Is Matter Conscious? - Can All Matter Be Conscious?

[Jimmy Snyder]

I have read the posts presenting circular logical arguments masquerading as evidence and I fear for the future of science. However, that is not my issue. I was afraid that this thread was nothing more than a flight of fancy. My hope was to ground it by asking for some connection between the OP's idle speculation and reality. Even if I don't agree with the quality of the evidence, my fight ended when people finally accepted the idea that evidence is necessary for the meaningful conduct of the conversation.

 

[DaveC426913]

Ok i understand, no causation. But look at the bit I've bolded. Because consciousness-as-we-know-it entails brainwaves, isn't this just another way of saying "whenever we see brainwaves, we see brainwaves"?

No.

I've said "where there is A , we also see B".
You seem to be interpreting that as "yeah, but since A=B, we could say where there is A we also see A".

Which makes no sense to me.

 

[DaveC426913]

And what does it have to do with jimmy pointing out that there is no experimental evidence of the OP's post? You guys seem to have completely missed jimmy's point.

Wait a minute. Are you saying that, ignoring all we know so far, since we have not actually explicitly tested atoms for consciousness, we can't know?

Does that likewise mean that, since we have not actually tested the molecules of Mercury, we cannot say that they are the same atoms we've put in our periodic table?

 

[Pythagorean]

Wait a minute. Are you saying that, ignoring all we know so far, since we have not actually explicitly tested atoms for consciousness, we can't know?

Does that likewise mean that, since we have not actually tested the molecules of Mercury, we cannot say that they are the same atoms we've put in our periodic table?

I guess so... It's the same line of reasoning used to "debunk" human evolution, which, likewise doesn't have a specific experiment demonstrating that humans evolve.

 

[Pythagorean]

I have read the posts presenting circular logical arguments masquerading as evidence and I fear for the future of science.

What's circular about it?

 

[pftest]

Observed non-linear behavior and phase transitions are very unlikely to be reduced to more fundamental interactions unless new, unknown causal factors are discovered(basically a different type of physics). It's not that temperature is not emergent, it's that according to the latest knowledge, the field is fundamental and everything emerges from it(incl. space and time). Not a small conceptual issue by any standard. Moreover, the modern understanding of the transition between micro and macro does away with particles - particles are illusory appearances, left over in the process of decoherence. Basically, all we know intuitively is wrong to a large extent and in the process of finding out, we are seeing that what were once self-evident Truths(axioms), they turn out to be a case of human "baggage".

I prefer we focus on a single simple example of emergence. The emergence of space and time (if they emerged) arent good examples since they would not counter the idea that consciousness traces back to at least the big bang (a muddy and poorly understood phenomenon), and that no emergence has been happening in nature ever since. So let's focus on non-linear behaviour. Id like to understand what it is that emerges there.

As for the illusory appearance of particles, that is not to do with any physical kind of emergence, since it is merely about how they appear to a conscious observer.

The point is we do have circumstantial evidence(what you call anecdotes) that points to consciousness being highly related to the nervous system. The opposite proposition has none at all, just baseless speculation.

We have anecdotes of nonmaterialist experiences aswell. It doesn't matter, since i explained earlier how the evidence is not robust and open to many different interpretations than a materialist one.

Any manifestation of the consciousness of rocks whatsoever. I am willing to pay to see the evidence.

You said that there is no evidence for consciousness in rocks. That means you are looking for a particular type of evidence and you did not find it. Thats why i asked what it is that you accept as evidence of consciousness?

 

[pftest]

You start proofs with assumptions; if they're wrong, you will get contradictions by applying them (or you can proof by induction, but this topic isn't formalized mathematically so that would be more difficult)

This is a long-term proof. It started with an assumption... all of the EVIDENCE so far has supported the assumption.

All of the evidence (experiments, measurements, observations, etc) are in cognitive neurosciences. People are studying the binding problem, people are studying qualia (in neuroscience). People are studying self-awareness.

The evidence has repeatedly shown that the complex behavior and cognitive moment all directly come from operations in the brain pertaining to neurons and how they communicate to each other. The matter they are made up of is just the means... the actual information transfer comes from the interactions between the billions of neurons.

Most neuroscience is about how the brain interacts with consciousness. Interaction between mind and brain is only indicative on monism, and not materialist monism in particular. The only evidence that points towards materialism, is anecdotes of unconsciousness, but this is as problematic as all anecdotal evidence and is wide open to non-materialist interpretation.

