The Role of Philosophy in Science: Separating Fact from Fiction

[metacristi]

metacristi, thanks for your reply and sharing your thoughts with us...

regards
marlon

Thanks marlon.What I forgot to add is that in any case the epistemological problems that still exist are enough to advocate pure relativism...

By the way if you are interested at least by the philosophy of science try this very good site (I do not entirely agree with Hugo Holbling-but it is an excellent site):

http://www.eblaforum.org/main/viewforum.php?f=13

[We 'reconciled' on another site,by the way,if you read what I've written here and there :-) ]

all the best

metacristi

 

[Clausius2]

Anybody wants a proof?

Here are the titles of the last threads published in the General Philosophy Forum:


- time and consciousness
- What is the purpose of Life ?
- What if we are all wrong ?
- Universe is expanding?
- Natural Law
- Does Our Creator Have A Creator Itself?
- cloning human--pros and cons
- Do you believe in Destiny?
- What is energy?
- Are we ever in the present time?
- Does it require a god to create the physics rule?

NONE of that questions can be answered by a classic philosopher. He does not have knowledge about the reality as a physicist, chemist, mathematician, biologist, physician, and engineer have. In past times, a philosopher could answer those questions. Nowadays his words are not worth of listening.

The reality is constructed by geometrical figures and mathematical signs (as Galileo Galilei said once). If you don't have knowledge about that, please give your opinion just only inside the toilet.

 

[humanino]

Thus it is safer to talk of different degrees of confidence (of scientists) in different programmes than to talk of a clear difference between science and pseudo-science (Laudan even talk of the impossibility to make a clear difference in front of the existing problems).

I very much agree with this statement. However,

For example scientists have a greater degree of confidence in GR than in,let's say,the standard inflationary theory

right, but we are also aware that GR probably owes its elegance to a coincidence. GR might very well not be "true" only efficient, and this is very different (and unfortunate, when one thinks the way Albert did : his marvelous insight would fail !)

...a greater degree of confidence in the standard inflationary theory than in Guth's M[ulti]verse theory (making reference to the existence of different physical laws in other universes or not).

IMHU, Guth's Multiverse is not even classified in science !

 

[marlon]

I feel sad. I think most of physicists consider they serve philosophy first. Philosophy without science is masturbation of the mind. We experimentalist try to figure out which road can lead us to the outside of Plato's cave.

I want to add that most physicists I know are well educated and respectable persons, eager to learn about philosophy. As for myself, I am meeting on thursday a philosophy student friend of mine, both of us have much considerations for the other's occupation. We were together studying math in kindergarden He wants to discuss his views on relativity, and I intend to deepenth my understanding of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason".

Remember the beginning of the century : philosophers were aware of and understanding the current open problems of physics. Louis de Broglie himself was only Maurice's little brother, and Louis first wanted to go for litterature. Today, philosophers are not afraid of claiming "I do not get it at all ! No matter..." when it comes to quantum stuff. This is very sad.

Hi Humanino, it's been a while, thanks for the reply. However I share a different view than yours. In my opinion the philosophy of science can only be done by the very scientists that construct the very theoretical models which describe nature. I have been reading posts containing an "expensive" vocabularium, yet they don't say anything real. The point i want to make is that philosophers (let's say 99,9% of them) tend to invent some field of study and then claim to be experts in it. Just read the post in which selfAdjoint replyed to cogito. It contains many over-considerations on stuff like implications and empirical laws. Basically those semi-scientists just keep on twisting facts and replacing them into a different perspective so that the actual value is totally lost. We work with real facts and experimental backup. You know, i hate the discussions in which philosophers state that QM for example is not well understood because of the probabilistic nature or the measurement problems (you know decoherence and so on). I am not denying these problems, but the point is they tend to approach these subjects in the wrong non-scientific way. People shouldn't say QM isn't exact or inaccurate because of these very specific reasons. I mean, they do trust the electronics
they use every day : computers, and so on... Even QM saves lives in the medical industry, just look at the MRI-instruments which are broadly used there...

regards
marlon

 

[marlon]

Multiverse is not even classified in science !

Beware of statements concerning multi-universes. They are just a way of interpreting the results of QM. They certainly do not belong to philosophy, they belong to QM.

marlon

 

[jcsd]

Interesting. So, you think that the subject of ethics over the last couple thousand years contains very little of value?

False. I've made it clear that I'm talking about the modern academic subject.

 

[metacristi]

I very much agree with this statement. However,
right, but we are also aware that GR probably owes its elegance to a coincidence. GR might very well not be "true" only efficient, and this is very different (and unfortunate, when one thinks the way Albert did : his marvelous insight would fail !)

Having 'confidence' in no way means dropping fallibilism...

IMHU, Guth's Multiverse is not even classified in science !

marlon is right when says that scientists themselves are the most entitled to say what is science and what's not.If you'll ask Guth or Linde (or a leading cosmologist) they will say that it is science,the most promising existing program...only that it fails,at least momentarily,to comply to all the popperian requirements.But,as Guth says very well in his 'The inflationary Universe',who can say that it will never exist at least more logical reasons in favor of Multiverse theory (even accepting that the predictions involving other universes will never be corroborated)?

After all we make from the good beginning the difference between realism and epistemological/ontological idealism entirely on logical grounds (as Russell points well in his 'The problems of philosophy' (you can find it also online).Unfortunately the rigid heuristic you are intrinsically implying does not justify entirely scientific practice,as history proves,and moreover falsificationism has big logical problems (the theory ladeness problem,weak and strong underdeterminism and so on).

