- #36
hypnagogue
Staff Emeritus
Science Advisor
Gold Member
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Russ, you seem to be employing an evaluation of moral codes by reference to their social utility: If moral code X works, i.e. if X is empirically shown to be beneficial to society, then it is established to be 'true' (in some sense). This is the descriptive component of morality. But even though there exists a descriptive component, I have to agree with Tom that it's not really a moral code unless it also has a prescriptive component. In and of itself, observing that adherence to moral code X benefits society is really no different from observing any fact of nature. For instance, we could just as well observe that the Earth orbits the sun, and certainly there is no morality in that phenomenon one way or the other.
To transition from observation of facts to a system of morality requires an additional argument that I don't think you've yet made explicit. That additional argument would be something like this:
1. Moral code X benefits society;
2. Anything that benefits society, broadly speaking, is to be valued, is good;
3. We should strive to bring about goodness in the world;
4. Therefore, we should adhere to moral code X.
That's certainly a noble argument, and one we would be wise to pay credence to, for our own collective good. However, I think the nature of the argument invalidates any hope for establishing some system of morality as somehow describing objective facts about the world. Built into this argument is an implicit evaluation of goodness, an implicit value system. Values like these, I think, are clearly idiosyncratic creations in the minds of humans rather than some objective facet of nature.
Think of it this way: If someone were to systematically disagree with you about the goodness of those things you valued, what objective criterion could you turn to in order to settle the debate? Certainly you couldn't refer to social utility and so on, as that would be circular. I don't think you could objectively settle this debate any more than you could objectively settle a debate over whether broccoli tastes good or not. There is no fact of the matter as to whether broccoli is delicious or disgusting; its gustatory 'goodness' can only be evaluated on a case-by-case basis within the domains of individual, subjective tastes. The same is true for all values in general, I think; it's just that it's much more difficult to find someone who thinks e.g. that pain and suffering is to be valued than it is to find someone who thinks broccoli does or doesn't taste good. We humans do seem to have a relatively stable and conserved set of core values built into us, which can create the illusion of universal, context-free, objective and absolute truth. But in the end, to me at least, it is still an illusion.
Just to be clear, btw: I think morality is to be valued and people should strive to act morally and so on; I just think there is no truly objective or absolute basis for this imperative. But nor do I think there needs to be one.
To transition from observation of facts to a system of morality requires an additional argument that I don't think you've yet made explicit. That additional argument would be something like this:
1. Moral code X benefits society;
2. Anything that benefits society, broadly speaking, is to be valued, is good;
3. We should strive to bring about goodness in the world;
4. Therefore, we should adhere to moral code X.
That's certainly a noble argument, and one we would be wise to pay credence to, for our own collective good. However, I think the nature of the argument invalidates any hope for establishing some system of morality as somehow describing objective facts about the world. Built into this argument is an implicit evaluation of goodness, an implicit value system. Values like these, I think, are clearly idiosyncratic creations in the minds of humans rather than some objective facet of nature.
Think of it this way: If someone were to systematically disagree with you about the goodness of those things you valued, what objective criterion could you turn to in order to settle the debate? Certainly you couldn't refer to social utility and so on, as that would be circular. I don't think you could objectively settle this debate any more than you could objectively settle a debate over whether broccoli tastes good or not. There is no fact of the matter as to whether broccoli is delicious or disgusting; its gustatory 'goodness' can only be evaluated on a case-by-case basis within the domains of individual, subjective tastes. The same is true for all values in general, I think; it's just that it's much more difficult to find someone who thinks e.g. that pain and suffering is to be valued than it is to find someone who thinks broccoli does or doesn't taste good. We humans do seem to have a relatively stable and conserved set of core values built into us, which can create the illusion of universal, context-free, objective and absolute truth. But in the end, to me at least, it is still an illusion.
Just to be clear, btw: I think morality is to be valued and people should strive to act morally and so on; I just think there is no truly objective or absolute basis for this imperative. But nor do I think there needs to be one.
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