Let us assume Feynman was wrong.

[Demystifier]

To conclude:
Perhaps what Feynman meant was correct (we shall never know), but what he actually said was clearly wrong, because some people (who are professional physicists by the way) claim that they know a possible mechanism.

 

[Dmitry67]

All you're really saying is that we can never know for certain whether any 'interpretation' we place on mathematics has any bearing on what 'really exists'. This is about as obvious a statement as one can make on the issue. Clearly one can never know this.

The point is - what viewpoint is convenient for understanding the behaviour of the systems we are trying to model mathematically?

Yes and no, there are 2 different things: interpretation and the "machinery". Many, but not all interpretations explicitly describe the machinery behind, like "knowledge of an observer collapses the wavefuction" or "wave guides the particle inside" et cetera. When I hear about the "knowledge of an observer" I always think about the "gigantic tree named Yggdrasil, whose trunk supports Earth" (c) - the example I gave above.

Why "observer's knowledge" is supposed to be less complex object then Yggdrasil or a turtle staying on a whale?

So, why I say that machinery and interpretations are not the same? Because not all who adopt the MWI or "Shut up and calculate" accept Max Tegmark's "Mathematical Universe Hypotesis" (MUH).

So there is a difference from what you say "we can never know for certain whether any 'interpretation' we place on mathematics has any bearing on what 'really exists'" and MUH.

As a MUH proponent I can say that:
1. It is know about not being possible to know for certain what machinery behind is right: it is about an absence of any machinery (except formulas).
2. Physics IS mathematics on the fundamental level, so the there is no difference in principle between the mathematics (adequate to our universe) and "what 'really exists'"

But over and over people ask "what is a wavefunction? what is space made of? are virtual particles real?" trying to discover wheels and rubber bands behind the curtain.

 

[Fra]

Assume Feynman was wrong, please give me a deeper representation of the situation.

I think Feynman was just stating the fact that no one did in fact have a deeper explanation. I think that was correct. That doesn't mean however that this will always be the case.

I can acknowledge my instant ignorance at the same time that I defend my ability to learn.

What you seem to be asking for is a derivation of QM from more basic principles. What more basic principles could there possibly be? By definition basic principles apply to a broad range of situations, and not just a few. And I suppose that the most basic principles that apply to everything are the principles of logic and reason. I don't believe that anyone is going to argue that there is anything in reality that does not comply with reason, is there? So I have to wonder if the laws of physics (QM, in this case) can be derived from logic. If physics could be derived from logic, then that would be the completion of physics. We would no longer be able to question where physics came from since the answer would be that it comes from reason itself, and how do you question that?

I think most sane persons would agree that scientific knowledge doesn't follow deductively from logic. But some people think that the scientific process as well as physical processes itself is to be thought of as inducive information processes.

Not the answer, not even close, but a good start and thought provocations mad enough to be brilliant...

From Inference to Physics, Ariel Caticha
"Entropic dynamics, a program that aims at deriving the laws of physics from standard probabilistic and entropic rules for processing information, is developed further. We calculate the probability for an arbitrary path followed by a system as it moves from given initial to final states. For an appropriately chosen configuration space the path of maximum probability reproduces Newtonian dynamics."
--http://arxiv.org/abs/0808.1260

The Information Geometry of Space and Time, Ariel Caticha
" Is the geometry of space a macroscopic manifestation of an underlying microscopic statistical structure? Is geometrodynamics - the theory of gravity - derivable from general principles of inductive inference? Tentative answers are suggested by a model of geometrodynamics based on the statistical concepts of entropy, information geometry, and entropic dynamics. The model shows remarkable similarities with the 3+1 formulation of general relativity. For example, the dynamical degrees of freedom are those that specify the conformal geometry of space; there is a gauge symmetry under 3d diffeomorphisms; there is no reference to an external time; and the theory is time reversible. There is, in adition, a gauge symmetry under scale transformations. I conjecture that under a suitable choice of gauge one can recover the usual notion of a relativistic space-time."
-- http://arxiv.org/abs/gr-qc/0508108

In that paper ha raises the idea

"...The connection between physics and nature could, however, be less direct. The laws
of physics could be mere rules for processing information about nature..."

