Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 crash

[mpresic]

To me, a plane disappearing is amazing. This isn't 1937 with Amelia Earhart. Prior to last week, if someone told me their phone app could image the flight path of every flight in real time, I think I would have believed them.

 

[arildno]

To me, a plane disappearing is amazing. This isn't 1937 with Amelia Earhart. Prior to last week, if someone told me their phone app could image the flight path of every flight in real time, I think I would have believed them.

Well, it shows our globe isn't as extensively surveilled as we thought it to be.
For example, some Indian military official recently said that the Andaman/Nicobar isles simply aren't worth the cost having permanent surveillance of (in contrast to the India/Pakistan border), so there isn't really anything strange if Indian military radars haven't picked up any signals from there, since the radars there probably were shut off..

 

[Pythagorean]

aaaand... back to terrorism:

The missing Malaysian airlines flight MH370 may have been deliberately flown under the radar to Taliban-controlled bases on the border of Afghanistan, it has emerged, as authorities said that the final message sent from the cockpit came after one of the jet's communications systems had already been switched off.

http://www.independent.co.uk/news/w...-engineers-and-crew-investigated-9195320.html

 

[nsaspook]

To me, a plane disappearing is amazing. This isn't 1937 with Amelia Earhart. Prior to last week, if someone told me their phone app could image the flight path of every flight in real time, I think I would have believed them.

Unless you have actually traveled the area involved on ship or (slow) aircraft it's hard to get an idea of how quickly any sign of man vanishes once you leave the coast and once you hit the ocean you might as well be in space unless you have direct Satcom.

I've done some time on the 'rock', we have good coverage overhead but it's not targeted at civilian air. If you're hot, fast and/or have active sensors with a signature that seems military the probability that someone has noticed is high. We used to hide whole battle-groups from the USSR for weeks (unlikely to be true today) in the IO by only using signal lights , flagmen and complete (EMCON on normal non highly directional emitters) EM silence that included disconnecting active receivers from antennas so even local oscillators weren't detected.

 

[Pythagorean]

As someone who has fished king crab in the Bering Sea... let me tell you, the world is big.

 

[Greg Bernhardt]

Wired has a decent article up

A Startlingly Simple Theory About the Missing Malaysia Airlines Jet
http://www.wired.com/autopia/2014/03/mh370-electrical-fire/

 

[Dotini]

A key point being made by CNN analysts:
The west turn away from original course was plotted into ACARS maybe 12 minutes before contact was lost. This locks in a premeditated cockpit decision to change course.

CNN analyst's points against the slow burning fire theory:

- there were closer runways than the one supposedly aimed for
- continued course changes made later
- ACARS was transmitting longer than thought. No hint of smoke, fire or even elevated temperatures in the wheel well or elsewhere.

 

[Ptero]

Hello Greg and others from the Dreamliner thread,
It is becoming clear to me what probably happened. Clifford Irving and other sources state that the manifest list includes "an extraordinarily large" number of lithium batteries in the cargo hold. I have been unable to determine the quantity or type but let us assume a pallet load of laptop batteries. If these started shorting and burning, an airline pilot agreed with me that they could burn through the wiring for the automatic communications systems and render them inoperative. We know several things about putting out lithium battery fires that we researched on the Dreamliner thread. One is that you can't put them out. As soon as you pull the Halon extinguisher away, they reignite. Two, they propagate, setting off adjacent battery packs that had no shorts. Three, the only way to get the fire out of the aircraft is to physically remove the battery/s from the aircraft. But what we did not discuss on the Dreamliner thread is the toxicity - particularily the fumes. We assumed at worst the pilots could don oxygen masks and land the plane while the batteries sparked and fumed in their protective shell - and after the "fix" the fumes would vent outside the pressure hull. But there was no protective shell around the batteries in Flight 370's cargo hold.
This is what I suspect happened:
(1) Around 1:00 a.m., the fire begins to smolder, creating fumes of hydrofluoric acid vapor in the pressurized cargo hold.
(2) 1:07 a.m., the last ACARS transmission is automatically sent.
(3) 1:19 a.m., the flight crew signs off with Malaysian flight controllers.
(4) 1:20 a.m., the fire grows. Passengers and crew notice the smell of fumes for the first time.
(5) 1:21 a.m., following procedure for electrical fire, the pilot pulls the main breaker for all accessory systems. This disables the transponder.
(6) 1:22 a.m., pilot Zaharie Ahmad Shah puts the 777 in a climb to maximum ceiling of ~45,000 feet as he initiates a turn, programming the coordinates into autopilot for Palau Langkawi, the closest airport. He can tell by his burning eyes that the fire is not electrical in nature and he instantly suspects the lithium batteries in the hold. He knows they have one chance -- the fire might be starved for oxygen if he depressurizes the plane at that altitude.
(7) 1:24 a.m., the toxic fumes grow stronger. As panic grows in the passenger compartments, Shah orders passengers to don oxygen masks.
(8) 1:26 a.m., Shah depressurizes the 777, blowing out the fumes and extinguishing the fire. He flies at this altitude for several minutes. Many passengers fall unconscious during this period. The pilots may have become blind by this time.
(9) 1:28 a.m., Shah brings the plane back down but the fire erupts again, filling the plane with toxic fumes. All personnel and passengers are overcome and pass out, then die, if they are not already dead.
(10) 2:15 a.m., the 777 continues on its programmed course and crosses over the island of Pulau Perak, a flying coffin.