 

[ZapperZ]

But wasn't the "real" scientists those with logical and quantifiable theories? It seems that "real" scientists should conduct their experiment based on gut feeling and majority opinion? Is this the additional knowledge that physicists have that philosophers of science don't?

I find it amazing that scientists willingly reveal this ignorance. And not only that, in their arrogance take pride in this fact. And that at the same time that a whole generation physicists/psychologists/economists/biologists have in reality abandoned the old paradigm. Don't you see the need to establish new improved criteria for science, where the old criteria is a subset?

Y'know, I wish you'd stop associating what I wrote with what you are trying to bash others with.

We don't take pride in the fact that we are not aware of the epistemiology of what we do. It is just that it is obvious that such knowledge plays no role in our function! That's a FACT! You seem to have twisted what I wrote into something else.

And we didn't abandon any "paradigm". The ultimate paradigm is still intact - that Nature is the only source that dictates what we listen to, as stated by Glashow. And since when are "old paradigm" should be obeyed to perpetually? Who made such rules?

Can you point out, for example, in the discovery of high-Tc superconductors, where exactly is the instance where following "old paradigm" of the philosophy of science played a role? I mean, we are all here simply blowing things based on vague generalities. Let's stop pussyfooting around and look at specific examples. I had almost a front-row seat to the discovery and development of high-Tc superconductors. I want to know WHERE exactly (i) philosphy of science played a role and (ii) did the physicists involved aware of the epistemiology of what they were doing and the philosophical implications.

Philosphy of science is useful for those outside science to have some graps on the meaning of what scientists do? Sure, I might be persuaded to buy that concept. But is it consciously practiced within science, or within physics in particular? I would unhesitantly say no. Show me what you think is the epistemiology we should follow, and I will show you examples in science where it isn't followed. Your insistence that we all should learn, understand, and follow some "old paradigm" of a philosophy of science, IN SPITE of the fact that we have continued to do science successfully without it, sounds rather hollow.

Zz.

 

[jcsd]

What you said in your statements above seems to say something similar to that situation. The empirical methods science relies on everyday were worked out by philosophizing humans, some of whom were scientifically experimenting too. I don't believe anyone is saying scientists need to study philosophy. Why should anyone if they don't want to? Mostly we are talking about (or are supposed to be) the potential value of a philosophy area at PF, and in that respect I'd say the philosophy side of our discussion has been supporting the value of thinking about thinking.

I hope we aren't talking about a "class" of people, but rather a human endeavor. I am not a "philosopher," I am a human being who, among other things, finds it valuable to understand the reasons behind why we do what we do, or why it is something like empirical thinking "works." Why? Often a general principle can be taken from specific things that "work," and applied to other things.

So some people prefer to think about developing technologies or understanding the physical nature of reality, and others like to think about what kind of thinking can help in that regard (as well as in other areas of human thought). Is there any inherent reason we need to be at odds over this?

That's the entire point though isn't it, you seem to have a false idea of the relationship between philosphy and science. Scientists in general are not remotely interested in what your modern philsopher has to say, they do not regard him as an authority on empircal methods, they regard scientists as the authority in that area (after they develop these methods and empriricism should be devloped empirically). So while they ceratinly do philosphize on empricism etc, this philsophizing does not contribute to the scientifc process.

 

[marlon]

Unfortunately the rigid heuristic you are intrinsically implying does not justify entirely scientific practice,as history proves,and moreover falsificationism has big logical problems (the theory ladeness problem,weak and strong underdeterminism and so on).

Concepts like undeterminism are of no value in the development of real science. Look, what i am trying to say is that philosophy is a "field of study" that uses these vague terms in order to criticize the way real science evolves and is developed. I really don't see the need for such an approach. I have been reading lot's of nice terms like this underterminism, yet where is the use. I am asking for some real explanations yet i have never received them. Talking in a posh meaningless language is very easy. Ofcourse in physics for example there are a lot of difficult terms referring to all kinds of processes or definitions. the big difference is that these terms have a real practical value and they help us advance as a species. This is why i say that physics, mathematics, biology ,... are real sciences and philosophy is NOT. This implies that philosophy CANNOT judge real science, only real science itself can. So if you want to use the term philosophy then it needs to be stated that only real scientists can philosophy on real science...

regards
marlin

 

[metacristi]

marlon

Is it so?No one claims that philosophy is a science but the basics of science lie in philosophy (epistemology) no matter if we want it or not.To call something knowledge needs justification,sufficient reasons if possible.The problem is not how conjectures are 'discovered' (everything goes) but how to justify them (as being knowledge).It is the epistemology which deals with this at the most basic level,a part of philosophy.Finally all scientific theories are sets of enunciations + (very often) a mathematical formalism needing scrutiny using (at least) formal logic (for we expect nature to be non contradictory-one of the basic axioms of science is that nature can be understood).

Now it is true that the most appropriate to be philosophers of science are scientists themselves due to the huge specialization we witness (we are far from the time of Hume,Descartes or Kant when philosophy and science were more or less united).But this does not really change the essence of the problem,they criticize science as...philosophers.

As regarding the alleged 'inutility' of underdetermination well probably you have not read too much on philosophy of science.I do not intend to teach here,there is a rich literature,I'll only say few words.Even if we talk only in terms of pure pragmatism,science 'works'.

