What is the Role of Ontology in Epistemic Differences and Entity Connections?

[Mentat]

In the case where I see my co-worker who is physically there, and the case where I see her and she is not physically there (i.e. I hallucinate her), what is the difference, and what remains the same?

You have successfully missed the point once again, AKG. In the second instance you don't "see her when she's not physically there". You don't see her at all. A similar process to that which happens when you do see her, occurs of its own accord, but that does not necessitate that you are actually seeing anything at all (indeed, it is perhaps more likely to occur when your eyes are shut).

The only thing that we might say remains the same is the process that happens in the cortex. But my co-worker has bright green clothes. Nothing in my cortex is bright green. The activity in my cortex causes me to see (an image of) bright green clothes, the activity itself is not bright green.

And what are "you"? Your cortex "causes" nothing more than the continual self-re-stimulation of arrays of neurons (pyramidal ones, in this case). It doesn't even really "cause" this, as it is partly composed of such arrays. Activities in your cortex don't "cause you to see" anything, indeed they are the process of "seeing". What causes those processes to occur can either be external stimulus (your co-workers presence, and the correlate light reflections) or can be internal stimulus (self-re-stimulation by a series of such neurons as the aforementioned).

There is a subjective mental image that I have. You seem to be equivocating processes occurring in the cortex with qualia, the two are very clearly not the same.

Ok, but I was certainly not equivocating them. I don't even recognize the existence of these "qualia" or "subjective mental images". I do, however, recognize the confirmed existence of cortical processes.

Experiencing qualia includes experiences of redness and heat, etc. Chemical reactions in the brain are not experiences of redness or heat, they simply cause them.

An ad hoc (or, perhaps, ad hominem) assumption with no grounds in any field of study whatsoever.

Now, when I hallucinate, I can refer to my co-worker as a thing, as a noun, an object. I can refer to that hallucination of the co-worker, so what is its ontological status?

I can also "refer to" a unicorn, or to Zeus, or to Einstein. The purpose of this "reference" is to stimulate a similar reaction to those which occurred upon your first having learned of such things. It does not conjure (ex nihilo?) some new creature that fits the descriptions of such beings, nor does it conjure up (again, from where?) any "image" thereof.

Once again, you are making too many assumptions, and will bear the burden of proof for all of them.

When I say that I see purple clothes on my co-worker, I don't mean that I see purple clothes on my brain or on my electrons...

Why do you keep saying this? Of course you can't see your brain, you don't have any eyes in there!

You say that when I hallucinate and say that she appears there, that she really doesn't appear there. That's wrong. Physically, she is not there, but she really does appear there. I do see her there, despite the fact that she is not physically there.

No you don't.

{We could go on like that for a while, if you don't substantiate your claims...after all, that's all it really amounts to, for a person to conduct such sloppy philosophy as what you are currently doing: you make a claim, without substantiation, and I can do nothing but utter the opposite claim (or the negation of the claim) since you haven't given me anything else (of substance) to attack}.

I should point out that "see" can be used in different senses. In one sense, it implies physical existence, and in the other, you could say that it implies that I think there is physical existence, although that's not the best definition.

Sure it is. It is a perfect definition. You do indeed think that there is a physical presence when no such thing is there. You believe it to varying degrees, but belief is itself nothing more than the degree of argument your willing to put into defending a notion.

Note that when I imagine here to be in that physical location, I don't believe that she is there. I can imagine myself flying without actually believing that I'm flying. So "belief" is not what is common there. What is common, is what I refer to as "the image."

And you believe, with all your might, that such an image exists. It is nothing more than belief.

Since, whenever I use the word "image," the only thing you seem to understand is "photograph," I have had to try the above, roundabout way to try to get you to see what I'm referring to. Does it help? Do you know what I'm talking about when I speak of the common thing that is part of actually seeing her, dreaming her, imagining her, and hallucinating her?

The only thing common to seeing her, dreaming about her, imagining her, hallucinating about her, etc is that it is the same process with different origins of stimuli.

Reality is all that exists. To speak of multiple realities is to speak of multiple groups of all that exists.

Tell that to the philosophers who came up with ontological dichotomies.

It's not my problem (for the millionth time). I don't need to address your arguments against ontology, because I don't hold the concept myself. I agree with you. However, I do not agree that our not liking or agreeing with a notion has any effect on the "actual" state of things.

A rock is an element of the set of solids, which is a subset of all matter, which is a subset of all that is physical, which is a subset of all that is real.

But one can (as I have in a recent post...hopefully you'll recognize this, or else I'm going to assume you're not paying attention to my posts) show that the physical/non-physical distinction is exactly as problematic as any other ontological distinction, and that it does indeed fall back on what is "real" in one sense and "real" in another. Indeed, this is the most commonly-discussed ontological dichotomy.

However, by the reasoning(?) you've been using throughout this thread, the physical/non-physical distinction is ridiculous and should be thrown out since there is hardly even a vague concept/definition of what it means to be "physical".

If it makes you feel better, let's just say that when something happens in my brain that causes me to have a mental (non-physical) perception, then there is simply a reaction between my brain and my mind, and not an interaction.

There cannot be a "reaction" between two things. If it occurs continually between any two things, it is an "interaction", by definition.

 

[Tournesol]

The only thing common to seeing her, dreaming about her, imagining her, hallucinating about her, etc is that it is the same process with different origins of stimuli.

But I can know that there is a commonality between a perception of a horse, a dream about a horse, etc, without having any idea at all of what the neural
"process" is. The way things seem to me is no the neural process per se,
because the things do not seem to be neural processes. (The way things seem to me may well really be the the way the neural process seems to itself, however. Then the mind is the way the brain appears to itself,
and the brain is the way the mind appears form the outside.)

 

[Mentat]

But I can know that there is a commonality between a perception of a horse, a dream about a horse, etc, without having any idea at all of what the neural
"process" is.

This comment is deeply entrenched in philosophical jargon, and it's very hard to make sense of it in any real terms.

I don't mean that to be offensive, it's just that you are referring to the "perception of a horse" as though it were a quantitative entity, rather than a process of perceiving a horse. There are no "quantum perceptions", but there is indeed a process of "perceiving", provided the right stimulus is available.

Therefore, there is no "commonality" between "a perception of a horse" and anything else, since there's no such thing as "a perception". Perception is not quantum (if it were, you'd be able to tell me the exact beginning and end of "a perception", the Final Draft (to use Dennettian terms)).

That we can understand the difference between perceiving a horse and believing that we perceive a horse while no such horse is present is, without the knowledge of neurology, is nothing surprising at all. We can also speak of points of light in the sky without any knowledge of the internal physics of stars.

The way things seem to me is not the neural process per se,
because the things do not seem to be neural processes.

Come on, Tournesol. You should know better than this. The way something seems to you is a way that you process that thing itself. It won't seem like neural process unless you are oberving a neural process (and you can't observe your own, since you don't have eyes inside your head (not that eyes would be sufficient, you'd also need a brain that connected to those eyes...but you get my drift, don't you?)).

 

[AKG]

Mentat

The biggest problem you're having here is a semantic one. For clarification, let us define see, and another word, see'.

When I see my co-worker, and she is physically there, or when I hallucinate her, or when I imagine her, or when I dream her, the experience is the same. Define see by

I see iff I have the common experience described above

and define see' by

I see' iff I have the common experience described above AND this experience is the result of physical stimulus resulting from the physical presence of whatever it is I experience (see).

From now on, when I say see I mean see and not see'. Now, when we use see' in the transitive sense, when I say "I see' x", then x usually refers to the physical thing which is stimulating the experience. We can use see in a transitive sense as well, but clearly, when we say "I see x", x will not refer to the physical stimulus, since no physical stimulus is required for seeing (by the definition above).

Consider the dictionary.com definition for hallucination given below:

a) Perception of visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, or gustatory experiences without an external stimulus and with a compelling sense of their reality, usually resulting from a mental disorder or as a response to a drug.
b) The objects or events so perceived.

Also, the definition for perception:

a) The process, act, or faculty of perceiving.
b) The effect or product of perceiving.