Death by inhalation of hydrofluoric acid fumes is excruciatingly horrible. The maximum level permitted by the CDC is 3 ppm in an 8 hour period.
See http://www.colorado.edu/ehs/pdf/HWMedHFExpo.pdf

 

[Greg Bernhardt]

Clifford Irving and other sources state that the manifest list includes "an extraordinarily large" number of lithium batteries in the cargo hold.

Can you provide the sources that state the manifest?

 

[Ptero]

One problem is that many lithium-ion batteries today contain fluorine, which readily combines with hydrogen to make hydrofluoric acid (HF). In accidental battery fires, HF is noxious, dangerous to the touch, and an inhalation danger.
http://spectrum.ieee.org/green-tech...rds-at-both-ends-of-the-lithiumion-life-cycle

Chemistry
Investigation of fire emissions from Li-ion batteries
This report presents an investigation on gases emitted during Lithium-ion battery fires.
Details of the calibration of an FTIR instrument to measure HF, POF 3 and PF 5 gases are
provided as background to the minimum detection limits for each species. The use of
FTIR in tests has been verified by repeating experiments reported in the literature. The
study reports on gases emitted both after evaporation and after ignition of the electrolyte
fumes. Tests were conducted where electrolyte is injected into a propane flame and the
influence of the addition of water is studied. Finally three types of battery cells were
burnt and emission of fluorine and/or phosphorous containing species quantified.
http://www.brandforsk.se/MediaBinar...1_Rapport.pdf&MediaArchive_ForceDownload=true

 

[nsaspook]

This is my current time-line of known events of the beginning:

http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/asia/malaysia-airlines-flight.html?_r=0

The plane took off at 12:41 a.m. on March 8 carrying 239 people headed for Beijing and reached a cruising altitude of 35,000 feet at 1:01 a.m. Six minutes later, at 1:07 a.m., the Malaysian authorities say, the plane sent its last Acars message, which reported nothing amiss.

The authorities have not specified what time the last verbal exchange between the cockpit and the air traffic controllers took place. But Mr. Hishammuddin’s statement means it would have occurred between 1:08 a.m. and 1:21 a.m., when the plane’s transponder stopped transmitting and ground control lost contact with the jet.

http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/18/world/asia/malaysia-airlines-plane/

The Thai military was receiving normal flight path and communication data from the Boeing 777-200 on its planned March 8 route from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing until 1:22 a.m., when it disappeared from its radar.

Six minutes later, the Thai military detected an unknown signal, a Royal Thai Air Force spokesman told CNN. This unknown aircraft, possibly Flight 370, was heading the opposite direction.

1:07 am : Acars (Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System) last message. If there is no emergency it will send the next message 30min later at 1:37.
This is a packet digital system on HF/VHF or Satcom that shares the frequency with others so it's not transmitting at all times.
1:19 am : Last verbal message sent.
1:22 am : Radar Transponders off
1:28 am : plane turns around
1:37 am : No message from Acars.