Duhem's thesis (weak underdetermination) clearly shows the weaknesses of falsificationism,the popperian version,we can falsify only groups of premises.We have to renounce at least at one of the premises,but often scientists reject only some auxiliary premises,the core of a theory remaining intact.It is rather rare when single enunciations or whole theries can be soundly,unequivocally,falsified.In other words not only we do not have sufficient reasons to think that the 'branch' we are following now will ever be 'progressive','successful',but also there are no good reasons to think that other 'branches',potentially more fecund,do not exist.

Indeed even the results of experiments are mere interpretations,based on auxiliary premises,so we might even corroborate many predictions before arriving at a deadlock,when no further 'breakthrough' is possible.In such cases we have to return at a 'lower level',possible renouncing altoghether even at some theoretical entities which we considered previously as fecund,thought as indirectly verified to exist.So we could even have the surprise to see that some conjectures,considered previously as non reasonable,are in fact the science of tomorrow (in the sense of being the most successful programmes).

On the other hand the possibility of strong (quinean) underdetermination shows that basically no one of the currently accepted scientific enunciations have their place assured forever,in the standard of knowledge of science.Basically nothing can be 'reliable verified'.

This is important if we refer at a scientific method for it does make rational to pursue,sometimes,ad hoc programmes as the first choice (at least so they seem at a certain moment because do not comply to all requirements of the popperian heuristic).

And even to consider them as giving us fallible scientific knowledge sometimes in case of 'natural' candidates.Exactly this is the case of the Multiverse hypothesis (with other universes having different laws) where we base also on the objective interpretation of probability,widely used in science.Indeed there are different levels of ad hocness,we can still make a logical difference among them,though no empirical difference is possible.

In the light shed by the lessons of history,the difficulties of falsificationism (this does not mean we have to renounce it) and the situation at the borders of science I think it's safer to talk of different degrees of confidence in our theories instead of talking of scientific and metaphysical programmes.

Of course the programmes which fully comply at certain moment to all popperian requirements are to have priority but in any case is it justified to call the other approaches as being non reasonable (I assume that they have internal consistency and also power of explanation).As matter of fact scientists should follow other paths,as secondary choices,even in the periods of the so caled 'normal science' instead of only trying to accommodate the existing puzzles within the existing paradigm,being a maverick is not at all a sign of being not serious.Of course as much as no claim of epistemological priority is made (without proper justification).

 

[ZapperZ]

I think there is a clear cultural difference here as can be seen in the current style of interactons. For example:

Duhem's thesis (weak underdetermination) clearly shows the weaknesses of falsificationism,the popperian version,we can falsify only groups of premises.We have to renounce at least at one of the premises,but often scientists reject only some auxiliary premises,the core of a theory remaining intact.It is rather rare when single enunciations can be soundly,unequivocally,falsified.In other words we have no certitude that the 'branch' we are following now will ever be 'progressive','successful' and that other 'branches',potentially more fecund,do not exist.

For many of us who are "philosophically-challenged" (I refer to me in particular), such descriptions are rather vague because they involve a lot of linguistic gymnastics. May I suggest that each time one tries to make a point, that one illustrates such a point with a specific, concrete example? I mean, in science and math, we illustrates a principle via an example, simply because the principle or idea itself cannot be well-understood until it is applied to a particular situation. Thus, if one claims

"...clearly shows the weaknesses of falsificationism,the popperian version,we can falsify only groups of premises.We have to renounce at least at one of the premises,but often scientists reject only some auxiliary premises,the core of a theory remaining intact.

... can we at least illustrate this with an example? What particular area of physics did this happen? Are we referring to the "falsification" of Newtonian laws, for example, where we now realize the boundary of applicability of such concepts? Without such example, these things are mere words (confusing words too) without justification that such point of view is even valid.

Zz.

 

[arildno]

ZapperZ makes an important observation here:
While the "groups/clusters of premises"-argument has a certain intuitive appeal, it really has no justification unless you can come up some concrete example.

 

[metacristi]

Zapper Z

Well history of science has enough examples,we interpret facts via theory,auxiliary enunciations.One of them is that given by Duhem itself with the Foucault's apparatus which supported the wave theory and apparently refuted the particle theory.At the time this experiment was seen as a sound falsification but we know now that it is not so.Another very well known example is with Copernicus' theory which seemed rejected by the common sense observation (counting at the time as a scientific observation,using Mill's methods) that the Sun rotates around Earth.Well we cannot merely decree that such things are impossible from now on.As I said to falsifiy a theory is extermely difficult as Kuhn observed once.Honestly your question 'hint' that you have not read anything on the post popperian philosophy of science.You should,there is Kuhn,Lakatos,Feyerabend and so on,even the supporters of the inductivist program.For philosophy of science has gone way above the 'naive falsificationism' of Popper without actually renouncing at falsificationism (this does not stop me to have him as my preferred philosopher od science).

 

[ZapperZ]

Zapper Z

Well history of science has enough examples,we interpret facts via theory,auxiliary enunciations.One of them is that given by Duhem itself with the Foucault's apparatus which supported the wave theory and apparently refuted the particle theory.At the time this experiment was seen as a sound falsification but we know now that it is not so.Another very well known example is with Copernicus' theory which seemed rejected by the common sense observation (counting at the time as a scientific observation,using Mill's methods) that the Sun rotates around Earth.Well we cannot merely decree that such things are impossible from now on.As I said to falsifiy a theory is extermely difficult as Kuhn observed once.Honestly your question 'hint' that you have not read anything on the post popperian philosophy of science.You should,there is Kuhn,Lakatos,Feyerabend and so on,even the supporters of the inductivist program.For philosophy of science has gone way above the 'naive falsificationism' of Popper without actually renouncing at falsificationism (this does not stop me to have him as my preferred philosopher od science).

