Can Everything be Reduced to Pure Physics?

[loseyourname]

You asked me if I could function when I was unconscious. The only time I am usually considered unconsiousness is when I am asleep. So how else was I to answer your question? And you also specifically mentioned sleepwalking.

Well, let's go back to this. Sleepwalking is the only example I can think of in which a human being performs motor functions not distinguishable from those of conscious humans despite not being conscious (at least of the fact that they are performing these functions and of their surroundings). As far as I can tell, that makes sleepwalking the best example of what a human could accomplish through physical interaction with its environment without consciousness. So answer me: How long do you think such a sleepwalker would last in the wild? How successful do you think it would be in reproducing?

You definitely aren't seeing the point I'm making or the cans of worms you're opening. I am not creating a hypothetical brain. What I am trying to point out is that we have a feature that is not addressed by any physical process of the brain. Yet, all the behavior that is being referenced as "useful" can be mapped to a brain process. You are only making an assumption that consciousness is useful because that is the way it seems to be working to you subjectively. How else could you possibly know this?

I'm trying to take this out of the realm of subjectivity by asking you how we could accomplish conscious processes without being conscious. You keep saying that all of the functions I am pointing to are carried out by brain processes, but my whole point is that they are carried out by conscious brain processes. Just take the sleepwalker example and use that one alone - you can forget about every other point I've brought up. I'd like to know how a human in that situation, without being conscious of his relationship to his environment or even of that environment, could last more than a couple minutes in the wild or ever reproduce.

Now I realize the point you are trying to make. An organism could still be functionally aware of its environment and its relationship to it without being subjectively aware of anything. So why do you we have subjective awareness? Well, I contend that before you can even ask that question (if you want it to be evolutionarily meaningful), you must find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware. Now I know that you're going to contend that such traits as the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror and to learn human languages are not conscious processes. Then what is? Outside of trying to pose a philosophical mind-bender, is there any reason to believe that there exists a hominid primate that is not subjectively aware? You can pose functional awareness as a viable alternative to subjective awareness until the cows come home, but asking why we have subjective awareness is no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth.

Yes I can easily see the fallacy here. But this is not what I am doing. I have already responded to this comment by saying that this only works if consciousness is useful to begin with! Wings are useful regardless of whatever else one might have evolved to replace wings with. But you haven't given any examples of how consciousness is useful.

I will continue to contend that I have done this. Awareness of oneself is useful. There are plenty of brain processes that don't need to be conscious. I will agree with this. Pain and pleasure are obvious examples. We can see plenty of lower-level organisms responding to positive and negative stimuli without subjectively experiencing pain or pleasure. You can even argue that prairie voles respond to neuropeptides responsible for monogamous relationships and they may very well never subjectively experience any feeling of love. I would argue that they probably do, but either way, there are many matters that are not settled. But I have pointed out several human activities crucial to survival and reproduction that are carried out consciously, and that I contend cannot be carried out unconciously. Could they be in principle? Sure, but principle is not what is being argued here. No existing human could survive for long in the wild without being conscious. If you honestly don't think consciousness helps us to strategize, then explain to me how humans can clobber a computer in the game of Go despite the thousands of times superior computing ability of the machine?

To do this, you will need to point to an activity that cannot be fully explained by some other process that has nothing to do with consciousness. Everything that has been listed here can be completely explained by physical processes of the brain that are not attributable to consciousness.

You don't seem to be willing to admit that there are any processes that have anything to do with consciousness. Despite the fact that you are consciously thinking through your response right now, you will continue to say that consciousness is not used for anything.

 

[loseyourname]

On second thought, forget about the learning of language example. Given that there are rare instances of people speaking languages that they don't remember learning, I suppose it is possible for a human to unconsciously learn a language.

I would like to point out one more thing. This discussion seems to be predicated on the notion that evolution cannot be an explanation for any trait that serves no purpose. That is not the case. A simple example that comes to mind is the long eyestalks of certain fruit flies. Though they serve no purpose, they have been selected for because the gene responsible for increased length of the eyestalk is adjacent to another gene responsible for some aspect of reproductive health (I don't remember what exactly). Evolution is not always as easy to figure out as it seems. Many traits can evolve for reasons other than their usefulness.

 

[Les Sleeth]

Now I realize the point you are trying to make. An organism could still be functionally aware of its environment and its relationship to it without being subjectively aware of anything. So why do you we have subjective awareness? . . . Outside of trying to pose a philosophical mind-bender, is there any reason to believe that there exists a hominid primate that is not subjectively aware? You can pose functional awareness as a viable alternative to subjective awareness until the cows come home, but asking why we have subjective awareness is no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth. . . . No existing human could survive for long in the wild without being conscious. . . . . you will continue to say that consciousness is not used for anything.

If you answer the question of why we are conscious by saying the question is "no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth"), you've not said anything except the classic philosophical head scratch: "that's just how it is." On the other hand, I am not sure arguing the irrelevance of consciousness to survival is the best argument either if it has to stand alone as what defines the "hard problem." I can, for example, see how I use it to help me survive.

Yet you are easily proven wrong when you contend consciousness is necessary to survival (i.e., even if it is helpful now that we have it). Look at bacteria or phages . . . do you think they are conscious? As some have pointed out in this thread, bacteria are the most successful organism (in terms of survival) on the planet. Plants too have extensively evolved apparently without benefit of consciousness. So there is no doubt that consciousness is not needed to evolve and survive. If it is not needed, I think the only way to show the significance of the fact that it did develop is to link it to a second fact which is: how can a physical system evolve non-mechanistic traits of consciousness?

If physicalism is true, then the only influences in/on evolution have been mechanics. Therefore, consciousness should be 100% mechanical. However, instead we have a few of little things like free will, creativity, selflessness (and even self sacrifice), and of course the big daddy of them all -- subjective awareness. Exactly how did mechanical processes produce such non-mechanical traits?

So I believe it is when we combine the fact that consciousness isn't necessary for survival with the non-mechanical nature of the highest traits of consciousness, that you really do have a "hard problem" for a purely physicalist theory of consciousness.

 

[loseyourname]

If you answer the question of why we are conscious by saying the question is "no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth"), you've not said anything except the classic philosophical head scratch: "that's just how it is." On the other hand, I am not sure arguing the irrelevance of consciousness to survival is the best argument either if it has to stand alone as what defines the "hard problem." I can, for example, see how I use it to help me survive.

I agree. I'm not trying to say there is no hard problem. I just don't see any reason to think of consciousness as incompatible or irrelevant to evolution (non-guided evolution, that is). I think the problem lies in explaining the nature of subjective experience, not in explaining its usefulness.

Yet you are easily proven wrong when you contend consciousness is necessary to survival (i.e., even if it is helpful now that we have it). Look at bacteria or phages . . . do you think they are conscious? As some have pointed out in this thread, bacteria are the most successful organism (in terms of survival) on the planet. Plants too have extensively evolved apparently without benefit of consciousness. So there is no doubt that consciousness is not needed to evolve and survive.

Following that line of reasoning, bacteria and plants don't have opposable thumbs, either. So there is no doubt that an opposable thumb is not needed to evolve and survive. It is, however, an important part of human evolution, as is the development of consciousness.

