Is 'I Think, Therefore I Am' a Valid and Obvious Philosophy?

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
... continued from the previous post
You mean you've studied all "known" and "unknown" logical systems? How did you do this?

I never said I did.

And suppose, only suppose, it really exists in all logical systems. Doesn't it matter that its meaning changes from one system to the other?

Sure it matters. It just doesn't change the fact that "practicality", by definition, is just something's usefulness in practice. Thus, people can have different ideas of what is "practical", but if they actually try their ideas out, they may (not necessarily, but likely) find that it is not really useful in practice.

No. Monads are isolated. They don't interact but they may undergo harmonized changes. Two events coincide but aren't bound to each other by Universe's structural properties for the monads taking part in those events are isolated.

Interesting. However, let's say that 100 times out of 100, certain Monads (harmoniously) change, after I clap my hands. Then it can be concluded that it is practical to assume a relationship (betwixt clapping and the change of those particular Monads). It is practical because it can be "put into practice" (and has been 100 times). If, at some point in the future, the clapping of my hands is not accompanied by the change of those particular Monads, then I will have to assume that something out-of-the-ordinary has happened. This is all just human nature.

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

... What I meant was that I am not criticizing the proof itself, but rather, it's applicability to Descartes' philosophy.

... how does the fact that one proposition suggests (or, really, requires) the truth of another propostion lead to a paradox/loop?

Questioning the applicability of this proof is senseless. "If" this proof is all right then it will show something about Descartes' statement (and that's clear), so it's applicable. It's "clear" that this proof is applicable for studying Descartes' statement because its aim is to show Descartes' statement's incompatibility with Boolean logic. Now "if" and only "if" this proof is all right "then" and only "then" we learn something about Descartes' statement. That's the "applicability" of "this proof" to "Descartes' statement."

The proof has "two" lines. These "two" lines are "different." One line leads to a "paradox." The other leads to a "loop." The paradox line is "clear." The loop line is what we are talking about right now. Don't use "loop/paradox," use "loop."

The proof claims that if statement P is set T, then any deduction resulting in statement Q set T will be circular reasoning, a "loop." Why is it that way? Because of the word "therefore" put there. We know P and Q are logical equivalents, so they can be used in place of each other. If one says "Q and Q" one would have said "P and Q" or "P and P." This isn't circular reasoning for it combines statements P and Q with the logical operator "and." (using mathematical notation, "Q ^ Q" isn't circular because it may be either T or F based on Q's state and the truth table for "and" operator).

Truth table for AND operator on statements R and S:

R----S----(R ^ S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----F
F----F----F

According to truth table:

If Q = T then (Q ^ Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q ^ Q) = F;

On the other hand, it would be circular to say "Q therefore Q" or equally "P therefore Q" because "therefore" is the conditional logical operator, mathematically shown as "Q => Q." This form of reasoning is circular and non-informative because regardless of Q's "real" state, Q's conditional combination with Q will be true.

Truth table for CONDITIONAL operator on statements R and S:

R----S----(R => S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----T
F----F----T

According to truth table:

If Q = T then (Q => Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q => Q) = T;

The difference here lies in the obvious distinction between AND and CONDITIONAL logical operators. Saying "Q and Q" is right but saying "Q therefore Q" is wrong. "Q and Q" is stating the same thing twice while "Q therefore Q" is deduction of Q's state from itself.

Clear enough?

No. So? I wasn't saying that you had to actually believe any other premises, merely that you should take them for granted (as being true) for the purpose of testing something else.

Taking premises for granted means "believing" them. If you take a premise "true" then you'll judge everything according to the "truth" of that premise.

... If I want to test the response of a particle to near-light-speed velocities, I have to take for granted that the speed of light is ~186,000 miles/per second...

This is different. Speed of light isn't a premise, it's a measurement. The premise here is that "everything in scientific Universe can be measured."

The premises of a knowledge body, Science for example, are the most basic statements which are necessary for conformance to that knowledge body.

Speed of light is a particular from scientific Universe. Particulars aren't challenged here, generalizations are called to judgment.

... Uncertainty has it's own premises as well. You cannot stand within the framework of Uncertainty, and [fairly] judge another framework - according to your own reasoning.

"Fair" observer's situation is paradoxical. Uncertainty's paradoxical nature is a reflection of that other more basic paradox.

The point with Uncertainty is that there's "no framework." You said that "Uncertainty" can never be achieved because it's paradoxical. That's right and that's why Uncertainty has no framework. I wrote many times before that "Uncertainty is a between-the-lines hint." It's a hint of "fair" observer's paradoxical situation.

By working inside Uncertainty one's working actually nowhere. It's surely somewhere but no certain place. Uncertainty provides dynamism. At any given time one's submitted to some set of premises, but Uncertainty let's one be aware of the uncertain nature of these premises and of interferences caused by them and also prepares one for change at every moment.

Like I wrote before, Uncertainty is one facet of something more basic. The other facets are Paradox and Self-reference. That more basic thing seems unreachable to me but its facets give clues to its nature.

Absolute fairness can't be achieved but relative fairness is at hand. Uncertainty is relatively fairer than other stances because it has a hint to the more basic concept of "fair" observer while many other stances only hide away that more basic problem.

Yes you can. However, I don't suppose this is the thread to discuss that in.

No, you can't. Nonetheless, I don't think this is the thread to talk that over

You need to start recognizing the difference between misunderstanding and disagreement.

And you need to start recognizing the difference between a well-thought disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding (and I'm not angry with you ).

I was talking about studying one premise at a time, which necessitates the acceptance of some other premises. If you want to test an entire reasoning system, then there is no "fair" place to stand.

We talked about this before. There's no point in studying one premise at a time while other premises are taken for granted.

Every knowledge body is "internally consistent." Inconsistencies and discrepancies can't be seen from "inside." This means you have no option of proving one of premises wrong when you have accepted other premises to be true.

Neither "inside" nor "outside" is fair. Now this is a point of agreement for us, right?

Previously Posted by Manuel_Silvio
Whatever comes near should better be doubted before it's taken into account. This is exactly the task of Uncertainty.

In this, you are using the concept "should" (forget about word-usage, the concept has been present throughout most of this discussion).

That isn't a "should" which is an obligation. It's a "should better" which is a suggestion.

As an aside, at this level nothing is necessitated because necessities are against "fairness." If something is necessitated then it's been "preferred" and "preference" has no place here.

... If you can find practicality in a reasoning system, then the reasoning system doesn't fit in the framework of Uncertainty. Something's practicality is an assumption, and Uncertainty doesn't allow for any assumptions.

"Practicality" isn't an assumption. It's a "criterion." You define it and then compare things to it. One may define "practicality" as "being uncertain" and then Uncertainty is practical.

You've accepted that practicality may be defined at will.

Yes. The premises of "it's flexible" are (basically):

1. "It" exists.
2. "It is usable in a flexible manner".

Who has associated these premises with "flexibility?" And what's given her/him an undeniable right to do so and to generalize her/his personal definition?

"From the truth of a distinct statement"? "I'm fifteen" is a distinct statement. The fact that I restate it later (even if in the same sentence) doesn't change that, does it?

Yes, it changes based on the logical operator used in statement synthesis (see above).

No! Have you been reading my words and not my reasoning this whole time? No offense, but I think you have entirely missed the point of "keep the statement within it's context".

Even if it's an "unfair, biased and personal" context that is claimed to be "fair, unbiased and encompassing?"

Yes it is, you just need to define which kind of practicality you are using at any given time.

It just doesn't change the fact that "practicality", by definition, is just something's usefulness in practice. Thus, people can have different ideas of what is "practical", but if they actually try their ideas out, they may (not necessarily, but likely) find that it is not really useful in practice.

Smells like "self-contradiction."

The fact? What fact?
By definition? Whose definition?
Usefulness? What use?
Practice? Which practice?
Actually? Which, what or whose Actuality?

Because I would then have to doubt my doubt, and doubt that doubt, and so on ad infinitum. If I doubt that I must doubt, then I can just as easily fall into Certainty as Uncertainty.

That's the dear price of "relative fairness." Be cautious, you will fall nowhere.

Isn't that obvious?

No.

Yes, it can't be fair, otherwise it would be (at least in some way) worthwile, instead of worthless.

And who associates "fairness" with "worthiness?"

Yes, thus your striving for a "fair" standpoint is in vain, is it not?

Hell knows, it's in vain. All in vain but I didn't know this when I started out. I started doubting and went on till nothing remained but doubting itself. I doubted the doubt and I asked why ask why.

There's much more to the landscapes one sees on the way than to those one sees at the destination. The way is the destination.

This is humane treatment of human situation.

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous post

If I refer to "it", "him", or "her", I am referring to an individual entity, through the use of a pronoun. This is much too basic...

Yes, "you" are doing that and "you" think it's "much too basic."

Says who?

Me .

"Equally unreliable" and "equally creditable" are opposites not synonymous, as you would have me believe.

On a homogenous scale of credibility that starts from "most unreliable" and ends with "most creditable" those which are "equally unreliable" are "equally creditable."

Scale of credibility:

(-) most unreliable
(+) most creditable

X is at (*)
(-)----------------*------(+)

Y is at (*)
(-)----------------*------(+)

X and Y are equally close to (-);
Hence, X and Y are equally close to (+);

Note that saying X is as much creditable as it's unreliable is wrong (because X is 16 dashes away from (-) and 6 dashes away from (+)). However, saying that X and Y are equally creditable thus equally unreliable is right (because this means they occupy the same place on the scale).

A suggestion is fine, but you cannot ask that one accept - or, even for an instant, take for granted - these suggestions, without contradicting the rule of Uncertainty.

Descartes' statement was fine, too, as long as it was a suggestion.

You're right but Uncertainty is a step in a way. What one gathers at this step can be used on next steps (seems like I've always got too many metaphors).

And yet, your "cautiousness" is based on Uncertainty, isn't it?

Not "based on" but rather "derived from."

Once again, if Uncertainty were a step in the way, it would be one with no physical substance, and without any imaginable usefulness.

Do you take your steps of thought for "usefulness?" Have you considered a situation in which you may take a step essentially creditable yet essentially impractical to scientific measures?

Why did you start asking why somewhere in your childhood? Is that scientifically practical? I think not, for those things you've asked "why" from have been of no scientific use.

Wouldn't it be more "practical" to swallow all scientific premises and then start out with them "blindly?" You could have taken many more "practical" steps if you studied Calculus all the time you were contemplating more basic things.

I never said I did.

You said, however, that practicality exists in all logical systems.

Interesting. However, let's say that 100 times out of 100, certain Monads (harmoniously) change, after I clap my hands. Then it can be concluded that it is practical to assume a relationship (betwixt clapping and the change of those particular Monads). It is practical because it can be "put into practice" (and has been 100 times). If, at some point in the future, the clapping of my hands is not accompanied by the change of those particular Monads, then I will have to assume that something out-of-the-ordinary has happened. This is all just human nature.

A "bond" among Monads can't be concluded. No structural property can be devised for the Universe.

Nevertheless, one can devise a property for the Harmony and hope that this property remains there within a very long (but not infinite) stretch of time. Now this property of Harmony may be put to "use," whatever "use" may mean.

Causality and all of its substitutes, including Pre-established Harmony, are mental patterns imposed on events happening here and there. That's why they're all equally creditable.

Using these mental patterns may end in desirable results but this use introduces a risk factor (for there's a considerable possibility that these patterns become invalid). That's why I call Causality and its substitutes "optimization" methods. These methods can "optimize" processing routines but at the cost of a new risk factor.

And notice, "probabilistic" conclusions can't be made because number of experiments never yields to infinity. Moreover, "probabilistic" conclusions don't describe the "distribution" of possible events in order of happening.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Greetz,

1. For Mentat:
Questioning the applicability of this proof is senseless. "If" this proof is all right then it will show something about Descartes' statement (and that's clear), so it's applicable.

So, the fact that 1+1=2 is right means that it is applicable to Descartes' statement? What I mean by this is that any proposition could be proven correct in some framework, but that doesn't mean that all of them are "helper devices" for Descartes' philosophy. I can show you the inapplicability of "1+1=2" to Descartes' philosophy, but can you show me the applicability of your proof to his philosophy?

The proof has "two" lines. These "two" lines are "different." One line leads to a "paradox." The other leads to a "loop." The paradox line is "clear." The loop line is what we are talking about right now. Don't use "loop/paradox," use "loop."

Yes sir!

However, a loop is a paradox. If you have looping reasoning, then you have a paradox. But I'll just use "loop" from now on.

The proof claims that if statement P is set T, then any deduction resulting in statement Q set T will be circular reasoning, a "loop." Why is it that way? Because of the word "therefore" put there. We know P and Q are logical equivalents, so they can be used in place of each other. If one says "Q and Q" one would have said "P and Q" or "P and P." This isn't circular reasoning for it combines statements P and Q with the logical operator "and." (using mathematical notation, "Q ^ Q" isn't circular because it may be either T or F based on Q's state and the truth table for "and" operator).

I still don't think that the use of the word "therefore" makes a loop. Here's why: If I say "I'm fifteen, therefore I will be 30 in 15 years", I have no logical loop. Yes, the second proposition has a sub-proposition that is equal to the first proposition (in the sentence), but there is still no loop.

Also, I would like to take this opportunity to remind you that you are examining the sentence outside of it's context. This would be fine, if there were no story involving a Demon that does create a loop (by trying to convince someone that they don't exist), but as it is I don't think it correct that one examine the statement, without making any reference to the context.

Truth table for AND operator on statements R and S:

R----S----(R ^ S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----F
F----F----F

According to truth table:

If Q = T then (Q ^ Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q ^ Q) = F;

On the other hand, it would be circular to say "Q therefore Q" or equally "P therefore Q" because "therefore" is the conditional logical operator, mathematically shown as "Q => Q." This form of reasoning is circular and non-informative because regardless of Q's "real" state, Q's conditional combination with Q will be true.

I know this. I've already admitted to it's non-informative nature. However, I stil disagree. You are saying that because I say "this is true, therefore it is true", there is a loop. I just don't see the loop. Also, look at the example of my age. I have written that one in the same style as Descartes' statement, to get the point across. "I was born 15 years ago, therefore I am 15" is not circular, even though the first premise contains (as a sub-premise) the second premise.

Truth table for CONDITIONAL operator on statements R and S:

R----S----(R => S)
T----T----T
T----F----F
F----T----T
F----F----T

According to truth table:

If Q = T then (Q => Q) = T;
If Q = F then (Q => Q) = T;

The difference here lies in the obvious distinction between AND and CONDITIONAL logical operators. Saying "Q and Q" is right but saying "Q therefore Q" is wrong. "Q and Q" is stating the same thing twice while "Q therefore Q" is deduction of Q's state from itself.

Clear enough?

No, sorry (I mean that I'm really sorry, if my disagreeing is frustrating you). See above for why.

Taking premises for granted means "believing" them. If you take a premise "true" then you'll judge everything according to the "truth" of that premise.

Exactly, that's why Uncertainty doesn't allow one to take anything for granted - which is something that you seemed to disagree with me on before.

Also, there is something wrong with the (above quoted) comment. You said that I would then judge everything according to the "truth" of that premise. This is not necessarily true, I may just be judging one thing with that premise as my basis, and then discarding the premise later.

This is different. Speed of light isn't a premise, it's a measurement. The premise here is that "everything in scientific Universe can be measured."

No, it's that the speed of light can, and has been measured. It has nothing to do with any other measurements. Besides, how is it that I am not taking for granted the measurement, when performing an experiment on what happens at near-light-speed?

The premises of a knowledge body, Science for example, are the most basic statements which are necessary for conformance to that knowledge body.

Speed of light is a particular from scientific Universe. Particulars aren't challenged here, generalizations are called to judgment.

True Uncertainty must challenge everything. You may not like this one example (I don't much either, but it was the first thing that popped into my head), but that doesn't mean that you can take it for granted, and still be Uncertain.

"Fair" observer's situation is paradoxical. Uncertainty's paradoxical nature is a reflection of that other more basic paradox.

I know, that's the point I was making: Your attempt to find a "fair" (or even "fairer") observer's situation is doomed to failure, and Uncertainty is probably a step backwards, because that's just accepting that it can't be done, while (at the same time) believing that you have the answer.

By working inside Uncertainty one's working actually nowhere.

Exactly why it is utterly pointless, and impossible.

It's surely somewhere but no certain place.

Beware of contradictions.

Uncertainty provides dynamism. At any given time one's submitted to some set of premises, but Uncertainty let's one be aware of the uncertain nature of these premises and of interferences caused by them and also prepares one for change at every moment.

No, that's what uncertainty does. Uncertainty doesn't allow you (even for a moment) to submit yourself to any knowledge body or any premise of any kind.

Like I wrote before, Uncertainty is one facet of something more basic. The other facets are Paradox and Self-reference. That more basic thing seems unreachable to me but its facets give clues to its nature.

A true paradox is unsolvable. Self-reference is truly paradoxical. Thus, the grand thing that your searching for is probably going to end up being complete acceptance of the unsolvable nature of everything. I don't like this conclusion, therefore I don't like it's facets.

Answer continued on next post...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Absolute fairness can't be achieved but relative fairness is at hand. Uncertainty is relatively fairer than other stances because it has a hint to the more basic concept of "fair" observer while many other stances only hide away that more basic problem.

Look, the fact that it hints at paradox more than any other reasoning system does not make it more fair. I just makes it closer to what the concept of fairness actually is, impossible.

No, you can't. Nonetheless, I don't think this is the thread to talk that over

Well, if we were discussing it (which we're not), I would reply that knowing which things are symbolic and which things are literal resolves the situation. But, of course, we're not discussing it, so it really doesn't matter .

And you need to start recognizing the difference between a well-thought disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding

Actually, the difference I mentioned was not between a disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding. It was between a disagreement (any disagreement) and a misunderstanding.

We talked about this before. There's no point in studying one premise at a time while other premises are taken for granted.

And there's not point in denying all premises. They're both wrong. But, it does seem that one has had greater success in the history of humankind .

Besides, you have made it rather obvious that Uncertainty does exactly the same thing as any other system (it takes one premise for granted while examining all others), so it's no better.

Neither "inside" nor "outside" is fair. Now this is a point of agreement for us, right?

Sure, we can agree on that - provided you realize that that leaves out Uncertainty.

That isn't a "should" which is an obligation. It's a "should better" which is a suggestion.

No, it's a proposition. You are assuming that you know what's better. You are also assuming that the way you have posted here is better than others. Both of these are assumptions, not suggestions.

As an aside, at this level nothing is necessitated because necessities are against "fairness." If something is necessitated then it's been "preferred" and "preference" has no place here.

Then why do you prefer Uncertainty? *Contradiction Alert!*

"Practicality" isn't an assumption. It's a "criterion." You define it and then compare things to it. One may define "practicality" as "being uncertain" and then Uncertainty is practical.

