Law of Conservation of Energy and Its Implications for p-Consciousness

[Fliption]

Now, you can attribute the act of will being carried out by the brain and body to physicalness, but the truth is consciousness desired it, initiated it, and was in control all along. To claim will is physicalness in this case is the same as saying a car is steered by the steering wheel alone. To look at it that way, you have to eliminate everything but acts of movement. No, consciousness made it happen through the medium of physicality.

I think the reason you don't see this part of your consciousness definition being discussed much is because people do see it as possible in principle to functionally explain this. Whereas there is no hope for qualia. The Windows OS is a program that does quite a few things as if it "wants" to do them, all can be functionally explained and we don't assume it has consciousness. It is true that a human programmed this behaviour in but the point is that it is possible in principle for the behaviour itself to be explained functionally and therefore someone could argue that it will one day be functionally explained in humans as well. Whether any of this is true or not we cannot say but I think the possibility of it in principal is why you don't see it in many philosophy discussions dealing with the "hard problem".

Of course there is always the possibility that I still haven't grasped your concept .

 

[Les Sleeth]

I think the reason you don't see this part of your consciousness definition being discussed much is because people do see it as possible in principle to functionally explain this. Whereas there is no hope for qualia. The Windows OS is a program that does quite a few things as if it "wants" to do them, all can be functionally explained and we don't assume it has consciousness. It is true that a human programmed this behaviour in but the point is that it is possible in principle for the behaviour itself to be explained functionally and therefore someone could argue that it will one day be functionally explained in humans as well. Whether any of this is true or not we cannot say but I think the possibility of it in principal is why you don't see it in many philosophy discussions dealing with the "hard problem".

Of course there is always the possibility that I still haven't grasped your concept .

I don't think you quite got it. What you left out was Window's OS intiating so it can have the experience of qualia. You can't look at my behavior in this case without asking me why I am doing it. If functionalists are forced to admit a subjective aspect exists because people say so, and because they are aware of their own subjectivity, then they also have to admit that consciousness does things in search of experiencing what something specifically "is like."

Remember, I am starting out with the desire for the experience of "what it's like" to enjoy a gourmet pizza, which is of course possible because I've experienced what a gourmet pizza "is like" before. Since "what it's like" is how we are defining consciousness, that that part of awareness is doing things to achieve a conscious experience means the initiation and control is done by consciousenss. A computer could perform the actions, but a computer couldn't perform the actions with the intent of having a subjective experience.

As far as some functionalist only pointing to the behaviors, he still has to commit the error of denying subjectivity by refusing to acknowledge why the person is doing an act specifically aimed at achieving a subjective experience.

 

[selfAdjoint]

Remember, I am starting out with the desire for the experience of "what it's like" to enjoy a gourmet pizza, which is of course possible because I've experienced what a gourmet pizza "is like" before.

I think you could program something that would "want" to behave in certain ways in order that itself measured internal parameters should remain in a given "pleasurable" range. Indeed this is what homeostasis provides, a totally simplistic pattern exhibited by thermostats. And think of the control systems of cruise missiles; they want to be on track and adjust their thrusts and vanes to achieve that and continuously monitor and adjust to see that they are in the groove. Feedback it's called; Wiener noticed that it was identical to what happened when he reached his arm out to grasp something and coined the word cybernetics.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I think you could program something that would "want" to behave in certain ways in order that itself measured internal parameters should remain in a given "pleasurable" range. Indeed this is what homeostasis provides, a totally simplistic pattern exhibited by thermostats. And think of the control systems of cruise missiles; they want to be on track and adjust their thrusts and vanes to achieve that and continuously monitor and adjust to see that they are in the groove. Feedback it's called; Wiener noticed that it was identical to what happened when he reached his arm out to grasp something and coined the word cybernetics.

True, I agree want or intent is theoretically programmable, I argued that myself earlier in this thread (or the thread on consciousness).

But you've left out the essential part of my statement, which is that an intent be linked to the desire for an experience of "what it's like." If that isn't part of the conditions, then I have nothing to say about intent alone (though I've recently seen papers by philosophers trying to prove intent alone indicates consciousness).

I am talking about what we're defining as conscious experience intiating actions, say using the brain and body to make a pizza, specifically out of the desire to have an experience of what the pizza "is like." In this case, intent is being used by what we've already defined as consciousness . . . it is not following programming. Even if someone were so experienced at making a pizza they could do it unconsciously, I still maintain that if consciousness sets the programming in motion in order to experience "what it's like" to taste pizza, then consciousness "causes" physical effects (everyone has probably forgot, but that's the original point I was making i.e., that consciousness can physcially "cause").

 

[StatusX]

I don't think you quite got it. What you left out was Window's OS intiating so it can have the experience of qualia. You can't look at my behavior in this case without asking me why I am doing it. If functionalists are forced to admit a subjective aspect exists because people say so, and because they are aware of their own subjectivity, then they also have to admit that consciousness does things in search of experiencing what something specifically "is like."

This is the premise I used in another thread to reach the opposite conclusion. I argued that zombies would try to discover the cause of their own "consciousness", just like us. I'm not saying that my way is necessarily right; neither way is. You're basically saying that zombies would not explore questions about consciousness because consciousness is causal, which is your conclusion, and I'm doing basically the same thing. Neither of these arguments carry any weight.

Remember, I am starting out with the desire for the experience of "what it's like" to enjoy a gourmet pizza, which is of course possible because I've experienced what a gourmet pizza "is like" before. Since "what it's like" is how we are defining consciousness, that that part of awareness is doing things to achieve a conscious experience means the initiation and control is done by consciousenss. A computer could perform the actions, but a computer couldn't perform the actions with the intent of having a subjective experience.

Ever thought that your brain is hardwired to want food like pizza? It probably has something to do with survivial, but that's just a guess.

 

[Les Sleeth]

You're basically saying that zombies would not explore questions about consciousness because consciousness is causal, which is your conclusion, and I'm doing basically the same thing. Neither of these arguments carry any weight.

I am not saying anything about zombies, or anything about exploring questions. This is just a point of logic.

IF you accept the definition of consciousness as qualia experience, THEN an action taken to bring about qualia experience is an instance of consciousness causing physical effects (i.e., in the use of the brain and body).

If you don't accept that definition of consciousness, then the logic doesn't apply.

Ever thought that your brain is hardwired to want food like pizza? It probably has something to do with survivial, but that's just a guess.

It just might be, but again, that's not the dynamic I am referring to. I am only referring to the IF-THEN I stated above.

 

[hypnagogue]

IF you accept the definition of consciousness as qualia experience, THEN an action taken to bring about qualia experience is an instance of consciousness causing physical effects (i.e., in the use of the brain and body).

That isn't necessarily the case. It certainly appears to us from the 1st person perspective that we do things (eg eat pizza) in order to bring about subjective experiences (eg the subjective experience of tasting pizza); however, it's possible that this is an illusion.

First, let me clear the air a bit. I do not put in any weight in deflationist arguments that suppose that subjective experience does not exist or is an "illusion"; it is obvious enough to me that it does exist. That is a sort of first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable. However, I do recognize that higher order judgments about, or derived from, qualia can be wrong. For instance, I cannot be misguided about how a necker cube appears to me, but I can be misguided if I make the judgment that the cube itself is a 3-dimensional shape (although it qualitatively looks 3D, in fact it is 2D). Likewise, I cannot be misguided that it appears to me that I perform actions in virtue of seeking a certain qualitative experience, although I may be misguided in my belief that this appearance accurately reflects the reality of the situation.

How could I be misguided in this belief? Well, one way I could be misguided in my belief is if something like epiphenomenalism turned out to be true. If epiphenomenalism were true, then all of my actions would be caused completely by the physical dynamics of my brain, with subjective experience playing no active causal role. I would enjoy a tasty sensation each time I eat pizza, but this pleasurable experience would not be the cause of my behavior, but rather an attendent 'side-effect.' The actual cause would be the complex evolution of my brain states, as completely described by physical laws. Nonetheless, I still might have the profound intuition that I ate the pizza because I wanted to experience its taste, simply because repeatedly observed correlation appears to imply causation.