He continuous and develops a tradition from ET Jaynes, the author of the book

Probability Theory: The Logic of Science
-- http://bayes.wustl.edu/etj/prob/book.pdf

He also has a related reasoning in

"Consistency, Amplitudes and Probabilities in Quantum Theory"
-- http://arxiv.org/abs/quant-ph/9804012

I do not personally quite like that paper however. His choice of reasoning is not unique IMO, and the complex formalism is imlplicitly assumed.

But Ariels general idea is that the laws of physics doesn't follow from deductive logic, but possibly from inductive reasoning... and I think it's close. Close to the ideas on evolving law in the other thread.

/Fredrik

 

[friend]

I think most sane persons would agree that scientific knowledge doesn't follow deductively from logic.

I see no basis for this statement. Are we going to say at some level of physics that it does not comply with logic? If not, and everything does comply with logic, then everything is actually derived from logic. For otherwise, you have the situation where you stop at some particle or situation saying there is no reason for it. But to say that EVERYTHING is reasonable is equivalent to saying that everything can ultimately be derived from reason.

However, perhaps you meant that general principles do no predict specific event. I would have to agree with that. That seems to be the nature of generality - not to be specific. Even the laws of physics as we presently know them do not predict specific events - like my typing these words right now. They are just as much generalities as logic itself.

But Ariels general idea is that the laws of physics doesn't follow from deductive logic, but possibly from inductive reasoning... and I think it's close. Close to the ideas on evolving law in the other thread.

General principles, however, could predict the probability of specific events. Based on principle alone it might be possible to predict how LIKELY specific events might be. Remember that if it is not possible to deterministically say that a specific event has truly happened or not, then it is not possible to count the frequency of occurances and calculate the probablities. So inductive logic comes from deductive logic.

 

[p764rds]

Check Max Tegmarks "Mathematical Universe"
Just equations, and nothing else.

Yes, and those 'equations' implemented in 1s and 0s, data, numbers, - call it what you like. In a Von Neumann-like machine. We are clever enough to design/model a 3d universe prototype (i.e. a bad one) and with quantum computers a better one until eventually... complete the sentence yourself.

 

[Dmitry67]

Yes, and those 'equations' implemented in 1s and 0s, data, numbers, - call it what you like. In a Von Neumann-like machine. We are clever enough to design/model a 3d universe prototype (i.e. a bad one) and with quantum computers a better one until eventually... complete the sentence yourself.

Again, you are trying to find wheels behind the reality.
'Equations' are not 'implemented'. They just exist.
You don't need any Von Neumann machines for the natural numbers to exist. Natural numbers do not require any underlying substance.

 

[p764rds]

Again, you are trying to find wheels behind the reality.
'Equations' are not 'implemented'. They just exist.
You don't need any Von Neumann machines for the natural numbers to exist. Natural numbers do not require any underlying substance.

A particle made of equations? The 'wheels' for that is a Von-Neumann-like machine in 'information space' outside normal 3 space (which itself is a data creation and does not exist in the normal sense we think about).
There are many physicists who already realize that something like this - or similar - is going on, its just that its not in their daily work schedule, so they suppress it - and who is really interested anyway (apart from us geeky folk with weird ideas)?

 

[Dmitry67]

A particle made of equations?

You still not getting the idea.
The reality is not "made of" equations
The reality is a mathematical system, the reality is equations.

Does Mandelbrot's set need a computer constantly calculate it over and over again to exists? Does number 11 become less prime when no computer is verifying that it is really prime in an infinite loop? Mathematical structures just exist, and then don't need any machines to 'calculate' or 'simulate' them.

