Is reality just a matter of perception?

[moving finger]

Chalmers doesn't insist "every property in the world must be accessible and describable from a 3rd person perspective" is true of the world. He insists it is an implication of physicalism

therein lies his mistake then, because it's not (at least it's not an implication of physicalism defined as the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical - perhaps he has a private meaning in mind)

Best Regards

 

[bchmtnedisto]

I've read somewhere around here someone saying that the color red is an abstraction and it does not exist on its own, which is to say, there can be a red car, but the red car is not the thing that makes up the color red.

I went on to think about this, and what is then the color red? First I thought that perhaps it is everything that is red, so in short, red is everything that is red. Then I asked myself, is something that is red, but is outside your field of vision, still red? THere seems to be a great difference between something that you are directly seeing as red, and the redness that associates in your mind with your red car that is outside your field of vision.

i like to read and ponder philosophy.i do wonder at times though how discussions get so off course from the original question.

so to get back to the original question which becomes a scientific answer not philosophical here we go:

a red apple has no color or light energy of it's own..it appears red because it reflects wavelenghts of white light that cause us to see red.and it absorbs most other wavelengths that contribute to the sensation of red.because of this,the human eye,camera film, or a light-sensing instrument will all perceive the apple as red.it's not as subtractive color.


a bit deeper regarding red:

The Doppler effect causes objects moving away to have their light spectrum red-shifted while objects approaching have their light blue-shifted. This really means that the wavelengths of light they radiate (or reflect) are moved downward or upward on the frequency spectrum. These measurements were the first clue that the universe is expanding.
However, it does not mean that visible light is more red (or more blue in the unfortunate event of a fast approaching object). Visible light is only a small portion of radiation; there also exists significant infrared (longer wavelengths below visible red) and ultra-violet (shorter wavelengths above visible violet) radiation.


what was previously red becomes invisible infrared
some colours may remain as different visible colours with a longer wavelength (eg blue may become yellow)
some of what was previously invisible ultra-violet becomes a visible colour
so we still continue to see a full visible colour spectrum as white.

incidentally, the absence of light on colors of the spectrum creates black.

 

[moving finger]

i like to read and ponder philosophy.i do wonder at times though how discussions get so off course from the original question.

with respect, I'm a scientist myself, but I do often wonder why so many scientists often look at everything from a purely 3rd person perspective (which then leads to the 3rd person scientific answer that you provided).

The original questions in the OP regarding “red” were in fact :

is something that is red, but is outside your field of vision, still red?

now the real question is, what else (or does everything) simply exist in the mind

These seem to me to be most definitely philosophical, and not simply scientific, questions.

Best Regards

 

[graffix]

That depends on how one defines "mind". To quote Wiki :

Mind refers to the collective aspects of intellect and consciousness which are manifest in some combination of thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind

By saying the universe has a mind do you mean that “the universe has a mind by virtue of the fact that I have a mind, and I am part of the universe”, or do you mean that the universe as a whole (independently of your own mind) has an intellect and consciousness manifest in some combination of thought, perception, emotion, will, memory, and imagination?
[/QUOTE]

That's an interesting question, but if I had to pick one, I would have to say the first one because, I don't think there is any thing really independent or really separate from other things.

But I do see the limitation of the use of the word mind, since those things you've mentioned seem more like human qualities (though some seem like they would apply). I would assume that it doesn't have memory though, since I think this thing is above time.

What you seem to be saying is “if there is a greater mind behind all of this”…..

I don’t see that the zen idea that “everything is everything” (whatever that might mean) entails that there is a greater mind behind everything?

Best Regards

descriptions can't be complete. It's just one way to describe it (perhaps not a very good one). Maybe I should refrain from that term. It borders on being a infallible belief.

If I go back to this moment being me, and i am this moment, the whole universe and my mind is a big equal sign. But I know my mind (this time brain?) is also at the same time, not the universe since .. getting back to the human brain, it's restricted to not knowing all. So maybe I'm trying to explain the mind without these restrictions. It probably is above the concept of time. It probably encompasses all probabilities. Its only desire probably is to view itself.

Those descriptions borders on being beliefs.

As trying to prove it or to accurately define it, I don't have much :)

Best regards

 

[nannoh]

The question is: do you exist?

If you experience sound and color you could construe this to indicate that they exist. When we read your typing on our monitors we could construe that you exist. When you feel your own hand clapping against your other hand this could indicate that you have two hands. However the only proof is that you have perceived this to be true. And your perception is not admissible as evidence that you, the hands, the color or the sound exist.

It's left to each individual's discretionary powers to decide if anything exists or does not exist. If there is agreement between two observers this simply confirms that two people have found similarities in their assumed independent observations. Whether the observations are independent and not influenced by one or the other opinion would have to be determined by a third party. And then, the results of this inquiry would be questionable with regards to whether or not the results actually "exist".

 

[Tournesol]

knowable from which perspective?

If physicalism is true, everything is knowable
in principle from any perspective (literal only,
of course).

how would you propose to go about "knowing" what it is like to be the computer?

How would you go about persuading me that there is anything
it is like to be a computer ?

 

[Tournesol]

therein lies his mistake then, because it's not (at least it's not an implication of physicalism defined as the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical - perhaps he has a private meaning in mind)

There is nothing private about it. (He makes much of the difference
between logical and metaphsyical supervenience, BTW).
And all the physicalists who think qualia must be rejected seem to
agree with him -- about the incompatibility, if not
about which of the two is best retained.

 

[Tournesol]

If I claimed that "A is neither B nor C", does that imply I am claiming that B entails C, or that C entails B? No, I don't think so.