Maybe I don't read things very well, but I am having a bit of a problem trying to understand your point.

Well history of science has enough examples,we interpret facts via theory,auxiliary enunciations.One of them is that given by Duhem itself with the Foucault's apparatus which supported the wave theory and apparently refuted the particle theory.At the time this experiment was seen as a sound falsification but we know now that it is not so.

Refresh my memory. "Wave theory" of what? What is "waving" that the "Foucault's apparatus" is measuring?

Another very well known example is with Copernicus' theory which seemed rejected by the common sense observation (counting at the time as a scientific observation,using Mill's methods) that the Sun rotates around Earth.Well we cannot merely decree that such things are impossible from now on.As I said to falsifiy a theory is extermely difficult as Kuhn observed once.

Er... "common sense observation" need not correspond to "scientific observation". What exactly is the thing that we "cannot merely decree that such things are impossible from now on"? We cannot decree that the concept of the sun rotating around the Earth is impossible? I find that rather odd. Does this mean at some point, someone is going to make a better measurement to prove that the sun DOES orbit the earth?

Honestly your question 'hint' that you have not read anything on the post popperian philosophy of science.You should,there is Kuhn,Lakatos,Feyerabend and so on,even the supporters of the inductivist program.For philosophy of science has gone way above the 'naive falsificationism' of Popper without actually renouncing at falsificationism (this does not stop me to have him as my preferred philosopher od science).

I'm not sure how my "suggestion" in my previous posting hinted at anything. I asked that you illustrate your point with concrete examples that I can understand as a physicist. I am not trained as a philosopher. However, since we ARE talking about "philosophy of science", it is imperative that any philosophical ideas be based on actually scientific examples. Is this not a reasonable request? I wasn't defending nor questioning any particular philosophical ideas, as apparently what you seem to think I was doing.

Ironically, if you think that philosphy of science has gone way above "naive falsificationism" of Popper, I would also say that "science" has gone way above and beyond Copernicus and other classical physics examples. So let's pick more "recent" scientific examples, or at least out of 20th Century physics.

Zz.

 

[Aquamarine]

There has been no serious answers to my questions. I will post them again and include somewhat more concrete questions since the critiques seem unaware of even the problems presented. For those asking for examples, they are relevant in all of science. That many scientists answer them with gut feeling and majority opinion is not a solution, just ignorance similar to giving God as an answer to all questions.

Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ (See critical evaluation)

What is the answer to the problem of induction?
What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?
What is the justification for assuming that current physical laws will continue to function the same way in the future? Or that they will function in different place from where tested? How is the limits of generalization decided?

What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?
What are the ultimate statements that provide justification for all other statements?

What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?
Why is a theory ever abandoned, it is always possible to resurrect any theory by adding ad hoc exceptions?

 

[Les Sleeth]

That's the entire point though isn't it, you seem to have a false idea of the relationship between philosphy and science. Scientists in general are not remotely interested in what your modern philsopher has to say, they do not regard him as an authority on empircal methods, they regard scientists as the authority in that area (after they develop these methods and empriricism should be devloped empirically). So while they ceratinly do philosphize on empricism etc, this philsophizing does not contribute to the scientifc process.

No, I definitely do not think that is even remotely the point. I think the issues of this debate need to be made more clear. I read what one side says and it seems irrelevant to what the other side is pointing out.

This little war originally got going because I offered a debate. From my side of it, I wanted defend the potential value of the philosophy section here at PF to be beneficial to members, and not as a necessary to practicing science!

To be clear: I have not said nor do I believe philosophical concerns should be involved in the practice of science. That would be a disaster! (Doesn’t that seem a bit too close to those days of the Church’s interference?) I don’t know how that got to be part of the discussion because I don’t believe any philosopher type here would suggest such a thing. The only connection I see is not to on-going science, but to science students who might be interested in learning the history of thought that led to the empirical method.

Beyond that I’ve said that the philosophy area at PF could be helpful in encouraging participants to think more empirically (and I don’t mean established scientists!) if the PF staff were committed to that.

Okay, so scientists should be free to practice empiricism unfettered by philosophy. Throw the silly idea of interference or participation by philosophers in scientific research out of the debate.

If it isn’t inside the laboratory where philosophical issues arise, where might they? Well, I say it is outside of the laboratory and in the social situations where we all live, including scientists. Take a look at where the most posts are at PF and you will see it is in General Discussion, with Politics being a big chunk of that. In the main index, after General Physics at 56k is General philosophy at 29k posts. (By the way, would you suggest getting rid of General Discussion and Politics since they are not “exact sciences”?)

What that says to me is that people are attracted to PF not just because of the science they can learn and teach, but they also because they are thinking about what goes on in the world, why they are alive, how to be happy, what “truth” is, is war ever justified, should teenage lovers be accused of rape, how to find a girl/boy friend . . .

It is a good thing to have people come to a science site looking for answers, even if some of the questions science can’t directly answer. In my opinion, when trying to think, it is always better to want whatever facts are available. In contrast to that approach to thinking, do a Google search on philosophy sites that are available for someone and you will see there are many choices. Much of the discussion that goes on is ghastly, with little if any reference to facts about how reality works.