If it is not needed, I think the only way to show the significance of the fact that it did develop is to link it to a second fact which is: how can a physical system evolve non-mechanistic traits of consciousness?

Well, I think it has both evolutionary significance (in that conscious organisms do have increased fitness) and added significance as well. I think the initial advantage of consciousness probably had to do with developing strategies. Going back to the example of a human always beating a computer at the game of Go, there is clearly an advantage in the ability to integrate thought and sensory processes into a conscious moment, in being able to view a problem holistically. A non-conscious intelligence, such as a computer, is not able to do this. While it is entirely possible that some programmer will eventually come up with a computer capable of playing an elite-level game of Go, the computing power necessary (because of the near-infinite possibilities at each branch point of the game) is mind-boggling and well beyond the capabilities of any organic brain. It may very well be that a brain could have evolved in such a way that it could perform the strategizing functions that a human does without being conscious, but it is clear that the computational ability necessary would have been staggering and probably hundreds of millions of years off in the future. Consciousness was a far more economical, and attainable, if not necessarily a simpler, solution.

If physicalism is true, then the only influences in/on evolution have been mechanics. Therefore, consciousness should be 100% mechanical. However, instead we have a few of little things like free will, creativity, selflessness (and even self sacrifice), and of course the big daddy of them all -- subjective awareness. Exactly how did mechanical processes produce such non-mechanical traits?

Well, it's rather Newtonian to suggest that physicalism necessarily implies mechanism. I don't see this dichotomy, though the question remains an interesting and difficult question. This problem extends beyond physics. Even if you assume consciousness to be non-physical, it's still a seeming paradox that it should behave in a non-deterministic manner. It is logic, not physics, that dictates every event should have a cause, and in such a manner it should be theoretically possible to know the outcome of every event that will ever take place from a set of first causes. Physics is becoming more probabilistic than deterministic.

So I believe it is when we combine the fact that consciousness isn't necessary for survival with the non-mechanical nature of the highest traits of consciousness, that you really do have a "hard problem" for a purely physicalist theory of consciousness.

I don't see any difficulty placing consciousness in an evolutionary context. I think it is very clear, and it seems that you agree, that it is an advantage that we are conscious. I still there is a hard problem, but it is a hard problem for any theory of consciousness, not just a physicalist theory.

 

[Fliption]

So answer me: How long do you think such a sleepwalker would last in the wild? How successful do you think it would be in reproducing?

Are you saying that there isn't a brain process that is in charge of reproducing? Or are you saying that there is such a brain process and this reproductive brain process is the same process that generates consciousness?

The only reason you are linking consciousness with these brain processes is because of your own personal experience. There is no other basis to make such a link. This is part of my whole point. Sure I'll agree with you. Consciousness is useful. But I only say that because it seems useful to me too.

I'm trying to take this out of the realm of subjectivity by asking you how we could accomplish conscious processes without being conscious. You keep saying that all of the functions I am pointing to are carried out by brain processes, but my whole point is that they are carried out by conscious brain processes.

What is a conscious brain process? I contend that there is no such thing in science. Not if consciousness is defined the way it's being defined here.

Just take the sleepwalker example and use that one alone - you can forget about every other point I've brought up. I'd like to know how a human in that situation, without being conscious of his relationship to his environment or even of that environment, could last more than a couple minutes in the wild or ever reproduce.

So you have solved the hard problem. All we have to do is analyze the brain process of a sleep walking person and a person fully awake and these processes will be the processes that generate consciousness! No further study is needed. It must be so! Otherwise, we'd have to acknowledge the idea that consciousness doesn't emerge from brain processes. So rather than be open to that, let's just assume it isn't true from the very beginning.

This solves nothing.

Well, I contend that before you can even ask that question (if you want it to be evolutionarily meaningful), you must find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware.

Better yet, why don't you find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware AND subjectively aware. And then you have to show me how you can know such a thing.

If you do not see the philosophical issues here then I'm not sure what else I can say except asks "how do you know anyone other than yourself is subjectively aware?" Your science is much more advanced than mine if you can answer this.

Outside of trying to pose a philosophical mind-bender, is there any reason to believe that there exists a hominid primate that is not subjectively aware?
You can pose functional awareness as a viable alternative to subjective awareness until the cows come home, but asking why we have subjective awareness is no more meaningful than asking why a squid has teeth in its stomach instead of teeth in its mouth.

I am not arguing that anything is not subjectively aware. I am telling you that you have no basis other than your own subjective experience to conclude such a thing. Based on this subjective conclusion, you are now going to extrapolate this feature to everything else and then, in addition, claim it is useful. Where is the science that suggests all this? All I've heard are statements and examples of incredulity. Nothing scientific.

But I have pointed out several human activities crucial to survival and reproduction that are carried out consciously, and that I contend cannot be carried out unconciously. Could they be in principle? Sure, but principle is not what is being argued here. No existing human could survive for long in the wild without being conscious. If you honestly don't think consciousness helps us to strategize, then explain to me how humans can clobber a computer in the game of Go despite the thousands of times superior computing ability of the machine?

OK so you agree it is possible for these processes to be unconscious in principle. But you think that this is not how it works in a human. I can buy all that. Now show me with scientific evidence the difference. This is crucial. Do not gloss over it.

You don't seem to be willing to admit that there are any processes that have anything to do with consciousness. Despite the fact that you are consciously thinking through your response right now, you will continue to say that consciousness is not used for anything.

How do you know I am consciously thinking through my response right now? Do you have a machine that you can attach to me that will tell you such things?

Again, I am not claiming it isn't useful nor am I claiming that brain processes don't have anything to do with conscousness. I am saying that you cannot claim it is useful until you solve the hard problem. Do I personally believe it is useful? Absolutely. But I once believed in Santa Claus. So do you really want to rely on subjective opinion only? Need to solve that hard problem.

 

[Fliption]

discussion seems to be predicated on the notion that evolution cannot be an explanation for any trait that serves no purpose. That is not the case. A simple example that comes to mind is the long eyestalks of certain fruit flies. Though they serve no purpose, they have been selected for because the gene responsible for increased length of the eyestalk is adjacent to another gene responsible for some aspect of reproductive health (I don't remember what exactly). Evolution is not always as easy to figure out as it seems. Many traits can evolve for reasons other than their usefulness.

Just for the record, I'm not really interested in the link to evolution. I may personally believe that consciousness is useful. Therefore, it isn't a surprise that it would have survived. I'm just saying that this belief is just that. A belief.

Consciousness is very different from thumbs and stomach teeth and anything else that we have scientific knowledge about. I can objectively see your thumbs. But I am only assuming your consicous experience is something close to mine, if it exists at all.

 

[loseyourname]

Are you saying that there isn't a brain process that is in charge of reproducing? Or are you saying that there is such a brain process and this reproductive brain process is the same process that generates consciousness?

The only reason you are linking consciousness with these brain processes is because of your own personal experience. There is no other basis to make such a link. This is part of my whole point. Sure I'll agree with you. Consciousness is useful. But I only say that because it seems useful to me too.

I take it you aren't going to answer the question? I will not do you the same discourtesy.