But then what does entail the inaccessability of consciousness?

but it is entailed by physicalism in
the sense that Chalmers uses the word, so his
claim that there is a HP is entirely consistent.

That must be some kind of "private meaning" of physicalism then. Physicalism is simply the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical, this thesis does not entail that all properties of the world are accessible from all perspectives.

If everything logically supervenes on the properties known to
physics, everything is 3rd-person accessible, since the
properties known to physics are, and since anything
logically deducibe from what is 3rd-person
knowable is itself 3rd-person knowable.(And therefore
not strongly emergent).

Thus you must be using some other sense of "supervenes". (Such
as natural supervenience. Chalmers thinks qualia supervene
naturally, but doens't think that is enough for full-blooded
physicalism).

It is only because some people seem to believe that all properties of the world must be accessible from all perspectives (which is in fact not entailed by physicalism) that they then create the HP for themselves (ie qualia are then mysterious and inexplicable). Accept the truth that not all properties of the world are accessible from all perspectives and the HP doesn't exist (ie qualia are trivially explained as 1st person perspective properties of the world) - and all still consistent with physicalism.

Yet they remain indescribable by the mathematical
language of physics. (And in that sense the HP remains)
All you are doing is employing
a sense of the word "physical" that is detached from physics.
There is nothing wrong with the concept, but it
would be better to call it something that makes it clear
you have watered-down your concpet of physicalism
(e.g. "liberal naturalism" or "non-reductive physicalism").

 

[moving finger]

If physicalism is true, everything is knowable
in principle from any perspective (literal only,
of course).

That's where I disagree. How do you conclude that everything is necessarily knowable in principle from any perspective if physicalism (ie the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical) is true?

How would you go about persuading me that there is anything
it is like to be a computer ?

Ask the computer. If it replies and tells you that there is something it is like to be it, why would you disbelieve it? If you would disbelieve it, why believe a human being who tells you there is something it is like to be that human being?

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

There is nothing private about it. (He makes much of the difference
between logical and metaphsyical supervenience, BTW).
And all the physicalists who think qualia must be rejected seem to
agree with him -- about the incompatibility, if not
about which of the two is best retained.

Sure there is. Physicalism simply says that everything supervenes on the physical. It does not say everything is measurable, it does not say everything can be described by mathematics, it does not say that everything is accessible from any particular perspective. These latter assumptions are not assumptions of physicalism, they are arbitrary additional assumptions which some people like Chalmers seem to wish to make. These additional assumptions are not necessary at all. And it is these additional unnecessary assumptions which lead to problems understanding qualia.

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

But then what does entail the inaccessability of consciousness?

This refers to a post of mine in a different thread I think?

Phenomenal consciousness is inaccessible to any perspective apart from the perspective of the conscious agent itself, by definition, because the conscious agent is an integral part of the conscious experience. Consciousness is not something where you can separate “observer” and “observed” (which separation is the fundamental assumption of 3rd person perspective science), because the observer is an inextricable part of the conscious experience. Hence, the 1st person perspective properties of phenomenal consciousness are not accessible to study from any other perspective.

If everything logically supervenes on the properties known to
physics, everything is 3rd-person accessible, since the
properties known to physics are, and since anything
logically deducibe from what is 3rd-person
knowable is itself 3rd-person knowable.(And therefore
not strongly emergent).

The argument is rather confused, but seems to be :
1) Premise : All physical properties are 3rd person accessible (knowable from any perspective)
2) Premise : Everything which supervenes on 3rd person accessible properties is logically deducible (knowable from any perspective)
3) Hence, if physicalism is true, everything is 3rd person accessible (knowable from any perspective)

Is this a correct rendition of your argument?

Unfortunately, I challenge both of your premises (1) and (2). Neither of these premises is a necessary premise under physicalism, these seem to be additional ad-hoc premises that you assume to be true (and thence lead to the so-called Hard Problem)

Thus you must be using some other sense of "supervenes". (Such
as natural supervenience. Chalmers thinks qualia supervene
naturally, but doens't think that is enough for full-blooded
physicalism).

Not at all.
“Full blooded physicalism” is simply the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical.

Yet they remain indescribable by the mathematical
language of physics. (And in that sense the HP remains)
All you are doing is employing
a sense of the word "physical" that is detached from physics.
There is nothing wrong with the concept, but it
would be better to call it something that makes it clear
you have watered-down your concpet of physicalism
(e.g. "liberal naturalism" or "non-reductive physicalism").

Not at all, my definition of physical is the same as the one that I gave in the "weak and strong emergence" thread, viz :

Physical = pertaining to physics, which is the study of the properties and principles related to matter and energy, and of systems comprising matter and energy.

Do you disagree with this definition?

And my definition of physicalism (viz that everything supervenes on the physical) comes straight from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Where do you get yours from?

But physicalism does NOT say that everything (which supervenes on the physical) is itself necessarily physical.

You seem to be insisting that all properties of the world must be describable mathematically. Physicalism simply says that everything supervenes on the physical, it does not say that everything is physical, it does not say that everything is measurable, it does not say that everything can be described by mathematics, it does not say that everything is accessible from any particular perspective. These latter are not premises of physicalism, some of them seem to be your own personal premises (and incidentally most of them are part of the premises of 3rd person perspective science). Your additional premises lead to a much more constrained version of physicalism, which I would then say is the "watered down version" since it imposes extra boundaries on physicalism which are unnecessary. "Full-blooded physicalism" does not include such unnecessary boundaries. Thus perhaps your notion of physicalism would be better described as "scientific physicalism" or "scientism" - meaning no disrespect to science, being a scientist myself (if the term "scientism" had not already been coined, but on the other hand scientism is indeed the belief that scientific knowledge is the foundation of all knowledge, which is exactly what you seem to be claiming)

Best Regards

 

[Royce]

Man, you ARE a realist! The rose continues to scatter light in a way that is interpreted differently by different organisms.

