can accept externally given "free will" decisions. But a superdeterministic theory CANNOT do that: it wouldn't give self-consistent results if we "forced" it into free will decisions which are not compatible with its dynamics which is supposed to generate superdeterministic correlations. So in a superdeterministic theory we have no choice but to follow up through all the complicated chain of events up to the "determined experiment choice".

There is a similar problem in standard QM when you have complicated systems (like a brain). In the case of an EPR experiment the system of QM is 2 particles, while in the suprdeterministic (SD) theory is 2 particles + detectors + source. True, for this experiment, SD is not suitable to do the calculations. So what? You still can verify the theory by using smaller systems.

 

[vanesch]

I disagree. The superdeterministic character of the theory is only a consequence of the fact that the theory contains a (local) field that does not decreases quickly with distance (as the classical EM field does). The mechanism proposed by the theory can be verified statistically in different ways, not necessarily using EPR experiments. For example one can replace the resultant, pseudorandom field produced by all particles in the universe with a random field that has the same statistical properties (like the probability of the field to have a certain amplitude in a certain time interval). Then, one could model the dynamics of an atom or molecule in this random field and calculate the emission spectra. Because both the properties of the random field and the motion of the particles composing the atom/molecule are calculated using the proposed mechanism, a correctly predicted spectra is a proof of the theory.

You seem to forget that the particularity of a superdeterministic theory is that the essential correlations found, are due to specific correlations in the CHOICES made by the experimenters because their choices are not "free", and that if we allowed them to be truly random and independent, then the theory would NOT yield the correct results (THAT's what it means to be superdeterministic).

Let us take a toy example. Let us imagine that I have a switch and a light bulb. When I simply OBSERVE the switch states and the light bulb states, I see a perfect correlation: when the switch is "ON", the light is "ON", and when the switch is "OFF", the light is "OFF". This is an observed correlation, but it doesn't teach me much about any mechanism behind it: are the switch and the light bulb both activated by a common mechanism ? Is the switch causing the light bulb to go on and off ? Is the light bulb causing the switch to go on or off ? Is this just a weird correlation in nature ? Difficult to say.

However, in "normal" deterministic theories, we take it that we can CHOOSE the state of the switch. I can actively, and "freely" pick the state of the switch, and THEN I look for correlations. If I flip the switch to on, I see that the light goes on, and if I flip the switch to off, I see that the light goes off. Assuming that I did this "freely", then I can now CONCLUDE that the correlation between light bulb and switch is a CAUSAL relation: the switch must cause something that lights the light bulb. On the other hand, if with an external battery, I light the bulb, I don't see the switch flipping over. So this is a one-way causal relationship: the switch CAUSES the light bulb to go on.

It could have been different: there could have been a computer that activated electromagnetically a switch, and that also activated through a different circuit, the light bulb. It would have been a 'common cause' scenario, and me flipping the switch "freely" wouldn't make the light bulb light up.

However, a superdeterministic theory would say the following: even if I "freely" flip the switch, and I see a perfect correlation with the light go on or off, this is NO PROOF for a causal relationship between the switch and the light bulb, because there might have been a COMMON CAUSE which made me exactly flip the switch at the right times when that common cause also made the light go on and off. So imagine that the light bulb going on and off is actually caused by, I don't know, some radioactive decay or so, that there is strictly no relationship with the switch, but nevertheless, whatever causes the radioactive decay to happen also happens to influence my brain and makes me flip the switch at exactly the same moment when the light goes on or off. THAT is what a superdeterministic theory tells us: that the correlation I observe between a "freely made" choice and an observed phenomenon does NOT imply a causal relationship from the thing that was determined by the "choice" (flipping the switch) and the observed phenomenon (the light goes on or off), but rather, that my "choice" was exactly in tune with whatever caused really the phenomenon, because it had a common origin.