There is a process in charge of reproducing. It is partially controlled by the brain, and partially controlled by hormone levels that are effected by factors other than brain processes. I am not saying that a reproductive brain process is linked to the production of consciousness. I am saying that an unconscious human cannot survive or reproduce as well as a conscious human. Therefore, consciousness outcompetes unconsciousness in an evolutionary battle for the environmental niche filled by the human species.

What is a conscious brain process? I contend that there is no such thing in science. Not if consciousness is defined the way it's being defined here.

Sorry about that. I was ambiguous. What I mean by "conscious brain process" is a brain process that a given organism is conscious of. Given that I am conscious of quite a few brain processes myself at this moment, I don't really feel the need to scientifically prove that such a phenomenon exists. I'm pretty certain you experience the same thing as well, so I don't feel the need to prove it to you either. If you have never been conscious of any brain processes, just tell me so, and I will agree that I have a problem.

So you have solved the hard problem. All we have to do is analyze the brain process of a sleep walking person and a person fully awake and these processes will be the processes that generate consciousness! No further study is needed. It must be so! Otherwise, we'd have to acknowledge the idea that consciousness doesn't emerge from brain processes. So rather than be open to that, let's just assume it isn't true from the very beginning.

This solves nothing.

I don't recall saying I had solved the hard problem. I do contend that I have given more than enough examples of how consciousness could be an advantage and selected for through evolution. Read through my preceding post to Sleeth, where I hope I make it clear that I am claiming nothing beyond that one thing.

Better yet, why don't you find me a hominid primate, at the very least, that is functionally aware AND subjectively aware. And then you have to show me how you can know such a thing.

I don't know of any organism that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware, but I can give you a pretty easy example of a hominid primate that is both - myself. If I really need to prove to you that I am, I contend you are simply being obstinate.

If you do not see the philosophical issues here then I'm not sure what else I can say except asks "how do you know anyone other than yourself is subjectively aware?" Your science is much more advanced than mine if you can answer this.

Answer me this: How does science know that if an object is dropped at sea level on the planet Earth with no air resistance, it will accelerate toward the center of the Earth at a constant rate? If by "know," you are expecting absolute certainty, science will not give you that. Science will also not prove to you that anyone other than yourself is conscious. However, the inductive process key to developing a scientific theory can help us out here. It goes something like this:

I am conscious. I am human. All humans are similar organisms to the point where they are distinguishable physiologically and behaviorally only in small details, not in holistic processes put into context. Consciousness is a holistic process (in the sense that I am conscious of myself as a holistic organism and I experience integrated moments that bring together a huge amount of sensory and thought input) and I exist in a similar context (in the same physical world, in the same species of body, etc.) as other humans. Therefore, other humans are conscious as well.

I have not nor will I ever claim that I have proven anything. By the same token, I cannot even prove that other organisms exist, or for that matter, that the physical world exists. A meaningful existence, however, must be predicated on the inductive conclusion that the world I seem to be a part of does exist. The default state of affairs is basically that all members of the same species share the same traits unless there is good reason to believe they don't. There is good reason to believe that Veronica Lake had blonde hair, whereas I don't, so that trait is thrown out the window. I have never been presented with any good reason to think that there exists a functional human being that is not conscious. If you can give me one, go for it.

I am not arguing that anything is not subjectively aware. I am telling you that you have no basis other than your own subjective experience to conclude such a thing. Based on this subjective conclusion, you are now going to extrapolate this feature to everything else and then, in addition, claim it is useful. Where is the science that suggests all this? All I've heard are statements and examples of incredulity. Nothing scientific.

You are acting as if no argument carries any weight unless it is backed by scientific confirmation. I think that is pretty clearly not the case. I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss subjective evidence - especially when it is intersubjective evidence (that is, Sleeth agrees and I'm sure you do as well that being conscious is of value to you, for survival purposes) - when discussing a subjective phenomenon.

OK so you agree it is possible for these processes to be unconscious in principle. But you think that this is not how it works in a human. I can buy all that. Now show me with scientific evidence the difference. This is crucial. Do not gloss over it.

You can badger me all you want, but I really don't feel the need to do that. I think that even you can clearly see that these processes are conscious processes, and that you cannot carry them out without being conscious. If you are able to carry out and of them without being conscious, then say so. Otherwise, I think that you are again being obstinate.

Furthermore, I have presented evidence. Both the sleepwalking human and the strategizing computer are evidence. Neither can perform functions crucial to human survival. While it is not logically inconsistent to postulate the possibility that a sleepwalker might be able to perform these functions, all the evidence runs against it. While it might be possible for a computer to perform these functions, the computing power necessary is far beyond what is attainable by the human brain.

I don't know what else you want me to do. By the standards you seem to be setting, I cannot even prove to you that I am conscious myself. Yet you respond as if I am aware of what is being discussed.

How do you know I am consciously thinking through my response right now? Do you have a machine that you can attach to me that will tell you such things?

All right, see what I mean? Where do I go with this? If you're going to squabble over something as simple as the conclusion that you are conscious of your own thought processes, how are we to hold a meaningful discussion?

Again, I am not claiming it isn't useful nor am I claiming that brain processes don't have anything to do with conscousness. I am saying that you cannot claim it is useful until you solve the hard problem. Do I personally believe it is useful? Absolutely. But I once believed in Santa Claus. So do you really want to rely on subjective opinion only? Need to solve that hard problem.

Then solve for me the hard problem of the opposable thumb. In principle, evolution could have developed a method by which all of the motor functions performed with an opposable thumb could have been performed without it. In fact, I can't even prove that an opposable thumb is useful. Although I could cut off both my thumbs and lose the ability to perform crucial functions, this is apparently no more a piece of evidence than the inability of a sleepwalker to perform functions crucial to the sustained survival of a human being. In fact, I cannot even prove that the external world exists, so any theory of the opposable thumb predicated on the assumption that such a limb is crucial to the manipulation of the external world is very seriously flawed. Man, this is a hard problem.

 

[loseyourname]

Consciousness is very different from thumbs and stomach teeth and anything else that we have scientific knowledge about. I can objectively see your thumbs.

No you can't. You can only assume that what you subjectively experience as the sight of a human thumb in fact has a link to a physical organism external to your self.

 

[Fliption]

I take it you aren't going to answer the question? I will not do you the same discourtesy.

I'm not ignoring your question. I'm trying to get you to see that it is irrelevant. Apparently, I'm just not doing a very good job of it.
(Of course, even a good saleman will sell nothing to a brick wall )

I am not saying that a reproductive brain process is linked to the production of consciousness.

When you claim that a conscious brain is performing activity that an unconscious brain is not capable of because of the fact that it is conscious, you are associating that activity with consciousness itself. But it doesn't matter. From your comments below I suspect we actually agree on what I've been trying to get across.

If you have never been conscious of any brain processes, just tell me so, and I will agree that I have a problem.

I have never been conscious of a brain process. See how easy I tore down your knowledge base? Tis the nature of subjectivity.

I don't know of any organism that is functionally aware without being subjectively aware, but I can give you a pretty easy example of a hominid primate that is both - myself. If I really need to prove to you that I am, I contend you are simply being obstinate.

