Ultimate question: Why anything at all?

[apeiron]

Evo was pointing out this part from your https://www.physicsforums.com/showpost.php?p=3477808&postcount=11":

Well, yes, we know that. So again, where did she say anything that justifies your:

But, Evo is right. A dichotomy does not mean an impossibility to decide.

I realize this conversation could not be sillier. But if you keep insisting on making the false implication that I thought something else and Evo was correcting me, I have to ask you to please go back and read the words that have been written with more care. Otherwise you risk being infracted for trolling I would have thought.

 

[Evo]

Well, yes, we know that. So again, where did she say anything that justifies your:



I realize this conversation could not be sillier. But if you keep insisting on making the false implication that I thought something else and Evo was correcting me, I have to ask you to please go back and read the words that have been written with more care. Otherwise you risk being infracted for trolling I would have thought.

You created your own definition, that is prohibited by the guidelines. You should know better.

Guidelines -

explicitly defining key terms;

In particular, please make a concerted effort to adequately define key terms whose meaning might otherwise be ambiguous and to provide proper justification for any claims that might be contentious.

A good rule of thumb is to place yourself in the shoes of your readers and ask whether a prospective post is clear enough and developed enough to be understood by them-- Does this make sense?

Cut the nonsense.

 

[apeiron]

You don't get to make up your own words. Stick the the dictionary defintions.

You still have not said what words are made up. In what way did anything I say fail to follow familiar philosophical usage?

To be going on and on here, you must be alleging that you know of a different definition to the term, dichotomy, within metaphysics to the one that I have argued. So let's see you cite it here. Where are the words?

 

[Willowz]

Hey, I don't mean to be nitpick and I'm sorry if I offended your intelligence. But, there was no need for the "metaphysicality". Off to another thread.

 

[apeiron]

Guidelines - Cut the nonsense.

But I explained my use of the term dichotomy and was reacting to Wuliheron's apparent misuse of it. Now you can ask for further clarification. You can ask for sources. I can happily give both. And have already done so.

Yet still I am being hounded for apparently not adopting a usage which is "standard", and you cannot explain in what way it is not standard.

You have made the claim, out of the blue, that I have invented a definition. And yet the first definition you would find on Google leaves you no support on that.

if there is a concept A, and it is split into parts B and not-B, then the parts form a dichotomy: they are mutually exclusive, since no part of B is contained in not-B and vice-versa, and they are jointly exhaustive, since they cover all of A, and together again give A.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dichotomy

How is that not a "crisp metaphysical choice" in the context of the argument being made - that nothing and infinity are the kind of mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive possibilities that arise when metaphysical concepts are being made clear?

 

[JordanL]

So you subscribe to a believe that things exist which are accepted or rejected. Are these things atomic, undividable, entities? [What is the nature of these things?]

I subscribe to a belief that existence is a prerequisite to the abstract acceptance or rejection of it. Even if these things are not atomic, undividable, etc., the abstract of their acceptance or rejection provides an informational input upon our universe in that they are reacted to, (by either their acceptance or rejection).

My point is that a "will" requires both decision and direction, and that the decision is expressed as both the acceptance of something, and the rejection of the things which are mutually exclusive with what is accepted.

To ascribe will to the Universe, you are also making an inherent claim that the Universe is part of a larger set which contains both the things our Universe accepted (everything that can be experienced or imagined or interacted within our Universe), and the things our Universe rejected.

Or another way of saying what I am talking about is that no set which contains all sets, including itself, can exercise will be definition.

If you believe the Universe to have will, you must also believe it to be part of a system or set larger than itself. Conversely, if it is not part of a larger system or set, it cannot have will.

I believe that the Universe is part of a larger system or set, and that it has will in the sense that there are things that are part and not part of our Universe, but not in the classical sense of conscious decision.

The second part of the question. My original claim was: 'The universe can exist, therefor it exists.' That is substantially different from 'The universe exists so that it can exist,' which to me (unless it was a typo), looks like it implies it has self-moving/self-creationary/autonomic attributes. Does it?

They are substantially different, and I was being less careful with my words. The intended meaning was compatible with your intended meaning. Accidentally, through negligence, I created a similar statement that I also agreed with, but was not the point I was trying to convey, if that makes sense.

 

[apeiron]

You created your own definition, that is prohibited by the guidelines. You should know better.

Re-reading your post, it is still ambiguous.

Are you meaning to say here that you believe the correct definition of a dichotomy is indeed "an impossibility to decide"?

Can you answer directly, yes/no. Then I might have some clue about the source of your complaint.

 

[Willowz]

Ok, let's take this a bit further.

How is a dichotomy a metaphysical choice?

