- #36
superwolf
- 184
- 0
OB 50 said:Should we oppose what?
Stoning in Iran.
OB 50 said:Should we oppose what?
superwolf said:Should we oppose it?
superwolf said:Betterment is relative.
superwolf said:Stoning in Iran.
OB 50 said:Personally, this is the kind of moral relativism I find disgusting.
JoeDawg said:Not standing up for what you believe in is apathy, not relativism.
Moral relativism and cultural relativism are not synonymous.OB 50 said:Agreed. However, you have to resolve your stance on moral relativism before you can make a moral judgment on what it is you believe.
No. I acknowledge they have a different moral system than I do. I also put more value on mine. I just don't pretend mine is written in stone somewhere. I also put more value on mine, than on those shared by many Americans.If you think it's okay for women to be stoned in Iran because "that's acceptable in their culture", then you subscribe to moral relativism and it is not a violation of your beliefs.
OB 50 said:I get what you're saying, and I agree with you for the most part.
It's all about context. If we step back far enough, nothing really matters at all. Humans will be extinct one day, and nothing that anybody ever did will mean anything at all. The universe will die a slow heat death, and all is for naught.
However, while we're here and alive, we all have to play along within the context of our individual experience.
OB 50 said:Not really. Every action taken by an individual either contributes to that society's ability to continue existing, or hampers it. The consequences may not be immediately obvious, but it's one or the other.
OB 50 said:Agreed. However, you have to resolve your stance on moral relativism before you can make a moral judgment on what it is you believe.
superwolf said:That each case must be treated differently doesn't make moral realism untrue. If x makes X happy and y makes Y happy, it is moral to give x to X and to give y to Y.
All I want to rob poeple of, is the ability to determine that they don't value happiness. Even if different things make people happy, everyone must value happiess. Happiness is valuable per definition, I dare say. Since happiness is valuable, we should try to obtain as much as possible of it.
superwolf said:I reckon that intrinsic moral realities maybe don't exist, but does that mean that I have to be a moral relativist?
TheStatutoryApe said:This is moral relativism. In moral realism, as I understand it, one must be able to make objective and empirically verifiable moral statements absent subjective opinion. If the factors in a proposition change value depending on the subjective opinion of individuals then no proposition will have a consistent moral outcome and is there for non-objective.
JoeDawg said:Well, there are really two issues here.
First, is there an objective/absolute morality, and second, can I know, figure out, what it is?
If an absolute morality exists, we could simply be ignorant of what it is. In which case a god, with a couple of spare stone tablets, would come in handy.
If an objective morality exists, I need a system that provides some sort of conclusive way of identifying that standard.
I don't think gods exist, and I haven't seen a system able to derive an ought from an is.
Even if one, or the other, does exist though, if we are simply not privy to, or capable of, knowing it, then moral relativism is basically a fall back position, that acknowledges our ignorance.
The more affirmative relativism, denies the existence of any kind of standard. This seems an unreasonable and unnecessary step. If we can't get access to it, it might as well not exist, as far as we are concerned.
Morality seems quite distinctly a human issue, having to do with our ability to create abstractions from observation, nothing more. That's not a bad thing either in my mind. It gives us the freedom to decide how we will live.
Moridin said:For example, theft is the simultaneous assertion and rejection of universal property rights, which cannot stand.
Moridin said:No, it is moral realism. Moral realism means that the validity of moral statements depend on reality, whereas moral relativism says morality is arbitrarily subjective.
superwolf said:Moral realism is established in the moment you can show that evverybody should value something. That people disagree is not an argument as long as the proof is valid. I came with this proof in the OP.
superwolf said:Moral realism is established in the moment you can show that evverybody should value something. That people disagree is not an argument as long as the proof is valid. I came with this proof in the OP.
TheStatutoryApe said:Precisely as I said. If you apply values to your moral propositions based on subjective opinion it is moral relativism.
JoeDawg said:Well, that's one opinion.
Its way more complicated than that however.
First, it must be agreed that property rights exist.