I really don't understand how you can say this and still believe there is a hard problem to solve. This obstinance that you speak of is the nature of the hard problem.

Answer me this: How does science know that if an object is dropped at sea level on the planet Earth with no air resistance, it will accelerate toward the center of the Earth at a constant rate?

I wasn't really trying to set up an obstinate standard of knowledge. I was only trying to make the claim for the hard problem, which is that brain processes don't entail consciousness. Your standard of induction whereby you just conclude that all solipsists are obstinate people seems to suggest a poor opinion of philosophical views. If we follow this method, I don't see why we can't inductively rationalize many philosophical problems.

I am conscious. I am human. All humans are similar organisms to the point where they are distinguishable physiologically and behaviorally only in small details, not in holistic processes put into context. Consciousness is a holistic process (in the sense that I am conscious of myself as a holistic organism and I experience integrated moments that bring together a huge amount of sensory and thought input) and I exist in a similar context (in the same physical world, in the same species of body, etc.) as other humans. Therefore, other humans are conscious as well.

I agree with this. But does this tell us anything about consciousness? My point wasn't so much focusing on whether others have consciousness or not. I was attempting to focus on the very reason you have to inductively conclude such things. Which is that we know nothing about it. No brain process can be linked to it and as I state aboved, brain processes don't even entail consciousness.

I wouldn't be so quick to dismiss subjective evidence - especially when it is intersubjective evidence (that is, Sleeth agrees and I'm sure you do as well that being conscious is of value to you, for survival purposes) - when discussing a subjective phenomenon.

I agree with this. This is all I needed to hear. If you're claiming your comments about consciousness and evolution are subjective and non-scientific then I definitely agree.

I think that even you can clearly see that these processes are conscious processes, and that you cannot carry them out without being conscious. If you are able to carry out and of them without being conscious, then say so. Otherwise, I think that you are again being obstinate.

You think I am being obstinate because you don't understand my point. I am emphasizing phrases to attempt to lead you where I'm going and it's probably a bit confusing. What you are saying is exactly what I usually say to Mentat. He pretends that he doesn't know what consciousness is so that he can avoid the hard problem. He doesn't know what subjective experience is. He does this so that our inability to define it or reductively describe it can be used to prove it doesn't exists. I say he's being obstinate and just using the hard problem itself to prove the hard problem doesn't exists. But in the end, I think you and I agree. I personally and subjectively agree with you about consciousness and evolution. I just interpreted you to put some scientific credibility behind these comments. While I might agree with them, assumption and induction is the only way we can get there.

Furthermore, I have presented evidence. Both the sleepwalking human and the strategizing computer are evidence. Neither can perform functions crucial to human survival.

Again, you realize that in principle these things can be done without consciousness. This is not intended to illustrate that consciousness isn't needed or useful. It is intended to illustrate that we cannot rely on these functions as proof of consciousness; thereby solving much of the hard problem. The linkage to consciousness is purely a subjective one we have inductively applied to everyone. Not because we can analyze a brain and see consciousness at work.

In fact, I cannot even prove that the external world exists, so any theory of the opposable thumb predicated on the assumption that such a limb is crucial to the manipulation of the external world is very seriously flawed. Man, this is a hard problem.

Now this is obstinate. You agree that the quality of knowledge we have for carbon dioxide is different from the quality of the subjective induction you use for your conclusions don't you? Unless you really think there is a hard problem of chemistry, it seems you do.

Since I'm doing such a poor job of explaining this, I'll post a link to a thread about evolution from some time ago. This thread ended up talking about evolution and consciousness. Ironically, it is the science types who claimed that consciousness had no place in the study of evolution. I participated here and disgreed with them strongly claiming that consciousness shouldn't be ignored. The thread seemed to end when Hypnagogue finally came in and straigtened things out.

I'll quote a little of his opinion here...

The reason the ommission of P-consciousness is not terribly problematic for a theory of evolution is that it is still an open issue whether or not P-consciousness is causally efficacious in any way; that is, whether or not it is epiphenomenal. If it is shown one day to be causally efficacious, then certainly it must be taken into account by an evolutionary theory, but it would seem premature to say that a theory is incomplete for ommitting a phenomenon whose causal relevance is yet to be determined.

In particular, the purported causal role of P-consciousness would seem to be readily filled by causal mechanisms that are already part of the physicalist model of reality. This is precisely why the philosophical notion of the 'zombie' is a useful one-- because it would seem that we can describe the behavior of an organism (in particular, a human) in purely physical terms without needing to invoke P-consciousness at all.

That last sentence probably includes reproduction too.

This is what I've been trying to say. Perhaps his words or maybe the discussion in this thread in general will help communicate that point.

https://www.physicsforums.com/showthread.php?t=16648&page=12&pp=15&highlight=evolution

 

[Fliption]

No you can't. You can only assume that what you subjectively experience as the sight of a human thumb in fact has a link to a physical organism external to your self.

True. But you have already acknowledged the hard problem. I'm just trying to point out what appeared to be an inconsistency. Claiming knowledge of scientific status about something subject to a hard problem is not consistent. But I now understand that you are agreeing that this is a subjective, inductive conclusion on your part.

 

[loseyourname]

True. But you have already acknowledged the hard problem. I'm just trying to point out what appeared to be an inconsistency. Claiming knowledge of scientific status about something subject to a hard problem is not consistent. But I now understand that you are agreeing that this is a subjective, inductive conclusion on your part.

It is intersubjective and inductive. What you don't seem to realize is that all scientific knowledge is at best intersubjective and inductive. You are asking the scientific method to do something that it cannot do. This entire mess started (assuming I didn't misinterpret anything) with Sleeth and yourself claiming that consciousness has no survival or reproductive value, and so could not be fit into an evolutionary framework, whereas I claimed that consciousness did have survival and reproductive value and could be fit into an evolutionary framework.

Using solipsism to argue your case is a little silly. I will again restate the basis of my argument. There are functions crucial to both survival and reproduction that I perform while conscious. Though it may be conceivable that I could perform them without being conscious, it is not conceivable that I could perform them as well as I could while conscious. That is, I could simply drift through life as a sleepwalker or zombie and perhaps be able to eat and have sex, but I would not be as successful at performing these functions as I would be in a waking state.

Now keep in mind, this is only a hypothesis. I contend that it can be tested scientifically, but you seem to want a ready-to-publish paper detailing the results of this study. Well, I don't even know if there has been a study. I can, however, design a study that would test this hypothesis. First, we would need to find a way to induce a sleepwalking state in one group of subjects. We observe them, specifically putting them in situations in which we can test survival and reproductive success. Let's say, we have groups of husbands and wives sleepwalking, and observe whether or not they ever make any moves towards engaging in intercourse. We take people that are hungry, put them in sleepwalking mode, and see how successful they are at obtaining food. We then perform these same tests with people that are in a waking state. My hypothesis is that the group in the waking state will be more successful at performing critical functions than those in the sleepwalking group.