 

[JordanL]

Ok, let's take this a bit further.

How is a dichotomy a metaphysical choice?

If I were to argue the point, I would do it by saying that dichotomy represents a set of choices which inherently through their existence, (which metaphysics deals with through Ontology), exclude one another.

I don't think that's the most semantically accurate way of defining dichotomy, but it certainly seems more true than false.

 

[apeiron]

Ok, let's take this a bit further.

How is a dichotomy a metaphysical choice?

An interesting thread has been derailed enough with this nonsense. Open a separate thread or PM me if you really want to discuss this.

 

[disregardthat]

I think Evo might be trolling this thread.

 

[Maui]

I think Evo might be trolling this thread.

Disregard that. Trolls are not fundamental to existence :)

 

[Willowz]

An interesting thread has been derailed enough with this nonsense. Open a separate thread or PM me if you really want to discuss this.

Nothing serious has happened. Or at least we can put it aside.

In my opinion some imporant points are;

"Vageness" (in reference to the link you provided)

Mathematical realism and Indispensability Arguments, such as (all in order to aviod Vageness);

(P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities that are indispensable to our best scientific theories.

(P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories.

(C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities.

I don't know where you want to go on from here. QM, time...

 

[Willowz]

The thread would be most productive if we could go through Tegmarks reasonings for a mathematical universe. That is, why does he think it is indispensabile? "Just because it is", doesn't cut the mustard.

 

[MarcoD]

My point is that a "will" requires both decision and direction, and that the decision is expressed as both the acceptance of something, and the rejection of the things which are mutually exclusive with what is accepted.

Ah. I agree on direction but not on decision. I am inclined to intuitive arguments which discard mutual exclusion as an emergent property of a delusional linguistic game.

To ascribe will to the Universe, you are also making an inherent claim that the Universe is part of a larger set which contains both the things our Universe accepted (everything that can be experienced or imagined or interacted within our Universe), and the things our Universe rejected.

It was a question, I don't ascribe will to the universe.

I believe that the Universe is part of a larger system or set, and that it has will in the sense that there are things that are part and not part of our Universe, but not in the classical sense of conscious decision.

No idea what is meant here. But I mostly reject mathematics as a basis for philosophical answers.

They are substantially different, and I was being less careful with my words. The intended meaning was compatible with your intended meaning. Accidentally, through negligence, I created a similar statement that I also agreed with, but was not the point I was trying to convey, if that makes sense.

Ah, ok.

 

[JordanL]

Ah. I agree on direction but not on decision. I am inclined to intuitive arguments which discard mutual exclusion as an emergent property of a delusional linguistic game.

Hmmm... how do you describe will without something like decision? How can you have intended direction without decision?

 

[MarcoD]

Hmmm... how do you describe will without something like decision? How can you have intended direction without decision?

Decision implies binary choice, at least, to me. I don't think that (binary choice) exists, in an ontological sense.

It's a bit of more lengthier thought experiment, but it starts of with the question: Have you ever experienced a 'thing'?

To me, the answer to that question is: No. And since I deny that things exist, as atomic undividable entities, and see them as linguistical delusions, I reject mathematics (which is a more precise, and therefor, to me, more flawed form of language) as a delusion.

(My general feeling described very briefly.)

EDIT: I should have said that if you deny that things exist, that then choice is a delusion.

EDIT: Essentially, this is a reversal of the Platonic argument. Plato stated that 'real' things exist as imperfect approximations of 'ideals.' In that terminology, I would state that 'ideals' are the imperfect approximations of 'real' things.

 

[Evo]

Re-reading your post, it is still ambiguous.

Are you meaning to say here that you believe the correct definition of a dichotomy is indeed "an impossibility to decide"?

Can you answer directly, yes/no. Then I might have some clue about the source of your complaint.

I said to stop making up your own words for definitions. Show me where "crisp metaphysical choice" is a definition of "dichotomy".

Once again the rules.

explicitly defining key terms;

In particular, please make a concerted effort to adequately define key terms whose meaning might otherwise be ambiguous and to provide proper justification for any claims that might be contentious. Doing so will go a long way towards stimulating productive discussion, whereas failure to do so will inevitably lead to lots of confusion, wasted words, and effort, and ultimately to moderator intervention as outlined above.

How likely is it that someone will be confused by, or misinterpret, what I have written? You should strive to make your posts intelligible, well supported, and unambiguous.

If you wish to be allowed to post here, you need to obey the rules. One of the biggest problems with online *philosophy* is sticking to well known, clear definitions that are understood by all. Acting obtuse isn't helping you.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=47294

This thread needs to get back on topic.

 

[JordanL]

Decision implies binary choice, at least, to me. I don't think that (binary choice) exists, in an ontological sense.