Second, it must be agreed that a particular object belonged to a particular person
Third, it must be agreed that another person took possession of that object in a way that implied ownership, when ownership was not indeed transfered.
Individual property rights is a relatively new concept.
Its easy to claim ownership on all sorts of grounds.
There are all number of different levels of possession.
Ultimately it becomes a matter of legal consensus, not really morality.
TheStatutoryApe said:So you determine what other people should value? And exactly what value they should attach to it? Its one thing to say that everyone does or should value something (generally everyone values their own life for instance, easy argument) its a whole other issue to determine precisely what value should be placed upon that thing. Consistent relative values between different factors in moral propositions is necessary to an objective rule of measure.
Moridin said:Not at all. Any statement that simultaneously reject and affirm the existence of jaxyplonk is an invalid position, even if we know nothing about jaxyplonk.
Moridin said:Values are the functional equivalent to biological needs. But as stated earlier, even if values where subjective, that which we should do to fulfill values (= morality) is not. It is true that in order for my car to function, I ought to change the oil in my car. This is objectively true, even if other people do not value their cars. This is what individualist morality (as oppose to collectivist morality) is about.
superwolf said:Ethics are our theories on morals, and morals are what we should do. But why do we need ethics? The human being is a living organism, and we have to choose between life and death. Maintaining life depends on certain actions. It is the existence of life that gives rise to values, because it is only for living entities that things can be good or evil.
Values express our relationship to things that benefit or hurt a living organism. To say that something is of value for an organism, is to say that it maintains the life of an organism. For instance, when we say that water is valuable for a plant, we are saying that water supports the life of the plant, which is an undisputable fact.
Ethics therefore have a fundament in empiri. The sphere of values is therefore not separated logically from the sphere of facts. Normative considerations can therefore be derived from facts. Several specific sciences care about normative considerations. In medicine, for instance, prescribes those actions that should be carried out to maintain health. But for the decisions of the doctor to be vaild, they must be bassed on objective knowledge, facts about human nature though physiology, anatomi, etc. Ethics is therefore a normative science.
A normatiive consideration is to say that we must act in a certain way to obtain a given target. A doctor should do X if he wants to cure his patient. In the same way, ethics are theories about what we should do to obtain Y. We therefore have to find what this target is that we want to obtain. What should we value more than anything? If we don't know this, we get a problemm motivating actions, solving conflicts, something Immanuel Kant knew perfectly well.
Happiness is the ultimate goal. I have therefore proven that those actions that lead to less suffering and more happiness, relative to other choices, are the moral ones. Utilitarianism is true.
It is important to note that this is not only about the consequence of the action for the external environment, but also for the very person that acts. Ethical theories are therefore objective.
TheStatutoryApe said:Moral realism states that moral propositions are objectively true or false independant of subjective opinion. If the objective truth in a moral proposition is changed by the subjective values placed upon the factors in the moral proposition it is no longer objective and no longer moral realism.
The use of facts in moral propositions, of itself, does not constitute moral realism. All moral philosophys include facts in their moral propositions and then resolve those propositions based on a measure of value; absolute value in the case of absolutism, objective value in the case of realism, and subjective value in the case of relativism.
These are part and parcel to the definitions of each philosophy.
"A car engine needs oil to operate properly" is not a moral proposition. Rewording this and tossing in the qualifier "If you value your car" does not change this.Moridin said:This is clearly false. Even if you don't value your car, the conditional "if you value your car, you ought to change the oil when it needs to". This is not something that varies between people or cultures. It is not the case that cars do not worth without oil in Iraq, but not in the United state.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moral_realismMoral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:
-Ethical sentences express propositions.
-Some such propositions are true.
-Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.
Moridin said:You are confusing value and morality here. They are not the same.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MoralityIn its second, normative and universal sense, morality refers to an ideal code of conduct, one which would be espoused in preference to alternatives by all rational people, under specified conditions. In this "prescriptive" sense of morality as opposed to the above described "descriptive" sort of sense, moral value judgments such as "murder is immoral" are made. To deny 'morality' in this sense is a position known as moral skepticism, in which the existence of objective moral "truths" is rejected.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ValuesA personal and cultural value is a relative ethic value, an assumption upon which implementation can be extrapolated.
