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But I am not explaining quantum mechanics by a classical model - I am arguing that it is unreasonable to apply different standards to arguments about quantum mechanics and arguments about classical mechanics - in order to make quantum mechanics appear more problematic than classical mechanics.stevendaryl said:But that's exactly the type of nondeterminism that Bell shows cannot serve as an explanation for quantum statistics.
To state it without any reference to determinism and classical arguments:
- The logical explanation for quantum statistics is the quantum mechanical formalism.
- The quantum mechanical formalism is mathematically consistent and can be interpreted consistently and applied to observations in a quantum world consisting of quantum objects only, without any reference to classical objects or other classical concepts.
- Once the quantum-classical framework is dropped, all philosophical obstacles (beyond those already in the classical concept of probability) are dissolved.
- A satisfying understanding can be developed, both of the interpretation (no need to ''shut up'') and of the formal side (''and calculate'').
- The resulting quantum theory makes a huge number of predictions that confirm our everyday experience.
- In particular, it explains the properties of water and ice, the color of gold, that mercury is a fluid metal, why chemicals undergo reactions, the laws of hydrodynamics, and much else.
- In addition, as any - classical or quantum - theory that makes predictions under conditions that we don't usually are exposed to, quantum theory also makes some predictions that are outside our everyday experience, therefore violate our untrained intuition (and invite heated debates such as the present one).
- These predictions follow from the impeccable mathematical basis together with its interpretation that tells how to relate the mathematics and the observable world.
- To the extend that they deviate from our native intuition (e.g., in the case of large distance entanglement), this is not a defect of the theory or its foundations.
- Instead it is a limitation of our experience and the resulted limited intuition.
- To improve the intuition, one can train oneself by developing useful analogies rooted in our experience but reflecting key properties of the formalism, while remaining aware of the limits of any such analogies.
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