It's a bit of more lengthier thought experiment, but it starts of with the question: Have you ever experienced a 'thing'?

To me, the answer to that question is: No. And since I deny that things exist, as atomic undividable entities, and see them as linguistical delusions, I reject mathematics (which is a more precise, and therefor, to me, more flawed form of language) as a delusion.

(My general feeling described very briefly.)

Hmmm... I don't see decision as being binary either, even in the way I described it, which is not mathematical either. Allow me to elaborate.

Let's suppose that we are creating a list of things which are true about our planet. Not an exhaustive list, just some of the things that are true. It has an atmosphere, it has gravity, it has liquid water, it exists approximately between -40 and +40 centigrade on the surface.

Now these sets of things are approximated facts. But they, by definition, exclude other possible facts. For instance, it if has an atmosphere it cannot lack an atmosphere, which is an alternative but invalid fact. If it has gravity it attracts other masses, instead of not interacting or repelling them.

The idea that the truths of our planet have non-binary but opposed falsities does not inherently imply decision. But it is necessary for decision.

The following is an argument I am presenting for philosophical reasons, not because I believe it to be true.

Suppose that the facts of our planet represented intent. That they are "supposed" to be this way. In order to be intended, it must represent a set of facts that do not include ALL facts. If it included all facts, then both those intended and not intended would be true. So within existence, which contains all truths of any meaning to us, the specific truths of any given thing, in this case the Earth, represent a portion of all truths.

Intent requires the exclusion of possible truths, or the transformation of a true statement into a false statement. For example, in the absence of reality, any statement is tautologically true by its utterance. But reality in many ways is not tautological, and this implies that not all statements are true (which we observe to be an accurate statement).

The statement is not reversible. The presence of possible false statements does not prove intent, they simply must be possible for intent to be an explanation. Why, if intent represents direction only, is this the case? Direction would be the pursuit of a specific truth or specific set of truths, not the exclusion of possible truths or the presence of possible falsities.

It is because decision, or the ability to exclude possible truths from the group of all truths, is also necessary for intent. Will is defined as follows:

1.the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action
3. the act or process of using or asserting one's choice; volition

http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/will

Using these definitions I will paraphrase and connect the ideas by stating that will is the expression or the act of intent.

Decision does not imply binary choice in my opinion. Decision implies the acceptance of some non-empty group of possible truths, and the rejection of some non-empty group of possible truths, but not between binary choices, simply incompatible ones.

In that sense, what I am saying is not that Ontologically there is absolute truth and absolute falsity; I am saying that existence requires that the false exists in order for it to be rejected. If the Universe were to have will, then all truth and all falsity exist, even if not within our Universe. The implication of that, in my opinion, would be far more important than the idea that the Universe has will. My original point, which again I didn't express very well and perhaps am still not expressing very well, is that the existence of all possible statements and ideas is necessary for the Universe to express will, and that a "place" to contain the statements and ideas which are false within our Universe must exist as well if the Universe can express will.

So I see the question of whether or not the Universe has will as being the same as whether or not there exists an infinite multi-verse, because in my mind, an infinite multi-verse is required for the Universe to have will, even if the reverse is not true.

In the sense of all things being linguistic illusions, regardless of the "illusion" being presented, the illusion exists within some thing that can contain the illusion as a truth or a falsity. The presence of the illusion proves the existence of existence, for the purpose of creating an illusion.

 

[MarcoD]

Hmmm... I don't see decision as being binary either, even in the way I described it, which is not mathematical either. Allow me to elaborate.

The problem with a lot what you said is that what you feel is not a linguistical delusion, I think is, and what you feel is not a binary choice on existence, I feel is.

I basically seem to default to a not very well fleshed-out current-day version of Parmenides view that the universe is an undivisable whole. (At least, I don't think there are things with clear cut boundaries. Since math [/logic] assumes that, I wonder about the relation between math and the world and our understanding of it.)

In the sense of all things being linguistic illusions, regardless of the "illusion" being presented, the illusion exists within some thing that can contain the illusion as a truth or a falsity. The presence of the illusion proves the existence of existence, for the purpose of creating an illusion.

Evidently.

 

[JordanL]

The problem with a lot what you said is that what you feel is not a linguistical delusion, I think is, and what you feel is not a binary choice on existence, I feel is.

I basically seem to default to a not very well fleshed-out current-day version of Parmenides view that the universe is an undivisable whole. (At least, I don't think there are things with clear cut boundaries. Since math assumes that, I wonder about the relation between math and the world and our understanding of it.)

Evidently.

Interesting. I see where we're diverging too.

