Weinberg on the measurement problem

[Stephen Tashi]

What should the "consciousness of the observer" have to do with quantum measurements, which you can just let dead apparati do fully automatically without interference of any living being.

The dead apparati do not interpret what they are measuring. Investigating probabilities experimentally involves repeated measurements of similar events. It's human's who judge that a series of actions repeats "the same" experiment. Two repetitions of literally "the same" experiment wouldn't be two repetitions of something, it would be just that single self-same experiment. So interpreting the statistical significance of measurements involves a decision to classify different things as being alike.

A question (not particularly for @vanhees71 ) is how and whether interpretations of QM that invoke the conscious observer actually need an observer who experiences the subjective feeling we call consciousness. Can their approach be explained by an "observer" who is merely a machine or process that classifies things?

Suppose an observer (conscious or not) judges that preparations A define "the same" experiment. While he is executing these similar experiments, he encounters some cases where event B happens and some where it does not. He has the option of consider the cases where B happens as a subset of the data for theories about what happens after preparation A. He also has the option of considering those cases alone and taking data relevant to "What happens after preparation A is made and event B occurs?". Variations in passive classification don't affect the outcome of experiments, but they do affect probabilities in the sense that they affect the very definition of what probabilities are being estimated.

Is it necessary to call the choices in classification subjective, or a belief, or a function of the knowledge of the observer? Those things are are associated with conscious human observers. But do interpretations of QM that invoke a conscious observer actually need consciousness? Or do they merely need a process that makes decisions about classification?[

 

[Mentz114]

I'm not sure why you think I'm trapping you rather than just discussing things.
The problem is that in QM the initial preparation, $\rho$ and the dynamics $U(t)$ do not give the outcomes in experiments. Thus it is not only the initial conditions and the dynamics that seem to govern experiments. Doesn't the Kochen-Specker theorem block all the dofs having values?

Told you so. I knew you would bring that up.

QM is a theory that predicts the probabilities of outcomes. It has nothing to say about the underlying dynamics. Theorems that claim otherwise are mathematically true but prove nothing except that such statements have no physical import.

 

[DarMM]

Told you so. I knew you would bring that up.

I referenced DOFs because you mentioned them in a way that seem to run counter to the Kochen-Specker theorem. I didn't originally intend to comment on them. I only did so in response to what you said in #33. It's odd to introduce a topic and then claim I brought it up. Of course it will now come up since you introduced it.

Are you saying that all DOFs have well-defined values prior to measurement?

Again my original intent was not even related to this, but you mentioned it.

QM is a theory that predicts the probabilities of outcomes. It has nothing to say about the underlying dynamics. Theorems that claim otherwise are mathematically true but prove nothing except that such statements have no physical import.

What theorems do you have in mind here?

 

[microsansfil]

By incomplete, I mean an effective theory which describes only what we, The human beings with limited abilities, can observe in practice with current technology.

It seems that many scientists have still not become aware that what we call "nature" appears to us first of all through our consciousness. A consequence is for example :

http://www.ler.esalq.usp.br/aulas/lce1302/visao_aves.pdf

It is true, as many youngsters learn in school, that objects absorb some wavelengths of light and reflect the rest and that the colors we perceive “in” objects relate to the wavelengths of the reflected light. But color is not actually a property of light or of objects that reflect light. It is a sensation that arises within the brain.

The correlation between wavelength and perceived color is imperfect. Similar perceptions of color can be associated with various mixtures of light of different wavelengths and intensities.

It is the same for all our senses.

For us human being, consciousness/Lived experience is the starting point of any inquiry, is where we start from and where all must link back to.

/Patrick

 

[Mentz114]

I referenced DOFs because you mentioned them in a way that seem to run counter to the Kochen-Specker theorem. I didn't originally intend to comment on them. I only did so in response to what you said in #33. It's odd to introduce a topic and then claim I brought it up. Of course it will now come up since you introduced it.

I mentioned dof's in the hope you might realize the futility of quoting theorems to persuade me of your point.
You never address my main point that the wave function cannot influence a dynamic process and is only a formula to calculate probabilities etc which I've tried to restate in different ways above.

All your arguments contradict this and therefore have no weight for me.

 

[DarMM]

I mentioned dof's in the hope you might realize the futility of quoting theorems to persuade me of your point.

All your arguments contradict this and therefore have no weight for me.

I wasn't aware I had a point I was arguing in favor of. I certainly was not advocating the wave function as real. I don't know a single place where I invoked this.

The Kochen Specker theorem doesn't even rely on nor is concerned with the wave function being real. What's your issue with it or why do you think you can ignore its implications considering they seem to run counter to what you have said? You seem to be saying all the values prexisted the measurement, but this seems impossible in light of the theorem and the theorem isn't about wave function reality. In fact it's a theorem about the observable algebra not the state.

 

[Mentz114]

I wasn't aware I had a point I was arguing in favor of. I certainly was not advocating the wave function as real. I don't know a single place where I invoked this.