None of this fits the definition of "praciticality".

You've accepted that practicality may be defined at will.

Not exactly. I have accepted that people may have different views of what is practical, but "practical" retains the meaning of "useful when put into practice".

Who has associated these premises with "flexibility?" And what's given her/him an undeniable right to do so and to generalize her/his personal definition?

I/myself have associated these premises with "flexibility". Prove that they are inapplicable, and I/myself will change my/his mind .

Yes, it changes based on the logical operator used in statement synthesis (see above).

(See previous post for refutation.)

Even if it's an "unfair, biased and personal" context that is claimed to be "fair, unbiased and encompassing?"

How can you know any of this, if you don't put the statement where it belongs (in it's context) and try to study it as it was intended.

Smells like "self-contradiction."

Not self-contradiction, completion of a point. I've already explained this (previous post) so I suggest that you read that explanation

In fact, I must go now. I apologize, but I will complete my response later.

 

[heusdens]

Originally posted by Mentat
This philosophy of Descarte has been brought up numerous times, in the old PFs. I'm just starting it up again.

Descarte gave an illustration that went (somewhat) as follows:

And Evil Demon sought to convince a man that everything he (the man) had ever believed, was false. The Demon had such power that it almost succeeded. The only thing that the Demon could not prove to the man was that the man himself did not exist. It could not do this because you cannot convince someone that doesn't exist, of anything. From this came the saying, "I think, therefore, I am".

What is your opinion?

The statement "I think, therefore, I am" I regard as a statement regarding the issue of the relation between being and thinking.

It says that thinking requires being.

The inverse statement is "I am, therefore, I think".

This would claim that all being requires thinking. Something is, only if it is able of thinking.

I would consider the first "I think, therefore, I am" as the right statement regarding the relation between being and thinking. Thinking requires being. The inverse statement, claims a false relationship between being and thinking. Being does not require thinking.

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

... can you show me the applicability of your proof to his philosophy?

Let's see. If I gave you a proof (just some proof not this one) that shows that Descartes' statement is incompatible with Boolean logic then would this exemplary proof be applicable to Descartes' statement? I think the answer is "yes."

Now I claim that the proof we're discussing here is one that shows such incompatibility. If this proof succeeds in its task, that is showing some incompatibility, then it can be considered an "applicable" proof. Do you agree?

And in order to prove this proof "inapplicable" one has to "understand" it and then show that it either doesn't succeed in its task or that it just does another task. Please "show" either of these cases.

By the way, this proof isn't "every" proof. It's a specific one concerned with its specific task (and it isn't 1 + 1 = 2).

However, a loop is a paradox.

How did you make that? A loop is based on self-reference. A paradox is based on the collocation of contraries. Are these two equal? If yes, why have they been forbidden through distinct rules of logic and not under a single rule?

You are saying that because I say "this is true, therefore it is true", there is a loop.

Please make sure you read and re-read my following words until you get the point. I'm really tired of this and I can't describe my point more clearly.

No. (Q => Q) isn't "this is true therefore it is true." It's "because this is true therefore it is true." A loop is an instance of self-reference, where the validity/truth of some statement is taken from the validity/truth of the same statement.

As I showed on the previous post a (Q => Q) statement is "always" true, no matter whether or not Q is T. It was rock solid Boolean logic. You may insist that your (Q => Q) statement (which is "I am therefore I am" or "I'm fifteen therefore I'm fifteen") is T and you're right with that but you must note that the truth of Q can't be deduced from this.

Suppose we have (Q => Q) = T (means, "I am therefore I am" is considered T). You can't deduce Q = T (means, "I am" is T) because regardless of Q's state (means, the truth of "I am" which is I's existence and the matter of debate here) (Q => Q) is ever-true.

Whether or not I exist (means, whether or not "I am" is T), "I am therefore I am" is true. "I am therefore I am" leads nowhere but "I am therefore I am." From that you can't get "I am" as true and for I to be proven to exist "I am" must be proven true (and there's no discussion about that).

Non-informative-ness isn't only a "disadvantage," it's a "fault." The only non-informative statements in Boolean logic are those forbidden ones (they were forbidden because they were non-informative). If you have a non-informative statement you can know for sure that you have a "fault" at hand.

"I was born 15 years ago, therefore I am 15" is not circular, even though the first premise contains (as a sub-premise) the second premise.

This can't be compared to a (Q => Q). Here you have (R => Q) where Q's truth is deduced from R's truth and R's truth is independent of Q.

You may be born 15 years ago but have 20 years of age because you were involved in a hypothetical time machine experiment. "I was born 15 years ago" isn't a logical equivalent to "I am 15." These two can be converted to each other in presence of other statements which declare solemnly that you haven't experienced any time distortions.

Consequently, this statement isn't analogous to Descartes' statement which is a (Q => Q) (deduction of a statement's truth from its logical "equivalent" and not from its "result along with other auxiliary statements").

Exactly, that's why Uncertainty doesn't allow one to take anything for granted - which is something that you seemed to disagree with me on before.

Uncertainty is paradoxical so one can be taking its premise for granted while one doesn't violate "nothing is certain."

Uncertainty's premise assumes no definite state of T or F, its value is none of the members of truth value set defined for Boolean logic. It can be taken simultaneously T and F or none of them or a mixture of T and F or something beyond T and F.

Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step can be taken under many names, call it Uncertainty, call it Angst, call it whatever. Under one name or the other, this step must be taken. It's the righteous successor of all previous steps. One starts out with doubts, with precision, with clarity, with cautiousness, with hopes and with desire for knowledge. This individual will, I think, someday somehow understand how these starting steps give the clues to a critical step beyond them.

That critical step is where limits of knowledge, its righteousness, its fairness and the honesty in one's desire for knowledge become subjects to one's quest for knowledge. Knowledge is all we know. Consider the situation where knowledge itself becomes a subject for being known. What happens? Would our knowledge give us clues to its own nature? Isn't this another paradox?

If our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge then we'd be knowing it and there's no point in asking. If our knowledge doesn't contain the knowledge about its own nature then we'd never acquire that knowledge for we can't access something that lies outside itself (knowledge of any form or about anything must be somewhere inside knowledge and can't be outside of knowledge).

Uncertainty, Paradox and Self-reference are all evaded for they're the borders to rationalized knowledge. In studying the knowledge itself the most important aspects of study are the limits of knowledge - those borders.

No, it's that the speed of light can, and has been measured. It has nothing to do with any other measurements. Besides, how is it that I am not taking for granted the measurement, when performing an experiment on what happens at near-light-speed?

... This is not necessarily true, I may just be judging one thing with that premise as my basis, and then discarding the premise later.

I think we have different understandings of "premises" for a knowledge body. For me, the premises of a knowledge body are the "most basic" statements whose truth enforces the truth of all other statements of that knowledge body.

Science, for example, has its premises (historically) told in Francis Bacon's "Novum Organum." The most basic to Science is its methodology. Assuming that methodology will in time result in "all" scientific achievements, including a measurement of light speed.

You can't be working in a knowledge body without being "totally" (consciously or otherwise) believing in its premises (which are the "most basic" of all). You can't assume Science's methodology for studying stones but look from Bible's outlook at human beings. This is a paradox just like Uncertainty.

You choose to be a scientist. You understand Science's methodology. You use it to view the Universe, to view all. Then you get everything out of it. Science and all other knowledge bodies are self-sufficient encompassing systems of thought applied to an entire Universe (some knowledge bodies may assume more Universes or some Multiverse or no Universe at all).

Uncertainty's task is to detect inconsistencies and discrepancies in these knowledge bodies that wouldn't be seen if one's "inside" (or even "outside") these knowledge bodies. One concerned with Uncertainty won't fulfill the requirements of Uncertainty (eg, won't be "totally" Uncertain, as you say) but will be assuming a relatively fairer stance compared to other stances.

True Uncertainty must challenge everything. You may not like this one example (I don't much either, but it was the first thing that popped into my head), but that doesn't mean that you can take it for granted, and still be Uncertain.

Uncertainty challenges Science's methodology instead. This challenge invalidates all that relies on this methodology including but not limited to a measurement of light speed.

I know, that's the point I was making: Your attempt to find a "fair" (or even "fairer") observer's situation is doomed to failure, and Uncertainty is probably a step backwards, because that's just accepting that it can't be done, while (at the same time) believing that you have the answer.

This is humane treatment of human situation.

No, that's what uncertainty does. Uncertainty doesn't allow you (even for a moment) to submit yourself to any knowledge body or any premise of any kind.

Your "uncertainty" allows for unfair preference of some premises over others. Uncertainty, by its paradoxical nature, doesn't "allow" and/or "disallow" anything.

A true paradox is unsolvable. Self-reference is truly paradoxical. Thus, the grand thing that your searching for is probably going to end up being complete acceptance of the unsolvable nature of everything. I don't like this conclusion, therefore I don't like it's facets.

My current guess of that "grand" thing (as you call it) is that it's Unknown

There's even enough "scientific evidence" to the unsolvable nature of everything. Even Science doesn't claim "direct" observation or manipulation of everything or anything. Even Science asserts that what we observe and manipulate is a "representation," nothing more. However, this "unsolvable" case isn't my point here and now.

Look, the fact that it hints at paradox more than any other reasoning system does not make it more fair. I just makes it closer to what the concept of fairness actually is, impossible.

So the fact that one is always ready to review one's thoughts doesn't make one fairer?

continued on the next post…

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

… continued from the previous post

Well, if we were discussing it (which we're not), I would reply that knowing which things are symbolic and which things are literal resolves the situation. But, of course, we're not discussing it, so it really doesn't matter.

Nevertheless, if we were discussing it (which we never ever are) I would counter that knowing that symbolic things can be interpreted at will worsens the situation, but, more apparently than obviously we aren’t discussing it, so it more really than really doesn't matter and has never mattered to no one

Actually, the difference I mentioned was not between a disagreement and a disagreement made upon misunderstanding. It was between a disagreement (any disagreement) and a misunderstanding.

Well, I'm gradually learning to know that difference. Did you try, too?

And there's not point in denying all premises. They're both wrong. But, it does seem that one has had greater success in the history of humankind.

Success? From what point of view? By what definition of success? In what history of human beings?

No, it's a proposition. You are assuming that you know what's better. You are also assuming that the way you have posted here is better than others. Both of these are assumptions, not suggestions.

Then why do you prefer Uncertainty? *Contradiction Alert!*

You're right. Have you noticed you're using the other edge of the double-edged sword that Uncertainty is?

None of this fits the definition of "praciticality".

Not exactly. I have accepted that people may have different views of what is practical, but "practical" retains the meaning of "useful when put into practice".

And how "useful" and "practice" are defined?

I/myself have associated these premises with "flexibility". Prove that they are inapplicable, and I/myself will change my/his mind.

First you tell me, "inapplicable" to which measures and tell your grounds for choosing those measures.

How can you know any of this, if you don't put the statement where it belongs (in it's context) and try to study it as it was intended.

As far as I know, the context is an entity's opposition to a denial of that specific entity's existence. That entity used a statement that was problematic within the framework that that entity intended that statement to be understood in.

Not self-contradiction, completion of a point. I've already explained this (previous post) so I suggest that you read that explanation.

I'd read it. You used terms that weren't subject to consensus (in this two-individual community, of course) while we'd agreed to use terms that refer to the same (or almost the same) things on both sides of dialogue.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by heusdens
The statement "I think, therefore, I am" I regard as a statement regarding the issue of the relation between being and thinking.

It says that thinking requires being.

The inverse statement is "I am, therefore, I think".

This would claim that all being requires thinking. Something is, only if it is able of thinking.

I would consider the first "I think, therefore, I am" as the right statement regarding the relation between being and thinking. Thinking requires being. The inverse statement, claims a false relationship between being and thinking. Being does not require thinking.

And I would agree with you entirely.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Let's see. If I gave you a proof (just some proof not this one) that shows that Descartes' statement is incompatible with Boolean logic then would this exemplary proof be applicable to Descartes' statement? I think the answer is "yes."

Now I claim that the proof we're discussing here is one that shows such incompatibility. If this proof succeeds in its task, that is showing some incompatibility, then it can be considered an "applicable" proof. Do you agree?

Yes, if it can be used to show an incompatibility between Boolean Logic and Descartes' philosophy, then I agree to it's applicability.

And in order to prove this proof "inapplicable" one has to "understand" it and then show that it either doesn't succeed in its task or that it just does another task. Please "show" either of these cases.

Didn't you already show that it is the type statement, wherein "P" is a function of [bleep]? If this is so then I may understand the proof, but I still don't see how it accomplishes the aforementioned task.

By the way, this proof isn't "every" proof. It's a specific one concerned with its specific task (and it isn't 1 + 1 = 2).

Yes, but it's specific task is to show an incompatibility between Boolean Logic and a statement of the form "P ([bleep])", isn't it?

How did you make that? A loop is based on self-reference. A paradox is based on the collocation of contraries. Are these two equal? If yes, why have they been forbidden through distinct rules of logic and not under a single rule?

Hm, I guess a loop isn't a paradox. I had read a book that dealt with paradox (Godel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid), and it seems to have said that self-referential statements are paradoxical. Oh well, I have already agreed to use the word "loop".

Please make sure you read and re-read my following words until you get the point. I'm really tired of this and I can't describe my point more clearly.

No. (Q => Q) isn't "this is true therefore it is true." It's "because this is true therefore it is true." A loop is an instance of self-reference, where the validity/truth of some statement is taken from the validity/truth of the same statement.

As I showed on the previous post a (Q => Q) statement is "always" true, no matter whether or not Q is T. It was rock solid Boolean logic. You may insist that your (Q => Q) statement (which is "I am therefore I am" or "I'm fifteen therefore I'm fifteen") is T and you're right with that but you must note that the truth of Q can't be deduced from this.

Suppose we have (Q => Q) = T (means, "I am therefore I am" is considered T). You can't deduce Q = T (means, "I am" is T) because regardless of Q's state (means, the truth of "I am" which is I's existence and the matter of debate here) (Q => Q) is ever-true.

Whether or not I exist (means, whether or not "I am" is T), "I am therefore I am" is true. "I am therefore I am" leads nowhere but "I am therefore I am." From that you can't get "I am" as true and for I to be proven to exist "I am" must be proven true (and there's no discussion about that).

Alright. I understand it. It isn't much different then I thought it was. You are showing that "Q=>Q" doesn't prove anything. I agree entirely. Now, put the statement back into context, please, and see the impossible nature of the Evil Demon's task (to prove to someone that they don't exist), and we will have nothing left to discuss.

I keep mentioning context because I already knew that the statement itself doesn't get you anywhere. It is the application to the story that shows that, when someone tries to prove to you that you don't exist, they only further validate belief in your existence.

Non-informative-ness isn't only a "disadvantage," it's a "fault." The only non-informative statements in Boolean logic are those forbidden ones (they were forbidden because they were non-informative). If you have a non-informative statement you can know for sure that you have
a "fault" at hand.

Why is a non-informative statement forbidden by Boolean Logic?

This can't be compared to a (Q => Q). Here you have (R => Q) where Q's truth is deduced from R's truth and R's truth is independent of Q.

Oh no it's not independent. It's not possible that I was born 15 years ago, and yet am not 15 years old. Thus, this statement is of exactly the same nature as "I think therefore I am", because the first statement has the second statement as one of it's sub-premises.

You may be born 15 years ago but have 20 years of age because you were involved in a hypothetical time machine experiment. "I was born 15 years ago" isn't a logical equivalent to "I am 15." These two can be converted to each other in presence of other statements which declare solemnly that you haven't experienced any time distortions.

So now you introduce context? This is a little irritating.

Besides, if I was born 15 years ago, then I must be 15 years old. If I travel through time, I was still born 15 subjective years ago, and that's all that matters to the statement.

Consequently, this statement isn't analogous to Descartes' statement which is a (Q => Q) (deduction of a statement's truth from its logical "equivalent" and not from its "result along with other auxiliary statements").

Actually, Descartes' statement isn't the one that you showed to be equivalent to "Q=>Q", it was "I am therefore I am" that was of this kind.

Uncertainty is paradoxical so one can be taking its premise for granted while one doesn't violate "nothing is certain."

This is backward reasoning. You must take the premise for granted while not violating "nothing is certain", and thus Uncertainty is paradoxical.

Uncertainty's premise assumes no definite state of T or F, its value is none of the members of truth value set defined for Boolean logic. It can be taken simultaneously T and F or none of them or a mixture of T and F or something beyond T and F.

Then it isn't useful. You said that it's usefulness (and it's "fairness") were that it could be used to determine the truth of another knowledge body.

Response Continued on the Next Post...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Uncertainty is a step in a way. This step can be taken under many names, call it Uncertainty, call it Angst, call it whatever. Under one name or the other, this step must be taken. It's the righteous successor of all previous steps. One starts out with doubts, with precision, with clarity, with cautiousness, with hopes and with desire for knowledge. This individual will, I think, someday somehow understand how these starting steps give the clues to a critical step beyond them.

I don't want to sound repetitious, but you leave me no choice: You are not describing Uncertainty, you are describing uncertainty.

That critical step is where limits of knowledge, its righteousness, its fairness and the honesty in one's desire for knowledge become subjects to one's quest for knowledge. Knowledge is all we know. Consider the situation where knowledge itself becomes a subject for being known. What happens? Would our knowledge give us clues to its own nature? Isn't this another paradox?

Not really. Knowledge is not a system for learning, and thus does not fall into the paradoxes of Russel or Godel.

If our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge then we'd be knowing it and there's no point in asking. If our knowledge doesn't contain the knowledge about its own nature then we'd never acquire that knowledge for we can't access something that lies outside itself (knowledge of any form or about anything must be somewhere inside knowledge and can't be outside of knowledge).

You are (IMO) misusing the word "knowledge". You are asking things like "if our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge...", when in fact, unless you know something about the nature of knowledge, it is obvious that "our knowledge" doesn't (yet) contain knowledge about the nature of knowledge.

Uncertainty, Paradox and Self-reference are all evaded for they're the borders to rationalized knowledge. In studying the knowledge itself the most important aspects of study are the limits of knowledge - those borders.

Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops are not the borders of rationality. "Borders" have recognizable existence on both sides of them. Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops do not have recognizable (or understandable) existence on either side of the rationality/irrationality.

I think we have different understandings of "premises" for a knowledge body. For me, the premises of a knowledge body are the "most basic" statements whose truth enforces the truth of all other statements of that knowledge body.

That's what I think a premise of a knowledge body is as well.

Science, for example, has its premises (historically) told in Francis Bacon's "Novum Organum." The most basic to Science is its methodology. Assuming that methodology will in time result in "all" scientific achievements, including a measurement of light speed.