I seem to default to the following: Anything that can be described exists within the fact that it can be described. Because of this the Universe and existence are as divisible or undivisible as you describe them to be, even if not within our experienced Universe or existence. (That is, all statements and ideas are true, even if they are not locally true.)

 

[apeiron]

Nothing serious has happened. Or at least we can put it aside.

Nothing except more infractions for no defensible reason. A philosophy forum should be moderated by people with a working knowledge of philosophy.

 

[MarcoD]

Interesting. I see where we're diverging too.

I seem to default to the following: Anything that can be described exists within the fact that it can be described. Because of this the Universe and existence are as divisible or undivisible as you describe them to be, even if not within our experienced Universe or existence. (That is, all statements and ideas are true, even if they are not locally true.)

Hmm, no.

I saw a falling star tonight when I was thinking about the 'undivisability' of things. Great, I had my first mystic experience!

I asked the question: Did you ever experience a 'thing'? So, let's take the falling star as an example.

What is a falling star? I know, from hearsay, that it is a collection of rubble passing through our atmosphere. Does it have a boundary which makes it a 'thing'? No. It consists of rubble, a level deeper of atoms (silicon, water, air molecules it interacts with, light it dissipates), a level deeper QM 'clouds'.

Does it exist? I would say no. The abstraction 'falling star' exists, but not in physical reality, but as a linguistic experience, a fuzzy abstraction (a sign) of an imperfect [sensory] experience of a physical phenomenon.

The same seems to be true for 'a chair,' 'a star,' 'a person,' anything.

But the basis of math, arithmetic, is that I can abstract physical phenomena into abstract things and can, for instance, count them. One falling star, two falling stars, etc. But discrete things don't seem to exist in reality, except as linguistical phenomena. How can we assume that counting things actually says anything about reality? [Except as an imperfect approximation?]

Similarly, the basis of the denial of the existence of things is that those (discrete) things exist. But discrete things don't seem to exist, only the linguistic abstraction, how can we deny the existence of physical things except as a word game? Does the denial of the linguistic abstraction imply the non-existence of the physical phenomenon?

The basis of logic, and the excluded middle, is that something is, or is not. And this then, to me, seems to be a reduction at absurdum, an abstraction [logic] of an abstraction [linguistics] of [imperfect experiences of] physical phenomena? The first abstraction I have doubts about, the second abstraction might as well be called absurd?

 

[JordanL]

Nothing except more infractions for no defensible reason. A philosophy forum should be moderated by people with a working knowledge of philosophy.

I've worked large forums as a moderator before, so I have some advice:

Forums and their moderators are not about fairness or correctness or truth. It is about following instruction. It does not matter if the rules are not applied how you interpret them, they are applied as the moderators and administrators interpret them.

Forums are kind of like dictatorships, in that the merit of a decision does not matter. Or rather, your interpretation of the merit does not matter. If the moderator has been tasked with enforcing rules, it is because their judgment has been trusted as the final interpretation of those rules.

The defensible reason for any infraction is that it has been given. The very fact that the person who gave was capable of giving it is the reason that it is correct, within the context of this forum. That is why there are many different forums with many different kinds of communities.

If Evo cited a rule to challenge something you posted, you cannot both defend your position and understand the reason. It is one or the other, because the moderator is correct and you are not, because they are the moderator. In that sense, defending the position inherently means misunderstanding the reason, and moderators often have few tools to deal with that situation other than conversation and infraction.

My advice to you would be this: if you believe that the reasoning is flawed, first accept that you received some kind of infraction, then seek out the moderator in a PM with the solitary intent of understanding how you violated the rules. Do not seek to change the rules, or change interpretation, try and find under what assumptions the infraction is valid, then understand that participating in this forum means agreeing with those assumptions.

 

[JordanL]

Hmm, no.

I saw a falling star tonight when I was thinking about the 'undivisability' of things. Great, I had my first mystic experience!

I asked the question: Did you ever experience a 'thing'? So, let's take the falling star as an example.

What is a falling star? I know, from hearsay, that it is a collection of rubble passing through our atmosphere. Does it have a boundary which makes it a 'thing'? No. It consists of rubble, a level deeper of atoms (silicon, water, air molecules it interacts with, light it dissipates), a level deeper QM 'clouds'.

Does it exist? I would say no. The abstraction 'falling star' exists, but not in physical reality, but as a linguistic experience, a fuzzy abstraction (a sign) of an imperfect [sensory] experience of a physical phenomenon.

The same seems to be true for 'a chair,' 'a star,' 'a person,' anything.

But the basis of math, arithmetic, is that I can abstract physical phenomena into abstract things and can, for instance, count them. One falling star, two falling stars, etc. But discrete things don't seem to exist in reality, except as linguistical phenomena. How can we assume that counting things actually says anything about reality? [Except as an imperfect approximation?]