If I have a superdeterministic theory, I have to work out exactly HOW I am going to make these choices, and demonstrate that my choices are going to be exactly such that a correlation is going to appear AS IF there was a direct causal link. If I don't do that, but I make a "shortcut" to introducing GENUINLY RANDOM choices, then my superdeterministic theory would this time NOT show any correlation - because there IS no causal link between the flipping of the switch and the bulb - there is only a correlation between the choice I made and the light bulb which I did now away with, and hence be in contradiction with the observed correlations.

Now, saying that you COULD eventually do a small-scale calculation with not a brain that makes the "decisions", but a much smaller system - a 3-particle system or something, that might show some hope of being tractable with a computer simulation, doesn't prove ANYTHING. After all, it is very well possible that there IS a small scale correlation with a *particular* simple setup. Imagine for instance that we use a simple periodic oscillator to flip the switch, and that we use an identical oscillator to power the light bulb. Then we WILL find of course a "superdeterministic" correlation without there being a causal link, if the frequencies and phases of both oscillators are identical. But that's simply because the "free choice" made by an oscillator is a simplistic "free choice". It doesn't demonstrate AT ALL that if we use *no matter what mechanism to do the free choosing* we will ALWAYS obtain the same correlation, which is exactly what a superdeterministic theory needs to demonstrate before being able to explain those correlations in a non-causal matter.

 

[PhilDSP]

Well recall that the assumptions in Bell's theorem are that

1) Kolmogorov classical probability axioms are valid.
2) locality is valid (no causal influences can propagate faster than c between two events).
3) causality is valid (future measurement settings are "free" or random variables).

One could only reject locality as is often done, and get a nonlocal HV theory such as the pilot wave theory of de Broglie and Bohm.

Thanks for this clarification. In saying "non-local" about the general pilot wave theory, you mean that in the sense that the system response cannot be determined on the basis of a single instance in time and space don't you?

You're not saying that such a pilot wave must have a "faster than light" transfer of information or energy, are you?

 

[Maaneli]

Thanks for this clarification. In saying "non-local" about the general pilot wave theory, you mean that in the sense that the system response cannot be determined on the basis of a single instance in time and space don't you?

You're not saying that such a pilot wave must have a "faster than light" transfer of information or energy, are you?

By nonlocal I mean that the guiding equation for the particles is given by

dQ/dt = J/P

where J is the quantum probability current, P is the quantum probability density, both deduced from the quantum continuity equation, and Q is the actual position of the particles in space. So this means that the velocity of anyone particle in an N-particle guiding equation depends instantaneously and simultaneously on the positions of all the other particles, due to the fact that the wavefunction defining J and P is a function not in physical 3-space, but in configuration space of dimension R^3N . This nonlocality does not however allow for superluminal signalling (meaning information transfer or observable matter/energy transport for an entangled quantum state). So it is safe from your worries.

 

[PhilDSP]

Okay. Thanks again for being so specific. It's very refreshing to get a straight, very descriptive and usable answer from someone for a change!

 

[Maaneli]

You're welcome. Thanks. Not to sound haughty, but I think this is a subject that most people in this forum are very interested in, but have not studied very carefully, which the reason my answer sounds refreshing to you.

 

[DrChinese]

Well recall that the assumptions in Bell's theorem are that

1) Kolmogorov classical probability axioms are valid.
2) locality is valid (no causal influences can propagate faster than c between two events).
3) causality is valid (future measurement settings are "free" or random variables).

Notice that "realism" is not at all the issue in Bell's theorem, despite the common claim that it is.

Repeating for the sake of completeness: Realism ABSOLUTELY is assumed and critical to Bell's Theorem. Not sure why this is hard for some folks to accept, so let's reference the paper itself: On the EPR Paradox. When Bell says that there is a simultaneous A, B and C (circa his [14] in the original), he is invoking realism. He says "It follows that c is another unit vector...". His meaning is that there if there is an a, b and c simultaneously then there must be internal consistency and there must be an outcome table that yields probabilities for all permutations of outcomes a, b and c that are non-negative. That is where both the Kolmogorov axiom comes into play (also in Bell's []12]), as does EPR style Realism (explicitly formulated here in a way in which Einstein would have to accept).