In addition to the everyday matters of living (which I think is what most people ponder) I believe there are also a couple of huge philosophical issues up for grab in the world arena. Metacristi has mentioned the idea of “epistemological privilege,” and the idea of scientism dogma. The questions involved there are no less than a battle for the mind of humanity (or an important part of it).

Some say empiricism can reveal all revealable truths about reality. Because science so far only has given us physical facts, many conclude existence is entirely physical. I feel safe saying that most of the science thinkers at this site are of that physicalist opinion.

But there problems with the theory, one of which is explaining the presence of consciousness in the universe (we humans). Now, devoted physicalists may assert they will get the answer one day, just give them time. But some of us counter that claim by saying their faith is due to already believing physicalistically, not because there is enough encouragement from the evidence yet to believe consciousness is purely physical.

Meanwhile, the human world is watching and listening. In an issue of Scientific American, Michael Shermer, writing in his regular column Skeptic, pointed out that, “being the Age of Science, it is scientism’s shamans who command our veneration.” Yet while people are listening to science specials on TV, the vast majority are also going to church at other times.

So what is the truth about creation, and our presence here? Can science really answer all the knowable questions, or is there “something more”? If you look at some of the best debates we’ve had in philosophy area at PF, in my opinion it is that issue of physicalism versus “something more.” Maybe the scientism devotees here want to get rid of everyone who questions empiricism’s claim to epistemological privilege. But even if they do, the question will still be a most important one for humanity.

Should we let it be fought out only at rationalistic philosophy sites, pseudoscience sites, in local bars? Or can we provide a format here where intelligent people who disagree can argue such controversial subjects with facts, and within standards of sound debating rules?

 

[Aquamarine]

Les Sleeth, I agree with what you are saying. But a large problem is that many of the questions that most concern humans like happiness, relationships, money and welfare cannot be studied if one follows Popper's paradigm. It is usually impossible to conduct falsifiable, controlled experiments in evolutionary psychology or macro economics. Using the criteria for science advocated by some here, these questions cannot be answered. It essentially removes physics, chemistry and some medicine from the rest of world, leaving other areas to be decided by instincts or chance.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Les Sleeth, I agree with what you are saying. But a large problem is that many of the questions that most concern humans like happiness, relationships, money and welfare cannot be studied if one follows Popper's paradigm. It is usually impossible to conduct falsifiable, controlled experiments in evolutionary psychology or macro economics. Using the criteria for science advocated by some here, these questions cannot be answered. It essentially removes physics, chemistry and some medicine from the rest of world, leaving other areas to be decided by instincts or chance.

I have to admit I am not quite sure of your stance in all this, so if my answer isn't a good fit to what you mean, then that is why.

If your point is that falsifiability is not a standard that can be applied to all areas of humanity science wants to investigate, then I would agree. I would say just contribute what facts are possible, and then do the best we can do figuring out how something "works" that is unavailable to falsification.

But I would also add that it isn't necessarily true that all aspects of existence can be scrutinized by science whether falsification is part of it or not. I am content for science to look at consciousness, for instance, and tell me what it sees, and to also have it be there is "something more" there which science can't see. Science can do what it can do, and what it can't answer I'll look elsewhere for that.

 

[metacristi]

Maybe I don't read things very well, but I am having a bit of a problem trying to understand your point.



Refresh my memory. "Wave theory" of what? What is "waving" that the "Foucault's apparatus" is measuring?



Er... "common sense observation" need not correspond to "scientific observation". What exactly is the thing that we "cannot merely decree that such things are impossible from now on"? We cannot decree that the concept of the sun rotating around the Earth is impossible? I find that rather odd. Does this mean at some point, someone is going to make a better measurement to prove that the sun DOES orbit the earth?



I'm not sure how my "suggestion" in my previous posting hinted at anything. I asked that you illustrate your point with concrete examples that I can understand as a physicist. I am not trained as a philosopher. However, since we ARE talking about "philosophy of science", it is imperative that any philosophical ideas be based on actually scientific examples. Is this not a reasonable request? I wasn't defending nor questioning any particular philosophical ideas, as apparently what you seem to think I was doing.

Ironically, if you think that philosphy of science has gone way above "naive falsificationism" of Popper, I would also say that "science" has gone way above and beyond Copernicus and other classical physics examples. So let's pick more "recent" scientific examples, or at least out of 20th Century physics.

Zz.

Well what can I say more other than elegantly advise you to read directly what Duhem,Kuhn,Lakatos and Feyerabend have to say...I am not a teacher and anyway it is not my goal to teach here.All I can tell you is that,indeed, they have strong reasons for their views.All unbiased researches into the subject can easily see this (having also the necessary baggage of philosophical knowledge of course).We are wasting our time,honestly.

Not that I agree entirely with them,no I have my own vision somewhere between Lakatos and Feyerabend.That is I still support the 'method' stance,nonwithstanding that a minimal method,the 'reliabilist' account does vindicate such a view (based on fecundity,the fact that new paradigms does unite facts considered previously as unconnected and not lastly the fact that the vast majority of accepted knowledge inferred using Mill's methods are very stable in time).In other words I advocate the view that we are still having,currently at least,more 'positive' reasons (including purely logical ones) pro method though only a very flexible one.

This in spite of the fact that nontrivial changes do occur,we have clear historical examples,sometimes even contradicting scientific knowledge inferred using the most reliable 'tool' we have had so far,namely Mill's methods.Empiricism alone might be not enough but,as I said,we still have more positive reasons to prefer a 'weak' form of realism and generally to grant a fallible epistemological privilege to a (minimal) method stance.