Similarly, the basis of the denial of the existence of things is that those (discrete) things exist. But discrete things don't seem to exist, only the linguistic abstraction, how can we deny the existence of physical things except as a word game? Does the denial of the linguistic abstraction imply the non-existence of the physical phenomenon?

The basis of logic, and the excluded middle, is that something is, or is not. And this then, to me, seems to be a reduction at absurdum, an abstraction of an abstraction of physical phenomena? The first abstraction I have doubts about, the second abstraction might as well be called absurd?

Ah, but you see, your interpretation of reality is within mine, it just excludes the rest of my interpretation. As the interpretation exists, it discretely exists, even if not within this Universe. Similarly, my interpretation does as well, even if not within this Universe.

All ideas which can be described with language are things, even your interpretation, and as things, they neither represent an objective truth nor represent any kind of permanence. There was a state in which both of our interpretations were not extant, so neither of our interpretations represent a constant truth of any kind from any perspective. Tautologically both of our interpretations are approximations of some "thing", not the thing itself.

Whether or not a thing is experienced or conveyed as information is completely irrelevant to the existence of those things, because all things, whether abstractions or not, had a time or a state in which they were absent, and so do not represent any kind of ultimate truth, either for you or for anyone else. They can be more true or less true, but not the truth.

Experiences are just as valid and invalid as knowledge for justifying existence, because they are both part of existence. In order to justify existence you must describe it within something larger than existence, otherwise you describe it incompletely.

A more concrete example of this principal would be the following: suppose you had a program to simulate the deterministic nature of a Universe. Could this program simulate our own Universe from within it? No, it could not, as it would require all of the totality of our existence within this Universe to create a simulation of our existence within this Universe. Our existence can be described as real or simulated, but they describe the same thing.

If real, they are discrete, and if not, they can only exist within some thing discrete which can contain their indiscreteness in order to be experienced as discrete. The fact that they can be interpreted as discrete, even if they are not, means that their discreteness holds at some level, even if it is a level beyond our own experience of existence.

 

[MarcoD]

Ah, but you see, your interpretation of reality is within mine, it just excludes the rest of my interpretation. As the interpretation exists, it discretely exists, even if not within this Universe. Similarly, my interpretation does as well, even if not within this Universe.

Great!

All ideas which can be described with language are things, even your interpretation, and as things, they neither represent an objective truth nor represent any kind of permanence. There was a state in which both of our interpretations were not extant, so neither of our interpretations represent a constant truth of any kind from any perspective. Tautologically both of our interpretations are approximations of some "thing", not the thing itself.

This is my point. I wonder whether 'discrete' things exist, as far as I know, I have a fuzzy understanding of the universe, and even a fuzzy experience of the linguistic abstractions I assign to what I experience. I find it a leap of faith to conclude from that those things exist, in an ontological sense, from that fuzzy understanding.

Since logic and math presuppose the existence of things (which don't exist), any mathematical description of the universe [as a collection of things] would therefor be flawed.

Whether or not a thing is experienced or conveyed as information is completely irrelevant to the existence of those things, because all things, whether abstractions or not, had a time or a state in which they were absent, and so do not represent any kind of ultimate truth, either for you or for anyone else. They can be more true or less true, but not the truth.

For the sake of the argument (I am not that rabid on it), I deny the existence of things altogether.

Moreover, you presuppose the existence of things by them being able to be absent. Like Parmenides I would say: Nothing is absent, nothing is present, the whole universe is the only thing there.

Experiences are just as valid and invalid as knowledge for justifying existence, because they are both part of existence. In order to justify existence you must describe it within something larger than existence, otherwise you describe it incompletely.

The existence of the universe, yes. The existence of discrete things within it, no.

A more concrete example of this principal would be the following: suppose you had a program to simulate the deterministic nature of a Universe. Could this program simulate our own Universe from within it? No, it could not, as it would require all of the totality of our existence within this Universe to create a simulation of our existence within this Universe. Our existence can be described as real or simulated, but they describe the same thing.

I would agree to that since the universe is an undivisable thing, and therefor couldn't be put in itself.

If real, they are discrete, and if not, they can only exist within some thing discrete which can contain their indiscreteness in order to be experienced as discrete. The fact that they can be interpreted as discrete, even if they are not, means that their discreteness holds at some level, even if it is a level beyond our own experience of existence.

Again. I wonder, and for the sake of the argument deny, that there are discrete things. Except for the one universe.

I would say that 'discreteness' is a fuzzy delusion of my perception of my internal linguistical games. So, I again deny that discreteness holds, in an ontological sense, at some level.