Of course there is evidence that complex brainactivity results in complex consciousness. But from this it doesn't follow that simpler structures and simpler activity do not result in simpler consciousness. So when we see there is an interacting relationship between consciousness and matter, it is not evidence that this relationship can be broken.

 

[ThomasT]

Is there any evidence, in the first place, that consciousness is something unique to humans/mammals/living things (whatever your personal bias)

Not unique to humans and mammals, but unique to living things. This is just how we use the term. Consciousness is attributed via evaluation wrt certain behavioral criteria. Nonconscious things are so called because they don't behave/respond in certain ways. This has been associated with certain structural characteristics, and so we're fairly confident in identifying hubcaps, tennis racquets, etc. as being nonconscious, nonintelligent, nonliving things (as differentiated from the behavior, or lack thereof, of unconscious, unintelligent, or once alive but now dead things).

My assumption may align with yours; I think that consciousness results from the higher complexity; I wouldn't be surprised if a single-celled organism had some limited form of consciousness, but rocks and tires don't seem to. However, that's not reasonable to just state it and leave it there. We still have to prove either philosophically that it must be, or empirically that it is.

The word, consciousness, is just a communicative convention. It's just a label associated with certain behaviors and physical forms. It doesn't require any empirical justification, or philosophical proof, other than that. We know that rocks and tires aren't conscious because of how we conventionally use the term. It's either that, or, consciousness is just a superfluous collection of letters with no particular communicative utility.

But I think I understand what you're saying. We want better, more comprehensive definitions of certain terms like consciousness, intelligence, life, etc. The OP asks, ... "how is it that some matter is conscious? For example people?" Well, this is an open question, afaik. But at this point it seems to me to be primarily a problem for empirical science (insufficient data), not philosophy.

He asks, " ... theoretically couldn't all matter be conscious?" Well, no, because consciousness is a scale (complexity) dependent phenomenon. That's how the term is used. We call something conscious if its behavior closely approximates certain criteria, and 'life' is the only physical regime where such behavior is evident.

The major difficulty is that already, you can't prove that any other humans are conscious unless you define it behaviorally ...

This isn't a major difficulty because ultimately that's how any term (whether it refers to a relatively persistently ponderable object or a behavior) is unambiguously defined. It's been refined and incorporated into science as the practice of defining terms 'operationally'. Consciousness refers to behavior. And structural associations follow. If it looks like a duck, etc., etc., then we call it a duck. Consciousness isn't applicable to hubcaps or rocks because, afaik, they've never behaved in a manner that even remotely approximates any of the criteria that we associate with consciousness.

... (which isn't satisfactory to most philosophers).

Then how would most philosophers define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?

My guess is that we're not going to have a deep understanding of the emergence of life and consciousness unless a fundamental wave dynamic(s) is incorporated into physics as a first principle(s). (Even then, it might be impossible to simulate the emergence of relatively simple particulate phenomena.) In this view, life and consciousness (like baseballs, proteins, atoms, etc.) are nothing more than artifacts of countless iterations of a fundamental wave dynamic(s).

 

[pftest]

"Whenever we see consciousness-as-we-know-it, we also seem to detect brain waves. Places where we do not see consciousness-as-we-know-it, we also do not detect brain waves. No causation between the two is impllied or intended."

No.

I've said "where there is A , we also see B".
You seem to be interpreting that as "yeah, but since A=B, we could say where there is A we also see A".

Which makes no sense to me.

You may be calling it two different names, but i think you are referring to the same physical things.

You say "whenever we see consciousness...". What is it that you see then? Surely it must be something physical?

 

[pftest]

The point has already been made that water and plasma (for instance) are made of the same subatomic particles, yet have much different emergent properties. Sharing the same matter doesn't mean anything, it's all about the interactions and dynamics.

Ok let me ask you: if 2 atoms 1mm apart move 2mm apart, is this emergence?

 

[Pythagorean]

Most neuroscience is about how the brain interacts with consciousness. Interaction between mind and brain is only indicative on monism, and not materialist monism in particular. The only evidence that points towards materialism, is anecdotes of unconsciousness, but this is as problematic as all anecdotal evidence and is wide open to non-materialist interpretation.

You can say the same thing about physics. Who's to say there isn't invisible gremlins grabbing masses and pulling them towards other masses every time we measure the force of gravity?

It's a useless proposition, despite me not being able to prove it, because we have no access to the invisible gremlins or how they work. We don't know how masses attract each other, we just know they do. It helps explains why other things occur, though (specifically, all the rules that were developed in astronomy prior to Newton generalizing to the law of gravity.