 

[benk99nenm312]

Yes, and those 'equations' implemented in 1s and 0s, data, numbers, - call it what you like. In a Von Neumann-like machine. We are clever enough to design/model a 3d universe prototype (i.e. a bad one) and with quantum computers a better one until eventually... complete the sentence yourself.

Since this is a free, argumentative thread, I will share my thoughts accordingly.

This is the same thing people have said for a while now. This is a problem with modern physicists. They think in equations, and they neglect what the equations mean. Eventually, they lose the notion of a picture, or a conceptual idea. Numbers are what we use to represent nature. They are not nature itself.

 

[Fra]

I think most sane persons would agree that scientific knowledge doesn't follow deductively from logic.

I see no basis for this statement.

The most sane persons was a provocative stretch, but the I think it should be clear that the scientific method is not a deductive process.

Of course this is an old philosophical problem, the problem of induction. Popper wanted to turn the scientific method into a deductive one, since he thought induction was not valid. Unfortunately he didn't succeed. He ignored the hypothesis generation, which again is a kind of induction.

Though something further classifications appear and it's called abduction, which is a sort of induction where you try to infere the best causal explanation for observer phenomena.

With scientific knowledge isnt' deduced, but rather induced (or abduced) I mean that the inference of laws and general principles from experiemence is a form of a risky argument, it is not a certain argument.

Popper tried to forget about the induction of hypothesis and instead just focues on the falsification, which he first imagined as deductive, either the prediction matches observations, or it doesn't. Then even that is hard due to uncertainty and experimental error, than he agreed to turn into a probabilistic deduction. Which really is a deductive form of induction. But even that makes no sense IMHO because to make a probabilistic dedcution, ie. make deductions rather than inductions, and assign each deduction a probability, you first have to - from experience - infere a probability space! And again, this is not deductive, is risky arguments.

However, perhaps you meant that general principles do no predict specific event. I would have to agree with that. That seems to be the nature of generality - not to be specific. Even the laws of physics as we presently know them do not predict specific events - like my typing these words right now. They are just as much generalities as logic itself.

I mean both. I mean that general principles do not predict specific event. And you then suggest that it still predicts the probability exactly.

Then I have two issues with that.

- To first make a deduction (from general principles), you have to establish the correctness of the general principles. Usually these are inferred from our experience with nature, which again isn't deductive.

- The next problem is exactly what the significance of probability is, when in certain cases it's obvious that it's practically impossible to repeat the experiment, and in particularly to repeat and collect the data an infinite amount of times to get a certain statistics. In that case, what does probabiliy mean? Usually we can think of it in a bayesian sense, but even that leaves issues, unless you pull out of nowhere a master space.

So inductive logic comes from deductive logic.

I was not too careful about my notion, there are different names around here but I was actually talking about induction as a risky reasoning in general.

You seem to talk about induction here as probabilistic deduction. Given the probabilistic formalism, it's true that it's deductive. But the probabilistic general framework isn't given. It contains implicit assumptions and ergodic hypothesis etc. So in the end, it's still not a foolproof and 100% deductive argument - where back to induction.

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

I think the solution to the problem of induction isn't to focus on wether it's valid, it's to descrie what induction IS, and as I see it it's an evolving process, which evolves by induction, but (uncertain) induction, not deductive probabilistic one, because the probabilistic framework contains implicit information that is only induced, not deduced.

So my original comment was that, I think it should be clear that scientific predictions as well as the inferece of physical law from nature are not riskfree processes, thus not deductive.

/Fredrik

 

[dx]

Fra,

Einstein said in one of his essays, "Physics constitutes a logical system, whose basis cannot be distilled, as it were, from experience by an inductive method, but can only be arrived at by free invention. The justification (truth content) of the system rests in the verification of the derived propositions by sense experiences, whereby the relations of the latter to the former can only be comprehended intuitively."