EDIT: Again, it's a bit of stretch, but it comes from my own, say even mystical, experience, that I never in my life have met 'a thing.' And I wonder what that means.

 

[JordanL]

This is my point. I wonder whether 'discrete' things exist, as far as I know, I have a fuzzy understanding of the universe, and even a fuzzy experience of the linguistic abstractions I assign to what I experience. I find it a leap of faith to conclude from that those things exist, in an ontological sense, from that fuzzy understanding.

The existence of the universe, yes. The existence of discrete things within it, no.

You find it to be a fuzzy understanding, but in concluding that it is fuzzy, you assign varying degrees of truth or falsity to them. How could one do so with things that do not exist? Things. In the absence of discreteness within the things of our Universe, there would be no such thing as truth or falsity at all, for any particular thing that is either true or false would be a declaration of the truth of falsity of existence itself.

For the sake of the argument (I am not that rabid on it), I deny the existence of things altogether.

Moreover, you presuppose the existence of things by them being able to be absent. Like Parmenides I would say: Nothing is absent, nothing is present, the whole universe is the only thing there.

In denying the existence, you confirm it exists. How can you deny that which is not extant? In order to deny it must be described, and this that can be described exists tautologically within its description.

I am not saying that the absence of things confirms their existence. Quite the opposite. I am saying that the things which can be declared false or can be denied must be present so that they can be declared upon.

How can one deny that which is not anywhere or within anything? The denial of it provides it exists within the context of denial. That has nothing to do with whether or not it is a thing or whether or not it is discrete. It by definition exists, as an idea, as a thing, or as something indescrete, in order to be commented upon at all.

I suppose the leap I am describing is that knowledge and experience are as concrete an existence as physical existence, they just interact with our Universe using different rules and different mechanisms. But they are a part of existence, or existence is a part of them, however you wish to phrase it.

Again. I wonder, and for the sake of the argument deny, that there are discrete things. Except for the one universe.

I would say that 'discreteness' is a fuzzy delusion of my perception of my internal linguistical games. So, I again deny that discreteness holds, in an ontological sense, at some level.

EDIT: Again, it's a bit of stretch, but it comes from my own, say even mystical, experience, that I never in my life have met 'a thing.' And I wonder what that means.

If the issue is mostly about whether or not the parts are discrete or not, and thus can be confirmed to exist inherently instead of as a part of the whole, then I would say that the idea of inherent or whole existence as you are describing it is missing the point.

Things do not need to be separate to be inherent, and the whole does not need to be divisible to have things. You can choose to engage all things as part of arbitrarily large or small systems, (ontological systems), because the only part of existence that has been utterly consistent has been this: all things exist within a larger existence, and contain smaller existences.

Where you decide to stop along this infinite chain of regress is unimportant and arbitrary in my opinion. Each thing within it contains the same infinite microchasms of existence, just as all things are contained within the larger macrochasm of our Universe's existence, and at least to me, logically it is also contained within infinitely larger existence.

There is no stopping point or starting point. Existence contains the Universe, the Universe does not contain existence, so dividing the Universe up into the real and not real is unimportant to me from an ontological perspective.

Side note: I am not actually trying to convince you of anything, and I would like to say that I've found your points fascinating and thought-provoking. This is an angle I have not had to consider the idea I'm proposing from before, and even as I explain it within the context of what you are presenting, my conclusions are not fully formed, and I am not nearly as firm in these opinions as I'm sure I seem to be.

 

[Willowz]

Nothing except more infractions for no defensible reason. A philosophy forum should be moderated by people with a working knowledge of philosophy.

I found your old thread very readable. https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=301514

 

[MarcoD]

You find it to be a fuzzy understanding, but in concluding that it is fuzzy, you assign varying degrees of truth or falsity to them. How could one do so with things that do not exist? Things.

No, you see. That's where I totally disagree with you. In the claim of 'assignment of varying degrees of truth of falsity,' is a presupposition that things exist. (To what can I assign if I don't believe in things, but think that the concept of 'thing' is a delusion?)

Again, I don't deny that I (fuzzily) perceive 'things' as emergent attributes from an internal linguistical game which is the result of an imperfect reflection on reality, but I fail to see how that would make things exist since everything I perceive is fuzzy, and -again- I have never encountered an (undividable/atomic) thing in reality, or in thought.

In the absence of discreteness within the things of our Universe, there would be no such thing as truth or falsity at all, for any particular thing that is either true or false would be a declaration of the truth of falsity of existence itself.

Yes, there cannot be a thing, as truth, since things don't exist. Truth itself is a delusional linguistic abstraction stemming from a linguistic game.