Definitions b) (for both hallucination and perception) are the "image" that I keep talking about. When I say, "I see x" then x refers to the product of perception, or the object that is hallucinated (perceived without external stimulus causing the perception), the image, etc.

And what are "you"? Your cortex "causes" nothing more than the continual self-re-stimulation of arrays of neurons (pyramidal ones, in this case). It doesn't even really "cause" this, as it is partly composed of such arrays. Activities in your cortex don't "cause you to see" anything, indeed they are the process of "seeing". What causes those processes to occur can either be external stimulus (your co-workers presence, and the correlate light reflections) or can be internal stimulus (self-re-stimulation by a series of such neurons as the aforementioned).

This is false. When I see my co-worker, I see a purple shirt. Nothing in my cortex is a purple shirt. Keeping in mind my use of the word "see", even if I'm hallucinating, I see a purple shirt even if there is no physical purple shirt. So the purple shirt being referred to in seeing (not see'ing) is not a physical shirt, and is certainly not a part of the cortex, since the cortex is a piece of brain with chemical reactions going on, there are no purple shirts there.

Ok, but I was certainly not equivocating them. I don't even recognize the existence of these "qualia" or "subjective mental images". I do, however, recognize the confirmed existence of cortical processes.

Well, "qualia" includes things like redness and hotness. Cortical processes are neither red nor hot. The sensations/images I experience may indeed be red or hot. Even if I'm hallucinating, I can see red or feel (and not feel') hot, so we can't equivocate these things to external physical stimulus. Nor can we equivocate these things with cortical processes, quite simply, because they are neither red nor hot.

An ad hoc (or, perhaps, ad hominem) assumption with no grounds in any field of study whatsoever.

That's wrong. It is shown that when certain parts of the brain are stimulated, i.e. when certain activity is induced in the brain, then the experience that a person has is affected. Science suggests a causal relationship. Of course, this does hinge on the idea that the experience and the brain activity are distinguishable. Indeed, they are, but you don't seem to want to understand. The idea of "image" is quite simple, you seem to have tremendous difficulty.

I can also "refer to" a unicorn, or to Zeus, or to Einstein. The purpose of this "reference" is to stimulate a similar reaction to those which occurred upon your first having learned of such things. It does not conjure (ex nihilo?) some new creature that fits the descriptions of such beings, nor does it conjure up (again, from where?) any "image" thereof.

Once again, you are making too many assumptions, and will bear the burden of proof for all of them.

It was your claim that anything that can be referred to has ontological status. But there's nothing make-believe about the image. The image is in fact "most real", or rather, that which we can be most certain of. We don't know whether or not we're perpetually hallucinating, and we can't be certain that there actually is external stimulus causing our experiences, but we can be certain that we do have these experiences. Most reasonable people will also accept that they have external causes. However, the nature of the experience and the nature of the external stimulus are different.

No you don't.

{We could go on like that for a while, if you don't substantiate your claims...after all, that's all it really amounts to, for a person to conduct such sloppy philosophy as what you are currently doing: you make a claim, without substantiation, and I can do nothing but utter the opposite claim (or the negation of the claim) since you haven't given me anything else (of substance) to attack}.

You seem to, as Fliption suggested, purposely trying to take the least generous interpretation of my words in order to refute them more easily. As he pointed out, it is quite clear what I'm referring to when I speak of this image. Either you have trouble with English and just can't understand, or are commiting the "Socratic Fallacy" and not trying to understand. For your consideration, definition 3 of see from dictionary.com:

To have a mental image of

You make it sound like I'm using words like "see" and "image" in an unfathomable way, but clearly, it's something that is very natural. I believe Fliption even mentioned something to that effect, that people in normal conversation refer to their experiences as images, or something like that.

Sure it is. It is a perfect definition. You do indeed think that there is a physical presence when no such thing is there. You believe it to varying degrees, but belief is itself nothing more than the degree of argument your willing to put into defending a notion.

No, it's not a perfect definition. With the given definitions of see and see', to see is not exactly to think you see'. To see' is to have an experience and believe it to be caused by external physical stimulus. But when I imagine my co-worker, I see her, but I don't think I see' her, i.e. I don't believe that this image of her that I experience is a result of external physical stimulus. In some cases, when I see her, I think I see' her (for example, when I hallucinate), but not in all cases, so it is certainly not a perfect definition.

The only thing common to seeing her, dreaming about her, imagining her, hallucinating about her, etc is that it is the same process with different origins of stimuli.

No, that process is one thing. Another thing that is common is the effect of the process, i.e. definition b) of perception. That effect is an image, and it is not physical, since we can't put it in any physical place. Not only do we know that the image exists because we can see it, but we know that the image is not the brain activity (it is caused by it, it is not identical to it) because the brain activity is a process, and the image is a thing, and also because the brain activity is not purple or hot or loud, but the image can be purple, the sensation can be hot or loud.

Tell that to the philosophers who came up with ontological dichotomies.

It's not my problem (for the millionth time). I don't need to address your arguments against ontology, because I don't hold the concept myself. I agree with you. However, I do not agree that our not liking or agreeing with a notion has any effect on the "actual" state of things.

It is your problem. The philosophers who came up with ontological dichotomies did not come up with the dichotomies you are coming up with. You are coming up with unique (uniquely absurd) dichotomies. If philosophers ever stated that things were of two realities, they were either insane, or meant that things were of two natures, not that they were elements of two disjoint sets of all that exists, because that would be a contradiction. Perhaps the Socratic Fallacy is symptomatic of your style of argumentation. Try to assume the most reasonable, strongest interpretation of another's argument. If two realities means, to me and to you, that there are two sets of all things, and philosophers go on talking about multiple realities, then we ought to assume that they meant something different from what we interpret. Not only is that more reasonable, it is also more generous, and in being generous, you make your opponent's position seem as strong as possible, thus when defending your position against it, you put your own position through a better test.

Things of different ontologies, or, as some would put it, different realities, does not imply that things are of different realities as you and I interpret, it is a weaker statement that perhaps implies little more than that the things are different in nature, and not the contradiction we interpret it to imply. This interpretation, the one that doesn't lead to blatant contradictions, is the more reasonable one, don't you think? Given this interpretation, the problem you pose for dualists vanishes.

There cannot be a "reaction" between two things. If it occurs continually between any two things, it is an "interaction", by definition.

If we have a proton and an electron very far apart, then they continually undergo an interaction in which the two accelerate towards each other. Now, is there a gluon passing back and forth between the two, or what? Anyways, what is different between what is going on between the proton and electron that doesn't require an infinite regress of intermediary things to carry the interaction, and what would happen between body and mind?

Also, another example that came to mind today with regards to "mixtures." An electron is said to have a dual nature, or, as you could put it, "mixed" nature. This doesn't mean that one thing that was entirely a wave and one thing that was entirely a particle were put into a blender and out came a dual-natured wave-particle called an electron. It simply is of both natures, and this doesn't requires any previous mixing of waves and particles. It can interact with waves, and we can see this when we observe the interference patterns created when it does interact with other waves. However, we can talk about electrons undergoing elastic collisions with particles, something that things of particle nature do. It interacts with particles and with waves. It is of both natures, and so, in a sense, yes, it is of a third nature, but it is also both previous natures, and can interact with them without requiring a mixing process.

 

[Mentat]

Mentat

The biggest problem you're having here is a semantic one.

And what else would it be?

For clarification, let us define see, and another word, see'.

When I see my co-worker, and she is physically there, or when I hallucinate her, or when I imagine her, or when I dream her, the experience is the same. Define see by

I see iff I have the common experience described above

and define see' by

I see' iff I have the common experience described above AND this experience is the result of physical stimulus resulting from the physical presence of whatever it is I experience (see).

All nonsense. You still haven't defined "experience" (in spite of having been asked, more than once) and so its use in the definitions is only an obstruction to clarity, nothing more.

There is no "experience" that is common to hallucinating and seeing your co-worker. To see requires visual stimulus. However, to believe that see something that you do not actually see, requires only internal stimuli.