 

[Demystifier]

As a MUH proponent I can say that:
1. It is know about not being possible to know for certain what machinery behind is right: it is about an absence of any machinery (except formulas).
2. Physics IS mathematics on the fundamental level, so the there is no difference in principle between the mathematics (adequate to our universe) and "what 'really exists'"

But over and over people ask "what is a wavefunction? what is space made of? are virtual particles real?" trying to discover wheels and rubber bands behind the curtain.

I like the way you said it.
But let me explain how I view this from the point of view of different interpretations:

Copenhagen: equations AND observers

Many world: equations AND "frogs" who somehow see only a tiny part of the solutions of these equations

Bohm: equations AND some additional equations (that remove the need for observers and frogs)

MUH: equations AND additional equations AND more additional equations AND more and more additional equations ... until you exhaust the infinite set of all possible equations

In particular, MUH contains Bohm as a special case.

 

[Fra]

Fra,

Einstein said in one of his essays, "Physics constitutes a logical system, whose basis cannot be distilled, as it were, from experience by an inductive method, but can only be arrived at by free invention. The justification (truth content) of the system rests in the verification of the derived propositions by sense experiences, whereby the relations of the latter to the former can only be comprehended intuitively."

This seems like a reasonable way of putting it. However, I suggest that the notion of "free invention" and "intuitive comprehension" can be improved and formalised, as a sort of game of risky reasoning and learning by feedback.

Popper considered that the logic of hypothesis generation belongs to pscyhology of scientists brains, and he didn't seem to think further analysis was relevant. Instead he focused on, given a hypothesis, how can it either be falsified or corroborated.

The scientific problem of induction is based on the general almost unquestionable observation, that science infers laws and general principles from experience interacting with nature. The problem is howto describe this process? Popper thought that the inductive description isn't valid, so he came up with the deductive step of falsification, and dismissed the biggest problem to human pscyhology. Not a very satisfactory resolution.

Still, it's correct that induction such as (we've only seen white swans; therefor "there are no white swans in nature") is not a valid or satisfactory universal abstraction; no one would question that. But there is a more sophisticated way of seeing this inference - like a game. And consensus is emergent among players, in an evolving perspective. This takes on to abstract the very core of the problem that some pople dismiss to "free invention" or "human phsycology". After all the human brain is nothing but a physical system, so I don't see how a scientist can accept to dismiss such a crucial problem to "human mind" and then be satisfied.

The more inductive approach however, and in particular the version I am advocating, suggest that there is a very important feedback between the corroboration/falsification tests and the logic by which new hypothesis is generated. So the ambition is higher than than of Popper. As I see it, we are questioning the PHYSICS and the physical basis of hypothesis generation, which when you think of it, is closely related to the physical basis of expectations and information. Here we are close to QM, which suggest that different observers, having different information, have different expectatins and therefore behave differently!

The deductive focus, focuses on falsification (which is the simplest part). The inductive focus, is on how the hypothesis generator evolves (the deep part). Here comes the evolutionary view, as a possible resolution to the scientific problem of induction: Is this induction valid? Well, what doe valid me? IF it means, is it true, then NO. Instead, this is a game, a game we have no choice but to play.

In this context, the various ideas of evolving law and connecting physical interactions with the "laws of inference" (which are obviously evolving, just like physical law) are interesting.

Part of the key is I think that inference is sujbective, and thus attached to a physical observer. The different observers difference in reasoning upon incomplete information, results in disagreements, which in turn results in physical interactions. So there is an idea how to infere and classify physical interactions and phenomenology from classification evolving interacting learning models.

This a new way of reasoning that also comes with a new abstraction of the scientific method. It can even be said to have the ambition to unify the description of a scientific processes, with a physical processes.

The abstraction and simplification used by Popper is very simplistic. It's not "wrong", it's just
too simlpe, and I think we can get even more enlightened by analyzing the parts that Popper dismissed to self organisation of complex systems such as the human brain.

