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confutatis said:Yes, you see that P-consciousness is missing from an explanation of A-consciousness. That would be correct. But a zombie would think he sees it to. You must keep in mind that, according to Chalmers, there's nothing a zombie may say or do that would reveal his zombieness, because everything a zombie says and does is the result of A-consciousness - including statements about P-consciousness!
Right. I understand that. But are we saying that a zombie can't think for himself? The whole point of defining a zombie this way seems to be to make it impossible for "other people" to differentiate a zombie from a non-zombie to illustrate a point about consciousness.
For the same reason you do: he doesn't see P-consciousness in it. Or, rather, the physical action of a zombie scanning the words of an explanation of A-consciousness causes the zombie to move his mouth and tongue and utter the phrase: "I don't see P-consciousness in it!".
Again, this implies a zombie doesn't think for himself. I didn't realize that we were assuming that consciousness is what allowed me to think, calculate and make decisions. If we are that's fine. I'll just need to come up with another word to describe people like Mentat who don't know what the color red is.
I'm trying to understand why. The only reason I can fathom is that they have been defined as deterministic robots who are simply programmed to say the same things that conscious people say.He thinks he has it but he doesn't.
I think even Chalmers acknowledges that zombies would also eventually come up with a hard problem, except in their case it would be a pseudo-problem whereas in our case it's a real problem![]()
If they are allowed to think for themselves, I don't see how this can be true. But they may not be defined that way in which case I can see how that's true and I just need to come up with another word.