I will not work with these definitions, as they have been added ad hominem, and as yet have no coherent meaning.

a) Perception of visual, auditory, tactile, olfactory, or gustatory experiences without an external stimulus and with a compelling sense of their reality, usually resulting from a mental disorder or as a response to a drug.
b) The objects or events so perceived.

Also, the definition for perception:

a) The process, act, or faculty of perceiving.
b) The effect or product of perceiving.

Definitions b) (for both hallucination and perception) are the "image" that I keep talking about. When I say, "I see x" then x refers to the product of perception, or the object that is hallucinated (perceived without external stimulus causing the perception), the image, etc.

These definitions are also stuck on post-Kantian notions. Granted, I have deferred to dictionaries (among other sources) as points of authority in semantics throughout this debate. However, unless someone can explain to me why there should be such a "final product" of perceiving, and what use it would serve, I will not hold that it is there at all. In fact, this concept (or misconception) only further clouds the issues it touches. After all, would the concept of hallucination be so problematic (and it is, in philosophy, quite problematic), if it weren't for the questions about the nature of these "final products"?

This is false. When I see my co-worker, I see a purple shirt. Nothing in my cortex is a purple shirt.

For the last time, you do not see your cortex, and I never claimed that you did. You do not have eyes inside your head, or any other such apparatus which would allow you access to the inner workings of your cortex.

Keeping in mind my use of the word "see", even if I'm hallucinating, I see a purple shirt even if there is no physical purple shirt. So the purple shirt being referred to in seeing (not see'ing) is not a physical shirt, and is certainly not a part of the cortex, since the cortex is a piece of brain with chemical reactions going on, there are no purple shirts there.

And there are no purple shirts elsewhere either. You seem to be missing the fact that your assumptions will eventually lead one to the conclusion that everything you believe in must have some kind of existence, or else it would be impossible for you to believe in them. But this is preposterous! A person who believes in Zeus does not expect Zeus to become real simply because of that person's belief. They think they are talking about something that was already real. However, to follow your reasoning, every time I believe I am perceiving unicorns or gods, these must come into (some form of) existence in order for me to be able to believe in them.

Well, "qualia" includes things like redness and hotness. Cortical processes are neither red nor hot.

So, what? The fact remains: you could not know about redness or hotness had you not first processed such things cortically.

The sensations/images I experience may indeed be red or hot. Even if I'm hallucinating, I can see red or feel (and not feel') hot, so we can't equivocate these things to external physical stimulus.

Actually, I would like you to try to "feel" hot, right now, if you please. Without outside stimulus, attempt to make any part of your body "feel hot".

That's wrong. It is shown that when certain parts of the brain are stimulated, i.e. when certain activity is induced in the brain, then the experience that a person has is affected. Science suggests a causal relationship.

No, that is wrong. Science has never suggested a relationship (causal or otherwise) between brain activity and "experiences". Science doesn't even suggest that there are "experiences", let alone what they are related to.

It was your claim that anything that can be referred to has ontological status.

Anything which can be referred to (or, perhaps, one that cannot be referred to, for whatever reason) does have ontological status, simply by virtue of its being "something". If there is an empty reference (one that doesn't actually refer to anything, even though the speaker believes that it does), then there need be no ontological status assigned to anything except the reference itself (since there is nothing else to speak about).

But there's nothing make-believe about the image. The image is in fact "most real", or rather, that which we can be most certain of.

I wish you'd post that in my "Wrong Turns" thread. The concept of mind-body distinctions, and the difference between "images of the mind" and their related objective stimuli, were devised specifically to establish that about which the speaker could be incorrigible. But such incorrigibility will never be found in any meaningful sense, and that is why I think the inventing of these empty terms was a mistake.

I do not, however, deny that the terms exist. So, your reference to the dictionary will change nothing. I know that these terms exist and are in wide use. My confusion springs, not from an unfamiliarity with the terms, but from an unfamiliarity with anything to which these terms might conceivably refer.

You make it sound like I'm using words like "see" and "image" in an unfathomable way, but clearly, it's something that is very natural.

Not natural. Normal.

Yes, people use these terms constantly. But these terms are no less empty for use.

No, it's not a perfect definition. With the given definitions of see and see', to see is not exactly to think you see'. To see' is to have an experience and believe it to be caused by external physical stimulus. But when I imagine my co-worker, I see her, but I don't think I see' her, i.e. I don't believe that this image of her that I experience is a result of external physical stimulus. In some cases, when I see her, I think I see' her (for example, when I hallucinate), but not in all cases, so it is certainly not a perfect definition.

You missed the point completely. I'm sorry if I'm explaining this badly, but I can't think of any better ways. But hear me out...

You only devised the distinction between "see" and "see' " because you want to hold on to the concept that something (though not physical) must exist whenever you believe you are perceiving it. After all, it would be shameful indeed to be wrong about what you are perceiving. However, belief is indeed the most important part of this discussion. Whether or not you believe that you "see' " her is irrelevant. That you believe you "see" her in any way is the root fallacy.

It is your problem. The philosophers who came up with ontological dichotomies did not come up with the dichotomies you are coming up with. You are coming up with unique (uniquely absurd) dichotomies. If philosophers ever stated that things were of two realities, they were either insane, or meant that things were of two natures, not that they were elements of two disjoint sets of all that exists, because that would be a contradiction.

Yes it would be; you are correct. They meant "realities" in the sense that "physical" and "non-physical" are of "different realities", not different "sets of all that exist" (since the clearly believe that both kinds of entity exist).

When I say it's not my problem, it's because I didn't come up with such dichotomies, nor the words to describe them. That "reality" was misused by those same philosophers is also not my problem.

Things of different ontologies, or, as some would put it, different realities, does not imply that things are of different realities as you and I interpret, it is a weaker statement that perhaps implies little more than that the things are different in nature, and not the contradiction we interpret it to imply. This interpretation, the one that doesn't lead to blatant contradictions, is the more reasonable one, don't you think? Given this interpretation, the problem you pose for dualists vanishes.

No, it doesn't. I do not mean to construct strawmen, I have indeed given the opportunity for others here to give a more generous definition of "ontology". That you did not do so until now is (once again) not my problem. My definition of it does make seem more blatantly absurd than it would otherwise, but that doesn't change the absurdity of the actual cases. For example: physical/non-physical.

If an action/entity is physical, and it wishes to interact with something non-physical, it will not require some other physical thing to connect it with that non-physical one. Nor will it require something non-physical, as it would have equal difficulty interacting with that non-physical entity as the previous. It would require something that was neither physical nor non-physical, which is obviously (semantically, logically, etc) absurd.

If we have a proton and an electron very far apart, then they continually undergo an interaction in which the two accelerate towards each other. Now, is there a gluon passing back and forth between the two, or what?

Between a proton and an electron? No. Their interaction is to do with their opposite electrical charges.

Anyways, what is different between what is going on between the proton and electron that doesn't require an infinite regress of intermediary things to carry the interaction, and what would happen between body and mind?

Both a proton and a neutron (as used in my example) are of the same ontology.

Also, another example that came to mind today with regards to "mixtures." An electron is said to have a dual nature, or, as you could put it, "mixed" nature. This doesn't mean that one thing that was entirely a wave and one thing that was entirely a particle were put into a blender and out came a dual-natured wave-particle called an electron. It simply is of both natures, and this doesn't requires any previous mixing of waves and particles.

I know that. But it cannot serve as an intermediary between waves and particles any better than a wave or particle could on its own (though, this is clearly distinct from ontological difficulty).

When I spoke of the problems with mixing ontologies, I was speaking of the fact that either the third ontology was created by a previous interaction of the two, or else it was as distinct from the others as each of them are from one another.

Aside from the fact that a "mixed ontology" would imply something composed of parts that cannot interact (as per my aforementioned problems of ontological interaction), which is a worse problem than any I've posed, think of this: The third ontology is just that, a third ontology. Why should its being composed of parts that are of different ontologies make it a good bridge?

 

[AKG]

All nonsense. You still haven't defined "experience" (in spite of having been asked, more than once) and so its use in the definitions is only an obstruction to clarity, nothing more.

