- #106
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
marlon said:
And Metacrista has given you some links to read that will be more clear. Has anyone read them?
The Role of Philosophy in Science: Separating Fact from Fiction
- Thread starter marlon
- Start date
In summary, the conversation revolves around the role of philosophy in relation to science, particularly in the context of the "semi-scientists" or philosophers. Some express anti-philosophy sentiment while others argue for the usefulness of philosophy in fields such as mathematics and string theory. The discussion also touches on the boundaries of philosophy and the consensus among real scientists.
And Metacrista has given you some links to read that will be more clear. Has anyone read them?
- #107
hypnagogue
Staff Emeritus
Science Advisor
Gold Member
- 2,285
- 3
ZapperZ said:
From the article: "Realism is the view that things in the world exist that are not of our own making - independent of human perception and thought - and that scientific theories are true if they faithfully correspond in some way to these things."
I haven't scoured the rest of the article to find a specific definition of "real," but from the definition of realism it seems safe to say that something is "real" if it exists independent of human thought and perception. So the question "is X real?" would seem to be just "does X exist 'out there,' or is it just a theoretical or perceptual construct 'in the head'?" It's unclear to me after browsing the article again whether the author actually defined the term 'real' in this way for his respondents, or just let them put their own spin on the word. Obviously if it was the latter, then we can't tell much from the poll results. But if it was the former, I think the term is well-defined enough to begin to tell us something legitimate about the physicists' varying ontological stances.
I don't get why you're so militant about this. I don't say that because I disagree with you, but rather because I completely agree! Physics is in no dire need to answer metaphysical questions, of course not (sounds rather obvious in those terms). Physics gets along fine without any major contributions from philosophy-- agreed. I'm not trying to point out a major flaw in physics or advocate a renovation of how it's done.
As to the question "why does it matter," the simple answer is that some people are curious and want to know what the world is like! Even if it doesn't matter a whit to the practical applications of quantum mechanics, some people are just genuinely curious to know what it all means for how the world is and how it works. Could it really be that something like the many worlds interpretation is true? Perhaps we can't conclusively answer such a question, but that doesn't necessarily make it uninteresting or not worth inquiring about.
- #108
metacristi
- 265
- 1
hypnagogue
Well the majority of the philosophers of science (by the way almost all have scientific training being physicists and so on at base) are no more so sure that the difference between science and metaphysics is so clear cut as Sir Karl thought once and how many scientists still believe even now.
The reality is that the history of science,what happens now at the frontiers of science and even logic itself have shown that popperian falsificationism is at least not satisfactory.Any unbiased course in philosophy of science point to this,presenting also the logical difficulties of falsificationism (as happened once with logical positivism-totally unsatisfactory on logical grounds).
Even if we accept the revised version of falsificationism,which require the unity of the theories (in the Ayer's sense,but without making any reference to weak 'verification' or meaning) we still have the problem of key unobservables in very successful otherwise scientific theories.
Even if we could 'verify' them somehow indirectly in a crucial experiment (of the type of that of Rutherford which finally convinced even physicists to accept the existence of atoms) we still have the problem of theory ladeness.
Logically it is still possible that some very fruitful otherwise theoretical concepts (such 'entities' are not testable in isolation) do not exist in reality.Thus is conceivable,as a possibility,that further developments would require to renounce at them altoghether in future theory making (not only at some minor attributes attached to them)!This 'mere' possibility (toghether with the possibility of Quinean underdetermination) and the Duhemian underdetermination (which is a fact in spite of some here failing to understand it's importance) is more than enough to not be able to talk of a clear demarcation between science and metaphysics.
Neither are we allowed to grant to a scientific method based on fallibilism and falsificationism (even methods going well beyond the mere popperian falsificationism) a perpetual epistemological privilege.Moreover if strong Quinean underdetermination (irrespective [of] data) were proved to be more than a mere possibility then we would not be even entitled to talk of epistemological privilege of science (based on fallibilism and intersubjectivity)...
Some feyerabendists take the strong underedetemination as granted by I argue that we do not have yet sufficient reasons to believe this (finding an alien civilisation would be very instructive for,if the strong underdetermination thesis is right,then we should expect that their set of scientific-in physics at least-enunciations are totally different,anyway very different,from our's,after the 'translation' in a human language of course).
Now all this does not mean that modern philosophers of science want the demise of falsificationism,no.Popper's version of falsificationism involve a methodological choice,counting only as a mere logical argument,favorizing falsifiable hypotheses.Based on the common sense,logical,expectation that a good model of the universe must have internal unity and coherence,must make novel,testable,predictions and resist severe attempts at potential falsification ('corroboration' of the theory).It [has problems] but is,still,a good criterion,though in itself insufficient.
The idea is that falsificationism alone is one of the [key] criterions we should use but this in no way should restriction the freedom of movement (in the light shed by the clear limits of falsificationism).Indeed sometimes ad hoc hypotheses deserve to be part of science,to be the first choice program more exactly (though such ad hoc hypotheses are metaphysical in the popperian methodology).
