In what sense does MWI fail to predict the Born Rule?

In summary, the Born Rule is a mathematical rule that describes how the probability of finding a particle or system in a particular state is related to the amount of energy it has.
  • #71
DarMM said:
It seems odd to me that in a theory that is about the deterministic evolution of the universe, with probability only arising from local subjective viewpoints, the deterministic evolution would have the mathematical form of a probability theory.
Isn't this just the result of classifying ##C^*## algebra factors? Or do you ask specifically why MWI assumes ##I_\infty##?
 
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  • #72
A. Neumaier said:
Yes, this is exactly what I was paraphrasing..

Well, your "paraphrase" substituted a completely different meaning. It isn't what I meant. It isn't what I said. I didn't say that because that's not what I meant.
 
  • #73
stevendaryl said:
Well, your "paraphrase" substituted a completely different meaning. It isn't what I meant. It isn't what I said. I didn't say that because that's not what I meant.
But that's how your arguments sound to me. The words you are using convey nothing significant, since you simply postulate a lot of unseen worlds and a probabilistic law for them to justify with a weak argument only what you know already about the world you see.
 
  • #74
A. Neumaier said:
But that's how your arguments sound to me. The words you are using convey nothing significant, since you simply postulate a lot of unseen worlds and a probabilistic law for them to justify with a weak argument only what you know already about the world you see.

No, that wasn't what I was doing, at all. When you're confused about what someone means, ask questions. There is no point in responding to you if you just ignore what I say and pretend I said something else.
 
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  • #75
Stephen Tashi said:
Taking pains to speak only of frequencies, how do we decide if MWI predicts the Born Rule? It has to be something like "On the the most frequent branches ( i.e. the most frequent "wolds") , the frequency of events observed in a repeated experiment is approximately the frequency given by the Born Rule."

Probability in quantum mechanics is definitely not a matter of "counting branches". You can have just two branches, and that doesn't mean that they have equal weight.

If you prepare an electron in a state that is spin-up in the z-direction, and then measure its spin along an axis that is 5o away from the z-axis, you'll get spin up with probability .998 and spin-down with probability .002. In a Many-Worlds type interpretation, there are now two branches, but they're not equally weighted.
 
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  • #76
A. Neumaier said:
Isn't this just the result of classifying ##C^*## algebra factors? Or do you ask specifically why MWI assumes ##I_\infty##?
I think the question I'm asking might be more on the philosophical side after some thought. It was basically that the mathematical structure of any quantum theory is that of a C*-algebra, i.e. a generalised probability theory. In MWI, probability is not a fundamental component of the theory and yet the theory has the mathematical structure of a probability theory. I was wondering if there was any discussion of this odd mathematical structure, given the non-probabilistic nature of the theory.
 
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  • #77
A. Neumaier said:
The real question is: In what sense does MWI predict Born's rule? I cannot see any coherent argument.
Really? I would understand if you had said "valid argument" but to deny the existence of a coherent argument is patently ridiculous.
 
  • #78
stevendaryl said:
Probability in quantum mechanics is definitely not a matter of "counting branches". You can have just two branches, and that doesn't mean that they have equal weight.
Yes, if you take the usual notion of "probability" as fundamental, but my remarks are directed at attempts that begin with the MWI sans probabilities and attempt to substitute actual frequencies for probabilities. If you take the MWI, you can have unequal weights, but these have no direct interpretation as probabilities - at least not without a lengthy proof. If you want to deal only with actual frequencies, you have to figure out a way to define your frequencies in such a manner that branches that have higher weights are "frequent". For example, you could assume there are more copies of them.
 
  • #79
DarMM said:
Just another question, doesn't decoherence already require the Born rule, to permit tracing over the environment? Hence without the Born Rule, how do you show the state vector is of essentially Schmidt form to permit the clear branching structure without the Born Rule?
No. Decoherence does not require the Born Rule! It's a physical process that does not resolve a state as a proper mixture anywhere.
I may have failed to understand your question about the Schmidt form but I would assume that the answer lies in the fact that we define the subsystems - the original system, the detector, the environment, the observer - and each of these has its own state space. So the state space must be factorizable and the state is then a sum of product states.
 
  • #80
Derek P said:
No. Decoherence does not require the Born Rule!
How is Tracing justified without the Born Rule?
 
  • #81
DarMM said:
How is Tracing justified without the Born Rule?
No idea. Why would you want to?
 
  • #82
Stephen Tashi said:
Yes, if you take the usual notion of "probability" as fundamental, but my remarks are directed at attempts that begin with the MWI sans probabilities and attempt to substitute actual frequencies for probabilities. If you take the MWI, you can have unequal weights, but these have no direct interpretation as probabilities - at least not without a lengthy proof. If you want to deal only with actual frequencies, you have to figure out a way to define your frequencies in such a manner that branches that have higher weights are "frequent". For example, you could assume there are more copies of them.
Well there are. What you are calling a branch is a branch of the original superposition - the state of the system under observation. It's not a world.
 