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

This isn't to suggest that subatomic particle have "humamn level brains" to reason with. OTOH, what I mean is that the "reasoning" taking place in subatomic physics is pretty much one-2-one with the PHYSICAL processes and interactions that is going on there. This evolving process is the same as the evolving microstructures and how they communicate at this level. This construction would start at the very smallest level, down to the Planck scale or whatever the scale turns out to be.

Like Ariel puts it, mybe the laws of physics governing the interaction of parts of the universe, are simlpy the parts of the universe acting upon incompete information on the others? If that is so, then this route of analysis is likely to bear fruit.

/Fredrik

 

[Ilja]

well, at least there are some good news: I mean, the relatively recent discovery of the Quantum Decoherence. It demonstrated that most or all 'classical' behavior can be derived directly from the 'pure' (interpretation-less) QM

It cannot. Decoherence needs some "decomposition of the universe into systems", which is not part of pure QM. http://arxiv.org/abs/arXiv:0903.4657"

 

[Dmitry67]

Copenhagen: equations AND observers

Many world: equations AND "frogs" who somehow see only a tiny part of the solutions of these equations

Bohm: equations AND some additional equations (that remove the need for observers and frogs)

MUH: equations AND additional equations AND more additional equations AND more and more additional equations ... until you exhaust the infinite set of all possible equations

I almost agree, except

1. MUH does not imply that the number of equations is limited. It is a well-justified HOPE. In fact, if the number of equations is infinite then MUH would lose all its charm for me.

So your claim (that the number of equations is infinite) is just your thought and not a part of MUH.

2. it does not contradict your description of MWI, but I was not absolutely confinced by MWI before I learned MUH. MUH implies that interpretation must be NULL - it can talk, however, about 'how the observers inside would percieve such universe' - but it does not change the basics.

So, if we forget about the frogs (imagine that in an Universe carbon syntesis was impossible and no life is created, or let's talk about our early universe) then what is left:

Copenhagen: ***FATAL ERROR*** can't not continue without any observers
Many minds: ***FATAL ERROR*** for the same reason
Many world: core QM equations
Bohm: core QM equations AND some additional equations
+ for example Objective collapse theories: core QM equations + objective collapse equations

Thank you for your patience :) Now apply the Occams razor. What is left? :)

So I imply that:
1. MUH + Occam = MWI
2. MWI = Null interpratation (shut up and calculate) + wordy stuff about 'what observers would see' derived from core QM.

 

[Ilja]

Copenhagen: ***FATAL ERROR*** can't not continue without any observers
Many minds: ***FATAL ERROR*** for the same reason
Many world: core QM equations
Bohm: core QM equations AND some additional equations
+ for example Objective collapse theories: core QM equations + objective collapse equations

Thank you for your patience :) Now apply the Occams razor. What is left? :)

So I imply that:
1. MUH + Occam = MWI
2. MWI = Null interpratation (shut up and calculate) + wordy stuff about 'what observers would see' derived from core QM.

Many worlds is core QM equations + unspecified "decomposition into systems" + some strange "containment"-relation between points in Hilbert spaces.

 

[Dmitry67]

Many worlds is core QM equations + unspecified "decomposition into systems" + some strange "containment"-relation between points in Hilbert spaces.

It is true that quantum decoherence is defined in terms of some degrees of freedom system, while that system is arbitrary.

But QD itself is used to define how the 'universe' looks like to that system X. So think about the QD as a function of a system.

If you don't care about the observers, then you don't care about it.

So your claim is true but it is a pure tautologie: to talk about what systems see we need to define systems somehow.

 

[Demystifier]

1. MUH does not imply that the number of equations is limited. It is a well-justified HOPE. In fact, if the number of equations is infinite then MUH would lose all its charm for me.

But according to Tegmark, MUH says that ANY logically consistent mathematical structure exists. There is certainly an infinite number of such structures.

But of course, you don't need to agree with Tegmark.

 

[Dmitry67]

But according to Tegmark, MUH says that ANY logically consistent mathematical structure exists. There is certainly an infinite number of such structures.

