Is Free Will Governed by Quantum Mechanics?

[christianjb]

Why should this follow?

Decision-making is an algorithmic process, a process of deterministically evaluating the values of alternative possible courses of action, and then deterministically selecting that course of action with the highest value. A computer can do this. Why should such a process necessarily involve free will (whatever that might be)?

MF

I accept that the brain is almost certainly following an algorithmic process. That doesn't mean it doesn't have free will. It's still making decisions- choices between considered alternatives.

In that sense- computers almost certainly can have free will. Maybe they already do. They make decisions don't they?

Determinism is a tricky subject. Not even computers are deterministic if they're hooked up to a rapidly changing external stimulus- i.e. the outside world. The system as a whole is definitely not deterministic- and thus neither are its parts- if they're in connection to the system and making decisions.

As to the defn. of free will. You tell me. It doesn't matter that much to me precisely how it's defined, but it does need to be a testable concept, especially if you want to claim it doesn't exist.

 

[moving finger]

I accept that the brain is almost certainly following an algorithmic process. That doesn't mean it doesn't have free will. It's still making decisions- choices between considered alternatives.

In that sense- computers almost certainly can have free will. Maybe they already do. They make decisions don't they?

Depends on how you define "choice", and on how you define "free will". I've been in debates with libertarians who insist that determinism is incompatible with genuine choice (ie only an agent with libertarian free will can genuinely choose). On the other hand, a compatibilist would define free will along the lines of the ability to act unconstrained by external forces at the time of the act (in which case determinism is compatible with free will).

Determinism is a tricky subject. Not even computers are deterministic if they're hooked up to a rapidly changing external stimulus- i.e. the outside world. The system as a whole is definitely not deterministic- and thus neither are its parts- if they're in connection to the system and making decisions.

Is it? How do you know it is not deterministic? (as opposed to being unpredictable - predictability and determinism are not synonymous)

As to the defn. of free will. You tell me. It doesn't matter that much to me precisely how it's defined, but it does need to be a testable concept, especially if you want to claim it doesn't exist.

It is the libertarian concept of free will that I claim is incoherent (hence cannot exist in a natural world). Basically, a libertarian believes in the notion of ultimate responsibility (UR), where UR is the premise that an agent is able to act autonomously of all external circumstances (past and future) and yet still be in control of its actions. UR entails that an agent’s actions be ultimately uncaused, and yet at the same time remain under the control of that agent. Self-determination is another way of saying that to be free we must be ultimately responsible for what we do.

 

[Royce]

It is the libertarian concept of free will that I claim is incoherent (hence cannot exist in a natural world). Basically, a libertarian believes in the notion of ultimate responsibility (UR), where UR is the premise that an agent is able to act autonomously of all external circumstances (past and future) and yet still be in control of its actions. UR entails that an agent’s actions be ultimately uncaused, and yet at the same time remain under the control of that agent. Self-determination is another way of saying that to be free we must be ultimately responsible for what we do.

This is a gross mis-statement of the libertarian position as I understand it. No wonder you believe that freewill doesn't exist.

No person or agent of freewill is free of external nor internal circumstances nor influences. Nor is any decision uncaused. The operative words are "compelled" and
"predetermined."

An agent's of freewill decisions are not compelled nor predetermined by cause and effect but real choices between real alternatives. The influences, both external and internal, the may influence his decision one way or the other are also real but are influences only not compelled nor predetermined. The are not free of all influences nor are they uncaused.

It is also the libertarian's position that with personal freedom comes personal responsibility. The greater the freedom the greater the responsibility. If we have and exercise freewill then we are also responsible for our decisions and the consequences of the choices, good or bad.

There is no such thing, IMO, as absolute freewill as you defined it, absolutely free of influences, circumstances or cause.


While doing a Google search on free will, I came across this article.

free will

"Free will is probably located in the pre-frontal cortex, and we may even be able to narrow it down to the ventromedial pre-frontal cortex."
--Stephen Pinker, How the Mind Works


Free will is a concept in traditional philosophy used to refer to the belief that human behavior is not absolutely determined by external causes, but is the result of choices made by an act of will by the agent. Such choices are themselves not determined by external causes, but are determined by the motives and intentions of the agent, which themselves are not absolutely determined by external causes...

http://skepdic.com/freewill.html" [

 

[christianjb]

Well- the libertarianism thing seemed to come out of left-field. No ideas about that.

As I understand it, the consensus view is that the universe is not deterministic, because of 'pure' randomness from quantum fluctuations. It's also inherently unpredictable, because of chaos on many levels.

It may even be tricky to speak of some quantum events having a cause. If a decay is perfectly random- then the precise time of the decay is not caused by anything.

Even a thermostat is hooked up in a feed-back loop with the environment. The system as a whole is inherently unpredictable and indeterminable. It doesn't seem obvious to me that we can't say that a thermostatted room isn't making a (very basic) choice to be at a certain temperature.

 

[moving finger]

No person or agent of freewill is free of external nor internal circumstances nor influences. Nor is any decision uncaused.