I have already shown the fallacy in this argument. There is no moral prescriptive in moral relativism. If you think there is then please find a standard definition that says so and show it to me. There are many moral relativists and they all are possessed of their own moral codes, some of which may contain the belief of non-intervention, but by the very definition of moral relativism there is no right or preferred moral code.Moridin said:Let me make the following argument against moral relativism with the reformers dilemma. By moral relativism I mean the position: "that which is moral is determined by culture".
1. If moral relativism is valid, then all moral reformers are mistaken.
2. It is not the case that all moral reformers are mistaken.
3. Moral relativism is invalid.
It is clear that if moral relativism is valid, then any societal moral climate is valid within that culture and the moral reformer is challenging the true moral values of his culture. It seems also quite impossible to deny the second premises, because it means you have to hold things as slavery and the Holocaust as morally correct and that the moral reformers who challenged these beliefs where morally wrong. Thus, it follows, that moral relativism is invalid.
A prescriptive statement is not by definition moral in nature. A prescriptive statement sets down a rule and a rule can be moral, itellectual, mathematical, artistic, scientific, mechanical, linguistic, logical, ect. A rule can be subjective: based on opinion and belief, or a rule can be objective: based on observation and reason. If you believe all such rules are moral in nature than I suggest we simply stop discussing this since I do not wish to read the dictionary according to Moridin so we can understand one another.Moridin said:That is not a prescriptive, but descriptive statement. But yes, all prescriptive statements are ultimately morally descriptive statements, since they prescribe an attitude to claims.
Moridin said:1. If moral relativism is valid, then all moral reformers are mistaken.
TheStatutoryApe said:"A car engine needs oil to operate properly" is not a moral proposition. Rewording this and tossing in the qualifier "If you value your car" does not change this.
"It is wrong to kill" is a moral proposition.
If the value placed upon "life" and the value placed upon what could theoretically be gained or lost by taking that life are based on subjective opinion then any truth or fallacy in the proposition is subjective/non-objective/relative.
Morality is dependant upon values. Without values moral propositions can not be true, false, or in any way meaningful. To make claims as to the possible truth, fallacy, or meaning of moral propositions is to make claims about values.
I have already shown the fallacy in this argument. There is no moral prescriptive in moral relativism.
There are many moral relativists and they all are possessed of their own moral codes, some of which may contain the belief of non-intervention, but by the very definition of moral relativism there is no right or preferred moral code.
I can not damn you for doing what you believe you should do, but I can damn myself for not doing what I believe I ought to do. The argument taken to its full logical conclusion invalidates itself.
The idea that 'the nazi or slaver possesses a "right" to act and the relativist has the "right" to interefer is contradictory' is not a problem for relativists, it is a problem for those looking at relativism through other than a relativist perspective.
The notion that statements about morals are themselves moral statements is absurd. I may as well say that statements about mathematics (ie "Math is hard") are equivalent to mathematical statements (ie "1+1=2").
A prescriptive statement is not by definition moral in nature.
A prescriptive statement sets down a rule and a rule can be moral, itellectual, mathematical, artistic, scientific, mechanical, linguistic, logical, ect.
If you believe all such rules are moral in nature than I suggest we simply stop discussing this since I do not wish to read the dictionary according to Moridin so we can understand one another.
JoeDawg said:This is patently false. Moral relativism means there is no objective truth, so no one can be 'mistaken'.
Everyone simply has an 'opinion', based on their subjective experience.
By saying that two conflicting opinions must imply one is 'mistaken', you are simply claiming that objective morals exist. And while this may be true, you have not shown any way one could logically determine what is objectively moral.
Not even science deals with 'truth' objectively, it attempts to be as objective as possible, but science is about evidence and probability. All of which is perspective dependent and relativistic. Objectivity is an ideal, objectivism is idealism.