Not all ad hoc hypotheses are on the same level of rationality,in spite of the fact that we might have problems even here we can still define a clear ladder of rational preferences (whilst still taking in account all proposals,even those who seem not reasonable at a certain moment).
The key factor is that ad hoc hypotheses should solve some key 'puzzles' or anomalies.Additionally we can define an orientative 'official' ladder of preferences,that is what programmes ought to be pursued as the first choice and so on (if exist more proposals).But this 'official' list (based on previous experience) in no way reastrict the freedom of scientists who can have their 'private' list of preferences.The idea is that finally to obtain a program which fully comply with the standard popperian requirements.In enough many cases ad hoc hypotheses initially did lead to full programmes,as history of science do prove plenty.
This was the case with the quanta hypothesis or with the neutrino hypothesis at their time (from what I've read Pauli writes somewhere that even if he and his colleagues were '[embarassed]' first of the totally ad hoc character of the neutrino hypothesis they still thought that it was much more than mere 'metaphysics').
Sure it is possible that some of those might not prove capable to help the conjectures they are part of to become theoretically and empirically evolving on medium term.However there is no need to keep them inside science on long term (or continuing to prefer them as the first choice program) if we have sufficient reasons against this (the program is stagnant,degenerative or other programmes are progressive,much more successful).
There is no mistake to proceed so for anyway in the light of what I said before (the 'normal science' itself is a mere program on which scientists spend more of their efforts trying to develop it further).Basically nothing is indispensable.
Let me explain my point of view from a different perspective (above what I said before).Well all (at least in physics,but this is valid in broad lines for science in general) all existing scientific programmes counting as 'normal science' have at least puzzles (facts not accommodated yet within theory,the 'problems' of Popper) if not anomalies (but much more often they have).
The first task of scientists,in the scientific tradition,is the accomodation of those puzzles within the existing system,paradigm.Thus even in cases that a paradigm considered as 'normal science' become degenerative (more and more puzzles,at least,do accumulate) scientists still try to stick to the letter with the existing paradigm,still try to accommodate all those puzzles or anomalies inside the existing normal science.
This does not really let enough space for creativity,scientists tend to not follow more variants in the same time and devise potentially new hypotheses (whilst still spending their most efforts by trying to accommodate the puzzles within the existing paradigm).On the contrary they tend to grant to the existing paradigm the capacity to explain those puzzles later,in the vrtue of scientific tradition and epistemological conditioning during the years of learning.
This could lead at least to important detours.I'd argue that instead of attaching to the existing paradigm and not trying to devise alternatives until much later (by pursuing the existing program until much later as the main choice,the only choice in many cases) it would be much more useful from the good beginning (at all times as a matter of fact) to devise as many as possible alternatives (as I've argued before we can define a ladder of preferences for them) though they seem totally unreasonable at a certain moment.
I argue that is a legitimate action sometime to prefer other programmes,as the primary choice,in the process of theoretical development,which solve a certain 'puzzle',by using new theoretical concepts if 'puzzles' begin to pile up,even when there exist only few.The first choice on that ladder of preferences among different ad hoc hypotheses (as the main choice only,without renouncing to implicate actively on other paths) is the addition of new 'constructs',totally coherent with previous knowledge.
They might seem ad hoc at a certain moment but further theoretical and empirical work could prove that they represent indispensable constructs,enabling a greater fecundity for the theories incorporating them.It deserves sometime to follow such paths,especially when such ad hoc constructs 'fit' naturally with the other parts of the existing accepted enunciations.
In the latter cases scientists might accept those constructs as part of the existing normal paradigm itself.As such not only that they try to find further direct or indirect empirical support for that construct [in a key experiment] (or merely theoretical support),that is try to make them 'reliable concepts' within that paradigm,but they USE THEM (even when still ad hoc) together with other enunciations,in other,TOTALLY UNRELATED,'problems' (in other,higher level,sciences for example).
There is no mistake to do so since scientists use indispensable nonobservables in certain successful theories to explain 'puzzles' in other sciences even though those entities could be only some constructs which happen to 'work'.This is possible we do not have sufficient reasons to think otherwise,unfortunately the 'no miracle' argument is,still,not sound.
I mean that those unobservables do make testable predictions in conjunction with other enunciations but they are not testable in isolation-there is no known separate experiment which to 'confirm' directly or indirectly their existence.Anyway indirect confirmation involve an inductive process,using often Mill's methods,and might [also] be theory ladden.Nothing impedes the possibility that intial ad hoc hypotheses could lead to huge 'leap' ahead.What is clear for all unbiased philosophers is that the history of science proves plenty that a too rigid method is not the fastest way toward 'success' (understood as mere fecundity).
Well the majority of the philosophers of science (by the way almost all have scientific training being physicists and so on at base) are no more so sure that the difference between science and metaphysics is so clear cut as Sir Karl thought once and how many scientists still believe even now.