Here's a rough analogy. Suppose that there is a black box with two light bulbs attached to it. Observation of the box shows that whenever bulb A lights up, B inevitably follows. To an observer who goes no further, it could very likely appear as if bulb A's lighting up causes bulb B to light up. However, the truth of the situation is that inside the box, there is an electronic circuit designed such that whenever circuit 1 is on, circuit 2 turns on as well. It just so happens that circuit 1 is connected to bulb A, and circuit 2 to bulb B. So in actuality, the underlying circuitry is what causes bulb B to light up, not the lighting of bulb A. The correlated activity of A and B mimics that of 1 and 2, but the causative links between A and B and 1 and 2 are nonetheless distinct. In this case, obviously, the light bulbs represent epiphenomenal experience and the circuits represent the physical brain.

 

[Fliption]

I don't think you quite got it. What you left out was Window's OS intiating so it can have the experience of qualia.

OK I think I got it now. This one seems to be dependent on the whole free will philosophy discussions. Bahhh! I hope we don't get into that because it doesn't interest me in any way

 

[Les Sleeth]

That isn't necessarily the case. It certainly appears to us from the 1st person perspective that we do things (eg eat pizza) in order to bring about subjective experiences (eg the subjective experience of tasting pizza); however, it's possible that this is an illusion.

Well, this is an interesting thing to debate. Since I don’t believe your analysis is correct I am tempted to start another thread so we don’t hijack Loseyourname’s theme. If you don’t accept the point I am about to make, or I yours in the next post or two, then I’ll start that thread.

That is a sort of first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable.

Good, because my point is contingent on accepting qualia as true.

However, I do recognize that higher order judgments about qualia can be wrong. For instance, I cannot be misguided about how a necker cube appears to me, but I can be misguided if I make the judgment that the cube itself is a 3-dimensional shape (although it qualitatively looks 3D, in fact it is 2D). Likewise, I cannot be misguided that it appears to me that I perform actions in virtue of seeking a certain qualitative experience, although I may be misguided in my belief that this appearance accurately reflects the reality of the situation.

I would agree we can be misguided by judgements and beliefs. But judgements and beliefs play no role in my argument.

How could I be misguided in this belief? Well, one way I could be misguided in my belief is if something like epiphenomenalism turned out to be true. If epiphenomenalism were true, then all of my actions would be caused completely by the physical dynamics of my brain, with subjective experience playing no active causal role. I would enjoy a tasty sensation each time I eat pizza, but this pleasurable experience would not be the cause of my behavior, but rather an attendent 'side-effect.' The actual cause would be the complex evolution of my brain states, as completely described by physical laws. Nonetheless, I still might have the profound intuition that I ate the pizza because I wanted to experience its taste, simply because repeatedly observed correlation appears to imply causation.

Having stated judgements and beliefs play no role in my argument I probably don’t need to agree with you here, but I do agree.

Here's a rough analogy. Suppose that there is a black box with two light bulbs attached to it. Observation of the box shows that whenever bulb A lights up, B inevitably follows. . . . obviously, the light bulbs represent epiphenomenal experience and the circuits represent the physical brain.

Likewise, I don’t disagree.

Let me see if I can make my point more clear so you don’t argue against something I don’t mean.

Your statement “. . . first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable” sets the stage. If qualia experience is the definitive property of consciousness, and if a person seeking a specific qualia experience initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has “caused” physical effects.

This is a point made to someone who will first accept that “. . . first-order judgment about qualia [are] indisputable.” My second “if” I may not have been so clear about, but we need that too (i.e., that consciousness is actually attempting “feed” itself a specific qualia experience).

I am not arguing that epiphenomenalists or functionalists or behaviorists can’t point to any observable act whatsoever and find a way to explain it with their theory. I know they certainly can. Neither would I argue that I cannot believe or misjudge circumstances. But if I, as consciousness, merely attempt or even wish to produce a specific qualia experience, and that desire has physical consequences, then the existence of consciousness has been physically causal.

 

[Les Sleeth]

OK I think I got it now. This one seems to be dependent on the whole free will philosophy discussions. Bahhh! I hope we don't get into that because it doesn't interest me in any way

It isn't about free will, I was trying to explain how consciousness can be seen as causal. I hope my last post to Hypnagogue made it more clear.

 

[StatusX]

Here's a thought experiment that might illustrate the point:

Picture a man in a virtual reality system. This system simulates an external world and supplies the man with all the appropriate sensory stimulation. But another thing the program does is predict exactly how this man will react in given situations. It knows the sensory data this man is getting, and it knows the way his brain is wired to respond to this data. So, for example, if the program predicts the man will want to scratch his back, it will simulate the sights, sounds, and other sensations of the man scratching his own back. If it predicts the man will want pizza, it will get some virtual pizza for him. (Specifically, it will predict the man wants to stand up, then once he's up it will predict that he'll want to start walking towards the fridge, etc.)

This man will think he is in complete control. When he feels the subjective desire for pizza (say he sees a pizza hut commerical on tv), he will get some. But this is only because the computer has predicted he will feel this desire and done what it predicted the man would do.

Now there is no doubt the man would have subjective experiences identical to those he would have if he was really doing these things. The only crucial assumption is that human behavior can be predicted given a sufficient understanding of the person's brain and sensory experiences. This may not be practically possible, but the point remains even if it is only explainable in principe, ie, governed by physical laws. I think this basically does boil down to a free will argument, which is disappointing, but unavoidable.


One more thing. I don't know if you saw any of my posts in the other consciousness thread about zombies, but what we're talking about now is closely related. I was talking about the paradox that arises if consciousness is not causal. Zombies with the same physical makeup as us but lacking conscious experience would also try to explain consciousness, because that's really just physical behavior. I had a hard time convincing people they really would, but I hope you can all see why it's a real problem if you deny consciousness causal power. My resolution was that zombies can't exist, and if one physical system is conscious, an identical one must necessarilly also be.

 

[hypnagogue]

Your statement “. . . first-order judgment about qualia that I hold to be indisputable” sets the stage. If qualia experience is the definitive property of consciousness, and if a person seeking a specific qualia experience initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has “caused” physical effects.

This is a point made to someone who will first accept that “. . . first-order judgment about qualia [are] indisputable.” My second “if” I may not have been so clear about, but we need that too (i.e., that consciousness is actually attempting “feed” itself a specific qualia experience).

By first order judgment about qualia, I mean ascertaining the existence, type, quality, etc. of a given quale. First order judgments of this type are observational and apply only to qualia in themselves. "The sky is a rich shade of blue" would be such a first order judgment. A higher order judgment might include logical inferences and could apply to things other than qualia in themselves. "I ate pizza because I wanted to enjoy its taste" would be a higher order judgment about qualia; it is not restricted to the quale in itself, but rather uses subjective information to make inferences about non-qualitative phenomena (the causal process of physically eating the pizza). The speaker here cannot be wrong about his notion of what pizza tastes like to him, but he can be wrong about his logical inference.

You hold, "if a person seeks a specific qualia experience and initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has 'caused' physical effects." Ultimately, you want to assert the truth of the consequent, that consciousness causes physical effects. Depending on how one interprets your exact phrasing, one could make a case that either your argument is circular or that the conditional is false; I'll argue briefly for both cases.

The antecedent of your conditional is "people seek specific qualitative experiences and initiate action to attempt to bring it about." If you mean to imply a causal connection here from consciousness to brain, then you have begged the question by already presuming the existence of the 'downward' causation you wanted to demonstrate, and so the conclusion becomes vacuous.