Yes, but (I HOPE) the number of equations of our particular Universe is finite

 

[friend]

Fra,

Einstein said in one of his essays, "Physics constitutes a logical system, whose basis cannot be distilled, as it were, from experience by an inductive method, but can only be arrived at by free invention. The justification (truth content) of the system rests in the verification of the derived propositions by sense experiences, whereby the relations of the latter to the former can only be comprehended intuitively."

This is because the scientific method used is to conjure up equations to fit the data collected by experiments. After we have what we think is an adequate equation that predicts the data, we see if we can find more fundamental structure in the equations and assign physical meaning to them. By this process we will never know if we've got the most fundamental theory.

But if a theory can be derived on principle of reason alone, and it results in equations that we are accustomed to, how could anyone object to it? How could they then after deny that physics is derived from logic?

 

[dx]

This is because the scientific method used is to conjure up equations to fit the data collected by experiments. After we have what we think is an adequate equation that predicts the data, we see if we can find more fundamental structure in the equations and assign physical meaning to them. By this process we will never know if we've got the most fundamental theory.

But if a theory can be derived on principle of reason alone, and it results in equations that we are accustomed to, how could anyone object to it? How could they then after deny that physics is derived from logic?

That's not quite what Einstein meant. He was talking about the conceptual foundations of physical theories. Like the concept of force. That is not something that is uniquely determined by experience, but is a creation of the mind.

 

[p764rds]

Since this is a free, argumentative thread, I will share my thoughts accordingly.

This is the same thing people have said for a while now. This is a problem with modern physicists. They think in equations, and they neglect what the equations mean. Eventually, they lose the notion of a picture, or a conceptual idea. Numbers are what we use to represent nature. They are not nature itself.

I am not sure where you are coming from, but IMO numbers are able to implement mathematical equations. For example the computer we are on now is doing all its 'thinking' and data retrieval using numbers (well, binary numbers - 0s and 1s in effect). But the numbers are only the cogs in the machine, as you know.

(I would say that 'nature', and us, are totally in numbers, its just we think its a 3 Dimensional space - I think you do not agree with that though - yet )

 

[benk99nenm312]

I am not sure where you are coming from, but IMO numbers are able to implement mathematical equations. For example the computer we are on now is doing all its 'thinking' and data retrieval using numbers (well, binary numbers - 0s and 1s in effect). But the numbers are only the cogs in the machine, as you know.

(I would say that 'nature', and us, are totally in numbers, its just we think its a 3 Dimensional space - I think you do not agree with that though - yet )

Yet? I'm so very sorry, but you will find that I am one of the most stubborn people on the planet. I do not change my views. I think I actually posted this because I misinterpereted one of the other posts, but since we are on the subject, I will keep going.

You say that nature is totally in numbers. You say that we just think that it is 3 dimensional space. You seem to harbor a view where numbers are the truth, and the concept of space and time is a creation of man. This is flat out wrong. I am very sorry to be the one to tell you this, but it is the exact opposite. Numbers are a creation of man, to represent what we see. When we look at the universe at a whole, we don't see a set of equations. We see a star, or a galaxy, that follows laws that we can represent with equations.

If you are not totally convinced, then you will be thinking of QFT, and how it regards particles to be excitations in a field. And by the way, a field is just an equation too. If you look beyond its mathematical interpretation, it is no different from the word ether. Obviously, QFT is not perfect. This tells us that, thankfully, we are not governed completely by numbers. Concepts have to be considered when you deal with physics.

This discussion is a popular one. I'm sorry, but I regard this as a very basic, yet imortant subject. How hard is it to see why I'm right? Is it hard to admit that? Do you really think you are sitting on the number 7? The universe is represented with math. It is not math itself.

 

[Dmitry67]

My opinion is that you're absolutely wrong.
I assume you had read Max Tegmark's 'Mathematical Universe Hypotesis'. If not search arxiv. He claims exactly is opposite: our universe IS math.

