Is Consciousness Beyond Physical Explanation?

[Hurkyl]

When we come to a logical dead end and find there is no way out, then the problem is most likely with one of our unwritten assumptions.

What's unwritten? You have explicitly assumed qualia is non-physical and cannot affect physical systems, and naturally, you arrive at the conclusion that one cannot measure qualia physically. This isn't particularly deep, mystifying, or paradoxical -- unless one tries to simultaneously cling to ideas like the experiences one has that shape how one interacts with the world are supposed to be qualia.


I have no problem with simply making postulates and seeing where they lead as a mental exercise.

My problem is with asserting these postulates are really true, in the face of apparent contradiction, without anything resembling a decent supporting argument.

 

[Pythagorean]

Q_Goest,

The (fact?) that qualia are subjective isn't contradictory to physicalism at all. For arguments sake, let's say each person does have an individual sensation to the same experience. This is perfectly acceptable, since everyone's physically wired a little different. When they first experience something (say a color), that color is stored in memory somehow. It doesn't matter whatsoever that the way it's stored is a little different to each person. What's important is that it consistently gives the same sensation and that it's a sensation that is separable from other sensations (and furthermore, it's class is separate from other classes of sensation). We don't expect the semantic memory of the color blue to wire itself the exact same way in every person. That's irrelevant.

What is important, again, is that they have a reliable flag to repeatedly identify the object. What's even more important though, is that the person can somehow assess the danger or benefit of the object with an emotional memory (as mitigated by the amygdala and the basal ganglia) and furthermore that the emotional memory as compared to the sensation gives an accurate prediction of how one should behave in the presence of that sensation. (For instance, knowing that pain is bad and pleasure is good as a simplified example).

The science of how and why sensations are subjectively different will deal with the minute differences in cell structure and dynamics between any two people. But it's not significant in terms of survival. Our brains are meant to be dynamic and adaptive. They don't have a rigid storage system (because that would almost certainly fail in a real world situation).

Why should the concept of a p-zombie be flawed? In my view it is perfectly logical. A zombie is simply the physical process less the phenomenal experience.

Well, I guess this is the fundamental difference in both our assumption and conclusions. I think the evidence has continually favored the physicalist stance though.

 

[Q_Goest]

The (fact?) that qualia are subjective isn't contradictory to physicalism at all.

The fact qualia are not objectively measurable is a (potential) problem for physicalism. Along with other assumptions, Shoemaker and Rosenberg have pointed out it leads to a knowledge paradox. We can accept this paradox or try to resolve it. To me, it is just one more of the many problems associated with computationalism.

For arguments sake, let's say each person does have an individual sensation to the same experience. This is perfectly acceptable, since everyone's physically wired a little different. When they first experience something (say a color), that color is stored in memory somehow. It doesn't matter whatsoever that the way it's stored is a little different to each person. What's important is that it consistently gives the same sensation and that it's a sensation that is separable from other sensations (and furthermore, it's class is separate from other classes of sensation). We don't expect the semantic memory of the color blue to wire itself the exact same way in every person. That's irrelevant.

What is important, again, is that they have a reliable flag to repeatedly identify the object. What's even more important though, is that the person can somehow assess the danger or benefit of the object with an emotional memory (as mitigated by the amygdala and the basal ganglia) and furthermore that the emotional memory as compared to the sensation gives an accurate prediction of how one should behave in the presence of that sensation. (For instance, knowing that pain is bad and pleasure is good as a simplified example).

The science of how and why sensations are subjectively different will deal with the minute differences in cell structure and dynamics between any two people. But it's not significant in terms of survival. Our brains are meant to be dynamic and adaptive. They don't have a rigid storage system (because that would almost certainly fail in a real world situation).

That’s all perfectly in line with computationalism. It shows you have a good understanding of computationalism. What I see from this however, is that you’ve not tried to address the “http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Explanatory_gap" ” which asks the question, “Why should there be any qualia at all?” Daniel Dennett for example, is a computationalist that has suggested, “So contrary to what seems obvious at first blush, there simply are no qualia at all.” (See “Quinning Qualia”) He comes to this conclusion for many of the reasons you cite above (ie: we can’t know how qualia compare, even within the same person from one time to another). However, if this phenomena exists at all, it begs the question, “Why?” I think to get rid of the various paradoxes and issues with consciousness, we really have to ignore them and go back to behaviorism because these kinds of phenomena are not explainable otherwise. Problem is, despite Dennett’s plea to ignore them, we can’t.