If you don't mean to imply anything about the nature of a causal connection here and are simply listing correlated events, then you've underdetermined the problem, because we don't have enough information in the antecedent to determine the nature of the causitive link. Suppose we are given the events

D: "Bob experiences the qualitative state of desiring pizza."
B: "Bob's brain encodes for 'wanting' pizza."
E: "Bob eats pizza."

One possible causal connection between these events is that D leads directly to B, which leads directly to E, as you are suggesting; in other words, B happens in virtue of D, or D does the ontological 'work' required to bring about B. This causal model looks like this: D -> B -> E

Another possible connection among these events is that D and E both occur in virtue of B. Here B does all the ontological 'work,' and there is no actual causal connection from D to E. This causal model would look like this:

D
^
|
B -> E

In this scenario, your antecedent is true and your consequent is false, meaning that your original conditional statement was false as well.

 

[Les Sleeth]

By first order judgment about qualia, I mean ascertaining the existence, type, quality, etc. of a given quale. First order judgments of this type are observational and apply only to qualia in themselves. "The sky is a rich shade of blue" would be such a first order judgment. A higher order judgment might include logical inferences and could apply to things other than qualia in themselves. "I ate pizza because I wanted to enjoy its taste" would be a higher order judgment about qualia; it is not restricted to the quale in itself, but rather uses subjective information to make inferences about non-qualitative phenomena (the causal process of physically eating the pizza). The speaker here cannot be wrong about his notion of what pizza tastes like to him, but he can be wrong about his logical inference.

I didn’t realize that’s what you meant by “judgment.” I suppose I thought you meant it figuratively. So to get more precise now, if we use the experience of blue, then I was referring to the specific moment of experience when blue information reaches consciousness and is experienced. We don’t need a word or concept to experience that, we need only be conscious. If a person were able (and some humans are), they could refrain from assigning interpretation or inference or a name to the experience and still recognize blue the next time it was experienced. So my argument doesn’t concern mental interpretations or logical inference unless you want to say recognition is a judgment. I am just pointing to what happens when consciousness desires experience and that consequently involves the brain and body.

You hold, "if a person seeks a specific qualia experience and initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has 'caused' physical effects." Ultimately, you want to assert the truth of the consequent, that consciousness causes physical effects.

Correct.

If you . . . are simply listing correlated events . . .

Let’s get this out of the way first. I am not simply listing correlated events.

The antecedent of your conditional is "people seek specific qualitative experiences and initiate action to attempt to bring it about." If you mean to imply a causal connection here from consciousness to brain, then you have begged the question by already presuming the existence of the 'downward' causation you wanted to demonstrate, and so the conclusion becomes vacuous.

It is hardly a presumption or a vacuous conclusion to suggest cause and effect after repeated observations of subjective longing (“I want”) setting the brain and body in motion. Just how prohibitive are you going to be about considering something a cause which obviously behaves as one?

I am going to quote others a bit, so I’ll make them the color blue so they are easily recognized.

Rudolf Carnap points out, “From my point of view, it is more fruitful to replace the entire discussion of the meaning of causality by an investigation of the various kinds of laws that occur in science. When these laws are studied, it is a study of the kinds of causal connections that have been observed. The logical analysis of laws is certainly a clearer, more precise problem than the problem of what causality means.”

In other words, rather than speculate, let's look at how reality “works.” What does our experience with cause tell us? Consider the concept of causality as offered by physics Nobel laureate Max Born:

"1. Causality postulates that there are laws by which the occurrence of an entity B of a certain class depends on the occurrence of an entity A of another class, where the word entity means any physical object, phenomenon, situation, or event. A is called the cause, B the effect.

2. Antecedence postulates that the cause must be prior to, or at least simultaneous with, the effect.

3. Contiguity postulates that cause and effect must be in spatial contact or connected by a chain of intermediate things in contact.”

Of course, he is talking about physical cause and effect, but without the endless “what ifs” rationalists tend to attach to every question, the meaning of cause should seem clear to anyone interested in being practical. When one class of occurrence A is followed under the same conditions every time by occurrence B, and when there is an unambiguous connection between A and B, then we can assume A causes B.

In their book “Realism Rescued: How Scientific Progress is Possible” Aronson, Harré, and Way suggest, “The relative verisimilitude of laws can be thought of . . . as the degree to which the relationships between properties depicted in relevant theories resemble the actual relationships between properties in nature.”

They continue, “It is the method of manipulation. It is so commonplace that we are hardly aware of its ubiquitous role in our lives and practice. Every time we turn on the shower and stand beneath it we are, in effect, using the unobservable gravitational field to manipulate the water. The way that Stern and Gerlach manipulated magnetic fields to manipulate atomic nuclei in their famous apparatus is metaphysically much the same as our everyday strategy of standing under the shower.”

John Sowa, whose pragmatic thinking influenced me in the past http://www.jfsowa.com/pubs/, and whose view of causality guided my response here says, “As Peirce would say (:!) . . . love Peirce!), experience provides a pragmatic confirmation of the law of gravitation and its applicability to the event of taking a shower. But Peirce's view of law includes much more than the laws of logic and physics. In addition to the laws that make the shower work, he would include the habits and social conventions that cause people to take a shower. Various formulas ‘to which real events truly conform’ can be observed, tested, and verified at every level from mechanical interactions to the conventions, habits, and instincts of living creatures.’”

In the case of consciousness causing brain and body effects, there is an unswerving relationship between consciousness seeking specific experiences, and brain and bodily activity. What possible reason is there to question the consistent response of brain and body in accordance with conscious intent? If I say lift your hand, and you will it, then hand lifts. You want water, you will your body to get water to drink, and it does.

You can observe your body responding to your will, I know mine does, and you can question billions of people who will report the same thing. If you suggest that because of conditioning, inattentiveness, daydreaming, etc., that consciousness isn’t always in control of one’s physical and mental faculties, I’d agree. But that doesn’t alter the fact that when an act of will is conscious, the brain and body respond (plus, try to remove consciousness entirely from brain and body, as when someone is in a coma, and see what can be willed).

When we observe the same consistency between two events in purely physical situations, science accepts that as an adequate indication of cause and effect. So is there a different standard of certainty required for the apparent cause and effect relationship between consciousness and brain/body?

To make sure it doesn’t seem I’ve wandered from my original argument, let me reaffirm that. I claim that because experience is what defines consciousness, when its intention/desire to stimulate a specific experience in itself results in brain and body involvement, those are instances of consciousness causing physical effects.

EDIT: I suppose to be correct I should say those are instances of consciousness triggering physical effects. I am not implying that consciousness is handling the entire range of activity-movement of the brain and body. It appears conscious lives in the brain, and is able to affect it in what ever place it needs to for the brain and body to respond. The pathways for physical response are already set up and powered, ready to respond.

 

[loseyourname]

His is not the definition physical science gives us, nor any dictionary/encyclopedia I can find, so why should I adopt his defintion just because he needs the definition to be a certain way to help him to make his argument?

Princeton's Word Reference site give the definition of physical science here:

- the science of matter and energy and their interactions


On the same page you can find a definition for physicalness:

- the quality of being physical; consisting of matter


The Word Reference site gives several relevant definitions of physical here:


1* physical
* involving the body as distinguished from the mind or spirit . . .

2* physical
* relating to the sciences dealing with matter and energy; especially physics; "physical sciences"; "physical laws"
3* physical, tangible, touchable
* having substance or material existence; perceptible to the senses; "a physical manifestation"; "surrounded by tangible objects"
4* physical
* according with material things or natural laws (other than those peculiar to living matter); "a reflex response to physical stimuli"

6* physical
* concerned with material things; "physical properties"; "the physical characteristics of the earth"; "the physical size of a computer"

Well, I thought I gave a pretty good account of why I think these definitions are inadequate and fail to communicate the essence of what a physical interaction is. If you're satisfied with these definitions, continue to use them.