You seem to be contending that such a test would at best be inconclusive because I can never know whether or not the waking subjects of the study are actually conscious. I contend that solipsism as a theory holds no more creedence than theories of extreme skepticism that would hold no subjective experience as reliable, even the perception of having a body. Under such a system of skepticism, no scientific knowledge of any kind is reliable knowledge, including the laws of chemistry. So if you are going to use solipsism to argue against a test for the value of consciousness, I contend that, to be consistent, you must regard all scientific knowledge as equally flawed. If you won't allow the premise that all humans in a waking state are conscious to be the base of an experiment, then you can't allow the premise that human sense perception is inherently reliable or even that other humans exist. In fact, under these strict rules of skepticism, macro-evolution itself would not be an acceptable theory. The attempt to fit consciousness into an evolutionary framework then becomes meaningless from the outset.

 

[loseyourname]

Another thing to keep in mind is that there exist many traits for which the evolutionary significance is not known. There are cases, as in the eyestalk, where gene loci are close to each other, and the evolution of a certain trait owes only to its linkage to another trait that has survival or reproductive value. This is fairly easy to determine for monogenetic traits. A trait such as consciousness, on the other hand, requires many interconnected systems to be operational at the same time. It is an emergent, polygenetic trait, such as the ability to walk, which requires the coordination of many aspects of the nervous and skeletomuscular systems.

Another thing to consider is that certain traits evolve as byproducts of other traits that have survival or reproducive value. Take dolphin song, for example. It is not necessary, from an evolutionary standpoint, for the song of a dolphin to be as complex as it is. All of the information that needs to be transmitted from one dolphin to another could easily be transmitted using a system as simple as that of a primate. Dolphins, however, have a far more complex larynx and nasal passage than does any primate. The reason for this is that dolphins use echolocation, in addition to sight, to navigate and find food. Echolocation requires a complex vocal and auditory apparatus. This apparatus was already in place because it served the evolutionary purpose of making echolocation possible, and it just so happened that it could be used to communicate as well. As such, dolphin song is an emergent trait that emerged, by chance, from a complex system that evolved for other purposes. It is entirely possible that consciousness evolved in a similar manner. It could just be a trait that emerged, by chance, from the complexities of the human nervous system, which evolved for separate purposes (initially for navigating through trees and complex social and child-rearing behavior, later for problem-solving).

One such trait that I would argue is an example of this phenomenon in humans is culture. Culture does not serve any obvious survival or reproductive purpose. In fact, given the gross prejudice and even warfare that exists because of cultural differences, I think it could be argued that culture is detrimental to species fitness. The development of language and complex social behavior, however, did serve an obvious survival purpose. Culture simply could have emerged from language and social behavior as a secondary trait with no real survival value of its own.

 

[Fliption]

Did you not read anything I wrote? It seems you just regurgitated your last post which I spent several paragraphs already responding to. I even linked another thread where at least a handful of people disagree with what you are saying.

It is intersubjective and inductive. What you don't seem to realize is that all scientific knowledge is at best intersubjective and inductive. You are asking the scientific method to do something that it cannot do.

I understand that science is an inductive process. But you must admit that much less can be said about consciousness scientifically then can be said about acid neutalization. Do you not agree with this? You have already acknowledged the hard problem so what is it that you think still needs to be solved with consciousness that doesn't exists for acid neutalization? And why can't I refer to this problem without being called obstinate and silly? If you want to claim that the hard problem is the result of being obstinate then don't pretend I'm the only one you need to address. You have quite a task in front of you.

This entire mess started (assuming I didn't misinterpret anything) with Sleeth and yourself claiming that consciousness has no survival or reproductive value, and so could not be fit into an evolutionary framework, whereas I claimed that consciousness did have survival and reproductive value and could be fit into an evolutionary framework.

See the thread I linked. I argued in that thread that it should be included in the framework only because I know that it cannot be properly addressed until the hard problem is solved. I argued for this approach as opposed to the "let's just ignore it and maybe it'll go away" approach that the science folks seemed to defend.

Also, I've already explained that my point wasn't so much to debate whether consciousness is useful or not. Yet somehow this point continues as is demonstrated below.

Using solipsism to argue your case is a little silly. I will again restate the basis of my argument.

This is because you do not understand the relevance of this point beyond someone just being obstinate.

There are functions crucial to both survival and reproduction that I perform while conscious. Though it may be conceivable that I could perform them without being conscious, it is not conceivable that I could perform them as well as I could while conscious. That is, I could simply drift through life as a sleepwalker or zombie and perhaps be able to eat and have sex, but I would not be as successful at performing these functions as I would be in a waking state.

And this is just further proof of that. I've already responded to this. Do you think I do not agree with something so obvious as this? Again, I am making a philosophical point about consciousness. Continuing to post examples, like sleepwalkers, that demonstrate the absurdity of believing consciousness is not useful can do nothing but convince me personally. They do nothing to change the philosophical issues themselves. My points still stand regardless of what I personally believe.

Now keep in mind, this is only a hypothesis. I contend that it can be tested scientifically, but you seem to want a ready-to-publish paper detailing the results of this study.

You seem to be contending that such a test would at best be inconclusive because I can never know whether or not the waking subjects of the study are actually conscious.

Please see your own acknowledgment of the hard problem and point in that direction for any obstinance you see. It is my source.

I don't understand why you keep referring to my comments about consciousness as being obstinate as if consciousness is no different from any other scientific endeaver. Yet you acknowledge the hard problem.

 

[loseyourname]

Did you not read anything I wrote? It seems you just regurgitated your last post which I spent several paragraphs already responding to. I even linked another thread where at least a handful of people disagree with what you are saying.

I've already seen that thread. Calm down.

I understand that science is an inductive process. But you must admit that much less can be said about consciousness scientifically then can be said about acid neutalization. Do you not agree with this? You have already acknowledged the hard problem so what is it that you think still needs to be solved with consciousness that doesn't exists for acid neutalization? And why can't I refer to this problem without being called obstinate and silly? If you want to claim that the hard problem is the result of being obstinate then don't pretend I'm the only one you need to address. You have quite a task in front of you.

Of course consciousness is more difficult to study scientifically then acid neutralization. I never claimed otherwise. All I have claimed in this thread - the only thing - is that consciousness probably can be accounted for in an evolutionary framework as something that would naturally be selected for because of the advantages it offers over non-consciousness. Everything else being brought up is a tangent, in particular since you seem to agree with me on the only point I am trying to make.

See the thread I linked. I argued in that thread that it should be included in the framework only because I know that it cannot be properly addressed until the hard problem is solved. I argued for this approach as opposed to the "let's just ignore it and maybe it'll go away" approach that the science folks seemed to defend.

Also, I've already explained that my point wasn't so much to debate whether consciousness is useful or not. Yet somehow this point continues as is demonstrated below.

But that's the only point I'm trying to make. If you have nothing to debate regarding that, why did you ever reply to me in the first place?

This is because you do not understand the relevance of this point beyond someone just being obstinate.

I don't see it as being relevant. I have explained why. If you read the texts (the few that are available) regarding scientific treatments of consciousness, they don't find the concerns of solipsists to be of any relevance either. There is concern as to whether or not subjective experience can ever be given a full account of on a physical basis, but there is certainly no concern over assuming other humans to be conscious. In fact, all of the major studies I know of have been conducted on chimps, because it is illegal to do these experiments on humans.