 

[Q_Goest]

You have explicitly assumed qualia is non-physical and cannot affect physical systems, and naturally, you arrive at the conclusion that one cannot measure qualia physically. This isn't particularly deep, mystifying, or paradoxical -- unless one tries to simultaneously cling to ideas like the experiences one has that shape how one interacts with the world are supposed to be qualia.

Not at all. How does the above deviate from computationalism and the assumption of weak emergence? Especially this:

… whatever the machine indicates in the way of behavior or verbal explanation, is also a description of the qualia that machine experiences. In other words, if a computer flinches as if in pain, and screams as if in pain, that behavior is equal to, and an indication of, the experience of pain. The behavior and the experience are one in the same. The experience of pain may be epiphenomenal, but we might assume that the experience of pain is THE SAME AS the physical behavior. This is the most common conclusion and why consciousness and mental states are often thought to be epiphenomenal. This conclusion holds there is a 1 to 1 correlation between the behavior, or time evolution of the physical states, and the experience of the qualia.

That’s the simple, straightforward description of the conclusion that comes from computationalism. There are philosophers that work hard at defending the conclusion of epiphenomenalism (ex: http://comp.uark.edu/~jclyons/papers/Epiphenomenalism.pdf" ), though few have tried to address the knowledge paradox.

 

[Pythagorean]

Q-Goest,

I'm not sure how you define computationalism, but I was thinking of connectionism. My rsearch is in computational neuroscience, but that just means I use a computer (because the equations are nonlinear and beyond standard analysis). Nonlinear dynamics that govern neurons are not particularly similar to computer operations. They pertain to a complex set of electrochemical interactions on a global scale.

Anyway, I have tried to address the explanatory gap. The answer isn't satisfactory or particularly interesting. The answer is that qualia are a byproduct of the most efficient way to store information (not like a computer, this is a much more fluid idea of storage and information) that pertains to survival.

 

[Pythagorean]

Also, I'm starting to thing this computationalism accusation is a bit of a straw man, looking at your last reply to Hurkyl. Computers are a lot different in terms of their dynamics and structure. Some analogies can be drawn, but that example takes the analogy too far.

 

[Q_Goest]

Also, I'm starting to thing this computationalism accusation is a bit of a straw man, looking at your last reply to Hurkyl. Computers are a lot different in terms of their dynamics and structure. Some analogies can be drawn, but that example takes the analogy too far.

I don't see any problem in claiming there is a difference between a computer and a brain, and that difference may make a difference in phenomena produced. Alwyn Scott for example, might point out how nonlinear a brain is (and a neuron is) and would claim there are emergent phenomena based on this observation, so there are plenty of other arguments out there that would identify differences between a computer and a brain. But we need to start somewhere which is the intent of the analogy. People tend to take these arguments personally though, and don't like to look at the wider array of logical arguments presented regarding qualia and consciousness.

I would personally agree that there's a difference between a brain and a computer. However, I have very little interest in discussing my own conclusions. The arguments I'm presenting are essentially those of others. So the argument regarding the knowledge paradox (as given by Rosenberg and others), and applying it to strong AI as I've done, disputes that people are measuring qualia and reporting them in some way as suggested earlier. I think there are philosophers that will argue that the analogy still holds for a brain however, and I enjoy seeing what conclusions are being drawn given the various assumptions people make.

 

[Pythagorean]

I don't see any problem in claiming there is a difference between a computer and a brain, and that difference may make a difference in phenomena produced. Alwyn Scott for example, might point out how nonlinear a brain is (and a neuron is) and would claim there are emergent phenomena based on this observation, so there are plenty of other arguments out there that would identify differences between a computer and a brain. But we need to start somewhere which is the intent of the analogy. People tend to take these arguments personally though, and don't like to look at the wider array of logical arguments presented regarding qualia and consciousness.