I never claimed that any agent is free of external or internal circumstances - what I claimed is that libertarian free will assumes that a free will agent is ABLE TO ACT AUTONOMOUSLY of all external circumstances - in other words, the agent is ultimately responsible for it's decision (the chain of responsibility terminates in the agent, and does not extend to preceding causes). Libertarian fee will indeed assumes that a free will agent's actions must be ultimately uncaused, in the sense that there is no chain of cause and effect preceding the point of the agent's alleged free will decision (hence causing that decision).

The libertarian believes in the notion of ultimate responsibility, in the sense that we can claim "the buck stops here" with the free will agent (ie the free will agent can claim to be ultimately responsible for its actions), in effect the libertarian believes she CAN, in certain circumstances, choose independently of all external influences IF SHE SO WISHES - and it is this notion of ultimate responsibility which I argue is incoherent.

In this sense of UR, the libertarian is in effect saying, for a given action X for which she claims she is responsible, "I and only I am responsible for that act X - although there were external influences acting on me, none of those influences CAUSED me to act in any particular way, I was able to deliberate independently of those external influences and act X happened because, and only because, I wanted it to happen". It is in this sense that a libertarian believes she is able to act independently of external factors.

There is no such thing, IMO, as absolute freewill as you defined it, absolutely free of influences, circumstances or cause.

Then we agree - because this is precisely what the libertarian is claiming - that she CAN (if she chooses) make decisions which are NOT caused by preceding influences but at the same time are not random - that the chain of cause and effect for a free will decision terminates in the agent - that she is ultimately responsible.

Your quote brings us to the crux of the free will problem, because as defined :

Free will is a concept in traditional philosophy used to refer to the belief that human behavior is not absolutely determined by external causes, but is the result of choices made by an act of will by the agent. Such choices are themselves not determined by external causes, but are determined by the motives and intentions of the agent, which themselves are not absolutely determined by external causes...

I could model such a "free will" decision-making machine by simply installing a genuinely indeterministic random-number generator as a source of choices/motives/intentions within the agent - such a model would do exactly as described above - but would we claim the model has free will?

I think not - hence clearly the definition advanced is inadequate, since it does not allow us to distinguish between genuine free will choice and random selection.

 

[moving finger]

Well- the libertarianism thing seemed to come out of left-field. No ideas about that.

As I understand it, the consensus view is that the universe is not deterministic, because of 'pure' randomness from quantum fluctuations. It's also inherently unpredictable, because of chaos on many levels.

It may even be tricky to speak of some quantum events having a cause. If a decay is perfectly random- then the precise time of the decay is not caused by anything.

Even a thermostat is hooked up in a feed-back loop with the environment. The system as a whole is inherently unpredictable and indeterminable. It doesn't seem obvious to me that we can't say that a thermostatted room isn't making a (very basic) choice to be at a certain temperature.

The jury is out on whether the world is fundamentally deterministic or indeterministic. The only safe conclusion we can draw from QM is that the world is epistemically indeterminable - but this is not the same as ontically indeterministic.

But even if the world were ontically indeterministic - how does this generate free will? (It allows for the libertarian holy grail of alternate possibilities, but alternate possibilities are not sufficient for free will - we also need ultimate responsibility)

 

[christianjb]

The jury is out on whether the world is fundamentally deterministic or indeterministic. The only safe conclusion we can draw from QM is that the world is epistemically indeterminable - but this is not the same as ontically indeterministic.

But even if the world were ontically indeterministic - how does this generate free will? (It allows for the libertarian holy grail of alternate possibilities, but alternate possibilities are not sufficient for free will - we also need ultimate responsibility)

Rephrase the above in terms that a physicist can understand.

Do you mean libertarianism as a political philosophy?

 

[moving finger]

Rephrase the above in terms that a physicist can understand.

The following paper may help : http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/archive/00000939/00/determ.pdf

I'm a physicist myself, so this may be a case of the blind leading the blind, but basically :

epistemically indeterminable = we are unable to determine (measure) the world to an arbitrary precision (even though it may be fixed to an arbitrary precision) - basically here we are saying we are limited in what we can know about the world

ontically indeterministic = the world is fundamentally indeterministic, over and above any limitations we may have in our measurement of the world

Do you mean libertarianism as a political philosophy?

No, I mean philosophical or metaphysical libertarianism, see :
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Libertarianism_(metaphysics)

It is generally claimed that libertarian philosophy requires the principle of alternate possibilities or PAP (ie the future is not "fixed" and there are genuine alternate future possibilities), but PAP alone is not sufficient to generate free will (after all, ontic indeterminism also gives us PAP). The real essential ingredient for libertarian free will is ultimate responsibility, which many including myself claim is an incoherent concept (unless one appeals to supernatural forces)

 

[christianjb]

Quantum processes are truly random- so that makes it 'ontically' indeterministic, to use that strange phrase.