I don't see this as a very different kind of generalization. Evolution (as I mentioned previously) is yet another generalization that compiles a lot of individual empirical facts into a theory.

Then how would most philosophers define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?

My guess is that we're not going to have a deep understanding of the emergence of life and consciousness unless a fundamental wave dynamic(s) is incorporated into physics as a first principle(s). (Even then, it might be impossible to simulate the emergence of relatively simple particulate phenomena.) In this view, life and consciousness (like baseballs, proteins, atoms, etc.) are nothing more than artifacts of countless iterations of a fundamental wave dynamic(s).

I generally agree with your post. But to the question you ask "how would most philosopher define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?" my answer is that most philosophers don't see consciousness as a behavioral thing. We all generally have an emotional attachment to our consciousness from the very beginning of our conscious life. I was born a dualist, it's only through long-term exposure to the scientific method and neuroscience that I became a physicalist. It wouldn't have been very easy to convince me otherwise at the time.

Ok let me ask you: if 2 atoms 1mm apart move 2mm apart, is this emergence?

it depends... do they interact? If they do, then yes. What emerges is force. Gravitational force does not exist without two masses. You can't talk about it with one mass.

If they don't interact, then no, superposition holds; if they're the same kind of particle, the dynamics of the whole system can be described with just one of them.

 

[ThomasT]

I generally agree with your post. But to the question you ask "how would most philosopher define a behavioral term if not behaviorally?" my answer is that most philosophers don't see consciousness as a behavioral thing.

Well, if consciousness isn't a behavioral thing, then what is it? How/what do you think most philosophers think about consciousness?

We all generally have an emotional attachment to our consciousness from the very beginning of our conscious life.

Of course, but this isn't at all what we're talking about. We're talking about the general meaning of consciousness, and, wrt the OP, whether matter is conscious. The answer is that some matter is consious. That is, consciousness is evident wrt certain scales of material behavior.

 

[Pythagorean]

Well, if consciousness isn't a behavioral thing, then what is it? How/what do you think most philosophers think about consciousness?

I shouldn't say most philosophers. I mean most philosophy-based arguments against physicalism that I encounter on the philosophy forum here.

They generally refer to the non-behavioral aspects such as the subjective experiences we perceive (i.e. qualia).

 

[ThomasT]

That qualifies as evidence in my books.

And yes it is. Thanks Dave. The object or goal was to count instances of conscious behavior (much like photomultipliers count instances of photonic behavior). To date, wrt thousands of individual experiments with my hubcaps and my tennis racquets, I've counted exactly zero (0) instances of conscious behavior.

 

[pftest]

You can say the same thing about physics. Who's to say there isn't invisible gremlins grabbing masses and pulling them towards other masses every time we measure the force of gravity?

It's a useless proposition, despite me not being able to prove it, because we have no access to the invisible gremlins or how they work. We don't know how masses attract each other, we just know they do. It helps explains why other things occur, though (specifically, all the rules that were developed in astronomy prior to Newton generalizing to the law of gravity.

I don't see this as a very different kind of generalization. Evolution (as I mentioned previously) is yet another generalization that compiles a lot of individual empirical facts into a theory.

Yes i agree we can say the same about physics, because physics doesn't tell us whether the objects it describes are conscious or not. There is no need to talk about invisible gremlins, because we have a perfectly natural invisible consciousness that is present in our bodies in conjunction with the laws of physics. Physics has nothing to do with materialism (the idea that consciousness requires brainlike complexity) and offers no support for it. It describes how matter behaves but leaves open whether it is conscious.

I have no problem with having a theory based on lots of individual empirical facts, but we have no empirical facts of unconscious matter. When we get down to it, the only empirical fact we have is that of conscious matter, ourselves. Regardless of how used everyone is to the idea of it, nonconscious matter is the postulation of a new type of matter. It is not extrapolated from a known phenomenon, whereas conscious matter is.

it depends... do they interact? If they do, then yes. What emerges is force. Gravitational force does not exist without two masses. You can't talk about it with one mass.

If they don't interact, then no, superposition holds; if they're the same kind of particle, the dynamics of the whole system can be described with just one of them.

When was there a situation with only 1 mass in the entire universe, and no forces and interaction?

To me it seems like there is only a quantitative difference between 2 atoms 1mm apart and 2 atoms 2mm apart.

 

[ThomasT]

I shouldn't say most philosophers. I mean most philosophy-based arguments against physicalism that I encounter on the philosophy forum here.

They generally refer to the non-behavioral aspects such as the subjective experiences we perceive (i.e. qualia).