Sorry about that. But you accept it as a premise, which is nearly as bad

The Kochen Specker theorem doesn't even rely on nor is concerned with the wave function being real. What's your issue with it or why do you think you can ignore its implications considering they seem to run counter to what you have said? You seem to be saying all the values prexisted the measurement, but this seems impossible in light of the theorem and the theorem isn't about wave function reality. In fact it's a theorem about the observable algebra not the state.

I admit that I have not tried to understand the theorem.

You make my point with the words I've emphasised. For the theorem to have physical import the 'operator algebra' must be physical. But it is a mathematical object. The theorem makes a statement about a methodology not about values of dynamical variables.

 

[DarMM]

Sorry about that. But you accept it as a premise, which is nearly as bad

Where did I accept it as a premise?

You make my point with the words I've emphasised. For the theorem to have physical import the 'operator algebra' must be physical. But it is a mathematical object. The theorem makes a statement about a methodology not about values of dynamical variables.

That was the classic Kochen Specker theorem. The modern one in the ontological models framework can be proven directly as a contradiction between pre-existing values and observations, just as Bell's theorem does not rely on the mathematical structure of QM.

 

[vanhees71]

By incomplete, I mean an effective theory which describes only what we, the human beings with limited abilities, can observe in practice with current technology.

That's of course a hard to answer question. We can always only get information about nature by observing her. It may well be that we cannot observe some aspects of nature. Also any theory is always "complete" as long as no observations indicate that something is missing. For me to say "a theory is complete" always includes an "as far as we know now", and in this sense many previous theories turned out to be incomplete in the one or the other way.

In that sense, as far as we know, QT is complete. It precisely describe what we observe. The key issue we always come back to in our debates over interpretation is the probabilistic meaning of the state. According to QT the implied randomness of nature is fundamental, i.e., it is not due to lack of knowledge about the value of an observable but even if we have determined the state of a system completely, i.e., determined the values of a complete set of compatible observables, some other observables are indetermined. According to QT this indeterminism is not due to lack of knowledge of the state but it's a necessary conclusion of the theory.

So far, despite some effort, nobody has found a way to save the determinism of classical physics in a way that's compatible with the observations. E.g., the time at which a given unstable nucleus decays is indetermined. It's not due to a lack of knowledge about its state but it simply is indetermined.

Everything we can say about nature is however only preliminary in the sense that we can always only use or most up-to-date knowledge (condensed to theories) to make statements like these discussed above. Maybe one day somebody finds a deterministic theory, but then it must explain at least the same phenomenology as QT does, and I'm not sure whether those who feel uneasy with QT, particularly it's state on ontolgy, will feel more comfortable with a non-local deterministic more comprehensive theory. If there's "quantum weirdness" (which I don't think there is, because I accept the posibility of genuine randomness without any quibbles), then I predict there'll be even weirder ideas necessary to formulate such a non-local determinstic theory.

 

[vanhees71]

Told you so. I knew you would bring that up.

QM is a theory that predicts the probabilities of outcomes. It has nothing to say about the underlying dynamics. Theorems that claim otherwise are mathematically true but prove nothing except that such statements have no physical import.

What do you mean by "it has nothing to say about the underlying dynamics"? To the contrary QT has everything to say about dynamics. Given the initial state and the Hamiltonian of the system you can calculate the state at any later time. That's dynamics, isn't it? It's not a theorem but makes up part of the fundamental postulates of the theory.

 

[Demystifier]

For me to say "a theory is complete" always includes an "as far as we know now"

So when you say that physics doesn't care about philosophical problems one might have with physics, you really mean that the best theories we currently have are just instrumental tools that work in practice, and from the point of view of their work in practice the philosophical questions are simply irrelevant. Asking philosophical questions about quantum mechanics is no more meaningful than asking philosophical questions about a hammer.

 

[Mentz114]

What do you mean by "it has nothing to say about the underlying dynamics"? To the contrary QT has everything to say about dynamics. Given the initial state and the Hamiltonian of the system you can calculate the state at any later time. That's dynamics, isn't it? It's not a theorem but makes up part of the fundamental postulates of the theory.

I think you are referring to the 'dynamics' of the probabilities $\psi(t) = e^{i\hat{H}t}\psi$. I mean something else.

 

[Mentz114]

Where did I accept it as a premise?That was the classic Kochen Specker theorem. The modern one in the ontological models framework can be proven directly as a contradiction between pre-existing values and observations, just as Bell's theorem does not rely on the mathematical structure of QM.

OK, I'll read up on the KS theorem when I get the chance. But it sounds as if it assumes that $\psi$ must be real.

 

[DarMM]

OK, I'll read up on the KS theorem when I get the chance. But it sounds as if it assumes that $\psi$ must be real.

It doesn't. I don't know why you think it sounds like it does because it literally does not assume it.