We can't know how different organisms interpret anything. The colored markings of red and black seem to be universal (inter-species) signs of poisonous organisms. So much so that other harmless organisms copy the markings as a defense mechanism. How long have cardinals or blue jays been around? Are they the color they are to impress us our their potential mates?
Octopus and squid use color to communicate and give warnings and show emotion or excitement. Regardless of what they perceive or interpreter they use color that existed long before there was a human mind to perceive it as red or any other color the same with sounds.

Bees, I am told, respond to the ultraviolet spectrum of the scattered radiation. "What is it like to see like a bee?" Red is what a human mind gets out of processing the scattered radiation, if no human is looking at a particular rose, there is no red there. Or so it seems to me, as much a nominalist as you are a realist.

I ask one simple question. How did life on Earth adapt to and develop organs to see and hear that which exists only in our human minds? How did life develop the genes, DNA, to produce or reflect a certain color consistently, if it, the information and the property of color, is just perception and interpretation? (Okay two related questions.)

Who says birds see "red"? Prove it! Presumably birds and other organisms responded to some Human association: such-and-such a distribution of frequencies ("spectrum" is the term physicsts use for that) is frequently found to accompany some particular situation of interest: ripe fruit, presence of nectar, fresh blood indicating danger from a predator, or many many other things. The organisms evolved under selection to take advantage of the situations, and part of that evolution entailed improved perception of the associated spectrum. When human minds came along they gave names and attributed values to these associations (the ones they could perceive) as they did with all the rest of their perceived world.

We gave it names. We named that which we see. We did not created it nor the perception of color. We simply observed it and agreed to call it color and each color red, blue, etc, figuratively comparing note and observations and agreeing that we see the same things and colors even though we have no way of knowing that what I perceive as red is the same perception of red that you have.

No. We see them as red because it is the property of our minds to interpret the range of spectra that way.

Could it just possibly be that our minds interpret the range of spectra as color because that is what it is. That all life that is able to generate, reflect and/or see color do it because it is color and it is real and we, life, respond to and utilize what is really there rather than just what is in our minds?
If it is only in our mind that we perceive color then why is it so prevalently used in both Flora and Fauna. All of life survives by being able to perceive reality as it really is to the best of their ability and needs, not by perceiving that which is not really real.

 

[octelcogopod]

About the color thing..

Whether or not color exists AS WE SEE IT, is irrelevant, other species and/or humans might see the color in a different way, but because it is the same frequency spectrum, we all see the same property.

I think it's more a matter of contrast than anything else.

Even if color wasn't perceived the same way, it would look the same compared to another color.
In that way we all see the same thing, because they all look the same when compared to each other, only we MIGHT have completely different WAYS of comparing.

Right?

 

[moving finger]

About the color thing..

Whether or not color exists AS WE SEE IT, is irrelevant, other species and/or humans might see the color in a different way, but because it is the same frequency spectrum, we all see the same property.

I think it's more a matter of contrast than anything else.

Even if color wasn't perceived the same way, it would look the same compared to another color.
In that way we all see the same thing, because they all look the same when compared to each other, only we MIGHT have completely different WAYS of comparing.

Right?

imho it makes sense to ask questions such as "can birds distinguish between objects which humans see as red and blue?" (in which case the answer is either yes or no, and we can verify this experimentally)

but it makes no sense to ask questions such as "do birds see red the same way that humans see red", because this question is meaningless (for the same reason that the question "what would moving finger's sensation of the colour red be like if experienced by octelcogopod?" is meaningless)

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

All of life survives by being able to perceive reality as it really is to the best of their ability and needs, not by perceiving that which is not really real.

I disagree. I believe life survives simply because it has learned to utilise properties of the world to give it competitive advantage (the ones who don't survive are generally the ones who fail to gain enough competitive advantage).

Survival does not entail that we have access to "reality as it really is", it entails only that our models and interpretations of the world provide us with at least some competitive advantage compared to those against which we compete.

As to whether the property "my phenomenal consciousness perception of the colour red" is real or not, I maintain that it is indeed a real property of the world, but it is a property which is accessible only from my conscious perspective (because consciousness inextricably convolves the perceiver and the perceived, they cannot be separated).

Best Regards

 

[Tournesol]

Phenomenal consciousness is inaccessible to any perspective apart from the perspective of the conscious agent itself, by definition, because the conscious agent is an integral part of the conscious experience.

The conclusion doesn't follow from the premise. My bathroom is an integral
part of my house, but that does not inaccessaible.

Consciousness is not something where you can separate “observer” and “observed” (which separation is the fundamental assumption of 3rd person perspective science), because the observer is an inextricable part of the conscious experience.

The conscious observer is an inextricable part of
the conscious experience. However, it is perfectly
possible to have unconsious obervers with merely
literal perspectives, suhc as CCTV cameras. Your
statementis an accurate statement abot cosnicousness, but
it
still does not show that any facts about consciousness
are necessitated by the existence of observers (in gerneal)
or perspectives (in general).

Hence, the 1st person perspective properties of phenomenal consciousness are not accessible to study from any other perspective.

Or rather from any other consciousness.

