Law of Conservation of Energy and Its Implications for p-Consciousness

[loseyourname]

But what if there was a universal dimension prior to the Big Bang, strictly non-physical I guess, that was comprised of energy? Wouldn't this in fact account for what appeared to be nothing? ... and yet was anything but?

You're still missing the point. I'm not asking any questions of cosmological origins in this thread. In order to pertain to my argument, energy from this prior dimension that you are postulating would need to be continuously infused into living systems through some mechanism of conscious control, meaning that the energy level of the system would rise without any physical input. This rise would be measurable. I'm not going to say wholesale that your idea is wrong, but because of these considerations, it is inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, if we assume the universe to be an otherwise closed system, and it is also empirically testable in principle. It can also be the case that your postulation is in fact not inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, which would mean the universe is not a closed system. Nonetheless, given that you have given no reason to think that energy infused from outside of the universe would be any different than energy produced within the universe, there is no reason to consider the source of energy non-physical. In fact, as far as I can tell, the very idea of a non-physical causative factor with mechanical effects is incoherent. Any agent that can be the cause of a mechanical effect is being defined here as physical.

This one is probably just a semantic issue, but it's also incoherent for you to refer to a universal dimension existing prior to the universe.

 

[Iacchus32]

The components or atoms of everything that is physical do have electro-magnetic fields. If your definition of induced, is to produce (an electric current or a magnetic charge) by induction, then I would say when I am conscious my brain has electrical activity is a alive and working. If you disassemble me you will observe that I do not work. Can you come to a conclusion then, if the lack of the body is the reason why there is no more consciousness? Notwithstanding we observe things act like they should because that’s what they are and all have electro-magnetic fields that pertain to what ever there complexity is. If you took a radio or TV back in time a hundred years, would anybody think different, that nobody was in the box?

If consciousness were an energy field that passes between your ears, then one would presume that consciousness exists within that energy field. Yes, and if you destroy the body, then it is no longer capable of "conducting" this energy field.

 

[Iacchus32]

Something of a constitutional nature appears to be missing from the current physical model of the universe, why couldn't that be some as-yet unobserved potentiality? It wasn't that long ago virtual particles were unobserved, so just because we haven't observed it doesn't mean it is a useful modeling possibility. That's what is happening with "dark energy" now. Nobody can observe it, but we do see the universe behaving in a way that indicates something is there.

Forgive me for not being totally up on phyisics, but what is "dark energy?" Has it got anything to do with black holes?

 

[Iacchus32]

You're still missing the point. I'm not asking any questions of cosmological origins in this thread. In order to pertain to my argument, energy from this prior dimension that you are postulating would need to be continuously infused into living systems through some mechanism of conscious control, meaning that the energy level of the system would rise without any physical input. This rise would be measurable. I'm not going to say wholesale that your idea is wrong, but because of these considerations, it is inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, if we assume the universe to be an otherwise closed system, and it is also empirically testable in principle. It can also be the case that your postulation is in fact not inconsistent with the law of conservation of energy, which would mean the universe is not a closed system. Nonetheless, given that you have given no reason to think that energy infused from outside of the universe would be any different than energy produced within the universe, there is no reason to consider the source of energy non-physical. In fact, as far as I can tell, the very idea of a non-physical causative factor with mechanical effects is incoherent. Any agent that can be the cause of a mechanical effect is being defined here as physical.

So, what kind of energy is given up when it is induced through an electro-magnetic field? That's typically pretty efficient isn't it?

This one is probably just a semantic issue, but it's also incoherent for you to refer to a universal dimension existing prior to the universe.

I'm not quite sure about the rest of what you're saying (above), but all I'm implying here is that the Universe was pre-existent prior to the Big Bang ... albeit in a different form or, dimension.

 

[loseyourname]

So, what kind of energy is given up when it is induced through an electro-magnetic field? That's typically pretty efficient isn't it?

Energy is conserved in induction. Mechanical energy (motion of a magnet through a field) is converted to electrical potential.

Electromagnetic Induction

Notice the "N" in Faraday's equation.

I'm not quite sure about the rest of what you're saying (above), but all I'm implying here is that the Universe was pre-existent prior to the Big Bang ... albeit in a different form or, dimension.

Fine by me. You may be right, you may not be. Ultimately, you're just speculating. What I'm saying is that whether or not your speculation is correct is irrelevant to whether or not energy is conserved in a neurological system under conscious control.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Any agent that can be the cause of a mechanical effect is being defined here as physical.

That's convenient. I think I'll define everything that's physical as spiritual, so then I get to claim every physical effect has a spiritual cause.

As I've already suggested, every key argument you make in this thread seems circular, so much so that I can't tell if you have a point or not. Since you've not addressed my complaint yet, I wonder if you really see how this is true (I'm sure you understand what a circular argument is).

Let's take your argument apart:

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.

Efficacious means having the ability to produce a desired result, so I assume this is how you are defining an efficacious relationship between p-consciousness and the brain. In other words, consciousness causes brain effects.

If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.

This is where I think your problem starts. It would be okay if you only mean the brain itself burns energy to function. If you also mean consciousness must itself burn energy, it is an utterly unsupported assumption. I'll hold off completing that idea until the end.

Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.

You can only correctly say that if p-consciousness initiates brain functions, then brain functions, having proven to be physical, must have used energy.

If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.

That's right, because energy is a physical concept. Right now you are getting fatally circular. The source of energy is from matter, or the presence of matter. That is how it is defined. That's why Iaachus is wrong to talk about non-physical energy; it doesn't make any sense given the official definition of energy. There is no such thing, by definition! That's not to say, however, there isn't something else which can initiate and cause, but which is NOT derived from material processes.

Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.

P-consciousness is efficacious.

Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

This is nothing but a physicalist tautology! You argue consciousness is physical by first limiting the definition of effacacious only to that which is physical. The tactic is clear, you set up your "proof" so there was no other conclusion possible.

What you do not know is if something non-physical can trigger physical phenomena. But we do know that if it is non-physical, by definition it won't burn energy to function as it does (because energy is only derived from physical processes). So obviously you can't assume the lack of an energy energy trail proves consciousness is physical. In essence, you eliminate the possibility of different rules for a non-physical world by claiming up front that it must function according to physical principles. That is a textbook example of a circular argument. It's meaningless.