Of Physicalism the Wikipedia says:

Physicalism is the metaphysical position that everything is physical; that is, that there are no kinds of things other than physical things. Likewise, physicalism about the mental is a position in philosophy of mind which holds that the mind is a physical thing in some sense. This position is also called "materialism", but the term "physicalism" is preferable because it does not have any misleading connotations, and because it carries an emphasis on the physical, meaning whatever is described ultimately by physics -- that is, matter and energy.

So tell me, what is semantic about insisting we use proper definitions. Physical is defined first and foremost by mass and energy, and then those properties and laws which stem from that. The tactic of redefining physical so you can claim broaden the meaning to include what isn't necessarily physical is a dubious approach.

I don't exactly see how it helps to describe "physicalism" as the theory that "everything is physical." That explains nothing. If all "physical" meant was "pertaining to matter or energy," then it would include the intrinsic properties of matter and energy, but it does not. It is this central inconsistency in the idea of physicalism that led me to attempt a better definition.

My opinion of Loseyourname's position is, physicalness was established first, and then consciousness arose out of physicalness. Right now I don't think physicalness as the baseline is a logical assumption if we weigh all the evidence objectively. This thread, IMO, is his attempt to show physicalness must have arisen first because, he states, consciousness must use something physical, energy, to be efficacious. What I've been objecting to is expanding the meaning of physical to explain what can't be explained with physicalness.

See, I just don't understand this objection. If a causal relation behaves mechanically, then in principle it can be explained by mathematics. Whether or not you want to call it "physical," this entails the likely inclusion of the phenomenon into the study of physics, which is not by any theoretical constraint limited to describing the relational roles of only matter and energy. Physics is at least theoretically capable of explaining anything that is describable mathematically. Given this, if we accept the definition of "physical" as synonymous with "material," we leave open the possibility that "physics" can describe non-physical interactions.

Anyway, I did want to show that anything that is the cause of a mechanical effect must use energy, because the definition of energy entails that. I really just wanted to use this as a jumping off point from which we can then move on to the possibilities for the principles by which this interaction takes place, all the while assuming that phenomenal consciousness is indeed efficacious (an assumption that I guess you don't mind since you agree with it). Energy has to be used. There is no way around that. That's the reason that I actually like your idea of the fundamental existent as an organizational principle that plays a causative role in the workings of energy, since it does not take (or at least there is the theoretical possibility that it does not take) work to perform a causal role on a massless material agent.

I'm honestly not too concerned with the historical origins of consciousness and materialism, or attempting to delineate the order in which each came to be (or perhaps in which one came to be from another that simply always existed). This investigation may come to such conclusions incidentally, but that really isn't the point. The point is simply to determine relations as they exist currently. Let's just run with your own theory here, but develop it a little further. If there is such a fundamental existent that preceded all other existence, what is it and how does it give rise to experiential phenomena? For that matter, if it is indeed fundamental, how does it give rise to non-experiential phenomena? Is it truly the fundamental existent, or is it in fact only a property of things that exist? If it is an organizational principle by which matter/energy comes to create complex structures that accounts for structures that you don't think known organizational principles do, how is it different from these other principles? Of course, to ask that, we need to know what these other principles are to begin with. Are they relational properties that exist because of interactions between material agents, or are they intrinsic properties that give rise to the interactions of material agents?

I really didn't mean to get into such a fundamental aspect of metaphysics, but I'm coming to realize that any construction of a model of consciousness is going to have to account for these others things if it is not to be ad hoc.

 

[loseyourname]

You can observe your body responding to your will, I know mine does, and you can question billions of people who will report the same thing. If you suggest that because of conditioning, inattentiveness, daydreaming, etc., that consciousness isn?t always in control of one?s physical and mental faculties, I?d agree. But that doesn?t alter the fact that when an act of will is conscious, the brain and body respond (plus, try to remove consciousness entirely from brain and body, as when someone is in a coma, and see what can be willed).

I'm curious as to what you think about studies in which electrodes are attached directly to the brain in neural action-initiation sites. These electrodes are used to effect actions that the subject thinks he is initiating by the pressing of a button. It has been found that the subject reports the actions seeming to be initiated before he becomes conscious of the decision to initiate it. This suggests that decisions might very well be made without conscious input, with consciousness simply coming in milliseconds later and thinking that it actually did something. The findings are certainly not conclusive, but they do at least seem to confirm what I said about being wary as to what you will consider valid simply because of intuition.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I'm curious as to what you think about studies in which electrodes are attached directly to the brain in neural action-initiation sites. These electrodes are used to effect actions that the subject thinks he is initiating by the pressing of a button. It has been found that the subject reports the actions seeming to be initiated before he becomes conscious of the decision to initiate it. This suggests that decisions might very well be made without conscious input, with consciousness simply coming in milliseconds later and thinking that it actually did something. The findings are certainly not conclusive, but they do at least seem to confirm what I said about being wary as to what you will consider valid simply because of intuition.

You didn't include the timing on that experiment, but I assume you mean his brain was stimulated before he pushed the button. If so, to me it indicates exactly the opposite of the interpretation you gave.

If consciousness is not created by the brain, but is instead associated with it, then you could stimulate the brain to act, but consciousness, having not initiated it, would be unaware of that until after the action.

 

[Les Sleeth]

See, I just don't understand this objection. If a causal relation behaves mechanically, then in principle it can be explained by mathematics. Whether or not you want to call it "physical," this entails the likely inclusion of the phenomenon into the study of physics, which is not by any theoretical constraint limited to describing the relational roles of only matter and energy. Physics is at least theoretically capable of explaining anything that is describable mathematically. Given this, if we accept the definition of "physical" as synonymous with "material," we leave open the possibility that "physics" can describe non-physical interactions.

This is a pretty big point. Traditionally, non-physical has been described as lacking materiality, and materiality is associated with mass/matter. Why is that significant?

You say math could describe mechanics, and you are correct. But that isn't all there is to science. In science, a mathematical prediction must be experienced, and with the senses, to be considered true! You cannot leave this out of any debate about what is real to physicalists.

Once you no longer require mass and the effects of mass to be the definition of physicality, you have also eliminated the possibility that something unavailable to the senses is present, lacks mass, but has a mechanical or orderly aspect to it. The definition of physical I'm arguing for allows both physical and non-physical to have ordered aspects, but the demarcation between them is mass and the effects of mass (which is also the definition virtually every authority states).

 

[selfAdjoint]

Mass is pretty small cheese in modern physics. The mass of protons and neutrons, which is nearly all your tangible mass, is partly due to interactions between quarks and Higgs particles, and partly the binding energy of the sea of gluons that holds them together. Neither string theory or LQG add anything that would make mass more central.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Mass is pretty small cheese in modern physics. The mass of protons and neutrons, which is nearly all your tangible mass, is partly due to interactions between quarks and Higgs particles, and partly the binding energy of the sea of gluons that holds them together. Neither string theory or LQG add anything that would make mass more central.

Let me ask you a sincere question. If it weren't for the realities of mass, what would there be to observe? Gravity, for instance, might exist, but who would know it unless something with mass were present? What was the measure of mass at the moment of the Big Bang? Even if you say there is significant masslessness around, how much of hasn't emerged from mass or isn't manifested by the presence of mass?

 

[RingoKid]

Isn't mass another vibrational signature of a string operating in a compactified dimension that masquerades as a higgs field ?

The transition through said field is how a particle/object acquires mass.

so mass while having a physical presence in our 4d universe doesn't limit universes to having objects with mass only universe that have 3d + time d...

...like ours ?

consciousness on the other hand not requiring mass or a physical presence to exist transcends the multiverse scenario...

What then is there to observe in a universe without mass ?... seemingly chaotic string activity like neo vision in the matrix

of course this is all IMHO...

 

[selfAdjoint]

Let me ask you a sincere question. If it weren't for the realities of mass, what would there be to observe? Gravity, for instance, might exist, but who would know it unless something with mass were present? What was the measure of mass at the moment of the Big Bang? Even if you say there is significant masslessness around, how much of hasn't emerged from mass or isn't manifested by the presence of mass?