It's very possible that the same event (accident or human intervention) that took out the transponders at 1:22 also disabled the voice systems and Acars at the same time. If the pilots were busy with a fire in the cockpit or other emergency that required them to move from the flight consoles, quickly punching in a location (that might have been a preprogrammed 'bugout' location) and letting the plane fly on auto to a possible landing location is not a outlandish possibility.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/...r-about-mh370/
http://www.airtrafficmanagement.net/...0-satcoms-101/

 

[Ptero]

Can you provide the sources that state the manifest?

Irving said the flight's disappearance had been compounded by "an engulfing fog of speculation, frequently reaching a tone of hysteria".

"People are spooked. They want information that nobody is able to provide. We have come to expect quick enlightenment. That isn’t possible. We demand transparency and coherence. They’re not happening," he wrote.

He pointed out that the Boeing 777's safety record was exceptional but asked if there was an issue in the cargo hold of the missing MAS plane.

"Last week, the National Transportation Safety Board discovered that there was an unusually large consignment of lithium-ion batteries on the cargo manifest.

"This technology is more recently known as the cause of fires that led to the grounding of the Boeing 787 fleet, but lithium-ion batteries for personal electronic devices have been a frequent cause of emergencies in cargo holds and baggage handling," he said.

Irving wrote that the batteries were prone to overheating and combustion and that the FAA’s Office of Security and Hazardous Materials Safety recorded many of these incidents in the US, including a fire caused by a battery on a self-propelled surf board on a FedEx airplane.

But he said the pilots would have had time to report an emergency if there was a battery induced fire in the cargo hold of MH370.

"There is, however, a relevant example of a large airplane being lost over the Indian Ocean after a cargo fire. In 1987, a South African Airways 747 with a 159 people aboard suffered an uncontrollable cargo fire that began with computers packed in polystyrene. The airplane fell into a deep part of the ocean east of Mauritius.
http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/malaysia/article/no-facts-to-blame-pilots-of-mh370-yet-says-report

 

[lisab]

"Last week, the National Transportation Safety Board discovered that there was an unusually large consignment of lithium-ion batteries on the cargo manifest.

Do you have a source for this?

"This technology is more recently known as the cause of fires that led to the grounding of the Boeing 787 fleet, but lithium-ion batteries for personal electronic devices have been a frequent cause of emergencies in cargo holds and baggage handling," he said.

Not sure about the cargo/baggage handling incidents. Is there a source for that claim?

The 787 issues are totally apart from what happens to *stored* batteries, in any case. I don't see how that applies to this case.

 

[AlephZero]

This is what I suspect happened:...

Nice story, but there are too many loose ends. Even if the pilots disabled non-essential electrical circuits, that doesn't include the emergency radio transmitter for sending distress messages by voice. That doesn't rely on ground receiving stations, and most other planes within range of several hundred watts of transmitter power would be monitoring that channel. If you plan to make an emergency landing, or a ditching at sea, you want people to know your intentions.

The other implausible part is the creativity of the crew in first guessing what the problem was, and then inventing a plan to deal with it that was outside of the aircraft operating manual. (There is a procedure for depressurizing the cabin, but at 20,000 feet not 45,000 feet. The passengers won't like being depressurized at 20,000 feet, but most of them will survive with nothing worse than nose bleeds and/or perforated eardrums that will heal.) That's not they way flight crews have been taught to think. Right from basic flying training, you don't fix problems by getting creative, you follow the drills and checklists that have been devised by teams of people who collectively know a lot more than you do.

 

[AlephZero]

lithium-ion batteries for personal electronic devices have been a frequent cause of emergencies in cargo holds and baggage handling

I would delete "frequent", but there have been one or two, including http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UPS_Airlines_Flight_6. Note the final comment that

In October 2010 ...The FAA issued a restriction on the carrying of lithium batteries in bulk on passenger flights.

 

[Ptero]

<<<Do you have a source for this?