  • #83
Derek P said:
No idea. Why would you want to?

Well, it's the most general form of a quantum prediction. If you have a state that is described by a certain density operator ##\rho##, and you have an operator ##A##, then the expected value of ##A### is ##tr(\rho A)##.
 
  • #84
Derek P said:
No idea. Why would you want to?
Tracing is required to obtain decoherence and tracing requires the Born Rule. Hence decoherence does require the Born rule.

I'm reading Wallace's book right now, so I'll see what he says.
 
  • #85
DarMM said:
Tracing is required to obtain decoherence and tracing requires the Born Rule. Hence decoherence does require the Born rule.
I'm reading Wallace's book right now, so I'll see what he says.
stevendaryl said:
Well, it's the most general form of a quantum prediction. If you have a state that is described by a certain density operator ##\rho##, and you have an operator ##A##, then the expected value of ##A### is ##tr(\rho A)##.
You're both missing something. The Born Rule and tracing are not assumed in MWI, they are derived from the unitary model. Indeed it is hard to imagine how a treatment that concludes with quantum predictions could fail to reproduce the Projection Postulate - except that it would no longer be a postulate but a theorem. But let's not be too ambitious - this thread is about the Born Rule, not the entirety of MWI's mathematical underpinnings. It can be tackled by explicitly expanding the global state as a sum of many ket products. It is a result, not an assumption. And of course once the Born Rule is established, you can hit the density matrix with it if that's what floats your boat.
 
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  • #86
Derek P said:
You're both missing something. The Born Rule and tracing are not assumed in MWI, they are derived from the unitary model. Indeed it is hard to imagine how a treatment that concludes with quantum predictions could fail to reproduce the Projection Postulate - except that it would no longer be a postulate but a theorem.

He wasn't saying that tracing was assumed. He was asking how it was justified. A theorem is a good justification, if there is a theorem.
 
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  • #87
DarMM said:
tracing requires the Born Rule
Actually, tracing and decoherence do not involve measurement, hence tracing is strictly speaking an additional assumption independent of the Born rule in its conventional formulation. The latter is a statement about measurement results, but things not yet measured have no results, hence the conventional form of Born's rule is inapplicable.
 
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  • #88
stevendaryl said:
He wasn't saying that tracing was assumed. He was asking how it was justified. A theorem is a good justification, if there is a theorem.
Okay. So let's pretend there isn't a theorem and tracing is not justified. You can (I believe) derive the Born rule by expanding the state as a sum of components. Of course you will actually be taking a trace but you won't be relying on a theorem to give you permission.
 
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  • #89
bhobba said:
Look into Gleason.

Thanks
Bill
You need to change your signature to "Every serious student of QM needs a copy of Ballentine and to Look into Gleason" !
 
  • #90
DarMM said:
However, if it's not branch-counting, what is it?
No, it's state counting.
 
  • #91
DarMM said:
I know the proof of Gleason's theorem, but it has never genuinely helped me comprehend the MWI arguments as it comes from a very different direction, Wallace argues that his proof is a separate line of argumentation to Gleason. I think I need to read Wallace's book in full perhaps.

Look into the non-contextuality theorem in the appendix of Wallace. It may have an error - but I couldn't find it. That means Gleason applies.

IMHO the real issue is, yes there are physical reasons one can ague about regarding the proof but the real bug bear is - how to introduce probabilities into a deterministic theory. I won't say what I think, you probably have guessed it, arguing positions is not something I enjoy that much. A little bit is OK. I think its much better to understand the pro's and con's of different views - to that end form and elucidate your view but arguing just seems to go on and on not really getting anywhere. Just my view of course - mentors as a group will ensure it all remains under control.

Interesting to hear what you think after reading Wallace. I actuay found it very illuminating of decoherent histories as much as MW - interesting. I like its theorem/proof approach due to my math background but I know its not every-ones cup of tea.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #92
Derek P said:
Okay. So let's pretend there isn't a theorem and tracing is not justified.

Then it doesn't agree with experiment, because the tracing prediction is what we observe.
 
  • #93
DarMM said:
Tracing is required to obtain decoherence and tracing requires the Born Rule. Hence decoherence does require the Born rule. I'm reading Wallace's book right now, so I'll see what he says.

Tracing does require the Born rule - and other things - but the mixed state after decoherence may or may not be what we call an observation. One out, one I actually like, is simply define it that way - but it just semantics.

Decoherent histories replaces measurement with consistency - but the details require to study a text on it.

I personally like Schlosshauer's book - it looks at a lot of interpretations and decorehrence implications:
https://www.amazon.com/dp/3540357734/?tag=pfamazon01-20

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #94
Derek P said:
No, it's state counting.

What do you mean by "state counting"? In the MWI, there is only one state for the entire universe, so counting states always gives you the answer 1.

