Is Time Merely Constant Change?

[Tournesol]

I'm not saying it is "going somewhere". "In motion", "changing", "dynamic", everyone understands these things slightly differently, we hardly need to argue about their meaning.

It is precisely because they are understood differently that we do need
to establish their meanings.

Yeah, and the question is then what is it that is undergoing a change. If we do not wish to follow the path of dualism, then it seems the sensible alternative is to say that all of reality is in motion (instead of just our "consciousness" as is the case in dualistic view)

Something like that.

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

This makes spacetime non-sensical concept as far as ontology

It conflicts with the "block universe" interpretation of relativity.

When all is said and done, all our sense of reality is based on a set of assumptions.

Since we reject assumptions that conflict with evidence. it is based
on evidence too.

I cannot really claim our sense of reality is caused by the physical processes of the brain without first having made a large amount of assumptions so to build such and such worldview where it certainly makes sense to say that the brain "between my senses" is giving rise to my subjective experience.

Yes. You have to start by taking a scientific picture
of the mid-world relationship realistically, in order
to come to your conclusions that nothing
should be taken realistically. Which is a contradiction.

In other words, I have to choose some path of ontology and try to follow it, to see if it leads anywhere. At this time I cannot explicitly deny dualism or idealism or solipsism, but I can say those views seem very arbitrary and very unlikely to me.

Yes. we can say what is probably true, in ontology.

When I make assertions about motion or about my subjective experience being caused by such and such things, these are claims that make sense to me according to the knowledge that I hold at current time, even if these assertions are subject to change if I come across information that sparks a larger paradigm change in my worldview.

That is how any scientifically informed person makes realistic
statements. But you want to reserve realism for
yourself, while telling others that they know nothing
of ontology...

Map/territory relationship should not be confused with some kind of "anti-realism". It doesn't deny the existence of objective reality. It just notes that the intrinsic nature of reality is not found by classifying the stable behaviour around us into entities which have such and such properties.

...like you do here. Arriving at a simple, predictive map is the
best guide we have to what reality really is. It isn't final
or perfect. But you allow yourslef wo work within its imperfections.

Just like a tornado is not a fundamental object and it doesn't have a metaphysical identity, any stable behaviour cannot be said to have a metaphysical identity outside of some specific semantical criteria to classifying them that way.

we can say that if a map works, it is telling us something about reality.

I.e. it is not to say that electrons are not there even when we think they are. It is to say that electrons are not metaphysically "objects with identity" just because we like to think of them that way.

If thinking about them that way works, that is a good
reason it suppose they are objects with identity.
That is your basis for taking realistically the things
you take realistically. It is only problem when other
people do it, apparently.

Care to tell us what is your ontological view on this?

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

If you think about the way you try to figure out how some system comes up with the behaviour you observe, it should be obvious we can understand the same thing in many different ways.

We have falsified many theories and are rarely faced with two equally
good theories we cannot decide between.

I think each QM interpretation and each interpretation of relativity is a valid example of this.

I think they are not.

Many physicisist and philosophers have also noted that the elementary particles of current models are things that are likely to only exist in the models, not necessarily in reality, although the behaviour we observe is real. If this doesn't seem to make sense;

http://tech.groups.yahoo.com/group/ai-philosophy/message/9215

It shouldn't have to do with physics in that physics should be holding a null interpretation of predictive math

Absolutely not. The whole point of physics is to say what the
world is. Combining that with the valid points about what is and
isn't knowable, subtracting the various contradictions we arrive
at modest realism: we make statements about what the
real world is probably like.

Orbitals are fairly well-defined. But that is not really the point.
If quantum fuzziness works as a predictive model, then I
will project that metaphysically.

What do you mean by that?

I mean that having well-defined spatial boundaries is not the prerequisite for being metaphysically real.

Featuring in a predictive theory is the prerequisite for being metaphysically real.

Note that any boundary you draw, you draw it according to some criteria.

Some criteria work better than others. The playing field is not level.

How could we say there exists a boundary even without us choosing to draw the boundary in such and such way? Can you see how one could simply choose to say that there is no such thing as space, but there are only atoms in their extended sense, and that atom is the size of its whole "influence sphere" (whatever that is thought to mean)?

That theory would soon run into problems.

Metaphysical nature is what map/territory relationship is about. The whole exercise is an attempt to point out *why* it is naive to assume reality probably is the way we imagine it.

On the contrary, it is irrational to suppose that a theory
works for some reason other than modelling reality correctly.

A man made concept of the boundary of an atom would be, for example, the place where other atoms get deflected (where atoms collide with each others).

This is the distance at which the residual electromagnetism causes a repulsion. It is not a place where there is a wall of an atom, but rather where there is such and such information about the atom. There is information about the atom further away too, and we cannot say this is a metaphysical boundary, it is a man-made boundary.

All boundaries of an atom you can think of are like this. And furthermore, when I say "information about an atom", notice how that too is true only by accepting a certain way to identify an atom and information that is "about the atom". (There already was some discussion about identity of things)

Then we are finding out what realty is in terms of our
"man made" concepts. You are implying that we don't know anything unless
reality provides us with some kind of non-man-made concepts. That doesn't
follow.

Unfortunately the link doesn't work... ... but, Peter D Jones? Are you Peter, just using a different name? Haven't we been going through the same issues elsewhere?

yes and yes.

Haven't I already said;
Of course any astute person also readily recognizes that motion is just as much a man-made concept as time and as such these views should be equally valid, so I would like to be more careful in my assertion and just claim that it is merely useful for many purposes to assume that motion is more fundamental than time, and it is certainly useful to recognize that "time", as a backdrop for motion, is not necessarily of fundamental existence at all.

That should be reversed.

I've said many times that motion can be understood in many different ways. The point is that you cannot say we observe time, rather we first observe motion and when we structure a more sophisticated worldview, we decide to use such concept as "time".

"more sophisticated". You said it. The sophisticated analysis is better.

 

[nannoh]

When was it invented?

Time was invented when animals (assumedly anthropods) took note of change and applied to their activities in a predictive manner.

 

[Tournesol]

What happened before that?

 

[nannoh]

What happened before that?

There were no contrived interpretations of change that we know of. Change was simply another condition to be spontaneously dealt with by animals, plants and other organisms. Change was and is a condition that had to be adapted to the same as cold, heat, flood, hunger and so on. Conscious decisions to interpret change as "time" did not exist as far as we know. Not until there was a perceived requirement to predict.

 

[Tournesol]

change is the same thing being in different states at different times.

 

[AnssiH]

It is precisely because they are understood differently that we do need
to establish their meanings.

I guess what I actually meant with reality being in motion was described in the earlier posts which you haven't read, so just to re-cap, the point was to present a contrasted view from the idea that spacetime is static. In the static view all of past and all of future exists all the time, and we are simply "reading the spacetime from one location at a time".

In this view reality would be static and it does not explain in any sensical way why subjective experience is not static, other than suggesting that subjective experience is a case of some kind of metaphysical entity being in motion in spacetime. (Notice how the idea of "motion" is used in two different ways here, one is the motion of "consciousness", and other is how the consciousness is observing static things as if they are in motion)

I was pointing out that this is unnecessary assumption even if you assume that Relativity makes ALL the correct observable predictions. It's one type of mental model.

Something like that.

http://www.geocities.com/peterdjones/tim_aspects.html#mctaggart

I think I need to read that page from the beginning to understand what that section is about.

But just to comment on few things at the beginning:
Time either exists or does not; if it exists it is either objective or subjective; if objective, it either involves flow or not.

The question is rather, is "time" a proper concept to understand the metaphysical nature of motion. I.e, is it fair to say that there needs to exist some sort of invisible entity called "time", before anything can move.
What do you think?

You argue against "there is only movement" with "how do you define movement without bringing time?" The point with arguing there is only movement is to remove "time" as a some kind of metaphysical entity or canvas from our conception of reality, on the basis that it is unnecessary component; motion can be metaphysical directly. It complicates matters to define speed of time and also the speed of motion on top of that.

Also, I think rather than saying time is either objective or subjective, we need to rather discuss by what degree the experience of time is subjective and by what degree we could expect it to be objective. For example, I think it is fair to say that the observed "rate of time" is not an objective property in any scheme (and when you think about this, you realize that even such a concept as "speed of time" is somewhat confused, and it is far simpler to say speed of motion)

There is a certain regularity to events e.g. if B1 is simultaneous with B2 and B2 is simultaneous with B3 then B1 is simultaneous with B3

Are you using the concept of simultaneity differently than it is used in relativity?

It conflicts with the "block universe" interpretation of relativity.

Of course it does, it is the alternative view.

Since we reject assumptions that conflict with evidence. it is based
on evidence too.

Yeah, of course, we observe things and make assumptions accordingly. What is notable is that the observation is never objectively made, since only way to interpret any sensory input is to do it according to the assumptions thus far made. This is true to any single experiment we can possibly conceive.

Yes. You have to start by taking a scientific picture
of the mid-world relationship realistically, in order
to come to your conclusions that nothing
should be taken realistically. Which is a contradiction.

To me it just means I cannot be sure of my views. Also there is a fair amount of unnecessary wordplay involved when I first say "I cannot be certain of anything", and someone says I'm contradicting myself since then I cannot be certain of being uncertain; perhaps I am certain after all. Just what I would expect to happen when our thoughts are are restricted to semantical concepts. Goes right besides the point.

But you want to reserve realism for
yourself, while telling others that they know nothing
of ontology...

I've said before that "realism" is always to a degree "naive realism", since each view of reality is a conception made of man-made concepts. I do not claim I know what reality is like. And understanding the concept of noumenons is knowledge of ontology, but it is also a realization that ontology is not answerable even in principle.

Map/territory relationship should not be confused with some kind of "anti-realism". It doesn't deny the existence of objective reality. It just notes that the intrinsic nature of reality is not found by classifying the stable behaviour around us into entities which have such and such properties.

...like you do here.

Where in that quote I claim to know what reality is like?

Arriving at a simple, predictive map is the
best guide we have to what reality really is.

Yeah, and it isn't an answer to ontology. No past model ever were, and no future model ever will be. They are models, they classify reality into some bits of identity with some properties, because this is useful for making predictions about the behaviour of reality. This way we know what is about to happen in reality before "reality itself" knows it, so to speak.

If thinking about them that way works, that is a good
reason it suppose they are objects with identity.
That is your basis for taking realistically the things
you take realistically. It is only problem when other
people do it, apparently.