Release #13.FDX
July 26, 2013

FedEx Pilots’ Union: Report on UPS Crash Highlights Need for New Regulations on Carriage of Lithium Batteries

MEMPHIS, Tenn. — On September 3, 2010, our industry lost two fellow aviators when UPS Flight 6 crashed near Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). Yesterday, the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority (GCAA) released its final report concerning the investigation into this fatal crash. The GCAA, while not pinpointing the origin of the fateful blaze, determined that the ensuing fire was promulgated by lithium batteries and found that smoke-detection equipment took too long to alert the crew.

The report provides recommendations specific to air cargo fire safety. The FedEx MEC joins ALPA in praising the GCAA for its thorough report. The report makes unmistakably clear the dangers of carrying large quantities of lithium batteries. “As cargo pilots, we are fully aware of the potential dangers associated with the carriage of lithium batteries,” said MEC chairman Captain Scott Stratton. “These pilots’ lives were tragically cut short as they valiantly tried to bring their crippled aircraft back to the ground. Through their actions, they were able to prevent a much larger disaster from occurring. We owe it to them as well as to all of those who fly this nation’s commerce every day, to ensure that regulatory directives are harmonized across the globe and robust enough to preclude future events such as this.”

The GCAA recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and its European counterpart develop better firefighting standards and equipment for cargo planes, with visual warnings about where a fire is located. The FedEx MEC strongly believes that the United States must take a leadership role in protecting aircraft against the possibility of catastrophic fires caused by lithium batteries. The improvement in regulations covering the transportation of large quantities of lithium batteries must proceed immediately in order to begin to eliminate this deadly hazard. “Now is the time for the U.S. government to act to ensure the safety of our skies,” said FedEx Legislative Affairs chairman Captain Fred Eissler. “We will continue to work with our government leaders, dangerous goods regulatory authorities, and our fellow airline pilots to address the safety issues and concerns found in the GCAA report.”

“The FedEx pilots are committed to working with industry and government leaders to minimize the risks associated with the carriage of dangerous goods,” continued Captain Stratton. “The GCAA’s report adds to the building body of evidence that clearly shows much more effort is needed to facilitate negating the risks associated with the carriage of lithium batteries.”

# # #

SOURCE: Air Line Pilots Association
CONTACT: FDX ALPA, Courtney Bland, 901-842-2220 or Courtney.bland@alpa.org
http://www.alpa.org/Portals/Alpa/PressRoom/PressReleases/2013/7-26-13_13.FDX.htm

<<<Not sure about the cargo/baggage handling incidents. Is there a source for that claim?

STATEMENT OF THE
AIR LINE PILOTS ASSOCIATION, INTERNATIONAL
TO THE
NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
FORUM ON LITHIUM BATTERIES IN TRANSPORTATION
April 11-12, 2013
...
Lithium Battery Incident History
According to the FAA, there have been over 40 lithium battery incidents documented
involving smoke, fire, extreme heat or explosion in air transportation since the
introduction of lithium batteries in the early 1990s. The incidents have occurred both in
the passenger cabin and in cargo compartments when batteries have been shipped as
cargo on passenger and cargo-only aircraft. Lithium battery fires may be the result of an
external short circuit (e.g. contact with other batteries or metal), internal short circuit
(e.g. design deficiency, manufacturing defect), damage, or exposure to an external fire
or heat source. Counterfeit batteries (i.e., those that are made by illicit manufacturers
and deliberately not designed to meet UN standards and are not subject to UN-
approved testing) often lack safety features and are poorly manufactured, leading to a
higher likelihood of being involved in an incident.
Additionally, while the investigation is ongoing and no cause has yet been determined,
a cargo-only aircraft carrying over 80,000 lithium batteries crashed in September 2010
after departing Dubai International Airport, and reporting a fire on the main deck cargo
compartment. Regardless of the cause of the fire, the lithium batteries aboard almost
certainly contributed to the severity and intensity of the fire, which ultimately led to the
loss of the flight crew, aircraft and cargo. The flight crew was not aware that they were
2carrying such large quantities of batteries, nor were they required to be, based on the
rules at the time.

<<<The 787 issues are totally apart from what happens to *stored* batteries, in any case. I don't see how that applies to this case.[/QUOTE]

No they aren't "totally apart." They are very, very close. Learn the chemistry. Read the Dreamliner thread.