I would personally agree that there's a difference between a brain and a computer. However, I have very little interest in discussing my own conclusions. The arguments I'm presenting are essentially those of others. So the argument regarding the knowledge paradox (as given by Rosenberg and others), and applying it to strong AI as I've done, disputes that people are measuring qualia and reporting them in some way as suggested earlier. I think there are philosophers that will argue that the analogy still holds for a brain however, and I enjoy seeing what conclusions are being drawn given the various assumptions people make.

Computers are stupid. They do what we tell them to do. Even a single-celled organism is more advanced than a computer in terms of learning and memory... and they don't even have neurons. Even the genetic code is type of generational learning and memory (epigenetics being the learning, the code itself being the memory).

It comes to no surprise that eventually, through selection, this aspect of knowing relevant information became such a pressure on large creatures, that they had to develop better systems of information handling (better in terms of accuracy and speed... and generally only relevant to survival and comfort... comfort being an indicator of good survivability).

This development was the central nervous system: A central location to integrate sensory information and control behavior in response to the information (as opposed to distributed neurons and molecular networks in single-celled organisms). beliefs, opinions, etc:

That a sense of individuality and subjectivity, sensation, and feelings emerges from this is a mystery still, no doubt. It's my opinion that there is a dynamical state that must be maintained by an equilibrium, and that our subjective existence is directly tied to that equilibrium. But this means that if such similar dynamics exist in other systems, the too must experience a subjective state. Computers definitely don't seem to exhibit the likely dynamics. In fact, for us to be able to control them, we want them as static as possible.

I believe that even single-celled organisms have a subjective experience, personally. Does this extend to non-living systems? I doubt it.

 

[Maui]

Is everything matter and can everything be reduced to matter? Does it make sense to hold such an opinion?

 

[Upisoft]

Is everything matter and can everything be reduced to matter? Does it make sense to hold such an opinion?

What is matter?

 

[Maui]

What is matter?

Neurons' humming?

What is mind?



True knowledge exists in knowing that you know nothing.

And in knowing that you know nothing, that makes you smartest of all.

Socrates

 

[Upisoft]

Then the answer to your question is: "yes".

 

[Maui]

Then the answer to your question is: "yes".

All is matter?

I'd note that the FACT that not everything is reducible to matter and its interactions is puzzling and deserves attention.

 

[Pythagorean]

I'd note that the FACT that not everything is reducible to matter and its interactions is puzzling and deserves attention.

You still have yet to prove that it's a fact...

 

[Maui]

You still have yet to prove that it's a fact...

There is no property of matter that requires that it produces something as unphysical and intangible as mind.

If one denies the existence of emergent properties altogether, one is faced with deep and unsurmountable paradoxes. Think of the difference between mind and matter as in the example - Mind thinks, matter does not.

 

[Pythagorean]

There is no property of matter that requires that it produces something as unphysical and intangible as mind.

If one denies the existence of emergent properties altogether, one is faced with deep and unsurmountable paradoxes. Think of the difference between mind and matter as in the example - Mind thinks, matter does not.

We're not talking about dead matter, we're talking about matter and its interactions (as you stated in your previous post). Matter alone is likened to a rock or dirt. But lightning, weather, light, fusion, and life itself are all just a few of the examples of what matter and it's interactions are capable of. (Actually, so can be the rock if you consider phonons, magnons, etc.)

We ARE talking about emergent properties (of physical systems). I don't understand what constraints you're placing on matter or why you think it's necessary to place them there... I mean do you have a journal reference entailing what matter can't do? I can give you plenty of journal references about what matter can do, certainly you're not just subtracting that from the universal set and calling it good? Because we keep expanding the list of things matter can do...

 

[sganesh88]

Romanticists like me hope that the mysteries of quantum mechanics are very much linked to the mystery of consciousness and hence, Life.
If its all in "connectivity inside the brain" as someone said in that video, I will chase God and make him eat the damned apple. Mandamned God!

 

[Maui]

We're not talking about dead matter, we're talking about matter and its interactions (as you stated in your previous post). Matter alone is likened to a rock or dirt. But lightning, weather, light, fusion, and life itself are all just a few of the examples of what matter and it's interactions are capable of. (Actually, so can be the rock if you consider phonons, magnons, etc.)