His article was much more convincing then your post, may be because he proided some arguments instead of saying "How hard is it to see why I'm right" :)

 

[Demystifier]

Yes, but (I HOPE) the number of equations of our particular Universe is finite

I hope that too.

But to hope that we already know all these equations would be too much. On the other hand, MWI arises from a desire that we do already know them, that there are no other equations behind those of standard quantum theory.

 

[Dmitry67]

On the other hand, MWI arises from a desire that we do already know them, that there are no other equations behind those of standard quantum theory.

On some level, yes, but of course QM equations are not final - we'll get something like QLG or strings or something else that makes GR and QM mutually consistent.

However I don't expect TOE to explain the quantum phenomena more 'classically'. So we should forever abandon realism or single history (we don't know yet what exactly should be abandoned) loike we had forever abandoned the euclidean 3d space and we don't expect euclidean 3d space appear again in TOE

Personally I expect TOE to be even more weird then QM. So far the theories we have are not crazy enough - like Stabdard Model does not provide anything more fundamental then we have in QFT. That is why there is no significant progress.

So even TOE would change the equations I don't think it would remove or explain the 'QM weirdeness'

 

[Fra]

we should forever abandon realism or single history
...
Personally I expect TOE to be even more weird then QM. So far the theories we have are not crazy enough

I agree.

So even TOE would change the equations I don't think it would remove or explain the 'QM weirdeness'

What if the QM weirdness is simply the result of our still realist-mode brains trying to make sense of our "not crazy enough theories"?

In no way do I think we will recover realism at any level, but I do think that some of the "weirdness" in QM could be partly reduced if the take the abanoning of realist thinking fully.

Here are I am referring to IMO realist remnants such as bird views etc. Here I am not with Tegemark. There is one way in which I can see a close connection between mathematics and reality, and that is that the physical makeup of say an observer, is the basis on which mathematics, such as counting, real numbers, transformations are based. But then, that is still almsot an opposite view of Tegemark, Tegemark seems to think of mathematics as existing in some transendent sense. I take the exact opposite view, that the fact that IF mathematics is supposedly one-2-one with physical reality, then this constrains the mathematics, rather than frees up reality. This is why I object to the use of continuum abstractions.

Smolin also made the correlation between realist thinking, and the idea of universal timeless law. The problem is that even with current QM, it still contains realist elements - which is why I think it's almsot conceptually inconsistent.

So I agree it's not mad enough.

/Fredrik

 

[Dmitry67]

We have agreed on the first part.
But regarding the second, I wanted to ask you, did Mandelbrot set exist before it was discovered?

 

[Fra]

But regarding the second, I wanted to ask you, did Mandelbrot set exist before it was discovered?

To make sense out of this question, the key is what do you mean with exist.

Sure, it's easy to imagine that yes of course it did exist before, it's just that we didn't discover it until then. But there is something wrong with that way of reasoning when you put reasoning in a sort of scientific context, where the justification of a conjecture lies in what implications it has.

If we by exists, mean the only reaonsonable thing, that someone (the one saying it exists) has the information, then clearly before it was first observed, it didn't exists in the sense that it had any predictable impact on reality.

But certainly, two observers here could disagree. Someone who discovers it first, would think the second observer is "crazy" to suggest that it didn't exists just because he didn't know about it.

But m point is that from the point of view of measurable differences. The realist-sense of "EXIST" that I think you have in mind, doesn't make sense.

What I am focusing on, is how different observes interact with each other. And each observer, acts in line with his information, not in line with "some reality" to which he is indifferent. It's a form of locality in terms of information, that an observer responds and acts only upon the information he has, this is so even if the information is wrong!

This relates to my comments in this thread.
https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=2130382

I don't expect you to agree, but I present to you my incomplete arguments.

So to repeat my point.

To put your question in context, there must be a way in which the observer is not indifferent to the existence of non-existence of the mandelbroth. If not, the answer
is not yes it did exist or it did not exist, the resolution is that this question would
never appear physically.