 

[nsaspook]

The other implausible part is the creativity of the crew in first guessing what the problem was, and then inventing a plan to deal with it that was outside of the aircraft operating manual.

I basically agree but the sustained 45,000 foot number is one of the least supported 'facts' in this mystery even if indeed it came from (very good) Malaysian radar. If it made it that high it must a been only for a very short time as that's at the Coffin corner for most civilian air which might explain the uneven and quick decent to something much lower .

http://edition.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1403/14/ebo.01.html

So I guess let me start with the first thing, flying at 45,000 feet, that was reported. By the way, I want to put caveat on this. The "New York Times," Michael Schmidt did that reporting and Barbara Starr was saying, look, this was based off military radar on the ground, which could have been 100, 200 miles away from the plane.

Meaning those readings may not be exactly accurate, OK, which might end up having all of this make a lot more sense. Right now with the information that we have, about 45,000 feet, that's above the 43,100 level approved, so why is that the level that's approved? What happens at 45,000 feet to the people on the plane?

MARK WEISS, RETIRED AMERICAN AIRLINES PILOT: What happens to the wing aerodynamically, the air is only so -- think about it being thick? Molecules of air. It's supporting the lift on the wing. As you go higher, the molecules of air are further and further apart. It won't be able to support the weight of the aircraft or the weight of the wing.

The aircraft is going to basically be on a teeter totter and descend, immediately descent, 40,000 feet, when you hear something like that going down 40,000 feet in one moment, for myself, that makes me very skeptical that that really is a very accurate report.

http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_slat..._times_takes_on_mh370_anonymous_sourcing.html

 

[OCR]

Right from basic flying training, you don't fix problems by getting creative, you follow the drills and checklists that have been devised by teams of people who collectively know a lot more than you do.

A general rule, with an occasional exception...

The crew called United Airlines' maintenance base using one of their radios, but as a total loss of hydraulics on the DC-10 was considered "virtually impossible", there were no procedures or guidelines for dealing with such an event.

Upon entering the cockpit and looking at the hydraulic gauges, Fitch determined that the situation was beyond anything he had ever faced.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Airlines_Flight_232

http://www.airdisaster.com/reports/ntsb/AAR90-06.pdf




OCR

 

[Ptero]

I'm following a lead that there were 2000 lbs of lithium batteries on MH370. I believe that would be 3-4 pallets. Visitors to the Dreamliner thread will remember how impurities in the manufacturing process can lead to increased risk of shorting in new batteries.

"Counterfeit batteries (i.e., those that are made by illicit manufacturers
and deliberately not designed to meet UN standards and are not subject to UN-
approved testing) often lack safety features and are poorly manufactured, leading to a
higher likelihood of being involved in an incident." (above)

Where in the world would one expect to find counterfeit lithium batteries?

Dangerous Goods Advisory Bulletin
The Government of Hong Kong’s Civil Aviation Department issued a Dangerous Goods Advisory
Circular in March 2007. The department’s Dangerous Goods Office recognized that many air cargo
consignments containing batteries departing Hong Kong International Airport were accompanied
with incorrect shipping documentation. This shipping documentation included forged or sub-
212standard laboratory certificates and Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS). The Advisory Circular
condemned these actions and described the requirements for transporting batteries as general
cargo on aircraft according to the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Technical
Instructions and the International Air Transport Association (IATA) regulations. The Advisory Circular
requested that freight forwarders and airlines exercise due diligence in verifying that laboratory
certificates and/or MSDS submitted for the batteries are reasonable and logical. It also encouraged
freight forwarders and airlines to cooperate and exchange information regarding mis-declaration of
dangerous goods. [SOURCE: below]

Excerpts:
AAIS Case Reference: 13/2010
AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION SECTOR
FINAL
AIR ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT
Uncontained Cargo Fire Leading to Loss of Control
Inflight and Uncontrolled Descent Into Terrain
Boeing 747-44AF
N571UP
Dubai
United Arab Emirates
03 September 2010
General Civil Aviation Authority of the United Arab Emirates

- The uncontained cargo fire directly affected the independent critical systems necessary for crew survivability. Heat from the fire exposed the supplementary oxygen system to extreme thermal loading, sufficient to generate a failure. This resulted in the oxygen supply disruption leading to the abrupt failure of the Captain’s oxygen supply and the incapacitation of the captain.

