- #561
zapperzero
- 1,045
- 2
NUCENG said:Operators at Fukushima were not wringing their hands over the decision to vent. There were three causes of the delay.
they had delays to get corporate and government permission to vent. Finally, they waited until initial evacuations were complete.
IOW, hand-wringing on several levels. It is worth noting that their SAMG did not say "delay venting until evacuation is complete" (it would have been absurd if they did). That was a decision taken by plant management.
Yes.I agree that the target should be no release, and that means preventing core damage from external events or extended SBOs.
But we must also have some level of design for severe (beyond design basis) accidents.
AHH. THANK YOU. It took me a while, but now I can lay the problem out: severe accidents should not be kept out of the design basis.
There should be provisions to design for them in a reasonable manner (as per your earlier asteroid example) but they should NOT be kept out of consideration. At the very least, one should design taking into account the severe accidents that have already happened!
You may be spot on about early depressurization. You may also be right about filtration options for the vent path. But you also may be totally underestimating the interaction of the potential solutions. I was trying to help you see that by the discussion of interplay with early depressurization and venting. NRC and industry (and "watchdog" groups) have begun a series of meetings to discuss these complex issues. When trascripts or webcasts are available I will post links to the discussions. I hope you will see I am urging detailed evaluations for the options to make certain the results actually improve safety.
I do see that interaction between various safety systems and procedures needs to be taken into account. A small filter may be worse than no filter, hence the decision to have un-filtered vents of last resort. A big filter of new design is more expensive, may not be needed or may not work as advertised.