 

[moving finger]

Quantum processes are truly random- so that makes it 'ontically' indeterministic, to use that strange phrase.

Not necessarily - check the Bohmian interpretation (and before you claim that hidden variable theories do not work, that's not correct - LOCAL hidden variable theories don't work, in fact NO local real theory works - whatever the world is, it is non-local if it is real) (by works I mean fits the empirical data)

 

[christianjb]

Not necessarily - check the Bohmian interpretation (and before you claim that hidden variable theories do not work, that's not correct - LOCAL hidden variable theories don't work, in fact NO local real theory works - whatever the world is, it is non-local if it is real) (by works I mean fits the empirical data)

The Bohmian interpretation is highly controversial at best. That doesn't mean it's wrong- but it is very much disputed.

The majority view is that true randomness lies at the heart of quantum mechanics. Not very many physicists like hidden variable theories.

Personally- I doubt it matters to the free-will debate, which view you take of quantum mechanics. The brain's mechanism probably isn't dependent on such effects.

 

[moving finger]

The Bohmian interpretation is highly controversial at best. That doesn't mean it's wrong- but it is very much disputed.

I certainly agree with that - just as I dispute the assumption that the world is necessarily ontically indeterministic

The majority view is that true randomness lies at the heart of quantum mechanics. Not very many physicists like hidden variable theories.

Perhaps so - but at one time the majority view was that the sun circled the Earth and not vice versa - Galileo & Copernicus were the underdogs of their time, and I have an affinity for the underdog - truth is not decided by popular vote thank goodness

Perhaps most physicists "don't like" hidden variable theories because as far as physics is concerned, Copenhagen and Shut Up And Calculate are good enough - not many physicists venture into metaphysics. Physics is after all about epistemology, ontology is not very relevant for most physicists.

Personally- I doubt it matters to the free-will debate, which view you take of quantum mechanics. The brain's mechanism probably isn't dependent on such effects.

I agree - I don't see how indeterminism engenders free will (the libertarian needs indeterminism, because she needs the PAP, but indeterminism alone is not enough)

 

[christianjb]

The fact that Galileo was in conflict with religious teachings says nothing about the truth of the Bohmian picture.

Physicists have had decades to evaluate Bohm's works in a fair and free manner. In that time- they have found no convincing evidence that Bohm's approach is in any way superior to more standard quantum theories.

 

[moving finger]

The fact that Galileo was in conflict with religious teachings says nothing about the truth of the Bohmian picture.

Physicists have had decades to evaluate Bohm's works in a fair and free manner. In that time- they have found no convincing evidence that Bohm's approach is in any way superior to more standard quantum theories.

Perhaps because physicists are fundamentally concerned only with epistemology - what they can measure. That was certainly Bohr's view. If the world is deterministic, but it appears indeterministic in all of our experiments, then a physicist can safely assume indeterminism. That doesn't mean the physicist is right, it's just a good working assumption. That's not good enough for a philosopher however.

 

[Mahler765]

I'm not exactly sure why people try to use mathematics and physics to try to prove free will...

Human beings obey different laws than math and science. One of the very first posts on this thread talked about humans not having free will because we can not choose to disobey the laws of gravity.

We live in a physical world and we have to obey the laws of that world. Free will has to do strictly with making decisions. While you can't decided to disobey the law of gravity, you can decide to test the laws of gravity...

When standing on the edge of a cliff, there are an infinite number of possible options(as there are with any decision that has to be made). The law of gravity is a law only because every time something is dropped, it falls to the ground.

One of the first things you learn in any philosophy class is that the scientific laws are based on precedence only. Just because the pencil fell to the floor when you dropped it the first thousand times you let it fall out of your hand, doesn't mean that it won't fly towards the ceiling the thousand and first time you "drop" it.

When you decide to "disobey" the law of gravity, you are putting it to the test. Every time a 3rd grader does an experiment dropping a sheet of paper, that same law is put to a test.

In fact, every time an experiment is done to determine whether a hypothesis is a law, you are trying to "disobey" that law.



Also, there was mention of computers being able to make decisions...I'm an electrical engineering student and I spend most of my time writing code for computers to follow.

Whenever you see a computer doing something "clever", it's because a clever programmer told it to do that.

Computers are becoming increasingly "independent", but that's only because human beings are able to make them so.

When a computer has to make a decision, it has a conditional structure programmed into it for it to follow...if x = 3, then do this; if x <0, then do this, etc.

When a human makes a decision, there's an infinite amount influences to take into consideration. A computer would have to be obeying an infinite number of conditional structures, which is impossible because it would have to actively generate it's own programming.

Also, "Decision-making is an algorithmic process, a process of deterministically evaluating the values of alternative possible courses of action, and then deterministically selecting that course of action with the highest value." was mentioned on page three by moving finger...

You can't describe a decision making process as deterministic because if it's deterministic, there can't be any decision...your course of action has already been "determined" for you.

One good analogy that helped me understand free will was that we are all characters in a story...

The book's already been written, but we are within the story and we have to live it in a linear fashion.