The reality is that the history of science,what happens now at the frontiers of science and even logic itself have shown that popperian falsificationism is at least not satisfactory.Any unbiased course in philosophy of science point to this,presenting also the logical difficulties of falsificationism (as happened once with logical positivism-totally unsatisfactory on logical grounds).
Even if we accept the revised version of falsificationism,which require the unity of the theories (in the Ayer's sense,but without making any reference to weak 'verification' or meaning) we still have the problem of key unobservables in very successful otherwise scientific theories.
Even if we could 'verify' them somehow indirectly in a crucial experiment (of the type of that of Rutherford which finally convinced even physicists to accept the existence of atoms) we still have the problem of theory ladeness.
Logically it is still possible that some very fruitful otherwise theoretical concepts (such 'entities' are not testable in isolation) do not exist in reality.Thus is conceivable,as a possibility,that further developments would require to renounce at them altoghether in future theory making (not only at some minor attributes attached to them)!This 'mere' possibility (toghether with the possibility of Quinean underdetermination) and the Duhemian underdetermination (which is a fact in spite of some here failing to understand it's importance) is more than enough to not be able to talk of a clear demarcation between science and metaphysics.
Neither are we allowed to grant to a scientific method based on fallibilism and falsificationism (even methods going well beyond the mere popperian falsificationism) a perpetual epistemological privilege.Moreover if strong Quinean underdetermination (irrespective [of] data) were proved to be more than a mere possibility then we would not be even entitled to talk of epistemological privilege of science (based on fallibilism and intersubjectivity)...
Some feyerabendists take the strong underedetemination as granted by I argue that we do not have yet sufficient reasons to believe this (finding an alien civilisation would be very instructive for,if the strong underdetermination thesis is right,then we should expect that their set of scientific-in physics at least-enunciations are totally different,anyway very different,from our's,after the 'translation' in a human language of course).
Now all this does not mean that modern philosophers of science want the demise of falsificationism,no.Popper's version of falsificationism involve a methodological choice,counting only as a mere logical argument,favorizing falsifiable hypotheses.Based on the common sense,logical,expectation that a good model of the universe must have internal unity and coherence,must make novel,testable,predictions and resist severe attempts at potential falsification ('corroboration' of the theory).It [has problems] but is,still,a good criterion,though in itself insufficient.
The idea is that falsificationism alone is one of the [key] criterions we should use but this in no way should restriction the freedom of movement (in the light shed by the clear limits of falsificationism).Indeed sometimes ad hoc hypotheses deserve to be part of science,to be the first choice program more exactly (though such ad hoc hypotheses are metaphysical in the popperian methodology).
Not all ad hoc hypotheses are on the same level of rationality,in spite of the fact that we might have problems even here we can still define a clear ladder of rational preferences (whilst still taking in account all proposals,even those who seem not reasonable at a certain moment).
The key factor is that ad hoc hypotheses should solve some key 'puzzles' or anomalies.Additionally we can define an orientative 'official' ladder of preferences,that is what programmes ought to be pursued as the first choice and so on (if exist more proposals).But this 'official' list (based on previous experience) in no way reastrict the freedom of scientists who can have their 'private' list of preferences.The idea is that finally to obtain a program which fully comply with the standard popperian requirements.In enough many cases ad hoc hypotheses initially did lead to full programmes,as history of science do prove plenty.
This was the case with the quanta hypothesis or with the neutrino hypothesis at their time (from what I've read Pauli writes somewhere that even if he and his colleagues were '[embarassed]' first of the totally ad hoc character of the neutrino hypothesis they still thought that it was much more than mere 'metaphysics').
Sure it is possible that some of those might not prove capable to help the conjectures they are part of to become theoretically and empirically evolving on medium term.However there is no need to keep them inside science on long term (or continuing to prefer them as the first choice program) if we have sufficient reasons against this (the program is stagnant,degenerative or other programmes are progressive,much more successful).
There is no mistake to proceed so for anyway in the light of what I said before (the 'normal science' itself is a mere program on which scientists spend more of their efforts trying to develop it further).Basically nothing is indispensable.
Let me explain my point of view from a different perspective (above what I said before).Well all (at least in physics,but this is valid in broad lines for science in general) all existing scientific programmes counting as 'normal science' have at least puzzles (facts not accommodated yet within theory,the 'problems' of Popper) if not anomalies (but much more often they have).
The first task of scientists,in the scientific tradition,is the accomodation of those puzzles within the existing system,paradigm.Thus even in cases that a paradigm considered as 'normal science' become degenerative (more and more puzzles,at least,do accumulate) scientists still try to stick to the letter with the existing paradigm,still try to accommodate all those puzzles or anomalies inside the existing normal science.