- The progressive failure of the cargo compartment liner increased the area available for the smoke and fire penetration into the fuselage crown area.

- The rate and volume of the continuous toxic smoke, contiguous with the cockpit and supernumerary habitable area, resulted in inadequate visibility in the cockpit, obscuring the view of the primary flight displays, audio control panels and the view outside the cockpit which prevented all normal cockpit functioning.

- The shutdown of PACK 1 for unknown reasons resulted in loss of conditioned airflow to the upper deck causing the Electronic Equipment Cooling [EEC] system to reconfigure to “closed loop mode”. The absence of a positive pressure differential contributed to the hazardous quantities of smoke and fumes entering the cockpit and upper deck, simultaneously obscuring the crew’s view and creating a toxic environment.

- The fire detection methodology of detecting smoke sampling as an indicator of a fire is inadequate as pallet smoke masking can delay the time it takes for a smoke detection system to detect a fire originating within a cargo container or a pallet with a rain cover.

Probably out of all the sources I've mentioned, this is the most significant:
http://www.gcaa.gov.ae/en/ePublication/admin/iradmin/Lists/Incidents%20Investigation%20Reports/Attachments/40/2010-2010%20-%20Final%20Report%20-%20Boeing%20747-44AF%20-%20N571UP%20-%20Report%2013%202010.pdf

 

[Ptero]

Note that the descent of the UPS 747 was uneven due to "pitch control anomalies," similar to the 777 incident:

A cargo on the main cargo deck had ignited at some point after departure. Less than three minutes after
the first warning to the crew, the fire resulted in severe damage to flight control systems and caused the
upper deck and cockpit to fill with continuous smoke.
The crew then advised Bahrain East Area Control [BAE-C] that the cockpit was ‘full of smoke’ and that
they ‘could not see the radios’, at around the same time the crew experienced pitch control anomalies
during the turn back and descent to ten thousand feet. (p 10)

 

[Pythagorean]

Right from basic flying training, you don't fix problems by getting creative, you follow the drills and checklists that have been devised by teams of people who collectively know a lot more than you do.

According to some research, this is THE problem for westerners[1]. Consider the Soviet vs. the US space programs. In the US we have a procedure for every little thing that happens. When something goes wrong, you look it up in a book... but what about when something that's an exception to the book goes wrong? US Astronauts throw their hands up.

Soviet astronauts? They weren't given and endless list of procedures. They were essentially given duct tape and bailing wire and told to fix any problems that arise... and they were usually able to do so because they're not dependent on a book of procedures. Part of the training of being an astronaut for them was being able to improvise to solve problems and having had to solve the small problems that weren't in a book with their own brain, they are better prepared for the larger problems when they come.

This is a common risk aversion phenomena. By being so careful to avoid hundreds of small risks, larger risks become more detrimental. Another example is natural forest fires. There are several different orders of magnitude of forest fire. Humans have the urge to put out even the little fires to avoid the risk of it becoming a big fire. What effect does this have? It begins to leave a larger set of combustible material behind that would have burned away in the small fires. Then when the big fire comes, it's tougher to stop. Via percolation theory, it now has more neighboring seeds. The larger event has been made more potent by the aversion to smaller events.

[1] http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1042823

 

[nsaspook]

According to some research, this is THE problem for westerners[1]. Consider the Soviet vs. the US space programs. In the US we have a procedure for every little thing that happens. When something goes wrong, you look it up in a book... but what about when something that's an exception to the book goes wrong? US Astronauts throw their hands up.

This is so true, I've been a avid reader of the 'comp.risks' Usenet digest forever (when I still had a .uucp node address). Our perception of events and the 'Malaysian' pilots possible responses to those events might seem less odd if we understand their risk culture.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RISKS_Digest

 

[jim hardy]

A week ago on pprune: http://www.pprune.org/8368195-post2040.html
regarding the left turn - an easy mistake to make

What if MH370 wanted to perform an emergency landing for whatever reason. Close to IGARI point the crew entered a possible airport to land in their FMS which could be VVCT CAN THO with VOR "TRN", because this one has a 3000m runway which is close to the intended route ahead. But, there is another "TRN" VOR closer by, guess where: TRANG VOR close to the Andaman sea. The crew under severe stress executes the top TRN (closest by) in the FMS and the plane turns immediately to that point. Could this explain the hard left turn after IGARI point towards the Andaman sea?

bigger image at
http://postimg.org/image/4d8stni21/

 

[SteamKing]

According to some research, this is THE problem for westerners[1]. Consider the Soviet vs. the US space programs. In the US we have a procedure for every little thing that happens. When something goes wrong, you look it up in a book... but what about when something that's an exception to the book goes wrong? US Astronauts throw their hands up.