And this is just further proof of that. I've already responded to this. Do you think I do not agree with something so obvious as this? Again, I am making a philosophical point about consciousness. Continuing to post examples, like sleepwalkers, that demonstrate the absurdity of believing consciousness is not useful can do nothing but convince me personally. They do nothing to change the philosophical issues themselves. My points still stand regardless of what I personally believe.

Well what is your point and how does it stand in opposition to mine? My point is that consciousness is useful and that we can conduct a study that would give confirmation of its usefulness. That is scientific. So do you now agree that it is possible to confirm the usefulness of consciousness scientifically? Or will you say that it is not possible because we can't know that the subjects being studies are conscious. I don't think you realize the consequences of doing this.

I don't understand why you keep referring to my comments about consciousness as being obstinate as if consciousness is no different from any other scientific endeaver. Yet you acknowledge the hard problem.

I've never said it's no different. One thing I will say is that is becoming increasingly difficult to carry on a discussion with you. You continue to ignore most of my questions, while straightforward answers would probably facilitate a greater understanding of exactly what your position is. I have misunderstood it enough and I am tired of trying to figure out what the point is that you are making.

I will end this by reiterating the only point I was ever trying to make. There is nothing, in principle, that disallows the accounting for of consciousness in an evolutionary framework. That is all. I think it clearly provides a survival and reproductive advantage over a non-conscious version of the same organism. That is, a conscious human will be more successful than a non-conscious human. As such, it is sensible that natural selection would result in the evolution of conscious humans. Furthermore, I have pointed out that a particular trait does not necessarily need to have a survival or reproductive value in order to be accounted for through natural selection. I make no claim beyond these.

I thought at first that you disagreed, whereas now I'm pretty sure that do agree with me on this. This is my position. If you can give me any reason to believe that solipsism is a more tenable position than pure epistemological skepticism, I might listen. As it is, you have done nothing but to say that we can be more certain of scientific theories than we can be of the conclusion that other humans are conscious. I would like to know why this is. If relying on our sensory perception to be accurate is not too big of a leap for you, then why is believing another human being when he says that he subjectively experiences, in addition to the inductive conclusion drawn from the fact that we are of the same species and have the same general nervous and bodily capabilities? What good reason is there to believe that every single human being that has ever lived, other than yourself, is a liar?

 

[Fliption]

I've already seen that thread. Calm down.

Calm Down? What makes you think I need to calm down?

I thought at first that you disagreed, whereas now I'm pretty sure that do agree with me on this. This is my position. If you can give me any reason to believe that solipsism is a more tenable position than pure epistemological skepticism, I might listen. What good reason is there to believe that every single human being that has ever lived, other than yourself, is a liar?

I've already responded to this. I'm not arguing for solipsism. Explaining subjective experience with a physical theory is difficult for the exact same reason that solipsism cannot be disproven. I was simply using solipsism as an attempt to demonstrate the philosphical issues you have claiming scientific facts about consciousness. Of course, if you deny the hard problem then at least you'll be consistent.

Well what is your point and how does it stand in opposition to mine?

I've never said it's no different. One thing I will say is that is becoming increasingly difficult to carry on a discussion with you. You continue to ignore most of my questions, while straightforward answers would probably facilitate a greater understanding of exactly what your position is. I have misunderstood it enough and I am tired of trying to figure out what the point is that you are making.

You don't know what my point is? I've tried to explain it. I posted a thread where you could read the objections of others to your theory. I even cut and past a relevant section of Hypnagogue's post in that thread and and stated at the end of it that "This was the point I was trying to make". His post didn't make any sense to you either? I haven't seen any acknowledgment of anything that I've referenced for you, trying to make you understand my point and realize that it isn't just me that has an issue with the way you callously call things scientific. All of these references have just been ignored.

I've told you that I have not answered your questions because they are not relevant. They do not change the philosophical issue. They wouldn't change them even if I wanted them to.

So you won't mind if I don't explain my point again. I've referenced enough that you can research the philosophy if you choose to.

 

[Fliption]

It's interesting to me how even people who claim to be science enthusiasts don't even agree on what is scientific. And they have the nerve to go into a philosophy forum and bash metaphysics.

 

[Egmont]

It's interesting to me how even people who claim to be science enthusiasts don't even agree on what is scientific. And they have the nerve to go into a philosophy forum and bash metaphysics.

If I may offer a third opinion, I don't think loseyourname was bashing metaphysics, he was simply restating something not everyone seems able to understand.

Explaining subjective experience with a physical theory is difficult for the exact same reason that solipsism cannot be disproven.

Solipsism can be disproven, only the reasoning is a bit complicated to understand, because it involves a somewhat novel approach in philosophy: linguistic analysis (I mean novel in the context of 3,000 years of philosophy; the approach is more than a century old already)

Imagine someone claiming that the world is filled with "gnooks". You ask the person what a gnook is, and they say a gnook is an entity that can't be perceived in any conceivable way; they can't be seen, touched, or heard. Can you convince this person that gnooks don't really exist except in their flawed imagination? It's impossible.

The miracle of linguistic analysis, which is still too young a discipline and has not yet found its way into popular culture, is that it helps us realize most traditional philosophical dilemmas are nothing but arguments about the existence of gnooks. They are pseudo-dilemmas, not real philosophical problems, and the reason they are still popular is because people often fail to understand how language confuses them. They think any sentence that seems gramatically correct is a valid philosophical proposition, and that is just not the case.

Solipsism is a case in point. The "hard problem" of consciousness is just another. No modern philosopher takes those issues seriously, but of course not all philosophers are modern.

 

[Fliption]

If I may offer a third opinion, I don't think loseyourname was bashing metaphysics, he was simply restating something not everyone seems able to understand.

I didn't say that loseyourname was bashing metaphysics. I was just pointing out the somewhat less sturdy than expected foundation on which those that do bash metaphysics base all their conclusions on.

And exactly what is it that he was explaining that few understand? I understand his point perfectly well. He just doesn't appear to understand the philosophical issues he creates. Having an opposing philosophical issue is one thing. Ignoring them altogether is very different.

Solipsism is a case in point. The "hard problem" of consciousness is just another. No modern philosopher takes those issues seriously, but of course not all philosophers are modern.

Well, having a different philosophical opinion is one thing. Claiming that opinion is correct and everyone else is just stuck in the stone ages is something quite different. Anytime you wish to actually argue the point go ahead. But this probably isn't the thread for it.

I would guess that probably 99% of the people who are interested in this topic are not what you would call "modern" so be prepared for that. I'd be interested to see if there is anything to it or if it's yet another cop-out language theory that attempts to avoid the issues.

 

[vanesch]

Consciousness is very different from thumbs and stomach teeth and anything else that we have scientific knowledge about. I can objectively see your thumbs. But I am only assuming your consicous experience is something close to mine, if it exists at all.