 

[loseyourname]

What you do not know is if something non-physical can trigger physical phenomena. But we do know that if it is non-physical, by definition it won't burn energy to function as it does (because energy is only derived from physical processes). So obviously you can't assume the lack of an energy energy trail proves consciousness is physical. In essence, you eliminate the possibility of different rules for a non-physical world by claiming up front that it must function according to physical principles. That is a textbook example of a circular argument. It's meaningless.

I'm saying that "physical" means anything that has the ability to be a mechanical cause or effect. This is because "physics" is pretty nothing more than the study of mechanical causes and effects and the relationships between them. I don't think the definition is a stretch. If it is, then insert another word. We're still talking about the same thing. Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner under this framework, but if you would prefer non-physical to mean simply "not empirically detectable," then so be it. It does no damage to my framework.

I'm not sure if you're just using the word "trigger" to avoid using the word "cause" or if you actually mean something different. I'll assume the latter for now, in which case my argument holds. If something non-physical "triggers" a physical event, it has injected energy into a physical system, as the system now has kinetic energy it did not previously have that came from no material source. The thing is, the simple fact that this immaterial energy source is not empirically detectable (although the energy itself obviously is) does not make it non-mechanical or contracausal. The conflict we seem to be having is not a conflict or ideas, but only a conflict of terminology, which is why I continue to contend that you are simply averse to the use of the word "physical" to describe consciousness, even if consciousness must necessarily behave to some extent in a mechanical manner, and the framework you have introduced gives no reason to think that it doesn't behave in an entirely mechanical manner.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I'm saying that "physical" means anything that has the ability to be a mechanical cause or effect. This is because "physics" is pretty nothing more than the study of mechanical causes and effects and the relationships between them. I don't think the definition is a stretch. If it is, then insert another word. We're still talking about the same thing. Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner under this framework, but if you would prefer non-physical to mean simply "not empirically detectable," then so be it. It does no damage to my framework.

You are wrong. Physicalness is not defined by being mechanical. That's partly why your argument is circular, because you want to kidnap every possible thing that happens and slap a physical label on it.

Physicalness is anything associated with matter, which ordinarily exists in one of three physical states: solid, liquid, or gas. The McGraw-Hill Encyclopedia of Science and Technology provides an interesting way to think about matter: “[matter is] The substance composing bodies perceptible to the senses. The distinguishing properties of matter are gravitation and inertia. Any entity exhibiting these properties when at rest is matter. . . . All material bodies have mass, which is a measure of inertia; every material body near the Earth’s surface has weight, which is a measure of the Earth’s gravitational attraction for the body.”

Mass and the effects of mass are much more defining of physicalness than anything else. Mechanicalness is exhibited in physicalness, but that isn't what defines it. It's like saying the presence of water in biology defines biology. Mechanics are just one thing that shows up in physics. So I can't go along with your concept of physical. You cannot just arbitrarily claim every characteristic exhibited in physicalness has a physical origin. You don't even know what the origin of physicalness is (of course, neither does anyone else).

And then you jump to conclusions without any evidence, like this "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner." Why is that? You don't know that; you are just assuming that so your argument holds water. Prove that first, and then you get to use it as a fact.

I'm not sure if you're just using the word "trigger" to avoid using the word "cause" or if you actually mean something different. I'll assume the latter for now, in which case my argument holds. If something non-physical "triggers" a physical event, it has injected energy into a physical system, as the system now has kinetic energy it did not previously have that came from no material source.

Not so. Doesn't mercury drop when it gets colder? The loss of energy can also trigger/cause can't it?

The thing is, the simple fact that this immaterial energy source is not empirically detectable (although the energy itself obviously is) does not make it non-mechanical or contracausal.

No it doesn't. But you are the one attempting a proof, not me. I haven't said I can prove anything except that your argument doesn't hold water.

The conflict we seem to be having is not a conflict or ideas, but only a conflict of terminology, which is why I continue to contend that you are simply averse to the use of the word "physical" to describe consciousness, even if consciousness must necessarily behave to some extent in a mechanical manner, and the framework you have introduced gives no reason to think that it doesn't behave in an entirely mechanical manner.

As I posted above, mechanics do not define physical. But let's say we agreed that physical is defined by being mechanical. How exactly are creativity, love, and subjectivity mechanical? You nor anyone else can prove they are, yet you just assume it "entirely."

Here's what I think. In consciousness there are mechanical aspects and there are unified and flowing aspects. Physicalists seem to obsess with the mechanical aspects to the point they miss the interconnectedness of things. And then they project that failure of perception into theories which reflect what they themselves have simply missed. That's why, IMO, none of your answers address my claim that your argument is circular. If you only micro-focus on mechanics it will be difficult see you are only looking at one aspect of a multifaceted situation.

 

[Rader]

I'm saying that "physical" means anything that has the ability to be a mechanical cause or effect. This is because "physics" is pretty nothing more than the study of mechanical causes and effects and the relationships between them. I don't think the definition is a stretch. If it is, then insert another word.

Information is that word. All physical systems require a third fundamental agent in order for work to be accomplished. Information has to be injected into the system or you can not even test the thermodynamics of the system.

 

[Fliption]

Things are hectic and there's a lot going on so my brain may not be functioning properly (for a change ), but I just don't get this thread. I don't mean to interrupt an intense debate but the moment I read the original post I couldn't help but ask myself "Who cares?". This logical proof at the beginning and the whole thread since seems to dwell on what "label" we get to assign to consciousness. Is it physical or is it non-physical? Again, I asks "Who cares?". A proof one way or the other is obviously an exercise in semantics. What do we know about consciousness after reading this proof that we didn't know before? Nothing from what I can see. As a matter of fact it seems this proof glosses over the real issue of consciousness by assuming
"Consciousness is efficacious" seemingly only for the purpose of assigning it to a category. Who cares?