Interesting question. In addition to science-fictional zombies, we now have to consider science-fictional pure energy beings. Since in GR (only an effective theory, I know, but this aspect of it is lovingly preserved in current tries at quantum gravity) not only mass but momentum and energy gravitate; in fact the "mass term" in the momentum-energy tensor carries the energy equivalent: m/c^2 of local mass, and is perfectly capable of adding other forms of energy. So pure energy beings in a pure energy universe could observe gravity. If we talk about very high energy domains, like the earliest moments of the universe, the three other forces are unified, the masses of all the elementary particles are zero, but you still have the binding energy of the gluon sea, so there is something to curve space that is localized, too.

 

[hypnagogue]

So my argument doesn’t concern mental interpretations or logical inference unless you want to say recognition is a judgment. I am just pointing to what happens when consciousness desires experience and that consequently involves the brain and body.

Well, there are two layers here. You can recognize that it feels as if your conscious intention is causing you to act. That would be a first order judgment; it is simply an observation of what it is like to be in a particular experiential state, and nothing more. There is no arguing that it feels as if conscious intention causes bodily action.

However, if we rely on the experiential feeling of conscious agency to come to the conclusion that consciousness is in fact a causal agent, then we have moved beyond mere recognition / observation / first order judgment. Now we are using information from consciousness to make judgments about phenomena beyond just subjective experience in and of itself-- in this case, that consciousness actually does have causal agency, as opposed to just seeming as if it does. This is a higher order judgment, and as such it is a belief / logical construct that can be wrong. For instance, in addition to mere observation of qualitative experience, we are also relying here at least on the assumption that our qualitative experience of self-agency is veridical, that it accurately depicts the reality of the causal situation.

Let’s get this out of the way first. I am not simply listing correlated events.

It is hardly a presumption or a vacuous conclusion to suggest cause and effect after repeated observations of subjective longing (“I want”) setting the brain and body in motion. Just how prohibitive are you going to be about considering something a cause which obviously behaves as one?

Sorry if I didn't explain myself properly, but that isn't what I meant. Let's look at your conditional statement again: "If a person seeks a specific qualia experience and initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about, then consciousness has 'caused' physical effects." The reason I asked about the wording of the antecedent is as follows. You're trying to establish a causal relation between consciousness and physical action in the body, but on one reading of your antecedent, you've already built in this causal relationship. If you mean "...initiates mental and bodily action to attempt to bring it about" to mean that consciousness, upon having desired a certain experience, actually goes down into the brain and somehow starts up a causal chain of events, then your argument is circular. In this case, your conditional statement would essentially be "If consciousness causes physical events, then consciousness causes physical events," which is a vacuous statement.

The only way to avoid this is to be neutral about the nature of the causal relationship between consciously experienced desire and bodily action from the start. That is, we should initially consider them only to be correlated (since this correlation is without dispute), and then try to establish a causal relationship from that correlation and whatever other information may be relevant. That's what I was getting at when I asked if you were considering these two events only to be correlated when you mention them in the antecedent of your conditional statement.

The consistent correlation between consciously experienced intention and bodily action is certainly suggestive of a causitive link between the two. However, starting from just the observations that these events are correlated, we are not justified in concluding that they are causally linked in the way you want to demonstrate-- that consciousness is directly causally responsible for bodily action. For example, this correlation is also consistent with the scenario I drafted in my previous post, where consciously experienced intention and bodily action are both the effects of a single underlying cause. In this case, they are links on the same causal chain, but nonetheless they are linked in an indirect manner such that conscious experience is not the causal agent responsible for initiating bodily action. Since the antecedent of your conditional statement is consistent with a conclusion that contradicts the consequent you wanted to demonstrate, the conditional statement is false.

When we observe the same consistency between two events in purely physical situations, science accepts that as an adequate indication of cause and effect. So is there a different standard of certainty required for the apparent cause and effect relationship between consciousness and brain/body?

I would say there is good reason for holding a stricter standard here. For one thing, there are well established epistemic challenges facing any attempt of understanding consciousness and reconciling it with our understanding of physical reality. For this reason alone, it behooves us to be especially cautious and precise in our reasoning.

There is also the matter of what is at stake here. Coming to a conclusion about the nature of the causal relationship between consciousness and the body/brain will naturally have enormous implications for our worldview, much more so than evaluating causal relationships on a strictly physical level of analysis. Once again, we have good reason for being especially cautious and precise in our reasoning.

Thus far I've only attempted to argue that your argument asserting downward causation from consciousness is either circular or unsound. To do so I presented an alternative to your conclusion that is nonetheless logically consistent with your premises. It's worth noting, however, that there is also some positive empirical evidence for a conclusion that would contradict downward causation from consciousness. For instance, Benjamin Libet demonstrated (at least in the conditions of his experiment) that the brain begins to show neural activity related to performing an action before an individual reports the subjective experience of willing that action. Daniel Wegner has written an entire book, The Illusion of Conscious Will, with other empirical findings that appear to contradict the notion of conscious will. I'm not well-read on all the evidence, and I'm not trying to argue the case for it; for now I'm just pointing out that, if you are unsatisfied with my approach, there have been more empirical efforts that also contradict your conclusion about consciousness's causal powers.

 

[Les Sleeth]

There is no arguing that it feels as if conscious intention causes bodily action. However, if we rely on the experiential feeling of conscious agency to come to the conclusion that consciousness is in fact a causal agent, then we have moved beyond mere recognition / observation / first order judgment.

I am not primarily relying on feeling, I am relying on the observation of my system. I am witnessing it, I am not thinking about it, or wondering about it. I am just looking at what is happening.

Let's look at your conditional statement again . . . In this case, your conditional statement would essentially be "If consciousness causes physical events, then consciousness causes physical events," which is a vacuous statement.

From bad to worse! In my last post I attempted to clear up what I meant to say. I certainly am not so silly as to think it means anything to say, “If consciousness causes physical events, then consciousness causes physical events.” I do know what a proper logical statement is supposed to be (whether I originally expressed it clearly or not).

In my last post I restated it as, “. . . because experience is what defines consciousness, when its intention/desire to stimulate a specific experience in itself results in brain and body involvement, those are instances of consciousness causing physical effects.” I followed that up with a pragmatic defense, which is that I simply accept what I observe to be true. I justified that by pointing out I have no reason to doubt the team of cause and effect are working any differently between my volition and body than the way cause and effect work in all other observed situations. That is, the consistent observation that when I (and all observable humans) will the body to move, the body moves, is proper support for my conclusion of a causal relationship by the empirical standards which define cause and effect. There would, of course, be reason to doubt that causality with sufficient contrary evidence (more on that in a second).

If you ask me, the current challenge to will is a premature functionalist effort to win debate points. If they can find a way to make will irrelevant or illusory, then they can claim the brain is doing it all and merely feeding the subjective aspect a little feeling to make it believe it’s in control.

In a book review of Wegner’s The Illusion of Conscious Will, reviewer Thomas W. Clark says, “The functionally necessary self/world distinction has been overlaid with, or misinterpreted as, the metaphysically dubious and functionally otiose proposition that persons, as Harvard psychologist Daniel Wegner puts it, ‘cause themselves to behave.’ Folk wisdom has it that from some internal vantage point, imagined to be something over and above the brain, we consciously will our actions – behavior is more than the deterministic outcome of neural and muscular mechanisms.

“In The Illusion of Conscious Will, Wegner sets out to deconstruct, largely from an experimental psychological perspective, this sense of conscious willing. His thesis is that our feeling of will doesn’t reflect the underlying causes of behavior, rather it’s an ‘emotion of authorship’ that usefully tags actions as ours, not someone else’s. This is very much in line with neuroscientific and cognitive-behavioral accounts of the functional necessity of having a robust self-representation. The sense of will more or less accurately tracks who (me or somebody else) did what, so that persons can successfully manage social contingencies.”