But you haven't answered my question. If consciousness isn't based on behavior, than how can we ascertain if some object is conscious or not?

 

[pftest]

And yes it is. Thanks Dave. The object or goal was to count instances of conscious behavior (much like photomultipliers count instances of photonic behavior). To date, wrt thousands of individual experiments with my hubcaps and my tennis racquets, I've counted exactly zero (0) instances of conscious behavior.

What do you accept as an instance of conscious behavior?

 

[Pythagorean]

But you haven't answered my question. If consciousness isn't based on behavior, than how can we ascertain if some object is conscious or not?

You can't!

That's why saying it's not based on behavior is an argument tactic from dualist arguments, which was my point.

 

[Pythagorean]

To me it seems like there is only a quantitative difference between 2 atoms 1mm apart and 2 atoms 2mm apart.

Ah, well your problem is that you're assuming point particles, spherical cows, or far-field effects, which are only very simple special cases.

 

[ThomasT]

What do you accept as an instance of conscious behavior?

Ok, this can get a bit complicated. Let me ask you these questions. Do you think that your friends are conscious? At least when you're interacting with them. If you have pets, are they sometimes conscious? Do you think that your front door is conscious? Is your microwave oven, or your refrigerator conscious?

 

[ThomasT]

You can't!

But we evaluate and determine whether or not things are conscious all the time in the course of our ordinary navigations through our world.

That's why saying it's not based on behavior is an argument tactic from dualist arguments, which was my point.

I don't understand this.

 

[pftest]

Ok, this can get a bit complicated. Let me ask you these questions. Do you think that your friends are conscious? At least when you're interacting with them. If you have pets, are they sometimes conscious? Do you think that your front door is conscious? Is your microwave oven, or your refrigerator conscious?

I have an intuition about which things are and arent conscious yes. But of course this intuition can be flawed. Some people think fish can't feel pain, others think they can. Some think insects arent conscious, others think they are. I remember reading that a few hundred years ago people generally thought that animals were nothing more than clocklike mechanisms.

 

[Pythagorean]

But we evaluate and determine whether or not things are conscious all the time in the course of our ordinary navigations through our world.

Yes, based on their behavior alone!

edit: alone is perhaps too strong, since we also infer from our own internal behavior.

I don't understand this.

Conveniently enough, pftest just utilized it:

Most neuroscience is about how the brain interacts with consciousness. Interaction between mind and brain is only indicative on monism, and not materialist monism in particular. The only evidence that points towards materialism, is anecdotes of unconsciousness, but this is as problematic as all anecdotal evidence and is wide open to non-materialist interpretation.

 

[ThomasT]

I have an intuition about which things are and arent conscious yes. But of course this intuition can be flawed. Some people think fish can't feel pain, others think they can. Some think insects arent conscious, others think they are. I remember reading that a few hundred years ago people generally thought that animals were nothing more than clocklike mechanisms.

Ok so you're saying that the word 'conscious' is ambiguous, ill-defined. I think I basically agree with you. So the answer to the OPs questions are that the word consciousness has no particular meaning. Is matter conscious? What does conscious mean? Maybe it doesn't refer to anything. Just a bunch of letters. Might as well ask, is matter qouisdflkjsd?

 

[ThomasT]

Yes, based on their behavior alone!

edit: alone is perhaps too strong, since we also infer from our own internal behavior.

Ok, so why would most philosophers be opposed to a behavioral defintion of consciousness?

 

[Pythagorean]

I specified my choice of words was wrong, but to answer your question (or not) I don't know what their motivation is.

Maybe just because it's an argument that supports their conclusion?

Why don't you ask pftest or Jimmy Snyder?

 

[pftest]

Ok so you're saying that the word 'conscious' is ambiguous, ill-defined. I think I basically agree with you. So the answer to the OPs questions are that the word consciousness has no particular meaning. Is matter conscious? What does conscious mean? Maybe it doesn't refer to anything. Just a bunch of letters. Might as well ask, is matter qouisdflkjsd?

Ive defined it in this post: https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3006049&postcount=117

But earlier you said you didnt find evidence of consciousness in hubcaps, so this means you know what consciousness looks like. So I asked you what it looks like, what you accept as evidence of consciousness.

I think i know the answer to that however ("consciousness looks like humanlike behaviour"), and if I am right, then it was a case of circular reasoning:

- first assume that consciousness looks like humanlike behaviour
- then conclude we don't find consciousness in non-humanlike behaviour

Or in short: we don't find humanlike behaviour in non-humanlike behaviour.