Everyone is defining physical and non-physical differently and always has. I have pointed this out for at least two years now. Here now we have a logical proof that consciousness is physical. What does this mean? Well, it depends on what "physical" means. So all we really have is a conclusion that is built into the definition to begin with. It tells us nothing about whether consciousness is efficacious, which is part of the real issue anyway. We just assumed that was true.

The whole discussion seems to be about who's word we get to use (all preconceived notions included) and I'm not real clear on why it matters. Please straighten me out if I'm missing something which I surely could be.

 

[loseyourname]

You are wrong. Physicalness is not defined by being mechanical. That's partly why your argument is circular, because you want to kidnap every possible thing that happens and slap a physical label on it.

Okay. So am I right to say that if I use a word other than physical, you will be happy? Because your definition does nothing different in an epistemological sense than mine does. I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect and so consciousness becomes physical, even if it is a more fundamental form of existence than matter or energy. You define physical as something composed of matter/energy, and use that definition to suggest that consciousness is not physical if it is composed of something more fundamental. Is there honestly an importance difference between our actual ideas, or is it just the words?

And then you jump to conclusions without any evidence, like this "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner." Why is that? You don't know that; you are just assuming that so your argument holds water. Prove that first, and then you get to use it as a fact.

Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner by my definition. That is the purpose of definitions. It's the same reason any man that is not married is a bachelor. It's not an argument. It's a definition. Again, I can use a different word if that will make you happy.

Not so. Doesn't mercury drop when it gets colder? The loss of energy can also trigger/cause can't it?

That's correct. I should have mentioned that change in a system can also be brought about by removing energy. Either way, energy is required.

No it doesn't. But you are the one attempting a proof, not me. I haven't said I can prove anything except that your argument doesn't hold water.

There are only three ways in which my initial argument can fail. Let me copy it here:

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious. The second way is if energy is somehow not necessary for the initiation of neural processes. The third way is if it is possible for energy to have a non-physical source.

Clearly, I'm attempting to establish a framework for efficacious p-consciousness, so in order to do so I must, for the purposes of my investigation, assume that it is. The second and third ways in which my argument can fail would both constitute violations of the law of conservation of energy. (Edit: Actually the second way might not violate the law after all. I just received the Rosenberg book in the mail, and I suspect he might have found a way around that little problem.) Now, don't get me wrong. It's entirely possible that the laws of physics as we know them are wrong, at least when they are applied to phenomenal causation as manifested in human consciousness. I'm not discounting this possibility. I'm simply doing what most investigators do: assuming to being with that the laws we already have in place are correct and do apply. After making this initial assumption, we then move on to make an attempt at fitting the phenomenon in question into a framework that is consistent with these laws. If it subsequently becomes clear that this won't work, we then make the contrary assumption that the laws we know do not apply to the case we are investigating. That has yet to be shown, so for the purposes of investigation, I continued to make my assumption.

As I posted above, mechanics do not define physical. But let's say we agreed that physical is defined by being mechanical. How exactly are creativity, love, and subjectivity mechanical? You nor anyone else can prove they are, yet you just assume it "entirely."

Actually, if I had to take a guess, I'd say they weren't. It is certainly counterintuitive to suggest otherwise. Thankfully, I'm not constrained by the limits of my intuition when it comes time to make an attempt at establishing a consistent framework that is not ad hoc. My research into neurology strongly suggests that a lot of what we intuit about consciousness is at best misleading, and at worst dead wrong.

Here's what I think. In consciousness there are mechanical aspects and there are unified and flowing aspects.

That's exactly what I think as well, but I'm not going to post it simply because I think it. I'm going to post only what I think I have a decent shot of demonstrating.

Physicalists seem to obsess with the mechanical aspects to the point they miss the interconnectedness of things.

Well, I think you're obsessing with the definition of "physical" that I'm using to the point that you gloss over the fact that what I've put into this thread is only a very small part of an overall framework that I've come nowhere near working out, a framework that may very well stress "interconnectedness" more than you think.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Okay. So am I right to say that if I use a word other than physical, you will be happy? Because your definition does nothing different in an epistemological sense than mine does. I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect and so consciousness becomes physical, even if it is a more fundamental form of existence than matter or energy. You define physical as something composed of matter/energy, and use that definition to suggest that consciousness is not physical if it is composed of something more fundamental. Is there honestly an importance difference between our actual ideas, or is it just the words?

I'm afraid I can't see why you don't think improper definitions aren't a problem in a debate. You say, "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner by my definition. That is the purpose of definitions." Do you think you get to make up the rules of reality? You didn't just define a term you were going to use, you stated how reality works, and for that you don't get be arbitrary. Either it is known to be true or its not. If it's not, then you don't get to use it as an assumption of as though it is a fact.

The other "defining tactic" you are employing is equally improper. What if the theme of this thread were "Can Everything be Reduced to Mind?" So then when you point out the realities of physicalness I just say, "well, I'm defining that as mind." It is a ridiculous debating ploy because your assertions can't possibly be falsified (ask anyone who's tried to debate an idealist), and because such circular arguments prevent you from saying anything meaningful to begin with.

Remember, you are the one who's argument ended with "therefore, p-consciousness has a physical source." It makes no sense, as Fliption points out, to define everything as physicalness and then to state the obvious tautology that any particular thing is physical. If everything is defined as physical, then what else can anything be?

Look at this assertion and explain to me how it doesn't render your entire assertion pointless: "I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect . . ." Well, that's what everyone is debating about. That is, we are debating if something non-physical can cause physical effects. Once you define anything that causes as physical, then what is there to say about the real debate?

The real and established debate, the one I assumed you were speaking to, is if consciousness can be explained by known physical principles. Everyone already knows that however consciousness is explained, it still must be able to cause physical effects (like causing body movements).

Your syllogism appeared to be attempting to prove consciousness must have a physical source, but I say you've failed to do that because your assumptions are not established fact, and because claiming everything is physical to begin with leads to an overall circlular argument. So in the end you leave us with an unsound and illogical proof.

There are only three ways in which my initial argument can fail. Let me copy it here . . . One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious.

I can't see how that can be true. We think and we move the body around.

The second way is if energy is somehow not necessary for the initiation of neural processes.

Right. So, there's a big hole in your argument right there.

The third way is if it is possible for energy to have a non-physical source.