I do think QM behaviour brings quite considerable weight to my argument about "non-objectivity of identity of things".

I think each QM interpretation and each interpretation of relativity is a valid example of this.

I think they are not.

Yeah I know, on the basis that you don't think the are equivalent... You do realize though that each and everyone has been built by a human brain, after observing the same observable behaviour?

Absolutely not. The whole point of physics is to say what the
world is.

You are completely wrong here. The whole point of physics is to come up with predictive models. It is philosophy when physicists give their interpretation as to why such and such math brings out the correct predictions, since they recognize we can make many conflicting assertions here without any observable effects. Most physicists know very well.

Combining that with the valid points about what is and
isn't knowable, subtracting the various contradictions we arrive
at modest realism: we make statements about what the
real world is probably like.

Perhaps the difference in our views is simply that I think it is more proper to say "we make statements about how to correctly predict reality". This does not entail knowing any single answer to any single ontological question. It just entails having made good assumptions about what things exist (with more or less stability) and how they behave.

Since Einstein showed mass is basically just energy, and since QM behaviour showed in more detail that little things are not very stable in their identity in space and time when they move from one place to another (whatever that means), it became less reasonable to assume reality is in ontological sense like the models with which we choose to understand the behaviour of so-called sub-atomic particles.

I mean that having well-defined spatial boundaries is not the prerequisite for being metaphysically real.

Yeah, exactly. There is objective reality, but to draw boundaries is something that we do, not something that nature does. That's what I'm saying.

I'm not saying it because of "QM fuzzyness", but because it is impossible to show that some boundary we draw is more than something we have drawn for convenience. Just like the boundaries between countries are not metaphysically real, the boundary between an atom and a space cannot be said to be more than a convention.

How could we say there exists a boundary even without us choosing to draw the boundary in such and such way? Can you see how one could simply choose to say that there is no such thing as space, but there are only atoms in their extended sense, and that atom is the size of its whole "influence sphere" (whatever that is thought to mean)?

That theory would soon run into problems.

Why would it run into problems? Because you are used to think in terms of space and matter duality? Why do you do that? No one has ever seen empty space. Space is filled with electromagnetic activity, which is what atoms are pretty much made of. There's no reason why you couldn't build a model where you use such terminology (and associated definitions) that there is nothing called "space". This could even be beneficial in that it removes some invalid assumptions about the "identity of location in space".

On the contrary, it is irrational to suppose that a theory
works for some reason other than modelling reality correctly.

No one is saying it isn't modeling reality correctly. You are missing the point. A weather simulation is modeling Earth's atmosphere correctly and thus it makes pretty accurate predictions. In principle we could build a weather simulation that works by moving everything according to QED. But the question is closer to something like, should it be assumed the particles move in many universes (like in MWI), or should their paths be calculated into static spacetime (transactional interpretation) or should the particles be modeled as something completely different, as if there is just a space with energy waves in interaction? Or something completely different?

Each of these would come up with the same predictions. Each of these feature ideas where things like particles and space and time are understood little bit differently, but the end result is exactly the behaviour as predicted by QED.

A man made concept of the boundary of an atom would be, for example, the place where other atoms get deflected (where atoms collide with each others).

This is the distance at which the residual electromagnetism causes a repulsion. It is not a place where there is a wall of an atom, but rather where there is such and such information about the atom. There is information about the atom further away too, and we cannot say this is a metaphysical boundary, it is a man-made boundary.

All boundaries of an atom you can think of are like this. And furthermore, when I say "information about an atom", notice how that too is true only by accepting a certain way to identify an atom and information that is "about the atom". (There already was some discussion about identity of things)
Then we are finding out what realty is in terms of our

"man made" concepts. You are implying that we don't know anything unless
reality provides us with some kind of non-man-made concepts. That doesn't
follow.

There is no such thing as non-man-made concept. There are concepts because they can be used to predict the behaviour of some system without knowing what really makes the system tick.

Also consider this question; What does an atom probably look like? Can you try and give an answer?

"more sophisticated". You said it. The sophisticated analysis is better.

More sophisticated is not the same as more fundamental. Physics simulations add more and more properties to things to calculate their behaviour more realistically (since they can't realistically go along modeling each sub-atomic particle), which can be said to be more sophistication, but it doesn't mean these properties really exist.

-Anssi

 

[nannoh]

change is the same thing being in different states at different times.

Change seems to me to be the condition of transition. There are different rates of change for different things. If everything was changing at the same rate then change would be imperceptible. It's only because we have references between contrasting rates of change that we are able to perceive change. So, without various and diverse rates of change as references, change is undetectable.

It's the nature of change that led humans to use contrasting rates of change to invent the measuring and comparitive system of time. We use the system of measuring change against more and less active changes (time) as one of our unique adaptations to the condition of change. It may be because we have more grey matter to work with that we arrived at this invention but, whales have larger brains than us however I don't know if they have invented a similar adaptation to change.

Time is an elaboration of the natural adaptive techniques that have evolved in the nervous systems of the organisms from which we have evolved. The sensory organs of all organisms use nature's diversity of conditions to judge how far to jump, how much to eat and when to hibernate among a many other survival activities.

But these adaptations and reactions to natural conditions are what we call "instinctive". They are not consciously measured responses to change or any other condition. Our adaptation to the conditions in nature, including change or "transition", is an intellectual one. We have measured the rate of the rotation of the Earth in relation to the relatively stable condition of the sun and used relationships like this to develop an abstraction of change known as "time". We use this abstraction to predict many things but ultimately to support our survival.

So time is not an illusion, by definition. It is an elaboration, an abstraction and invention that is used, like a tool, in our adaptation to the natural condition of change.

By definition illusion is this:

a misinterpreted perception that is caused by mistaking something present for something it is not. Illusions commonly occur with information that is seen or heard. For example, a common illusion is misinterpreting the noise made by wind for a voice. By contrast, a hallucination is a strong sensory perception that one has of an object or event while awake, when no such object or event exists.

www.dbs-stn.org/glossary2.asp[/URL]

 

[mosassam]

QUOTE FROM ANISSH
(Notice how the idea of "motion" is used in two different ways here, one is the motion of "consciousness", and other is how the consciousness is observing static things as if they are in motion)

There are various assumptions, models and interpretations involving sensorial data. What, in your view, is occurring when one 'observes' ones own consciousness?
The main point I'm making is, what happens when an observation is made that is not reliant on the 'dubiousness' of sensorial data?

 

[Tournesol]

The question is rather, is "time" a proper concept to understand the metaphysical nature of motion. I.e, is it fair to say that there needs to exist some sort of invisible entity called "time", before anything can move.
What do you think?

I think it does. Probably

You argue against "there is only movement" with "how do you define movement without bringing time?" The point with arguing there is only movement is to remove "time" as a some kind of metaphysical entity or canvas from our conception of reality, on the basis that it is unnecessary component; motion can be metaphysical directly.

How?

It complicates matters to define speed of time and also the speed of motion on top of that.

That is not what I am saying. I have been saying that the "speed" questions
are not very philosophically important.

Yeah, of course, we observe things and make assumptions accordingly. What is notable is that the observation is never objectively made, since only way to interpret any sensory input is to do it according to the assumptions thus far made.

Assumptions may be objective.

I've said before that "realism" is always to a degree "naive realism", since each view of reality is a conception made of man-made concepts.

That's not how Naive Realism is defined.

I do not claim I know what reality is like.

You claim to know what it is not, in various ways.

Where in that quote I claim to know what reality is like?

"It just notes that the intrinsic nature of reality is not found by classifying the stable behaviour around us into entities which have such and such properties".

why not? It might be right.

Arriving at a simple, predictive map is the
best guide we have to what reality really is

Yeah, and it isn't an answer to ontology.

Saying what reality really is, however tentatively,
is ontology.

No past model ever were, and no future model ever will be. They are models, they classify reality into some bits of identity with some properties, because this is useful for making predictions about the behaviour of reality. This way we know what is about to happen in reality before "reality itself" knows it, so to speak.

And why do these useful models work, if
they do not in some way resemble reality?

I do think QM behaviour brings quite considerable weight to my argument about "non-objectivity of identity of things".

It's non non-objective, it just works in a different
way to classical assumptions. You are much too
quick to say that things are not objective.

Yeah I know, on the basis that you don't think the are equivalent... You do realize though that each and every [interpretation of quantum physics] has been built by a human brain, after observing the same observable behaviour?

Not really. The statistical interpretation is ruled
out by single-particle experiments. Local HV theories
are rules out by the Aspect experiment.

And then there's all the intra-theoretic stuff that you always
ignore...

You are completely wrong here. The whole point of physics is to come up with predictive models.

Nope.

"Physics (from the Greek, φύσις (phúsis), "nature" and φυσικῆ (phusiké), "knowledge of nature") is the science concerned with the discovery and understanding of the fundamental laws which govern matter, energy, space, and time."

"The Road to Reality"(Book by R Penrose. Note: nto the road
to better predictions).

"the study of matter and energy"

"Discipline of Science dealing with the properties of matter and energy. Includes; acoustics, atomic physics, cryogenics, electromagnetism, elementary particle physics, fluid dynamics, geophysics, mathematical physics, mechanics, molecular physics, nuclear physics, optics, plasma physics, quantum physics, solid state physics, statistical mechanics, thermodynamics.".

Perhaps the difference in our views is simply that I think it is more proper to say "we make statements about how to correctly predict reality". This does not entail knowing any single answer to any single ontological question. It just entails having made good assumptions about what things exist (with more or less stability) and how they behave.

What things are and how they behave is ontology!

Since Einstein showed mass is basically just energy,

Don't you mean he showed that the mathematical formula e=mc^2
is a good predictor? Again, you can't stick to
your own anti-realism!

and since QM behaviour showed in more detail that little things are not very stable in their identity in space and time when they move from one place to another

Ditto.

(whatever that means), it became less reasonable to assume reality is in ontological sense like the models with which we choose to understand the behaviour of so-called sub-atomic particles.

People became anti-realist about some theories
because it allowed them to cling to dogmas
like determininism.

Yeah, exactly. There is objective reality, but to draw boundaries is something that we do, not something that nature does. That's what I'm saying.

How do you know that nature doesn't do it? Statements
about what the world isn't are still ontology!

I'm not saying it because of "QM fuzzyness", but because it is impossible to show that some boundary we draw is more than something we have drawn for convenience.

The fact that it works predictively, if it
does, is "something more".