Bell's conclusion is that if hidden variables are added, they must be non-local. Alternately, QM is complete as is; the EPR paradox is solved with the answer that EPR rejected as "unreasonable" (because Realism is rejected).

 

[Maaneli]

Repeating for the sake of completeness: Realism ABSOLUTELY is assumed and critical to Bell's Theorem. Not sure why this is hard for some folks to accept, so let's reference the paper itself: On the EPR Paradox. When Bell says that there is a simultaneous A, B and C (circa his [14] in the original), he is invoking realism. He says "It follows that c is another unit vector...". His meaning is that there if there is an a, b and c simultaneously then there must be internal consistency and there must be an outcome table that yields probabilities for all permutations of outcomes a, b and c that are non-negative. That is where both the Kolmogorov axiom comes into play (also in Bell's []12]), as does EPR style Realism (explicitly formulated here in a way in which Einstein would have to accept).

Bell's conclusion is that if hidden variables are added, they must be non-local. Alternately, QM is complete as is; the EPR paradox is solved with the answer that EPR rejected as "unreasonable" (because Realism is rejected).

But already discussed that the realism assumption is no different than the realism assumptions made in other physics theorems, and that if you remove realism, it is impossible (or at least inconcievable) to derive an inequality along with the assumptions of locality and causality (and indeed it would become problematic how to define locality and causality without realism) that can be empirically tested and that differs from Bell's. I recall I also challenged you to try and do this. Finally, it is also possible to keep locality, realism, and causality, but to change Kolmogorov's axioms about the measure density on a spherical manifold. For example, see Pitowsky's work:

Resolution of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and Bell Paradoxes
Itamar Pitowsky
Phys. Rev. Lett. 48, 1299 - 1302 (1982)
http://prola.aps.org/abstract/PRL/v48/i19/p1299_1

 

[DrChinese]

But already discussed that the realism assumption is no different than the realism assumptions made in other physics theorems, and that if you remove realism, it is impossible (or at least inconcievable) to derive an inequality along with the assumptions of locality and causality (and indeed it would become problematic how to define locality and causality without realism) that can be empirically tested and that differs from Bell's. I recall I also challenged you to try and do this...

And the full conclusion we came to, quoting yourself a bit further to make it clearer to other readers (such as PhilDSP), was that Realism IS present and a necessary component of Bell's Theorem:

"Indeed the form of realism you generally suggest is an absolutely necessary pin in the logic of the theorem (or any physics theorem for that matter; in fact, that realism assumption is no different than the realism assumptions in, say, the fluctuation-dissipation theorem or Earnshaw's theorem, both of which are theorems in classical physics). But it is completely false to say that realism is necessarily falsified by a violation of the Bell inequalities. There are other assumptions in Bell's theorem, if you recall, which can be varied without making the general mathematical logic of the inequality derivation inconsistent. They are, once again,

1) Kolmogorov classical probability axioms are valid.
2) locality is valid (the propagation speed for causal influences between two events is bounded by the speed of light, c).
3) causality is valid ("future" or final measurement settings are "free" or random variables).

One can drop anyone of these assumptions and it wouldn't falsify realism. Well, if you drop 3) and replace it with a common past hypothesis or a form of backwards causation as Huw Price and others have suggested, then you just have to modify your notion of realism in a particular way (there is a literature on this you know). That's not the same however as saying that realism gets falsified."

So I would completely agree with your statement that violation of a Bell Inequality does NOT imply Realism must be rejected. It could be 1) 2) or 3) above instead. As before, I do not think there is a disagreement between us on this particular point.

A minor nitpick about your 3), Causality: I would change the meaning of causality slightly to be: The future cannot influence the past. If it could (causality violated), it would be possible to draw diagrams where Alice and Bob are causally connected at space-like separated points without there being any non-local influence. I do not believe 3) is mentioned explicitly in Bell's original paper, but I don't think that really changes the sense of Bell's conclusion.