You can't be working in a knowledge body without being "totally" (consciously or otherwise) believing in its premises (which are the "most basic" of all). You can't assume Science's methodology for studying stones but look from Bible's outlook at human beings. This is a paradox just like Uncertainty.

Not paradoxical, but yes, it is as unusable as Uncertainty.

You choose to be a scientist. You understand Science's methodology. You use it to view the Universe, to view all. Then you get everything out of it. Science and all other knowledge bodies are self-sufficient encompassing systems of thought applied to an entire Universe (some knowledge bodies may assume more Universes or some Multiverse or no Universe at all).

Uncertainty's task is to detect inconsistencies and discrepancies in these knowledge bodies that wouldn't be seen if one's "inside" (or even "outside") these knowledge bodies. One concerned with Uncertainty won't fulfill the requirements of Uncertainty (eg, won't be "totally" Uncertain, as you say) but will be assuming a relatively fairer stance compared to other stances.

Again you describe "uncertainty" instead of "Uncertainty". This is not fitting, as my argument is against your belief in "Uncertainty".

Uncertainty challenges Science's methodology instead. This challenge invalidates all that relies on this methodology including but not limited to a measurement of light speed.

Then you agree with me?

This is humane treatment of human situation.

Thank you .

Your "uncertainty" allows for unfair preference of some premises over others. Uncertainty, by its paradoxical nature, doesn't "allow" and/or "disallow" anything.

Until you can prove to me that this reasoning system (Uncertainty) can even exist, I will keep on repeating myself: If it doesn't allow or disallow anything, then it is unusable.

My current guess of that "grand" thing (as you call it) is that it's Unknown

It's obviously unknown, the point is in getting to know it, isn't it?

So the fact that one is always ready to review one's thoughts doesn't make one fairer?

One cannot even take it for granted that they should review their thoughts, under the framework of Uncertainty.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Nevertheless, if we were discussing it (which we never ever are) I would counter that knowing that symbolic things can be interpreted at will worsens the situation, but, more apparently than obviously we aren’t discussing it, so it more really than really doesn't matter and has never mattered to no one

Yeah, so who cares that your absolutely wrong, and that the Bible supplies it's own interpretations, and makes itself clear to anyone who actually studies it? It isn't even an issue that historians don't call Herodutus' writings foolish, just because they use symbolisms.

Success?

Yes.

From what point of view?

The common one.

By what definition of success?

The usual one.

In what history of human beings?

The only one.

You're right. Have you noticed you're using the other edge of the double-edged sword that Uncertainty is?

I don't really consider it a double-edged sword. I consider it to have only one edge, and it's the one that pierces through whoever tries to use it. One may not turn it about, either, because that would be making use of it, and thus would (inevitably) lead to their being pierced, before any useful progress is made.

And how "useful" and "practice" are defined?

In my post, or in general use?

First you tell me, "inapplicable" to which measures and tell your grounds for choosing those measures.

Any measure that you choose. It is you that was assigned to prove the inapplicability of my premises, so it is you who decides what is and is not applicable. If I disagree with your definition of applicability, then I will argue that point later.

As far as I know, the context is an entity's opposition to a denial of that specific entity's existence. That entity used a statement that was problematic within the framework that that entity intended that statement to be understood in.

The statement is not problematic, merely self-evident (and thus non-informative, just as you said). He was telling the Evil Demond what it should have known to begin with: You can't convince me of [bleep] if I don't exist, and thus will never prove to me that I don't exist.

I'd read it. You used terms that weren't subject to consensus (in this two-individual community, of course) while we'd agreed to use terms that refer to the same (or almost the same) things on both sides of dialogue.

Please explain. What terms did I use, and which ones should I have used instead?

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

=

Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

Didn't you already show that it is the type statement, wherein "P" is a function of [bleep]?

Yes, but it's specific task is to show an incompatibility between Boolean Logic and a statement of the form "P ([bleep])", isn't it?

That P([beep]) was a generalization. I used it to prove that incompatibility case for all statements of the form "I [beep] therefore I am" ("I think therefore I am," "I eat therefore I am," "I want therefore I am," etc). Instead of using the specific verb, "think," I used a non-specific variable [beep]. You could say whatever verb in place of [beep] (for example "I discuss therefore I am") and P([beep]) would be a statement like "there need be an I to [beep]" (means, for example, "there need be an I to discuss").

Remember you claimed that one can't be thinking if one's not being. The function P([beep])'s value for [beep] = "think" is "there need be an I to think." P([beep]) is the generalization of your premise that thinking (or [beep]ing) and being are firmly bound. There's a reason for my using P([beep]). I took your premise (and generalized it, an action that complicated the matter), then I showed, during that proof, that your premise by which you claim the truth for Descartes' statement leads to a loop along with the same Descartes' statement. This was the loop case in that proof where I said if P = T and Q = T then we'll have a loop. And then I showed even if you put away your premise (eg, you say P = F) and we get P = F and Q = T you won't get much out of it because that would be a paradox. This was the paradox case.

Now, let's forget the P([beep]) generalization for it only complicates the matter (even though it's a decent generalization).

With or without P([beep]), it's clear that statements of form (Q => Q) are ever-true and that they "can't" be used to deduce the truth of Q itself. Take a look at this new formulation of the same proof, perhaps this one works for you.

You repeated many times that "if there wasn't an I, who could be thinking?" Let's have your word and say that "thinking" is the "undeniable" companion of "being." Saying this necessitates that "I think" be logically equivalent to "I am."

Descartes' statement is "I think therefore I am." Take "I think" and name it R. Take "I am" and name it Q. Descartes' statement can be expressed as (R => Q). Since R = Q (thinking is always the companion of being), we can always substitute Q with R so (R => Q) becomes (Q => Q). This (Q => Q) is an equivalent of Descartes' statement, (R => Q), by your premise that thinking and being are firmly bound. We know that any statement of form (Q => Q) is ever-true and the truth of Q itself (Q being "I am") can't be deduced from it. This is a non-informative case, a loop. You can't say if Q is T or F (eg, if you exist or not) by knowing that (Q => Q) is true.

It's worth noting that the equivalence of (R => Q) and (Q => Q) was taken from your premise. If you decide to put aside the firm bond between thinking and being then such equivalence can't be claimed and we have a (R => Q) which deduces Q's truth from R's truth like many other plain statements. However, in putting aside the firm bond between thinking (eg, "I think" which is R) and being (eg, "I am" which is Q) you've already accepted that Q's truth is irrelevant to R's truth and deducing Q's truth from R's truth isn't allowed. This is a self-contrary case, a paradox. You can't say R indicates Q when you've previously stated that R and Q are independent (eg, aren't bound).

Now, put the statement back into context, please, and see the impossible nature of the Evil Demon's task (to prove to someone that they don't exist), and we will have nothing left to discuss.

Back to Evil Demon scenario, we have the Evil Demon claiming there's no Rene Descartes and Descartes claiming there is indeed a Rene Descartes by deducing from his ability to think of this scenario. Descartes is saying Q (eg, that "he is") is T because he's thinking of an Evil Demon scenario and from his thinking, his being can be directly derived, that (R => Q). Descartes is saying R = Q (eg, one's being can be derived from one's ability to think) and that (R => Q). The loop case happens here: (R => Q) can be turned to (Q => Q) and then Evil Demon can turn back to Descartes and tell him that from (Q => Q)'s truth (from "I think therefore I am"'s truth) Q's truth can't be derived without making a loop and violating the rules of game which are the boundaries of Boolean logic.

The incompatibility of Descartes' statement and Boolean logic gives the Evil Demon a chance to trap Descartes in a corner of the fight arena he's chosen to deal with the Evil Demon in; that fight arena being Boolean logic. Descartes' only way out is on the street and out of fight arena.

Why is a non-informative statement forbidden by Boolean Logic?

For those who invented and developed it didn't like what wasn't "productive" and "practical" based on "their" understanding of "practice" and "production."

Searching for non-informative statements you won't find any but those statements that are inherently paradoxical and/or self-referenced. A statement is a sentence that can be assigned a "state" (in case of Boolean logic, either of T and F states). If a statement can be assigned a definite state then it's informative for it surely tells us something about something. There remain those statements which can't be assigned a definite state, these can only be of the above categories and because of their indefiniteness are non-informative.

So now you introduce context? This is a little irritating.

Besides, if I was born 15 years ago, then I must be 15 years old. If I travel through time, I was still born 15 subjective years ago, and that's all that matters to the statement.

No, that wasn't a new context. I was only saying that "I was born 15 years ago" doesn't directly result in "I am 15." Hence, an "I was born 15 years ago therefore I am 15" can't be equaled to an "I am 15 therefore I am 15."

Even in the case you talk of 15 subjective years, those auxiliary statements (eg, those that must accompany "I was born 15 years ago" to get "I am 15") are present. Now they solemnly declare that there's a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Or they may declare Special Relativity and time dilation. Nonetheless, there should be some statements additional to "I was born 15 years ago" to deduce "I was 15." Your statement is of form (R => Q), R and Q being convertible to each other only under special circumstances, thus it isn't of form (Q => Q).

This is backward reasoning. You must take the premise for granted while not violating "nothing is certain", and thus Uncertainty is paradoxical.

What happens after I realize Uncertainty's paradoxical nature? I know that its premise has no definite state and can be rejected while it is accepted.

Then it isn't useful. You said that it's usefulness (and it's "fairness") were that it could be used to determine the truth of another knowledge body.

Truth or falsity aren't of the properties of knowledge bodies; they're states defined "within" knowledge bodies. Uncertainty doesn't determine "truth," it determines "attributes."

Here's an example. We can use aerial photos and telemetry to understand the geomorphology of Sierra Nevada. We can use the same methods to understand the geomorphology of Rockies. A geomorphologic assessment will determine the "attributes" of these terrains. Sierra Nevada will be seen with much more discontinuities than Rockies. Whether or not discontinuities are "good" or "bad" isn't a matter of geomorphology's interest; it's up to the inhabitants of these terrains to honor or lower the discontinuities of their land.

In analogy, Uncertainty isn't interested in finding out the "truth" (it would be biased if it was interested in truth which requires much debate before it can be defined), it will only reveal the attributes of knowledge bodies, for example if one specific knowledge body is consistent (or if is has whatever attribute) or not. It's up to the inhabitants of that knowledge body to decide if they like consistency (or any other attribute) or not. For example, those who live within Science like to see it consistent with observations while those who live within a Religion like to see their observations consistent with their Religion.

Not really. Knowledge is not a system for learning, and thus does not fall into the paradoxes of Russell or Godel.

I wasn't talking about Gödel’s theorem or Russell’s paradox. Knowledge isn't a system for learning but this has nothing to do with its being studied. I was only asking if a study of knowledge, or rather gathering knowledge about knowledge, doesn't give rise to new problems.

... You are asking things like "if our knowledge contains the knowledge about the nature of knowledge...", when in fact, unless you know something about the nature of knowledge, it is obvious that "our knowledge" doesn't (yet) contain knowledge about the nature of knowledge.

That's a repetition of my own question. If I ask "what's the nature of knowledge?" two possibilities are faced:

00. I know about the nature of knowledge, or the nature of my knowledge is contained in it. If so, why could I be asking this question?

01. I don't know about the nature of knowledge, or the knowledge of the nature of knowledge isn't contained in the knowledge. One part of the knowledge lies outside itself, so it can never be accessed.

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous topic

Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops are not the borders of rationality. "Borders" have recognizable existence on both sides of them. Uncertainty, Paradox, and Loops do not have recognizable (or understandable) existence on either side of the rationality/irrationality.

I have another definition of a "border," that's where one realm ends and another starts, a virtual line that inhabitants of one realm would pass in order to get to the other realm.

Suppose I'm a rational thinker. I start sorting out things rationally. I go on and on but then isn't there a limit to this task? I think there is. Whenever I, being a rational thinker, face Paradox, Self-reference and Uncertainty I go back and change my way in order to remain rational. If I went on my way I would've become irrational. I can pass these "borders" to go back and forth between these two realms. If I want to know in which realm I reside I only have to check out my log and see if I've passed these borders (eg, took into account these three or evaded them). Regardless of the nature of these three, they function like "borders" so I call them "borders."

Not paradoxical, but yes, it is as unusable as Uncertainty.

Yeah, so who cares that your absolutely wrong, and that the Bible supplies it's own interpretations, and makes itself clear to anyone who actually studies it? It isn't even an issue that historians don't call Herodutus' writings foolish, just because they use symbolisms.

Not paradoxical, just in case you want to force match Science and Bible by interpreting Bible words as scientific statements. Does Bible include an interpretation of the symbolism used in Genesis? Does it say how to understand what "the throne of God" is? Does it say how to explain for Eve being second to Adam? Does it contain instructions to map Genesis' naïveté about Creation or Cosmogony into the hyper-complexity that this Universe is?

You can compare Genesis to Big Bang and then map the Christian God into Big Bang's primary fireball. Do you like it that way?

I haven't studied Bible. I haven't even read it completely once. However, I've seen people of the three major Western faiths (Christian, Judaist and Muslim) and seen them interpreting their "holy" books into scientific concepts. I've seen how they contradict both Science and their own Religion. I've seen how they modify Science to work to their liking and how they modify their Religion to work to the this-worldly necessity that is Science. In both of situations they were modifying these rigid bodies not to match them honestly but to explain for their actions, to make excuse for what they would anyway do.

Again you describe "uncertainty" instead of "Uncertainty". This is not fitting, as my argument is against your belief in "Uncertainty".

Your "uncertainty" doesn't allow to see the inconsistencies in "uncertainty" itself but Uncertainty does even encourage one into looking at the inconsistency, the paradox that Uncertainty points at.

What I described required this condition and this condition is peculiar to Uncertainty and can't be satisfied with "uncertainty."

Then you agree with me?

Conditionally yes. If you, too, think that Uncertainty challenges the generalizations and not the particulars because particulars are challenged naturally.

Until you can prove to me that this reasoning system (Uncertainty) can even exist, I will keep on repeating myself: If it doesn't allow or disallow anything, then it is unusable.

Unusable for what use? And why do you want to "use" everything?

It's obviously unknown, the point is in getting to know it, isn't it?

No. By the nature of its facets, it can't be known but it can be guessed at. Every two guesses are equally creditable .

One cannot even take it for granted that they should review their thoughts, under the framework of Uncertainty.

One needn't take that for granted. One will naturally be continuously reviewing one's thoughts to find out where this Uncertainty comes from and why one's is Uncertain.

The common one.

The usual one.

The only one.

Common? Common among whom?

Usual? What's the usual definition of something? What's called usual?

Only one? Is this only one the only one written in history books or in cultural sediments or the only one advertised by governments? Viewed from whose point of view, from Blue Whales' point of view?

I don't really consider it a double-edged sword. I consider it to have only one edge, and it's the one that pierces through whoever tries to use it.

I saw it flashing past me then I saw nothing. It's double-edged for it first challenges everything else then itself, it first pierces all other stances then itself.

In my post, or in general use?

Neither. In your opinion.

Any measure that you choose. It is you that was assigned to prove the inapplicability of my premises, so it is you who decides what is and is not applicable. If I disagree with your definition of applicability, then I will argue that point later.

My measures? I can make bizarre requests. Well, only those ideas are applicable that their written form is made up of 10,000 words each containing exactly 10 letters. By this measure, no idea is applicable.

Please explain. What terms did I use, and which ones should I have used instead?

You said:

It just doesn't change the fact that "practicality", by definition, is just something's usefulness in practice. Thus, people can have different ideas of what is "practical", but if they actually try their ideas out, they may (not necessarily, but likely) find that it is not really useful in practice.

Where I think the terms:

00. Fact
01. Definition (you say by "definition" like there is "the" definition, a solemn one that is common among all beings)
02. Usefulness and/or Use
03. Practice
04. Actuality (referred to by the adverb "actually")

are unclear in the context of their containing sentences. I don't suggest any words in place of them, but I suggest we use them after we've made a common definition of them.

 

[heusdens]

I think that the statement "I think, therefore I am" tells a different story as is stated above.

I think the statement is about telling a relationship between "thinking" and "being". The statement just says that "thinking" implies "being". The reverse statement however ("I am, therefore I think") is not necesseraliy true, which does not contradict the fact that if Descartes says it, or anyone else, it is nevertheless true.

Being is not reserved for the entities that think. A rock "is". But nowhere this implies that therefore the rock also "thinks".

When thinking about being, I could in principle doubt my being. But that would deny the fact that in any case I think. Because I know I think, it necessitates me to assume also I exist.

The main proposition therefore is:

~P -> ~Q

where P stand for "being" and Q stands for "thinking"

The proposition claims that non-being implies non-thinking. It does not however claim that non-thinking implies non-being, or that being implies thinking.

If the it is stated that Q is true ("I think") the argument is then that P also must be true ("I am").

As we can see, this makes logical sense. If we assume that "non-being" impies "non-thinking", and we can state that there is thinking, this implies that there is being.

Hence: I think, therefore I am.

 

[Mentat]

How's it going, Manuel?

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
That P([beep]) was a generalization. I used it to prove that incompatibility case for all statements of the form "I [beep] therefore I am" ("I think therefore I am," "I eat therefore I am," "I want therefore I am," etc). Instead of using the specific verb, "think," I used a non-specific variable [beep]. You could say whatever verb in place of [beep] (for example "I discuss therefore I am") and P([beep]) would be a statement like "there need be an I to [beep]" (means, for example, "there need be an I to discuss").

Yes, I know. I was referring to the time when you started to talk about P[bleep] reasoning in the term of functions (like f(x)), and you said that you need not substitute an entity for "P".

Remember you claimed that one can't be thinking if one's not being. The function P([beep])'s value for [beep] = "think" is "there need be an I to think." P([beep]) is the generalization of your premise that thinking (or [beep]ing) and being are firmly bound. There's a reason for my using P([beep]). I took your premise (and generalized it, an action that complicated the matter), then I showed, during that proof, that your premise by which you claim the truth for Descartes' statement leads to a loop along with the same Descartes' statement. This was the loop case in that proof where I said if P = T and Q = T then we'll have a loop. And then I showed even if you put away your premise (eg, you say P = F) and we get P = F and Q = T you won't get much out of it because that would be a paradox. This was the paradox case.

Yes, I understood this as well.

With or without P([beep]), it's clear that statements of form (Q => Q) are ever-true and that they "can't" be used to deduce the truth of Q itself. Take a look at this new formulation of the same proof, perhaps this one works for you.

Well, first I have to point out that Descartes was not trying to deduce the truth of Q, when he made the statement, he was just proving the Evil Demon's attempt to be in vain.

You repeated many times that "if there wasn't an I, who could be thinking?" Let's have your word and say that "thinking" is the "undeniable" companion of "being." Saying this necessitates that "I think" be logically equivalent to "I am."