Just like the boundaries between countries are not metaphysically real, the boundary between an atom and a space cannot be said to be more than a convention.

That's not remotely analogous. Hydrogen atoms are so small
that hey can pass through the molecular structure of rubber, If I redefeine
them as being 1cm across--they still pass through rubber.
My claims is therefore falsified.

That is completely different from re-drawing a national boundary.

Why would it run into problems?

It would make false predicitions as in the hydrogen atom example.

No one is saying it isn't modeling reality correctly. You are missing the point. A weather simulation is modeling Earth's atmosphere correctly and thus it makes pretty accurate predictions. In principle we could build a weather simulation that works by moving everything according to QED. But the question is closer to something like, should it be assumed the particles move in many universes (like in MWI), or should their paths be calculated into static spacetime (transactional interpretation) or should the particles be modeled as something completely different, as if there is just a space with energy waves in interaction? Or something completely different?

if we can settle on an outstandingly good theory we
are entitled to say reality is "like" that. The kind
of situation prevailing in QM with multiple interpretations is
fairly abnormal.

There is no such thing as non-man-made concept.

Then why harp on about man -made concepts?

There are concepts because they can be used to predict the behaviour of some system without knowing what really makes the system tick.

You mean "knowing for certain". Good predictive models
give FAPP knowledge.

Also consider this question; What does an atom probably look like? Can you try and give an answer?

Ontological questions don't have to be answered in naive "looks like"
terms.

More sophisticated is not the same as more fundamental.

Better theories are a better guide to what is fundamental.

Physics simulations add more and more properties to things to calculate their behaviour more realistically (since they can't realistically go along modeling each sub-atomic particle), which can be said to be more sophistication, but it doesn't mean these properties really exist.

if the theory works, that is a good reason to think they do.

 

[Doctordick]

As I read the contributions to this thread, I find things to be much the same as seen by Kant over two hundred years ago. Is there no progress in the field of philosophy?

Metaphysic, a completely isolated and speculative science of reason, which declines all teaching of experience, and rests on concepts only (not on their application to intuition, as mathematics), in which reason therefore is meant to be her own pupil, has hitherto not been so fortunate as to enter on the secure path of a science, although it is older than all other sciences, and would remain, even if all the rest were swallowed up in the abyss of an all-destroying barbarism. In metaphysic, reason, even if it tries only to understand a priori (as it pretends to do) those laws which are confirmed by the common experience, is constantly brought to a standstill, and we are obliged again and again to retrace our steps, because they do not lead us where we want to go; while as to unanimity among those who are engaged in the same work, there is so little of it in metaphysic, that it has rather become an arena, specially destined, it would seem, for those who wish to exercise themselves in mock fights, and where no combatant has, as yet, succeeded in gaining an inch of ground that he could call permanently his own. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the method of metaphysic has hitherto consisted in groping only, and, what is the worst, in groping among mere concepts.

Immanuel Kant,1787

Or perhaps you could give attention to another of his comments:

It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure.

Oh, how true; how true!

These comments are taken from his 1887 edition of his "Critique of Pure Reason" (from a translation done by F. Max Muller). In reading that document, I came to the conclusion that Kant was apparently trying to develop a rational mechanism to turn metaphysics into an exact science. From an “exact” analysis of current philosophic thought, I would judge that the final consequence of his effort was abject failure; however, I do not find his goal to be at all ridiculous. I think he just made some very poor assumptions.

The most serious error in his approach was that he missed the very essence of the problem. He begins by setting up two categories of knowledge; a-priori, being achieved without experience of any kind, and a-posteriori, which he terms “empirical” and arises from analysis of one’s experiences. His first mistake is to attribute a-priori knowledge to “intuition”. By making that identification, he clearly makes the assumption that intuition is not based on experience, a rather extreme assumption. I think he made that error because he needed a source for that a-priori knowledge and “intuition” was the only thing he could come up with.

Kant himself essentially points out the impossibility of a-priori knowledge in his section, “The General Problem of Pure Reason”.

Now the real problem of pure reason is contained in the question, How are synthetical judgments a-priori possible?

In the same section, he credits David Hume with the closest approach to the problem. But, according to Kant, David Hume held that a-priori knowledge was entirely impossible. This Kant apparently held to be a clearly illogical statement.

If he [Hume] had grasped our problem in all its universality, he would never have thought of an assertion which destroys all pure philosophy, because he would have perceived that, according to his argument, no pure mathematical science was possible either, on account of its certainly containing synthetical propositions a-priori; and from such an assertion his good sense would probably have saved him.

It seems to me that Kant shows a major deficit in his comprehension of mathematics. Mathematics is little more than a very carefully examined synthetical construct. It seems quite clear to me that any decent mathematician would accept any abstract structure shown to be totally internally self consistent to be a “mathematical” structure. The ontology of mathematics is as intuitively (i.e.,from experience) generated as is any other field. What makes it “pure” is the fact that it is without contradiction (at least as best as the mathematicians can manage to achieve). In no way can the existence of mathematics (and its presumed “purity” of essence) be held as evidence that a-priori knowledge exists.

I don’t know Hume’s position, but, if he did hold that a-priori knowledge was impossible, I would certainly agree with him and not Kant. All knowledge is based upon past experience in some way and whether that experience be personal experience of an individual or the experience provided to the entity via evolution is of no real consequence, it is still experience.

However, there is certainly a very great difference between deduced conclusions and induced conclusions. Philosophers make much of the fact that those deduced conclusions are based upon a-priori inductive foundations. It seems to me that the common philosophic separation of this issue is fairly clearly expressed through the division between ontology and epistemology, ontology commonly refers to the collection of things concepts or ideas held to be the foundation of a field (in philosophy that would be the fundamental question of what exists).

I should be clear to anyone that exactly what this ontology consists of is certainly beyond our knowing a-priori; it has to be learned subject. Prior to being learned or understood the correct ontology is no more than a collection of undefined “things”: concepts, objects, ideas…., whatever! The issue everyone seems to miss is the very fact that this “ontology” being referred to has to be regarded as a collection of undefined things.

That is, the definitions people put up for ontological elements are divined from arguments based on those ontological elements. These definitions are developed from functioning explanations as those explanations are refined. What needs to be understood here is that the definitions of those ontological elements can not be a-priori information: they themselves must be explained.

The problem most everyone seems to have with the issue of ontology is that they cannot comprehend not knowing what they have to work with and thus fail at the very first step. The issue being that the moment you put meaning to any ontological element, you are already outside the field of ontology and discussing epistemology: i.e., attaching meaning to an ontological element requires understanding the explanation of a definition and that is the essence of epistemology.

The very essence of metaphysics is understanding what can be said about ontology without defining that ontology. That is the very essence of my paper on explanation.

If anyone here can come up with a concept more basic than “an explanation” I would be quite interested in their arguments (I was very tempted to say “their explanation” but that sort of presumes they are wrong). Baring the existence of a more basic concept, it follows, as the night the day, that the absolute first effort of any objective scientific analysis must begin by examining exactly what it is that should be used to qualify something as “an explanation”. An effort apparently attempted by no one save myself. As you all well know, my opinions on that issue are expressed in the document http://home.jam.rr.com/dicksfiles/Explain/Explain.htm .

So long as you refuse to come to grips with that central problem, you will all be doomed to “exercise themselves in mock fights”.

Saying what reality really is, however tentatively,
is ontology. … What things are and how they behave is ontology!

So, are you interested in ontology? Or is it merely a preferred arena of mock logic? I am here for anyone who wishes to discuss metaphysics from the perspective of an exact science.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[mosassam]

The limit of Reason

[

I am here for anyone who wishes to discuss metaphysics from the perspective of an exact science.

Maybe it is possible to acquire knowledge without the process of Reason, although I'm not sure how this would be done. When discussing, interpreting, assuming, explaining or just plain guessing, we are inextricably tied to Reason. However, when simply observing, we are not. If we wish to extrapilate results from our observations or draw conclusions etc. we are once more at the behest of Reason. Any 'exact science' or 'metaphysics' is the prisoner of Reason. In my last post I asked, what is happening when we observe our own consciousness (which includes Reason)? I wanted to get away from the process of observing sensorial data as there is a necessary 'interpretation' required of such data. To observe or to be aware of something does not require Reason, anything that happens after this can be labelled Science.
What do the many theories and models that have sprung out of Quantum Mechanics have to say about observing ones own consciousness? Can any science or philosophy exist without Reason? If not, then the only thing they can ever say is that Reason is king, it is the ultimate, it is the conclusion.But is this really the case?

 

[Doctordick]

Maybe it is possible to acquire knowledge without the process of Reason, although I'm not sure how this would be done.

I am not talking about “acquiring knowledge”; I am speaking of a rational “scientific” way of examining one’s ontology so as to set up a mechanism for assuring a firm foundation prior to speculating as to the nature of that ontology (so as to fulfill Kant’s hopes).

When discussing, interpreting, assuming, explaining or just plain guessing, we are inextricably tied to Reason. However, when simply observing, we are not.

It isn’t the observation which concerns me; it’s the interpretation of those observations (the mechanism of representing the ontology behind those "observations").

If we wish to extrapolate results from our observations or draw conclusions etc. we are once more at the behest of Reason. Any 'exact science' or 'metaphysics' is the prisoner of Reason.

And so it should be if we wish to be objectively scientific about it.

In my last post I asked, what is happening when we observe our own consciousness (which includes Reason)?

The problem here is that you have already stepped out of ontology and into epistemology. You simply cannot even define what you mean by consciousness without asserting what Kant refers to as a "speculative edifice".

I wanted to get away from the process of observing sensorial data as there is a necessary 'interpretation' required of such data.

Indeed there is and that “interpretation’ is itself a “speculative edifice”. To ignore it, and proceed to an edifice more established by common speculation, is not a solution to the problem. The only solution is to develop a rational way of referring to a ontology which is all encompassing and thus requires no “speculative edifice”.

To observe or to be aware of something does not require Reason, anything that happens after this can be labeled Science.

I agree one hundred percent; but, your approach is essentially to ignore the issue of ontology as a science: i.e., you want to “finish your speculative edifice”. Why? Well, it’s quite clear to me that you have no idea as to how to handle the issue of ontology without a “speculative edifice” to work from. I am afraid that is putting the horse on the wrong side of the cart. Don’t feel bad; your attitude is quite the standard.

What do the many theories and models that have sprung out of Quantum Mechanics have to say about observing ones own consciousness? Can any science or philosophy exist without Reason? If not, then the only thing they can ever say is that Reason is king, it is the ultimate, it is the conclusion.But is this really the case?