 

[Maaneli]

So I would completely agree with your statement that violation of a Bell Inequality does NOT imply Realism must be rejected. It could be 1) 2) or 3) above instead. As before, I do not think there is a disagreement between us on this particular point.

Yes, OK.

A minor nitpick about your 3), Causality: I would change the meaning of causality slightly to be: The future cannot influence the past. If it could (causality violated), it would be possible to draw diagrams where Alice and Bob are causally connected at space-like separated points without there being any non-local influence. I do not believe 3) is mentioned explicitly in Bell's original paper, but I don't think that really changes the sense of Bell's conclusion.

Yes. In fact the definition that the "future" measurement settings are "random" variables already implies the statement that the "future cannot influence the past". Yes, 3) is not mentioned in Bell's original paper, but of course he discusses it more explicitly in "Free Variables and Local Causality" as well as "La Nouvelle Cuisine".

 

[ueit]

You seem to forget that the particularity of a superdeterministic theory is that the essential correlations found, are due to specific correlations in the CHOICES made by the experimenters because their choices are not "free", and that if we allowed them to be truly random and independent, then the theory would NOT yield the correct results (THAT's what it means to be superdeterministic).

Testing the EPR correlations is not the only way a theory can be verified. A prediction of a complex atomic spectra is good as well.

Let us take a toy example. Let us imagine that I have a switch and a light bulb. When I simply OBSERVE the switch states and the light bulb states, I see a perfect correlation: when the switch is "ON", the light is "ON", and when the switch is "OFF", the light is "OFF". This is an observed correlation, but it doesn't teach me much about any mechanism behind it: are the switch and the light bulb both activated by a common mechanism ? Is the switch causing the light bulb to go on and off ? Is the light bulb causing the switch to go on or off ? Is this just a weird correlation in nature ? Difficult to say.

However, in "normal" deterministic theories, we take it that we can CHOOSE the state of the switch. I can actively, and "freely" pick the state of the switch, and THEN I look for correlations. If I flip the switch to on, I see that the light goes on, and if I flip the switch to off, I see that the light goes off. Assuming that I did this "freely", then I can now CONCLUDE that the correlation between light bulb and switch is a CAUSAL relation: the switch must cause something that lights the light bulb. On the other hand, if with an external battery, I light the bulb, I don't see the switch flipping over. So this is a one-way causal relationship: the switch CAUSES the light bulb to go on.

It could have been different: there could have been a computer that activated electromagnetically a switch, and that also activated through a different circuit, the light bulb. It would have been a 'common cause' scenario, and me flipping the switch "freely" wouldn't make the light bulb light up.

However, a superdeterministic theory would say the following: even if I "freely" flip the switch, and I see a perfect correlation with the light go on or off, this is NO PROOF for a causal relationship between the switch and the light bulb, because there might have been a COMMON CAUSE which made me exactly flip the switch at the right times when that common cause also made the light go on and off. So imagine that the light bulb going on and off is actually caused by, I don't know, some Radioactive Decay or so, that there is strictly no relationship with the switch, but nevertheless, whatever causes the radioactive decay to happen also happens to influence my brain and makes me flip the switch at exactly the same moment when the light goes on or off. THAT is what a superdeterministic theory tells us: that the correlation I observe between a "freely made" choice and an observed phenomenon does NOT imply a causal relationship from the thing that was determined by the "choice" (flipping the switch) and the observed phenomenon (the light goes on or off), but rather, that my "choice" was exactly in tune with whatever caused really the phenomenon, because it had a common origin.