(http://www.sci-con.org/reviews/20020508.html#Libet )

It's worth noting, however, that there is also some positive empirical evidence for a conclusion that would contradict downward causation from consciousness. For instance, Benjamin Libet demonstrated (at least in the conditions of his experiment) that the brain begins to show neural activity related to performing an action before an individual reports the subjective experience of willing that action. . . . I'm just pointing out that, if you are unsatisfied with my approach, there have been more empirical efforts that also contradict your conclusion about consciousness's causal powers.

Regarding Libet’s findings (who himself rejected notions of will like Wegner’s “the emotion of authorship”), in my opinion they do not provide nearly enough evidence to seriously challenge the causality of will. The fact that the body would ready itself for an action before consciousness is aware of the action being taken is too easily explained.

(http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/libetnew.html)

There is no doubt the body can be readied for pregnancy, for example, before the woman becomes aware of it, or that the body has systems which can ready if for fight or flight, or that we have an autonomic system, or we are capable of subliminal perception, etc. Because the body has certain survival or biologically programmed responses/capabilities built into it doesn’t mean consciousness doesn’t have control of selected aspects too.

It doesn’t matter whether we have complete control for consciousness causality to be true. If I fly a jet, I must adapt to how the systems work. If there is a system which automatically takes over when the plane stalls, or if the plane is worn out in some respect, or if it lacks a capability I want anyway . . . then I don’t have total control in the sense I can’t make it obey every exertion of my will. Nonetheless, I can still assert my will in specific ways, and so in those ways my conscious will causes the plane to do certain things.

I would say there is good reason for holding a stricter standard here. For one thing, there are well established epistemic challenges facing any attempt of understanding consciousness and reconciling it with our understanding of physical reality. For this reason alone, it behooves us to be especially cautious and precise in our reasoning.

I don’t find it the slightest bit useful, or find any compelling reason to doubt, my volition. I believe it is merely the exaggerations and sophistries of functionalist theorists who are raising doubt, aided by those opposing intellectuals who are willing to debate functionalists’ still-vacuous assertions. I believe I am on solid empirical and logical ground to believe there is no evidence serious enough to warrant doubting what is observed to be true.

There is also the matter of what is at stake here. Coming to a conclusion about the nature of the causal relationship between consciousness and the body/brain will naturally have enormous implications for our worldview, much more so than evaluating causal relationships on a strictly physical level of analysis. Once again, we have good reason for being especially cautious and precise in our reasoning.

If you want to doubt your own volition, we should probably agree to disagree about this. I will continue to state that as for me, I am certain my will causes physical effects. What makes me so certain? Here is where I think it becomes obvious you and I are working on the problem of consciousness from opposite ends. I respect your approach, but I don’t agree it is the best way to understand the nature of consciousness.

I’ll try an analogy to explain myself. Let’s say you are a pool of water that can ripple itself, and when you do, that produces thoughts. A bunch of pools are trying to figure out what consciousness is by rippling the most brilliant thoughts that can be. The thing is, the nature of a pool only becomes apparent when it is so still the surface becomes like a mirror which reflects the depth of the pool. What the ripplers don’t realize is the very act of trying to figure out what they are obscures their underlying nature from them, and restricts them to surface operations (where rippling takes place).

I don’t expect you (or anyone) to agree that the nature of consciousness is revealed when it achieves silence. Believe what you want. You certainly have the mainstream approach (academia) agreeing with you. I am content to have my little experientialist spot from which to suggest an alternative approach. But I am not going to doubt what is crystal clear to me when in the experience of silence. I look at all the thinking about volition as the very thing that is producing the confusion and doubt. When one is absorbed in the experience of consciousness, one knows what it is. Very simple, no doubts.

And hey, I do okay when it comes to supporting my ideas with evidence and logic. At least I'm not a total flake.

 

[StatusX]

I justified that by pointing out I have no reason to doubt the team of cause and effect are working any differently between my volition and body than the way cause and effect work in all other observed situations. That is, the consistent observation that when I (and all observable humans) will the body to move, the body moves, is proper support for my conclusion of a causal relationship by the empirical standards which define cause and effect. There would, of course, be reason to doubt that causality with sufficient contrary evidence (more on that in a second).

That's exactly what the problem is: correlation does not imply causation. Say you do a study that finds a correlation between juvenile diabetes and cancer later in life. Does this mean diabetes cause cancer? Or just that some third factor, maybe a faulty gene, causes both? You don't have enough information to make that judgment. So just because your conscious willing of an action and that action tend to occur at the same time doesn't mean there couldn't be a third factor, possibly the physical brain, that causes both.


That being said, we're left with only two undesirable options:

1. The physical world is causally closed, which means nothing that happens is affected by the mental world. And yet, we have discussions about consciousness. We suppose that consciousness is there and yet not causal, but how could that opinion have arisen if our thoughts aren't affected by our consciousness? The only conclusion we can reach is that it's a complete coincidence that we think about consciousness and actually happen to have it which, as anyone will agree, is bad science.

2. The physical world is not causally closed, and the laws of physics are routinely broken.

They'll probably have to be some massive shift in our way of thinking before we'll be able to resolve this paradox.

 

[Les Sleeth]

That's exactly what the problem is: correlation does not imply causation. Say you do a study that finds a correlation between juvenile diabetes and cancer later in life. Does this mean diabetes cause cancer? Or just that some third factor, maybe a faulty gene, causes both? You don't have enough information to make that judgment. So just because your conscious willing of an action and that action tend to occur at the same time doesn't mean there couldn't be a third factor, possibly the physical brain, that causes both.

I understand the difference. I dropped my pen awhile ago and a car immediately backfired down on the road. I realize one doesn't decide causality by casual observation and thought. It requires experience and a solid understanding how reality works. That said, I stand by my statement. I am certain from experiencing the nature of my own consciousness, that I can cause physical action with my will. If you want to indulge in doubt, be my guest.

They'll probably have to be some massive shift in our way of thinking before we'll be able to resolve this paradox.

Or, you might consider my suggestion of learning to experience consciousness directly.

 

[Fliption]

What started all this was me posting this response.

Originally Posted by Fliption
loseyourname: One way is for phenomenal consciousness to not be efficacious.

Les: I can't see how that can be true. We think and we move the body around.

I wanted to ask here if it was possible for consciousness to just be along for the ride? It just experiences the qualia it associates with the information it receives from brain processes. The fact that we cannot know otherwise is what the hard problem is all about.

We got off track a bit. My original point was that whether consciousness is efficacious or not is a major philosophical issue. The logical argument that started this thread made an assumption about this important issue apparently so that it could draw a conclusion about... the definition of the word "physical"? This is like building a vehicle that runs on water so that you can drive to the strore to buy gasoline for your regular car which is out of gas in the backyard. This just doesn't make sense to me.

Where are all those pesky linguistic analytical philosophers when you need one?

So I'm still not clear on what the intent of the original post is. I didn't see any confirmation that this logical argument is trying to make a claim that physical things come before consciousness as Les suggested. It seems to me more like loseyourname is just trying to define physical in such a way that everything is physical. Who cares? Once that is done then it's a new word that means nothing to anyone else other than loseyourname. Physical means causal, consciousness is causal, therefore consciousness is physical. So what? What does this tell us? We can define words how ever we like in our assumptions and can conclude anything we wish but what do we know about the real world as a result of this exercise? I'm struggling here

I can see where an assumption that consciousness is efficacious may suggests to some that it can be mathematically described but why can't we just discuss that? Why do we have to insert the messy middle step of assigning a label like physical to it when there are so many pre-conceived notions about what it means?

 

[loseyourname]

You didn't include the timing on that experiment, but I assume you mean his brain was stimulated before he pushed the button. If so, to me it indicates exactly the opposite of the interpretation you gave.

If consciousness is not created by the brain, but is instead associated with it, then you could stimulate the brain to act, but consciousness, having not initiated it, would be unaware of that until after the action.