Descartes' statement is "I think therefore I am." Take "I think" and name it R. Take "I am" and name it Q. Descartes' statement can be expressed as (R => Q). Since R = Q (thinking is always the companion of being), we can always substitute Q with R so (R => Q) becomes (Q => Q). This (Q => Q) is an equivalent of Descartes' statement, (R => Q), by your premise that thinking and being are firmly bound. We know that any statement of form (Q => Q) is ever-true and the truth of Q itself (Q being "I am") can't be deduced from it. This is a non-informative case, a loop. You can't say if Q is T or F (eg, if you exist or not) by knowing that (Q => Q) is true.

It's worth noting that the equivalence of (R => Q) and (Q => Q) was taken from your premise. If you decide to put aside the firm bond between thinking and being then such equivalence can't be claimed and we have a (R => Q) which deduces Q's truth from R's truth like many other plain statements. However, in putting aside the firm bond between thinking (eg, "I think" which is R) and being (eg, "I am" which is Q) you've already accepted that Q's truth is irrelevant to R's truth and deducing Q's truth from R's truth isn't allowed. This is a self-contrary case, a paradox. You can't say R indicates Q when you've previously stated that R and Q are independent (eg, aren't bound).

You are mostly right about all of this. One thing to keep in mind, R does not equal Q, but rather contains Q as a sub-premise. The difference is that R's truth necessitates that Q be true, but Q can be true without R.

Back to Evil Demon scenario, we have the Evil Demon claiming there's no Rene Descartes and Descartes claiming there is indeed a Rene Descartes by deducing from his ability to think of this scenario. Descartes is saying Q (eg, that "he is") is T because he's thinking of an Evil Demon scenario and from his thinking, his being can be directly derived, that (R => Q). Descartes is saying R = Q (eg, one's being can be derived from one's ability to think) and that (R => Q). The loop case happens here: (R => Q) can be turned to (Q => Q) and then Evil Demon can turn back to Descartes and tell him that from (Q => Q)'s truth (from "I think therefore I am"'s truth) Q's truth can't be derived without making a loop and violating the rules of game which are the boundaries of Boolean logic.

Incorrect. The Demon is the one that tried to convince an existent entity that he didn't exist, so it is the Demon that is at fault. Descartes would not tell the Demon "I think therefore I am", but would, rather, say "I can think about what you are trying to convince me of, therefore you are defeating your own purpose".

Something to remember about Descartes (I've read a few of his works now) is that he often starts with a statement or concludes with a statement, but the statement doesn't even need to make sense outside of it's context. He gives the context at some point, and the statement should be evaluated only within the framework of the context.

For those who invented and developed it didn't like what wasn't "productive" and "practical" based on "their" understanding of "practice" and "production."

Searching for non-informative statements you won't find any but those statements that are inherently paradoxical and/or self-referenced. A statement is a sentence that can be assigned a "state" (in case of Boolean logic, either of T and F states). If a statement can be assigned a definite state then it's informative for it surely tells us something about something. There remain those statements which can't be assigned a definite state, these can only be of the above categories and because of their indefiniteness are non-informative.

Well this makes sense. However, Descartes' was making the statement within a context that allowed it to be relevant. It was the conclusion of an entire "lesson", so to speak.

He started out with the Evil Demon, trying to convince Descartes that all of the things that he believed were false. Then the Evil Demon went on to try to convince Descartes that he didn't exist. But Descartes came back at him by (basically) saying that the fact that the Demon is making an effort to convince him (Descartes) that he didn't exist, and the fact that Descartes could think about not existing, proved that Descartes did (in fact) exist. At the end of it, Descartes compacted this reasoning into "I think therefore I am".

No, that wasn't a new context. I was only saying that "I was born 15 years ago" doesn't directly result in "I am 15." Hence, an "I was born 15 years ago therefore I am 15" can't be equaled to an "I am 15 therefore I am 15."

Look at the statement "I was born fifteen years ago": One of it's sub-premises is "I was born", and another is "it's been fifteen years since then".

Thus, the second statement of "I was born fifteen years ago, therefore I am 15" (let's call it Q') is one of the sub-premises of the first statement (P'). This is the same situation as "I think therefore I am", as I have shown before.

Even in the case you talk of 15 subjective years, those auxiliary statements (eg, those that must accompany "I was born 15 years ago" to get "I am 15") are present. Now they solemnly declare that there's a distinction between subjectivity and objectivity. Or they may declare Special Relativity and time dilation. Nonetheless, there should be some statements additional to "I was born 15 years ago" to deduce "I was 15." Your statement is of form (R => Q), R and Q being convertible to each other only under special circumstances, thus it isn't of form (Q => Q).

And neither is "I think therefore I am", as I've shown above.

Response continued on the next post...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
What happens after I realize Uncertainty's paradoxical nature? I know that its premise has no definite state and can be rejected while it is accepted.

No, a paradoxical state is also definite. It is the state of "damned if you do, damned if you don't", so to speak, and doesn't allow you to choose either to reject or to accept.

Truth or falsity aren't of the properties of knowledge bodies; they're states defined "within" knowledge bodies. Uncertainty doesn't determine "truth," it determines "attributes."

But each "attribute" is seen as either being true or false.

I really apologize, but I must go now. I will finish my response later.

P.S. Please wait for the rest of my response, before responding .

 

[wimms]

"I can think only if I exist"

Premises:
1. to think, i must have intelligence
2. to have intelligence, i must have brain
3. to have brain, i must exist in one way or other

I think - is evidence, not reason or cause. its observable. true

if I exist = true
if I have brain = true
if I have intelligence = true
then I am thinking = true

negating any of above without negating conclusion invalidates logic.
invalidating of any of above will lead to invalid reasoning, or basically that answer is undefined and above inference cannot be used for reasoning

Thus, if you observe thinking, then it falls out that all of the above MUST be true.

if I exist = false
then I am thinking = false

if I exist = unknown
then I am thinking = unknown, maybe true, maybe false

not that this prooves you can't know if you exist, but that if your existence is undefined, then this reasoning is invalid. It cannot be used to inquire new information or check validity of claims.

if I exist = true
if I have brain = false
if I have intelligence = false (because of premise 2)
then I am thinking = false

if I exist = true
if I have brain = invalid
if I have intelligence = unknown
then I am thinking = invalid

if I exist = true
if I have brain = true
if I have intelligence = false
then I am thinking = false

Observation: there exists only 1 valid logical reasoning that yields statement I am thinking = true. And it is only when all of premises are both defined and true. Therefore we can safely backtrace and claim that if evidence supports that we are thinking, then all of the above must be true. There are no other valid cases.

Therefore, it is impossible to convince one into 'thinking' that he 'does not exist'.

Descartes was right.

Manuel is pointing out that logical reasoning is broken when encountering invalid premises. This means that conclusion of such reasoning cannot be used in further reasonings as premise, even though reasoning line itself is perfectly logical.
When premise's truth is unknown as is awfully often, then same long chain of reasoning can produce any of unknown, false, true, invalid, depending just on combination of truthness of premises and complexity of reasoning chain.

Thats the reason why circular reasoning is banned strongly, its truthness is undefined. Its easy when Q=>Q and that's not problem. Much worse is when such circular reference is hidden inside long chain of reasoning. When such circular reasoning is found, its usually evidence of confusing between anteriority and posteriority of statements and must be rearranged. This can be both killer and fruitful in finding more fundamental things.

Any theory depends of premises that cannot be proved. Because depending on these premises whole theory can go south, they are postulated true. Thats it, the rest is to find out how far you can get without hitting contradictions and complying with observable evidence.

So there are 3 components: premises -> internal consistency -> conclusions (testable).
When someone says 'this is logical' then only 'internal consistency' is implied.

One can only proove one thing: from this bunch of premises there exists internally consistent path to that bunch of conclusions. Nothing else. One cannot proove premises or that conclusions are true, their truthness depends on premises.

What Manuel seems to imply with Uncertainty is that you can never be completely sure that your premises are true. Similarily you can never be completely sure in your conclusions. You can only be sure in internal consistency. Postulates are arbitrary choices made under influence of beliefs.

Descartes just showed that given true observable and internally consistent reasoning there can be only one premise that can lead to thinking: to exist.

So at times it seems one can 'proove' premises by means of evidence. But quite often such 'proof' is illusion, there may exist other internally consistent reasoning that leads to opposite conclusions. This just tells that one must never be imagining that he has solid ground to start from, that this solid ground has been proved by evidence shouldn't get dogmatic.

Logical reasoning has no start and no end, its just endless swamp.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Here's an example. We can use aerial photos and telemetry to understand the geomorphology of Sierra Nevada. We can use the same methods to understand the geomorphology of Rockies. A geomorphologic assessment will determine the "attributes" of these terrains. Sierra Nevada will be seen with much more discontinuities than Rockies. Whether or not discontinuities are "good" or "bad" isn't a matter of geomorphology's interest; it's up to the inhabitants of these terrains to honor or lower the discontinuities of their land.

In analogy, Uncertainty isn't interested in finding out the "truth" (it would be biased if it was interested in truth which requires much debate before it can be defined), it will only reveal the attributes of knowledge bodies, for example if one specific knowledge body is consistent (or if is has whatever attribute) or not. It's up to the inhabitants of that knowledge body to decide if they like consistency (or any other attribute) or not. For example, those who live within Science like to see it consistent with observations while those who live within a Religion like to see their observations consistent with their Religion.

Nice analogy. Think of this, the arieal photos cannot be used to analyze the camera, can they? Apply that to Uncertainty (in analogy), and you'll see my point.

I wasn't talking about Gödel’s theorem or Russell’s paradox. Knowledge isn't a system for learning but this has nothing to do with its being studied. I was only asking if a study of knowledge, or rather gathering knowledge about knowledge, doesn't give rise to new problems.

Why would it?

That's a repetition of my own question. If I ask "what's the nature of knowledge?" two possibilities are faced:

00. I know about the nature of knowledge, or the nature of my knowledge is contained in it. If so, why could I be asking this question?

01. I don't know about the nature of knowledge, or the knowledge of the nature of knowledge isn't contained in the knowledge. One part of the knowledge lies outside itself, so it can never be accessed.

I don't understand point "00". Please explain it, and the I will respond.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
I have another definition of a "border," that's where one realm ends and another starts, a virtual line that inhabitants of one realm would pass in order to get to the other realm.

But does this line not exist on both sides of it, like I said?

Suppose I'm a rational thinker. I start sorting out things rationally. I go on and on but then isn't there a limit to this task? I think there is. Whenever I, being a rational thinker, face Paradox, Self-reference and Uncertainty I go back and change my way in order to remain rational. If I went on my way I would've become irrational. I can pass these "borders" to go back and forth between these two realms.

Not really. As I see it, a (defined) border is a rational concept, and cannot exist on the irrational side. Once you get to "irrational", you lose track of all rational concepts, including the border, or what's on the other side.

Does Bible include an interpretation of the symbolism used in Genesis?

Yes, for all practical purposes. Besides, the only symoblism I can think of (in the Creation account of Genesis) is the use of the word "days" - and this is easily resolved with an understanding of the Hebrew term, rendered "day" in English.

Does it say how to understand what "the throne of God" is?

Yes, it is symbolic of His authority, and His right to rule - much like His having a "white beard" is symbolic of His wisdom, because that was the common-place opinion in the past (age = wisdom).

Does it say how to explain for Eve being second to Adam?

Common sense dictates that He wanted to try it (creating a human) out once, before making his masterpiece . (Or, He just didn't want someone telling Him how to do the job ).

Seriously, it was to demonstrate the head-ship arrangement, as explained later in the letter to the Colossians (by the apostle Paul).

Manuel, we should drop the religious discussion now. This isn't the thread, or the Forum, for it. Can we agree on that, please?

Your "uncertainty" doesn't allow to see the inconsistencies in "uncertainty" itself but Uncertainty does even encourage one into looking at the inconsistency, the paradox that Uncertainty points at.

"uncertainty" is not inconsistent, merely lacking (like any other knowledge body). Uncertainty, OTOH, is inconsistent, and thus there is no reason to study it any further, because all you are going to get is further knowledge about why it is inwardly inconsistent, and thus outwardly unusable.

What I described required this condition and this condition is peculiar to Uncertainty and can't be satisfied with "uncertainty."
Conditionally yes. If you, too, think that Uncertainty challenges the generalizations and not the particulars because particulars are challenged naturally.

I don't understand this, can you please explain what you mean?

Unusable for what use? And why do you want to "use" everything?

Open foot and insert mouth, Manuel (no offense). You are the one who came up with reasons why Uncertainty was "fair" and "helpful". This was your attempt to make it appear usuable.

No. By the nature of its facets, it can't be known but it can be guessed at. Every two guesses are equally creditable .

Every two usable guesses are equally creditable.

One needn't take that for granted. One will naturally be continuously reviewing one's thoughts to find out where this Uncertainty comes from and why one's is Uncertain.

Don't you get it? One will only continue to examine this after having taken Uncertainty's premise for granted.

Common? Common among whom?

Humans.

Usual? What's the usual definition of something? What's called usual?

Usual things. Things that are common.

Only one? Is this only one the only one written in history books or in cultural sediments or the only one advertised by governments?

Probably both.

I saw it flashing past me then I saw nothing. It's double-edged for it first challenges everything else then itself, it first pierces all other stances then itself.

Who assigns this order to it? If it has an order in which to challenge things, then it contradicts it's own premise of taking nothing (including such an order as you have posted here) for granted.

Neither. In your opinion.

Ok, practical is "useful when put into practice"; and useful is "able to be used".

My measures? I can make bizarre requests. Well, only those ideas are applicable that their written form is made up of 10,000 words each containing exactly 10 letters. By this measure, no idea is applicable.

By this post alone, one can see that you are stuck on the "irrational" side of the border.

You said:Where I think the terms:

00. Fact
01. Definition (you say by "definition" like there is "the" definition, a solemn one that is common among all beings)
02. Usefulness and/or Use
03. Practice
04. Actuality (referred to by the adverb "actually")

are unclear in the context of their containing sentences. I don't suggest any words in place of them, but I suggest we use them after we've made a common definition of them.

Fact: Something that is demonstrably, and unquestionably true. You don't have to agree that such a thing exists, but can we agree that that is it's definition?

Definition: Something assigned to the ink mark/electrically produced symbol/audible noise, produced by the mouth/or any other form of communicating "words", which gives the word meaning.

Actuality: Reality, being factual in nature.

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

Greetz,

1. For wimms:

Thanks for your help. You said much more than, I think, I could've said.

2. For Mentat:

How's it going, Manuel?

I have a cold and I'm having a feverish time but I can take it, or make it, with Uncertainty .

Well, first I have to point out that Descartes was not trying to deduce the truth of Q, when he made the statement, he was just proving the Evil Demon's attempt to be in vain.

Q is "I am." To show the Evil Demon's attempt was in vain, Descartes must have been able to prove that Q was true, that "he was." Otherwise, the Evil Demon's attempt could be considered successful. If he wasn't trying to prove that "he was," it's been him who's worked out of context. For the Evil Demon had only claimed that "he wasn't."

One thing to keep in mind, R does not equal Q, but rather contains Q as a sub-premise. The difference is that R's truth necessitates that Q be true, but Q can be true without R.

Notice that the equality sign "=" used there meant "logical equivalence" and not "literal equivalence." If two statements always have the same state (like R and Q, because by your premise R's truth means Q's truth and vice versa) they are "logically equivalent" and each of them can be replaced with the other at any time.

The equality sign used in symbolic logic for logical equivalence of statements is a set of three horizontal lines put on top of each other, like a numerical equality sign (the "=," I mean) plus one other horizontal line. I couldn't find this symbol among PF symbols so I used "=" in place of it.

... Descartes would not tell the Demon "I think therefore I am", but would, rather, say "I can think about what you are trying to convince me of, therefore you are defeating your own purpose".

And the Demon could tell him that by his premise that is the firm bond between "thinking" and "being" he has made loop in saying "I think about your attempts therefore I am and you've defeated your own purpose."

Descartes attacks the Demon with his rigorous Aristotelian logic but the Demon (at least, this Demon that I am) knows that logic has its own rules and the rules can be used to show Descartes that he has violated his own logic by making a premise that necessitates a self-reference.

Many centuries ago (even before Descartes, I think) there was a proof for a God. Many Religions and religious people refer to God as "the being whose being is necessary." You see, they've made up a statement that is "God is therefore God is." Some monk proved God this way: "if God is the one whose being is necessary then the God is necessarily there." The monk later interpreted this God as the Christian God and lived a life of relieved faith; the monk had proved God, at last.

You can always define a being whose being is part of the being's definition, for example you can say "a green Ostrich is a being that is." By this definition, the being of a "green Ostrich" can never be logically denied. Since you can make countless definitions of this form at will, you can fill the Universe with countless beings who can never be logically proven non-existent. After all, they all "are," by definition.

The monk made two mistakes. The first and the easier one to detect, is to interpret that "being that is" as the Christian God. The monk could define as many "being that is" beings as he wished but he couldn't tell of what nature they were or even if these beings could interact with this Universe or not. The being's being could be defined but its attributes had to be "investigated" and such investigation wasn't possible because the being didn't seem to have any tendency to show up around human inhabited places.

The second mistake was to include a being's being in its definition. Immanuel Kant (or some other philosopher, I'm not sure) later forbid this form of definition (in the boundaries of Aristotelian logic, of course). Such definitions were "impractical" and "unproductive" to the inventors and developers of Aristotelian logic.

Descartes' "I am therefore I am," is of the same nature. Descartes wanted to show that logical validity of this deduction can do in place of the validity of its premises. This act is logically forbidden by forbidding loops. His manner of using an "undeniable" indication of his being, which was "thinking," led him into making a loop with two elements that were "being" and "thinking." If "being" and "thinking" are so firmly bound that "thinking" can be an undeniable indication of being then "being" and "thinking" are the same thing and deducing "being" from "thinking" is like deducing a statement's truth from itself. It's a loop.

Something to remember about Descartes (I've read a few of his works now) is that he often starts with a statement or concludes with a statement, but the statement doesn't even need to make sense outside of it's context. He gives the context at some point, and the statement should be evaluated only within the framework of the context.

I don't think I understand this well. The only context I can see is Descartes' conversation with the Demon.

The Demon says that Descartes "isn't there" and Descartes says the "he's indeed there." They are discussing the matter logically and have opposing opinions. One of these opinions can come out as the result of their debate, the one that's logically proven right or the one whose opponent is proven logically wrong. If either of these opinions, that of Descartes' or that of Demon's, has a logical fault inside then it's considered logically wrong so it's opposition is right. This is another limitation imposed by Aristotelian logic: it says "that which isn't right, is wrong."

Discussion about context is a new aspect of philosophical debates, compared to Aristotelian logic. Contextual conclusions can include uncertainties of many forms while Aristotelian logic allows for absolutely no uncertainty. It judges everything the harsh way, everything is either true of false. That's the reason why multi-value logic and later fuzzy logic were invented.

