- #106
brainstorm
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Pythagorean said:The assumption is Physicalism: that consciousness requires the complex processes provided by the physiology that life exhibits. You also have to accept the assumption that you can derive consciousness from behavior and cell dynamics. Then you would run the test on iron atoms (which would feel quite silly) and see that it failed.
Normally, I would assume this. However, what is so special about brain and nerve cells that would make them the only candidate for housing the kinds of electronic patterns that make it possible to consciously experience interactions between inputs and outputs?
Often people assume that "lower animals" have "a lower level of consciousness," but maybe it is other aspects they lack instead of consciousness. E.g. animals seem to have higher thresholds of pain and discomfort in many cases, but that could just be because they are not sensitized to the extent that humans are. They may also do less cognitive "thinking" than humans, but does that mean they are less aware of the things they pay attention to?
Animals might just be conscious entities like humans that do not think or feel as much. I.e. they could be like super-soldiers that block out thought and feeling to accomplish difficult and potentially traumatic missions.
Anyway, I guess I got off track from my initial point that consciousness might be possible in other media than living nerve tissue, but my point was basically that it's hard to imagine consciousness of different kinds of inputs and outputs than we are used to in human-situations, but that it might still be possible for other things to be conscious, except without self-perception, pain/pleasure, fear(of death), emotions, etc. Plants, for example, might be completely aware of everything going on around them but have absolutely no emotional investment in it, nor in their own existence.