This can go hand in hand with the idea that the only way to make objective judgements about a system is to be completely removed from the system.

Because of the flow of time, we have to make decisions to move on. Even the band Rush understood the concept. Even if you choose not to decide, you've still made a choice...

In the second Matrix movie, Neo knows he has to make a certain decision. The oracle tells him that he's already made that decision, he just has to understand it.

As a character in the book, you're locked in a certain position in time, just riding the flow, and your character has to make a decision at the end of chapter 2.

The only way for you to get to chapter 3 is to make a choice, and because time doesn't stop to wait for you, if you don't make an active decision(choose not to decide), then you move on to chapter three anyway.

That's the strongest argument for free will...that you can choose to influence what's going to happen in the future.

Sort of abstract, but it makes sense to me...

Also, say there is a God-like character...by definition He would be outside the system. He is the only objective observer. He might know what's going to happen, what you're going to do, but you still DON'T know what you're going to do, so it doesn't matter.

If there is a God that is all knowing, and He does know what's going to happen...so what? That doesn't affect your position at all...because you still don't know what you're going do. God's not making the decision, you're still the one who does that.

If Bob knows that you're going to choose blueberry pie for dessert, but you still haven't made up your mind yet, what Bob knows is irrelevant because Bob's not making the decision.

Back to my opening line...what electrons and rocks do is irrelevant because you aren't an electron or a rock. To prove that humans have free will or whether their actions are determined, look are what humans do.

 

[Your.Master]

I'm not exactly sure why people try to use mathematics and physics to try to prove free will...

Human beings obey different laws than math and science. One of the very first posts on this thread talked about humans not having free will because we can not choose to disobey the laws of gravity.

That is precisely why one might make the attempt to use mathematics and physics to prove free will (or rather, to disprove free will -- it seems to me probably significantly harder to prove such a thing if it is true than to disprove it if it's false -- but that's just my impression). Whatever higher level arguments we have, we are ultimately subject to reality. To physics. If one can utterly prove that physics affirms or denies free will, then all else is irrelevant. If one cannot, we must move to higher-level argumentation (or abandon the issue).

One of the first things you learn in any philosophy class is that the scientific laws are based on precedence only. Just because the pencil fell to the floor when you dropped it the first thousand times you let it fall out of your hand, doesn't mean that it won't fly towards the ceiling the thousand and first time you "drop" it.

Right. The assumption that the past is in some way like the future (and that some recording of the past, at least in memory, is reliable enough). There is also the assumption that standard logic is in some way truth-preserving. To abandon these assumptions would mean that the above logical and physical proofs are not valid, or at least, valid but insufficient. However, this puts aside a certain practicality, and also makes it quite impossible to ever evaluate your claims on any objective basis. Which, of course, is okay. But we are on the physics forums ;).

Also, there was mention of computers being able to make decisions...I'm an electrical engineering student and I spend most of my time writing code for computers to follow.

I'm an engineering scientist who began specializing in physics and ended specializing in computers and am receiving my graduate degree within a month ;).

Whenever you see a computer doing something "clever", it's because a clever programmer told it to do that.

Not necessarily. Evolutionary algorithms, neural networks, dynamical systems, and hell, even buggy software (especially buggy distributed software) all violate your principle. You are correct that most software used today does do this. But we have had practical results out of all of those other cases I mentioned, so they aren't merely academic.

When a human makes a decision, there's an infinite amount influences to take into consideration. A computer would have to be obeying an infinite number of conditional structures, which is impossible because it would have to actively generate it's own programming.

You're equivocating here. Humans have an extremely large but finite amount of influences, although a lot of them counteract and a lot of them fade away completely. Furthermore, an influence does not necessarily equate to a conditional strictly. It could relate to a variable assignment, especially to a variable that is never again used in the program.

You can't describe a decision making process as deterministic because if it's deterministic, there can't be any decision...your course of action has already been "determined" for you.

I disagree. Determinism merely suggests that you will definitely make the decision that is determined. But the decision is still made.

In the second Matrix movie, Neo knows he has to make a certain decision. The oracle tells him that he's already made that decision, he just has to understand it.

Argument by the Matrix.

...

I like your style ;).

If there is a God that is all knowing, and He does know what's going to happen...so what? That doesn't affect your position at all...because you still don't know what you're going do. God's not making the decision, you're still the one who does that.

Good. Now, can I further propose that God may not be sentient at all? Is there anything stopping us from labelling something else, even something with no understanding whatsoever, God?

Can we say that, in the context of this paragraph, God is determinism (I'm not trying to open up a religious debate, just draw an analogy)? Or, perhaps, that God is the laws of physics, not as man currently knows them, but as actually occur? Thus, does this not mean that determinism and free will can coexist, after a certain definition for free will and determinism?

Back to my opening line...what electrons and rocks do is irrelevant because you aren't an electron or a rock. To prove that humans have free will or whether their actions are determined, look are what humans do.

I contest that. Humans are electrons and rocks. They are also other things.