But then you have to change the definition of energy. Energy is defined quite strictly as physical, so how can it be non-physical too? Now, there might some kind of initiating power other than energy (which, BTW, is a fourth way your argument can fail); but if it is energy, then it is physical.

 

[loseyourname]

I'm afraid I can't see why you don't think improper definitions aren't a problem in a debate. You say, "Anything non-physical would have to behave in a contracausal manner by my definition. That is the purpose of definitions." Do you think you get to make up the rules of reality?

We do get to fuss with words somewhat when it really isn't entirely clear what they mean (if it were, we would not be having this discussion). For instance, it was once thought that breath was non-physical, that the properties of life were non-physical, that the propagation of light waves was non-physical. We gradually had to include these under the umbrella of physicalism when two things were realized. One thing was that they behaved mechanically. Another was that they were composed of matter (or in the case of light, energy quanta). So the question becomes: Which of these considerations is the reason they came to be considered physical? And correspondingly, what exactly does it mean for something to be physical?

We clearly have two options, and which you choose likely depends on what view of physicalism you take. You can take the view that only matter/energy can be considered physical, which is the view you seem to be taking. I'll explain why I don't share that view. It begins with the ontology of energy as physical stuff. Consider how it is defined: the capacity to perform work. This is a vague definition that fails to take into account the fact that certain massless particles, that do seem to be material of some sort and not simply a property of other material, are nothing more than energy quanta (string theory would hold that they are exactly the same material as matter, only with different vibrational signatures). The question we are faced with now is the same one I just asked: Given that energy and matter seem to be interchangeable manifestations of the same "stuff," is it this "stuff" that is to be considered physical? Are the physical facts nothing more than facts about relational properties between matter/energy "stuff?" You seem to think that they are.

There is another way of looking at it, though. Even before energy was known to be the same "stuff" as matter, it was still held to be a physical phenomenon. I ask why that was? My answer was that it was a mechanical property of matter and so figured into the mechanics of physical theory. Theory-physicalism, or t-physicalism, holds simply that the physical facts are those that describe relational properties, period. I take this to mean that any thing that can have a causal relation to another thing is physical. I see your view of physicalism (all that is matter/energy is everything) as matieralism. I will grant that many people, and even dictionaries, see the two as synonomous, but I'm trying my best to explain why I do not agree. I will elaborate below.

Remember, you are the one who's argument ended with "therefore, p-consciousness has a physical source." It makes no sense, as Fliption points out, to define everything as physicalness and then to state the obvious tautology that any particular thing is physical. If everything is defined as physical, then what else can anything be?

You're right. That doesn't make sense. It's also not what I did. I challenge you to find any instance of my defining everything as physicalness. I think I've been about as specific as a person could possibly be with definitions at this point, and it should be clear that I've defined "physical" to mean anything that is bound by mechanical laws of cause and effect and "physicalism" to mean the theory that states facts about causal relationships between objects are the only facts. It should be clear by now why this is. If a causal relationship behaves mechanically, then it can be described by mathematics (even if only probabilistically). If it can be described by mathematics, then it can be included into the study of physics. I think this is the most consistent definition of "physical" out there. Given this definition, I'm not even personally a physicalist, but I am at least investigating the possibility that consciousness is a phenomenon that can be explained by a physical theory (although I intuitively suspect it likely will not).

"I define physical as being anything that can be a cause or an effect . . ." Well, that's what everyone is debating about. That is, we are debating if something non-physical can cause physical effects. Once you define anything that causes as physical, then what is there to say about the real debate?

It says that for consciousness to behave in a way not describable by physical theory (and hence not be physical), it must be one of two things: It must either be contracausal, or it must be an intrinsic property of matter/energy "stuff" that is not a part of relational causality.

Your syllogism appeared to be attempting to prove consciousness must have a physical source, but I say you've failed to do that because your assumptions are not established fact, and because claiming everything is physical to begin with leads to an overall circlular argument. So in the end you leave us with an unsound and illogical proof.

You might question the soundness, but unless you disagree that the hypothetical syllogism and modus ponens are valid argument forms (you would be at odds with every single logician in the world if you did), you cannot question the logic. Anyway, all I was attempting to prove was what I stated in the paragraph above. Let me paraphrase myself:

For consciousness to be non-physical, it must either behave contracausally or be an intrinsic property of causally related agents that is not itself a relational attribute.

Right. So, there's a big hole in your argument right there.

Actually, let's examine this a bit. It isn't strictly a hole in the argument, because the argument is really only meant to establish a hypothetical conditional, not any fact about reality. Nonetheless, I get the feeling that this might actually be a fairly fruitful way in which to approach a theory of consciousness that at least isn't covered isn't by any currently known physics. I've been thinking about your idea of the fundamental existent as a causative agent of energetic action rather than of material action (obviously, energy itself is the cause of material action). Even if we consider energy to be the same "stuff" as matter, because of the definition of work, a causative agent that only acts on energy actually wouldn't perform any work. Work is defined as force applied over a certain distance, and force is defined as mass multiplied by acceleration. It should be clear that, because energy has no mass, that no force, and hence no work, is needed to cause a change in its behavior. The question of whether or not the fundamental existent is a cause of energetic behavior in a mathematically describable manner is still relevant to the question of whether or not it is physical under my framework, but it is certainly not covered by any known theory of physics.

Now, there might some kind of initiating power other than energy (which, BTW, is a fourth way your argument can fail)l.

Actually, I don't see that as being a possibility. Because work is performed when a material action is initiated, energy must be required by the definition of energy. I think looking into the initiation of energetic action is indubitably the potentially fruitful avenue we've uncovered here. Thanks for the help.

 

[StatusX]

If I understand you right, loseyourname, you're saying that consciousness causing physical events and the conservation of energy are incompatible views. I agree with this, as I'll illustrate below, but I think it might be that some of the confusion is coming from a difference in the definition of phenomenal consciousness.

Everything we have explained so far with physics has been functional relationships. No physical theory has made any claims about the intrinsic qualities of substances (neutrons or energy, for example). The hard problem of consciousness arises because experience is entirely intrinsic. This may be controversial, but I believe that every function of the human brain can be explained, from learning to believing to laughing.