However, Descartes' was making the statement within a context that allowed it to be relevant. It was the conclusion of an entire "lesson", so to speak.

A statement's validity is context-dependent. For example, "there's an intangible being right under my bed" is valid within a philosophical debate while it isn't valid within a scientific debate; there it's just out of context.

A statement's truth, on the other hand, isn't context-dependent. The statement "there's an intangible being right under my bed" is one calling for investigation of some being and its truth value can "always" be determined by investigation of its premises under the regulations of the logical system chosen for this investigation. Or the statement can be postulated and used for the formation of a new axiomatic construct. For Philosophy, there can "always" be countless intangible being right under everyone's bed.

Descartes' statement, being a statement and being discussed under the rule of Boolean logic, "must" be assigned a definite state that will remain with it all the time. The Evil Demon scenario makes a context in which this statement becomes valid but this statement's truth won't be limited to that context. Its truth can and should always be questioned until a proof or disproof (within the bounds the logical system it’s associated with) is found for it.

Look at the statement "I was born fifteen years ago": One of it's sub-premises is "I was born", and another is "it's been fifteen years since then".

Thus, the second statement of "I was born fifteen years ago, therefore I am 15" (let's call it Q') is one of the sub-premises of the first statement (P'). This is the same situation as "I think therefore I am", as I have shown before.

The point is that "it's been fifteen years since then" isn't the logical equivalent to "I am 15."

"I am 15" is a statement about the chronology of a biological phenomenon (that's "you"). It means, "15 solar years have been past after the turnover that was my birth." For this statement to be true there need be other statements than your "it's been fifteen years since then." There need be the truth of a statement like "and I have never been in a time machine" to deduce

Symbolically expressed we have (P ^ R) => Q which isn't a loop.


P: I've seen 15 years passing by.
Q: I am fifteen.
R: I haven't experienced any time distortions.

Truth table for (P ^ R) => Q

P-------Q-------R-------(P ^ R)-------(P ^ R) => Q
T-------T-------T----------T----------T
T-------T-------F----------F----------T
T-------F-------T----------T----------F
F-------T-------T----------F----------T
T-------F-------F----------F----------T <-
F-------T-------F----------F----------T
F-------F-------T----------F----------T
F-------F-------F----------F----------T

This truth table has 8 rows (2 raised to the power of 3), for all possible combinations of P, Q and R.

(P ^ R) => Q isn't an ever-true statement so it's surely not a loop. Ever-true-ness is a characteristic of all loops.

As seen on the table (P ^ R) => Q deduction is T in 7 cases out of 8 while Q (whose truth is the desirable result, that you're 15) can be F in 3 scenarios without any problems in your deduction. (P ^ R) => Q which is a logical deduction can be valid and true while your desired result Q is valid and false.

With a look at the line marked with "<-" you can see the scenario I proposed. You're born 15 years ago (P = T) but you've experienced a time distortion (R = F), so you aren't 15 (Q = F); and this is a valid and true deduction (for ((P ^ R) => Q) = T).

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous post

By the way, suppose this "I was born 15 years ago therefore I am fifteen" is really an "I am 15 therefore I am 15." If you're right in that supposition then you have another loop at hand, nothing more. What's the point in finding another loop?

And neither is "I think therefore I am", as I've shown above.

Neither of which you mean?

No, a paradoxical state is also definite. It is the state of "damned if you do, damned if you don't", so to speak, and doesn't allow you to choose either to reject or to accept.

Let's see the bright side of it: "blessed if you do, blessed if you don't." It's much fairer than "blessed if you do, damned if you don't" or "damned if you do, blessed if you don't." For it incorporates the "Hypothesis of Damnation and Blessing Equality" .

Quoting Lao-tzu from Tao-te Ching (James Legge’s translation):

13. 1. Favour and disgrace would seem equally to be feared; honour and great calamity, to be regarded as personal conditions (of the same kind).

2. What is meant by speaking thus of favour and disgrace? Disgrace is being in a low position (after the enjoyment of favour). The getting that (favour) leads to the apprehension (of losing it), and the losing it leads to the fear of (still greater calamity):--this is what is meant by saying that favour and disgrace would seem equally to be feared.

And what is meant by saying that honour and great calamity are to be (similarly) regarded as personal conditions? What makes me liable to great calamity is my having the body (which I call myself); if I had not the body, what great calamity could come to me?

3. Therefore he who would administer the kingdom, honouring it as he honours his own person, may be employed to govern it, and he who would administer it with the love which he bears to his own person may be entrusted with it.

But each "attribute" is seen as either being true or false.

This is a different story. Attributes themselves may be attributed some states, such as T/F. Uncertainty may be right/wrong in reporting an inconsistency or consistency in a knowledge body but the inconsistency attribute itself has no truth/falsity.

We have a database with data records like this:

Knowledge Body ~~ Consistency/Inconsistency Data
KB1---------------Consistent
KB2---------------Inconsistent
KB3---------------Inconsistent<-wrong data record, KB3 is consistent
KB4---------------Consistent
.
.
.
KBn---------------Inconsistent


Now, each of data records may contain wrong data but the contained data itself isn't about rightness/wrongness.

In that geomorphology example, we could have some topographic maps of the studied terrains. These maps might report wrong height values but height values themselves aren't about rightness/wrongness. Height values are chosen over an arbitrary range of real numbers and no real number is true/false (eg, 666.13 isn't true/false).

Nice analogy. Think of this, the arieal photos cannot be used to analyze the camera, can they? Apply that to Uncertainty (in analogy), and you'll see my point.

Well-thought extension to analogy .

That's a good question. Your "uncertainty" basically prohibits doubting its own premise(s) in order to avoid paradox. It tells one: "there's no point in trying to see a camera through the same camera." Uncertainty responds: "I know, but let's give it a try or at least pretend we're trying." By giving this "hint" of the situation it informs one of the aspects of one's situation. Your "uncertainty," on the other hand, hides away this basic piece of knowledge. If you explain Uncertainty to someone, that someone will be challenged in all aspects of her/his knowledge while if you explain "uncertainty," that someone will only be given another set of premises that challenges everything but itself and doesn't contain the basic rule of fairness: "challenge everything even yourself."

We could achieve absolute fairness if we could see a camera through the same camera, if we could analyze our premises without being committed to some premises. This isn't achievable, so absolute fairness isn't achievable. Relative fairness is in that you, at least, try "in vain" to view the camera through the same camera. It would be "in vain" but has a "hint" at one's desire of fairness. Without this "hint," it's easy to forget one's own desire.

In case of existence, it isn't logically provable or, at least, yet logically proven. That's where a form of uncertainty comes in. No one can indulge in playing with one's existence for too long but turning the existence into "a solid statement" is problematic. One breaks the rules of game by that action; a new game is created but this new game is blind and unfair. Existence would better be kept as a sort of "I know it, you know it, they know it, but I won't tell." Otherwise, the long debate is started over, possibly going through the same stages of development and experiencing the same downfall which spoils both existence and non-existence.

Why would it?

Because of the situation faced after asking "what's the nature of knowledge?" Nonetheless, such problems are still in question; I'm asking not negating/affirming.

00. I know about the nature of knowledge, or the nature of my knowledge is contained in it. If so, why could I be asking this question?

I don't understand point "00". Please explain it, and the I will respond.

For every piece of possible knowledge, either of the two states can be assumed:

00. It's contained in your knowledge (you know it).
01. It isn't contained in your knowledge (you don't know it).

Suppose you asked "what's the nature of knowledge?" (or similarly, "what're the limits of knowledge?" or any other questions concerned with knowing the knowledge itself). The answer to that question would be a possible piece of knowledge, for which either of the above states can be assumed:

00. The answer is contained in your knowledge, or your knowledge contains the knowledge of its own nature (you know the answer). If so, why could you be asking the question?

01. The answer isn't contained in your knowledge, or your knowledge doesn't contain the knowledge about its own nature (you don't know the answer). If so, the answer would be unreachable because this piece of possible knowledge lies totally outside your current knowledge and there's no way to get to something that lies totally outside itself (for the knowledge of the knowledge is some knowledge itself).

But does this line not exist on both sides of it, like I said?

Does the equator exist on both Northern and Southern hemispheres? Equator is a virtual line of zero thickness. What gives meaning to this virtual line is its function: it divides.

Uncertainty, Paradox and Self-reference are virtual lines. They don't exist on no side (in fact, on the irrational side existence itself can be a varying concept) but they function like borders: they divide.

Not really. As I see it, a (defined) border is a rational concept, and cannot exist on the irrational side. Once you get to "irrational", you lose track of all rational concepts, including the border, or what's on the other side.

See above. And irrationality doesn't have to do with "losing track of everything." One "needn't" keep track of anything when one's irrational but one may "like" to keep track of things and that liking works on both sides, rational and irrational.

Rationalization itself is a subset of irrationality. What's the rationale behind rationalization?

Yes, for all practical purposes. Besides, the only symoblism I can think of (in the Creation account of Genesis) is the use of the word "days" - and this is easily resolved with an understanding of the Hebrew term, rendered "day" in English.

It wasn't me who said Bible is symbolic. If Genesis isn't symbolic, then it's meant literally and if it's meant literally it's in contradiction to scientific Cosmogony.

Manuel, we should drop the religious discussion now. This isn't the thread, or the Forum, for it. Can we agree on that, please?

Yes. I won't make any other comments on that subject. However, it wasn't a religious discussion, it was one about two incompatible knowledge bodies as examples.

Manuel_Silvio: Your "uncertainty" doesn't allow to see the inconsistencies in "uncertainty" itself but Uncertainty does even encourage one into looking at the inconsistency, the paradox that Uncertainty points at.

Mentat: "uncertainty" is not inconsistent, merely lacking (like any other knowledge body). Uncertainty, OTOH, is inconsistent, and thus there is no reason to study it any further, because all you are going to get is further knowledge about why it is inwardly inconsistent, and thus outwardly unusable.

I didn't say "uncertainty" is inconsistent even though it is. I was referring to the inconsistency (or the paradox) of "fair" observer.

Uncertainty contains a hint of that paradox while "uncertainty" doesn't. And I think this hint would better be present but there's no necessity and that's why I personally "like" Uncertainty more than "uncertainty" but use "uncertainty" (or rather a form of certainty) in my everyday life.

I've studied Uncertainty and I've learned much. It wasn't unusable in my experience. Even if it's unusable, it's the "fairest." Suppose you (and all humanity) have tried to study human situation but have come to a possible dead-end. Close your eyes to the dead-end and you're stuck in a deadlock. Open your eyes and you'll possibly find some way out.

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous post

1. What I described required this condition and this condition is peculiar to Uncertainty and can't be satisfied with "uncertainty."

2. Conditionally yes. If you, too, think that Uncertainty challenges the generalizations and not the particulars because particulars are challenged naturally.

I don't understand this, can you please explain what you mean?

1 and 2 are separate. The condition called for in 1 isn't the one talked about in 2.

In case 1, the condition is that any system of thoughts one chooses after the realization of "fair" observer's paradox would better have a hint of that very basic paradox. Uncertainty satisfies this condition while "uncertainty" doesn't.

In case 2, the condition is that you put away discussion of particulars of scientific Universe and challenge its generalizations, its methodology for example. You've already satisfied this condition by not talking of measurement of light speed but talking of Science's generalizations.

Open foot and insert mouth, Manuel (no offense). You are the one who came up with reasons why Uncertainty was "fair" and "helpful". This was your attempt to make it appear usuable.

What does that idiom mean?

I was the one who asked why you wanted to "use" something and what "use" meant.

I said it's "fair" and "helpful." You associate these with your "use."

Every two usable guesses are equally creditable.

Usable to whom? Usable for what use? What does "use" mean? Why only usable guesses?

Don't you get it? One will only continue to examine this after having taken Uncertainty's premise for granted.

And one will only realize one's paradoxical situation after having impossibly made possible the impossible.

Humans.

Usual things. Things that are common.

Probably both.

What are humans? How did you summon them all and ask their opinions?

Am I non-human in striving for something else?

What is common? Who has the right to determine what is common and what is uncommon?

Both? They were three, not two and these three have countless equally creditable substitutes. Human history isn't a solid entity sitting somewhere, it's the fluid colloid of previous representations of human interactions. What human history means, is dependent on the observer and on the context. Human history isn't the same thing for any two individuals or any two beings.

Who assigns this order to it? If it has an order in which to challenge things, then it contradicts it's own premise of taking nothing (including such an order as you have posted here) for granted.

I, for I have a step-by-step approach to Uncertainty. I won't suggest anyone dives into it in one session.

Ok, practical is "useful when put into practice"; and useful is "able to be used".

This definition introduces new terms to be defined. What does "use" mean? What does "ability" mean? What does "practice" mean?

After you'd defined these, tell me please why you've preferred those definitions of these terms over countless other definitions.

By this post alone, one can see that you are stuck on the "irrational" side of the border.

Perhaps. I guess too much of rationality will lead to irrationality, at last .

You said I can have my measures. I was free to choose my measures so I chose at will. If you have "better" measures, tell me. And then, tell me why they're "better" and what "better" means.

Fact: Something that is demonstrably, and unquestionably true. You don't have to agree that such a thing exists, but can we agree that that is it's definition?

Definition: Something assigned to the ink mark/electrically produced symbol/audible noise, produced by the mouth/or any other form of communicating "words", which gives the word meaning.

Actuality: Reality, being factual in nature.

No problem, except for "definition."

I asked you to define "the definition" and not "definition." Because you use the phrase "by definition" like there's "the definition," a definition intrinsic to and inseparable from the terms you use.

You missed out two definitions: definitions of "usable and/or use" and "practice". Will you please define these?

Note that I can almost endlessly ask for definitions of the words you use to define your words. Think about it ... are you going to grant me that right?

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
2. For Mentat:
I have a cold and I'm having a feverish time but I can take it, or make it, with Uncertainty .

Well, I hope you feel better.

Q is "I am." To show the Evil Demon's attempt was in vain, Descartes must have been able to prove that Q was true, that "he was." Otherwise, the Evil Demon's attempt could be considered successful. If he wasn't trying to prove that "he was," it's been him who's worked out of context. For the Evil Demon had only claimed that "he wasn't."

The Evil Demon claimed that who "wasn't"? Don't you see that, in claiming that "entity D" (Descartes) didn't exist, he was implying "entity D"'s existence (otherwise there would be nothing to make claims about)? Then, to top it all off, the Demon tried to convince "entity D" of something, thus showing that the Demon believed "entity D" to be capable of thinking.

Notice that the equality sign "=" used there meant "logical equivalence" and not "literal equivalence." If two statements always have the same state (like R and Q, because by your premise R's truth means Q's truth and vice versa) they are "logically equivalent" and each of them can be replaced with the other at any time.

That makes sense.

And the Demon could tell him that by his premise that is the firm bond between "thinking" and "being" he has made loop in saying "I think about your attempts therefore I am and you've defeated your own purpose."

Don't you realize that the Demon was trying to convince Descartes that he didn't exist!? This means that it is the Demon (not Descartes) that created the paradox. He was trying to convince someone that P was true, but that Q was not.

You can always define a being whose being is part of the being's definition, for example you can say "a green Ostrich is a being that is." By this definition, the being of a "green Ostrich" can never be logically denied. Since you can make countless definitions of this form at will, you can fill the Universe with countless beings who can never be logically proven non-existent. After all, they all "are," by definition.

It's really strange to me that don't realize this but...if I were to find a green Ostrich, and try to convince it that it didn't exist, I would be further validating it's existence. I have to try to convince the thing that it doesn't exist, before Descartes' reasoning can have any effect.

Descartes' statement is of the same nature...

Not exactly, but fine, you can think of it that way - I just don't see the relevance. The issue is not the self-referential nature of Descartes' statement (see above, I don't have room to re-post my reasoning here).

This act is logically forbidden by forbidding loops. His manner of using an "undeniable" indication of his being, which was "thinking," led him into making a loop with two elements that were "being" and "thinking." If "being" and "thinking" are so firmly bound that "thinking" can be an undeniable indication of being then "being" and "thinking" are the same thing and deducing "being" from "thinking" is like deducing a statement's truth from itself. It's a loop.

Actually, no, I've just realized where the difference lies, between the monk's statement and that of Descartes. The monks statement is unfalsifiable, because he has defined the words to make it so. Descartes' statement, OTOH, can be taken apart, and each of it's premises denied. Unfortunately (for the Demon) the Demon already made the mistake of assuming P's truth, and so is stuck with assuming Q's truth as well.

I don't think I understand this well. The only context I can see is Descartes' conversation with the Demon.

Yeah, that's what I was talking about - Descartes' statement has no worth, outside of the context of someone's trying to prove that someone else doesn't exist.

The Demon says that Descartes "isn't there" and Descartes says the "he's indeed there." They are discussing the matter logically and have opposing opinions. One of these opinions can come out as the result of their debate, the one that's logically proven right or the one whose opponent is proven logically wrong. If either of these opinions, that of Descartes' or that of Demon's, has a logical fault inside then it's considered logically wrong so it's opposition is right. This is another limitation imposed by Aristotelian logic: it says "that which isn't right, is wrong."

I disagree on one minor point: You omitted the fact that the discussion itself couldn't take place, if the Demon was correct.

A statement's validity is context-dependent. For example, "there's an intangible being right under my bed" is valid within a philosophical debate while it isn't valid within a scientific debate; there it's just out of context.

This is not the kind of context I was talking about (see above, as I do not have enough room to re-post).

Descartes' statement, being a statement and being discussed under the rule of Boolean logic, "must" be assigned a definite state that will remain with it all the time. The Evil Demon scenario makes a context in which this statement becomes valid but this statement's truth won't be limited to that context. Its truth can and should always be questioned until a proof or disproof (within the bounds the logical system it’s associated with) is found for it.

I disagree with your assessment of statements - at least when applied to Descartes' statements. Validity is really the only issue, as he would probably never say that "I think therefore I am" is true and not looping. He was merely pointing out the flaw in the Demon's attempt.

The point is that "it's been fifteen years since then" isn't the logical equivalent to "I am 15."

"I am 15" is a statement about the chronology of a biological phenomenon (that's "you"). It means, "15 solar years have been past after the turnover that was my birth." For this statement to be true there need be other statements than your "it's been fifteen years since then." There need be the truth of a statement like "and I have never been in a time machine" to deduce

Actually, I already took care of the "time distortion/machine" problem. I told you that I was talking about subjective years, as related to the standard (Earthling) measurement of time.

This truth table has 8 rows (2 raised to the power of 3), for all possible combinations of P, Q and R.

(P ^ R) => Q isn't an ever-true statement so it's surely not a loop. Ever-true-ness is a characteristic of all loops.