The reality is that science (no matter the account of the method minimal or not,falsificationist or inductivist) is not the unassailable monolith in which some like to believe,it is merely our best 'tool' so far to make sense of the observed realities.Moreover the strong,popperian,fallibilism has problems,this is long ago accepted by all serious philosophers of science.At most we are entitled to talk of a weak form of fallibilism,but I'd rather talk only of the capacity of theories to make novel predictions apart from accomodating all existing anomalies and,preferably,existing 'puzzles'.Finally if the hypothetico-deductive method were so compelling then no would still bother now to revitalize the old inductivist account.Not successful yet,so far at least.

 

[ZapperZ]

Well what can I say more other than elegantly advise you to read directly what Duhem,Kuhn,Lakatos and Feyerabend have to say...I am not a teacher and anyway it is not my goal to teach here.All I can tell you is that,indeed, they have strong reasons for their views.All unbiased researches into the subject can easily see this (having also the necessary baggage of philosophical knowledge of course).We are wasting our time,honestly.

Not that I agree entirely with them,no I have my own vision somewhere between Lakatos and Feyerabend.That is I still support the 'method' stance,nonwithstanding that a minimal method,the 'reliabilist' account does vindicate such a view (based on fecundity,the fact that new paradigms does unite facts considered previously as unconnected and not lastly the fact that the vast majority of accepted knowledge inferred using Mill's methods are very stable in time).In other words I advocate the view that we are still having,currently at least,more 'positive' reasons (including purely logical ones) pro method though only a very flexible one.

This in spite of the fact that nontrivial changes do occur,we have clear historical examples,sometimes even contradicting scientific knowledge inferred using the most reliable 'tool' we have had so far,namely Mill's methods.Empiricism alone might be not enough but,as I said,we still have more positive reasons to prefer a 'weak' form of realism and generally to grant a fallible epistemological privilege to a (minimal) method stance.

The reality is that science is not the unassailable monolith in which some like to believe,it is merely our best 'tool' so far to make sense of the observed realities.Moreover the strong,popperian,fallibilism has problems,this is long ago accepted by all serious philosophers of science.At most we are entitled to talk of a weak form of fallibilism.Finally if the hypothetico-deductive method were so compelling then no would still bother now to revitalize the old inductivist account.Not successful yet,so far at least.

I'm sorry, but I don't think I am smart enough to decipher what you said, especially when you refuse to include concrete examples to illustrate what you are trying to get across. So I won't take up anymore of your time.

Zz.

 

[metacristi]

I'm sorry, but I don't think I am smart enough to decipher what you said, especially when you refuse to include concrete examples to illustrate what you are trying to get across. So I won't take up anymore of your time.

Zz.

Fair.But ignorance alone never justify a stance,though.I have never claimed I am 'smart',I only presented some of the results in the philosophy of science and some purely personal views which,it happens,due to my lack of proficiency in english I'm sure,you cannot understand from my account.Period.Thus I invited you elegantly to read some primary sources directly in english.This is the best way for you to understand better,simply contradicting me without really understanding is of no use.For both.

all the best

metacristi

 

[jcsd]

No, I definitely do not think that is even remotely the point. I think the issues of this debate need to be made more clear. I read what one side says and it seems irrelevant to what the other side is pointing out.

I'm not syaing scinec is the be all and end all, what I am saying is that philsophy is highly subjective, and because it is so subjective I see no objective great difference between a professor of philsophy and an armchair philospher like Rab C. Nesbitt ( obscure refernce to an incomphrenhisble Scottish sitcom). I also wonder what the value is of much (though though as I said before not all) of the modern acadmeic study of philsophy.

 

[marlon]

Fair.But ignorance alone never justify a stance,though.I have never claimed I am 'smart',I only presented some of the results in the philosophy of science and some purely personal views which,it happens,due to my lack of proficiency in english I'm sure,you cannot understand from my account.Period.Thus I invited you elegantly to read some primary sources directly in english.This is the best way for you to understand better,simply contradicting me without really understanding is of no use.For both.

all the best

metacristi

Put the words of Zz in the right perspective. What he meant was that you need to be more clear. When reading your post i felt the same thing. I stated many times that it is real easy to take in expesive terms that can be interpreted in various ways. What is your point and what do you mean ? Explaining something difficult in difficult terms is easy
explaining something difficult in easy terms is difficult.

I am not saying the explanation cannot be difficult yet it needs to be clear and instructive, which most of the philosopher-posts are NOT.

regards
marlon

 

[Les Sleeth]

I'm not syaing scinec is the be all and end all, what I am saying is that philsophy is highly subjective, and because it is so subjective I see no objective great difference between a professor of philsophy and an armchair philospher like Rab C. Nesbitt ( obscure refernce to an incomphrenhisble Scottish sitcom). I also wonder what the value is of much (though though as I said before not all) of the modern acadmeic study of philsophy.

Your opinion that philosopohy is "highly subjective" may or may not be true depending on how philosophy is practiced. Over and above that I think there is a question about the value of subjectivity. If you are talking about being subject to the forces of past conditioning or one's own likes and dislikes, passions, mental defects, etc. then most of us agree that that sort of subjectivity is undesirable in the pursuit of knowledge.