First let me explain what I don't mean. I don't mean the subjective experience of finding something funny or feeling a spiritual connection to the world, or anything like that. I mean the physical processes that take place in our brain when we think about something. We will one day be able to correlate electrical activity in the brain to specific thoughts. We will be able to explain exactly what our neurons are doing when we feel sad and start to cry. This is NOT an explanation of consciousness, it is an explanation of the functional relationships between different parts of our bodies and the outside world, and there is no reason whatsoever to doubt that these are within the explanatory reach of the current scientific method.

So when you say consciousness can't have an effect on the world, I couldn't agree more, because that is the definition of consciousness. It is what we subjectively experience, not the functions carried out by our brains. Now some people may say that experiences do affect the physical world. When I feel angry, I act differently than when I'm happy. Maybe I'll decide to punch a stranger in the back of the head. That's a physical event that was caused by a subjective feeling, right? Well, wrong. That is caused by physical processes that took place in the brain. Something physical happened, say your girlfriend called and told you she never wanted to see you again, and these sound waves caused neuron firing patterns in your brain that continued to be altered by sensroy information throughout the day until you saw that guys head and it triggered a signal to be sent to the muscles in your arm. I hate these dry, obvious explanations as much as anyone else, but you have to understand the crucial point. Experience was not mentioned once. This chain of physical actions took place, and the only place for consciousness was to experience the sounds, emotions, sights, and sore fist.

Many people don't believe this, and think that if we didn't have subjective experiences, we wouldn't have felt those strong emotions, and wouldn't have punched that poor guy. This is where conservation of energy helps to illustrate the flaw in this way of thinking. Assume that it was the subjective experience of anger that caused you to punch him, and there would be no physical way to predict this action just from examining the state of your brain a few minutes prior. Now I doubt you'd argue that it took some kind of impulse from a neuron in the central nervous system to get that arm to start moving. So what caused the impulse. One second, everything was quiet, and the next, spontaneously, an impulse fired. That violates conservation of energy.

One counterargument is to say that the laws of physics as we know them do not apply in the brain. This is unappealing physically, and while I would agree we don't yet have a complete description of the universe because of the remaining gaping hole of consciousness, I think that any final explanation will be universal, and not specific to the configuration of atoms in our brain. Chalmers is on the right track suggesting that the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system.

 

[Pavel]

Chalmers is on the right track suggesting that the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system.

Hey man, I thought you left the consciousness topic, so I never bothered replying back to you, but here you go again . Thanks for the reference to the Chalmers paper, I did read it. I loved the way he set up the problem. I thought he was superb and I was with him all the way... until he started talking about his proposals. I'm not going through all the problems that I had with him, until the need arises in posts that fall back on his ideas. Since you mentioned information, I want to comment on it, as it was one of the problems or misunderstandings that I had.

First of all, the use of the term "information" is probably a misnomer in his paper, unless he really means information. He needs to find another, very objective and naturalistic term. Another example of what I consider misnomers is when people talk about "purpose" in the context of the biological evolution. I hear all the time "the evolution meant", or "the purpose of the protein..." Remember, the evolution is blind and everything is working the way it is, is because the organic matter, accidentally or by external natural events, got arranged into a configuration that allowed it to "survive and procreate". By the same token, the genetic code, or the "information" in the DNA is a misnomer because it attributes a conscious process to something completely blind.

Information implies a conscious process behind coding and behind its interpretation. Otherwise, it's randomn noise. In my understanding, in Chalmers' view, consciousness stands to chemical brain in the same relationship as information stands to the computer running the software. If that's the case, there's a big problem, as far as I'm concerned.

I, the programmer and the end user, am the one who assigns and interpretes the information. It's something abstract that exists only in mind, or by convention and consensus, in similar minds. My mind can assign interpretation to anything. Did you see the toast with the image of virgin Mary on the news that was being sold on E-bay for over 10 grand? The toast apparently carries information but it's up to the "viewer" to interpret that information. So, my question is what is the ontological status of this information that Chalmers categorically equates with consciousness? Who is the viewer and who is the coder in his picture, what process, specifically. To me, if I believe in pure physicality of consciousness, I see neurons made up of chemicals, that's it, there's no information per se, just like there’s no inherent information in the gene. The computer analogy is wrong because I can clearly explain the information with respect to the human mind assigning interpretation to bits. So, when you say "the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system", specifically what information are you talking about?


Pavel.

 

[Fliption]

loseyourname: One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious.

Les: I can't see how that can be true. We think and we move the body around.

I wanted to ask here if it was possible for consciousness to just be along for the ride? It just experiences the qualia it associates with the information it receives from brain processes. The fact that we cannot know otherwise is what the hard problem is all about. But Status X has an eloquent post explaining all of this.

It says that for consciousness to behave in a way not describable by physical theory (and hence not be physical), it must be one of two things: It must either be contracausal, or it must be an intrinsic property of matter/energy "stuff" that is not a part of relational causality.

But we already know this right? Because consciousness appears to be "contracausal" in a world where science insist everything is causal is the reason we have a hard problem. Your logical argument just seems to have set up a proof for what we already know. It just goes the long way around by inserting categories(which are meaningless anyway).

Ultimately your conclusion is making a statement about one of the assumptions you made, "Consciousness is efficacious". This is why I was asking the questions in my previous post. Why bother with this debate on definitions and categories and let's just discuss the real issue. Is consciousness casual? The truth about it's causality may or may not decide whether it is physical depending on how one defines the word 'physical', but who cares about that anyway?

 

[selfAdjoint]

Fliption, you may "already know" that consciousness is acausal, but I sure don't. I find loseyourname's insistence on as much rigor as is available to be refreshing on this thread where hot air and squabbles over semantics are more common.

 

[RingoKid]

So, when you say "the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system", specifically what information are you talking about?

I suspect he's talking about the vibrational signatures of strings in a dimension of consciousness which takes into account the uncertainty principle. Information changes over time so that no 2 systems percieve the same result given the same input due to spatio temporal diffences giving rise to different subjective interpretations.