If everything logically supervenes on the properties known to
physics, everything is 3rd-person accessible, since the
properties known to physics are, and since anything
logically deducibe from what is 3rd-person
knowable is itself 3rd-person knowable.(And therefore
not strongly emergent).

The argument is rather confused, but seems to be :
1) Premise : All physical properties are 3rd person accessible (knowable from any perspective)
2) Premise : Everything which supervenes on 3rd person accessible properties is logically deducible (knowable from any perspective)
3) Hence, if physicalism is true, everything is 3rd person accessible (knowable from any perspective)

Is this a correct rendition of your argument?

(2) Should be "Everything which logically supervenes"

Unfortunately, I challenge both of your premises (1) and (2). Neither of these premises is a necessary premise under physicalism, these seem to be additional ad-hoc premises that you assume to be true (and thence lead to the so-called Hard Problem)

(2), in its correct form is a necessary truth per se.

Your "improved" defintion of physicalism doens't
actually assert anything.

Originally Posted by Tournesol

Thus you must be using some other sense of "supervenes". (Such
as natural supervenience. Chalmers thinks qualia supervene
naturally, but doens't think that is enough for full-blooded
physicalism).
Not at all.

“Full blooded physicalism” is simply the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical.

Not at all. That would allow emergentism , property dualism
and other theories stridently rejected by the more
hardline physicalists.

Quote:

Originally Posted by Tournesol
Yet they remain indescribable by the mathematical
language of physics. (And in that sense the HP remains)
All you are doing is employing
a sense of the word "physical" that is detached from physics.
There is nothing wrong with the concept, but it
would be better to call it something that makes it clear
you have watered-down your concpet of physicalism
(e.g. "liberal naturalism" or "non-reductive physicalism").
Not at all, my definition of physical is the same as the one that I gave in the "weak and strong emergence" thread, viz :

Physical = pertaining to physics, which is the study of the properties and principles related to matter and energy, and of systems comprising matter and energy.

Do you disagree with this definition?

Not at all. But once you realize that physical
theories invariably use the language
of mathematics, it follows that "All physical(ly describable) properties are 3rd person accessible (knowable from any perspective)"

And my definition of physicalism (viz that everything supervenes on the physical) comes straight from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Where do you get yours from?

Both I and the SEP have pointed out that the meaning of
"physical" needs to be specified.

http://www.science.uva.nl/~seop/entries/physicalism/#9

identifying physiclaims with current physics
is too shifting; identifying it with "perfect" or "final"
physics is useless since no-one knows what it is. Therefore
I identify it with a characteristi that all physical theories
have had, and , as far as anyone can tell, always will
have,, the fact that they are expressed mathematically.

But physicalism does NOT say that everything (which supervenes on the physical) is itself necessarily physical.

What logically supervenes on the physical is physical
in my sense.

You seem to be insisting that all properties of the world must be describable mathematically.

Do not confuse claims about reality with defintiions of
a theory.

Physicalism simply says that everything supervenes on the physical, it does not say that everything is physical, it does not say that everything is measurable, it does not say that everything can be described by mathematics, it does not say that everything is accessible from any particular perspective.

Well, of course if you leave "the physical" undefined
it won't say anything. It can't. It would be
a vacuous, non-commital theory. Non-commital
"theories" are always compatible with everything.

But you aren't consistently treating physicalism
as non-commital. Sometimes you agree
that "hte phsyical" is in some sense defined
by physics. But you don't want to follow
thorugh the implications.

These latter are not premises of physicalism, some of them seem to be your own personal premises (and incidentally most of them are part of the premises of 3rd person perspective science).

Physicalism must have some implications, or it is an empty claim.

What are the consequences of the claim
that "everything supervenes on something which
itself has unknown, unspecified properties"

Your additional premises lead to a much more constrained version of physicalism, which I would then say is the "watered down version" since it imposes extra boundaries on physicalism which are unnecessary. "Full-blooded physicalism" does not include such unnecessary boundaries. Thus perhaps your notion of physicalism would be better described as "scientific physicalism" or "scientism" - meaning no disrespect to science, being a scientist myself (if the term "scientism" had not already been coined, but on the other hand scientism is indeed the belief that scientific knowledge is the foundation of all knowledge, which is exactly what you seem to be claiming)

How many times do I have to point at that my claims
about what physicalism says are not claims about what our reality is ?

 

[Gelsamel Epsilon]

Colour and Sound are the interpretation of certain stimulus on our bodies. So they only exist as a interpretation out the world outside out bodies, a virtual reality if you may.

 

[moving finger]

Hi Tournesol

My bathroom is an integral part of my house, but that does not inaccessaible.

Interesting but false analogy. Presumably you can separate (at least logically) your bathroom from the rest of your house, such that you can define “this is my house, excluding bathroom” and “this is my bathroom, excluding the rest of my house”? But you cannot do that for phenomenal consciousness. The “I” of phenomenal consciousness does not exist separately from the experiences of phenomenal consciousness (so-called qualia), and the experiences of phenomenal consciousness do not exist independently of the “I”. They cannot be separated, because they are inextricably bound up together in the unity of conscious experience. This is precisely why 3rd person perspective science cannot, in principle, access these properties.

The conscious observer is an inextricable part of
the conscious experience. However, it is perfectly
possible to have unconsious obervers with merely
literal perspectives, suhc as CCTV cameras. Your
statementis an accurate statement abot cosnicousness, but
it
still does not show that any facts about consciousness
are necessitated by the existence of observers (in gerneal)
or perspectives (in general).

I have never claimed that facts about consciousness are necessitated by the existence of observers (in general) or perspectives (in general), thus I see no disagreement here. Apart from this, I am pleased to see that we seem to have some agreement.