But what about sincerity? Sincerity is a subjective property of consciousness, and anyone who lacks it cannot be trusted in epistomological endeavers whether scientific or philosophical. Just how much of our own being do we undervalue and remain ignorant of? Well, Socrates long ago suggested that knowing oneself is a path to wisdom. Does that really make any sense or was he just talking through his hat (or whatever they wore then)?

I wish we could throw out the term "philosophy" and just talk about what we want here at PF. If someone only wants to study the structure of the universe, I don't think anyone around here will object. But you must realize that the average person is thinking and wondering about other things. And if they are going to wonder, wouldn't it at least be nice to be able to encourage them to wonder with as many facts as possible, as well as not to wonder something for long which facts clearly contradict.

It is a great thing to see someone start to think more clearly, I love it. And I love the idea of a dedicated crew committed to that. The kicker is, to encourage such thinking you can't narrow people to only mechanistic stuff and that which can be proven beyond all doubt. Unless it is open, and more open than the hard core empiricist probably feels comfortable with, creative thinkers won't participate. Besides, as some have been pointing out lately even scientists don't mind entertaining a bit of science exotica such as time travel (which I personally believe is nonsense), bubbling multiple universes, computer consciousness . . .

The negative generalizations about philosophy I've heard over the last few days is a little discouraging to someone like me who does want to keep the traditional rationalistic approach of philosophy out of PF (the same thing you dislike), and who had hopes of gradually the turning the focus toward encouraging fact-based thinking and learning good logic. Oh well.

 

[russ_watters]

Just my $.02 (I'm not going to get into the nitty gritty of this): I participated in a long thread in another forum entitled "Is Science a Belief System?" You can imagine how it went, but what I got out of it was the thread starter, a philosopher, was bitter about the fact that much of what at one time was the domain of philosophy has been taken over by science. He perceived a conflict between the two, much like the science/religion conflict, over which discipline should be answering which questions. Like the science/religion conflict, its largely one sided: scientists don't care about such boundaries, they simply answer questions they can answer. As science progresses more questions can be answered, and the domain of science increases. Philosophers (some, not all) are fighting to keep a division that scienists don't even think exists. Its a battle only they are fighting and one they can't win.

Please do not construe this post as an attack on philosophy: as I said, the fight is largely one-sided. My personal opinion is that philosophy has a place, but the domain is shrinking (it will never disappear) as science progresses. Philosophers need to accept that.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Please do not construe this post as an attack on philosophy: as I said, the fight is largely one-sided. My personal opinion is that philosophy has a place, but the domain is shrinking (it will never disappear) as science progresses. Philosophers need to accept that.

I don't think anything you said is offensive. But I also don't believe you or anyone else I've been debating has really understood my point about philosophy either. I don't want to be disrespectful to academic philosphers who might be participating at PF, but I can't help but agree with you that traditional philosophy is not only shrinking, it's virtually dead. The traditional areas that are still relevant are logic, and the epistomological successes that helped establish empirical methods.

So I think the common complaint in this debate has been about the aspects of traditional philosophy which are now irrelevant. The thing is, I personally agree about that! So what the heck am I talking about then? I will try to find time in the next few days to start a new thread proposing a modernized philosophy that is more relevant to what we now know "works." I hope you and others disenchanted with philosophy will offer constructive opinions about it.

 

[misogynisticfeminist]

I may not know much philosophy nor much of science but here's what I think of the whole issue.

I personally don't think that philsophy should intrude on the basic scientific method and should not be involved in the forumulation of any scientific theory. I don't think that that is in the realm of philosophy, and i only think that philosophy should come into play only when after a theory is formulated and then philosophy comes in and puts in place what this theory means for our existence and our place as human beings in the cosmos.

The thing also, which I find a little flawed in philosophy is that logic is often mistaken as intuition. The scientific method is indeed an intuitive one, the process of doing the calculus, the math, the experimentation is definitely and intuitive one, but the conclusions may not always be so. Things such as QM especially, it tells me alot, that there is indeed a certain part of the cosmos which are simply not part of our understanding (ie. intuition).

Which is why i see the physical sciences as a better link to the secrets of our universe, it is because that it is hardly bound by the limits of our experiences and current perceptions of reality. It sounds abit on the positivist side, but I'm not advocating that the physical sciences is an entirely objective pursuit.

Of course, I'm not discounting the usefulness of philosophy, I'm saying that as much as the physical sciences is not all-encompassing, neither is philosophy. And as much as the physical sciences does a pretty decent job in telling us about why a ball moves the way it does, philosophy too tells us about the meaning of our life here, among others.

And neither do I think that just because philosophy disagrees among itself a fair bit, it does not mean that it is not an entirely reliable study either. I believe that all of us as scientists one way or another, we live with a certain amount of uncertainty in our life, and realize that we don't know the answers to everything.

therefore, i don't think that philosophy should dictate how stuff actually works, but rather provide meaning to the answers which the physical sciences have given.

 

[marlon]

Thanks for your reply miso...

marlon

 

[Ivan Seeking]

This is your philosophy
Critical Point: April 2002

When Physics World ran a special poll last year to find out how physicists think philosophically, more than 500 readers replied. Here are the results.