 

[microsansfil]

We can always only get information about nature by observing her. It may well be that we cannot observe some aspects of nature.

Are we observing from "nature " something other than a function of space and time F(r,t) or a function of sound and time F(s, t)?

For example, concerning the spin, what we observe is a position which is a function of space and time, and then we need a theoretical model to interpret it.

Another example: Cloud chamber.

/Patrick

 

[Lord Jestocost]

It seems that many scientists have still not become aware that what we call "nature" appears to us first of all through our consciousness.

Maybe, this might be true for matter-of-fact scientists with a limited philosophical background.
But there are others. For example, Bernard d'Espagnat who puts it in the following way: "What we call 'reality' is just a state of mind".

https://www.theguardian.com/science/blog/2009/mar/17/templeton-quantum-entanglement

 

[vanhees71]

I think you are referring to the 'dynamics' of the probabilities $\psi(t) = e^{i\hat{H}t}\psi$. I mean something else.

So what do you mean?

Dynamics means to calculate from the past state of the system (i.e., knowing it for $t<t_0$) the state for all $t>t_0$. QT is even more modest: You only need to know the state at one point in time $t=t_0$ to know it at all times $t>t_0$. So we have a pretty strong form of the causality principle.

Note than this does NOT imply determinism, since determinism means that all observables take determined values at any time, which is not the case in QT since the full preparation of a state does not imply that all observables take determined value, because the physical meaning of the quantum state is probabilistic (and only probabilistic).

 

[Elias1960]

We must go beyond the metaphysical beliefs of naive realism, to which many physicists seem to adhere.

As long as viable realistic interpretations exist, even "naive" ones, there is no need to give up realism.

 

[Elias1960]

According to QT the implied randomness of nature is fundamental, i.e., it is not due to lack of knowledge about the value of an observable but even if we have determined the state of a system completely, i.e., determined the values of a complete set of compatible observables, some other observables are indetermined.
According to QT this indeterminism is not due to lack of knowledge of the state but it's a necessary conclusion of the theory.

Sorry, but this is correct only for some particular interpretations of QT. Moreover, it has to be a non-minimal, because there exist deterministic interpretations of QT.

Maybe one day somebody finds a deterministic theory, but then it must explain at least the same phenomenology as QT does,

Sorry, but it already has been found long ago, namely de Broglie-Bohm theory.

 

[vanhees71]

Well, for me there's one quantum theory, describing all observations of nature correctly. There are not many different theories but just several metaphysical additions, dubbed "interpretations". The only interpretation one needs as a physicist is to relate the formal descriptions of the theory to real-world observations, and that's done with the minimal interpretation.

The only determinstic interpretation which makes some sense in the non-relativistic case is de Broglie-Bohm, but it doesn't add anything to QT as a physical theory since all predictions are by construction equivalent. I've not yet seen a convincing dBB interpretation of relativistic QFT. That's why I consider it incomplete.

 

[Elias1960]

Well, for me there's one quantum theory, describing all observations of nature correctly. There are not many different theories but just several metaphysical additions, dubbed "interpretations". The only interpretation one needs as a physicist is to relate the formal descriptions of the theory to real-world observations, and that's done with the minimal interpretation.

But the minimal interpretation remains silent about the metaphysical questions which those other interpretations add to QT. It does not reject them in any way.

I've not yet seen a convincing dBB interpretation of relativistic QFT. That's why I consider it incomplete.

I have. D. Bohm, B. Hiley and P. Kaloyerou, An ontological basis for the quantum theory: II - A causal interpretation of quantum fields, Phys. Rep. 144 (1987) 349-375.

 

[vanhees71]

Science is and should be silent about metaphysical questions. That's both its strength and limitation!

 

[DarMM]

What does the minimal interpretation say about superpositions which encompass macroscopic degrees of freedom. I don't mean macro dofs alone as they are handled by decoherence, I mean the superposition still present in total system, environment included

 

[A. Neumaier]

What does the minimal interpretation say about superpositions which encompass macroscopic degrees of freedom.

(dies -> does)

It says nothing about these themselves since it only interprets ideal measurements of observables defined by selfadjoint operators, nothing else.

But it says that if in such state you measure a spin component you get the right probabilities corresponding to the macroscopic superposition.

 

[vanhees71]

In the standard interpretation you trace out all details which are not resolved. You can do quantum statistics and quantum-many-body theory in the standard formulation very well and straight-forwardly.

 

[DarMM]

In the standard interpretation you trace out all details which are not resolved. You can do quantum statistics and quantum-many-body theory in the standard formulation very well and straight-forwardly.

My question was about the total system. What does the fact that the environment considered in total still has interference terms mean in the minimal statistical interpretation?

 

[vanhees71]

It means that, if you could resolve enough microscopic details you should be able to observe the corresponding interference terms, but it's tough to get such details measured. There are, however, some examples, where macroscopic systems show quantum behavior, like two diamonds with entangled phonon modes.