Actually, my description of the experiment was a little ambiguous. Sorry about that. The electrodes are actually stimulated by the brain. The brain has fired in whatever decision-making site was being read, causing the effect to be produced before the subject becomes conscious of his decision to push the button. The subject reports that it seems as if the machine is anticipating his decision. So given that the decision is made before the subject becomes conscious of it, it would seem to indicate that conscious input in the decision-making process is illusory. I'm not saying it is, but any model will have to account for these effects.

 

[loseyourname]

We got off track a bit. My original point was that whether consciousness is efficacious or not is a major philosophical issue. The logical argument that started this thread made an assumption about this important issue apparently so that it could draw a conclusion about... the definition of the word "physical"?

That's what it's come to, but that wasn't my initial intent. I've posted my intent in several posts, in bold type-face.

So I'm still not clear on what the intent of the original post is. I didn't see any confirmation that this logical argument is trying to make a claim that physical things come before consciousness as Les suggested. It seems to me more like loseyourname is just trying to define physical in such a way that everything is physical.

I think I've been careful enough in establishing a definition that it should be clear that I haven't defined everything as physical. I even said I don't consider myself to be a physicalist, so obvious I must not believe that everything is physical. It doesn't seem you're reading my posts very carefully.

I can see where an assumption that consciousness is efficacious may suggests to some that it can be mathematically described but why can't we just discuss that? Why do we have to insert the messy middle step of assigning a label like physical to it when there are so many pre-conceived notions about what it means?

Actually, discussion of a framework by which consciousness might be efficacious was what I wanted to discuss. I got sidetracked because of people focusing in on my use of the word physical, which I felt I must defend. I do feel it is a better definition, but it isn't particularly important what words we use. Maybe now that we've got all of it out, we can now get back on point and actually discuss what you just said we should be discussing. I agree with you wholeheartedly.

 

[hypnagogue]

Les, I think we're touching on a number of interesting points, but in the process it appears as the core of what I originally wanted to convey is getting lost. So allow me to just state my case here again in its most bare form.

A statement of the form P -> Q cannot be true if it can be the case that P is true and Q is false. In the case of your conditional statement about the causality of consciousness, I showed that your premises were consistent with an outcome contrary to your conclusion. That is, I presented a case where the statement P ^ ~Q is true, which means that P -> Q is false. It does no good to continue arguing the case for believing P -> Q if you can't show that P ^ ~Q must be false.

Putting this back into context, let's look again at the propositions from your argument--

P: "People seek a specific qualia experiences, and bodily actions are initiated in an attempt to bring these experiences about."
Q: "Consciousness causes physical effects."

and some other propositions to help us reason about your argument--

D: "Bob experiences the qualitative state of desiring pizza."
B: "Bob's brain encodes for 'wanting' pizza."
E: "Bob eats pizza."

One possible causal connection among events, D, B, and E is that D leads directly to B, which brings about E, as you are suggesting. So your conclusion Q looks like this:

Q:

D --(causes)--> B --(causes)--> E

Another possible connection among these events is that D and E both occur in virtue of B. Here B does all the causal work, and there is no actual causal connection from D to E. Call this causal scenario R.

R:

D
^
|
(causes)
|
B --(causes)--> E

Clearly, Q and R contradict each other, so both cannot be true. However, P does not sufficiently constrain the possibility space to pick out one or the other; P is consistent with both Q and R. So it is not enough from P to conclude that Q.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les, I think we're touching on a number of interesting points, but in the process it appears as the core of what I originally wanted to convey is getting lost. So allow me to just state my case here again in its most bare form.

A statement of the form P -> Q cannot be true if it can be the case that P is true and Q is false. In the case of your conditional statement about the causality of consciousness, I showed that your premises were consistent with an outcome contrary to your conclusion. That is, I presented a case where the statement P ^ ~Q is true, which means that P -> Q is false. It does no good to continue arguing the case for believing P -> Q if you can't show that P ^ ~Q must be false.

Putting this back into context, let's look again at the propositions from your argument--

P: "People seek a specific qualia experiences, and bodily actions are initiated in an attempt to bring these experiences about."
Q: "Consciousness causes physical effects."

and some other propositions to help us reason about your argument--

D: "Bob experiences the qualitative state of desiring pizza."
B: "Bob's brain encodes for 'wanting' pizza."
E: "Bob eats pizza."

One possible causal connection among events, D, B, and E is that D leads directly to B, which brings about E, as you are suggesting. So your conclusion Q looks like this:

Q:

D --(causes)--> B --(causes)--> E

Another possible connection among these events is that D and E both occur in virtue of B. Here B does all the causal work, and there is no actual causal connection from D to E. Call this causal scenario R.

R:

D
^
|
(causes)
|
B --(causes)--> E

Clearly, Q and R contradict each other, so both cannot be true. However, P does not sufficiently constrain the possibility space to pick out one or the other; P is consistent with both Q and R. So it is not enough from P to conclude that Q.

Here is my original statement you quoted, and then commented on:

“IF you accept the definition of consciousness as qualia experience, THEN an action taken to bring about qualia experience is an instance of consciousness causing physical effects (i.e., in the use of the brain and body) If you don't accept that definition of consciousness, then the logic doesn't apply.”

Remember, I’ve already admitted the very first thing I said wasn’t as clear as it needed to be, but you didn’t jump in then. You jumped in right where I stated the above, and posed your objection.

At that point I was clear (even if nobody else was) that the only condition I was talking about is if an actual state of consciousness exists, and it is that consciousness and only that consciousness which has desired and willed a specific experience. This is the case:

A. Consciousness exits
B. Consciousness can desire and will an experience
C. Les’ body responds to consciousness’s will and consumes pizza.
D. Les’ conscious will has caused physical effects

Here’s the logic (I can’t get my computer to make all the proper logic marks so I’ll use words:

If A and B, and if and only if C, then D

I have not excluded the possibility that the brain or conditioning can also cause Les to unconsciously eat pizza (your “R”). I made that about as clear as I could in my last post. I did not say only consciousness causes physical activity in the body.

At the end of my last post I also made my conviction clear that one has to be conscious of what consciousness itself is to be able to recognize if an action is conscious or not. So I did not exclude someone merely believing they consciously willed eating pizza (i.e., but really the brain did it).

Finally, I claim that I know I, as consciousness, will my body to do things because I experience what consciousness is. In fact, that is primarily what my statement was. I am not confused about what is going on, but maybe you or others are. I refuse to indulge the question much because it’s about on the same plane as contemplating if we are brains in a vat, or if we are just someone’s dream in another universe. If a person sacrifices the certainty of being consciously present for the speculation, imaginings and doubt that comes with trying to figure that sort of stuff out, then have at it. I’d rather just experience the certainty of knowing what I am doing.

 

[Fliption]

I think I've been careful enough in establishing a definition that it should be clear that I haven't defined everything as physical. I even said I don't consider myself to be a physicalist, so obvious I must not believe that everything is physical. It doesn't seem you're reading my posts very carefully.

What you are attempting to define physical as isn't really relevant to my comment. I was only pointing out that categorizing consiousness is all the argument seems to be geared to do. But since you brought it up, I do know what you have defined physical to be. Your argument basically says that if things in our reality have a causal relationship, then they are physical.
I can't think of anything that doesn't have a causal relationship. I assume consciousness does to. I just don't know where in the causal chain it is, the beginning or the end. But regardless of it's ontological nature, with this definition, it is physical and that's all we've concluded with this argument.

Actually, discussion of a framework by which consciousness might be efficacious was what I wanted to discuss. I got sidetracked because of people focusing in on my use of the word physical, which I felt I must defend. I do feel it is a better definition, but it isn't particularly important what words we use. Maybe now that we've got all of it out, we can now get back on point and actually discuss what you just said we should be discussing. I agree with you wholeheartedly.