Everybody - including scientists - makes seat-of-the-pants practical judgements about what's real and what's not. The common-sense assumptions underlying these judgements can be unrecognized, inconsistent and even untenable; they can be home-grown, inherited and absorbed from others. But when someone is engaged in an activity as complex as science, it is almost impossible to avoid making such practical judgements. No matter how implicit and readily revised these judgements may be, they are based on preconceptions of what the world consists of and what the world's most important distinctions and categories are - in other words of how it all hangs together. [continued with results]

http://physicsweb.org/articles/world/15/4/2/1

 

[ZapperZ]

http://physicsweb.org/articles/world/15/4/2/1

Except that there is ONE important factor that is left out - that the "seat of the pants" and other methods of figuring out what to do does NOT necessarily equate to what is eventually excepted! Each one of us pursue the line of inquiry or reasoning based on what we perceive to be correct. During the process of inquiry of something that is not yet known, there can be MANY lines of inquiry. The mechanism of high-Tc superconductor is a prime example. There are groups that are pursuing magnetism/spin fluctuations as the leading candidate, while other are pushing for phonons. There are groups that are pointing to "stripes", while others are sticking by BCS-like mechanisms, etc. Things like these are NOT uncommon on a research front area.

However, the final acceptance and consensus are NOT based on preferences, "seat of the pants" decisions, inherited ideas, preconceptions, etc. Nature still is the ultimate dictator, and this is independent of one's preconception or philosphy on anything.

Zz.

 

[hypnagogue]

However, the final acceptance and consensus are NOT based on preferences, "seat of the pants" decisions, inherited ideas, preconceptions, etc. Nature still is the ultimate dictator, and this is independent of one's preconception or philosphy on anything.

I think you are talking here more about the development of theory whereas the article talks more of ontological interpretation of theory. Perhaps nature can dictate formulaic relationships to us fairly straightforwardly, but it can't dictate what these things mean on a deeper level. I imagine that 100% of physicists agree how to describe kinetic energy mathematically and the role that it plays in physical dynamics and so on, but apparently only 67% of the physicists polled for this article can venture to say that kinetic energy is 'real.' Thus, while the functional role of KE in physics may be beyond dispute, its ontological nature is undecided.

In general, every scientist should agree on the validity and utility of theoretical constructs that can accommodate existing empirical results and faithfully predict new ones, but not every scientist will agree on how to interpret what those theories are telling us about the 'ontological furniture' of reality. These kind of second order ontological interpretations, I believe, are the things that the article states are based on preferences, inherited ideas, etc.

 

[ZapperZ]

I think you are talking here more about the development of theory whereas the article talks more of ontological interpretation of theory. Perhaps nature can dictate formulaic relationships to us fairly straightforwardly, but it can't dictate what these things mean on a deeper level. I imagine that 100% of physicists agree how to describe kinetic energy mathematically and the role that it plays in physical dynamics and so on, but apparently only 67% of the physicists polled for this article can venture to say that kinetic energy is 'real.' Thus, while the functional role of KE in physics may be beyond dispute, its ontological nature is undecided.

In general, every scientist should agree on the validity and utility of theoretical constructs that can accommodate existing empirical results and faithfully predict new ones, but not every scientist will agree on how to interpret what those theories are telling us about the 'ontological furniture' of reality. These kind of second order ontological interpretations, I believe, are the things that the article states are based on preferences, inherited ideas, etc.

If you ask anyone this question "Is it impossible for me to take these pieces of a broken vase, throw it on the ground, and have it spontaneously reformed back into the orginal vase?", you will get the definite answer "Yes, it is impossible". But ask a physicist that question, and you will get "Improbable, but not impossible" as an answer.

Now, how does that related to that question you cited? This is because the question was asked to a bunch of physicists to related something that is well-defined (kinetic energy), to something that isn't ("real"). Philosphers LOVE things like this. They can talk about "real" and "reality" ad nauseum without needing to come to any kind of closure. We don't! When a philospher ask me if so-and-so is "real", I would be VERY hesitant to answer, because I have no idea what he/she means as "real". Would it be the same as what *I* would consider to be real as in qualitatively and quantitatively verfied?

Ask that question again to high school physics students, or even undergraduates, and you will probabily get a definite "Yes, KE is real!". When one doesn't know any better, it appears simplistic and obvious. However, when one learns a lot more and in detail, then even a vase that has been broken into a million pieces still has a chance to be reassembled back into the original object simply by throwing it onto the floor! The lack of an answer on the "reality" of KE isn't because "ontological nature is undecided", it is because it is a question that is vague and has no quantitative, testable value!

But here's the kicker! Even if you are correct, and that the ontological nature of KE is undecided, I will then ask "why does this matter"? It is obvous that physics can function AND work, without having the need to know such things. This is consistent with what I have been trying to say since the very beginning of this mess - that physicists and the working of physics are not in dire need to answer and address these things. It has worked without it. This is a fact, not a conjecture. Now maybe you, other philosphers, and the general public do. Then I would say, go at it!

Zz.

 

[Ivan Seeking]

I think you are talking here more about the development of theory whereas the article talks more of ontological interpretation of theory.

Implicit philosophies also play a large role in determining the next question asked; given what we "know" right now. The next question may be the most important question ever asked.

Also, right now, string theorists proceed on a philosophical, not an empirical basis.

Finally, this discussion is philosophical. Therefore philosophy plays a role in science.

 

[ZapperZ]

Implicit philosophies also play a large role in determining the next question asked; given what we "know" right now. The next question may be the most important question ever asked.

Also, right now, string theorists proceed on a philosophical, not an empirical basis.

Finally, this discussion is philosophical. Therefore philosophy plays a role in science.

I must be dense. Somehow, there is a big leap between "this discussion is philosophical" and "therefore, philosophy plays a role in science". I do not see a logical connection between these two statements.

Zz.