Again, the whole subject of your comment is epistemology (having to do with setting up a rational “speculative edifice”) not ontology (what exists).

As I said, “the only solution is to develop a rational way of referring to a ontology which is all encompassing and thus requires no ‘speculative edifice’.”

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Rade]

...If anyone here can come up with a concept more basic than “an explanation” I would be quite interested in their arguments...

"existence" is more basic than explanation. Before one can explain first must be some set of things that exist that are open to the operation of explanation. An explanation is nothing more than a theory, and as a theory must be built from "facts", and explanation must be built from the set of things that exists. Existence is to explanation as fact is to theory. The fundamental axiom from which all philosophy develops is "existence exists" --read Ayn Rand. To exist is to be something, to have a nature, to have an identity. Existence = Identity, and both, as a superposition, are more basic that "an explanation". Now, here is how you falsify above. Form "an explanation" without using something that first exists (such as the letters on your keyboard)--as you say--have fun.

 

[nannoh]

Is the sun just an illusion? Is the rotation of the Earth just an illusion? Are stars just the illusion made by holes in black fabric? Are the hour glass, sand and gravity just an illusion? Is atomic decay just an illusion? These are the types of questions that I think would come with this thread.

 

[Doctordick]

"existence" is more basic than explanation.

Yes it is; however, that is the very issue of ontology. The problem is that epistemology is based on a presumed ontology and any discussion of ontological elements requires a “speculative edifice” and the moment you enter that realm, you are discussing epistemology, not ontology.

Before one can explain first must be some set of things that exist that are open to the operation of explanation.

Exactly; however, you are concerning yourself “what” those things are. Go back and read what I said.

Indeed there is and that “interpretation’ is itself a “speculative edifice”. To ignore it, and proceed to an edifice more established by common speculation, is not a solution to the problem. The only solution is to develop a rational way of referring to a ontology which is all encompassing and thus requires no “speculative edifice”.

An explanation is nothing more than a theory, and as a theory must be built from "facts", and explanation must be built from the set of things that exists.

You are spouting words without defining them. You want to define “an explanation” in terms of “a theory” (apparently presuming “a theory” is a more basic concept than “an explanation”). Then all you say about “a theory” is that it is built of facts (which you have not defined) and you give me no description of the procedure to be followed nor do you give even a hint as how I am to know when I have successfully built this ‘theory’. If I pile all these facts in a mound, do I have a theory? Put a little thought into your comments.

Existence is to explanation as fact is to theory. The fundamental axiom from which all philosophy develops is "existence exists" --read Ayn Rand.

Ontology is the study of “what exists”. Fundamentally existence is a quality given to something which assigns it to the field of ontology. To go beyond that statement (any attempt to define “existence”) is outside the field of ontology. The moment you begin such a process, you are creating a “speculative edifice”. What is quite evident is that you have no idea as to how to handle the issue of ontology without a “speculative edifice” to work from.

To quote Kant again: “In metaphysic, reason, even if it tries only to understand a priori (as it pretends to do) those laws which are confirmed by the common experience, is constantly brought to a standstill, and we are obliged again and again to retrace our steps, because they do not lead us where we want to go; while as to unanimity among those who are engaged in the same work, there is so little of it in metaphysic, that it has rather become an arena, specially destined, it would seem, for those who wish to exercise themselves in mock fights, and where no combatant has, as yet, succeeded in gaining an inch of ground that he could call permanently his own. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the method of metaphysic has hitherto consisted in groping only, and, what is the worst, in groping among mere concepts.”

To exist is to be something, to have a nature, to have an identity. Existence = Identity, and both, as a superposition, are more basic that "an explanation". Now, here is how you falsify above. Form "an explanation" without using something that first exists (such as the letters on your keyboard)--as you say--have fun.

What you fail to comprehend (because, to you, ontology is a collection of defined things: i.e., a speculative edifice) is that “concepts” are the defined working material of epistemology, not “existence” which is no more than a label certifying membership to your ontology. Existence itself, as you see it, is a speculative edifice.

Finally, I am not “explaining” anything! I claim that the primary element of any “speculative edifice” is “an explanation”. Any “speculative edifice” you may decide to build is worthless unless you can “explain” it and its elements (at least to yourself). It follows that the most basic concept of epistemology (and the one which bridges the gap between ontology and epistemology) is the concept of “an explanation”. Without such a concept, you sail without a rudder.

It is the primary issue to be confronted if we are to turn metaphysics into a science. However if you prefer to exercise yourself in mock fights and waste your time "groping among mere concepts", you can find more agreeable adversaries.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[Paul Martin]

Interesting discussion. Where do each of you begin to disagree with the following?

1. Reality = existence. I.e. reality is what exists.

2. Ontology is the study of reality.

3. Explanation is basic for knowledge. I.e. one does not know if one can't explain, and if one can explain, then one knows whatever is explained.

4. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. I.e. Epistemology is, at base, the study of explanations.

5. Study requires a studier. I.e. a studier is one who studies.

6. Ontology requires a studier, since it is a study.

7. Without a studier there may be existence, but there can not be ontology.

8. Given a studier and an object of study, there still can be no study without some representation of the object of study. I.e. the studier must have some way of referring to the object(s) of study.

9. An explanation is an organized collection of these representations.

10. The organization of the representations in an explanation involves encoding the representations into symbols.

11. In the case of ontology, which is the study of what is real, the symbols used to encode the representations of the real objects of study, must, of necessity, also be real objects (because by definition, nothing else exists to serve as the symbols).

12. Even though the symbols are real and exist, they are not the objects of the study of ontology.

13. In the case of epistemology, which is the study of explanations, the symbols used must be at least of second order. I.e. the symbols must encode the representations of the objects of explanations, which explanations, in turn must involve symbols encoding representations of real existing objects.

14. In order to discuss either ontology or epistemology, as we are doing here, we must assume a studier.

15. If we make the common assumption that the studier is one or another of these live human bodies-with-brains, then we are making the further implicit assumption that such a thing exists.

16. This implies that live human bodies-with-brains really exist, which logically need not be the case.

17. We can avoid making that assumption by being careful in our language to refer to the studier only as 'one', as in "one may infer..." and also being careful not to assume any other characteristic, feature, or attribute of live human bodies-with-brains.

18. Putting it all together, one may study epistemology by considering the structure of possible explanations of representations of real objects, determining which if any of those structures are self-consistent, and finally exploring the logical implications of those consistent structures.

19. If one uses mathematical structures and language to encode (define) the representations and develop the representations, then the explanations will match reality to within mathematical isomorphism.

20. One may use any of several incompatible choices for the mathematical system to use in the study.

21. Among these incompatible choices are Euclidean vs. non-Euclidean geometry and discrete vs. continuous systems of numbers.

22. If one uses the continuous set of real numbers and Euclidean geometry, one may (IMHO) derive Dick's Theorem (much derided but scarcely studied) which generalizes the nature of consistent epistemology regardless of the underlying ontology.

23. The general nature of explanations (epistemology) is shown by Dick's Theorem to necessarily conform (by and large) to the known laws of Physics.

24. If one uses a discrete system of numbers instead of the continuous set, then it is my humble opinion that with work, the same (or equivalent) theorems of Mathematical Analysis, on which Dick bases his proof, can be proved, and thus I expect that Dick's Theorem will hold in certain discrete systems as well. I further suspect that better insights might be gained this way.

I'd be interested to know how far down my list each reader got before they began ROFLing.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Rade]

Originally Posted by Rade:
"existence" is more basic than explanation.

Originally Posted by Doctordick:
Yes it is

Thank you, see how quickly (within the first three words of an otherwise unnecessary post) you reach the truth that "existence" is priori to "explanation" without any speculation at all. What is "speculation"? -- it is a conclusion, opinion, or theory reached by conjecture, inconclusive evidence or supposition. But when you agreed with the axiom that "existence is more basic than explanation" you did not use conjecture, inconclusive evidence, nor supposition, you just exclaimed as a self evident axiom of logical thinking for all to read-- "Yes it is".

 

[Rade]

Interesting discussion. Where do each of you begin to disagree with the following?
1. Reality = existence. I.e. reality is what exists.

A few comments. First must be the statement:

1. Existence exists, first axiom.

then

2. You exist possessing consciousness, which is the faculty of perceiving that which exists, second axiom.

then

3. Reality is what exists as Identity as a metaphysical fact, third axiom.

I note that you derive the consciousness from your argument in #15, but I hold it to be an axiom, not derived.

 

[Paul Martin]

I note that you derive the consciousness from your argument in #15, but I hold it to be an axiom, not derived.

You didn't read what I wrote carefully enough. I didn't derive consciousness in #15. What I did was to point out the common assumption that the human body/brain is the conscious entity. I don't make that assumption. In #17 I propose avoiding that assumption by using the tag "one" to denote the conscious entity. This "one" can stand for whatever you think is conscious and has the ability to know and study, without affecting the conclusions we draw about what "one" can know about reality. My own personal belief, as you know, is that there is only one such "one", so the label is appropriate for me. But for the sake of investigating what "one" can know about reality, it doesn't matter.

2. You exist possessing consciousness, which is the faculty of perceiving that which exists

I think that assuming that "You", being the human body/brain, is an axiomatic given, is a HUGE "speculative edifice".

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Doctordick]

Thank you, see how quickly (within the first three words of an otherwise unnecessary post) you reach the truth that "existence" is priori to "explanation" without any speculation at all.

Unnecessary? You ought to go read it again; unless it is your sole interest to fight “mock battles groping among mere concepts” with no idea as to how to proceed. Have a ball! It may be more basic but it is, nonetheless, nothing but a mere label so long as you don’t indulge in construction of a “speculative edifice”.

And, Paul, I really miss your posts. I have begun to understand peoples inability to comprehend what I am talking about since reading Kant. Maybe we could reach an understanding if I made it clear that I am discussing ontology and not creating “speculative edifices”; something no one else (to my knowledge) has ever attempted. With regard to your post, I will give you my reaction.

Interesting discussion. Where do each of you begin to disagree with the following?

1. Reality = existence. I.e. reality is what exists.

One needs to avoid presenting arguments via relationships between words as those relationships are, in reality, “speculative edifices”. In other words, you are attempting to use the understanding of others (their comprehension of the meaning of those words) to convey the meanings you have in mind. In actual fact, the meanings you have in mind were arrived at via your lifetime of interaction with the ontology of your universe. Your representation of that ontology is a fundamental aspect of your world view: which is in fact, a “speculative edifice”. (I hate to keep using that expression but it is the only way of pointing out the massive volume of assumption behind your statements.