As seen on the table (P ^ R) => Q deduction is T in 7 cases out of 8 while Q (whose truth is the desirable result, that you're 15) can be F in 3 scenarios without any problems in your deduction. (P ^ R) => Q which is a logical deduction can be valid and true while your desired result Q is valid and false.

With a look at the line marked with "<-" you can see the scenario I proposed. You're born 15 years ago (P = T) but you've experienced a time distortion (R = F), so you aren't 15 (Q = F); and this is a valid and true deduction (for ((P ^ R) => Q) = T).

Well, I've already shown why "R" doesn't belong there, so reasoning on a table that includes it is not really relevant. I will read what is posted above when you explain to me why "R" belongs there.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
By the way, suppose this "I was born 15 years ago therefore I am fifteen" is really an "I am 15 therefore I am 15." If you're right in that supposition then you have another loop at hand, nothing more. What's the point in finding another loop?

I was trying to give you an example of a practical (and logically sound) statement that was non-informative (loopy). It doesn't really matter though, and we can drop it if you want to.

Mentat: And neither is "I think therefore I am", as I've shown above.

Manuel: Neither of which you mean?

Say what? I don't understand the question.

Let's see the bright side of it: "blessed if you do, blessed if you don't." It's much fairer than "blessed if you do, damned if you don't" or "damned if you do, blessed if you don't." For it incorporates the "Hypothesis of Damnation and Blessing Equality" .

Funny, but not applicable. I really mean that you are damned if you, and damned if you don't, there is no blessing to be found within the confines of unusability.

This is a different story. Attributes themselves may be attributed some states, such as T/F. Uncertainty may be right/wrong in reporting an inconsistency or consistency in a knowledge body but the inconsistency attribute itself has no truth/falsity.

We have a database with data records like this:

Knowledge Body ~~ Consistency/Inconsistency Data
KB1---------------Consistent
KB2---------------Inconsistent
KB3---------------Inconsistent<-wrong data record, KB3 is consistent
KB4---------------Consistent
.
.
.
KBn---------------Inconsistent


Now, each of data records may contain wrong data but the contained data itself isn't about rightness/wrongness.

In that geomorphology example, we could have some topographic maps of the studied terrains. These maps might report wrong height values but height values themselves aren't about rightness/wrongness. Height values are chosen over an arbitrary range of real numbers and no real number is true/false (eg, 666.13 isn't true/false).

I don't see how this answers what I said. Uncertainty doesn't allow one to assume the truth or false of any attribute. 666.13 is not an attribute (you were right about that), but 666.13ft is an attribute (of the terrain) and may be accurate or inaccurate.

Well-thought extension to analogy .

Thank you.

That's a good question. Your "uncertainty" basically prohibits doubting its own premise(s) in order to avoid paradox. It tells one: "there's no point in trying to see a camera through the same camera."

Kind of, although - actually - it allows you to doubt it's premise, but doesn't require it (as does Uncertainty).

Uncertainty responds: "I know, but let's give it a try or at least pretend we're trying."

No, Uncertainty responds: "There's no way that I'm going to take the camera for granted, I don't take anything for granted" (I know, I made it sound a little snobby, but it's how it feels to me).

Your "uncertainty," on the other hand, hides away this basic piece of knowledge. If you explain Uncertainty to someone, that someone will be challenged in all aspects of her/his knowledge while if you explain "uncertainty," that someone will only be given another set of premises that challenges everything but itself and doesn't contain the basic rule of fairness: "challenge everything even yourself."

If that is the basic rule of "fairness" then fairness = paradoxical.

We could achieve absolute fairness if we could see a camera through the same camera, if we could analyze our premises without being committed to some premises. This isn't achievable, so absolute fairness isn't achievable. Relative fairness is in that you, at least, try "in vain" to view the camera through the same camera. It would be "in vain" but has a "hint" at one's desire of fairness. Without this "hint," it's easy to forget one's own desire.

It's not about "desire" at all. Trying in vain to make the camera view itself is nothing like Uncertainty anyway, as Uncertainty demands that you both try to and not try to (can't take anything for granted, remember?).

For every piece of possible knowledge, either of the two states can be assumed:

00. It's contained in your knowledge (you know it).
01. It isn't contained in your knowledge (you don't know it).

Suppose you asked "what's the nature of knowledge?" (or similarly, "what're the limits of knowledge?" or any other questions concerned with knowing the knowledge itself). The answer to that question would be a possible piece of knowledge, for which either of the above states can be assumed:

00. The answer is contained in your knowledge, or your knowledge contains the knowledge of its own nature (you know the answer). If so, why could you be asking the question?

Well, I wouldn't be asking it, if I knew.

01. The answer isn't contained in your knowledge, or your knowledge doesn't contain the knowledge about its own nature (you don't know the answer). If so, the answer would be unreachable because this piece of possible knowledge lies totally outside your current knowledge and there's no way to get to something that lies totally outside itself (for the knowledge of the knowledge is some knowledge itself).

My current knowledge [x=] my potential knowledge.

Does the equator exist on both Northern and Southern hemispheres? Equator is a virtual line of zero thickness. What gives meaning to this virtual line is its function: it divides.

You are missing the point of my reasoning. What I'm saying is that the Equator must be distinguishable from the Hemisphere, and it must be distinguishable from either stand-point.

Uncertainty, Paradox and Self-reference are virtual lines. They don't exist on no side (in fact, on the irrational side existence itself can be a varying concept) but they function like borders: they divide.

See above.

And irrationality doesn't have to do with "losing track of everything." One "needn't" keep track of anything when one's irrational but one may "like" to keep track of things and that liking works on both sides, rational and irrational.

You can't be on both sides at the same time. You also can't distinguish "sides" when you are (fully) irrational.

Rationalization itself is a subset of irrationality. What's the rationale behind rationalization?

What are you talking about?

It wasn't me who said Bible is symbolic. If Genesis isn't symbolic, then it's meant literally and if it's meant literally it's in contradiction to scientific Cosmogony.

The Genesis account is not symbolic, just parts of it (like the use of the word "days" for example).

Yes. I won't make any other comments on that subject. However, it wasn't a religious discussion, it was one about two incompatible knowledge bodies as examples.

Good point.

I didn't say "uncertainty" is inconsistent even though it is. I was referring to the inconsistency (or the paradox) of "fair" observer.

You said: "your 'uncertainty' doesn't allow one to see it's inconsistencies in 'uncertainty' itself...

That means that it's got inconsistencies, but doesn't allow you to see them, right? That means that you did say that "uncertainty" is inconsistent.

Uncertainty contains a hint of that paradox while "uncertainty" doesn't. And I think this hint would better be present but there's no necessity and that's why I personally "like" Uncertainty more than "uncertainty" but use "uncertainty" (or rather a form of certainty) in my everyday life.

Actually, the "hint" is present only is "uncertainty" or forms fo "certainty", but it is not present in "Uncertainty" as nothing is present (you cannot take something's presence for granted) in "Uncertainty".

I've studied Uncertainty and I've learned much. It wasn't unusable in my experience.

That's because (IMO) you probably weren't using actual Uncertainty (which I don't think exists). You were using drastic uncertainty, but never Uncertainty.

Even if it's unusable, it's the "fairest."

I'm sorry, but something cannot be both unusable and fair at the same time. "Fairness" is a quality that is expressed when the system is put into use.

Suppose you (and all humanity) have tried to study human situation but have come to a possible dead-end. Close your eyes to the dead-end and you're stuck in a deadlock. Open your eyes and you'll possibly find some way out.

Only if it wasn't an actual "Dead-End" to begin with.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
1 and 2 are separate. The condition called for in 1 isn't the one talked about in 2.

In case 1, the condition is that any system of thoughts one chooses after the realization of "fair" observer's paradox would better have a hint of that very basic paradox. Uncertainty satisfies this condition while "uncertainty" doesn't.

"Uncertainty" doesn't satisfy that condition, as I've shown in the previous post.

What does that idiom mean?

Have you ever heard of "putting your foot in your mouth"? It's basically when you contradict your previous stance.

I was the one who asked why you wanted to "use" something and what "use" meant.

I said it's "fair" and "helpful." You associate these with your "use."

Yes, because nothing can be considered "fair" unless it has been shown to be so, when put into use.

Usable to whom?

Me .

Usable for what use?

Any use. "Uncertainty" has not use, because it cannot exist.

What does "use" mean?

I thought I already answered that.

Why only usable guesses?

Because I have no use for unusable guesses .

And one will only realize one's paradoxical situation after having impossibly made possible the impossible.

Was it your intent that that statement make no sense?

What are humans? How did you summon them all and ask their opinions?

I didn't have to. If you can show me that it's useful to any human, I will believe that it is "useful to humans".

Am I non-human in striving for something else?

No, you just don't realize that what you are striving for doesn't exist (no offense).

What is common?

That which occurs often.

Who has the right to determine what is common and what is uncommon?

Well, technically you gave me the right, by asking me.

Both? They were three, not two and these three have countless equally creditable substitutes.

Oops. I change my answer: probably all three.

Human history isn't a solid entity sitting somewhere, it's the fluid colloid of previous representations of human interactions. What human history means, is dependent on the observer and on the context. Human history isn't the same thing for any two individuals or any two beings.

Well that's just dead wrong, and I'll see if you can realize that without my help. (Hint: Time is one dimensional).

I, for I have a step-by-step approach to Uncertainty. I won't suggest anyone dives into it in one session.

Into what?! It doesn't exist, according to my previous reasoning, and you have yet to prove me wrong. You can avoid/ignore that point (in a purely wuliheron-ish style (no offense, wuliheron), and just keep talking about it as though it existed, but you would lose all creditability, AFAIC.

Perhaps. I guess too much of rationality will lead to irrationality, at last .

If you are looking for irrationality, then you are already there. A rational person would not spend their time looking for irrationality, but an irrational person wouldn't realize that they were irrational, and could keep looking for it.

You said I can have my measures. I was free to choose my measures so I chose at will. If you have "better" measures, tell me. And then, tell me why they're "better" and what "better" means.

Well, since you've used the word first, why don't you tell me what it means? After all, I can't be expected to answer a question about which choice is "better" if the one questioning hasn't defined what they mean by "better".

No problem, except for "definition."

I asked you to define "the definition" and not "definition." Because you use the phrase "by definition" like there's "the definition," a definition intrinsic to and inseparable from the terms you use.

That's what Langauge is: The assigning of meaning to words. Once a meaning is assigned, it's supposed to stay that way.

You missed out two definitions: definitions of "usable and/or use" and "practice". Will you please define these?

Note that I can almost endlessly ask for definitions of the words you use to define your words. Think about it ... are you going to grant me that right?

You can continue doing so, if you please, you've had that right the whole time. However, I don't see how it helps your position any, so I don't see much use in responding.

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

Well, I hope you feel better.

Thanks. I do feel better now.

... Don't you see that, in claiming that "entity D" (Descartes) didn't exist, he was implying "entity D"'s existence (otherwise there would be nothing to make claims about)? Then, to top it all off, the Demon tried to convince "entity D" of something, thus showing that the Demon believed "entity D" to be capable of thinking.

What I see as Evil Demon scenario is like this:

00. Rene Descartes is sitting by his fireplace. Satisfied by a French meal. Warmed by fire, daydreaming...
01. The Demon comes in, embodied in Aphrodite's most voluptuous figure.
02. The Demon says: "Honey, did you know you don't exist?"
03. Descartes responds: "No, I do exist, darling, for I can think of you. I think of you therefore I am."

You follow the scenario until here and conclude Demon's attempt has been in vain. How could the Demon be considered defeated if not given a chance to counter-attack?

Here's the Demon's counter-attack:

04. The Demon says: "But love, in making that conclusion you've made a loop."
05. Descartes blushes: "How then?"
06. The Demon caresses him, smiling: "You said your thinking of me is always equal to your being. So in saying that you've said you are therefore you are. You've pre-supposed your being's truth and proved it true. That's a loop and it's non-informative, my dearest!"
07. Descartes is lost in the Demon's eyes.
08. No one knows what happens hereafter but the two non-existent D entities (Descartes and the Demon) somehow make up their mind to write only the first part of scenario.

If you claim "the Demon claimed the non-existence of an existent entity," you're obviously biased towards the existence of this entity. How do you know the entity exists even before its existence is challenged? You first have to prove it exists (Q = T) and then ask the Demon how it could challenge the existence of an existing entity. One way or the other, Descartes "had to" prove Q = T to win this scenario (you know, he won in fact, but not the way you think ).

Your (Q => Q) statement is true, is ever-true for all states of Q. Whether or not your entity is, means whether or not Q is true, (Q => Q) is ever-true. Q's state remains undetermined for this scenario. In order to show whose, Descartes' or the Demon's, attempt has been "in vain," one has to show which one has been wrong. Neither of them has been right or wrong.

Descartes' basic effort to prove his existence is healthy but his later unfair conclusion that he really exists and the Demon's attempt has been in vain is neither healthy nor respectable.

This means that it is the Demon (not Descartes) that created the paradox. He was trying to convince someone that P was true, but that Q was not.

Suppose the Demon fails in proving Descartes' non-existence. Does this mean that Descartes' exists? I think not, it means Descartes is back to his state of hesitation about his existence (if he'd ever fairly doubted it). Descartes hasn't succeeded even though the Demon has failed.

... if I were to find a green Ostrich, and try to convince it that it didn't exist...

The green Ostrich isn't an example of that situation, it's an example of a being whose being is included in its definition.

The monk story is a classic example. Those definitions are forbidden and Descartes' statement "I am therefore I am" is equivalent to "I is a being that is" for I's existence is included in its definition so it's forbidden, too.

The Demon's first claim has a similar fault. Descartes and the Demon both are stating non-informative statements. Hence, Descartes' existence (the subject of their debate) remains undetermined.

... The monks statement is unfalsifiable, because he has defined the words to make it so. Descartes' statement, OTOH, can be taken apart, and each of it's premises denied...

Descartes' "I am therefore I am" isn't falsifiable, either. That's why it's non-informative. You saw it's an ever-true statement. (Q => Q) is ever-true regardless of its premises. Let its premise be true (Q = T), it's true. Let its premise be false (Q = F), it's true again.

... Descartes' statement has no worth, outside of the context of someone's trying to prove that someone else doesn't exist.

So its result, Descartes' existence, is neither valid nor true outside its context, right? Descartes can't know if he exists unless he finds someone to challenge his existence.

Descartes' statement has no worth even inside its own context. If the Demon is allowed to counter-attack, that statement will be shown inconsistent with part of the context that's compliance to Aristotelian logic.

I disagree on one minor point: You omitted the fact that the discussion itself couldn't take place, if the Demon was correct.

You insist that a non-existent entity can't discuss anything. Is that a logical obligation or an empirical pattern (using keywords from previous posts)?

The bond between an entity and a deed (which may be thinking, eating, discussing, whatever) isn't a logical obligation. It hasn't been deduced from a logical system's postulates. It isn't an abstract theorem proven from the axioms. We've observed it in scientific Universe so it's an empirical pattern.

For a statement to be undeniably true within a logical system, that statement must be proven to be logical obligation of that system and not an empirical pattern for empirical patterns are only "optimization methods" like I said. Empirical patterns such as "there must be a doer if there's a deed" aren't "proofs of truth" for statement like "there is a doer."

Moreover, if one uses an empirical pattern observed in scientific Universe one's already accepted the premises necessary for a scientific Universe to be. Those premises include one's existence. It's no great deed to feel oneself (perceive one's being) and claim that one is. The very premise for a perception to be, is the existence of the perceived and the perceiver. However, it's forbidden to take a premise for true and then prove it true. It's a loop. Hence, a bond between an entity and a deed "must" remain in scientific Universe and "must" be known to be an "empirical pattern" not a "logical obligation."

He was merely pointing out the flaw in the Demon's attempt.

So he'd better confine himself to "merely" knowing that the Demon's attempt has been in vain, not concluding that his own attempt has been successful. He had to suspend his judgment of his being for he really hadn't proven his existence. He'd "merely" pointed out a flaw in someone else's attempt while "overlooking the flaw in his own attempt."

The Demon came in because Descartes needed someone to challenge his existence in order for him to prove it but he treated his sparring partner unfairly and with unleashed bias towards his own opinion. He didn't show that he existed, he showed that claiming that he doesn't exist was illogical while he himself was making illogical statements for that purpose.

Actually, I already took care of the "time distortion/machine" problem. I told you that I was talking about subjective years, as related to the standard (Earthling) measurement of time.

Now that you're an Earthling and you're talking about subjective years are the auxiliary statements. By knowing that "you were born 15 years ago," one can't know that "you're an Earthling" and "you're talking about subjective years." So these auxiliary statements must be present in order to derive "I am 15" from "I was born 15 years ago."

I was trying to give you an example of a practical (and logically sound) statement that was non-informative (loopy). It doesn't really matter though, and we can drop it if you want to.

If it's a loop, it's "illogical." It's forbidden. It mustn't be there. I think, too, we'd better forget the thing.

Say what? I don't understand the question.

I was just kidding. I meant I'd exhausted both of your statements. Forget it, please.

Funny, but not applicable. I really mean that you are damned if you, and damned if you don't, there is no blessing to be found within the confines of unusability.

Funny, but not applicable, either. I really mean you are blessed if you do, and blessed if you don't, there's no damnation to be found within the confines of nowhere. Don't I offer a better prospect?

... Uncertainty doesn't allow one to assume the truth or false of any attribute. 666.13 is not an attribute (you were right about that), but 666.13ft is an attribute (of the terrain) and may be accurate or inaccurate.

No. The number 666.13 is a value associated with the attribute "height" (I like SI more, I don't use British units ).

Uncertainty is meant as a device (like GeoSat, for example) or a principle by which to measure the attributes of knowledge bodies (like GeoSat measures Earth's shape). Each attribute (eg, height) is assigned a value (eg, 666.13 units of length). These values may be right or wrong or accurate only to some decimal place, even though the attributes themselves have no rightness/wrongness. Aside from the rightness of a value assigned to an attribute, that attribute and its value can be honored or lowered by the inhabitants of a knowledge body. For example, those interested in Science honor consistency while those interested in Mysticism don't even mention it.

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous post

If that is the basic rule of "fairness" then fairness = paradoxical.

Well, suppose so, what then? Please tell me if you have a non-paradoxical basic rule for fairness.

No, Uncertainty responds: "There's no way that I'm going to take the camera for granted, I don't take anything for granted" (I know, I made it sound a little snobby, but it's how it feels to me).

Perhaps we're referring to the same thing under different names. If it's that way, I have to retreat some steps. Even though my discussion of Descartes' statement remains there and is independent of Uncertainty.

My current knowledge [is not equal to] my potential knowledge.

Please explain the transition from not-known to known, from potential knowledge to current knowledge.

What I'm saying is that the Equator must be distinguishable from the Hemisphere, and it must be distinguishable from either stand-point.