Physical to me means a percievable effect or object operating in 4d spacetime. String theory to me isn't a physical theory as it's background is not detectable by sensory perception inside of our 4d universe...yet!

What it is, is an elegant abstract mathematical theory that models reality and has the ability to include consciousness in a very simple and elegant fashion.

If strings are bands of energy and everything is made of strings but not everything is conscious then somewhere along the way an entity/accumulation of strings acquires consciousness by a vibrational signature in a compactified dimension of a Calabi-Yau manifold that is omni present and ever changing in 4d spacetime to allow the changing of matter due to movement of objects and the effects of electro magnetic fields.

So consciousness has it's origins in a non physical "location"

dimension2: a construct whereby objects or individuals can be distinguished;

Now what I'd like to know is who else is exploring this or is everyone too chickensh!t cos strings is still only a speculative theory with no physical evidence ?

 

[Les Sleeth]

loseyourname: One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious.

Les: I can't see how that can be true. We think and we move the body around.

I wanted to ask here if it was possible for consciousness to just be along for the ride? It just experiences the qualia it associates with the information it receives from brain processes. The fact that we cannot know otherwise is what the hard problem is all about.

That's if you define consciousness using only qualia, which has never made sense to me. How does it make sense that conscious experience is defined only by "what it's like" to taste a gourmet pizza, and then to say it is not conscious that I personally willed my intellect to learn and my body to create the dish I was going experience "what it's like"?

 

[Les Sleeth]

I find loseyourname's insistence on as much rigor as is available to be refreshing on this thread where hot air and squabbles over semantics are more common.

I don't know about anyone else, but I am not playing semantic games. I am trying to have a fair debate. Tell me how it makes sense to define physicalness as "anything that is bound by mechanical laws of cause and effect and 'physicalism' to mean the theory that states facts about causal relationships between objects are the only facts"??

In particular it is ridiculous to claim mechanistic cause and effect defines physical. We don't know that something non-physical can't have mechanistic characteristics as well. Mechanistic behavior is not what defines physicalness, it is merely part of it. It's the same way crystaline structure doesn't define ice; lots of other things have crystaline structure too.

His is not the definition physical science gives us, nor any dictionary/encyclopedia I can find, so why should I adopt his defintion just because he needs the definition to be a certain way to help him to make his argument?

Princeton's Word Reference site give the definition of physical science here:

- the science of matter and energy and their interactions


On the same page you can find a definition for physicalness:

- the quality of being physical; consisting of matter


The Word Reference site gives several relevant definitions of physical here:


1* physical
* involving the body as distinguished from the mind or spirit . . .

2* physical
* relating to the sciences dealing with matter and energy; especially physics; "physical sciences"; "physical laws"
3* physical, tangible, touchable
* having substance or material existence; perceptible to the senses; "a physical manifestation"; "surrounded by tangible objects"
4* physical
* according with material things or natural laws (other than those peculiar to living matter); "a reflex response to physical stimuli"

6* physical
* concerned with material things; "physical properties"; "the physical characteristics of the earth"; "the physical size of a computer"


Of Physicalism the Wikipedia says:

Physicalism is the metaphysical position that everything is physical; that is, that there are no kinds of things other than physical things. Likewise, physicalism about the mental is a position in philosophy of mind which holds that the mind is a physical thing in some sense. This position is also called "materialism", but the term "physicalism" is preferable because it does not have any misleading connotations, and because it carries an emphasis on the physical, meaning whatever is described ultimately by physics -- that is, matter and energy.

So tell me, what is semantic about insisting we use proper definitions. Physical is defined first and foremost by mass and energy, and then those properties and laws which stem from that. The tactic of redefining physical so you can claim broaden the meaning to include what isn't necessarily physical is a dubious approach.

 

[StatusX]

That's if you define consciousness using only qualia, which has never made sense to me. How does it make sense that conscious experience is defined only by "what it's like" to taste a gourmet pizza, and then to say it is not conscious that I personally willed my intellect to learn and my body to create the dish I was going experience "what it's like"?

There's no evidence that those functions can't be explained scientifically. This isn't proof, but think of it like this. An alien race comes and studies us the way we study animals. They document our behavior and examine some of our bodies, and using advanced technology and scientific knowledge, they are able to explain why we do everything we do.

Now you seem to disagree that this is even theoretically possible. So I have to ask you: would they be able to completely explain the behavior of an earthworm? How about a mouse, a dog, or a monkey? If so, then why not a human? What is so fundamentally different? Now you might say it's consciousness; that we have it while animals don't. What evdience do you have for this? If this is so, then this alien race, assuming it doesn't have anything resembling our consciousness, will be baffled as to why it can explain the behavior of every creature on Earth except humans. If instead you think that not all animal behavior can be explained, where is the line? Surely we'll understand bacteria, fungii, etc. Almost definitely, we'll explain the behavior of the most simple animals with brains. There would have to be some point in the hierarchy of animals where a mystical power creeped in. I'm sorry, but I just don't see any evidence that our behavior can't be explained.

 

[StatusX]

First of all, the use of the term "information" is probably a misnomer in his paper, unless he really means information. He needs to find another, very objective and naturalistic term. Another example of what I consider misnomers is when people talk about "purpose" in the context of the biological evolution. I hear all the time "the evolution meant", or "the purpose of the protein..." Remember, the evolution is blind and everything is working the way it is, is because the organic matter, accidentally or by external natural events, got arranged into a configuration that allowed it to "survive and procreate". By the same token, the genetic code, or the "information" in the DNA is a misnomer because it attributes a conscious process to something completely blind.

Information implies a conscious process behind coding and behind its interpretation. Otherwise, it's randomn noise. In my understanding, in Chalmers' view, consciousness stands to chemical brain in the same relationship as information stands to the computer running the software. If that's the case, there's a big problem, as far as I'm concerned.