This does not really let enough space for creativity,scientists tend to not follow more variants in the same time and devise potentially new hypotheses (whilst still spending their most efforts by trying to accommodate the puzzles within the existing paradigm).On the contrary they tend to grant to the existing paradigm the capacity to explain those puzzles later,in the vrtue of scientific tradition and epistemological conditioning during the years of learning.
This could lead at least to important detours.I'd argue that instead of attaching to the existing paradigm and not trying to devise alternatives until much later (by pursuing the existing program until much later as the main choice,the only choice in many cases) it would be much more useful from the good beginning (at all times as a matter of fact) to devise as many as possible alternatives (as I've argued before we can define a ladder of preferences for them) though they seem totally unreasonable at a certain moment.
I argue that is a legitimate action sometime to prefer other programmes,as the primary choice,in the process of theoretical development,which solve a certain 'puzzle',by using new theoretical concepts if 'puzzles' begin to pile up,even when there exist only few.The first choice on that ladder of preferences among different ad hoc hypotheses (as the main choice only,without renouncing to implicate actively on other paths) is the addition of new 'constructs',totally coherent with previous knowledge.
They might seem ad hoc at a certain moment but further theoretical and empirical work could prove that they represent indispensable constructs,enabling a greater fecundity for the theories incorporating them.It deserves sometime to follow such paths,especially when such ad hoc constructs 'fit' naturally with the other parts of the existing accepted enunciations.
In the latter cases scientists might accept those constructs as part of the existing normal paradigm itself.As such not only that they try to find further direct or indirect empirical support for that construct [in a key experiment] (or merely theoretical support),that is try to make them 'reliable concepts' within that paradigm,but they USE THEM (even when still ad hoc) together with other enunciations,in other,TOTALLY UNRELATED,'problems' (in other,higher level,sciences for example).
There is no mistake to do so since scientists use indispensable nonobservables in certain successful theories to explain 'puzzles' in other sciences even though those entities could be only some constructs which happen to 'work'.This is possible we do not have sufficient reasons to think otherwise,unfortunately the 'no miracle' argument is,still,not sound.
I mean that those unobservables do make testable predictions in conjunction with other enunciations but they are not testable in isolation-there is no known separate experiment which to 'confirm' directly or indirectly their existence.Anyway indirect confirmation involve an inductive process,using often Mill's methods,and might [also] be theory ladden.Nothing impedes the possibility that intial ad hoc hypotheses could lead to huge 'leap' ahead.What is clear for all unbiased philosophers is that the history of science proves plenty that a too rigid method is not the fastest way toward 'success' (understood as mere fecundity).
Last edited:
- #109
marlon
- 3,792
- 11
Fliption said:
I am just wondering why you guys are always referring to links and articles for clarification. Why can't you just post some clear explainatory answers to our questions whithout us having to read articles. The real scientists here do not make reference to some article in order to make a point in this thread. I do not bore you with articles on QFT or GTR in order to make my point. Please, don't hide behind someone else by quoting some article or some other socalled philosopher. The intention of this thread was to discuss personal opinions on philosophy and clear out the most common misconceptions of philosophy...YOU NEED TO EXPLAIN TO US, not the other way around...
just my opinion though...
regards
marlon
- #110
- 32,820
- 4,720
hypnagogue said:
Unfortunately, without knowing such things, this whole discussion is moot. We might be arguing a point that isn't "real". Ivan Seeking should not have brought it up in the first place.
However, it appears that the issue seems to not want to go away, maybe not due to you, but due to others who seem to want to keep resurrecting this. If we agree on the point above, then stick a fork in me because I'm done!
I should have made it clearer. When I asked "why does it matter", it was within the context of physics and the working of physics. I have ZERO problem with people wanting to know more and asking questions. What I do have a problem with is people who do not know any better foolishly presuming that the superficial knowledge that they have learned about physics (or on anything for that matter) accurately reflects the body of knowledge physics and the practice of physics. Just go ahead and skim through your Philosophy section and tell me that this does not happen. And I'm not just referring to quackeries either, which occurs everywhere no matter how vigilant one is.
Assuming that the issue of the role (or non-role) of philosophy in science, and in physics in particular, is settled (could you try to convince metacristi of this? I can't do anything about it because he/she still refused to illustrate his/her esoteric prose with specific, concrete examples that I requested), then let me be clear that I have no issues with discussing physics "philosophically" to one's content. Maybe that's a good thing, I don't know (is this better than discussing physics with physicists?) However, one should not fool oneself into thinking that one has had a true picture of the actual content. Analogy, metaphors, sybolism, etc. cannot convey what physicis is. Only when people consciously realize this, then they won't be so quick to build and extrapolate what they think they understand.
Zz.