That Conway paper shows that if logic holds, then humans have free will (under *his* definition) if and only if electrons have, in some sense, free will. Thus it is not irrelevant unless we strike down logic. At which point, argumentation becomes irrelevant unless we can agree on some other model to replace logic. Which I'm not sure is possible.

 

[Mahler765]

That is precisely why one might make the attempt to use mathematics and physics to prove free will (or rather, to disprove free will -- it seems to me probably significantly harder to prove such a thing if it is true than to disprove it if it's false -- but that's just my impression). Whatever higher level arguments we have, we are ultimately subject to reality. To physics. If one can utterly prove that physics affirms or denies free will, then all else is irrelevant. If one cannot, we must move to higher-level argumentation (or abandon the issue).

I suppose I never considered free will being defined as the ability to do whatever you want - including defying your reality. If being able to overcome the laws of physics is a requirement for free will, and let's suppose that you can...then you encounter that higher-level of argumentation. And then you say "Well, if free will does actually exist, then we should be able to disobey these laws just as we disobeyed the laws of physics" and then you proceed to the next set of laws. If you use these criteria for proving or disproving free will, then you'll either end up disproving it(because we can't disobey the laws of physics) or you'll end up disobey each set of laws in turn until human beings must be all powerful in order for free will to exist...so the test of free will is doomed to fail before it even begins since it's obvious that human beings aren't all powerful.

And I'd just like to point out that you could argue that physics and mathematics are no better at describing reality than psychology, history, or just sitting on a park bench and watching the way people interact with each other...

Most of the time, the discoveries in science raise more questions than they answer...so science simply shows us what we don't understand about reality rather than giving us dominion over it.

Right. The assumption that the past is in some way like the future (and that some recording of the past, at least in memory, is reliable enough). There is also the assumption that standard logic is in some way truth-preserving. To abandon these assumptions would mean that the above logical and physical proofs are not valid, or at least, valid but insufficient. However, this puts aside a certain practicality, and also makes it quite impossible to ever evaluate your claims on any objective basis. Which, of course, is okay. But we are on the physics forums ;).

I agree that the validity of logic and mathematics is one huge assumption...the assumption that most people are sane and rational. But that still doesn't mean that one day, all our logic systems and equations can't come crashing down around us. And do see your point that logic is really the only tool we have to test such things, no matter how flimsy it might be...



I'm an engineering scientist who began specializing in physics and ended specializing in computers and am receiving my graduate degree within a month ;).

Not necessarily. Evolutionary algorithms, neural networks, dynamical systems, and hell, even buggy software (especially buggy distributed software) all violate your principle. You are correct that most software used today does do this. But we have had practical results out of all of those other cases I mentioned, so they aren't merely academic.

Even if some computers do seem "think" creatively, wouldn't the intelligence of the computer always be limited by the intelligence of it's programmer?

You're equivocating here. Humans have an extremely large but finite amount of influences, although a lot of them counteract and a lot of them fade away completely. Furthermore, an influence does not necessarily equate to a conditional strictly. It could relate to a variable assignment, especially to a variable that is never again used in the program.

If the number of influences is limited, the number of alternatives can still be unlimited. In addition to all the logic choice you might make, you could consider all the illogical ones as well...

I disagree. Determinism merely suggests that you will definitely make the decision that is determined. But the decision is still made.

I would define free will as the ability to choose between options in making a decision...if determinism limits you to one option...there can't be a choice. In a decision, I would assume that you have to "decide" something. Usually, you decide between two or more options. If you only have one option, you aren't really given a decision to make.

Good. Now, can I further propose that God may not be sentient at all? Is there anything stopping us from labelling something else, even something with no understanding whatsoever, God?

No, if you define God as something that has no understanding. In that particular scenario, God would be an entity that allows the exercise of free will.

Can we say that, in the context of this paragraph, God is determinism (I'm not trying to open up a religious debate, just draw an analogy)? Or, perhaps, that God is the laws of physics, not as man currently knows them, but as actually occur? Thus, does this not mean that determinism and free will can coexist, after a certain definition for free will and determinism?

I don't think you could argue that God is determinism is because God is not the one determining your actions(in this scenario). If you were going to make any kind of statement like that, you would have to say that the individual determines his actions, which is the same as free will.

If you say that God is not the laws of physics, then He automatically loses his status as a God, by most definitions of a deity. I used to argue that free will and determinism coexist, but I came to think that if determinism does it exist, then you're the one who creates it...determining yourself.

I contest that. Humans are electrons and rocks. They are also other things.

The very first assignment that I had in my high school philosophy class was to take a rock in my hand and answer a series of questions about it. One of the questions was "What would it take to hold the rock morally responsible?"

I'm willing to go so far as to say it's impossible to hold a rock morally responsible without giving it human characteristics and qualities. If humans are rocks, then humans can't be held morally responsible either.

 

[moving finger]

When a human makes a decision, there's an infinite amount influences to take into consideration. A computer would have to be obeying an infinite number of conditional structures, which is impossible because it would have to actively generate it's own programming.