There is no "experience" that is common to hallucinating and seeing your co-worker. To see requires visual stimulus. However, to believe that see something that you do not actually see, requires only internal stimuli.

I will not work with these definitions, as they have been added ad hominem, and as yet have no coherent meaning.

I have to assume you're terribly thick-headed and simply can't figure out what I mean when I talk of this experience, or the experienced thing (the image). It is the common things you see (or at least think you see) when you see', imagine, hallucinate, and dream. Either that, or your sophistic approach to this topic won't let you understand. I asked my 14 year old sister if she understood what I'm talking about when I talk about the common image in those four situations, she understood with no problem. The sophist in you is demanding a definition for something a 14-year-old has no trouble understanding. Fliption also indicated that he knows what I'm talking about. Didn't we already go over the fact that we don't need such definitions to understand each other? Either you're too hard-headed to understand me (or if it's a language problem, I apologise), or you're your unwilling to understand.

However, unless someone can explain to me why there should be such a "final product" of perceiving, and what use it would serve, I will not hold that it is there at all.

What use does it serve? It is exactly what you see. If there were no final product of perception, there would be nothing to perceive. Perhaps my doctor can argue, "Unless I know why you were kicked in the back of the head, and what the purpose of you being kicked in the head was, I have no reason to believe you were kicked in the head, and I will not treat you." You're focusing on something entirely irrelevant.

For the last time, you do not see your cortex, and I never claimed that you did. You do not have eyes inside your head, or any other such apparatus which would allow you access to the inner workings of your cortex.

You don't get it, and you're really not paying attention. Assuming that there is a common image/experience in those four situations (see'ing, hallucinating, ...), then the object of the experience is certainly not the physical thing, since there is no physical thing when you hallucinate. But if it were the activity in your cortex, then activity in your cortex would be a green shirt, but it's not. You see a green shirt, not your cortex (nor the light entering your eyes, nor the physical object, since you can see - not see' - a green shirt without it being physically there). So whatever it is you see is none of those physical things.

And there are no purple shirts elsewhere either. You seem to be missing the fact that your assumptions will eventually lead one to the conclusion that everything you believe in must have some kind of existence, or else it would be impossible for you to believe in them. But this is preposterous! A person who believes in Zeus does not expect Zeus to become real simply because of that person's belief. They think they are talking about something that was already real. However, to follow your reasoning, every time I believe I am perceiving unicorns or gods, these must come into (some form of) existence in order for me to be able to believe in them.

I'm not just conceptualizing these images, I am seeing them. I can be certain of these images, and in fact can't be certain of the brain I think is causing them, or the physical objects that they represent. Simply conceiving a unicorn doesn't make it exist, but the image of a unicorn thus exists, or rather, the concept. And the concept is not physical. Your belief must exist in order for you to believe it, and your belief is not physical because you may have some beliefs about what is in your drawer, but your brain and the chemical reactions aren't about anything, they are just physical processes. If you have a hallucination of a red shirt, nothing in your brain is a red shirt, so the hallucinated shirt is not some part of the brain, or brain activity, etc.

So, what? The fact remains: you could not know about redness or hotness had you not first processed such things cortically.

Right, cortical processes cause the mind to experience these qualia. But cortical process are not identical to qualia since cortiacl processes are neither red nor hot. They cause qualia corresponding to redness or hotness, they aren't identical to them.

Actually, I would like you to try to "feel" hot, right now, if you please. Without outside stimulus, attempt to make any part of your body "feel hot".

I don't have that power of imagination, but if I were hallucinating, I could. There have certainly been times when I felt much hotter than I actually was. There was a time when I was sitting at my computer and a spider was crawling up my leg. It surprised me, and I for the next few days, I often got the feeling that spiders were crawling on my legs, even though I was feel'ing no such thing. Sometimes people will claim to hear things when there is nothing to hear'. My sister will sometimes tell me I smell like smoke when it is impossible for her to smell' smoke on me, as there was no smoke on me for her to smell'. People have sensations identical to sensations' even though their causes are different. Something is common to both situations (whether you're sensing or sens'ing) even though the physical causes are not. That common thing is the experience, or the thing you "think" you sense', or the thing you imagine you sense'.

No, that is wrong. Science has never suggested a relationship (causal or otherwise) between brain activity and "experiences". Science doesn't even suggest that there are "experiences", let alone what they are related to.

When a scientist pokes a certain part of my brain, I experience some change in what I see (not see'). What I see is what I experience. Science shows that activity in the brain effects what I experience. The only way you could deny that is to do what Fliption said, and tell me that I don't have experiences. This is only true to you because you're either hard-headed or sophistic, but everyone else in the world, including my 14-year-old sister, knows exactly what I mean when I talk about those experiences.

I wish you'd post that in my "Wrong Turns" thread. The concept of mind-body distinctions, and the difference between "images of the mind" and their related objective stimuli, were devised specifically to establish that about which the speaker could be incorrigible. But such incorrigibility will never be found in any meaningful sense, and that is why I think the inventing of these empty terms was a mistake.

I do not, however, deny that the terms exist. So, your reference to the dictionary will change nothing. I know that these terms exist and are in wide use. My confusion springs, not from an unfamiliarity with the terms, but from an unfamiliarity with anything to which these terms might conceivably refer.

You are indeed familiar with these things. In fact, these things are the only things with which you are undeniably, directly familiar. Everything else you know of you know from inference. The existence of the computer in a physical world independent from what you happen to see is something you infer from the image you have of the computer. You infer that there is something independent of your perception, and that it causes your perception, and that the thing in your experience (the computer) corresponds to some independent physical object. That's a rather reasonable inference, but an inference nonetheless. You need to make no inference to know that you see a computer, you must make inference to think you see' the computer.

You are familiar with these things, and either you are uncapable of noticing it, or, more likely, you are unwilling to admit it.

You missed the point completely. I'm sorry if I'm explaining this badly, but I can't think of any better ways. But hear me out...

You only devised the distinction between "see" and "see' " because you want to hold on to the concept that something (though not physical) must exist whenever you believe you are perceiving it. After all, it would be shameful indeed to be wrong about what you are perceiving. However, belief is indeed the most important part of this discussion. Whether or not you believe that you "see' " her is irrelevant. That you believe you "see" her in any way is the root fallacy.

No, it is the root of the argument, it is a true premise, and the argument is sound. Your belief that I don't "see" her in any way is the root of your problem. Everybody else understands what I mean when I say that I see her in some way. Clearly, "see" does have some meaning in this context if everyone understands it. It is distinct from see', and I don't see' her in any way, but I do see her in some way. What does "see" mean in this context? Well, everyone else seems to know what it means, so either you're unwilling or unable to understand what it means.

No, it doesn't. I do not mean to construct strawmen, I have indeed given the opportunity for others here to give a more generous definition of "ontology". That you did not do so until now is (once again) not my problem. My definition of it does make seem more blatantly absurd than it would otherwise, but that doesn't change the absurdity of the actual cases. For example: physical/non-physical.

If this is all it is, then I can choose a sufficiently generous definition of ontology such that the problem goes away. Solid and non-solid can interact, because they are of the same ontology, but that depends on how "ontology" is defined. Let's just define "ontology" such that it is little different from "state of matter" so that of physical ontology can interact with non-physical ontology.

If an action/entity is physical, and it wishes to interact with something non-physical, it will not require some other physical thing to connect it with that non-physical one. Nor will it require something non-physical, as it would have equal difficulty interacting with that non-physical entity as the previous. It would require something that was neither physical nor non-physical, which is obviously (semantically, logically, etc) absurd.

Just as a solid cannot interact with a non-solid. Of course they can interact, there is nothing in the definition of "solid" that makes it so that solid and non-solid can interact. All I'm asserting is that mind is non-physical, and just as solid and non-solid can interact, so can physical (body/brain) and non-physical (mind). Either categorize mind as the same ontology as physical things, or categorize them of different ontologies, but define ontology such that ontologically distinct things interacting is as problematic as solid and non-solid things interacting. Of course, I can do either of these things because it depends entirely on how I define ontology, and since you seem to define ontology in a completely arbitrary, unconventional manner for the sole purpose of making your argument work, I shall do the same thing so that my argument works.