Equator's dictionary definition doesn't necessitate this. Equator is only a virtual line dividing Earth into Northern and Southern hemispheres and making the imaginary reference for latitude. It's only one of countless great circles on Earth's surface.

Like I said before, Paradox, Uncertainty and Self-reference make the divide between rationality and irrationality. They divide so I call them "borders." Their function is my reason for calling them "borders."

You can't be on both sides at the same time. You also can't distinguish "sides" when you are (fully) irrational.

I got a problem with your "rationality." You’re expanding its definition. If distinguishing is rationality, understanding is rationality, everything is rationality, then where's irrationality?

Silvio: Rationalization itself is a subset of irrationality. What's the rationale behind rationalization?

Mentat: What are you talking about?

Rationalization means the use of reason for explaining things, as far as I know. To rationalize an idea one has to answer all "why" questions associated with that idea.

Now we have an idea: rationalization. We're rational ones, so we want to rationalize this idea as well. There are a few "why" questions associated with rationalization two of which are:

00. Why should one rationalize ideas?
01. Why should one throw away ideas that can't be rationalized?

The answers to these "why" questions lie beyond the duty and the power of rationalization. The roots to rational explanation and the need for it lie outside the boundaries of rationalization, in a realm that isn't rational, hence, irrational. Notice, irrational doesn't mean anti-rational for anti-rational thinking is another form of methodic thinking which can be categorized as rational. Irrational means non-rational, means that which is other than ration.

You said: "your 'uncertainty' doesn't allow one to see it's inconsistencies in 'uncertainty' itself...

That means that it's got inconsistencies, but doesn't allow you to see them, right? That means that you did say that "uncertainty" is inconsistent.

That's your interpretation. My saying doesn't mean your "uncertainty" has got inconsistencies (even though it's got some), it means this "uncertainty" is unable to inspect itself. Your interpretation is wrong. Nonetheless, the problem is solved now by agreeing on that the camera (be it "uncertainty" or Uncertainty) can noway inspect itself. However, it can try to, at least.

Actually, the "hint" is present only is "uncertainty" or forms fo "certainty", but it is not present in "Uncertainty" as nothing is present (you cannot take something's presence for granted) in "Uncertainty".

Isn't the paradoxical nature of Uncertainty the clearest hint of "fair" observer's paradox?

... you probably weren't using actual Uncertainty (which I don't think exists)...

I doubted the very principle of doubting. Isn't that an implementation of Uncertainty?

... but something cannot be both unusable and fair at the same time. "Fairness" is a quality that is expressed when the system is put into use.

"Fairness" is the quality of being unbiased. A fair jury can be known by its members being put under rigorous study of their beliefs and their past. A fair stance can be known by studying the features of that stance. These features can be studied by a study of the statements associated with that stance, thus there needn't be an implementation of that stance.

The quality of being unbiased which is fairness can't be achieved. "Fairness" in your use is "absolute fairness" which has been discussed before. What Uncertainty offers is "relative fairness" that isn't being unbiased but being aware of one's biases and being ready to review them. Uncertainty implies the acceptance of the presence of biases and conscious avoidance from them.

Only if it wasn't an actual "Dead-End" to begin with.

Or if this dead-end can be an opening to new realms. Within a paradigm, dead-ends may be encountered. These dead-ends are the hallmarks of that paradigm. Study of these dead-ends reveals knowledge about the structure and function of current paradigm and gives rise to the possibility of other paradigms.

Throughout human history (this is too big a claim for me, in fact) paradigm shifts have occurred very slowly and with many sacrifices. An understanding of current paradigm can facilitate paradigm shifts. There can even be self-initiated paradigm shifts towards a desired situation.

These dead-ends are hard as concrete within their respective paradigm. They are "actual dead-ends," and tough challenges. Outside that paradigm, they may be anything. Paradigm shifts aren't as easy as moving into a new house, but they're possible and they've happened many times, to individuals and to societies.

It's basically when you contradict your previous stance.

Thanks for the explanation .

Silvio: What does "use" mean?

Mentat: I thought I already answered that.

Among the definitions I asked for were those of "use and/or useful" and "practice." You haven't defined them in your previous posts.

Because I have no use for unusable guesses.

Suppose that I understand what you mean with "use." Why do you prefer "usable" ones? Why do you prefer those that have some "use" for you? Why are you seeking "use?"

... If you can show me that it's useful to any human, I will believe that it is "useful to humans".

I didn't talk of human beings, you did. You said you meant "use" in its "common" definition and that a "common definition" is "common among human beings." I asked you how you could know all other humans' opinions.

Was it your intent that that statement make no sense?

It's worth noting that the same applies to every human statement.

Well, technically you gave me the right, by asking me.

I asked for a definition of "common." My next question was of your right over preferring this definition over other possible ones. That you accept to give a definition means you consider yourself righteous over that and I'm questioning this right.

Well that's just dead wrong, and I'll see if you can realize that without my help...

Human history is dependent on the observer, for an instance compare human history from your own point of view with human history from a Blue Whale's point of view.

Human history is dependent on the context, for an instance compare human history in the context of Archeology and human history in the context of Hegelian system of thought.

If I'm still wrong, correct me please.

Into what?! It doesn't exist, according to my previous reasoning, and you have yet to prove me wrong. You can avoid/ignore that point (in a purely wuliheron-ish style (no offense, wuliheron), and just keep talking about it as though it existed, but you would lose all creditability, AFAIC.

Into the non-existent...
You're honoring me in comparing me to Wuliheron. She/he knows he has my respect and admiration.

Try to understand the relativity of necessities and obligations. That you can't convince me doesn't necessarily mean I'm in ignorance, it may mean you're losing countless options for one option. One the most powerful motives of philosophical thought is "what if:" what if you're wrong? What if you're the one in ignorance?

I don't mean you're wrong or you're in ignorance but I think our ideas are equally creditable hence equally unreliable, like any two other ideas.

Well, since you've used the word first, why don't you tell me what it means? ...

The word "better" is used to show preference of a choice over the other. Its use is user-dependent.

Your way of treating my proposed measures was like there're other measures that you prefer to those I proposed. By asking "why do you think they're better?" I asked of the reason of your preference. By asking "what does better mean?" I asked of the nature of this preference.

That's what Langauge is: The assigning of meaning to words. Once a meaning is assigned, it's supposed to stay that way.

Please don't get into defining language, it will take another lifetime to do. We discussed this before: meaning isn't stuck to the terms. You use and refer to your own (or dictionary) definitions of terms like these meanings are intrinsic of those terms. I was reminding you that clarity in used terms is essential to a discussion. In asking you to define "the definition' of some term, I wanted to know what kind of definition has convinced you of its being intrinsic to the term it describes.

... However, I don't see how it helps your position any, so I don't see much use in responding.

You say: "throw it away for it's unusable." I want to show your term "unusable" is vague enough to give an entire spectrum of meanings to your claim.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
1. For Mentat:

What I see as Evil Demon scenario is like this:

00. Rene Descartes is sitting by his fireplace. Satisfied by a French meal. Warmed by fire, daydreaming...
01. The Demon comes in, embodied in Aphrodite's most voluptuous figure.
02. The Demon says: "Honey, did you know you don't exist?"
03. Descartes responds: "No, I do exist, darling, for I can think of you. I think of you therefore I am."

You follow the scenario until here and conclude Demon's attempt has been in vain. How could the Demon be considered defeated if not given a chance to counter-attack?

Here's the Demon's counter-attack:

04. The Demon says: "But love, in making that conclusion you've made a loop."
05. Descartes blushes: "How then?"
06. The Demon caresses him, smiling: "You said your thinking of me is always equal your being. So in saying that you've said you are therefore you are. You've pre-supposed your being's truth and proved it true. That's a loop and it's non-informative, my dearest!"
07. Descartes is lost in the Demon's eyes.
08. No one knows what happens hereafter but the two non-existent D entities (Descartes and the Demon) somehow make up their mind to write only the first part of scenario.

Funny, but inaccurate portrayal. The Demon didn't just say that Descartes didn't exist. He (or she ) tried to convince him (the entity that s/he was speaking to) that he didn't exist.

If you claim "the Demon claimed the non-existence of an existent entity," you're obviously biased towards the existence of this entity.

No, I was saying that the Demon assumed Descartes' existence. If it didn't, then why would it even attempt to convince Descartes that he didn't exist.

How do you know the entity exists even before its existence is challenged?

Not before, but at the same instant. You see, the very fact that something's existence is being challenged prove that there is something to challenge. IOW, when someone tries to convince "entity D" that "entity D" doesn't exist, they have presupposed that there is such a thing as "entity D".

You first have to prove it exists (Q = T) and then ask the Demon how it could challenge the existence of an existing entity. One way or the other, Descartes "had to" prove Q = T to win this scenario

No he didn't. When will you understand that the Demon proved it for him? The Demon had to presuppose the existence of an entity (and the ability of that entity to think), before making an attempt to convince the entity that it didn't exist.

(you know, he won in fact, but not the way you think ).

Then how?

Your (Q => Q) statement is true, is ever-true for all states of Q. Whether or not your entity is, means whether or not Q is true, (Q => Q) is ever-true. Q's state remains undetermined for this scenario. In order to show whose, Descartes' or the Demon's, attempt has been "in vain," one has to show which one has been wrong. Neither of them has been right or wrong.

The Demon's attempt was in vain, because s/he defeated their own purpose (as shown above).

Descartes' basic effort to prove his existence is healthy but his later unfair conclusion that he really exists and the Demon's attempt has been in vain is neither healthy nor respectable.

(See above).

Suppose the Demon fails in proving Descartes' non-existence. Does this mean that Descartes' exists? I think not, it means Descartes is back to his state of hesitation about his existence (if he'd ever fairly doubted it). Descartes hasn't succeeded even though the Demon has failed.

Don't you even realize what you are saying? You speak of Descartes as "hesitating" or "doubting". This also implies his existence. One cannot doubt anything, if one doesn't exist.

The green Ostrich isn't an example of that situation, it's an example of a being whose being is included in its definition.

It doesn't matter, I made application of it anyway .

The monk story is a classic example. Those definitions are forbidden and Descartes' statement "I am therefore I am" is equivalent to "I is a being that is" for I's existence is included in its definition so it's forbidden, too.

Well, actually, his statement isn't really equal to "I is a being that is", but I'll let this go, since I have already agreed that the statement (by itself; outside of context) is non-informative and useless.

So its result, Descartes' existence, is neither valid nor true outside its context, right? Descartes can't know if he exists unless he finds someone to challenge his existence.

EXACTLY! It was the fact that someone attempted to convince him that he didn't exist, that ensured that he did exist.

Of course, he could have just thought about it (which is what he really did) and come to the same conclusion (based on the fact that he could think about it).

You insist that a non-existent entity can't discuss anything. Is that a logical obligation or an empirical pattern (using keywords from previous posts)?

Both. It is empirically verifiable. But it is also a logical obligation since discussion implies existence (you can see why, can't you? Hint: sub-premises).

Moreover, if one uses an empirical pattern observed in scientific Universe one's already accepted the premises necessary for a scientific Universe to be. Those premises include one's existence. It's no great deed to feel oneself (perceive one's being) and claim that one is. The very premise for a perception to be, is the existence of the perceived and the perceiver. However, it's forbidden to take a premise for true and then prove it true.

What you don't realize is that the assumption of the act's having taken place, equals an assumption of the existence of the doer. You agreed with me on this before (by saying that "I think therefore I am" = "I am therefore I am"), so why are you disagreeing now?

So he'd better confine himself to "merely" knowing that the Demon's attempt has been in vain, not concluding that his own attempt has been successful. He had to suspend his judgment of his being for he really hadn't proven his existence. He'd "merely" pointed out a flaw in someone else's attempt while "overlooking the flaw in his own attempt."

Wrong, for the reasons already given above (I don't have time or room to re-post them, sorry).

Now that you're an Earthling and you're talking about subjective years are the auxiliary statements. By knowing that "you were born 15 years ago," one can't know that "you're an Earthling" and "you're talking about subjective years." So these auxiliary statements must be present in order to derive "I am 15" from "I was born 15 years ago."

It's not that they must be present (any more than the definition of "think" has to be present for "I think therefore I am"), it's that they are used as rebuttals to your arguments.

Sorry, I have to go right now. It appears that I've forgotten to be home on time for my little sister. Bye (I will finish my response later).

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
If it's a loop, it's "illogical." It's forbidden. It mustn't be there. I think, too, we'd better forget the thing.

You seem rather certain of the forbidden nature of looping statements, while at the same time claiming Uncertainty. You even go so far as to claim that loops and paradoxes are the boudary between rationality and irrationality, and that they should be recognized. However, whenever I bring up something that you percieve to be "looping", you dismiss it immediately. Why do you change your standards so?

I was just kidding. I meant I'd exhausted both of your statements. Forget it, please.

OK.

Funny, but not applicable, either. I really mean you are blessed if you do, and blessed if you don't, there's no damnation to be found within the confines of nowhere. Don't I offer a better prospect?

Are you kidding? There are no "confines" of nowhere. See Exercise in Nothing Semantics, if you don't understand why.

No. The number 666.13 is a value associated with the attribute "height" (I like SI more, I don't use British units ).

Only in this instance, and only because you have now specified that. The number 666.13 could just as easily be the number of molecules in Leonard Nimoy's butt (just using a hyperbole, my point is obvious isn't it?).

The purpose of the number is not intrinsic to the number itself, as you seem to believe.

Uncertainty is meant as a device (like GeoSat, for example) or a principle by which to measure the attributes of knowledge bodies (like GeoSat measures Earth's shape). Each attribute (eg, height) is assigned a value (eg, 666.13 units of length). These values may be right or wrong or accurate only to some decimal place, even though the attributes themselves have no rightness/wrongness.

But Uncertainty doesn't measure these attributes. This would be putting it to use, and I think I've already posted enough times why I believe it to be entirely unusable.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Well, suppose so, what then? Please tell me if you have a non-paradoxical basic rule for fairness.

Why? Would it please you if fairness could be found without paradox?

No, I don't have such a rule, because the rule cannot exist (as the very concept is, at it's heart, paradoxical).

Perhaps we're referring to the same thing under different names. If it's that way, I have to retreat some steps. Even though my discussion of Descartes' statement remains there and is independent of Uncertainty.

I don't understand, do you mean that you may not have been talking about actual Uncertainty?

Please explain the transition from not-known to known, from potential knowledge to current knowledge.

I don't see why explanation is necessary. Suffice it to say that this "transition" occurs whenever I become aware of new knowledge?

Equator's dictionary definition doesn't necessitate this. Equator is only a virtual line dividing Earth into Northern and Southern hemispheres and making the imaginary reference for latitude. It's only one of countless great circles on Earth's surface.

Yes, but only one of them divides the Northern Hemisphere and the Southern Hemisphere. This means that it is a defined line, at a defined place, of a defined length. None of these "defined" states can exist in the realm of irrationality, therefore there is no "border" between rationality and irrationality that is percievable from the "irrational side", right?

Like I said before, Paradox, Uncertainty and Self-reference make the divide between rationality and irrationality. They divide so I call them "borders." Their function is my reason for calling them "borders."

No, Paradox and Self-reference are perfectly rational concepts. It is the actual paradoxes and self-referntial statements themselves that are in the realm of irrationality.

I got a problem with your "rationality." You’re expanding its definition.

Am I, or am I just expanding you definition of it?

If distinguishing is rationality, understanding is rationality, everything is rationality, then where's irrationality?

In the absence of these things (understanding, distinguishing, etc...), there lies irrationality.

Rationalization means the use of reason for explaining things, as far as I know. To rationalize an idea one has to answer all "why" questions associated with that idea.

Now we have an idea: rationalization. We're rational ones, so we want to rationalize this idea as well. There are a few "why" questions associated with rationalization two of which are:

00. Why should one rationalize ideas?

You already answered that: Because we are "rational ones".

01. Why should one throw away ideas that can't be rationalized?

Same answer.

The answers to these "why" questions lie beyond the duty and the power of rationalization. The roots to rational explanation and the need for it lie outside the boundaries of rationalization, in a realm that isn't rational, hence, irrational.

There are no answers in the realm of irrationality. Answers are the result of rational thought.

Notice, irrational doesn't mean anti-rational for anti-rational thinking is another form of methodic thinking which can be categorized as rational. Irrational means non-rational, means that which is other than ration.

Don't you realize that to be without ration, is to be anti-rational?

That's your interpretation. My saying doesn't mean your "uncertainty" has got inconsistencies (even though it's got some), it means this "uncertainty" is unable to inspect itself. Your interpretation is wrong.

My interpretation may be wrong, when compared to what you meant to say, but to "see the inconsistencies in 'uncertainty' itself" necessitates that such inconsistencies exist. Besides, you have now made the claim that there are such inconsistencies, so it's irrelevant that you didn't intend to with that particular statement.

Nonetheless, the problem is solved now by agreeing on that the camera (be it "uncertainty" or Uncertainty) can noway inspect itself. However, it can try to, at least.

The camera can't try to do anything, unless it rationally decides to. And, since looking at itself is utterly irrational, it couldn't rationally choose to try.

Isn't the paradoxical nature of Uncertainty the clearest hint of "fair" observer's paradox?

Nope. You cannot find the paradoxical nature of Uncertainty without using rationalization (as I have in previous posts). However, you cannot rationalize if you are bound to Uncertainty.

I doubted the very principle of doubting. Isn't that an implementation of Uncertainty?

No, because you must doubt the doubting of your doubt, and you must doubt that doubt, and so on and so on, ad infinitum.

The quality of being unbiased which is fairness can't be achieved. "Fairness" in your use is "absolute fairness" which has been discussed before. What Uncertainty offers is "relative fairness" that isn't being unbiased but being aware of one's biases and being ready to review them. Uncertainty implies the acceptance of the presence of biases and conscious avoidance from them.

You keep repeating this, but you are wrong. I will re-explain why: Uncertainty cannot cause you to be aware of anything, because that implies taking for granted that you should be aware of it. Uncertainty cannot imply acceptance of anything (or the conscious avoidance thereof) for similar reasons.

Within a paradigm, dead-ends may be encountered. These dead-ends are the hallmarks of that paradigm. Study of these dead-ends reveals knowledge about the structure and function of current paradigm and gives rise to the possibility of other paradigms.

You are changing the definition of "dead-end". It would seem self-explanatory, that there is nothing beyond a true dead-end, to me, but...

These dead-ends are hard as concrete within their respective paradigm. They are "actual dead-ends," and tough challenges. Outside that paradigm, they may be anything. Paradigm shifts aren't as easy as moving into a new house, but they're possible and they've happened many times, to individuals and to societies.

You contradict youself. You said that they are actual dead-ends within their respective paradigms, but could be anything outside of those paradigms; then you said that you needn't "move to a new house".