I, the programmer and the end user, am the one who assigns and interpretes the information. It's something abstract that exists only in mind, or by convention and consensus, in similar minds. My mind can assign interpretation to anything. Did you see the toast with the image of virgin Mary on the news that was being sold on E-bay for over 10 grand? The toast apparently carries information but it's up to the "viewer" to interpret that information. So, my question is what is the ontological status of this information that Chalmers categorically equates with consciousness? Who is the viewer and who is the coder in his picture, what process, specifically. To me, if I believe in pure physicality of consciousness, I see neurons made up of chemicals, that's it, there's no information per se, just like there’s no inherent information in the gene. The computer analogy is wrong because I can clearly explain the information with respect to the human mind assigning interpretation to bits. So, when you say "the right configuration of information gives rise to subjective experience in a system", specifically what information are you talking about?

I haven't read enough of Chalmers to get a real sense of what he means by information. Like you mentioned, there is a massive amount of information in our DNA, so does that mean each DNA strand has awareness? I doubt it. Does the information in DNA need a conscious observer to be meanigfully called information? I doubt that too. Surely any adequately general definition of information we can come up with will cover the function of DNA, which is precisely to pass on the "information" of the species, regardless of the presence of any intelligent observers.

Whether we have a good definition of information yet is debatable, but there is an interesting link between information and entropy that seems to make the second law of thermodynamics more of a true law and not just a statistical trend. Here is a quote from the wikipedia article on information entropy:

"Shannon's definition of entropy is closely related to thermodynamic entropy as defined by physicists and many chemists. Boltzmann and Gibbs did considerable work on statistical thermodynamics, which became the inspiration for adopting the word entropy in information theory. There are relationships between thermodynamic and informational entropy. For example, Maxwell's demon reverses thermodynamic entropy with information but getting that information exactly balances out the thermodynamic gain the demon would otherwise achieve."

If information entropy can be incorporated into an objective physical theory, than it is a good candidate for the physical root of consciousness. Specifically, I think Chalmers probably means something more like the processing of information. This is extremely vague, but perhaps one way of interpreting this is that any system that can be simulated by a turing machine has some kind of experience. Maybe the complexity of the simulating machine is in some sense a measure of the sophistication of the conscious experience. This is all just speculation. The important point is that there is the possibility that the world can still be completely described by its physical state, and that state is what determines how consciousness is distributed among physical systems. Whether the important structure in this correlation is information, in some sense, or something completely different, we don't know yet.

Now I don't intend to say this explains why consciousness arises from physical systems. That is philosophy, while the study of exactly how it does is (or one day will be) science, at least in my opinion.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Ultimately your conclusion is making a statement about one of the assumptions you made, "Consciousness is efficacious". This is why I was asking the questions in my previous post. Why bother with this debate on definitions and categories and let's just discuss the real issue. Is consciousness casual? The truth about it's causality may or may not decide whether it is physical depending on how one defines the word 'physical', but who cares about that anyway?

I can say why I am bothering with this point. It has to do with what is the baseline. Which is more basic, physicalness or consciousness? How you are discussing "causal" is confusing to me because we've been talking about it a couple of ways. One way is, can consciousness "cause" physical effects. The other is, is consciousness "caused" by physical processes. Which are you referring to?

If your meaning of "causal" is that consciousness cannot be shown to be caused by any principles present in creation, and so you want to discuss causality in that context as a strategy, I understand, especially given your new reading project.

My opinion of Loseyourname's position is, physicalness was established first, and then consciousness arose out of physicalness. Right now I don't think physicalness as the baseline is a logical assumption if we weigh all the evidence objectively. This thread, IMO, is his attempt to show physicalness must have arisen first because, he states, consciousness must use something physical, energy, to be efficacious. What I've been objecting to is expanding the meaning of physical to explain what can't be explained with physicalness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

There's no evidence that those functions can't be explained scientifically. This isn't proof, but think of it like this. An alien race comes and studies us the way we study animals. They document our behavior and examine some of our bodies, and using advanced technology and scientific knowledge, they are able to explain why we do everything we do.

The rules of proof are, if you assert functionalism can account for consciousness, YOU are the one who has to make your case. No one expected to prove it CANNOT be done.

Now you seem to disagree that this is even theoretically possible.

Not theoretically impossible, practically impossible.

So I have to ask you: would they be able to completely explain the behavior of an earthworm? How about a mouse, a dog, or a monkey? If so, then why not a human?

I think it's pretty funny you can't distinguish between human consciousness and that of an earthworm.

So what is so fundamentally different? Now you might say it's consciousness; that we have it while animals don't. What evdience do you have for this?

Well, I don't necessarily think earthworms aren't conscious, minimully of course.

If this is so, then this alien race, assuming it doesn't have anything resembling our consciousness, will be baffled as to why it can explain the behavior of every creature on Earth except humans.

How exactly will an alien race without consciousness be baffled? That makes NO sense.

If instead you think that not all animal behavior can be explained, where is the line? Surely we'll understand bacteria, fungii, etc. Almost definitely, we'll explain the behavior of the most simple animals with brains. There would have to be some point in the hierarchy of animals where a mystical power creeped in. I'm sorry, but I just don't see any evidence that our behavior can't be explained.

Yes, I've stated my opinion on this many times. I think the "line" is a nervous system.

 

[Fliption]

Fliption, you may "already know" that consciousness is acausal, but I sure don't. I find loseyourname's insistence on as much rigor as is available to be refreshing on this thread where hot air and squabbles over semantics are more common.

You haven't understood what I'm saying. I am not claiming that consciousness is not causal. Go back and read the entire exchange again. Loseyourname was making a point that IF consciousness cannot be described by a physical (which means casual to him)theory then it suggest that consciousness might be fundamental. This is what I'm saying we already know. I'm reading this statement and saying "Duh!"

And my whole point on this thread has been that Loseyournames's logical argument is nothing but an exercise in semantics. It is more of the same as it relates to the semantics issues in this forum(hot air and squabbles). If you step back and think about what information this argument is really giving you(nothing) then you'll see what I mean.

 

[Fliption]

That's if you define consciousness using only qualia, which has never made sense to me. How does it make sense that conscious experience is defined only by "what it's like" to taste a gourmet pizza, and then to say it is not conscious that I personally willed my intellect to learn and my body to create the dish I was going experience "what it's like"?

A definition of consciousness might include that aspect and I guess that's why there are terms like A-consciousness and P-consciousness to differentiate between the various components. Qualia is the part that is best understood to be non-reducable and subject to study by science. "Will" I'm not so sure about. It seems one might could argue that "will" could be explained with brain processes.