(2), in its correct form is a necessary truth per se.

I disagree. Can you show why this is necessarily true? (or is this an assumption on your part?)

But once you realize that physical
theories invariably use the language
of mathematics, it follows that "All physical(ly describable) properties are 3rd person accessible (knowable from any perspective)"

What you call "physical theories" are in fact human inventions, created to describe the regularities that we observe in the physical world.
From the fact that "all physical theories use mathematical descriptions". it does NOT follow that "all physical properties are describable using mathematics"
There is at least one premise missing.

To arrive at your conclusion you would need at least one additional premise, such as "all physical properties are describable by or within physical theories"

And it is this premise which I claim is false.

identifying physiclaims with current physics
is too shifting; identifying it with "perfect" or "final"
physics is useless since no-one knows what it is. Therefore
I identify it with a characteristi that all physical theories
have had, and , as far as anyone can tell, always will
have,, the fact that they are expressed mathematically.

As I said, that is your assumption. And I claim that the assumption that “all physical properties are necessarily describable by mathematics” is false. And the subjective experiences of phenomenal consciousness (so-called qualia) are one example of such properties.

Well, of course if you leave "the physical" undefined
it won't say anything. It can't. It would be
a vacuous, non-commital theory. Non-commital
"theories" are always compatible with everything.

But you aren't consistently treating physicalism
as non-commital. Sometimes you agree
that "hte phsyical" is in some sense defined
by physics. But you don't want to follow
thorugh the implications.

Sure I do, I gave a definition of physical which you agree with. What implication am I not following through?

What are the consequences of the claim
that "everything supervenes on something which
itself has unknown, unspecified properties"

I have defined the “physical”, and you seem to agree with that definition. How can you then say that this “physical” has “unknown, unspecified properties”?

How many times do I have to point at that my claims
about what physicalism says are not claims about what our reality is ?

How many times do I have to point out that your claims about physicalism are not entailed by the thesis of physicalism? (they are instead additional assumptions that you seem to want to tack on)

Best Regards

 

[Tournesol]

Interesting but false analogy. Presumably you can separate (at least logically) your bathroom from the rest of your house, such that you can define “this is my house, excluding bathroom” and “this is my bathroom, excluding the rest of my house”? But you cannot do that for phenomenal consciousness. The “I” of phenomenal consciousness does not exist separately from the experiences of phenomenal consciousness (so-called qualia), and the experiences of phenomenal consciousness do not exist independently of the “I”. They cannot be separated, because they are inextricably bound up together in the unity of conscious experience. This is precisely why 3rd person perspective science cannot, in principle, access these properties.

The posit of an "I" or homunculus or inner observer (separate from the objective self, the sum total of my bodily organs and cognitive content)
is entriely dispensible. See Dennett, "Consicousness Explained".

I have never claimed that facts about consciousness are necessitated by the existence of observers (in general) or perspectives (in general), thus I see no disagreement here.

That makes your claim that patterns of cells in the Life World
have inaccessable subjective rpoeprties even harder to fathom.

(2), in its correct form is a necessary truth per se.
I disagree. Can you show why this is necessarily true? (or is this an assumption on your part?)

I would have thought it is obvious.

"Everything which logically supervenes on 3rd person accessible properties is, in principle, 3d-person accessible and knowable from any perspective"

Where is the problem? Logical deductin is the epitome
of a prespectivally independent process. If it is applied
to what is 3rd-person accessible in the frist place,
the results will be 3rd-person accessible. There is nowhere
for subjectivity or the 1st-personal to "get in".

What you call "physical theories" are in fact human inventions, created to describe the regularities that we observe in the physical world.
From the fact that "all physical theories use mathematical descriptions". it does NOT follow that "all physical properties are describable using mathematics"

It does if "physical property" is defined as "property featuring in some
succesful theory of physics, present or future".

It could perfectly well be the case that "not all material properties
are describable using the language of mathematics" or
"not all spatio-temporal properties
are describable using the language of mathematics".

You need to be clearer.

As usual, you are talking as though youhave some other defintiion
of "physical", but you haven't given it.

There is at least one premise missing.

To arrive at your conclusion you would need at least one additional premise, such as "all physical properties are describable by or within physical theories"

That is already given by defining "the physical" in terms
of physics. You have already said it should be, so whya re
you objectiong ? If you are withdrawing your statement
that "the physical" is definid in terms of physics,
what is it defined in terms of?

And it is this premise which I claim is false.

Without saying what should replace it.

identifying physiclaims with current physics
is too shifting; identifying it with "perfect" or "final"
physics is useless since no-one knows what it is. Therefore
I identify it with a characteristi that all physical theories
have had, and , as far as anyone can tell, always will
have,, the fact that they are expressed mathematically.
As I said, that is your assumption. And I claim that the assumption that “all physical properties are necessarily describable by mathematics” is false.

But that claim is unsupported unless you can define "phyiscal".

The ball is very much on your court on this one.
My claims are entailed by "physicalsm" and "physical" as I define
them. Saying you don;'t like my defintion is pretty pointless unless you have an alternative.

And the subjective experiences of phenomenal consciousness (so-called qualia) are one example of such properties.

You don't know they are physical. (Strictly speaking the claim
that they are physical is meaningless rather than false on your part).

But you aren't consistently treating physicalism
as non-commital.

Sighh.. I am not saying physicalism per se is non-commital.
I am saying that your approach of defining
physicalism as "supervenient on the physical"
without defining "the phsyical" is non-commital. It amounts
to the claim that "everything supervenes on some thing X".