Why would it be impossible for a machine to actively generate it's own programming?

You can't describe a decision making process as deterministic because if it's deterministic, there can't be any decision...your course of action has already been "determined" for you.

Can you describe the alternative? What you seem to wish for is the incoherent concept of libertarian free will, the notion that we can somehow act as free agents with ultimate responsibility for our decisions and actions - that our actions may be neither determined nor random but "something else" and still controlled by us - but unfortunately such a notion is incoherent - it effectively means the "self" must be the cause of the "self". See http://www.moving-finger.com/papers/Swamp.pdf for a detailed explanation of the incoherency of ultimate responsibility.

If there is a God that is all knowing, and He does know what's going to happen...so what? That doesn't affect your position at all...because you still don't know what you're going do. God's not making the decision, you're still the one who does that.

It doesn't follow from this that we have free will in the libertarian sense.

If Bob knows that you're going to choose blueberry pie for dessert, but you still haven't made up your mind yet, what Bob knows is irrelevant because Bob's not making the decision.

Logically incorrect. What Bob knows is very relevant, because by definition knowledge entails truth, therefore if Bob knows that you are going to choose blueberry pie, it follows that you are going to choose blueberry pie. If you do not choose blueberry pie, it follows that Bob did NOT know that you are going to choose blueberry pie (which contradicts the premise).

To prove that humans have free will or whether their actions are determined, look are what humans do.

What actions of humans in particular lead you to the safe conclusion that humans have (libertarian) free will, and how do you arrive at this conclusion?

 

[moving finger]

That Conway paper shows that if logic holds, then humans have free will (under *his* definition) if and only if electrons have, in some sense, free will. Thus it is not irrelevant unless we strike down logic. At which point, argumentation becomes irrelevant unless we can agree on some other model to replace logic. Which I'm not sure is possible.

"that Conway paper" (http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0604079v1) is inconclusive and irrelevant to the question of whether humans have free will or not - simply because the authors admit in the paper that they find themselves unable to give an operational definition of "free"! (section 11.2 of the paper). If one cannot define one's terms, what is the point of arguing whether an electron has this undefined "thing" or not?

I might as well claim that all electrons, and hence all humans, possesses a property called "grungethump", but so long as I am unable to provide an operational definition of "grungethump", what's the point?

 

[moving finger]

I would define free will as the ability to choose between options in making a decision...if determinism limits you to one option...there can't be a choice. In a decision, I would assume that you have to "decide" something. Usually, you decide between two or more options. If you only have one option, you aren't really given a decision to make.

How do you make your choice, assuming your choice is neither determined nor random? (Indeed if its neither determined nor random, what is it?). If you could reset the physical world back to EXACTLY the way it was before you made your choice, would your choice be the same again? If no, why not? (If yes - then that's determinism pure & simple).

The very first assignment that I had in my high school philosophy class was to take a rock in my hand and answer a series of questions about it. One of the questions was "What would it take to hold the rock morally responsible?"

Easy answer :
First define the necessary & sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. For an entity to be morally responsible means it must meet these conditions. I suggest the conditions are :

We hold an agent to be “morally responsible” for an event X if:
Either : (1) Event X is causally related to the agent’s wilful prior actions
Or : (2) Event X is not causally related to the agent’s prior actions, but the agent could have acted to prevent X and wilfully chose not to do so
And : (3) The agent can be reasonably expected to be able to predict the possible consequences of acting or not acting in the above
(wilful = the agent’s actions are not externally forced or coerced against the agent’s will/wishes/intent)
I suggest that if either conditions (1) and (3) are true, or if conditions (2) and (3) are true, then we hold the agent to be morally responsible, and not otherwise.

(and no mention of libertarian free will)

Now, does a rock satisfy these conditions?

 

[<daleader>]

How must we overcome the laws of physics as independent actors? Can there be a science that explains this personal divergence from mechanical description? Is free will the rule of the universe rather than the exception?

In order for us to be able to answer these question carfully we most first understand the creation of God and evil. That is the problem of evil. God and therefore there been an evil. That is if you are a theist.

Reading suggestion: Plato's Euthyphro.

After reading this we see the problem is that what is value? And after that we can see why determining value is an issues. Than after this another problem can be raised which is the existence of evil. Which if why do we have evil in a world where the omipetent, omniscient and omnibelvelont allow such evil which than can be link to the idea of 'free will'.

What I think of free will, WELL i think IT IS JUST RUBBISH! We are never free on the decision that we make since all our idea are some how link for some prior experience/ ideas/feeling that we had in our life. WE can never wake up and say I do this today without knowing why! that is there is always a reason for doing, you may not know it but it doesn't mean there is NON!

 

[Rade]

I do not believe there is a free will. Free will implies that the universe is not completely governed by physical laws but also up to a certain extend by the imagination of the mind.