 

[pftest]

Ok, so why would most philosophers be opposed to a behavioral defintion of consciousness?

I can answer, and my previous post is related to this. One problem i have with defining consciousness in terms of behaviour, is that this is simply begging the question when the question concerns the origin of consciousness. If we define it as the behaviour of electrons, then we will find consciousness wherever we find electrons. If we define it as humanlike behaviour, then we will find it wherever we find humanlike behaviour.

But my main issue is that we simply cannot observe consciousness in others. This is simply a fact, whether we like it or not. It may be very useful to define C in terms of behaviour in some clinical settings or in everyday life, but ultimately this is not rooted in observation. So we cannot use observation to determine which behaviour is and isn't conscious.

 

[DaveC426913]

A few rules we're going to have to hammer out:

1] We can't move the goalposts willy nilly. Even if we don't know what causes consciousness, we have to come to an agreement on what we mean by the word.

2] We must have a definition that can be tested.

 

[Q_Goest]

I can answer, and my previous post is related to this. One problem [philosophers in general] have with defining consciousness in terms of behaviour, is that this is simply begging the question when the question concerns the origin of consciousness. If we define it as the behaviour of electrons, then we will find consciousness wherever we find electrons. If we define it as humanlike behaviour, then we will find it wherever we find humanlike behaviour.

But my main issue is that we simply cannot observe consciousness in others. This is simply a fact, whether we like it or not. It may be very useful to define C in terms of behaviour in some clinical settings or in everyday life, but ultimately this is not rooted in observation. So we cannot use observation to determine which behaviour is and isn't conscious.

Kudos to pftest. Totally agree with all this.

Just a minor observation in general. Many people here are defining "consciousness" as a state of self awareness. That's not what is generally being referred to in cognitive science. When consciousness is talked about, the term is generally referring to phenomenal consciousness, which constitutes a large number of different phenomena including qualia, experience, the 'feelings' we have, the sense of self awareness, etc... these are all phenomena that are subsets of consciousness in general. So when things such as bugs or microscopic organisms are talked about as having "consiousness" that doesn't necessarily pick out the phenomena of self awareness. It can also pick out any of those other phenomenal experiences such as the experience of qualia, feelings, etc... From that perspective, such things as house flys can be assumed to have conscious experiences. It might be debatable whether or not a single cell organism or a plant for example, is experiencing anything, although it's been suggested that even bacteria seem to behave (in certain circumstances) as if they were experiencing something.

 

[DaveC426913]

I'd like to start with some known examples, so I can understand what the rest of you are thinking. We'll make a differntial diagnosis later.
A human is conscious; we all agree.
Does a cat have consciousness?
Does a lizard have any consciousness?
Does an earthworm have any consciousness? (even if very dim)

 

[Q_Goest]

We must have a definition that can be tested.

The only 'test' I'm aware of is the Turing test, which really isn't a test for consciousness at all.

I'd like to start with some known examples, so I can understand what the rest of you are thinking. We'll make a differntial diagnosis later.
A human is conscious; we all agree.
Does a cat have consciousness?
Does a lizard have any consciousness?
Does an earthworm have any consciousness? (even if very dim)

Does an earthworm feel pain? (pain is an aspect of conscious experience)

 

[DaveC426913]

The only 'test' I'm aware of is the Turing test, which really isn't a test for consciousness at all.

I wasn't suggesting a definitive test. But the definition comes first...

Does an earthworm feel pain? (pain is an aspect of conscious experience)

An earthworm will enthusiastically recoil from a prick. Is that pain?

 

[Q_Goest]

I wasn't suggesting a definitive test. But the definition comes first...

The definition is generally understood (in philosophy, not perhaps in this forum <zing>) as meaning phenomenal consciousness which includes pain for example.

An earthworm will enthusiastically recoil from a prick. Is that pain?

I think a worm is similar enough to humans, given evolution, to believe that they have similar phenomenal experiences to us. They have a genome that is based on the same genome as ours (like all life on this planet) and they have neurons that serve the same purpose as ours do. So I think it follows that worms feel pain.

 

[Evo]

Wait a minute. Are you saying that, ignoring all we know so far, since we have not actually explicitly tested atoms for consciousness, we can't know?

Does that likewise mean that, since we have not actually tested the molecules of Mercury, we cannot say that they are the same atoms we've put in our periodic table?

No, I'm saying you guys completely missed his point. Which has been explained at least a dozen times. Go back and read. And don't try to put words in my mouth, that's lame.