Sure I do, I gave a definition of physical which you agree with. What implication am I not following through?

The exclusive use of mathematical descriptions by physics.

I have defined the “physical”, and you seem to agree with that definition. How can you then say that this “physical” has “unknown, unspecified properties”?

How can you say it doesn't have the property of
being mathematically describable ?

How many times do I have to point out that your claims about physicalism are not entailed by the thesis of physicalism? (they are instead additional assumptions that you seem to want to tack on)

You can pretend that "describable by physics" has no consequences, but it does.

 

[Tournesol]

Physical = pertaining to physics, which is the study of the properties and principles related to matter and energy, and of systems comprising matter and energy.

Do you disagree with this definition?

Almost. Of course when use the phrase "the physical" is the
definition of "physicalism" we don't mean nobel prizes, or electron
micoscopes, or partial differential equations, although
they all "pertain to physics". By "the physical" in the
definition of "physicalism" we of course mean certain
entities or properties or porcesses -- entities which
"pertain to" physics in the sense that they
are the objects of its investigation. We are usingthe
methodoolgy to delimit those entities which are
the object of the methdology. (To be more
precise, of its succesful investigation. There
are no thaumaturgic or phrenological entities.)

But physicalism does NOT say that everything (which supervenes on the physical) is itself necessarily physical.

It certainly does not say "everything is either physical or it isn't".

It says everything is directly phsyical, or has a certain kind
of close relationship with the physical -- a relationship of supervenience.

Now: everything that is directly phsyicial is the
kind of entity which can be succesfully studied by
phsyics, and that means studied mathemtatically,
and that means that mathematics must be able
to capture its properties, or the study will not be a sucess.

That means that everything directly physical must be
3rd-person communicable, since mathematics works
that way as a language.

And as for the derivative entities, it all depends on
exactly how you characterise "supervenience".

What logically supervenes on the 3rd-person desrbibale (what
can be deduced from it by logical necessity) is no less
3rd-person.

So there is at least one form of physiclaism that does indeed have the implication that "everything is measurable",
"everything can be described by mathematics" and so on.
(Even if it doesn't "say" it explictly)

How have I departed from your definition of "phsycialism" ?
I have "firmed up" your "pertaining to phsyics" so as to
exclude the Nobel Prize for Physics as a basic phsycial entitiy, and
I have "firmed up" your "supervenience" into "logical superveneince".
I think the latter is where the philoosphicla meat propbably is,
although it is the former that seems to be giving you the most trouble.

 

[moving finger]

The posit of an "I" or homunculus or inner observer (separate from the objective self, the sum total of my bodily organs and cognitive content)
is entriely dispensible.

I am not positing an homunculus – exactly the opposite! I am saying that to insist on a 3rd person perspective description of “qualia” is the equivalent of insisting that phenomenal consciousness can be separated into “qualia” and “homunculus” – which is exactly what you seem to be proposing. Phenomenal consciousness is a single unified property of the world, it makes no sense to try and split it into “observer” and “observed”, or “homunculus” and “qualia” (but your insistence that we can describe qualia from a 3rd person perspective amounts to such a splitting).

That makes your claim that patterns of cells in the Life World
have inaccessable subjective properties even harder to believe.

Note the use of the word necessary. I am not claiming there is necessarily any subjective (1st person perspective) internal properties within any particular GoL, I am simply claiming it is logically possible. But you seem to be quite categorically claiming that there are necessarily no such subjective properties in any such GoL. I have been asking how you know this, and all you can answer with is “I have access to all the information” – which simply begs the further question “how do you know you have access to all the information?”. You seem to assume that you have access to all the information, but you cannot show that this is necessarily the case.

Logical deductin is the epitome
of a prespectivally independent process. If it is applied
to what is 3rd-person accessible in the frist place,
the results will be 3rd-person accessible. There is nowhere
for subjectivity or the 1st-personal to "get in".

There is no law of logic or maths (as far as I am aware) which says that everything which supervenes on 3rd person accessible properties is itself necessarily knowable from any 3rd person perspective. This once again seems to be an assumption you are making.

It does if "physical property" is defined as "property featuring in some
succesful theory of physics, present or future".

Thus you are defining a physical property as something which is necessarily describable by a physical theory. I don’t agree with that definition, but if I did it would simply make your argument tautological – all physical properties are describable because a physical property is defined as something which is describable. Not very enlightening, is it?

You need to be clearer.

No, I simply don’t need to accept your personal definition of a physical property.

As usual, you are talking as though youhave some other defintiion
of "physical", but you haven't given it.

I have given my definition of physical already, and you (almost) agreed with it. Would you like me to repeat it?

Without saying what should replace it.

There is not necessarily anything required to replace it. A false premise is a false premise, it does not follow that there must be another premise to replace it.

But that claim is unsupported unless you can define "phyiscal".

Done already, and you (almost) agreed with the definition, Would you like me to repeat it?

My claims are entailed by "physicalsm" and "physical" as I define
them. Saying you don;'t like my defintion is pretty pointless unless you have an alternative.

Whether I like your definitions or not is irrelevant. Your definitions are your definitions, but I don’t define physicalism or physical the way that you do. I have given my definitions several times already, hence cannot understand what you are referring to about lack of alternatives.

you don't know they are physical. (Strictly speaking the claim
that they are physical is meaningless rather than false on your part).

That’s true, I don’t. But since I have no reason to believe these properties are not physical, I use Occam’s Razor.

The exclusive use of mathematical descriptions by physics.

That physics uses a mathematical language for descriptions does not imply that every property of the physical world can be described by mathematics (unless one chooses to define physical property such that this argument becomes tautological, as you choose to do)

How can you say it doesn't have the property of
being mathematically describable ?