We ARE talking about emergent properties (of physical systems). I don't understand what constraints you're placing on matter or why you think it's necessary to place them there... I mean do you have a journal reference entailing what matter can't do? I can give you plenty of journal references about what matter can do, certainly you're not just subtracting that from the universal set and calling it good? Because we keep expanding the list of things matter can do...

It's evident what matter can do and i have no idea why you need to state the obvious. The question I raised was and still is:

Is mind matter or not?

If mind is different from matter, then your implied statement that all is matter does not hold water, i.e. non-dualism(mind/body) doesn't make sense.

I mean do you have a journal reference entailing what matter can't do?

What does this have to do with the claim that matter is not all that exists?

Could you address specifically what i have been saying for 3 posts now - that matter is not all that exists? Here is the post you initially replied to:

I'd note that the FACT that not everything is reducible to matter and its interactions is puzzling and deserves attention.

The above is saying that my conscious choices and thoughts are not reducible to the properties of matter that comprises my brain.


Thanks.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

The above is saying that my conscious choices and thoughts are not reducible to the properties of matter that comprises my brain.Thanks.

I assume when you talk about the properties of matter, you are using the term broadly to mean matter-energy and in physical terms, the four fundamental forces that currently define all physical reality according to the Standard Model of physics.

If you define matter this way, what do you think this "non physical" existent is? It's not clear to me whether you accept that mind is an emergent property of natural processes or not. If you do, it seems we are all on the same page. Otherwise, just what do you think consciousness/mind is? Is it some unknown fifth force? Can this 5th force be discovered and described? Is is "psi" or spirit? Are are arguing for a deity? If it's a deity, that's out of bounds in PF. Defaulting to a deity ends all discussion outside of theology.

 

[Upisoft]

Is mind matter or not?

You don't know what is matter, I already asked you. I suspect that you will give me the same answer if I ask about the mind. So, they are both what you don't know. It seem they are the same to you.

 

[Maui]

You don't know what is matter, I already asked you. I suspect that you will give me the same answer if I ask about the mind. So, they are both what you don't know. It seem they are the same to you.

What does it matter for the purpose of this discussion that I and everyone else on the planet doesn't sufficiently well know what 'matter' is to state it as proven FACT?

We can still lead a philosophical discussion about it.

 

[Maui]

I assume when you talk about the properties of matter, you are using the term broadly to mean matter-energy and in physical terms, the four fundamental forces that currently define all physical reality according to the Standard Model of physics.

Yes.

If you define matter this way, what do you think this "non physical" existent is?

Consciousness.

It's not clear to me whether you accept that mind is an emergent property of natural processes or not.

Yes i do and that places me with the dualists.

If you do, it seems we are all on the same page. Otherwise, just what do you think consciousness/mind is?

This is going beyond science and philosophy. As far as i am aware there is very little progress within the current scientific paradigm.

 

[Upisoft]

What does it matter for the purpose of this discussion that I and everyone else on the planet doesn't sufficiently well know what 'matter' is to state it as proven FACT?

We can still lead a philosophical discussion about it.

Why do you assume that there is such thing as FACT? Matter can be unknowable.

 

[Maui]

Why do you assume that there is such thing as FACT? Matter can be unknowable.

I don't. That doesn't stop us from weighing in the possibities. That's what a good philosophical discourse is about.

 

[Upisoft]

Well, then matter is unknowable. I choose to call everything matter.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

Consciousness.
Yes i do and that places me with the dualists.

Well, if you believe that mind is an emergent property of natural processes, why is that dualism? This is my position as well. I checked "not a dualist" in the poll. I think the word "physical" is sometimes misunderstood. If we are talking about natural processes, then I equate that with physical processes. There's the nature we in some way "know" though tested models and there's the nature we don't "know" because we have no tested models. Can we eventually know (model) all of nature, including the nature of our own self-awareness and identity? Good question. There may be aspects of nature we cannot know because our brains are not sufficiently developed or there may be some natural censoring. For example our present theories tell us we cannot know of events outside of our light cone.

EDIT: Just to be clear, the "light cone" example is given as an example of natural censoring, nothing more. Afaik, it has nothing to do with self-awareness or consciousness.

 

[Maui]

Well, if you believe that mind is an emergent property of natural processes, why is that dualism?