This is false, existence of free will does not so "imply"--you confuse what are the "metaphysical given" (the physical laws of universe) and the "man-made" (free will). You freely make a mark in the sand, you do not make the sand. And, when was the last time your "imagination" caused the apple released from the tree (in reality) to fall up and not down ? But, of course you have a free will right not to "believe" in free will, just as I have a free will right to "know" free will. And please, do not ask me how "I" know what "I know" about free will--only "I know it".

 

[Rade]

In order for us to be able to answer these question carfully we most first understand the creation of God and evil.

Read the bible (old part not new), god informs that god created evil.

 

[<daleader>]

Read the bible (old part not new), god informs that god created evil.

What if you don't believein bible. My point is that God isn't only in churchs...or its holy places. In a way god is in you and all around you. a complex issue!

 

[christianjb]

What if you don't believein bible. My point is that God isn't only in churchs...or its holy places. In a way god is in you and all around you. a complex issue!

That's not really getting us anywhere. It's like claiming that Thor is all around us, which may or may not be true- but it doesn't progress this thread much.

 

[christianjb]

This is false, existence of free will does not so "imply"--you confuse what are the "metaphysical given" (the physical laws of universe) and the "man-made" (free will). You freely make a mark in the sand, you do not make the sand. And, when was the last time your "imagination" caused the apple released from the tree (in reality) to fall up and not down ? But, of course you have a free will right not to "believe" in free will, just as I have a free will right to "know" free will. And please, do not ask me how "I" know what "I know" about free will--only "I know it".

I think I agree with this. I don't think it's philosophically untenable for free-will to be compatible with a universe governed by physical laws- even a deterministic universe.

People have trouble reconciling free-will with physics, but they also have trouble comprehending how consciousness could arise from atomic, molecular and electrical interactions. (Though- some die-hards even dispute that consciousness exists!)

And, as I've said before, it doesn't matter to me if you think that theory X disproves free-will. What matters is that we have at the very least a very strong illusion of free-will, which does all the things that 'real' free-will does anyway- or at least we feel it does.

Why has evolution given us the pain stimulus if there's no free will? If we can't choose to avoid putting our hand in the fire, then there's no point in feeling pain when we do so.

 

[Wizardsblade]

Free will, but not for inamanimate objects.

I am not a computer engineer, but I do not understand how a program can have “free will”. A simple test can prove this is not so. Take the program and load it onto 2 identical computers then run it, assuming all inputs are exactly the same will not both computers have the same outcome? If I had the time and information could I not follow the code of the program and tell you what the out come is? Even random generators in computers are not random (given no outside influences, in which in this case to prove free will all out side data would need to be identical and know to the code reader.)

Moving finger wrote,
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Easy answer :
First define the necessary & sufficient conditions for moral responsibility. For an entity to be morally responsible means it must meet these conditions. I suggest the conditions are :

We hold an agent to be “morally responsible” for an event X if:
Either : (1) Event X is causally related to the agent’s wilful prior actions
Or : (2) Event X is not causally related to the agent’s prior actions, but the agent could have acted to prevent X and wilfully chose not to do so
And : (3) The agent can be reasonably expected to be able to predict the possible consequences of acting or not acting in the above
(wilful = the agent’s actions are not externally forced or coerced against the agent’s will/wishes/intent)
I suggest that if either conditions (1) and (3) are true, or if conditions (2) and (3) are true, then we hold the agent to be morally responsible, and not otherwise.

(and no mention of libertarian free will)

Now, does a rock satisfy these conditions?
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
And,

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
I contest that. Humans are electrons and rocks.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A rock hits a man in the head, did the rock do it?

1) No… but what is a willful action? “the agent’s actions are not externally forced `determination? ` or coerced against the agent’s will ‘ freewill?’ /wishes/intent)
2) Again no, a rock can’t choose to change direction.
3) No, a rock can not think. So this again does not apply.

So the rock is not morally responsible for hitting the man. But what about the man who held the rock before it was flying threw the air? It was stated that a man has no more free will then the rock so we must answer the question in the same way. Otherwise we are prejudice towards rocks (since neither can make a none externally forced decision). In this case only the determiner of the pre determination can be held accountable.

Or rock and humans have free will. But maybe the rock made the man throw it? This seems intuitively wrong because everything can be held accountable and we would be forced to hold everything responsible for any 1 action.

Obviously neither of these can be held to be true, but it seems that your definition test itself assumes freewill, as must all test that can logically assign responsibility.

Again your definition of willful grants that determinism is false “not externally forced” and that free will exist “agent’s will”. What kind of will is there besides free? If its not free then is it your will or is it something/ones else’s will or even not will at all?

 

[christianjb]

Wizardsblade:

It is conceptually very simple to think of a computer program that's impossible to predict. Have the computer hooked up to a web-cam such that it responds to the pattern of pixels. You could even use feedback effects with the webcam pointed at the computer-screen.

As soon as you couple a computer to the universe and spark off feedback mechanisms- the computer becomes part of the system and is as unpredictable as any other part of the system.