Among the definitions I asked for were those of "use and/or useful" and "practice." You haven't defined them in your previous posts.

I defined "practice" as synonymous with "use". Thus, I need only define "use". I shall do so with an example: I have a hammer. The hammer is not useful on it's own. The hammer is only useful, when I "use" it to for whatever purpose I happen to find for it. Basically, it's "usefulness" is ability to be used for at least one purpose.

Reponse continued on the next post...

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Suppose that I understand what you mean with "use." Why do you prefer "usable" ones? Why do you prefer those that have some "use" for you? Why are you seeking "use?"

Why have you asked the same question so many times? It's just the way I am. Why do you seek a reason for the way I am? Besides, by seeking to define it's "fair" state, you were also trying to find "use" for Uncertainty. You have betrayed the same tendency that I have, toward finding "use" for everything.

I didn't talk of human beings, you did. You said you meant "use" in its "common" definition and that a "common definition" is "common among human beings." I asked you how you could know all other humans' opinions.

Yes, and I answered that unless you can show me a human who thinks otherwise, I will believe as I have been. If this is about human nature, and I can produce numerous examples of people who have this opinion, while you can produce none that don't (and I'm not saying that you can't, I'm saying "if" you can't), I see no reason to leave my previous belief.

It's worth noting that the same applies to every human statement.
I asked for a definition of "common." My next question was of your right over preferring this definition over other possible ones. That you accept to give a definition means you consider yourself righteous over that and I'm questioning this right.

You haven't questioned Webster's right, have you? Besides, you were the one who asked for my definition (as I would be using it througout these posts), instead of the dictionary's definition.

Human history is dependent on the observer, for an instance compare human history from your own point of view with human history from a Blue Whale's point of view.

"Human" refers to the group of all Homo Sapiens. "Human history" refers to the action of these Homo Sapiens. In spite of opinions on what actually happened and didn't happen, there is one truth about what really did happen, and that's "human history".

Again, I must go. I'll finish my reponse tomorrow. I do apologize for the inconvinience.

 

[Mentat]

Originally posted by Manuel_Silvio
Into the non-existent...
You're honoring me in comparing me to Wuliheron. She/he knows he has my respect and admiration.

As he has mine. However, the comparison was not a positive one, as people have extreme difficulty in trying to rationalize with such a person.

Try to understand the relativity of necessities and obligations. That you can't convince me doesn't necessarily mean I'm in ignorance, it may mean you're losing countless options for one option. One the most powerful motives of philosophical thought is "what if:" what if you're wrong? What if you're the one in ignorance?

I don't mean you're wrong or you're in ignorance but I think our ideas are equally creditable hence equally unreliable, like any two other ideas.

Wrong! Are ideas are not equally creditable, and to say so (without confronting my counter-arguments) is to side-step the issue.

Please don't get into defining language, it will take another lifetime to do.

Langauge already has a definition. Well...I guess it shouldn't really be able to define itself. However, Science (a field that is independent of language) has defined it, and so I guess I can define it.

We discussed this before: meaning isn't stuck to the terms. You use and refer to your own (or dictionary) definitions of terms like these meanings are intrinsic of those terms. I was reminding you that clarity in used terms is essential to a discussion. In asking you to define "the definition' of some term, I wanted to know what kind of definition has convinced you of its being intrinsic to the term it describes.

But what you are forgetting is that language/communication is based on agreement on the meanings of words. If, in my conception/definition, "pink" means what "sphere" means to you, we will get nowhere in trying to discuss a pink sphere, will we? So, unless we can stop debating definitions, and settle for those that have been agreed upon for so long (as long as the current English language has existed), we aren't going to get anywhere.

You say: "throw it away for it's unusable." I want to show your term "unusable" is vague enough to give an entire spectrum of meanings to your claim.

I see, but you haven't done this. By debating definitions, you have merely side-stepped the real issue: That you cannot show me any practical use for "Uncertainty", while I can show you why I think it to be unusable.

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

Greetz,

1. For Mentat:

... The Demon didn't just say that Descartes didn't exist. He (or she ) tried to convince him (the entity that s/he was speaking to) that he didn't exist.

To my understanding, the Demon was Descartes' sparring partner. Descartes made the Demon to challenge his suppositions and verify their truth. From this viewpoint Descartes and the Demon have equal places, they're the two sides of a philosophical debate.

"Trying to convince" means "trying to prove logically," within a debate. It doesn't seem to me like that phrase has to say anything further. In trying to prove something logically, all positions are equal until a fault is found in one or more of positions.

If the Demon is said to "have tried to convince" of something (that Descartes didn't exist) then Descartes can also be said to "have tried to convince" of the opposite thing (that he did exist).

We have the statement Q (eg, "I am") and two minds who wish debating the truth/falsity of this Q. There's no difference (or at least, I can't see any, yet) between Descartes' and Demon's part in this act. The Demon tried to prove that Q = F while Descartes tried to prove Q = T.

Descartes' attempt had one difference. He didn't try to directly prove Q = T, instead he attacked the Demon's claim that Q = F and showed the claim's logical failure. He showed that "claiming Q = F" in face of the entity whose being is declared in Q, is logically problematic and from there he concluded "Q = T."

My proof furthers his attempt. The same way he proved "claiming Q = F" was logically problematic, I've proven "claiming Q = T" to be logically problematic, by using the same premise that was used in Descartes' proof.

The twist is that Descartes committed the same false attempt that the Demon had committed. He proved that "claiming Q = F" is problematic, and he concluded from there that "Q = T." He "claimed" Q to be T while he wasn't "allowed" to do so within the logical framework he and his partner, the Demon, were working.

No, I was saying that the Demon assumed Descartes' existence. If it didn't, then why would it even attempt to convince Descartes that he didn't exist.

No he didn't. When will you understand that the Demon proved it for him? The Demon had to presuppose the existence of an entity (and the ability of that entity to think), before making an attempt to convince the entity that it didn't exist.

You aren't allowed to infer based on your guess about the Demon's assumption.

I discussed Causality in previous posts. There's a reason to that. You think "if there's deed, there's a doer." The same way you think "if there's an attempt, there's a target," which is another form of Causality (used in inferring the Demon's "will" from its attempt). These relationships are mental patterns. These are "optimization methods," like I wrote before. They aren't theorems derived from the logical system's axioms. Hence, they can't be used in any logical debate.

You can't determine what the Demon "had" to do before it claimed Descartes' non-existence. The Demon is "the Demon" exactly because it's meant to be "non-human." It must be free of (strong but only empirical) patterns that human beings are used to. It must be Descartes' conscience of pure reason (within Aristotelian logic, of course).

... IOW, when someone tries to convince "entity D" that "entity D" doesn't exist, they have presupposed that there is such a thing as "entity D".

I think you mean that talking about "entity D" at the very moment the entity is named is equal to pre-supposing the entity's existence.

A subtle point is made here, very subtle indeed. If naming "entity D" is equal to pre-supposing its existence then "entity D" is defined by one of those "being that is" (remember the monk story) beings. You know, every being "is there" just after it's named. The very thinking of the existence of a being makes the being "be" in some sense. However, all these beings are "forbidden" within Aristotelian logic (and I wasn't the one who made this logical system).

Entity D "can't exist" within Aristotelian logic. I don't say it doesn't exist but it isn't allowed to "be" within this system. If Descartes is an "instance" of entity D then he "can't be" within the system he's chosen to work in.

Then how?

By those parts of the scenario that Descartes and the Demon decided not to publish .

The Demon's attempt was in vain, because s/he defeated their own purpose (as shown above).

And Descartes "later" attempt in concluding his existence from "his true proof" was in vain, because he defeated his own purpose (that's to remain within the bounds of Aristotelian logic).

... You speak of Descartes as "hesitating" or "doubting". This also implies his existence. One cannot doubt anything, if one doesn't exist.

How do you know that?

The bond between the doer and the deed is "an empirical pattern" (and one from the scientific Universe). It isn't "allowed" for use in logical debates.

Well, actually, his statement isn't really equal to "I is a being that is", but I'll let this go, since I have already agreed that the statement (by itself; outside of context) is non-informative and useless.

It is. Descartes' statement is non-informative because it's "circular reasoning," it's a loop. And a loop isn't allowed "even in that context," for part of the context to Evil Demon scenario is compliance to Aristotelian logic.

A loop must never ever appear in Descartes' statements because he himself has chosen to work bound to Aristotelian logic.

EXACTLY! It was the fact that someone attempted to convince him that he didn't exist, that ensured that he did exist.

But that someone was his own creation, what if he couldn't create that someone? What if he wasn't Descartes and hadn't made the Evil Demon scenario?

Both. It is empirically verifiable. But it is also a logical obligation since discussion implies existence (you can see why, can't you? Hint: sub-premises).

It can't be "both." It's only an "empirical pattern."

I say "I discuss" and you break this statement into two: "I am" and "I discuss." How can you break that statement into two sub-premises (as you call them)? This is by "pre-supposing" that "if there's a discussion then there's someone who discusses."

You say the two sub-premises are contained in "I discuss." Where does this claim of yours come from? It comes from pre-supposing Causality, based on your mental patterns.

This isn't allowed in a logical debate. Use of empirical patterns isn't allowed, it's forbidden and must never ever happen. If empirical patterns are allowed into logical debates, we could use the very usual and simple pattern, "I feel something so there is something" to prove our existence. There wouldn't be a need to trouble ourselves this much.

... You agreed with me on this before (by saying that "I think therefore I am" = "I am therefore I am"), so why are you disagreeing now?

I was following another line of discussion. There're two lines of discussion here:

00. If our agreement is in place then Descartes' had made loop. This can't be tolerated. No way, it's a loop and it "must" be thrown away. In the context or out of context, it "must be thrown away," if one's doing Aristotelian logic.

01. Our agreement can be questioned as well. I showed that Causality is one of countless possible options for explaining the phenomenal Universe (not going further than that even though it's possible). By that, the previous agreement that "I think" is an indication of "I am" is no more "necessarily true." It may be true, may be false. If that premise is doubted then Descartes' proof becomes totally invalid because it's based on a premise which has no definite state yet. This can't be tolerated, either.

You seem rather certain of the forbidden nature of looping statements, while at the same time claiming Uncertainty. You even go so far as to claim that loops and paradoxes are the boudary between rationality and irrationality, and that they should be recognized. However, whenever I bring up something that you percieve to be "looping", you dismiss it immediately. Why do you change your standards so?

The restriction on loops is an axiom of Aristotelian logic. Descartes chose this system to work out his proof and I've countered his proof within the system of his own choice.

Axioms are pre-supposed and dismissed at will but once they're chosen one has to avoid violating them as long as one wants to remain within the chosen axiomatic system.

As long as one's inside Aristotelian logic one isn't allowed to use loops. You've chosen that system and you're treated by your own choice. I oppose any use of loops on your side.

I, on the other hand, haven't chosen that system. I'm free in using my own axiomatic system.

If you use a loop and insist on your use then you've accepted to get out of Aristotelian logic and you're no more subject to its restrictions but you can no more use those restrictions to oppose me. You can't ban paradoxes, you can't ban loops and you can't oppose my paradoxical statements.

If you want to oppose loops, you have to accept opposition when you yourself make loops. If you want to make a loop, you have to give up opposing loops made by others.

Are you kidding? There are no "confines" of nowhere.

And are there any confines to the places that have "no confines?"

continued on the next post...

 

[Manuel_Silvio]

... continued from the previous post

The purpose of the number is not intrinsic to the number itself, as you seem to believe.

Did I say the purpose of a number is intrinsic to that number?

I said there's a value associated with every attribute. We have the attribute (for example, height) and its value (for example, 666.13). Does this mean that 666.13 is intrinsic to height values? Or that all height values are 666.13? Or that 666.13 can only be a height value? No. None of these is contained in my words.

Sometimes you make such "big" mistakes and make me think you don't read what you're objecting.

Why? Would it please you if fairness could be found without paradox?

No, I don't have such a rule, because the rule cannot exist (as the very concept is, at it's heart, paradoxical).

Yes and no, but you say "fairness = paradoxical" and throw the concept away.

You say my definition is paradoxical like there's a non-paradoxical definition. If the concept of "fairness" (that seems to be so important to Philosophy) is paradoxical then I must be right in saying that Paradox is one facet of the most basic point in Philosophy, don't you agree?

I don't understand, do you mean that you may not have been talking about actual Uncertainty?

I've been talking of Uncertainty as a manner of thought. As a way to approach "fairness" that is unreachable because of its paradoxical nature.

And I've been talking of doubt, as being generally applicable to every statement and supposition. This is what I mean with Uncertainty. Its basic rule that says "nothing is certain" is derived from the basic rule of uncertainty that says "most of things are uncertain." It's unreachable, like "fairness" is, but I tend to like it and "try in vain" to reach for it.

You oppose me because of the paradoxical nature of Uncertainty and that it's unreachable. You say it's "unusable."

Actually though, it (or at least, trying to reach for it) has got two uses:

00. Try in vain to achieve it and you've tried your best to achieve fairness. That best effort will give you the clearest possible human view point.

01. It's an answer to the question "what on Earth can be unusable?" Answering a question is a use after all. Isn't it?

Silvio: Please explain the transition from not-known to known, from potential knowledge to current knowledge.

Mentat: I don't see why explanation is necessary. Suffice it to say that this "transition" occurs whenever I become aware of new knowledge?

No, it doesn't suffice. The question "how do we move from not-knowing to knowing?," which is a question of this "transition," is a historical question.

It's been discussed since Plato and his "Meno" dialogue (where Plato contemplates the acquisition of "virtue," in fact). It's been answered many times and by many individuals.

If someone claims that this transition occurs or even that it's possible, that someone has to say "how it occurs," "why it occurs" and "why it doesn't occur in some other manner."

This debate must have taken place in "Knowledge?" thread but you came in and you were "sure" of "something" so I first had to "cure" this "certainty" .

No, Paradox and Self-reference are perfectly rational concepts. It is the actual paradoxes and self-referntial statements themselves that are in the realm of irrationality.

When I make a paradoxical and/or self-referential statement you tell me I'm being irrational. You can understand if I'm being rational or not by checking my statements for Paradox and Self-reference.

You don't want to call them, "borders." What do you call them instead (if you were to call them something, anyway)?

In the absence of these things (understanding, distinguishing, etc...), there lies irrationality.

There's never an absence of these so there's no irrationality, right?

You already answered that: Because we are "rational ones".

We've chosen to be "rational ones." Why have we chosen to be "rational ones?"

There are no answers in the realm of irrationality. Answers are the result of rational thought.

That you find someone to answer you indicates that someone as a "rational thinker" but answers themselves can be anywhere.

Answering a question rationally happens within the realm of rationality but questions can be answered irrationally as well.

Suppose you have question like "what am I?" and you're told that Schrödinger’s cat's state (eg, live/dead) will be the answer to that question. Is that a "rational" answer? It isn't even definite, let alone being rational.

My interpretation may be wrong, when compared to what you meant to say, but to "see the inconsistencies in 'uncertainty' itself" necessitates that such inconsistencies exist. Besides, you have now made the claim that there are such inconsistencies, so it's irrelevant that you didn't intend to with that particular statement.

I give up. You were right with your interpretation even though I didn't mean what you understood. I made a bad sentence.

Anyway, your "uncertainty" is either incomplete or inconsistent: incomplete if its rule doesn't apply to itself, inconsistent if its rule is applied to itself.

Nope. You cannot find the paradoxical nature of Uncertainty without using rationalization (as I have in previous posts). However, you cannot rationalize if you are bound to Uncertainty.

I surrender . Uncertainty can't be achieved, it's unreachable, agreed?

You are changing the definition of "dead-end". It would seem self-explanatory, that there is nothing beyond a true dead-end, to me, but...

You contradict youself. You said that they are actual dead-ends within their respective paradigms, but could be anything outside of those paradigms; then you said that you needn't "move to a new house".

Did I say I "needn't" move to a new house? I said it isn't easy (even though I really "needn't" do so).

You mean you don't get the "new house" metaphor or something like that? "The new house" means "another paradigm."

These dead-ends are "true" dead-ends, there's nothing beyond them "within their respective paradigm." And for someone within a paradigm "there's nothing there" where "there's nothing there only within that paradigm" even though "there may be anything there viewed from another paradigm."

From within a paradigm, there's "really" nothing beyond these dead-ends but "the reality" itself is twisted, if not entirely incomprehensible, within "every paradigm."

I defined "practice" as synonymous with "use". Thus, I need only define "use". I shall do so with an example: I have a hammer. The hammer is not useful on it's own. The hammer is only useful, when I "use" it to for whatever purpose I happen to find for it. Basically, it's "usefulness" is ability to be used for at least one purpose.

You aren't defining "use" here because definitions can't be made using "inductive method" and with examples.

By the way, you've made a loop in defining "usefulness" using the phrase "being used," an understanding of which can only be gained by first understanding "usefulness."

Why have you asked the same question so many times? It's just the way I am. Why do you seek a reason for the way I am? Besides, by seeking to define it's "fair" state, you were also trying to find "use" for Uncertainty. You have betrayed the same tendency that I have, toward finding "use" for everything.

Because if I don't ask "why are you this way?" I've introduced incompleteness in the rationalized system of thought. Why shouldn't I ask why you're this way?

To be rational, as you wish, one has to ask "why" and answer the "why" question. If you don't answer a "why" question, you're no more rational (I won't say you're irrational ).

Perhaps I'm like you, seeking "use" for everything. Then I should ask "why am I this way?" and I ask this of you because you're the defender of rational thought.

Yes, and I answered that unless you can show me a human who thinks otherwise, I will believe as I have been. If this is about human nature, and I can produce numerous examples of people who have this opinion, while you can produce none that don't (and I'm not saying that you can't, I'm saying "if" you can't), I see no reason to leave my previous belief.

Neither deductive nor inductive method suggest such a manner.

By deductive method you have to prove it. And you haven't.

By inductive method you have to find as many instances as possible, a reasonable statistical community. And you haven't.

Why do you want to keep this belief is it hasn't been proven superior?

Nonetheless, you can keep it and I can agree with you .

"Human" refers to the group of all Homo Sapiens. "Human history" refers to the action of these Homo Sapiens. In spite of opinions on what actually happened and didn't happen, there is one truth about what really did happen, and that's "human history".

Human history from a Blue Whale's point of view hasn't been anything but a few lethal or friendly encounters with Homo Sapiens.

Human history from Carnivora Canidae Canis genus of living beings' point of view has been the course of speciation of a new species, Canis Familiaris.

Human history from a Homo Sapiens's point of view is an entirely different thing.

We human beings associate "meaning," "order" and "incidence" with the events we experience. Other living beings do this their own way. In fact, these differ from individual to individual, from observer to observer. What we perceive as World War II and classify as a distinct era won't seem much different from the entire 20th century for a tortoise living around a pond somewhere in England.

continued on the next post...