In denying the existence, you confirm it exists. How can you deny that which is not extant? In order to deny it must be described, and this that can be described exists tautologically within its description.

I deny the existence of things, not the universe. The universe I perceive, it exists.

I deny that description is the proof of existence of things. The description is a delusional linguistical game in itself.

I am not saying that the absence of things confirms their existence. Quite the opposite. I am saying that the things which can be declared false or can be denied must be present so that they can be declared upon.

Which is a stretch to far for me, since I deny things exist, and therefor, things cannot be declared false.

How can one deny that which is not anywhere or within anything? The denial of it provides it exists within the context of denial. That has nothing to do with whether or not it is a thing or whether or not it is discrete. It by definition exists, as an idea, as a thing, or as something indescrete, in order to be commented upon at all.

No, the denial is on the fact that 'How can one deny that which is not anywhere or within anything,' is a linguistical stament, a word game, an imperfect delusion. 'The universe is,' is also a word game, but something I experience; 'that what is not' is (only) a word game, since it cannot be experienced.

I suppose the leap I am describing is that knowledge and experience are as concrete an existence as physical existence, they just interact with our Universe using different rules and different mechanisms. But they are a part of existence, or existence is a part of them, however you wish to phrase it.

To me, knowledge and experience and physical perception is the universe - they are all -for lack of better words- 'fuzzy'.

(After that, there is the process of accepting that there is also a physical universe, that I am a part of that, and that knowledge and experience are probably reducable to the universe itself- but I really don't want to start a debate on materialism.)

If the issue is mostly about whether or not the parts are discrete or not, and thus can be confirmed to exist inherently instead of as a part of the whole, then I would say that the idea of inherent or whole existence as you are describing it is missing the point.

Things do not need to be separate to be inherent, and the whole does not need to be divisible to have things. You can choose to engage all things as part of arbitrarily large or small systems, (ontological systems), because the only part of existence that has been utterly consistent has been this: all things exist within a larger existence, and contain smaller existences.

Yeah, well, unless I deny that last statement since the universe is undividable. No things exist.

There is no stopping point or starting point. Existence contains the Universe, the Universe does not contain existence, so dividing the Universe up into the real and not real is unimportant to me from an ontological perspective.

Ah. But you constantly do divide, or make statements which imply that you can divide things. For instance, a 'decision between accepted or rejected.'

Why do I reject decision (in free will)? Because:

A) I reject 'things' exist, except as for as delusions from my mind stemming from a linguistic game. And
B) A decision is a choice between (two) things.

Therefor, decisions don't exist. It is impossible since there is nothing to chose between.

Side note: I am not actually trying to convince you of anything, and I would like to say that I've found your points fascinating and thought-provoking. This is an angle I have not had to consider the idea I'm proposing from before, and even as I explain it within the context of what you are presenting, my conclusions are not fully formed, and I am not nearly as firm in these opinions as I'm sure I seem to be.

I am not trying to convince anyone of anything here too. I just think that I am deluded in my perception of reality, that's an uncommon stance.

 

[bohm2]

But I mostly reject mathematics as a basis for philosophical answers.

So I'm guessing you wouldn't agree with Friedman's quote below?

"the philosophers of the modern tradition from Descartes are not best understood as attempting to stand outside the new science so as to show, from some mysterious point outside of sciences itself that our scientific knowledge somehow mirrors an independently existing reality. Rather, they start from the fact of modern scientific knowledge as a fixed point, as it were. Their problem is not so much to justify this knowledge from some 'higher' standpoint so as to articulate the new philosophical conceptions that are forced upon us by the new science. In Kant's words, mathematics and the science of nature stand in no need of philosophical inquiry for themselves, but for the sake of another science: metaphysics."

If you don't agree, what are some reasons you think this view is mistaken?

 

[MarcoD]

So I'm guessing you wouldn't agree with Friedman's quote below?

"the philosophers of the modern tradition from Descartes are not best understood as attempting to stand outside the new science so as to show, from some mysterious point outside of sciences itself that our scientific knowledge somehow mirrors an independently existing reality. Rather, they start from the fact of modern scientific knowledge as a fixed point, as it were. Their problem is not so much to justify this knowledge from some 'higher' standpoint so as to articulate the new philosophical conceptions that are forced upon us by the new science. In Kant's words, mathematics and the science of nature stand in no need of philosophical inquiry for themselves, but for the sake of another science: metaphysics."

If you don't agree, what are some reasons you think this view is mistaken?

Well, for those who missed it, I just gave an ontological/metaphysical argument that math may fall short of describing reality by questioning a fundamental assumption in it: the existence of things. (Which leads to, among others, counting and the law of the excluded middle.)