 

[Fliption]

One way is, can consciousness "cause" physical effects. The other is, is consciousness "caused" by physical processes. Which are you referring to?

I'm referring to both. Perhaps I have misunderstood the use of terms in this thread but in the past I've read "causal" to mean any causal relationship at all. Wether one causes or it is caused, it has a causal relationship. This is what I think the hard problem is founded on. It isn't concerned with which comes first, physical or consciousness. It merely highlights the facts that there appears to be a causal relationship between these two ,yet consciousness cannot be reductively explained like everything else in the causal chain.

My opinion of Loseyourname's position is, physicalness was established first, and then consciousness arose out of physicalness. Right now I don't think physicalness as the baseline is a logical assumption if we weigh all the evidence objectively. This thread, IMO, is his attempt to show physicalness must have arisen first because, he states, consciousness must use something physical, energy, to be efficacious. What I've been objecting to is expanding the meaning of physical to explain what can't be explained with physicalness.

Well If Loseyouename is trying to make an argument along these lines then the thread doesn't seem as insane as it did before. I went back and re-read the original posts and it still seems to me like he's doing nothing but re-defining "physical" to include consciousness. I don't see any implications from this at all. It's just meaningless.

This is my impression of the first post. It's possible I missed some points in subsequent posts from him though.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I went back and re-read the original posts and it still seems to me like he's doing nothing but re-defining "physical" to include consciousness. I don't see any impications from this at all. It's just meaningless.

LOL. That's exactly my argument with him.

 

[Les Sleeth]

A definition of consciousness might include that aspect and I guess that's why there are terms like A-consciousness and P-consciousness to differentiate between the various components. Qualia is the part that is best understood to be non-reducable and subject to study by science. "Will" I'm not so sure about. It seems one might could argue that "will" could be explained with brain processes.

But you've left out the rest of my argument. How is consciousness absent from the process of willing the intellect to learn something, willing the body to carry it out, so that consciousness can experience the qualia of that pizza?

 

[StatusX]

The rules of proof are, if you assert functionalism can account for consciousness, YOU are the one who has to make your case. No one expected to prove it CANNOT be done.

Well that's exactly not what I'm asserting. I'm saying that the only thing that current science won't be able to explain is the non-functional aspect of what you call consciousness. Now, I happen to use the term "consciousness" to mean nothing more than that, and if you want to include the various functional processes of the mind in your definition, then we're not talking about the same thing. You think those processes can't be explained by science and I think they can. But I don't think we necessarily have to agree on this to talk about the non-functional "aspect" of consciousness, which is subjective experience.

I think it's pretty funny you can't distinguish between human consciousness and that of an earthworm.

Well, I'm glad you had a good laugh about it, but you're missing the point. There is only a quantitative difference, ie, in the number of neurons and synapses. So are you saying an earthworm's behavior could be completely explained without reference to the earthworm's subjective experience? If so, why can't a human's? What is it about "a lot" of neurons that is so fundamentally different from "not so many"?

How exactly will an alien race without consciousness be baffled? That makes NO sense.

It might not feel the subjective experience of being baffled as we do. But it would report confusion, much in the same way a computer would give an error message if it doesn't "know" what to do next. You have to understand that processes and the experiences of them are not the same thing.

Yes, I've stated my opinion on this many times. I think the "line" is a nervous system.

Ok, good. Does it have to be a biological one? If so, why?

 

[StatusX]

I'm referring to both. Perhaps I have misunderstood the use of terms in this thread but in the past I've read "causal" to mean any causal relationship at all. Wether one causes or it is caused, it has a causal relationship. This is what I think the hard problem is founded on. It isn't concerned with which comes first, physical or consciousness. It merely highlights the facts that there appears to be a causal relationship between these two ,yet consciousness cannot be reductively explained like everything else in the causal chain.

Just to be clear, when I have talked about consciousness not being causal, I meant having an effect on the physical world. (Just to push some buttons, it also can't even have one on the mental world, and is in fact completely powerless, like a man strapped to a chair being forced to watch a movie) Asking if the physical world "causes" consciousness is like asking if electrons "cause" charge, and I don't think that's a meaningful definition of cause.

 

[Fliption]

But you've left out the rest of my argument. How is consciousness absent from the process of willing the intellect to learn something, willing the body to carry it out, so that consciousness can experience the qualia of that pizza?

Heh I read that question 3 times. Can you rephrase it once more? Me slow

 

[Fliption]

Just to be clear, when I have talked about consciousness not being causal, I meant having an effect on the physical world. (Just to push some buttons, it also can't even have one on the mental world, and is in fact completely powerless, like a man strapped to a chair being forced to watch a movie) Asking if the physical world "causes" consciousness is like asking if electrons "cause" charge, and I don't think that's a meaningful definition of cause.

I agree with you.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Heh I read that question 3 times. Can you rephrase it once more? Me slow

I'm the one blushing now. I left a few words out of my post. Jeez, I must have been hungry. Okay, let's try it again.

The first step: my desire to have a qualia experience of what the experience of a pizza "is like."

I will my intellect to learn pizza making, I will my body to prepare it.

Now, you can attribute the act of will being carried out by the brain and body to physicalness, but the truth is consciousness desired it, initiated it, and was in control all along. To claim will is physicalness in this case is the same as saying a car is steered by the steering wheel alone. To look at it that way, you have to eliminate everything but acts of movement. No, consciousness made it happen through the medium of physicality.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Well that's exactly not what I'm asserting. I'm saying that the only thing that current science won't be able to explain is the non-functional aspect of what you call consciousness.

Okay, but that isn't what you said initially. You said, "There's no evidence that those functions can't be explained scientifically."

So are you saying an earthworm's behavior could be completely explained without reference to the earthworm's subjective experience?

Personally I don't think it can, but the earthworm's subjectivity is so primitive I can't make a convincing case. But in brief, I see the worm's will as a primitive form of subjectivity.

If so, why can't a human's? What is it about "a lot" of neurons that is so fundamentally different from "not so many"?

Well, there's more complexity too.