Yeah, like what happened with Apollo 13.

Soviet astronauts? They weren't given and endless list of procedures. They were essentially given duct tape and bailing wire and told to fix any problems that arise... and they were usually able to do so because they're not dependent on a book of procedures. Part of the training of being an astronaut for them was being able to improvise to solve problems and having had to solve the small problems that weren't in a book with their own brain, they are better prepared for the larger problems when they come.

And your source for this is?

This is a common risk aversion phenomena. By being so careful to avoid hundreds of small risks, larger risks become more detrimental. Another example is natural forest fires. There are several different orders of magnitude of forest fire. Humans have the urge to put out even the little fires to avoid the risk of it becoming a big fire. What effect does this have? It begins to leave a larger set of combustible material behind that would have burned away in the small fires. Then when the big fire comes, it's tougher to stop. Via percolation theory, it now has more neighboring seeds. The larger event has been made more potent by the aversion to smaller events.

[1] http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1042823

It's not clear how any of this pertains to MH370.

 

[DevilsAvocado]

Possible debris from Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 spotted

A satellite image taken on March 16, 2014 and released by the Australian Maritime Safety Authority shows debris
believed to be possible wreckage from Malaysia Airlines Flight 370 in the Indian Ocean, about 1,500 miles west of Perth. AMSA

Edit:

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jGMBo85G4UA


https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xrks6Sm614

 

[Borg]

Hopefully, this pans out - Possible debris found.

Australian authorities have spotted a large field of debris floating in the South Indian Ocean more than a 1,000 miles off the southwest coast of Australia.

 

[DevilsAvocado]

Close ;)

 

[Borg]

Close ;)

Timing is everything.

I'm hopeful that this pans out. The phrases "large debris field" and "redirecting satellites" make me think that they are confident in what they've found.

 

[DevilsAvocado]

Timing is everything.

Sure is!

I'm hopeful that this pans out. The phrases "large debris field" and "redirecting satellites" make me think that they are confident in what they've found.

Yeah, it looks like the real thing this time... a tragedy in any case... :/

 

[DevilsAvocado]

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mB9bJ5n91lU

 

[nsaspook]

Not surprised about the (possible) southern track location but wish it had been sooner for the long shot possibility of finding any living crew or passengers. If it's the debris field and the boxes are on the bottom it's 2 to 3 miles deep there. Please let this be the beginning of the end of this tragedy.

 

[Pythagorean]

Yeah, like what happened with Apollo 13.

And your source for this is?

It's not clear how any of this pertains to MH370.

The source is right there. Posts #119 and #127 should have given the context quite clearly about risk culture.

 

[leroyjenkens]

Timing is everything.

I'm hopeful that this pans out. The phrases "large debris field" and "redirecting satellites" make me think that they are confident in what they've found.

You're hopeful that we find out they crashed? I was hoping they landed safely somewhere.

 

[Enigman]

The source is right there. Posts #119 and #127 should have given the context quite clearly about risk culture.

(Doesn't seem that the full article is provided in your link, so...)
http://iandobson.ece.iastate.edu/PAPERS/bhattHICSS05.pdf
Pg.3

 

[nsaspook]

You're hopeful that we find out they crashed? I was hoping they landed safely somewhere.

I think we all were but the true possibility of that was always low after a few days of nothing found. At this point I'm very hopeful they found the crash that can help solve this mystery because I always assumed the people died in flight or impact from a crash.

I think this is the nearest land mass near this remote area.
http://archive.is/MES66
https://www.google.com/maps/ms?ie=U...d=216498248091250582578.0004d62be1afe177e2e10