2. Ontology is the study of reality.

More words! Officially, ontology is a label for an explicit specification of a conceptualization. The term is borrowed from philosophy, where an Ontology is a systematic account of Existence. Let’s just back down a little (i.e., back down from “speculation”) and suggest that the “explicit specification” being referred to here IS exactly the speculation which carries one into epistemology. That is precisely the issue I want to avoid and the one you people want to discuss.

As I said in my post, the only way to turn metaphysics into a science is to not ignore the existence of ontological speculation but “to develop a rational way of referring to an ontology which is all encompassing and thus requires no “speculative edifice”.

3. Explanation is basic for knowledge. I.e. one does not know if one can't explain, and if one can explain, then one knows whatever is explained.

Yes, “explanation” is absolutely the first “speculative definition” which must be developed. Without such a concept, we are totally without a rudder (so to speak).

4. Epistemology is the study of knowledge. I.e. Epistemology is, at base, the study of explanations.

Yes, again I agree with you 100%. That is exactly why one cannot “explain” ontology. Ontology is, “what is”, and, as soon as you begin to “explain” what is (that is, explain what you believe “IS”) you are defending your personal “speculative edifice”. Essentially, you are not talking about “what is”, you are talking about “what you think is”.

5. Study requires a studier. I.e. a studier is one who studies.

Now here is where you and I part ways. We part, not because I disagree with you but rather because I am interested in a coherent representation of a general ontology (which, being entirely general, can serve as a valid foundation for “speculation”). To quote Kant, “in metaphysic, reason, even if it tries only to understand a priori (as it pretends to do) those laws which are confirmed by the common experience, is constantly brought to a standstill, and we are obliged again and again to retrace our steps, because they do not lead us where we want to go”; this is exactly the log jam I wish to circumvent.

6. Ontology requires a studier, since it is a study.

My only complaint with this statement is that it is speculative: i.e., just because you cannot discover an alternate does not mean none exists.

7. Without a studier there may be existence, but there can not be ontology.

That need not be true. You are confusing “an ontology” with “a specific ontology”; which is an epistemological construct (an explanation of a specific ontology).

8. Given a studier and an object of study, there still can be no study without some representation of the object of study. I.e. the studier must have some way of referring to the object(s) of study.

I would have said the same thing; however, I would have said, construction of speculative edifices cannot take place without an ontology (i.e., if nothing exists).

9. An explanation is an organized collection of these representations.

With this I would strongly disagree. It is equivalent to saying that a pile of bricks is a building. You have omitted the central thread of an explanation. All brick piles are not necessarily buildings nor is a collection of specific ontological representations necessarily an explanation.

10. The organization of the representations in an explanation involves encoding the representations into symbols.

I would simply say representation itself requires symbolic definition of some kind. Symbolism is representation (essentially organization is superfluous to the issue). Please refer to something without using any symbolism at all.

11. In the case of ontology, which is the study of what is real, the symbols used to encode the representations of the real objects of study, must, of necessity, also be real objects (because by definition, nothing else exists to serve as the symbols).

Again, you are simply stating the conventional dogma: you cannot comprehend working with an undefined ontology.

As I said earlier, “the issue everyone seems to miss is the very fact that this “ontology” being referred to has to be regarded as a collection of undefined things”, otherwise we are off constructing “speculative edifices”. Per Kant, “it is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure”. We need a way of dealing with a “general undefined ontology” as the “ontology” is the foundation of any sepeculation.

12. Even though the symbols are real and exist, they are not the objects of the study of ontology.

In the final analysis they are; however, as soon as you separate the question into symbols and non-symbols, you are working with a specific ontology (the basis of your speculative edifice construction) and have diverted into epistemology.

13. In the case of epistemology, which is the study of explanations, the symbols used must be at least of second order. I.e. the symbols must encode the representations of the objects of explanations, which explanations, in turn must involve symbols encoding representations of real existing objects.

Every speculative edifice is constructed from a specific ontology so as soon as you present an explanation of any kind you have lost the generality of the possible ontologies.

14. In order to discuss either ontology or epistemology, as we are doing here, we must assume a studier.

You are assuming that there exists no ontology which requires no “studier”. I would simply assert again that you are attempting to finish your speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations is sure. You have been continuously specifying specific ontological elements. That attack has been used for thousands of years and has never shown any sign of ultimate success. How about we try something else?

15. If we make the common assumption that the studier is one or another of these live human bodies-with-brains, then we are making the further implicit assumption that such a thing exists.

Yes; you are discussing the specific ontology required by your speculation.

16. This implies that live human bodies-with-brains really exist, which logically need not be the case.

Quite true; but, from my perspective, quite beside the point. About as informative as “existence exists”.

17. We can avoid making that assumption by being careful in our language to refer to the studier only as 'one', as in "one may infer..." and also being careful not to assume any other characteristic, feature, or attribute of live human bodies-with-brains.

Again I disagree; it is still a specific ontology, just one a little more vague than the other.

18. Putting it all together, one may study epistemology by considering the structure of possible explanations of representations of real objects, determining which if any of those structures are self-consistent, and finally exploring the logical implications of those consistent structures.

Yeah, but that’s what everyone does. To paraphrase Kant, they all racing about constructing “speculative edifices” with no thought to the foundations of those edifices (the self consistency of their ontology itself).

19. If one uses mathematical structures and language to encode (define) the representations and develop the representations, then the explanations will match reality to within mathematical isomorphism.

You seem to miss the point that, if mathematics is defined to be the study of self consistent systems (which I think is a good definition of mathematics) and your explanation is self consistent, then mathematics and valid explanations themselves are isomorphic entities and “reality” has nothing to do with the question. (You have utterly failed to even mention the central purpose of “an explanation”: to connect your experiences to your expectations).

20. One may use any of several incompatible choices for the mathematical system to use in the study.

It seems to me, here, that you are referring to specific mathematical structures, not to the field of mathematics. Incompatibility is a question of interpretation of the elements

21. Among these incompatible choices are Euclidean vs. non-Euclidean geometry and discrete vs. continuous systems of numbers.

Again, this “incompatibility is a question of interpretation: i.e., a continuous system certainly includes the discrete set and I would not refer to that as “incompatible”.

22. If one uses the continuous set of real numbers and Euclidean geometry, one may (IMHO) derive Dick's Theorem (much derided but scarcely studied) which generalizes the nature of consistent epistemology regardless of the underlying ontology.

If you go and look at it, you will discover that it makes no assertion as to the continuity of the ontological elements. In fact C (that portion of the ontology standing behind the epistemology) is specifically finite and thus can not be continuous.

23. The general nature of explanations (epistemology) is shown by Dick's Theorem to necessarily conform (by and large) to the known laws of Physics.

Now I would put that a little differently. That the known laws of Physics have to conform to my equation is a fact. If they don’t, they are wrong as what I have presented is a proof (yes Paul, I am going to accept your declaration). What is astonishing is the fact that I can find no solutions to my equation which are not known laws of physics. That is a much stronger statement as it says that those are the laws because it cannot be otherwise.

Thousands of years of experimentation has managed to eliminate no self consistent explanation. Explanations have been thrown out for one of two very simple reasons: either because they have been shown to be inconsistent or they have been shown to be inadequate representations of our expectations (actually I guess these can be seen as equivalent problems).

24. If one uses a discrete system of numbers instead of the continuous set, then it is my humble opinion that with work, the same (or equivalent) theorems of Mathematical Analysis, on which Dick bases his proof, can be proved, and thus I expect that Dick's Theorem will hold in certain discrete systems as well. I further suspect that better insights might be gained this way.

As I said, the ontology being explained is explicitly discrete. It is only our reference to what we know and/or references to what we expect which are allowed to be continuous. That is to say, I allow explanations which make assumptions as to continuity but I certainly do not make any assumption that continuity is a characteristic of reality (that would be the underlying ontology the explanation is based upon).

And finally, if you were to come up with an explanation of reality which was entirely discrete, I can explicitly show that your explanation can be interpreted as being one which requires continuity. That fact arises from the finite nature of our communications. That is to say, the simplest interpretation of your explanation would include assumptions of continuity. If you want to understand that, you would need to understand my definition of an explanation and the derived deductions in detail.

Have fun -- Dick

 

[mosassam]

As Dr.Dick and Paul oil each other up with word games I can't help feeling that they've fallen for the oldest one in the book. Logic can only be proved by logic and, as such, it should be viewed as some kind of assumption at best. You are both disciples of the ultimate dogma (and, DrDick, your arrogance certainly marks you as dogmatic) - that Reason is All.
An explanation is never the thing being explained and so, instead of your apalling attempts at describing reality, why don't you experience it instead and if you wish to communicate your experiences, don't write a formula, write a poem instead. Poetry has as much chance of becoming an exact science as metaphysics does.
A prisoner of dogma has ceased to grow, that which has ceased to grow is dead.
I am, therefore I exist. Is this logic?
Have fun, warm regards and remember - rubbing too vigorously can cause chaffing.

 

[Paul Martin]

Hi Dick,

1. Reality = existence. I.e. reality is what exists.

One needs to avoid presenting arguments via relationships between words as those relationships are, in reality, “speculative edifices”. In other words, you are attempting to use the understanding of others (their comprehension of the meaning of those words) to convey the meanings you have in mind. In actual fact, the meanings you have in mind were arrived at via your lifetime of interaction with the ontology of your universe. Your representation of that ontology is a fundamental aspect of your world view: which is in fact, a “speculative edifice”. (I hate to keep using that expression but it is the only way of pointing out the massive volume of assumption behind your statements.

With respect, Dick, in number 1. I am not "attempting to use the understanding of others (their comprehension of the meaning of those words) to convey the meanings [ I ] have in mind". Instead I am simply choosing a symbol to use for some unspecified subject of discussion. My first statement was not an argument for anything. It was simply a declaration that I intend to use the symbols 'reality' and 'existence' as synonyms.

The fact that I have accumulated a "speculative edifice" over my lifetime which happens to be my particular world-view doesn't make me any different than you or any other person. We all have done that. But I have tried to keep anything from that edifice from contaminating my list of statements. I would ask you to read what I wrote to see if I have dragged any of that edifice into my arguments. I don't think I have in number 1.