- #111
arildno
Science Advisor
Homework Helper
Gold Member
Dearly Missed
- 10,123
- 138
Back this up with solid evidence, please.metacristi said:
Concrete examples of what you are taslking about, thank you.metacristi said:
Solid evidence, please.metacristi said:
What are you talking about?metacristi said:
What does this mean?metacristi said:
Please come up with examples.metacristi said:
Your problem being?metacristi said:
This does not follow from what you have said.metacristi said:
Who are you to say this?metacristi said:
Concrete examples of what you mean.metacristi said:
If this "follows" "underdetermination" (whatever that is), is simply false.metacristi said:
I could go on and on..
- #112
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
marlon said:
This is silly. This discussion called for further clarification. He has told you that english is not his primary language and was therefore pointing you to a site where the same explanation can be found in much better english. Seems perfectly reasonable to me.
Also, unfortunately, some people don't know near as much as they think they do. I refer people to outside links all the time so that they can get at least an understanding of the concepts I'm using. People are a bit more open minded and can come to trust an outside source before they can some guy named "Fliption" on the internet. But until they actually read the links, the discussion in this forum becomes exactly what this one is...a useless exchange of personal perspectives with no intention or possibility of understanding the other perspectives.
- #113
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
ZapperZ said:
I've seen this in the physics forum as well. Tis the nature of humanity to speak in ignorance. You should probably get used to it.
- #114
metacristi
- 265
- 1
arildno said:
No.It only follows that you (and many others) do not have even the slightest idea of the problems raised by the philosophy of science.What to explain,my goal is not to teach here.Because I should teach you basically everything...No offense a basic course in (modern) philosophy of science is urgently needed by many so called 'serious scientists' here.You'll see plenty of examples there,though,from a purely logical point of view,Duhem's thesis and others,do not need them as justification.
Try this,as a good introduction in philosophy (of science included):
http://www.eblaforum.org/main/viewforum.php?f=13
As regarding the value of philosophy,as an introduction only,I find Russell's account very good (with the observation that some of the views advocated there are no more 'en vogue';for example,relevant for the topic here,being the inductionist approach of Russell-upon him induction is [rather] 'apriori' and needs no justification,[edit to add][he talks however of a weak,probabilistic,justification;unfortunately,even now,neither the objective interpretation of probabilities nor bayesianism has managed to offer a sound argument in favor of a general inductive method][/edit to add]):
http://www.popular-science.net/books/russell/chapter15.html
(but try reading all book)
Indeed the first role of philosophy is to 'rummage' among everything we think we know in order to show which of our 'certitudes' and prejudices must be put first under doubt before hoping to affirm something more precise...
There is no science without philosophy,we should always be able to think way beyond the mere popperian methodology,especially because we already know it is very limited...Moreover philosophy has a great importance even when we 'work' inside the popperian account;indeed,as even Popper do recognize,metaphysical reasearch programmes do have a great impact over science,what seems now metaphysical (in the popperian heuristic) could be,potentially,the science of tomorrow.I would have liked if science had been the unshakable monolith some think it is even now,unfortunately it is not the case...A position entirely justified on rational grounds (it needs some basic grasp of logic and philosophy,of course,to really understand).
Last edited:
- #115
arildno
Science Advisor
Homework Helper
Gold Member
Dearly Missed
- 10,123
- 138
Since you obviously don't know a thing about PHYSICS, you are no authority upon whether the practices of physicists are false or not. (Since you are ignorant of what they are actually doing)
You can sit in a seminar-room all day phantasizing about what physicists do; your activity is still worthless and irrelevant to knowledgeable individuals.
Good bye.
You can sit in a seminar-room all day phantasizing about what physicists do; your activity is still worthless and irrelevant to knowledgeable individuals.
Good bye.
- #116
metacristi
- 265
- 1
arildno said:
Thanks for your proclamation,but of course,how all rational people do realize,this does not really count as a justification.Incidentally what justification have you,for example,when you say that 'you do not know anything about physics'?
- #117
arildno
Science Advisor
Homework Helper
Gold Member
Dearly Missed
- 10,123
- 138
By the fact that you don't bolster up your statements with solid, concrete examples from physics.
- #118
- 32,820
- 4,720
Fliption said:
Well, yes, I have gotten used to it (I have to, having been on the 'net this long), but I don't have to tolerate such mediocrity, and neither should anyone else. The fact that you don't and shouldn't tolerate when someone, be it a self-proclaimed scientist, or some Joe Schmoe, make incorrect characterization of philosophy, neither should I when someone makes an incorrect characterization of physics and the practice of physics. Here, we have people telling me what I AM doing, and believing in THAT rather than what I tell them what I am actually doing. You will understand if I find that rather incredible.
I have put out my challenge several days ago, and NO ONE took up on the offer. I asked for anyone to specifically point to me, in the case of the develoment (and still developing) of the discovery of high-Tc superconductors, where EXACTLY was and is the role of philosophy and philosphy of science in particular? This is an appropriate case study because (i) it is still on-going (ii) practically ALL of the major characters involved are still alive and we can ASK them if such-and-such are true, rather than having to deal with "dead philosophers" and "dead scientists", and (iii) most importantly, at least for, me, it is still fresh in the minds of many people. This is not Copernicus battling the church with fuzzy historical accounts and news coming down after several translations. This is DIRECT, VERIFIABLE, and clear accounts.