I have no other reason except for a) a feeling that we know way less than we think, b) the above argument, and c) (a reason stolen from fundamentalist Islamist) that the rational method leads to reductions at absurdum, or, doesn't seem to have improved our understanding of nature one iota, and d) doesn't seem to have solved any fundamental problem in the world.

I therefor, jokingly, posted that a more fundamental question than 'Why change?' would be 'Who are you?' Now that seems like an unscientific question, but stemming from Greek tradition, if we drop all assumptions, shouldn't the question about other intelligences be more fundamental to our core (ontological) knowledge of the world given what we experience?

 

[apeiron]

but stemming from Greek tradition, if we drop all assumptions...

Do you have a source for this?

Perhaps you mean here the method of induction. So where does that leave deduction (and hence mathematical argument)?

 

[bohm2]

a) a feeling that we know way less than we think,

This is what really confuses me also. On the one hand, one can't help but have this sense of immense progress in selected domains (like in physics) so that we are getting closer to ‘the real properties of the natural world’ and yet if we assume we are like all other animals and not gods, our knowledge must be pretty slim. It seems almost a sure thing that things-in-themselves (if that term even applies) will forever be hidden from us as Kant argued. Consider Pinker's argument:

We are organisms, not angels, and our minds are organs, not pipelines to the truth. Our minds evolved by natural selection to solve problems that were life-and-death matters to our ancestors, not to commune with correctness.

Thus, it's argued that our minds like most other biological systems/organs are likely poor solutions to the design-problems posed by nature. They are, "the best solution that evolution could achieve under existing circumstances, but perhaps a clumsy and messy solution." Thus, it seems we cannot have direct knowledge of how the world is like as the knowledge has to be routed in terms of the resources available to our theory-building abilities/mental organs and these are not likely to be "pipelines to the truth".

What is even stranger is the "the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences". Why is abstract mathematics so effective especially given its unlikely role in natural selection. I mean abstract mathematical thinking doesn't appear to have played any role in our evolution. I mean our ancestors didn't even know they had it, I think? I mean, what survival advantage does the ability to do abstract mathematics have to do with dealing with every day objects?

 

[MarcoD]

Do you have a source for this?

Perhaps you mean here the method of induction. So where does that leave deduction (and hence mathematical argument)?

One might wonder whether deduction, and you should define that, is a mathematical argument.

EDIT: Critical thinking is assigned to the Socratic school of thought, but probably older than that. I forgot why it is assigned.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Critical_thinking

 

[MarcoD]

This is what really confuses me also. On the one hand, one can't help but have this sense of immense progress in selected domains (like in physics) so that we are getting closer to ‘the real properties of the natural world’ and yet if we assume we are like all other animals and not gods, our knowledge must be pretty slim. It seems almost a sure thing that things-in-themselves (if that term even applies) will forever be hidden from us as Kant argued. Consider Pinker's argument:

We are organisms, not angels, and our minds are organs, not pipelines to the truth. Our minds evolved by natural selection to solve problems that were life-and-death matters to our ancestors, not to commune with correctness.

Fortunately, this problem is solved by all religions. (This was a joke. Thing is in your argument you assume an awful lot, which I tried to avoid in the ontological denial.)

Thus, it's argued that our minds like most other biological systems/organs are likely poor solutions to the design-problems posed by nature. They are, "the best solution that evolution could achieve under existing circumstances, but perhaps a clumsy and messy solution." Thus, it seems we cannot have direct knowledge of how the world is like as the knowledge has to be routed in terms of the resources available to our theory-building abilities/mental organs and these are not likely to be "pipelines to the truth".

Plato's cave enhanced with biology and evolutionary theory. The problem is that Plato already showed that without biology and evolutionary theory our understanding is hopelessly ineffective. (But to be honest, I don't care to much about these questions. The only interesting thing about my original denial of existence of things is that it might reasonably show that math is inadequate to describe reality. I don't really care to much about the other, for me, unanswerable questions of existence.)

What is even stranger is the "the Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences". Why is abstract mathematics so effective especially given its unlikely role in natural selection. I mean abstract mathematical thinking doesn't appear to have played any role in our evolution. I mean our ancestors didn't even know they had it, I think? I mean, what survival advantage does the ability to do abstract mathematics have to do with dealing with every day objects?

I don't buy into that claim except for that I think it's nice to believe as a physicist.

As for the last question, it just seems to me that nukes come in handy when dealing with existential questions of survival.

But, also, you reduced to Darwinism, which is amoral. I rather stopped worrying about that, and wonder more about why we fail to 'transcend' amorality.

EDIT: Maybe we should stop the thread, or discuss the reasonability of math being able to describe reality, or it's unreasonable effectiveness elsewhere.