I'd like to jump in here. As said in this thread, if we put aside the hypothesis that my own subjective experiences are not in any way related to an existing world, and that the ONLY thing I know for sure is that *I* am conscious and that I have subjective experiences, whatever they may mean - as in "I think therefor I am" - if we can put that hypothesis aside because it leads us a priori nowhere and we take for granted that there is a world out there, then there *IS* still a problem with conciousness in my opinion. If, as said before, we proceed by induction, and we assume that, because other people look and behave like myself, then we can reasonably take as a working hypothesis that most other people, in their awake state, also must have "conciousness". All that is allright. But it didn't tell us at all *what* is conciousness, and how we can measure, observe, do anything with it. Yes, we can measure brain processes. We can correlate certain brain activities with awake people, and assume they have something to do with conciousness.
But can we make one day a machine that is conscious ? And if so, how would we know ? Of course you don't expect to see "brain processes" in, I don't know, a computer. We cannot hide our ignorance anymore behind the simple induction of: "I'm concious, he looks like me, so probably he's conscious too."
Behaviouralism is probably not the right way to go, because we can mimick a lot of "conscious behaviour" with cleverly designed a-consious algorithms. I take it that my PC is not conscious (but HOW do I really know that ?). But it can simulate quite some behaviour that is "Turing test like". And wait for 20 or 30 more years, and machines will really behave "as if" they are concious. Are they ? Aren't they ? Up to now, we have no scientific clue as how to investigate this. I think this is THE fundamental, difficult issue, if any, that the physical sciences have to consider, if they want to claim (as I think they should do) to understand everything in this world, at least in principle.
A related question is: are higher animals conscious ? I know that biologists seem to think they aren't, but how can they know ?
Ignoring the existence of conciousness, as some seem to do, is no solution. I am concious. Conciousness thus exists.

cheers,
Patrick.

 

[loseyourname]

The reason the ommission of P-consciousness is not terribly problematic for a theory of evolution is that it is still an open issue whether or not P-consciousness is causally efficacious in any way; that is, whether or not it is epiphenomenal. If it is shown one day to be causally efficacious, then certainly it must be taken into account by an evolutionary theory, but it would seem premature to say that a theory is incomplete for ommitting a phenomenon whose causal relevance is yet to be determined.

In particular, the purported causal role of P-consciousness would seem to be readily filled by causal mechanisms that are already part of the physicalist model of reality. This is precisely why the philosophical notion of the 'zombie' is a useful one-- because it would seem that we can describe the behavior of an organism (in particular, a human) in purely physical terms without needing to invoke P-consciousness at all.

Look Fliption, I told you I already went through this thread. I may have even participated in it, though I don't really remember. I have participated in other threads questioning the relevance of consciousness to evolution. I'll try to answer this again.

All I am doing is going out on a limb here to propose that p-consciousness is epiphenomenal, and I've also proposed a way to test this hypothesis. The hypothesis proposes that not only is p-consciousness efficacious, but it provides a clear advantage for a human organism. The test is not meant to be proof, which seems to be your quabble. It is confirmation of a hypothesis, meant only to show that consciousness is not in principle excluded from evolutionary analysis. Sleeth has proposed in his empirical induction thread that third-person testing may not be the only scientific way to test a hypothesis, in particular a hypothesis regarding a subjective phenomenon. I agree with him and I am basing further explanation on that idea. Proof of my hypothesis, in the traditional third-person sense employed by the scientific method, is not available unless the hard problem is solved. Confirmation, however, is possible, and even something approaching proof may be sought if we allow one small assumption that is not so much of a leap from the assumptions on which the epistemology of science is based in the first place. There are consciouness studies being performed at both Cal Tech and USC which are based on this simple assumption - that all humans, and even chimps in the case of these studies, are conscious. The researchers don't seem to be concerned that their work is unscientific, and neither am I. Here are links to the labs I am speaking of:

http://www.klab.caltech.edu/

http://ilab.usc.edu/

The reason I tell you to calm down is that you seem to be getting rather exacerbated and you're beginning to be a tad bit insulting. I understand fully what you are saying, and I understand the points you are trying to make. What I did have trouble understanding initially is how they were relevant to the points I was making and whether or not you agreed with the bulk of what I was saying. It is frustrating that it took so long for me to figure these things out, because it would have happened a lot sooner had you simply answered the few questions I asked. I will admit that I am rather frustrated that no person on an internet forum anywhere, and particular on this one, seems to ever give a direct answer to a direct question. They instead call the question irrelevant and restate what they have already stated. When an answer would further my understanding of another's position, it is not irrelevant, even if that other does not consider it pertinent to the point he is making. A good discussion is facilitated by open lines of communication. Even if you don't see the importance of a particular question or example, it is best to address it. Answering questions will always further a discussion, whereas questioning questions only causes it to go in circles.

Another thing - please don't bemoan what you find as the deplorable behavior of scientific minded persons on a metaphysics forum. Address my arguments and my examples and my questions. I am the only person you are having this discussion with. There is no need for you to point out that my position may be inconsistent with that of other posters. I am not denying the philosophical perpelxedness of the hard problem. My only position on that matter is that the hard problem of consciousness can be circumscribed by a scientific investigation in the same way that Descartes' problem of the evil demon can be circumscribed. Just as we must assume that human sense perception is basically reliable and that there is indeed an external world that we can have knowledge of, we must assume that other humans are indeed conscious. Neither proposition can be proven, but what can be had is functional knowledge built from a set of basic assumptions. Any epistemic system must have a certain set of foundational principles, and one of the principles for the system I am proposing is that all humans are conscious. What we can derive from this assumption is the same thing we can derive from any scientific enquiry - functional knowledge that can reasonably be believed to closely approximate the truth.

The examples of Descartes' evil demon, the gnooks that Egmont speaks of, and my own hard problem of the opposable thumb are simply meant to illustrate the fact that philosophy is capable of posing any number of unsolvable, sometimes paradoxical questions and problems, none of which are of too much concern to a scientific researcher. This seems to be where we disagree. You think it is an important question that must be solved, I think it is not. It is obvious at this point that our respective positions on this will not be reconciled. We are both intelligent people and intelligent people sometimes disagree. There is nothing further to be argued on this particular matter.

 

[Fliption]

I think this is THE fundamental, difficult issue, if any, that the physical sciences have to consider, if they want to claim (as I think they should do) to understand everything in this world, at least in principle.

Oh come now. Don't you realize that this is just being obstinate and silly? It's obvious that everything behaving like me is conscious.

 

[loseyourname]

If, as said before, we proceed by induction, and we assume that, because other people look and behave like myself, then we can reasonably take as a working hypothesis that most other people, in their awake state, also must have "conciousness". All that is allright. But it didn't tell us at all *what* is conciousness, and how we can measure, observe, do anything with it. Yes, we can measure brain processes. We can correlate certain brain activities with awake people, and assume they have something to do with conciousness.

I want to jump in and say that I have never argued with this. Solving the problem of what consciousness is and how it is generated is another question entirely from the only question I meant to address. The only point I was ever trying to make is that consciousness is not, in principle, excluded from consideration as a naturally selected trait because it has no obvious evolutionary value.

A related question is: are higher animals conscious ? I know that biologists seem to think they aren't, but how can they know ?
Ignoring the existence of conciousness, as some seem to do, is no solution. I am concious. Conciousness thus exists.

Actually, biologists assume that higher animals are conscious. In order for consciousness to be an evolved trait, like any other trait, it must have arisen gradually through many species to eventually emerge in the form which we experience as conscious humans. If biologists didn't believe higher animals to be conscious, then researchers at Cal Tech and USC would not be performing consciousness studies on non-human primates.