... so I'm still waiting.
Zz.
P.S. I would like to clearly state that this challenge isn't directed at hypnagogue, because we both have the same understanding that philosophy plays no major role in the development of physics.
Last edited:
- #119
arildno
Science Advisor
Homework Helper
Gold Member
Dearly Missed
- 10,123
- 138
And so am I..ZapperZ said:
(I don't know if we're going to get any solid facts out of these people, though)
- #120
Aquamarine
- 160
- 4
Just one question. Why is a theory ever discarded? It is always possible to resurrect any theory with ad hoc exceptions.
So in the end physicists are forced to use criteria like "simplicity" and "elegance". But they generally have no definition for this except gut feeling and majority opinion.
Regarding falsification, here are many concrete examples that it is not how science works:
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html
So in the end physicists are forced to use criteria like "simplicity" and "elegance". But they generally have no definition for this except gut feeling and majority opinion.
Regarding falsification, here are many concrete examples that it is not how science works:
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html
- #121
marlon
- 3,792
- 11
arildno said:
And so am i...
marlon
- #122
arildno
Science Advisor
Homework Helper
Gold Member
Dearly Missed
- 10,123
- 138
A very interesting article written by a clearly knowledgeable man (Martin Gardner)
Thanks, Aquamarine.
Thanks, Aquamarine.
- #123
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
ZapperZ said:
That's like asking what the role of a CEO is on his company's assembly line. The relationship is a bit more complex than this question makes it out to be.
And as in all cases like this, of course the answer is different depending on who you ask! If you ask a worker on the assembly line, he'll tell you the CEO does nothing to help them out. Yet an outside investor who understands all the relationships and the big picture would say the CEO does indeed have an impact.
Last edited:
- #124
marlon
- 3,792
- 11
Fliption said:
Fliption,
You are just trying to avoid the question here. Please, give some specific answers to Zz's question and stop phillibustering here...This is not at political thread...
marlon
- #125
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
marlon said:
There is no answer to the question you are intending to ask. Insisting on one shows a lack of understanding of the relationships involved. Just like the assembly line worker has no idea how anything works outside his own world.
- #126
marlon
- 3,792
- 11
Fliption said:
So basically what you say is that when one someone asks you "what is the role of philosophy of science into the development of science?", there is no answer ? I am sure your buddies cogito and LesSleeth are going to disagree.
Nevertheless if you cannot come up with anyhting good here, then what are you doing here? What are the statements you are defending, what is your point? Basically why do you post here ?
Don't take this the wrong way, but i am really wondering about these questions to which there certainly IS an answer, as there is an answer to Zz's question. Let me answer it for you : NONE WHAT SO EVER !
marlon
- #127
arildno
Science Advisor
Homework Helper
Gold Member
Dearly Missed
- 10,123
- 138
Fliption:
Just remember the following.
It is simply bad form to masturbate in public; neither is it productive.
Just remember the following.
It is simply bad form to masturbate in public; neither is it productive.
- #128
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
marlon said:
I figured you would misunderstand so I modified my words. Apparently not soon enough. I'm saying that the answer you seek does not exists. The true answer to the question would require you taking some courses in philosophy. You don't understand what you're asking if you actually expect someone to tell you in a thread on the internet the relationship between philosophy and science! My god this could fill a library.
- #129
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
arildno said:
I always appreciate it when people share their personal lessons learned with me. Thanks for the advice.
- #130
- 32,820
- 4,720
Fliption said:
So, show me how that CEO makes an impact here, Mr. Outside Investor! All I have been getting are analogies, vague inference, esoteric generalization, etc. I'm trying to pin someone down to a specific case! Are philosphers who hold such idologies incapable of applying their principle to something that is REAL and can be verified to be true or false? Or are they only capable of upholding their point of view only on something that is waaaay back in history, can't be double-checked, and would be involved in a long, protracted discussion that sees no end?
I didn't pick some trivial, non-important example either. The mystery of high-Tc superconductors is one of the few phenomena that is generally listed as THE big mysteries in physics. Surely something as significant as that, if there were to be any coat-tailing by philosphers of science, THIS would be a very juicy one! So where are they?
Zz.
- #131
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
ZapperZ said:
Since my analogy is not even close to being vague(Note how you correctly identified me as an outside investor
) then I think another one is in order. Actually, I see your point. I now no longer believe that ecomonics is worth studying. Economics is useless because it has no role in explaining the mystery in high-Tc superconductors! Either I am correct about economics in this case, or I have no idea what economics is. Take your pick.
- #132
Aquamarine
- 160
- 4
I answered this but will make the answers even clearer. I will do this in spite of that I don't know the details of the theory (I am assuming there is a theory and not merely empirical observations).