Between a proton and an electron? No. Their interaction is to do with their opposite electrical charges.

Isn't this still action at a distance? There is no medium that passes the interaction from one thing to another, the two things are separate and just happen to have an effect on one another. If this is acceptable, then Newton's gravity shouldn't be problematic either. Two separate masses just happen to have an effect on one another. Anyways, an electron and proton interact with each other without any thing connecting them, and so do mind and body, or if you want, duct tape connects them, it really doesn't matter.

Both a proton and a neutron (as used in my example) are of the same ontology.

So what? What's so big about being of the same ontology that allows them to interact, but if they were of different ontologies, they couldn't? That ontologically similar things can interact and that ontologically distinct things can't interact is a baseless assumption you make.

I know that. But it cannot serve as an intermediary between waves and particles any better than a wave or particle could on its own (though, this is clearly distinct from ontological difficulty).

Of course it can. An electron can collide with a proton (particle) and then later on interfere with a wave, thereby intermediating between particle and wave.

When I spoke of the problems with mixing ontologies, I was speaking of the fact that either the third ontology was created by a previous interaction of the two, or else it was as distinct from the others as each of them are from one another.

Aside from the fact that a "mixed ontology" would imply something composed of parts that cannot interact (as per my aforementioned problems of ontological interaction), which is a worse problem than any I've posed, think of this: The third ontology is just that, a third ontology. Why should its being composed of parts that are of different ontologies make it a good bridge?

What would prevent it from being a good bridge? It is a third ontology, and it is partially both previous ontologies. You seem to think that since it is of a third ontology, the underlined stuff is irrelevant.

Let A be the set of all only-English speakers
Let B be the set of all only-French speakers
Let C be the set of all English-and-French speakers

Clearly, C is distinct from A and B, the intersection of any two sets is empty, so in that sense, C is a third, distinct thing from the other two. But in another sense, it is like a mix of the previous two, and people in set C can interact with both A and B, and perhaps act as translators and facilitate interaction between A and B, mediating some discussion. Metaphysical duct tape does the same thing.

Anyways, I'm done with this discussion. Your argument is based on a bunch of nonsensical assumptions and definitions of ontology, interaction, reaction, and a number of other things. Moreover, you either can't or won't understand something that my 14 year old sister, and probably everyone else who speaks English, understands, and unfortunately, understanding this thing is the root of understanding my argument. I didn't have to convince my sister or explain anything to her, she understood what I was referring to, it was very natural. It's not as though we are all referring to something we believe exists, but really doesn't, we are reffering to something that we can't help but believe exists. We are in fact referring to something we can't doubt exists. We can't, but somehow, you can. Anyone who is so thick-headed and/or sophistic as to be able to doubt such a thing is not worth arguing with. Pages and pages of posts won't make this plainly simple thing any clearer. Once it becomes clear, there will be nothing left to debate, but since you seem to be uncapable of seeing this thing clearly, I won't waste any more time.

 

[Mentat]

Well, AKG, I have asked pointed questions; I have reasoned pointedly. If you can't see that you are biased toward a view that has nothing to do with anything provable (or disprovable) or useful, then I have failed and apologize. I have countered every point. I have listened to the new points you added later, which could have been rejected out-right as ad hoc defenses of a PoV you couldn't defend without them (ergo, anti-Ockham's Razor), and have reasoned on such points. None of them hold any water, in the light of my arguments against them, nor do I (still, after three pages of this) see why you choose to invoke them in the first place. Why fix an understanding of perception that isn't broken?

If you think I've been thick-headed, you should look back at the posts, and see that I have been all but begging you to give my points (and counter-points) consideration, and you have done nothing but repeat your assertions or attempt to back them up with yet another ad hoc/hominem assumption, which you (in turn) cannot defend.

I, too, am tired of this, but I have a right to be. As to this...

All I'm asserting is that mind is non-physical, and just as solid and non-solid can interact, so can physical (body/brain) and non-physical (mind).

That is certainly not all you are asserting, but I'm done kicking this particular dead horse. All I have to say to this is that "solid" and "non-solid" are both physical concepts. "Non-physical" is (by semantic necessity) the set of all things that are "not...physical". That we don't have a perfectly good definition of "physical" becomes irrelevant to the discussion of the abstract truth that something physical (if there are such things which can be rigorously defined as such) could not, in principle, interact with something non-physical, for the reasons I have already stated.

If you want a better explanation of that particular point, read the first chapter of Dennett's Consciousness Explained.

 

[Tournesol]

Mentat

But I can know that there is a commonality between a perception of a horse, a dream about a horse, etc, without having any idea at all of what the neural
"process" is.

This comment is deeply entrenched in philosophical jargon, and it's very hard to make sense of it in any real terms.

What jargon ? 'Perception' ?

I don't mean that to be offensive, it's just that you are referring to the "perception of a horse" as though it were a quantitative entity, rather than a process of perceiving a horse. There are no "quantum perceptions", but there is indeed a process of "perceiving", provided the right stimulus is available.

No I am not. It doesn't make the slightest differnce to what I am
actually saying whether a perception is a process or a
"quantitative entity". (That's not
philosophical jargon?)

Therefore, there is no "commonality" between "a perception of a horse" and anything else, since there's no such thing as "a perception". Perception is not quantum (if it were, you'd be able to tell me the exact beginning and end of "a perception", the Final Draft (to use Dennettian terms)).

Why can't there be commonalities between processes ? ANyway, you are
missing a the basic point. What seeing a horse and reaiming a horse have in common is horses. (Note the completely non-technical non-jargon nature of that sentence. Note also that the proverbial schoolchild could easily understand it).

That we can understand the difference between perceiving a horse and believing that we perceive a horse while no such horse is present is, without the knowledge of neurology, is nothing surprising at all. We can also speak of points of light in the sky without any knowledge of the internal physics of stars.

Yep. We can have the prima-facie experience of a point of light without
knowing astrophysics, and our neural activity somehow tells us what is
goign on in our heads with another bunch of prima facie experience that
shomehow hides the neurological details of its implications. And
that might be explained neurologicaly too...but it never will be
unless we acccept that there are experiences, appearances and seemings
being produced; consciousness-denial will never explain it.

The way things seem to me is not the neural process per se,
because the things do not seem to be neural processes.

Come on, Tournesol. You should know better than this. The way something seems to you is a way that you process that thing itself. It won't seem like neural process unless you are oberving a neural process (and you can't observe your own, since you don't have eyes inside your head (not that eyes would be sufficient, you'd also need a brain that connected to those eyes...but you get my drift, don't you?)).

Nonetheless, there is no simple equation between the nerual process
per se and the seemings it generates. And , no, that does not mean
seemings are 'quantitative entitites'.

 

[Mentat]

What jargon ? 'Perception' ?

Not "perception", "a perception". I assure you, the concept of individual perceptions (as though perceiving was a quantized process) is never used in any other field of study.

No I am not. It doesn't make the slightest differnce to what I am
actually saying whether a perception is a process or a
"quantitative entity". (That's not
philosophical jargon?)

It makes all the difference. How can you refer to a comparison made between a horse (which is a singular, quantum entity) and "a perception of a horse", without assuming quantized perception?

Why can't there be commonalities between processes ? ANyway, you are
missing a the basic point. What seeing a horse and reaiming a horse have in common is horses.

"Reaiming"?

You are referring to the process of perceiving a horse, as compared to the process of believing that you perceive one when you do not?

(Note the completely non-technical non-jargon nature of that sentence. Note also that the proverbial schoolchild could easily understand it).

I am a school-child (until I finish this last credit of high school). Try harder.

Yep. We can have the prima-facie experience of a point of light without
knowing astrophysics, and our neural activity somehow tells us what is
goign on in our heads with another bunch of prima facie experience that
shomehow hides the neurological details of its implications. And
that might be explained neurologicaly too...but it never will be
unless we acccept that there are experiences, appearances and seemings
being produced; consciousness-denial will never explain it.