If choosing common words like 'reality' and 'existence' seems to imply that I am bringing along baggage from my worldview, then I will change and choose some sort of symbol, like 'A' to represent the unspecified subject of this discussion. Then my number 1. becomes A = A, which conveys exactly the same intent as my original. This, of course, is in the same spirit that, over the years, you also changed your language in your presentation from the old form of "Let reality = a set of numbers", to "1. A is a set. "What is to be explained."" Our starting points are the same.

2. Ontology is the study of reality.

More words!

Yes. Six words to be exact.

Officially, ontology is a label for an explicit specification of a conceptualization. The term is borrowed from philosophy, where an Ontology is a systematic account of Existence.

More words yet! Twenty seven words to be exact.

And, Paul, I really miss your posts.

Thank you, Dick. But I'll tell you what. I would be posting much less if I didn't use words. I am not enough of a mathematician to be able to write my posts entirely (or even partly) in mathematical language without using words, even though that might bring less "speculative edifice baggage" with it. But since using words is the normal form of this forum, I think I should be allowed to use them without being reproved and without negating any ideas I try to get across by using them.

Let’s just back down a little (i.e., back down from “speculation”)

With respect, Dick, I don't think my statement that "Ontology is the study of reality." is speculation. It is simply a definition. Now I admit that I used the term 'study' (along with 'is', 'the', and 'of') without defining it, but I hardly think that to have a reasonable discussion on this forum we need to define each and every word prior to using it. And my statement wasn't even as strong as a definition. It was simply a statement that I agree with the definition you gave for the term 'ontology' in your post #185

...ontology commonly refers to the collection of things concepts or ideas held to be the foundation of a field (in philosophy that would be the fundamental question of what exists).

I should be clear to anyone that exactly what this ontology consists of is certainly beyond our knowing a-priori; it has to be learned subject. Prior to being learned or understood the correct ontology is no more than a collection of undefined “things”: concepts, objects, ideas…., whatever! The issue everyone seems to miss is the very fact that this “ontology” being referred to has to be regarded as a collection of undefined things.

Here I think you might be making a category error, Dick (although the distinction you try to draw later between 'ontology' and 'a specific ontology' might be what I am talking about here). You seem to be conflating the subject of ontology with the subject matter of ontology. That would be equivalent to conflating 'biology' with 'life'. Biology is the subject; life is the subject matter. Similarly, according to common usage, ontology is the subject and existence is the subject matter.

But the distinction you are trying to make is valid, and, as you continually claim, is almost always overlooked or misunderstood. Let me try to clear it up and you tell me where I'm wrong.

Ontology, like biology, requires a studier and a subject matter at the outset. Then, with those two requirements met, the process of study may begin in which the studier studies the subject matter and produces explanations.

In the typical case of ontology, the studier is some human philosopher and the subject matter is that philosopher's mental concept of the notion of reality. As you and Kant have tried to point out, that philosopher's mental concept is a "speculative edifice" which provides an untrustworthy foundation for any explanation produced by that study.

In your atypical case, you (and any of us who have studied your work) are the studier and the subject matter is the unspecified set 'A'. The process you went through in logically studying the set 'A' culminated in your theorem (thank you for accepting my suggestion that it be seen as a theorem) which is a specific differential equation with some astonishing solutions.

Thus, your ontology, even though it involves an extremely mysterious studier (you), does not build its explanations on your world-view (which is every bit as much a "speculative edifice" as everyone else's). Furthermore, your ontology does not even build explanations, but instead demonstrates constraints which limit the possibilities for any and all self-consistent explanations of anything whatsoever. These constraints apply to all self-consistent explanations whether they be facts about sets of numbers or particular "speculative edifices" proposed by philosophers or others as explanations for the world.

I realize that it also applies to my own speculative world-view (much discussed here at PF) which posits the fundamental nature of consciousness. But I think that is positive. I think your theorem can show up any inconsistencies there may be in my edifice, and, if none shows up, the solutions to your differential equation might possibly suggest novel interpretations of the inferences. I just need some young, smart, energetic minds to explore those inferences.

5. Study requires a studier. I.e. a studier is one who studies.

Now here is where you and I part ways. We part, not because I disagree with you but rather because I am interested in a coherent representation of a general ontology (which, being entirely general, can serve as a valid foundation for “speculation”).

I think I now understand, and can possibly explain, why you have had such difficulty in communicating your work to anyone else.

Your ontology is more basic than anyone else's. Everyone else, including me, is interested in coming up with explanations for the world we find ourselves in. As you point out, we are each intimately familiar with "the world we find ourselves in" and this familiarity constitutes an untrustworthy "speculative edifice". You, on the other hand, are interested in discovering constraints that apply to everybody else's explanations. In other words, we are interested in discovering explanations for the world and you are interested in discovering what we might come up with.

So, yes, we part ways simply because of our different interests. But I think that we (the rest of us) can greatly benefit from your approach and results if we will only apply them to our own more down-to-earth efforts.

Good talking with you as always Dick,

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

As Dr.Dick and Paul oil each other up with word games I can't help feeling that they've fallen for the oldest one in the book. Logic can only be proved by logic and, as such, it should be viewed as some kind of assumption at best. You are both disciples of the ultimate dogma (and, DrDick, your arrogance certainly marks you as dogmatic) - that Reason is All.
An explanation is never the thing being explained and so, instead of your apalling attempts at describing reality, why don't you experience it instead and if you wish to communicate your experiences, don't write a formula, write a poem instead. Poetry has as much chance of becoming an exact science as metaphysics does.
A prisoner of dogma has ceased to grow, that which has ceased to grow is dead.
I am, therefore I exist. Is this logic?
Have fun, warm regards and remember - rubbing too vigorously can cause chaffing.

Thanks for the advice, mosassam; it is well taken. Since you don't know much about either of us, I can assure you that both Dick and I follow his persistent advice to "have fun". In my case, that is the reson my posts are so infrequent; I am usually heavily engaged in enjoying life in other ways than philosophizing here (which, incidentally, is also fun for me). In Dick's case, I am amazed that he has the time he does to post here since he is always having fun with his family, his world travel, and other engaging activities.

As for poetry, I am not as enamored with it as you seem to be. It seems evident to me that in spite of poetry being ubiquitous since Homer, it hasn't solved any of the great problems suffered by humanity. Mathematics, on the other hand, has led to the current understanding of the world, which in turn, has led more-or-less directly to many of the comforts (central heating, transportation, textiles, communication, entertainment, etc.) that we enjoy, as well as to the solution of many previously debilitating problems (starvation, disease, predation, etc.) and which we now take for granted. Poetry pales by comparison, IMHO. It's attempts at describing reality have been TRULY appalling.

We each have fun in our own preferred ways, so I would ask you to tolerate the fun Dick and I and others have here in "oiling each other up".

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Rade]

... Then my number 1.[edit addition:1. Reality = existence. I.e. reality is what exists] becomes A = A, which conveys exactly the same intent as my original...

The statement Reality (A) = Existence (B) is not A = A, it is A = B, correct ? So, let A = 1 + 1, let B = 3 - 1, then A = B. Reality and Existence are two separate concepts, just as (1 + 1) and (3 -1) are separate mathematical statements.
I am not sure how you thought you were starting with A = A (bty, A = A is known as the Law of Identity in terms of philosophic argument). Are you saying you start your argument list with the Law of Identity, and from that Law all else derives ?

 

[Paul Martin]

The statement Reality (A) = Existence (B) is not A = A, it is A = B, correct ?

It depends on what you mean by the equals sign.

So, let A = 1 + 1, let B = 3 - 1, then A = B.

Yes. And also A = A.

Reality and Existence are two separate concepts,

They may or may not be depending on the intent of the person using the terms. In my case I consider them to be two words denoting the same concept. That is what I intended to convey with my first statement.

just as (1 + 1) and (3 -1) are separate mathematical statements.

Not quite right. Neither of them is a mathematical statement. Each of them is a mathematical expression. The mathematical statement, (1 + 1) = (3 - 1) is an assertion that the two expressions are equal and in fact are the same number.

I am not sure how you thought you were starting with A = A

I hope I have adequately explained it above.

(bty, A = A is known as the Law of Identity in terms of philosophic argument). Are you saying you start your argument list with the Law of Identity,

No.

and from that Law all else derives ?

No.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Rade]

...In the typical case of ontology, the studier is some human philosopher and the subject matter is that philosopher's mental concept of the notion of reality. As you (reference here to Doctordick) and Kant have tried to point out, that philosopher's mental concept is a "speculative edifice" which provides an untrustworthy foundation for any explanation produced by that study...

Let S = studier and M = subject matter studied. The mental unit thus formed within the mind of is [S+M], which is not a speculative edifice, for to speculate is to believe or reason on uncertain or tentative grounds, and the concept [S+M] is not formed by belief or reason, but by perception. Where Kant errors (and thus DD also since he accepts the Kant definition of the speculative edifice), is that he develops his philosophy from the false premise that what is universal in knowledge derives "only" from mind itself. As shown, the universal is the [S+M] united, thus making the Kant definition of the "speculative edifice" much to do about nothing--a false premise.

Edit: mental concept to mental unit

 

[Rade]

...In my case I consider them to be two words denoting the same concept...

OK, then your argument derives from a contradiction, for "two different words" never denote the "same concept". Every word (except proper names) is a symbol for a single unique concept that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind. Until you have integrated a mental unit by means of a specific word, you cannot form "a concept". Thus it would appear that your "list" derives from a contradiction--not being critical, just a statement of fact.

 

[Paul Martin]

Let S = studier and M = subject matter studied. The mental unit thus formed within the mind of is [S+M], which is not a speculative edifice, for to speculate is to believe or reason on uncertain or tentative grounds, and the concept [S+M] is not formed by belief or reason, but by perception.

I'd say that perception is just as uncertain as belief or reason so I'd say that [S+M], whatever that is, is a speculative edifice.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Paul Martin]

OK, then your argument derives from a contradiction, for "two different words" never denote the "same concept".

Never?? Are you sure? Have you checked all pairs of words in all languages?

Every word (except proper names) is a symbol for a single unique concept that stands for an infinite number of entities of a certain kind.

Natural languages are much much less precise than that.

Until you have integrated a mental unit by means of a specific word, you cannot form "a concept".

In order for me to agree with this, I would have to know what you mean by integrating a mental unit by means of a specific word. It means nothing to me.

Thus it would appear that your "list" derives from a contradiction--not being critical, just a statement of fact.

You haven't convinced me of that.