Is Popper's rule of falsifiability the correct criterion for science? How do you respond to the common objections?
http://www.stephenjaygould.org/ctrl/gardner_popper.html
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/popper/ (See critical evaluation)
So if falsification is not the answer, what did you use?
What is the answer to the problem of induction?
What your view on Bayesian inference? Quasi-empirical methods?
What is the justification for assuming that current physical laws will continue to function the same way in the future? Or that they will function in different place from where tested? How is the limits of generalization decided?
How do you know the theory will hold in the future and in other places?
What is your view on coherentism versus foundationalism? The regress argument?
What are the ultimate statements that provide justification for all other statements?
What is the role of Ockham's razor in science? What role do you see for algorithmic information theory?
Do you claim that there is no contradictory evidence at all against the major theories today? How do you explain away minor contradictions? When do they become large enough for the theory to fail?
Why is a theory ever abandoned, it is always possible to resurrect any theory by adding ad hoc exceptions?
Why was earlier theories discarded?
Probably the answer is gut feeling and majority opinion. I am not arguing that this gut feeling is wrong and cannot produce correct result. People can be trained to produce correct results without knowing any theory. Especially in similar situations. But if the situation changes to unfamiliar where prior experience will not help, theory will be useful.
So I am not arguing that the philosophy of science is particularly useful in this instance. It is possible to use instincts gained from experience in similar scientific situations before. But if the situation changes, for example to those questions studied in string theory, a knowledge of the philosophy of science might be very useful. It might ultimately be algorithmic information theory that decides if loop quantum theory or string theory is correct.
Last edited:
- #133
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
"I fully agree with you about the significance and educational value of methodology as well as history and philosophy of science. So many people today -- and even professional scientists -- seem to me like somebody who has seen thousands of trees but has never seen a forest. A knowledge of the historic and philosophical background gives that kind of independence from prejudices of his generation from which most scientists are suffering. This independence created by philosophical insight is -- in my opinion -- the mark of distinction between a mere artisan or specialist and a real seeker after truth. (Einstein to Thornton, 7 December 1944, EA 61-574) "
- #134
- 32,820
- 4,720
Fliption said:Since my analogy is not even close to being vague(Note how you correctly identified me as an outside investor
Either I am correct about economics in this case, or I have no idea what economics is. Take your pick.
You misinterpreted what I asked. Recall that you said
So then I want to know from whoever this "outside investor" is (it could be you, or anyone that fits into your analogy), to tell me exactly how the CEO plays his/her role! Or is the outside investor simply thinks the worker on the assembly line is simply beneath him to be able to understand the whole thing?
So show me the equivalent of the "outside investor" in the high-Tc superconductor case. Explain to me how this "CEO" is truly affecting the physics of superconductivity of these materials.
This is NOT A TRICK! I have already explained waaaay back when of a possible cultural difference in how physicists understands and comprehend principles and ideas, and how it appears philosophers on here convey their ideas. Since this is about science/physics, and about the practice of science/physics, most of us who are in this want to know in specific terms, how philosophical ideologies, principles, and what-not applies on what we do and how we do it. It is the surest way our limited and simplistic brain can comprehend something into a tangible idea, by seeing it in action first hand!
Zz.
- #135
hypnagogue
Staff Emeritus
Science Advisor
Gold Member
- 2,285
- 3
I think what Fliption is trying to say is that while a real link may exist between philosophy of science and the practice of science, trying to sort out the nature of this link may be intractable. I think that's a defensible claim.
Hopefully, we've already established that much productive scientific work can be done, and is done, without the explicitly considering issues of epistemological justification to the extent that philosophers of science do. In other words, there is typically no explicit or direct link between the practice of science, as done by scientists, and the philosophy of science, as propounded by philosophers. Scientists do not use a checklist of epistemic qualifications afforded to them philosophers, and their methods may come under legitimate scrutiny by philosophers, but nonetheless the practice goes on and continues to be viable and productive.
Does this imply that philosophy of science exerts no influence upon the practice of science? Not necessarily. Perhaps such an influence exists, but is so subtle and indirect or acts over such a long period of time that it appears to be non-existant, and is practically impossible to tease out of the complicated knot of societal interaction over time. Perhaps the mimetic zeitgeist of a Popper really has swayed things in some non-obvious way.
I say 'perhaps.' But is it really the case? I honestly don't know enough about philosophy of science or the changing epistemic trends in science over time to even make an educated guess. But the sheer complexity of the issue may make it impossible to say one way or the other even for an expert on these topics. In that sense, even if some sort of influence does exist or has existed between the two disciplines, it may be impossible to answer the questions of who, what, when, where, how, why.
Hopefully, we've already established that much productive scientific work can be done, and is done, without the explicitly considering issues of epistemological justification to the extent that philosophers of science do. In other words, there is typically no explicit or direct link between the practice of science, as done by scientists, and the philosophy of science, as propounded by philosophers. Scientists do not use a checklist of epistemic qualifications afforded to them philosophers, and their methods may come under legitimate scrutiny by philosophers, but nonetheless the practice goes on and continues to be viable and productive.