There don't need to be raw "seemings" or "appearances" to account for us simply being wrong about what we perceive.

Nonetheless, there is no simple equation between the nerual process
per se and the seemings it generates. And , no, that does not mean
seemings are 'quantitative entitites'.

It doesn't matter, in this particular sentence, whether or not they are quantized, since you are assuming that neural processes "generate" "seemings". Neuroscience has yielded no good reason to believe that neural processes "generate" anything (except, of course, actions of the body (verbal reports, etc)).

 

[Tournesol]

Not "perception", "a perception". I assure you, the concept of individual perceptions (as though perceiving was a quantized process) is never used in any other field of study.

I am not at all convinced it is used in any field of study, let alone any other.
It looks like a straw-man on your part.

No I am not. It doesn't make the slightest difference to what I am
actually saying whether a perception is a process or a
"quantitative entity". (That's not
philosophical jargon?)

It makes all the difference. How can you refer to a comparison made between a horse (which is a singular, quantum entity) and "a perception of a horse", without assuming quantized perception?

I was actually comparing a veridical perception of a horse with a dream of
a horse. Are dreams and perceptions distinguishable ? Yes. Do we have to
take them to be irreducable building-blocks of the world to assert that ?
no.

Yep. We can have the prima-facie experience of a point of light without
knowing astrophysics, and our neural activity somehow tells us what is
goign on in our heads with another bunch of prima facie experience that
shomehow hides the neurological details of its implications. And
that might be explained neurologicaly too...but it never will be
unless we acccept that there are experiences, appearances and seemings
being produced; consciousness-denial will never explain it.

There don't need to be raw "seemings" or "appearances" to account for us simply being wrong about what we perceive.

There don't need to be to account for wrong reports, but my reports
don't just emerge from nowhere; they are reports of my experience.
Believe it or not, there is a middle way between the reified ("quantitative entity") seemings, which you don't like, and the consciousness-denial which you wrongly believe to be the only alternative.

Nonetheless, there is no simple equation between the nerual process
per se and the seemings it generates. And , no, that does not mean
seemings are 'quantitative entitites'.

It doesn't matter, in this particular sentence, whether or not they are quantized, since you are assuming that neural processes "generate" "seemings". Neuroscience has yielded no good reason to believe that neural processes "generate" anything (except, of course, actions of the body (verbal reports, etc)).

Consciousness-denying philosophers like Dennett make this sort of comment,
but you really have to look at what the neuroscientists themselves say:-

http://www.ini.unizh.ch/~kiper/Ramachandran_1997_qualia.pdf

 

[Mentat]

I am not at all convinced it is used in any field of study, let alone any other.
It looks like a straw-man on your part.

Then what the heck do you think a "quale" is? I've just finished responding to another post of yours, and my patience with your denial is wearing quite thin. I didn't study the history and current standing of PoM so rigorously just to be told "you're wrong" by somebody on the PFs. If I'm wrong, you need to prove it.

I was actually comparing a veridical perception of a horse with a dream of
a horse.

You. Are. Still. Quantizing.

Don't you see that that which we perceive (our "veridical perceptions of a horse") is an actual, physical, quantum entity? There is no "horseness" in the general surroundings, such that we cannot determine where the horse begins and ends in any meaningful way. Therefore, the horse is not a process, but a singular entity.

To compare a "hallucination of a horse" or a "dream of a horse" with an actual, veritable, perceived horse is to quantize the process of hallucinating (or dreaming) simply by virtue of the comparison with something that is, in fact, quantum.

There don't need to be to account for wrong reports, but my reports
don't just emerge from nowhere; they are reports of my experience.

And that is yet another report. If you believe that there is something more to your beliefs than that which you reported than you should explain why you witheld that additional information. If, OTOH, you believe there is something ineffable about your experience, than that is yet another belief that requires explanation.

Believe it or not, there is a middle way between the reified ("quantitative entity") seemings, which you don't like, and the consciousness-denial which you wrongly believe to be the only alternative.

If there is, then you should be able to make your statements without constantly leading right back to "quantitative seems", and you have yet to do so. I know you don't ever actually say that that's where your reasoning leads, by I have reasoned on all your statements and that is indeed where they lead.

Consciousness-denying philosophers like Dennett make this sort of comment,
but you really have to look at what the neuroscientists themselves say:-

http://www.ini.unizh.ch/~kiper/Ramachandran_1997_qualia.pdf

Unfortunately, my computer was unable to load that link. I tried twice. However, I have indeed read numerous studies on neuroscience that directly related to consciousness, and never invoked "mind-body", "quale", "subjective experience", or any other such thing. Gerald Edelman would probably be a good start (perhaps A Universe of Consciousness, or Bright Air, Brilliant Fire). Joseph LeDoux is also good (particularly Synaptic Self). William Calvin is a bit more advanced (which just means that I had more trouble understanding him than most of the other popular literature I've read on the topic), but The Cerebral Code is an excellent book on consciousness from a neurological perspective, if you're interested.

Neuroscience is conducted on a daily basis without reference to any of the extra terms that PoM has created. That some neuroscientists believe in the existence of such phenomena as PoM describes is quite irrelevant to the actual nature of the science, or the experiments and theories that it deals with.

 

[Fliption]

What else would it be?

You've debated with me before (for well over 10 pages, IIRC ).

Yes, it took me that long to figure out what you're all about. With that knowledge in hand, I am trying to shorten this useless semantic debate as if it has any meaning at all beyond language.

I see now, however, that you are indeed wrapped up in a lot of philosophical jargon, and just don't realize it (I was wondering for a while there). You are using "experience" in the same way as AKG (et al) have been using it (in the philosophical sense), rather than in the sense it takes in every other pursuit of man.

This is a philosophical forum, so it makes sense that we would use the definitions most appropriate for philosophy. There are many cases where a word will have different meanings across multiple disciplines. Just look in any dictionary and most words have multiple definitions. I'm not sure why you want to use such a fact as a reason to debate for 20 pages.

You are talking about "images" and the final results of collecting information, as though you would quantize the behaviors of the brain. Is it not a continual process of information-collection?

How does knowledge manifest itself in you? How do you "know" that a computer is in front of you now? Because you see it? What are you seeing? A computer. AKG is calling it an image and you are calling it a process. Who cares? What is your point if you are not assuming some other "meaning" that AKG has for the word "image"?

It's not about belief. He is using a term that has no meaning, in this context. My brain does not need images of the things I perceive in order to perceive them. His brain might, but then he'd have to answer the questions/problems I've already posed (such as what it is that beholds this new "image" within the mind, and whether that "eye" has a mind of its own, who (in turn) observes the image of the image, et cetera ad infinitum).

But this is what I'm trying to get at. Words don't have absolute meaning. Words have meaning if someone is using them. "You" cannot say it doesn't have meaning. If the word image does not have meaning then why would AKG be using it? AKG obviously uses it because he/she intends for that word to represent something. If it has no meaning to you then you won't use it but that doesn't equate to AKG.

Because I have yet to understand what you really mean by "experience", as though "experiencing" were some grand and vital process that transcends explication. I can't tell him he doesn't do "A" if I don't yet know a good definition of "A". I can, however, tell him that I've gotten along quite well without this thing that he believes he has (and believes that I have, though I should think I would know if I did), and so I see no need to invoke it in conversation.

I have given you a definition of experience in a post you didn't respond to. I said that for now just assume experience is the process of collecting information about the external world. AKG represents that information with the word "image" and you call it something else. So what is your point?

 

[Tournesol]

"In contrast to the views of philosopher Daniel Dennett, Edelman accepts the existence of qualia and incorporates them into his brain-based theory of mind."

http://members.tripod.com/~xtro1666/gerald_edelman.htm

 

[Fliption]

As info the title of the article is:

"Three Laws of qualia - What Neurology Tells us about the Biological functions of consciousness, qualia and the self"

I also think that claiming "science" doesn't do something simply because only a minority of scientists actually do it is nonsense and somewhat disingenuous to use in a discussion.