Warm regards,

Paul

 

[Doctordick]

Hi Dick,With respect, Dick, in number 1. I am not "attempting to use the understanding of others (their comprehension of the meaning of those words) to convey the meanings [ I ] have in mind". Instead I am simply choosing a symbol to use for some unspecified subject of discussion.

I think you miss the central point of my comments. It is my opinion that Kant’s inability to establish metaphysics as a science resides in the very issue I am talking about. Ontology (the specification of what exists) is a label for the fundamental elements of any speculation. The moment one defines any fundamental element, one is in great danger of making the simple error of speculation. In order to establish a scientific basis for your speculation you need to first establish a universal way of referring to the ontological elements of that speculation. This is the central flaw in all current speculation.

So long as that flaw exists everyone is committing that fundamental error Kant accuses them of.

It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure.

My position is that one must first establish the science of acceptable ontology; an issue untouched by any scholar that I am aware of. This must be done before one may have any hope of making a science of metaphysics. (Of course, I recognize that making a science of metaphysics is not in the interests of most people as to do so would preclude “off the wall” speculation and those mock fights everyone seems to love. If it were an exact science, people would have to back up their assertions’ with exact statements.)

My first statement was not an argument for anything. It was simply a declaration that I intend to use the symbols 'reality' and 'existence' as synonyms.

I don’t think that is entirely true. I believe you were setting up terms for an argument which is an issue of epistemology, not ontology; i.e. you were setting up a specific ontology (a specific set of symbols).

Here I think you might be making a category error, Dick (although the distinction you try to draw later between 'ontology' and 'a specific ontology' might be what I am talking about here). You seem to be conflating the subject of ontology with the subject matter of ontology.

No, I don’t believe I am. I am very seriously proposing that we study ontology as the central subject. Particularly the growth of acceptable definitions and relationships internal to an ontology as they develop from its undefined elements.

Similarly, according to common usage, ontology is the subject and existence is the subject matter.

If that is the way you wish to look at it, it is the subject I wish to study, not the subject matter.

Ontology, like biology, requires a studier and a subject matter at the outset. Then, with those two requirements met, the process of study may begin in which the studier studies the subject matter and produces explanations.

But, in metaphysics; the subject matter “IS” a speculative issue; therefore, as soon as the subject is anything but “undefined” you are no longer studying the subject, you are studying a particular ontology (a particular speculation). This is exactly where the common error made by everyone exists. The same error is made in every science (as studied by mankind): however, in all sciences, the associated ontology is presumed to be valid. It is only when you go to study ontology itself that this presumption can absolutely not be made.

As you and Kant have tried to point out, that philosopher's mental concept is a "speculative edifice" which provides an untrustworthy foundation for any explanation produced by that study.

No! What I am pointing out (something Kant did not) is that everyone is talking about examining ontologies, not about the subject of ontology itself.

Thus, your ontology ...

That is your first mistake. A is not MY ontology. It is my representation of YOUR ontology (or anyone else’s for that matter). And, second of all, I am not building a speculative edifice of any kind. I am simply defining “an explanation” (the absolute central concept of speculation itself) and then proceeding to deduce what relationships are logically required by that definition if one is to avoid contradiction.

Furthermore, your ontology does not even build explanations …

Again, it is my general representation of any ontology, not "my" ontology. If you want to talk about the ontology of my studies, I am using the ontology of logic (the single most well defined and self consistent speculative edifice ever conceived of by mankind), the underlying ontology of all “exact science”.

…but instead demonstrates constraints which limit the possibilities for any and all self-consistent explanations of anything whatsoever.

Not quite; it establishes required relationships which must be obeyed by any internally self consistent ontology. Thus all speculation, if it is to internally consistent, must be reducible to fundamental elements which obey my equations (otherwise, it is based on an internally inconsistent ontology).

I realize that it also applies to my own speculative world-view (much discussed here at PF) which posits the fundamental nature of consciousness.

I hate to be a kill joy but the problem is a little deeper than that. In actual fact, it follows directly from my proof, any valid explanation of “consciousness” must be based upon an ontology which obeys my equation: i.e., it must, in the final analysis, be an emergent phenomena and cannot be a fundamental element.

Now, that is not to say that speculation concerning the phenomena and related relationships is not valuable; it merely says that those speculations, even if found valid, must be considered rules of thumb rather than hard rules of an exact science. Unless, of course, they can be reduced to elements obeying my equation.

Everyone else, including me, is interested in coming up with explanations for the world we find ourselves in.

Not to be redundant but everyone seems to be subject to that “common fate of human reason” Kant has brought up. That is why we are not all exact scientists.

By the way, I am of the opinion that Physics has been so successful with its explanations for the simple fact that the elements of their ontology do indeed obey my equation. I might point out that the central relationship of that equation is “conservation of momentum”. In fact, if you look at it carefully, you will discover it is the only relationship underlying that equation. And exactly what is “conservation of momentum” as a fundamental thought? It is essentially the fundamental underlying concept of inductive logic: things that have always been the same will probably be the same in the future and things which have been changing in some way will most probably continue to change in that way. Is there anything else to inductive logic?

As you point out, we are each intimately familiar with "the world we find ourselves in". What people fail to take into account is that this familiarity arises because we set up our ontologies in terms of “things that don’t seem to change”. Actually, when we assume others live in the same universe as we do, it is a presumption with very subtle but profound consequences.

You, on the other hand, are interested in discovering constraints that apply to everybody else's explanations. In other words, we are interested in discovering explanations for the world and you are interested in discovering what we might come up with.

Again, the constraints I have discovered apply to the elements of their ontologies. I have no concern with the internal consistency of their explanations as humanity is well versed in discovering those. That is what all the “mock fights” being indulged in on this forum is based upon. All I am saying is that, so long as no one is interested in examining the nature of ontology itself, all those fights are mere moving battles without a single square inch of hard ground.

Have fun -- Dick

PS I am snow bound in Denver at the moment, visiting our six month old grandchild for Christmas/New Year. The last time we were in Denver they were shut down with snow (three years ago when they had the worst storm in something like seventy years). Ergo, we bring snow whenever we go there.

 

[Paul Martin]

I think you miss the central point of my comments.

You may be right. Your central points are very difficult to grasp.

Ontology (the specification of what exists) is a label for the fundamental elements of any speculation.

One problem we have in attempting to grasp your points is that you are not always clear about what you mean by terms you use. Here, for example, you say on the one hand that ontology is a specification and on the other hand that it is a label. Yet, at other times you use the term, as I defined it, as a study. Any of these definitions is OK with me, and all of them are OK too, as long as we make clear what connotation we are using each time we use the term.

But in spite of our use and mis-use of language, I think that you and I see eye-to-eye on the issues within the limitations of my own comprehension and the limitations of the English language. I think it would be pointless to try to resolve it any further.

That is your first mistake.

That is reassuring and wonderful news! I had the sinking feeling that I might have made a mistake earlier. Whew!

A is not MY ontology. It is my representation of YOUR ontology (or anyone else’s for that matter).

That's also good news. The mistake is easily rectified. Of course I meant that A is a representation of any ontology and not the ontology itself. How careless of me.

And, second of all, I am not building a speculative edifice of any kind. I am simply defining “an explanation” (the absolute central concept of speculation itself) and then proceeding to deduce what relationships are logically required by that definition if one is to avoid contradiction.

I agree. And that is what I was trying to say.

I hate to be a kill joy but the problem is a little deeper than that. In actual fact, it follows directly from my proof, any valid explanation of “consciousness” must be based upon an ontology which obeys my equation: i.e., it must, in the final analysis, be an emergent phenomena and cannot be a fundamental element.

Not to worry; you have not killed any of my joy. It does not surprise me that problems run deeper than my shallow understanding might consider. But in this case, I agree completely with what you say. In my speculative world-view, consciousness is indeed an emergent phenomenon. I just think it, or some rudimentary precursor, emerges extremely early, like as soon as the receptive principle receives one bit of information. But that's OT, as they say. I could get this thread closed down too if I say too much.

Good talking with you, Dick.

Warm regards to all and a Happy New Year to all.

Paul

P.S. Maybe we could work a deal and get a kick-back from the ski areas around here if you would agree to visit me in Seattle during the winter. The ski areas would welcome the extra snow and I would love to see you again.

 

[Doctordick]

You may be right. Your central points are very difficult to grasp.

I don’t think they are actually difficult to grasp, only so alien to the common approach to be incomprehensible on first examination. I am quite happy to find you agreeing with me so completely. I personally feel my perspective is entirely reasonable and constitutes the only viable path to making metaphysics a hard science. I suspect my real problem is that the number of people interested in “exact science” is relatively small. And, believe me, I fully understand why you do not wish to pursue the matter: the subject requires some new and agile minds. The real question is where are such minds to be found. I was hoping to raise some interest here but, to date, all I seem to have found are people interested in those “mock battles” Kant found so prevalent in philosophy.

If there is anyone here who would like to examine philosophy from the perspective of creating an exact science, I do believe that the only chance of doing such a thing is via my discovery. To date, no one but myself comprehends all the details of that deduction and I think it would benefit anyone interested in philosophy to make a serious attempt to understand what I have. I am an old man and what I know is very apt to die with me and that is really kind of a waste.

P.S. Maybe we could work a deal and get a kick-back from the ski areas around here if you would agree to visit me in Seattle during the winter. The ski areas would welcome the extra snow and I would love to see you again.

Well, I am sure you have heard that old adage, “it’s the exception which proves the rule!”

Have fun -- Dick

PS It’s 8:30 and we got to go home on New Year’s eve before midnight because the grand daughter got cranky (everyone is celebrating New Year’s at a neighbor’s house, only three houses down . Her parents are still out there as we offered to baby sit. Now that’s a burden we old people welcome! Merry Christmas and to all a good night. :zzz:

 

[AnssiH]

QUOTE FROM ANISSH
(Notice how the idea of "motion" is used in two different ways here, one is the motion of "consciousness", and other is how the consciousness is observing static things as if they are in motion)

There are various assumptions, models and interpretations involving sensorial data. What, in your view, is occurring when one 'observes' ones own consciousness?
The main point I'm making is, what happens when an observation is made that is not reliant on the 'dubiousness' of sensorial data?

I'm not quite sure what you are asking here, especially since I've been away for a while... But in my view, like I said, it is totally unnecessary to assume reality is static, and when all is said and done, it is far simpler to just assume reality is in motion. Also outside of conscious observation.

The conscious observation / subjective experience is caused by motion of reality; the physical processes of the brain.