Does this imply that philosophy of science exerts no influence upon the practice of science? Not necessarily. Perhaps such an influence exists, but is so subtle and indirect or acts over such a long period of time that it appears to be non-existant, and is practically impossible to tease out of the complicated knot of societal interaction over time. Perhaps the mimetic zeitgeist of a Popper really has swayed things in some non-obvious way.
I say 'perhaps.' But is it really the case? I honestly don't know enough about philosophy of science or the changing epistemic trends in science over time to even make an educated guess. But the sheer complexity of the issue may make it impossible to say one way or the other even for an expert on these topics. In that sense, even if some sort of influence does exist or has existed between the two disciplines, it may be impossible to answer the questions of who, what, when, where, how, why.
- #136
- 32,820
- 4,720
Aquamarine said:
I want to ask you this first. Why and how did Popper's falsifiability got into this? As far as I can remember, it was metacristi who were OBSESSIVELY presenting a thesis on such a thing. Why am I being made to answer to something we didn't bring up nor propose, nor espouse, nor pledge our allegance to? Can we get over this already?
"gut feeling" and "majority opinion"?? On high-Tc superconductors?! I'm sorry, but this is highly insulting. You picked a "generic" scenario and applied it to something which you yourself didn't hesitate to acknowledge you know nothing about. And we physicists get accused of yapping about things we don't know of when we "intruded" into philosophy?
And since when is the criteria of a theory or idea in physics being correct entirely based on "algorithmic information theory"? Can you point ONE single theory in physics, today, that is accepted to be correct that is just based on "algorithmic information theory"?
Zz.
- #137
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
ZapperZ said:
I understand the question. My response to it is the same as my response to Marlon. You're asking for an explanation about the relationship between philosophy and science and you want a one page answer? This is impossible(for me at least). Hypnagogues response is a fair representation of what I feel about the subject. But when Hypnagogue ask the question "But Is it really the case?", I believe the answer is "yes". I provided a quote from a prominent historic scientist who claims that it is. If Einstein thinks philosophy of science helped him in his endeavers in physics then who are we to disagree?
Last edited:
- #138
- 32,820
- 4,720
hypnagogue said:
Strangely enough, I actually agree with most of what you said here! :)
<hiding from the rest of the physicists>
I would even go a step further by saying that careful attention to espistemiology is a great advantage in the TEACHING of physics. Students understand things a lot faster and clearer when there is a systematic explanation on why things are done certain way, and why it is a good idea to have a clear methodology in attacking and solving a certain problem.
However, in the real practice of physics (and how many here can truly say they are familiar in the day-to-day workings of physics?), I don't EVER remember us stopping and pondering the philosophical ideologies of so-and-so figure and then reacting to that in ways that affect our work. I know this is not what you are saying, but this is what some are implying. I just want to know, if they truly believe that, to show me specific example of where this actually happens ...... so that I can stop it! :) :)
Zz.
- #139
- 32,820
- 4,720
Fliption said:
No, I do not want the "relationship between philosophy and science". I fully accept there is a "relationship"... in may instances, philosophy follows what science has to say! :) <ducking again>
I want to know where, exactly, in science, and in the specific example that I brought up, that philosphy AFFECTED the science. This is not for my own cultural benefit. This is to clarify the repeated claims that philosphy affects science and plays an important role in science. I want to know WHERE and HOW! I do not want pages and pages of answer. Just pick ONE specific way in which philosphy affected the discovery and development of our understanding of high-Tc superconductors.
Again, the reason why I picked this example is because we can DOUBLE-CHECK if so-and-so figure really meant it the way we are interpreting his or her quote! I can't double check with Einstein to see if his quote was taken out of context, the very same way his "Imagination is more important than knowledge" quote has been bastardized so often. Einstein is known to go by his "gut feeling" on a lot of things... he was right a lot of times (Special Relativity, General Relativity, Bose's theory, etc.) and he was also wrong a lot of times (cosmological constant, EPR paradox, etc.). So to make him a diety he isn't is simply naive.
Zz.
- #140
Fliption
- 1,081
- 1
ZapperZ said:
Does anybody ever get the feeling that you're involved in a huge debate and that everyone actually agrees? I thought most everyone had already acknowledeged that philosophy has no role in the day to day workings of a speciifc scientific endeaver. If anyone is arguing against this then they are doing a poor job. The responses I've seen from Metacrista and Aquamarine don't seem to be claiming this either. They are simply arguing that philosophy of science has a role to play in general. Not in a specific experiment. (Maybe I've misunderstood them.) It's easy to see why they would be so militant with this defensive view of philosophy in general given the title of this thread is not just a claim that philosphy has no role in high-Tc superconductors. It's claiming philosophy is pseudo-science. Perhaps Zapper and Marlon don't agree on this point?