If it appears, then it's asked by an observer who already found the mandelbroth, and then this observers QUESTIONING of othre observers would quality as a physical interaction, and this indirectly informs the first observer (originally indifferent to this) about the mandelbroth.

So I really do not see any contradictions here. The one point of confusion is this strange realist-view that something exists independent of observation. That applies IMHO to mandelbroth as much as it applies to electron spin.

But as always I would up my rear on this (I have no proof). But I have to say I'm comfortable.

/Fredrik

 

[Dmitry67]

I see your point.

There are 2 observers, A and B very far from each other so they can't communicate, until they lightcones intersect. When they finally meet together, is it possible that for A number 11 is prime while for B it is not? let's say thay examine together their list of primes and the value of pi. What a coincidence! They are identical!

How do you explain it, if the 'list of primes' did not exist before they discovered it?

 

[Fra]

If you will say that then the two observers view are inconsistent, then my response is that, this is exactly why we predict an interaction between these observers! Their different "view of reality", is what causes them to interact, and the result of the interaction is that both of them are updating their information! And loosely speaking, the consistency you seek is reasearched only asymptotically as an equilibrium condition.

Analogies of how such differing leads to interaction is common in human society. For whaterver reasons (culture, religion, history, personcal experiences etc) different people have different opinon on what is right and wrong and howto act according to that. Sometimes this leads to conflicts. The result of the conflict is that they are fighting each other, and there are different possible outcomes. One possibility is that they reach an compromise, based on a mutual understanding. It may not mean they agree, but they have agreed to disagree and coexist in a steady state.

Similary, the physical information, may lead to physical inteactions. And think classification of these, will help us understand the standard model, and it's place in a larger evolving scenario (the two persons interacting above, still both exist in a larger context, a cirty, or even a country, a planet, or galaxy, etc)

/Fredrik

 

[Fra]

There are 2 observers, A and B very far from each other so they can't communicate, until they lightcones intersect. When they finally meet together, is it possible that for A number 11 is prime while for B it is not? let's say thay examine together their list of primes and the value of pi. What a coincidence! They are identical!

How do you explain it, if the 'list of primes' did not exist before they discovered it?

This is not so mystical I think, but I'll have to get back to this later due to time. There are several levels here, such as the uniqueness of mathematics and logic etc. But also language.

The two observers, must first learn howto communicate to make a comparasion even. If observer A asks B : "gimme your list of primes" :), B would not understand anything, only hear noise. however, if as they met, agree upong a definition of "primes", sure they would agree upon their lists.

Is it possible though that one observer never even developed the notion of primes, or a different list of whatever that aren't A:s primes. Yes sure. But the disagreement on the lists is no contradiction because have not relation.

However, from my point of view as a human, pondering about a theory of the universe and other observers, then in my abstracion of an observer, there is a starting point of distinguishable states, which ultimately can label states, and further construct measures by counting, which indirectly leads to ordered sets. So I picture a mathematical abstraction of observers. But that is only MY view, as a human. But then it's my free choice. Someone else doing what I do, can do it differently, but I still suspect that while our descirptions would be different both of us would successfully be able to make sense of what we see.

To repeat rovelli, the only way to compare what I see with "what I think" you see is to interact with you, and try to interpret the response according to MY view. This applies also to my information about physical law. This is why I think we need an abstraction where physical law evolves.

/Fredrik

 

[Phrak]

I see your point.

There are 2 observers, A and B very far from each other so they can't communicate, until they lightcones intersect. When they finally meet together, is it possible that for A number 11 is prime while for B it is not? let's say thay examine together their list of primes and the value of pi. What a coincidence! They are identical!

How do you explain it, if the 'list of primes' did not exist before they discovered it?

You keep asking the interesting questions, Dmitry.

I don't think you have to get so invloved. Numbers don't exist. The counting numbers 1, 2, three... They don't exist. Show me the number 12.