What is being described, and who is doing the describing? Within phenomenal consciousness, there is no observer and no observed.

You can pretend that "describable by physics" has no consequences, but it does.

What is this cryptic comment supposed to mean?

Best Regards

 

[moving finger]

Of course when use the phrase "the physical" is the
definition of "physicalism" we don't mean nobel prizes, or electron
micoscopes, or partial differential equations, although
they all "pertain to physics". By "the physical" in the
definition of "physicalism" we of course mean certain
entities or properties or porcesses -- entities which
"pertain to" physics in the sense that they
are the objects of its investigation. We are usingthe
methodoolgy to delimit those entities which are
the object of the methdology. (To be more
precise, of its successful investigation. There
are no thaumaturgic or phrenological entities.)

There is nothing anywhere in the proposed definition of “physical” which implies that all properties of the physical are necessarily accessible to 3rd person perspective (objective scientific) examination or description.

everything that is directly phsyicial is the
kind of entity which can be succesfully studied by
phsyics, and that means studied mathemtatically,
and that means that mathematics must be able
to capture its properties, or the study will not be a sucess.

The definition of physical says nothing about all properties of the physical being necessarily accessible to 3rd person perspective (objective scientific) examination or description.

That means that everything directly physical must be
3rd-person communicable, since mathematics works
that way as a language.

Nope, as pointed out above, this seems to be another unwarranted assumption you are making. The definition of physical says nothing about all properties of the physical being necessarily accessible to 3rd person perspective (objective scientific) examination or description.

So there is at least one form of physiclaism that does indeed have the implication that "everything is measurable",
"everything can be described by mathematics" and so on.

This argument is unsound since at least one premise is false – that all properties of the physical are necessarily accessible to 3rd person perspective (objective scientific) examination or description.

How have I departed from your definition of "phsycialism" ?

You have chosen to assume that all properties of the physical are necessarily accessible to 3rd person perspective (objective scientific) examination or description – and that is the premise that I believe is false.

Best Regards

 

[Royce]

I disagree. I believe life survives simply because it has learned to utilise properties of the world to give it competitive advantage (the ones who don't survive are generally the ones who fail to gain enough competitive advantage).

(I apologize for the lateness of this response. I tried to post it yesterday afternoon but must have hit the wrong button as it didn't post.)

You are a scientist. Your goal as a scientist is to ask and hopefully answer the question "How?" How do we see color? How do we hear sound? How does life survive? I am a philosopher, at least a lay philosopher. My goal is to ask the next question "Why?" Why do we see, hear, survive etc.

I have or am coming full circle. As a child, a naïve realist, I saw the rose, the car, the ball as red because they are red. I later learned about light, photons, wavelengths, energy levels and electrons. I then knew how we see color and how it is transmitted as it is. As most of us do I assumed that that was all that there was to know. There is no such thing as color or sound, that we perceive these things and interpret them in our minds.

As I grew older and hopefully wiser I began to ask the question "Why?" Why do photons of different wavelength and energy levels effect us the way that they do so that we perceive color, as apparently do all of the other color-sighted animals? Why do flowers, birds fish etc spend so much effort and energy to reflect or produce so much color (and sound) if it does not really exist and is only our interpretation of physical phenomena? Why and how would life evolve organs, nerves and brains to perceive and is some cases produce that which is not real?

Doing away with all of the B.S. and complicated theories, all of the extraneous information and preconceived notions, Using Occam's Razor to its fullest extent, after years of contemplation, I have finally come to the very simplest, most reasonable explanation. BECAUSE IT IS! It is what it appears to be. An object stuck by white light appears red to us because it is red. All of the science and theories tell us how it is and how it does it and how we see red objects as red or any other color. The reason, the why of it all is simply because it is red. That is what realism, reality is and that's what realist do, accept the obvious and simplest answer. It is what it is and appears to be.

Now, after a very long dissertation about very little, I will respond to your last post. You wrote that life survives by developing an edge over the competition. Again this is how. I am simply asking one more question. How does life evolve and develop that edge it needs to survive? Once again, to me, the simplest more reasonable answer is that it perceives and responds via natural selection to reality better, more realistically, more to what it really is, than the others. That is life's edge. It is aware of and response to its environment, its reality. The better it is at perceiving or modeling reality, the better its edge, it's chances are to survive.

 

[Tournesol]

I am not positing an homunculus – exactly the opposite! I am saying that to insist on a 3rd person perspective description of “qualia” is the equivalent of insisting that phenomenal consciousness can be separated into “qualia” and “homunculus” – which is exactly what you seem to be proposing.

It's not my problem. If you are going to insist
that qualia are necessarily and inherently first-personal,
then you need to define "first person" somehow
or other. A 1stP which is a merely unconscious
observer is no good. You have rejected the homunculus.
What does that leave you with ?

Phenomenal consciousness is a single unified property of the world, it makes no sense to try and split it into “observer” and “observed”, or “homunculus” and “qualia” (but your insistence that we can describe qualia from a 3rd person perspective amounts to such a splitting).

I have not insisted we can do that. I have explained that the claim
we cannot is incompatible with the kind of phyicalism exemplified
by the GoL.

That makes your claim that patterns of cells in the Life World
have inaccessable subjective properties even harder to believe.

Note the use of the word necessary. I am not claiming there is necessarily any subjective (1st person perspective) internal properties within any particular GoL, I am simply claiming it is logically possible. But you seem to be quite categorically claiming that there are necessarily no such subjective properties in any such GoL. I have been asking how you know this, and all you can answer with is “I have access to all the information”
– which simply begs the further question “how do you know you have access to all the information?”.