My impression was that anyone who recognized the mind-body problem was a dualist.

This is my position as well. I checked "not a dualist" in the poll. I think the word "physical" is sometimes misunderstood.

It might be that it's always misunderstood to a certain degree. Calculations show there's suppsed to be 5 times as much dark matter than ordinary matter in my room that doesn't interact directly with ordinary matter. Is dark matter ''physical'' or just inferently present/existing? The word "physical" isn't quite what it used to be.

If we are talking about natural processes, then I equate that with physical processes. There's the nature we in some way "know" though tested models and there's the nature we don't "know" because we have no tested models. Can we eventually know (model) all of nature, including the nature of our own self-awareness and identity? Good question. There may be aspects of nature we cannot know because our brains are not sufficiently developed or there may be some natural censoring. For example our present theories tell us we cannot know of events outside of our light cone.

EDIT: Just to be clear, the "light cone" example is given as an example of natural censoring, nothing more. Afaik, it has nothing to do with self-awareness or consciousness.

There is no deep understanding of anything, and it may even be unattainable. One could argue that what Socrates said 2400 years ago about Truth was all that could be said about certainty - True knowledge exists in knowing that you know nothing.

 

[SW VandeCarr]

There is no deep understanding of anything, and it may even be unattainable. One could argue that what Socrates said 2400 years ago about Truth was all that could be said about certainty - True knowledge exists in knowing that you know nothing.

We build mental models of the world and to the extent they survive continuous testing, that suffices for empirical knowledge. Logic and reason however is a different kind of "knowledge" which in a Kantian sense seems to arise from an inherent ability for abstract thought. But that's another subject.

As for dualism, I don't accept there is a "mind-body' problem" in the same way as physicists don't accept that there is a fundamental problem with physics just because they cannot observe events outside our light cone or inside black holes. If they could, their theories would be wrong. The mind-body "problem" is not even as well defined. There may be problem, but we don't know if there are hard limits as to what we can know. In any case, any censoring that might exist will be natural, not supernatural IMO, and therefore could be accommodated by a (physical) theory of nature.

 

[Ferris_bg]

The reason I am not a dualist is that all forms of dualism contradict with itself in one way or another. Let's define mental states as M and physical as P. We have the following versions of dualism:
1) Interactionism (P <-> M) // mental events and physical events influence each other
2) Epiphenomenalism (P -> M) // mental events are caused by physical events, but have no causal influence on the physical
3) Parallelism (P | M) // no causal interaction, but run in harmony

In case 2) and 3) either the mental or both have no influence over the other, but we still want to value them somehow. So why not accept into the picture N (Neutral Monism)? The cases will look like this:
4) P interacts with M through N and M is reported to N, but not to P.
5) P and M are reported to N.

So this leaves option 1) as the single option for dualism. But again it faces the problem of causal over-determination.
6) Neural state (S) causes pain (P) which causes wince (W) => S causes W => W is causally over-determined.

And over-determination of behaviour doesn't seem logic.

 

[G037H3]

What is matter?

energy in a slow vibration

 

[Pythagorean]

It's evident what matter can do and i have no idea why you need to state the obvious. The question I raised was and still is:

Is mind matter or not?

You've changed your position from stating a "FACT" (you even capitalized it). You are the one claiming to have facts. That is why I "stated the obvious", to counter your claim about this "FACT":

I'd note that the FACT that not everything is reducible to matter and its interactions is puzzling and deserves attention.

I gave you suggestive evidence to the contrary. You still have to prove this as a fact if you want to utilize it in this discussion in such an authoritative manner. Can you even think of an example besides mind that fits this so-called fact? You claim to be just asking a question, but to me it looks like you're answering it.

If you want to make it about pure philosophy, then you should well know that you can't prove a negative since we can't assume to ever have the universal set or... to put it as you quoted from Socrates:

"True knowledge exists in knowing that you know nothing"

Which leads to the inevitable result of not being able to prove a negative. So a negative statement can never be revered as FACT.

If mind is different from matter, then your implied statement that all is matter does not hold water, i.e. non-dualism(mind/body) doesn't make sense.