The subjective experience of such facets of reality as the speed of its motion are not objective. A natural observer cannot say what is the "speed of reality", for example. Only in naive realist view the observed speed is also the objective speed of reality.

 

[AnssiH]

=AnssiH]
The question is rather, is "time" a proper concept to understand the metaphysical nature of motion. I.e, is it fair to say that there needs to exist some sort of invisible entity called "time", before anything can move.
What do you think?

I think it does. Probably

Why? Why does it seem to you that it is impossible for motion to exist without a backdrop which is more fundamental and defines motion?

=AnssiH]
...on the basis that it is unnecessary component; motion can be metaphysical directly.

How?

How can anything be fundamental? Is it not fair to say that "something exists fundamentally, for otherwise there would be nothing?"

So just like one can claim something like "energy" (or "information") is of fundamental existence (or rather more fundamental than the "heat" it causes), cannot one claim that motion is fundamental?

If one asserts motion cannot possible be fundamental, how is our subjective experience in motion? You cannot allow fundamental motion to "consciousness"-entity either, or if you do, why shouldn't you allow motion to reality directly since it makes things simpler here?

Of course nothing is certain, but I must wonder why do people insist time must be more fundamental than motion when it complicates the philosophy of the mind so much, and it is an issue that is even in principle beyond the observational capabilities of any natural observer. It's all topology of spacetime is what it is.

Assumptions may be objective.

Assumptions are by definition not objective. That is why I use to word; to point out one cannot make any "objective" declarations, only reasonable assumptions, and they are based on other assumptions. You didn't learn language by someone explaining you how it works; you made reasonable assumptions. That's how all learning works (at a high level). This is why we understand any semantics at all.

I guess it is somewhat different issue whether all this assuming and worldview building can lead to objective knowledge of reality (although I definitely cannot conceive how it could)

"It just notes that the intrinsic nature of reality is not found by classifying the stable behaviour around us into entities which have such and such properties".

why not? It might be right.

I said "...intrinsic nature of reality is not found..."
That something "might be right" doesn't prove it true. i.e. we do not find the intrinsic nature of reality by classifying the stable behaviour around us into... etc.

Arriving at a simple, predictive map is the
best guide we have to what reality really is

Yeah, and it isn't an answer to ontology.

Saying what reality really is, however tentatively,
is ontology.

Yeah, and it isn't an answer to ontology. Strictly speaking, there are no explicit answers. Only questions and assumptions.

I do think QM behaviour brings quite considerable weight to my argument about "non-objectivity of identity of things".

It's non non-objective, it just works in a different
way to classical assumptions. You are much too
quick to say that things are not objective.

Just works differently? We perform assumptions when we try to explain QM behaviour to ourselves. Just to take two set of assumptions on the table, how could we decide whether there exists multiple invisible universes which serve as the routes to the photons, or whether information exists in advanced & retarded form (moving forwards and backwards in time in some sense)

When I think about QM behaviour, my mind explodes with possible interpretations. When I look at the components of some interpretation, again my mind explodes with all the possible ways to understand them.

The route I am investigating the most, is one with objective motion to reality (universal simultaneity), because it seems to be just about the only way to reject dualistic views of mind. To me it's kind of analogous to following the (apparent) complexity of natural evolution, because it seems far too arbitrary to assume there is an "intelligent creator", albeit I cannot actually disprove the existence of one.

The whole point of physics is to come up with predictive models.

Nope.

"Physics (from the Greek, φύσις (phúsis), "nature" and φυσικῆ (phusiké), "knowledge of nature") is the science concerned with the discovery and understanding of the fundamental laws which govern matter, energy, space, and time."

"The Road to Reality"(Book by R Penrose. Note: nto the road
to better predictions).

"the study of matter and energy"

"Discipline of Science dealing with the properties of matter and energy. Includes; acoustics, atomic physics, cryogenics, electromagnetism, elementary particle physics, fluid dynamics, geophysics, mathematical physics, mechanics, molecular physics, nuclear physics, optics, plasma physics, quantum physics, solid state physics, statistical mechanics, thermodynamics.".

And all these tell you that if you are measuring the phenomenon which we call, say, "photons", you will find them to behave in such and such ways in such and such conditions. Just like we could say that if you measure the phenomenon which we call, say, a tsunami, you will find it to behave in such and such ways.

Neither of these tells you what is the ontological reality of either of these things. Just that we find them to behave in such and such ways. All the rest is extra words and basically philosophy. Your mental model of these behaviours includes some ideas of time and space which cannot be proven.

Since Einstein showed mass is basically just energy,

Don't you mean he showed that the mathematical formula e=mc^2
is a good predictor? Again, you can't stick to
your own anti-realism!

I'm pointing out that certain assumptions about matter were showed wrong. Still people stick to them. I have no problems in assuming that what we call "energy" is more fundamental than "matter", being that we make matter out of mere energy and vice versa. But at the same time I recognize, and I have said many times in the past, that one can just as well say only matter exists and what we call energy is its function. You can build a working model out of either assumption regardless of what observations we will make in the future, albeit other one can end up more elegant than the other (in some senses), and also some completely different model can make both look unnecessarily complex.

Yeah, exactly. There is objective reality, but to draw boundaries is something that we do, not something that nature does. That's what I'm saying.

How do you know that nature doesn't do it? Statements
about what the world isn't are still ontology!

Well to be precise, I guess I should say there is no reason to assume nature does it since we can never find out. I am basically saying that nature doesn't point a finger on a tsunami and say "that's a tsunami". We do. Nor does nature point its finger and say "That's water". We do. Nor does it say "These are atoms". We do. I guess you can always ask "how do I know", but I can only wonder why, oh why would anyone assume nature does this.

I'm not saying it because of "QM fuzzyness", but because it is impossible to show that some boundary we draw is more than something we have drawn for convenience.

The fact that it works predictively, if it
does, is "something more".

When a sat-nav system gives you directions, and a child assumes there is someone following you and giving you orders via the radio, this is basically an assumption made to the worldview, and it yields the correct prediction that orders will be hard when appropriate street junctions are approached. It doesn't make it "something more".

When you see a wave and assume it is an object moving underneath the surface at a steady rate, it gives you correct predictions but nothing more.

When you model the trajectory of a photon as a static "bundle of trajectories" into a relativistic spacetime, it gives you correct predictions but nothing more.

Just like the boundaries between countries are not metaphysically real, the boundary between an atom and a space cannot be said to be more than a convention.

That's not remotely analogous. Hydrogen atoms are so small
that hey can pass through the molecular structure of rubber, If I redefeine
them as being 1cm across--they still pass through rubber.
My claims is therefore falsified.

You are missing the point altogether. You could well claim they are 1 cm across (or much larger) but their residual electromagnetism, which causes the function which we call "solidity", only reaches to much less distance.

Also there is no such thing as a metaphysical rubber. The rubber too is made of same "functions" as the hydrogen atom. The rubber cannot falsify anything without you having first made some assumptions about how it works. You can do this only by trying to build a coherent worldview.

Basically you are making many tacit assumptions here that people make far too often. Atoms are most certainly NOT little balls with a metaphysical walls to them. "Wall" is meaningless concept without us having first observed one which was MADE OF ATOMS. Please read the latter part of this post again:

https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=925018&postcount=39

The worldview is always circular. Different concepts give credence to each others, but never they can be used to prove anything else but each others in circular fashion.

It would make false predicitions as in the hydrogen atom example.

And of course it would not, it would just be a different but also coherent worldview. You can disporve its concepts only by mixing the two.

Then why harp on about man -made concepts?

To point out there are no other kind. To point out our worldviews are self-supporting circles of beliefs, and not more.

Also consider this question; What does an atom probably look like? Can you try and give an answer?

Ontological questions don't have to be answered in naive "looks like"
terms.

Yeah of course not. The point of the exercise is to show that atoms do not look like anything. Yet people persistently ask themselves, wonder what atom looks like. There are even pictures of "single atoms", but one must understand how they are not really pictures of *atoms*, they are pictures about some information of the stable things we call atoms, and the information has been picked up not by looking at the atoms but by putting them under certain environment from which we get certain measurements, from which we can in some sense come up with a picture of an atom. All the while it was impossible, even in principle, to see an atom, regardless of how large it would be. This is all data that is interpreted according to a *model*.

There is a reason why they are called models.

 

[AnssiH]

It is indeed a very common fate of human reason first of all to finish its speculative edifice as soon as possible, and then only inquire whether the foundations be sure.

Oh, how true; how true!

Yeah. My argument is that we can never know if the foundations are true for they are a set of assumptions supporting each others. The only criticism against that argument seems to be that if the argument is true, then I cannot know if it's true. Which is yet another case of semantical wordplay, only to be expected from a being that cannot know anything about ontological reality objectively.

These comments are taken from his 1887 edition of his "Critique of Pure Reason" (from a translation done by F. Max Muller). In reading that document, I came to the conclusion that Kant was apparently trying to develop a rational mechanism to turn metaphysics into an exact science. From an “exact” analysis of current philosophic thought, I would judge that the final consequence of his effort was abject failure; however, I do not find his goal to be at all ridiculous. I think he just made some very poor assumptions.

The most serious error in his approach was that he missed the very essence of the problem. He begins by setting up two categories of knowledge; a-priori, being achieved without experience of any kind, and a-posteriori, which he terms “empirical” and arises from analysis of one’s experiences. His first mistake is to attribute a-priori knowledge to “intuition”. By making that identification, he clearly makes the assumption that intuition is not based on experience, a rather extreme assumption. I think he made that error because he needed a source for that a-priori knowledge and “intuition” was the only thing he could come up with.

I was also wondering if he made that assumption or not. Regardless of if he did, here is yet another way to put my point, and I think you agree; There is no such thing as a-priori intuition, and the "source of all knowledge" is a set of assumptions which cannot be known to be true. Just like the way we first learned language by assuming some meaning on things.

This assertion obviously includes such knowledge as knowing what some heard sound is, and knowing what some seen pattern is. I.e. all conscious experience is a case of interpretation of sensory data. The cortex does not know anything fundamentally!

That is, the definitions people put up for ontological elements are divined from arguments based on those ontological elements. These definitions are developed from functioning explanations as those explanations are refined. What needs to be understood here is that the definitions of those ontological elements can not be a-priori information: they themselves must be explained.

Exactly. Thank you. This seems to be one of the hardest things to explain to people even though at this day and age it should be as clear as a day to anyone dabbling in philosophy of the mind.

-Anssi