What's happening in this thread, for those who are particpating, is the same thing that I found myself mired in. Mentat's position is to deny the existence of all things that will give rise to philosophical problems of what is normally referred to as "physicalism". Therefore he will deny the existence of experiences, qualia, and subjectivity. His main argument has always been ( and does not seem to have changed one bit even though we are supposed to be talking about a new way of looking at things via Wittgenstein) that these things do not exist because no one can give him a definition of them that doesn't refer to other vague terms. I have stated numerous times that to get the definition that Mentat is looking for would require us to be able to reductively explain the term. This is exactly what the hard problem of consicousness is all about! If we could reductively explain consciousness then this whole discussion would just go away. So Mentat uses the hard problem of consciousness to deny the hard problem of consciousness. In other words, he uses the rules of physicalism to judge a criticism of physicalism. This approach is obviously flawed and most people will just ignore this viewpoint once they understand it.

I'm disappointed because I thought I was going to get another chance to understand this claim that the hard problem is all language. But so far this is just more of the same. To be honest, the quality of discussions in the philosophy forums here has gone up tremendously in the last few months. It's a shame we could get mired in this nonsense again. For good (and more legitimate) examples of people questioning the problems of consicousness, see posts from Loseyourname.

 

[Mentat]

Yes, it took me that long to figure out what you're all about. With that knowledge in hand, I am trying to shorten this useless semantic debate as if it has any meaning at all beyond language.

You are far from "figuring me out". I suggest reading Sextus Empiricus, for starters.

This is a philosophical forum, so it makes sense that we would use the definitions most appropriate for philosophy.

They are not appropriate for philosophy or anything else (at least, that is the position I'm defending...currently). That they are used in philosophy is another matter completely, which I have addressed in "Wrong Turns".

There are many cases where a word will have different meanings across multiple disciplines. Just look in any dictionary and most words have multiple definitions. I'm not sure why you want to use such a fact as a reason to debate for 20 pages.

You missed the point. This term only has special meaning in philosophy because of the history of the discipline (philosophy of mind), which has taken horribly bad turns ever since Descartes tried to establish incorrigibility.

How does knowledge manifest itself in you? How do you "know" that a computer is in front of you now? Because you see it? What are you seeing? A computer. AKG is calling it an image and you are calling it a process.

No, I'm calling it a computer...you are missing the point in the same manner as AKG.

But this is what I'm trying to get at. Words don't have absolute meaning. Words have meaning if someone is using them. "You" cannot say it doesn't have meaning. If the word image does not have meaning then why would AKG be using it?

Because AKG, is using a set of terms that have a long history in philosophy in spite of having no meaning in our actual experience at all (note: in this case, "experience" has its usual meaning: I've done it for a while, so I know what I'm doing).

BTW, "image" does have meaning, just not the one that AKG (and much of the PoM community) wants it to have.

I have given you a definition of experience in a post you didn't respond to. I said that for now just assume experience is the process of collecting information about the external world.

That's an arbitrary defining, and is quite distinct from the uses it typically has. Therefore you should defend the use of this term in this way.

AKG represents that information with the word "image" and you call it something else. So what is your point?

My point is that "image" makes it appear as though there is something more than the computer to observe. I am observing a computer. If there were an image of that computer, and I were observing that instead, then we would simply be begging the question of how I observe ITFP.

 

[selfAdjoint]

May I just ask one question, Mentat? When you say you are observing the computer, is there the tacit assumption that whatever necessary neurophysical processing necessary to support the observation is happening and is not problematical?

 

[Tournesol]

My point is that "image" makes it appear as though there is something more than the computer to observe. I am observing a computer. If there were an image of that computer, and I were observing that instead, then we would simply be begging the question of how I observe ITFP.

Indeed. We need a word for the way an external object is observed that does not
suggest that some mental item stands as a proxy for the external object and is
observed instead of it. How about "quale" ?

 

[Fliption]

You are far from "figuring me out". I suggest reading Sextus Empiricus, for starters.

Skepticism doesn't mean selectively skeptical.

I have a very good feel for your approach and agenda. It comes with age

They are not appropriate for philosophy or anything else (at least, that is the position I'm defending...currently). That they are used in philosophy is another matter completely, which I have addressed in "Wrong Turns".

They are indeed appropriate. If they were not then we would not be talking about them. People don't use the word Neuron. Only those pesky neurologists insist on using such words. Yet all people have neurons. How is this any different from what you're claiming?

You missed the point. This term only has special meaning in philosophy because of the history of the discipline (philosophy of mind), which has taken horribly bad turns ever since Descartes tried to establish incorrigibility.

I disagree. I cannot speak for anyone else but I use the term because it has meaning to me.

No, I'm calling it a computer...you are missing the point in the same manner as AKG.

No. I thought you were claiming that you are seeing a computer and not an image. But you don't deny that "seeing" is due to a "process". Do you?

That's an arbitrary defining, and is quite distinct from the uses it typically has. Therefore you should defend the use of this term in this way.

It is not my usual meaning for the word. But I am having to do what I always have to do with you Mentat. I always have to re-define terms so that we can begin to have a conversation. If I do not do this, we never get beyond "what does "X" mean, what does "Y" mean?" because you take the unusual and frustrating approach of playing ignorant about the things that you wish to deny. So I have attempted a definition that I feel you will understand(or admit to understanding), as a starting point.

My point is that "image" makes it appear as though there is something more than the computer to observe. I am observing a computer. If there were an image of that computer, and I were observing that instead, then we would simply be begging the question of how I observe ITFP.

I do not understand why this is the case. I also find it very irrelevant and not worth 5 pages of discussion.

 

[Tournesol]

I was actually comparing a veridical perception of a horse with a dream of
a horse.

You. Are. Still. Quantizing.

No. I'm. Flippin'. Not.

Don't you see that that which we perceive (our "veridical perceptions of a horse") is an actual, physical, quantum entity? There is no "horseness" in the general surroundings, such that we cannot determine where the horse begins and ends in any meaningful way. Therefore, the horse is not a process, but a singular entity.

There has to be some commonality. If it isn't based on "quantisation"--so what ? Then
it is based on somethign else. Since I am not basing my arguments on "quantisastion",
I don't care.

To compare a "hallucination of a horse" or a "dream of a horse" with an actual, veritable, perceived horse is

I am not doing that; look at the quote at the top:-

"I was actually comparing a veridical perception of a horse with a dream of
a horse. "

You are not even gettign my words right.

There don't need to be to account for wrong reports, but my reports
don't just emerge from nowhere; they are reports of my experience.

And that is yet another report.

For you, maybe.

If you believe that there is something more to your beliefs than that which you reported than you should explain why you witheld that additional information. If, OTOH, you believe there is something ineffable about your experience, than that is yet another belief that requires explanation.

The simplest being that there actually is.

If there is, then you should be able to make your statements without constantly leading right back to "quantitative seems", and you have yet to do so. I know you don't ever actually say that that's where your reasoning leads, by I have reasoned on all your statements and that is indeed where they lead.

Nope, it's a straw-man based on inaccurate quotation.

 

[Mentat]

May I just ask one question, Mentat? When you say you are observing the computer, is there the tacit assumption that whatever necessary neurophysical processing necessary to support the observation is happening and is not problematical?

I should think so.

After all, the understanding of "sight" as an unproblematic neurophysical process (an understanding that seems quite commonly accepted by scientists in the related fields) would be taken a priori as part of the rules of this language-game (IOW, I assume people know what I mean by "see").

 

[Mentat]

Skepticism doesn't mean selectively skeptical.

It means that I will counter every point (or, at least, almost every point) that my opponent makes. If that is "selective", then so be it. Skeptics (at least, in the Pyrrhonean tradition) attain ataraxia by countering all statements. However, as per the social activity of "discussion", it would be quite unbecoming to debate with yourself as well .

I have a very good feel for your approach and agenda. It comes with age

No, arrogance comes with age. May I never grow old .

They are indeed appropriate. If they were not then we would not be talking about them.

Wrong. If there were a historical reason for our using empty terms, then we would indeed be using them, regardless of their "emptiness". Again, this is covered in the beginning posts of "Wrong Turns".

