- #666
Les Sleeth
Gold Member
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Doctordick said:And considering your attitude, I wouldn't want to!
What attitude is that, the failure to kiss your condenscending rear?
Doctordick said:. . . I have no compunction to throw pearls before the thoughtless.
The onlyl pearls you've been throwing are pearls of self-aggrandizement.
Doctordick said:Essentially what I said was, if hard analytical science cannot explain it, then no valid explanation exists. Now the proof is not trivial and it requires a patient and exacting mind to follow it.
Do you really think everyone around here is going to agree ". . . if hard analytical science cannot explain it, then no valid explanation exists"? If you start off with that a priori assumption, you are going to have a fight on your hands every step of the way from some of us.
Doctordick said:If you really are interested, I suggest you take a look at the "What is Evidence" thread starting with my post at:https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?p=441146#post441146 . . . "This is a finite mechanical problem which we all know is solvable (we have all solved it via intuition); so why is no one interested in solving it via logic? Most tell me that's because it can't be solved and I am a crackpot for thinking it can be."
Maybe you should listen. It can't be done and still be called "scientific." It might be called philosophy, but who knows since all we've seen from you are attempts to get readers to commit to buying your approach wholesale, and calling them idiots for refusing of course, before you even have put out one substantial idea.
Doctordick said:Some "hard analytical explanations" yield the existence of undecidable questions; i.e., the existence of undecidable questions does not violate my proof at all.
That is not the standard even for a good scientific theory, much less a proof.
The material below is a taken from a link provided by Tom (another supermentor...btw, Nereid is a woman) to a theorist hopeful. It's notes taken from a lecture (which explains the choppy writing) on Popper's falsification concept that is now accepted as the standard for a scientific theory. Nothing I've read of yours (or what you claim you want to do) approximates it:
What makes a theory scientific? Or, what distinguishes science from non-science? (The demarcation problem.) Initial proposals:
(1) Science offers explanations.
(2) Science is objective.
(3) Science is descriptive.
(4) Science makes predictions.
(5) Science proceeds from observation.
The trouble with the initial proposals: they don’t do any distinguishing.
Popper
The following is the wrong answer to the demarcation problem: science is inductive; it proceeds by observation and experiment. Why is that the wrong answer? Non-scientific theories can be based on observation and experiment, e.g., "…astrology with its stupendous mass of empirical evidence based on observation—on horoscopes and biographies.”
Popper’s 4 candidate theories:
(1) Einstein’s theory of relativity.
(2) Marx’s theory of history
(3) Freud’s psychoanalysis
(4) Adler’s individual psychology
Popper’s intuition: (1) is scientific, (2)-(4) not. Truth is not the issue. At the time, Popper didn’t believe that Einstein’s theory was true. Exactness also was not the issue. The appeal of (2)-(4): Their apparent explanatory power. Exposure brought about an “intellectual conversion” and confirming instances of the theory were seen everywhere. Indeed, nothing seemed to count as disconfirmation, as evidence against the theory. Every observation could be interpreted in light of the theory.
The difference with respect to (1)— Einstein’s theory: The theory makes risky predictions, predictions which, if false, sink the theory. Einstein’s theory has the result that light, like material bodies, is attracted by heavy bodies such as the sun. This led to the prediction that the light from certain stars—those which appear in the night sky as close to the sun—would appear, if observed in daylight, as slightly shifted away from their normal position, slightly further away from the sun.
This prediction can’t be tested in ordinary circumstances because of the sun’s brightness. But during an eclipse one can take a photograph of a star’s apparent position in the daytime sky. And then photos of the star taken in the day and in the night can be compared and its apparent distance from the sun can be measured. This is just what Eddington did. And the prediction of Einstein’s theory was shown to be correct. The significance of this, acc. to Popper: Einstein’s theory, unlike (3)-(4), is incompatible with certain possible results of observation.
In other words, Einstein’s theory is refutable or falsifiable (the term that has stuck). It is possibly false. If our observations had been different, it would have been shown to be false (though they weren’t and it wasn’t). This, then, is Popper’s solution to the demarcation problem: A theory is scientific just in case it is falsifiable.
Truth is not the issue for Popper. Accordingly, his solution to the demarcation problem doesn’t make being true a criterion for being science. Theories that are true may be falsifiable. But, equally, theories that are false may be falsifiable as well. Some consequences and corollaries of Popper’s solution to the demarcation problem:
Theories not falsifiable by any conceivable event are not scientific. (Thus, the naïve view that science strives for irrefutability gets things exactly the wrong way around.) Every good scientific theory is a prohibition--it denies that certain things may happen. A test of a theory is an attempt to falsify it. “Confirming evidence” is too easy to come by and should only count towards the acceptability of a theory if it is the result of an attempt at falsification.
Some genuinely falsifiable theories, when falsified, are maintained by their admirers either by re-casting the theory or adding auxilliary assumptions. Such a procedure is always possible, but it rescues the theory only by destroying or reducing the theory’s claim to scientific status. (Popper calls such rescue operations conventionalist twists.)
Who passes the falsification test?
(1)—Einstein’s theory of relativity—passes. It makes risky predictions (re: the apparent positions of stars, e.g.) Astrology fails. Vagueness of its predictions makes it unfalsifiable.
(2)—the Marxist theory of history—fails. It once passed, but it was given various conventionalist twists.
(3) and (4)—the psychoanalytic theories—fail. No conceivable bit of human behavior could refute them. Non-science but not unimportant. Analogy with primitive myths. These myths often shape later science (the ancient Greek examples).
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