Have you ever played Life ? You look at the screen.
It's all there.

http://www.btinternet.com/~ahcox/GBA/Life.html

You seem to assume that you have access to all the information, but you cannot show that this is necessarily the case.

I can and I have. Life is essentially a wel-defined mathematical
construct. The fact that it is a game of perfect infomation
is just a technical statement, like saying 23 is a prime.

What are your qualification for denying any of that ?

Logical deductin is the epitome
of a prespectivally independent process. If it is applied
to what is 3rd-person accessible in the frist place,
the results will be 3rd-person accessible. There is nowhere
for subjectivity or the 1st-personal to "get in".

There is no law of logic or maths (as far as I am aware) which says that everything which supervenes

Logically supervenes. Logical supervenience means
logical deducability. logical deducability is objective. Or do you
dispute that, as well?

on 3rd person accessible properties is itself necessarily knowable from any 3rd person perspective. This once again seems to be an assumption you are making.

I have explained it as carefully as I can. It would be completely
obvious to most people with a maths/science/computing background.

It does if "physical property" is defined as "property featuring in some
succesful theory of physics, present or future".

Thus you are defining a physical property as something which is necessarily describable by a physical theory. I don’t agree with that definition,

or clearly disagree, since it is obviously covered by "pertaining to physics"

but if I did it would simply make your argument tautological
– all physical properties are describable because a physical property is defined as something which is describable. Not very enlightening, is it?

Aaaagh!

Necssarilly true statememnts are SUPPOSED to be tautological!

By you standards, no argument is valid;
either they are not necessarily true, or they are tautological.

I am honestly beginning to think you have no understanding of logic.

You need to be clearer.

No, I simply don’t need to accept your personal definition of a physical property.

The claim that it is a bad definition is vacuous unless you have
a better one. All you have is a vaguer one.

There is not necessarily anything required to replace it. A false premise is a false premise, it does not follow that there must be another premise to replace it.

Your claim that is false premise is unjustified.

I have given my definitions several times already, hence cannot understand what you are referring to about lack of alternatives.

You haven't explained what the difference is.

You haven't explained what stops your definition amounting to mine.
"Pertaining to phsyics". OK. What characterises physics? I have
answered that question, you haven't.

you don't know they are physical. (Strictly speaking the claim
that they are physical is meaningless rather than false on your part).

That’s true, I don’t. But since I have no reason to believe these properties are not physical, I use Occam’s Razor.

Ha ha! You may apply the Razor to life, but you don't apply
it to Life.

In any case, if you can't define "the physical" or "phsyics",
you are in no position to say whether the Razor applies.

The razor adjudicates between theories which work ITFP.

If you don't know what physicalism is you,
don't know whether it works or not.The exclusive use of mathematical descriptions by physics.

That physics uses a mathematical language for descriptions does not imply that every property of the physical world can be described by mathematics (unless one chooses to define physical property such that this argument becomes tautological, as you choose to do)

I do, and quite validly. You would say that "a bachelor is an unmarried
man" is tautological. In a way, it is. I would ask you: how can a correct
definition fail to be tautological?

How can you say it doesn't have the property of
being mathematically describable ?

What is being described, and who is doing the describing? Within phenomenal consciousness, there is no observer and no observed.

Maybe. Whatever. The original question I asked was

I have defined the “physical”, and you seem to agree with that definition. How can you then say that this “physical” has “unknown, unspecified properties”?

IOW, if it is not clear, I asked a question about "the physical"
not "consciousness".

How about answering that question.

You can pretend that "describable by physics" has no consequences, but it does.

What is this cryptic comment supposed to mean?

Answer my qeustion: "what characterises physics" and you'll
find out.

 

[Tournesol]

There is nothing anywhere in the proposed definition of “physical” which implies that all properties of the physical are necessarily accessible to 3rd person perspective (objective scientific) examination or description.

I explain that in the following passage:

everything that is directly phsyicial is the
kind of entity which can be succesfully studied by
phsyics, and that means studied mathemtatically,
and that means that mathematics must be able
to capture its properties, or the study will not be a sucess.
The definition of physical says nothing about all properties of the physical being necessarily accessible to 3rd person perspective (objective scientific) examination or description.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Tournesol
That means that everything directly physical must be
3rd-person communicable, since mathematics works
that way as a language.

Nope, as pointed out above, this seems to be another unwarranted assumption you are making. The definition of physical says nothing about all properties of the physical being necessarily accessible to 3rd person perspective (objective scientific) examination or description.

I have just given an arguemtn to the effect that they are.
You are sounding increasingly logic-blind.

This argument is unsound since at least one premise is false – that all properties of the physical are necessarily accessible to 3rd person perspective (objective scientific) examination or description.

I have justified that claim.

Quote:
Originally Posted by Tournesol

How have I departed from your definition of "phsycialism" ?
You have chosen to assume that all properties of the physical are necessarily accessible to 3rd person perspective (objective scientific) examination or description – and that is the premise that I believe is false.

You haven't said why it is false. It may well be a "conseqeunce"
of "pertaining to physics" should you ever get round to
saying how physics is characterised.

 

[mubashirmansoor]

Hello everybody, I really enjoyed the discusion its really interesting... now something, I find that there are open rooms for a whole different world for each single person... what I mean is that the world that is both observed and experienced can be actually different from the other person's and in other words we live in a type of relative network of our asumptions...
I learned a lot in this thread and I would like to thank everyone here.
Please inform me my mistake :)