Do you mean counting the number of terms in the superposition? If so, then how is that different from branch counting?
 
  • #95
Derek P said:
Okay. So let's pretend there isn't a theorem

But there is a theorem - you can't waive away Gleason. The only out with Gleason is non-contextuality - non-contextual interpretations usually have there own way of handling the measurement issue.

The measurement issue has problems - but we know things about it the early pioneers did not - there is no getting around it. Progress will not be made by - let's suppose something we know is true is not.

As I have said please please try to understand interpretations pro's and cons. I think your question has been answered. But if you or anyone wants to keep it going - go ahead. It will be shut down if it becomes simply argumentative.

Thanks
Bill
 
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  • #96
Okay, just to say, I'm going to stay away from this thread until I finish Wallace and Schlosshauer's books. I'm reading Wallace's book using Mandolesi's papers as a guide, both the 2015 and 2018 ones.
 
  • #97
stevendaryl said:
What do you mean by "state counting"? In the MWI, there is only one state for the entire universe, so counting states always gives you the answer 1.

Do you mean counting the number of terms in the superposition? If so, then how is that different from branch counting?
There are googols of terms in "the superposition" but only a small number of worlds. It's up to you which one you call "branches" but they are certainly very different.
 
  • #98
DarMM said:
Okay, just to say, I'm going to stay away from this thread until I finish Wallace and Schlosshauer's books. I'm reading Wallace's book using Mandolesi's papers as a guide, both the 2015 and 2018 ones.

Its a good approach, but you chose a tough one. I don't know if I could do it. I would post my latest thinking as I learn more. You have my very humble admiration.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #99
Derek P said:
You can (I believe) derive the Born rule by expanding the state as a sum of components.
This only gives a decomposition but assigns no meaning or frequencies/probabilities to the terms. You have to postulate that each term has a given frequency/probability. This is a postulate far worse than Born's rule since Born's rule has at least an empirical support, but assigning probabilities to worlds of which only one is observed is completely arbitrary.
 
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  • #100
DarMM said:
Okay, just to say, I'm going to stay away from this thread until I finish Wallace and Schlosshauer's books. I'm reading Wallace's book using Mandolesi's papers as a guide, both the 2015 and 2018 ones.
Schlosshauer's book is probably the best modern discussion of the measurement problem.
 
  • #101
bhobba said:
But there is a theorem - you can't waive away Gleason. The only out with Gleason is non-contextuality - non-contextual interpretations usually have there own way of handling the measurement issue.

The measurement issue has problems - but we know things about it the early pioneers did not - there is no getting around it. Progress will not be made by - let's suppose something we know is true is not.

As I have said please please try to understand interpretations pro's and cons. I think your question has been answered. But if you or anyone wants to keep it going - go ahead. It will be shut down if it becomes simply argumentative.

Thanks
Bill
I don't think it has been answered. If you decide to moderate it please just remove the offending subthreads.
I would agree that Gleason is conclusive but just saying so doesn't account for why the claim is so often made that MWI fails to deliver Born.
 
  • #102
A. Neumaier said:
This only gives a decomposition but assigns no meaning or frequencies/probabilities to the terms. You have to postulate that each term has a given frequency/probability. This is a postulate far worse than Born's rule since Born's rule has at least an empirical support, but assigning probabilities to worlds of which only one is observed is completely arbitrary.
I have no idea what you mean. I would not assign probabilities to worlds. As far as I know it cannot be done, and I think it is provably impossible.
 
  • #103
A. Neumaier said:
This only gives a decomposition but assigns no meaning or frequencies/probabilities to the terms. You have to postulate that each term has a given frequency/probability. This is a postulate far worse than Born's rule since Born's rule has at least an empirical support, but assigning probabilities to worlds of which only one is observed is completely arbitrary.

Gleason is the only generally accepted one.

It requires a few assumptions:
1. Assigning a probability to an outcome of an observation is the correct way to go.
2. Non-Contextuality.
3. The principle that any superposition is at least in principle possible - called if I remember the strong principle of superposition.

There may be others - but I just can't recall them.

The decision theoretic approach is much more controversial than Gleason. The OP can look up its objections and make up their own mind. There are others such as Quantum Darwinism that think they can prove it from entanglement - again its controversial.

Thanks
Bill
 
  • #104
Derek P said:
There are googols of terms in "the superposition" but only a small number of worlds. It's up to you which one you call "branches" but they are certainly very different.

Okay, but I'm asking what you mean by "world", if it's not a branch.
 
  • #105
Derek P said:
I have no idea what you mean. I would not assign probabilities to worlds. As far as I know it cannot be done, and I think it is provably impossible.

The principle of superposition says given any two states |a> and |b> then another state is c1*|a> + c2*|b> ie it forms a vector space what is the physical meaning of c1 and c2?

The Born rule gives the answer.

Thanks
Bill
 

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