People don't use the word Neuron. Only those pesky neurologists insist on using such words. Yet all people have neurons. How is this any different from what you're claiming?

It is different because "neuron" is a term used to refer to something we've actually discovered. It is a term assigned a posteriori.

The history of the terms I'm attacking is thoroughly indicative of their being biased and created a priori with no reference to discovery.

I disagree. I cannot speak for anyone else but I use the term because it has meaning to me.

And it has meaning to you because you were raised in a society that has followed the historical path that I outline in "Wrong Turns".

No. I thought you were claiming that you are seeing a computer and not an image. But you don't deny that "seeing" is due to a "process". Do you?

See my response to selfAdjoint.

It is not my usual meaning for the word. But I am having to do what I always have to do with you Mentat. I always have to re-define terms so that we can begin to have a conversation. If I do not do this, we never get beyond "what does "X" mean, what does "Y" mean?" because you take the unusual and frustrating approach of playing ignorant about the things that you wish to deny. So I have attempted a definition that I feel you will understand(or admit to understanding), as a starting point.

I refer you to my new thread, dear Thrasymachus, and ask you to stop acting as though you have any idea about why I debate as I do (except as revealed to you by my own explicit statements).

I do not understand why this is the case. I also find it very irrelevant and not worth 5 pages of discussion.

You have never understood the infinite regress implicit in such claims (ever since our 15+ pages of argument with Zero and Royce). That doesn't mean that they don't exist. I have tried to explain it before, and realize that I am not qualified, as you still don't get it. Perhaps someone else will try.

 

[Mentat]

No. I'm. Flippin'. Not.

Ok, I'm sorry.

There has to be some commonality.

No there doesn't. Why should my computational processes look anything like a horse? And if they do, they shall look nothing like the Dead Sea Scrolls, but I can see those too. My computational apparatus are not going to mold themselves to look like the things they are perceiving, it wouldn't make sense.

I am not doing that; look at the quote at the top:-

"I was actually comparing a veridical perception of a horse with a dream of
a horse. "

You are not even gettign my words right.

I humbly beg your forgiveness...let met try again. The very reference to "a perception (veridical or otherwise ) of a horse" is just sloppy side-stepping. You are still quantizing the perception by relating it to that which is perceived (which is a quantum entity).

For you, maybe.

Well, I am the one to whom you're talking, aren't I? Who else would your reports be for?

The simplest being that there actually is.

Ok, but we still haven't explained why the experience is unreportable, or how you came to have an experience that you don't know enough about to report it. "How" and "why", in case you didn't know, are the important aspects of "explanations".

Nope, it's a straw-man based on inaccurate quotation.

I got a couple of words wrong, and I apologize. The reasoning still leads where it leads.

 

[Tournesol]

No there doesn't. Why should my computational processes look anything like a horse?

Wrong question, yet again.

I humbly beg your forgiveness...let met try again. The very reference to "a perception (veridical or otherwise ) of a horse" is just sloppy side-stepping. You are still quantizing the perception by relating it to that which is perceived (which is a quantum entity).

Nope.

Well, I am the one to whom you're talking, aren't I? Who else would your reports be for?

The other person is me. But then you don't really understand my report
AS a report if you don't regad it as a report OF something.

Ok, but we still haven't explained why the experience is unreportable, or how you came to have an experience that you don't know enough about to report it. "How" and "why", in case you didn't know, are the important aspects of "explanations".

There's nothing very mysterious there. The bandwith of speach is much narrower than what goes on inside the skull, so even for the most brutal
reductivist, much should go unreported.

 

[Mentat]

Wrong question, yet again.

Why? You are referring to an "impression" as being whatever effect the actual horse has on me. You are insisting that our "impressions" could be any such effect; neural or otherwise. So, since neural computation is my candidate for "impressions" (in your framework of what "impressions" are), I asked a perfectly reasonable question.

Again, you said that there must be some "commonality" between the "impression" and that which caused it (the "object"). So, what's wrong with my question?

Nope.

Wanna elaborate on that a little?

You are still relating the "impression" directly to the object of perception. In doing so (since the object of perception is complete, singular, and quantized) you quantize the specific "impression" that relates to that specific horse.

The other person is me. But then you don't really understand my report
AS a report if you don't regad it as a report OF something.

I understand it as a report, and that's all I understand it as.

There's nothing very mysterious there. The bandwith of speach is much narrower than what goes on inside the skull, so even for the most brutal
reductivist, much should go unreported.

This is just an assumption. How do you know that the bandwidth of speech is narrower than what goes on in our heads? For that matter, how do you know that conscious "experience" takes place in our heads? You make too many assumptions.

 

[Tournesol]

Again, you said that there must be some "commonality" between the "impression" and that which caused it (the "object").

No I didn't.

Wanna elaborate on that a little?

I. am. not. quantizing.

How do you know that the bandwidth of speech is narrower than what goes on in our heads?

It's a scientific fact. Speech has a badnwidth of about 4khz. The brain consists of 100,000,000,000 neurons working in parallel. Do the math.

 

[Mentat]

No I didn't.

There are about seven posts between this one and another (posted by you) that says otherwise.

I. am. not. quantizing.

Respond to my reasoning, please. This childishness has run its course, don't you think?

It's a scientific fact. Speech has a badnwidth of about 4khz. The brain consists of 100,000,000,000 neurons working in parallel. Do the math.

How the hell am I supposed to do the math on how 100,000,000,000 neurons relates to the possible frequencies of human speech? And why is it relevant? Are you implying that, if we could speak in all possible frequencies, we could speak intelligently about our brain states??

 

[Tournesol]

bandwidth in herz ~ baud rate in bits per second.

Assume that 1% of neurons are transmitting at 1bps -- both extremely conservative.

The resulting bandwidth is many orders of magnitude more than speech.

 

[selfAdjoint]

bandwidth in herz ~ baud rate in bits per second.

Assume that 1% of neurons are transmitting at 1bps -- both extremely conservative.

The resulting bandwidth is many orders of magnitude more than speech.

But that bandwidth has many other calls upon it, such as vision, no?

 

[Tournesol]

But that bandwidth has many other calls upon it, such as vision, no?

Quite. The point was that there is more going on (objectively or subjectively) in our heads than we can possibly report on.

 

[Mentat]

Quite. The point was that there is more going on (objectively or subjectively) in our heads than we can possibly report on.

Which preassumes that we can report on anything that is going on in our heads, whereas such reports could merely be concomitant with the goings-on that they relate to.

 

[Tournesol]

Anything that looks causal could be coincidental -- but where did that assumption ever get anybody ?

 

[Mentat]

Anything that looks causal could be coincidental -- but where did that assumption ever get anybody ?

Where did the causal assumption ever get anybody? Where is everybody trying to go?

I suggest reading David Hume.

 

[Tournesol]

Where did the causal assumption ever get anybody?

It got us Science.

 

[Mentat]

It got us Science.

Which is but one of many games.

Causality is not only unprovable, but it is also useless in many "games".

 

[Doctordick]

Well, I don't know whether you guys are going to welcome my comments or not but I can't resist. It appears that the discussion has settled down to "things are caused" as opposed to "things are coincidental". It seems to me that even the slightest thought on the subject would reveal that, if one is discussing reality. the actual fact of the question absolutely cannot be settled as neither position yields a result which can be checked. And don't think predicting events has the power to settle the issue; that position is unsupportable in any a careful analysis.

However, there is another issue related to the question where a little thought immediately settles the question and that goes directly to the question of science. An explanation, by its very nature, is the embodiment of causality. As soon as you suggest an explanation exists you have established the idea of using causality. Even the extreme case, "it's absolutely random", by saying it has no cause uses the concept of "cause": i.e., the "cause" of the observed result does not exist "in reality" and that is the cause of the observed results. What I am getting at, as confused as it may sound, is that "cause" is a functioning relationship in any explanation. Thus it is, if you are going to explain something, you can't do it without implementing "causality".

On the other hand, "causality" is not needed at all to understand reality. What happens is what happens and that is about all you can prove.

Have fun -- Dick