 

[Wizardsblade]

Christianjb,

I understand what you are saying but a program is still not having free will, rather just a program that interacts with an environment through well defined (determined) actions.. if this then that ect. So like I said its not free will because if I knew the code and I knew the enviromental inputs I could tell you what the out put will be. This is not so with free will.
Look at it this way: hook both of these identcal computers up to the same camara, will they both act identicaly? This is not free will, but determination. Albiet, this is a nice way to make a "random" generator, it is not a free will generator nor is it unpredictable.

 

[christianjb]

Christianjb,

I understand what you are saying but a program is still not having free will, rather just a program that interacts with an environment through well defined (determined) actions.. if this then that ect. So like I said its not free will because if I knew the code and I knew the enviromental inputs I could tell you what the out put will be. This is not so with free will.
Look at it this way: hook both of these identcal computers up to the same camara, will they both act identicaly? This is not free will, but determination. Albiet, this is a nice way to make a "random" generator, it is not a free will generator nor is it unpredictable.

But the environmental inputs could be as large as you like. Hook the computer up to the internet and the input is fantastically large.

It's true that two computers running the same code attached to the same webcam will give the same results. However, envision a feedback mechanism where the web-cam is pointed partially at the computer screen. Then things like specks of dirt on the screen can become important- and it's impossible to prepare the same system twice.

I think feedback is crucial to understanding consciousness and free-will. Without feedback between the 'machine' and the 'environment' nothing much of interest will ever be observed.

 

[Wizardsblade]

But the environmental inputs could be as large as you like. Hook the computer up to the internet and the input is fantastically large.

It's true that two computers running the same code attached to the same webcam will give the same results. However, envision a feedback mechanism where the web-cam is pointed partially at the computer screen. Then things like specks of dirt on the screen can become important- and it's impossible to prepare the same system twice.

Again this is not free will, because if I know the "fantastically large" input I can tell you the out come. This is determinism maybe call it environmental determinism. Any set of finite inputs will lead to a determined result in a computer. The idea of free will is you can take two identical humans with exactly the same experience and give them a choice (with out environmental factors) and they can make different decisions. I must exclude environmental factors because they will affect decision making, i.e. if I do not like coffee and I have a decision to drink coffee or not. My choice will be influenced by my dislike of coffee.

Put it this way if someone like drink A and drink B the same, i.e. their value is 3, and they are given the options of drinking one of them. This assumes the infinite choices they have are confined to 2 choices, but will work for this exercise. Someone with free will will choose one of the drinks, without external factors in this decision making process. There could be environmental factors that made the value of both drinks 3 but this will not affect the current decision. Now write a computer program that chooses a drink.
If x=3 then
If random > .5maxrandom then A
Else B
But this is deterministic because if I know the random function or inputs I can tell you the answer the program will pick.

Without feedback between the 'machine' and the 'environment' nothing much of interest will ever be observed.

When I read this it seems to state that or imply, freewill is random decisions and only with the feedback of environment will these decisions be structured into freewill. Or put another way, freewill is randomness structured by environment. Is this your view of free will?

 

[aspect]

I'm not sure why people have the need to salvage this somewhat contractictory notion of "free will". Isn't it enough to say we have causally efficacious will? This would imply determinism and at the same time, in my opinion, save the intuitions we hope to hold.

 

[Edgardo]

I am not a computer engineer, but I do not understand how a program can have “free will”. A simple test can prove this is not so. Take the program and load it onto 2 identical computers then run it, assuming all inputs are exactly the same will not both computers have the same outcome? If I had the time and information could I not follow the code of the program and tell you what the out come is? Even random generators in computers are not random (given no outside influences, in which in this case to prove free will all out side data would need to be identical and know to the code reader.)

I think it is possible to set up a computer program that reacts differently
on two different computers.

Build a computer with an integrated
quantum random number generator (QRNG) .
Imagine the computer has a webcam, and everytime I expose something red
to the webcam, the QNRG fires 16 photons to the beamsplitter.

On computer 1 the result may be 10110110 01001110 (Reaction by computer (voice)): "I like the color, bring me tea")
On computer 2 the result may be 01010101 11010011 (Reaction by computer (voice)): "I don't like the color, bring me coffee")

Note that the enviromental conditions were exactly the same for both computers.

Can we say that this computer has a free will?

 

[christianjb]

Wizardsblade: Positive feedback mechanisms introduce unpredictable randomness, which is enough to disprove the idea that you can run the same program twice and get the same answer. You'd have to run the same universe twice in order to be guaranteed of that.

I don't think true random number generators are sufficient or even necessary for free will to happen, but feedback is necessary- there has to be some interaction with the environment or else what's the point in making choices?

aspect: I agree. The powerful and overwhelming illusion of free will is good enough for me- especially if no-one can tell the difference between that and genuine free-will.

All: No-one has answered my question. What's the point in feeling physical pain if free will doesn't exist?

 

[aspect]

christianjb: What for you is genuine free will? because I have no idea what it would look like, or why it is necessary to posit such a thing.