Yes, that's the point of this discussion... This is a true statement. If p --> q. My assumption is that p is false. Your assumptions is clearly that p is true, though you haven't proven it, you just keep stating it as if it were proven.

What does this have to do with the claim that matter is not all that exists?

Simply that matter is capable of unpredictable things. You can't predict what matter can't do. I'm still waiting for an example of something that can't be reduced to matter from you. and it can't be mind, because this is what is unknown and what is wished to be discovered. If you want to make a formal proof, assuming your conclusion is an important first step, but you still have to follow through with the proof. Assuming your conclusion alone isn't a proof.

The above is saying that my conscious choices and thoughts are not reducible to the properties of matter that comprises my brain.

I fully understand your claim, but I don't believe it. Prove it to me. Earlier in this thread, I gave plenty of suggestive evidence that the brain (at least) is directly responsible for consciousness. I have not seen anything from dualists even comparable. They do plenty of sitting back and criticizing little details of the more successful theory (the theory that, you know, leads direct medical applications like psychology and neurology) but they haven't offered any useful alternatives yet.

Thus, I stick with the assumption that has been more fruitful in our understanding and manipulation of consciousness. If dualism was to somehow become necessary or helpful in making predictions, I would adapt it... but that sounds pretty contradictory: once we can make predictions and model observables, it is necessarily physical, so being a dualist is unproductive: as time goes on, you lose more and more ground, while the physicalists gain more and more ground. That has been the history so far.

 

[Upisoft]

energy in a slow vibration

Then we will run into problem defining how much slow is enough... You better define a term for each rate of vibration if you go that way, thus dropping dualism in favor of something that is not based on the number 2, but on infinity. (Is there appropriate name for this?)

 

[G037H3]

Then we will run into problem defining how much slow is enough... You better define a term for each rate of vibration if you go that way, thus dropping dualism in favor of something that is not based on the number 2, but on infinity. (Is there appropriate name for this?)

Spinoza :D

 

[Maui]

You've changed your position from stating a "FACT" (you even capitalized it). You are the one claiming to have facts. That is why I "stated the obvious", to counter your claim about this "FACT":

It's FACT that my mind employs unscientific top-down causation and my conscious choices are REAL. The current scientific paradigm cannot explain this FACT, it can only deny it, because it makes NO sense to scientists. But scientists who consider their knowledge in the field final and true arent much better then creationists.

Even though you can't see me, I am now rasing my right hand through top-down causation. It's a FACT proven many billion times per second around the globe.

I gave you suggestive evidence to the contrary. You still have to prove this as a fact if you want to utilize it in this discussion in such an authorhow itative manner.

If your theory contradicts observational evidence, it's plain wrong.

I'm still waiting for an example of something that can't be reduced to matter from you. and it can't be mind, because this is what is unknown and what is wished to be discovered. If you want to make a formal proof, assuming your conclusion is an important first step, but you still have to follow through with the proof. Assuming your conclusion alone isn't a proof.

Observations are and have always been considered authoritive proofs in the sciences.

I fully understand your claim, but I don't believe it. Prove it to me.

If you wish i can make a video of myself raising my hands or legs and upload on youtube.

Earlier in this thread, I gave plenty of suggestive evidence that the brain (at least) is directly responsible for consciousness.

But it's not reducible to the brain. There are genuinely NEW properties that are not reducible to the brain that control my body in a NON-scientific, top-down causation.

I have not seen anything from dualists even comparable. They do plenty of sitting back and criticizing little details of the more successful theory

That "successful" theory posits that I can't raise my hands or that what I experience is an illusion. That theory is born out of the desire to prove that science has discovered almost everything. This is a religious belief probably designed to fill in gaps in our current knowledge.

Thus, I stick with the assumption that has been more fruitful in our understanding and manipulation of consciousness. If dualism was to somehow become necessary or helpful in making predictions, I would adapt it... but that sounds pretty contradictory: once we can make predictions and model observables, it is necessarily physical, so being a dualist is unproductive: as time goes on, you lose more and more ground, while the physicalists gain more and more ground. That has been the history so far.

No ground has been gained so far on the way the mind makes conscious decisions or how conscious experience is born. You should move on, instead of denying the obvious.

 

[Upisoft]

Spinoza :D

I have to read something... Any idea what can be a good start?