I assumed that there had to be something you were trying to show with the post other than semantics but I just haven't been able to figure out what it is. I have gone back and read the original post several times thinking each time that I might see something I didn't before. Each time, I see this conclusion:

"Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source."

which means to me that p-consciousness is physical. So the whole point of the argument seems to be to classify consciousness as physical as opposed to non-physical. Maybe I have misunderstood.

So I need more direction. As I said to Les...me slow

 

[Les Sleeth]

So I'm still not clear on what the intent of the original post is. I didn't see any confirmation that this logical argument is trying to make a claim that physical things come before consciousness as Les suggested. It seems to me more like loseyourname is just trying to define physical in such a way that everything is physical. Who cares? Once that is done then it's a new word that means nothing to anyone else other than loseyourname. Physical means causal, consciousness is causal, therefore consciousness is physical. So what? What does this tell us? We can define words how ever we like in our assumptions and can conclude anything we wish but what do we know about the real world as a result of this exercise? I'm struggling here

I can see where an assumption that consciousness is efficacious may suggests to some that it can be mathematically described but why can't we just discuss that? Why do we have to insert the messy middle step of assigning a label like physical to it when there are so many pre-conceived notions about what it means?

I’ll take one more shot at explaining why I think it is important to define physical properly. I just reviewed the debate between Loseyourname and myself, and I can’t agree with either your version of how we got to debating about the meaning of physical, or that the definition of physical is insignificant to his theme. It seems to me you’ve forgotten Loseyourname’s original assertion:

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

His conclusion:

Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

Well, what is physical? I see our disagreement starting with two of his statements. The first was, “’Remember the definition of physical here is "constrained by material laws of cause and effect.’" Okay, look at that statement. Does it not say material laws? What is material? Matter. What is matter? Mass (and I’d include the products/effects of mass).

Loseyourname’s second point is what made me object. He then decided that if anything behaves mechanically, that too must be physical. He indicated that by mechanics he meant order-regularity-predictability (“If a causal relation behaves mechanically, then in principle it can be explained by mathematics . . .”) My objection is, order-regularity-predictability isn’t necessarily only associated with matter. I didn’t want to allow him to claim if anything possesses order-regularity-predictability, then it is material. (Remember, it is he who first defined physical as “constrained by the material laws of cause and effect”)

You claim Loseyourname was not trying to suggest that physicalness is the bottom line, and make a case that consciousness is physically derived. Well, have you read this entire thread carefully? He says, for instance, “I am aware of your concerns with several explanatory gaps in physicalist theory. I just don't see how non-physicalist theory has any fewer gaps. Demonstrate progressive organization with non-physicalness. Demonstrate subjectivity with non-physicalness.”

Later he says, “. . . as all known things are so far physical, the default value for any unknown (at least any causally efficacious unknown, due to the definition of "physical" given) should also be physical until good reason is given to think otherwise.”

And don’t forget his original proposition:

Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

How much more plainly can he put it that consciousness is derived from material properties, proven (he claims) by the fact that it MAY use energy (he doesn’t know if consciousness uses energy or not, of if it does that it is a large enough quantity to measure)?

So I have been trying to hold him to a proper definition of physical, which no other authority seems ambiguous about. Does consciousness have a material source? Is it ONLY mechanistic and material? Or is there something more we yet need to explain consciousness?

 

[loseyourname]

I suggest that you guys abandon the conclusion of my original series of syllogisms and instead focus on the truth or falsity of my revised proposition as I stated it on page 4 (after all of the clarification):

For consciousness to be non-physical, it must either behave contracausally or be an intrinsic property of causally related agents that is not itself a relational attribute.

If you still find this proposition to be unclear, then I can further elaborate after any questions have been asked. I will specify, for now, that contracausality can mean either that conscious acts are not the result of mechanical causation, or that they are, but conscious volition, as the first link in the causal chain, is not itself the result of any other cause.

 

[Les Sleeth]

I suggest that you guys abandon the conclusion of my original series of syllogisms and instead focus on the truth or falsity of my revised proposition as I stated it on page 4 (after all of the clarification):

For consciousness to be non-physical, it must either behave contracausally or be an intrinsic property of causally related agents that is not itself a relational attribute.

If you still find this proposition to be unclear, then I can further elaborate after any questions have been asked. I will specify, for now, that contracausality can mean either that conscious acts are not the result of mechanical causation, or that they are, but conscious volition, as the first link in the causal chain, is not itself the result of any other cause.

Cool (hey, I do that all the time, adjust my statements when I understand either more about the subject or how to communicate it better during the discussion).

I think I'm going to drop out of this discussion however because I feel like I've interfered with what you want to say. I honestly don't get either the earlier statement or this one. Others seem to get it, so I'll let everyone who does, work on this question.

 

[Philocrat]

I was just thinking about this last night. Granted, I'm not pretending to answer any questions as to whether or not p-consciousness is efficacious or whether or not it has a non-physical origin. I am attempting only to eliminate one possibility. My proposition is that if p-consciousness were non-physical, then it could not be efficacious. In addition, if p-consciousness is efficacious, then it cannot be non-physical. Here is how I reached this conclusion:

I started from the law of conservation of energy, that says energy can be neither created nor destroyed. Another way of stating this is that all energy must have an origin in the physical world. This includes the energy necessary to carry out physical functions in the human body, as well as the energy to initiate neural processes that lead to physical action. If p-consciousness is efficacious, then it is capable of initiating these neural processes. Because neural processes require energy, they must be initiated by a physical source. Let me see if I can construct a formal proof for this. I will assume for the purposes of this proof that p-consciousness is efficacious.

If p-consciousness is efficacious, then neural processes are initiated.
If neural processes are initiated, then energy must have been used.
Therefore, if p-consciousness is efficacious, energy must have been used.
If energy is used, then it must have a physical source.
Therefore, if p-consciousness if efficacious, it must have a physical source.
P-consciousness is efficacious.
Therefore, p-consciousness must have a physical source.

Edit: I can't get LaTeX to separate my lines, so you'll need to accept this series of syllogisms as a formal proof. Two hypothetical syllogisms and a modus ponens are used.

Additional unanswered questions include:

1) THE DEFINITION OF 'CRTICAL MECHANICAL STATES': for the debates often approach a point where critical mechanical states are mistaken for the over-and-above-the-mechanical conscious activities.

QUESTION: Do critical mechanical states naturally mimic conscious states? If they do, why should one be mistaken for the other?

2) DEFINITION OF WHAT CONSCIOUSNESS IS (REGARDLESS OF TYPE): the general impression given so far in all the threads that deal with the subject in this forum seems so far to hold that 'Consciousness is indefinable', at least to the full satisfaction of both the philosophical and scientific communities. The most powerful definition would be that which bodly says consciousness is this and nothing else. But then why are we going around in circles in threads after threads? Why are we all afraid to land the aguments in safe intellectual grounds and say this is what consciousness is and get on with other issues?

3) IF CONSCIOUSNESS IS TRULY DISTINCT FROM OR OVER AND ABOVE THE MATERIAL, HOW DOES IT INTERACT WITH THE MATERIAL BODY WITHOUT THE ENERGY REQUIREMENTS OR PHYSICAL CONSTRAINTS THAT YOU ARE HYPOTHESISING ABOUT? The cartesian dualism is widely disputed in various ways in a forest of literatures. Aristotle's version of how they interact comes just very close to making a lot of sense, but fails when applying purposive analysis to it.

4) WHAT THE OUTWARD AND OVERRIDING PURPOSES OF MIND AND MATTER ARE. Can the 'what' and 'how' questions about both be answered via a purposive account of both? That is, if we cannot answer the questions about what they are, how they interact, can we answer these two questions by asking why they are in this sort of dual relationship in the first place? What is the fundamental purpose of them coming together in this inexplicable union? Since 1998, I have always had the suspicion that this might very well be the case. Othwerwise we might as well default to supension of all judgements about everything.

NOTE: Your argument has some validity in it, but as you know circularism often turns our focus to self-serving hypotheses.