If I have a superdeterministic theory, I have to work out exactly HOW I am going to make these choices, and demonstrate that my choices are going to be exactly such that a correlation is going to appear AS IF there was a direct causal link. If I don't do that, but I make a "shortcut" to introducing GENUINLY RANDOM choices, then my superdeterministic theory would this time NOT show any correlation - because there IS no causal link between the flipping of the switch and the bulb - there is only a correlation between the choice I made and the light bulb which I did now away with, and hence be in contradiction with the observed correlations.

1. You seem to give the "free choice" assumption an overemphasised importance. Hystoricaly, it didn't play an important role (astronomy was the first science to be developed and there were not many experiments with celestial bodies that could be performed in Copernicus' time). In modern times, we have the Big-Bang theory that deals with the universe as a whole. Asking for such a theory to accept "free" experimental imput is logicaly absurd. Does that mean that the evolution of the solar system or the evolution of the universe are not causal? I think not. I don't need a "free-willed" human to produce a non-uniformity in the early universe to accept that such non-uniformities caused galaxy formation. Now, there are situations where laboratory experiments are possible and they greatly reduce the time to develop a theory. But they are not an absolute requirement.

2. One should not start with assumptions that have no scientiffic basis whatsoever. In your example there is a good reason to take the experimenter's choice as a free parameter. We understand pretty well classical physics and we know that two macroscopic, electrical-neutral objects do not interact from a large distance. To propose that something like that happens to the experimenter and the light bulb will require a great conspiracy. On the other hand we do not know the dynamics of the quantum particles. This is the question that must be answered.

3. The argument you give against SD has nothing to do with SD but it is a restatement of Okham's razor. One should not propose a complicated mechanism when it is not required. We understand very well what's happening when a light bulb is switched on. To show you the fallacy I will construct a simillar argument against MWI.

The light bulb, the switch and experimenter are all in a superposition of all possible states. The experimenter does nothing and he is not "free" at all. It so happens that for an unknown reason his consciousness splits so that he only sees the known correlations between the switch and light bulb. I'm sure you can refine this argument so it will be rather devastating against MWI. But it is wrong. The reason we don't propose such explanations is that they are not required here. In the case of EPR they are required because a simple, classical causal chain does not work.

Now, saying that you COULD eventually do a small-scale calculation with not a brain that makes the "decisions", but a much smaller system - a 3-particle system or something, that might show some hope of being tractable with a computer simulation, doesn't prove ANYTHING. After all, it is very well possible that there IS a small scale correlation with a *particular* simple setup. Imagine for instance that we use a simple periodic oscillator to flip the switch, and that we use an identical oscillator to power the light bulb. Then we WILL find of course a "superdeterministic" correlation without there being a causal link, if the frequencies and phases of both oscillators are identical. But that's simply because the "free choice" made by an oscillator is a simplistic "free choice". It doesn't demonstrate AT ALL that if we use *no matter what mechanism to do the free choosing* we will ALWAYS obtain the same correlation, which is exactly what a superdeterministic theory needs to demonstrate before being able to explain those correlations in a non-causal matter.

If the same mechanism works for many different, even if simple setups, it is unlikely that a false, ad-hoc mechanism will work. So I think that a computer simmulation is a perfect way to test the theory. The burden is on you to explain why a human brain is qualitatively different than a random bunch of molecules when QM is concerned, and why such a large scale simullation is required at all.

 

[wawenspop]

I was thinking about your light switch analogy and applying it to entangled particles - i.e. some sort of 'causal correlation' mechanism, that the mathematics does not need, but we apparently do!...
Well, what about the Pauli Exclusion Principle, isn't that somewhat analogous, for say two electrons that *must* have opposite spins to be in the same orbit. I assume the two electrons are completely entangled with each other so that they are not 'individual' electrons. It just seems a more concrete example to consider...

 

[LaserMind]

Paulis Exclusion Principle is simply a bald statement of 'fact' and does not give a mechanism for the behaviour. Likewise entangled particles can be mathematically described using complex matrix analysis, but the 'mechanism' for correlation is again missing. Judging from these threads we are now thinking about mutiple entanglements rather than just between two discrete particles.