 

[loseyourname]

Oh come now. Don't you realize that this is just being obstinate and silly? It's obvious that everything behaving like me is conscious.

No, it isn't, and if you are referring anything I ever said, you have misinterpreted. I have said that it is obvious that other humans are conscious, not that any machine or creature that behaves like a human is conscious. If you can't see the difference, so be it. Just realize that the position you are mocking is not my position.

 

[Fliption]

No, it isn't, and if you are referring anything I ever said, you have misinterpreted. I have said that it is obvious that other humans are conscious, not that any machine or creature that behaves like a human is conscious. If you can't see the difference, so be it. Just realize that the position you are mocking is not my position.

The inference that you make about humans is not exempt from the point that Vanesch is making, regarding our inability to identify consciousness. You are merely appealing to common sense. What I mock is the use of common sense as an exception to a real philosophical issue.

 

[loseyourname]

And I don't think questioning whether or not other humans are conscious is a "real" issue. That is all. We disagree. I have people on my side, you have people on your side. All are intelligent people. So be it.

 

[Egmont]

we assume that, because other people look and behave like myself, then we can reasonably take as a working hypothesis that most other people, in their awake state, also must have "conciousness".

It may be a bit difficult to understand why, but it's perfectly possible to know that other people are conscious. It's not an assumption, not a working hypothesis, but a well-established fact. If for some reason you find out that other people do not have what you call consciousness, it only means you didn't know what the word "consciousness" means. You learned it from other people, and they couldn't tell you they have something only you have. They would not have a word for it.

But it didn't tell us at all *what* is conciousness, and how we can measure, observe, do anything with it.

It is wrong to think that we have a "problem of consciousness" just because we don't know what consciousness is. We don't know what most things "are" if taken in that sense. If we have a problem of consciousness because of that, then we also have a problem of space, a problem of time, a problem of object, a problem of language, a problem of numbers, a problem of intelligence... the list is endless!

But can we make one day a machine that is concious?

If we make a machine that appears to be conscious, we won't think it is conscious because we already know how to account for its behavior using other concepts. We need the concept of consciousness to explain why people do some things they do; we don't need the concept to explain how computers work, we already have simpler concepts like boolean logic and electricity.

We cannot hide our ignorance anymore behind the simple induction of: "I'm concious, he looks like me, so probably he's conscious too."

When your computer says "You have mail", you don't think it's conscious, do you? That is because you fully understand why it is doing it without having to invoke a conscious entity inside the computer. It's misleading to think we will one day build a machine so complex we won't understand it, and will be forced to come up with a concept like consciousness to explain its behavior. The reason is simple: we can't build a machine we don't understand. In fact, it's hard enough to build machines we fully understand.

I take it that my PC is not conscious (but HOW do I really know that ?).

You really know that because, if you claim your computer is conscious, an electrical engineer can explain to you what you mean by "conscious" in very precise terms (the same terms an engineer uses to build the computer in the first place). The concept of consciousness will then become a superfluous idea which can be stated in more precise, simpler terms.

A related question is: are higher animals conscious ? I know that biologists seem to think they aren't, but how can they know ?

As far as humans go, consciousness implies the existence of language abilities. If you can communicate using symbols, then you're conscious; if you're not, then it's impossible to know.

To answer the question about animals, until we discover if they use language (they might; after all they make a lot of noises), we have no way to know if they are conscious.

Ignoring the existence of conciousness, as some seem to do, is no solution. I am concious. Conciousness thus exists.

I never heard of anyone who denies the existence of consciousness. All I know about are people who don't subscribe to certain metaphysical views, but I never saw anyone claiming humans are not conscious.

 

[vanesch]

It is wrong to think that we have a "problem of consciousness" just because we don't know what consciousness is. We don't know what most things "are" if taken in that sense.

Not really. We have a quite accurate working definition of, say, an ethanol molecule. We have techniques to measure the amount of ethanol in a given liquid. We don't have anything comparable for conciousness.

If we make a machine that appears to be conscious, we won't think it is conscious because we already know how to account for its behavior using other concepts.

That's a bit silly: you reduce conciousness to a behavioural mystery. If there is no behavioural mystery, then there cannot be conciousness. So that would mean that people who's behaviour is perfectly predictable aren't conscious (so they don't feel pain when we hit them :Devil:)

When your computer says "You have mail", you don't think it's conscious, do you?

I don't know. If YOU tell me that I have mail, do I conclude from that that you are / aren't conscious ? I don't think that behaviourism can indicate the presence or absence of conciousness. It is not impossible to think of machines that do what many people do, a lot of their time.

You really know that because, if you claim your computer is conscious, an electrical engineer can explain to you what you mean by "conscious" in very precise terms (the same terms an engineer uses to build the computer in the first place). The concept of consciousness will then become a superfluous idea which can be stated in more precise, simpler terms.

Again, you seem to equate conciousness with "cannot be explained". So some parts of my car are concious, until I find out how it works ?

As far as humans go, consciousness implies the existence of language abilities. If you can communicate using symbols, then you're conscious; if you're not, then it's impossible to know.

Again. That's not what conciousness is about. Computers talk to each other over a network. Ants talk to each other using pheromones. Is "establishing a communication protocol and link" the same as "conciousness" ?
You know in your bones that that's not it. It is this "awareness of existence" together with what can be qualified as "feelings" we're talking about.
Is a human being who lost his linguistic abilities by accident not a conscious being anymore ?

To answer the question about animals, until we discover if they use language (they might; after all they make a lot of noises), we have no way to know if they are conscious.

We have no way, indeed. But linguistic abilities are not the same thing as conciousness. And, we might one day make machines that mimick so well ordinary human conversation, that you will be tricked into thinking they are concious. But all this is behaviourism. We're missing the point.


cheers,
Patrick.

 

[Philocrat]

More Questions About Consciousness


1) What is the BENEFIT of People installed in separate visual perspectives or spatiotemporal frames of reference feeling the same pain or seeing the same patch of red colour and knowing what it is like to do so? What will we now or in the end do with this sort of knowledge?

2) Does consciousness have VISUAL PRIORITY LEVELS extending outward and inward? For example, there are many physical events and actions in the human body that the body is already able to carry them out automatically that are claimed not to have any relations to consciousenss. If there are visual priority levels, ought we not to argue that somethings or events or actions in our body are given more visual attention than others, that things that the body is capable of doing without much visual attention are gracefully but naturally deprioritised? Could we not argue that despite the fact that they are visully deprioritised things or events, or actions nevertheless they are still conscious? And that at the outer higher conscious-level, more visual attentions are given to LIVE-CRITICAL things and events from within and from without? This question has serious implications on the need to reconcile 'SEQUENTIALISM' with 'SIMULTANEITY' in the overal mental and physical processes. Personally, I keep a very open mind on this, but if at all we still believe that there is a clear distinction between mental states and physical states, the pulling tension between Sequentialism and Simultaneity is a problem that plagues the two on equal terms. And I think that this problem has a connection with why we think of visually deprioritised things and events as unconscious or visually unattended, or even with why we created the gulf between physical states and mental states in the first place.

3) What PHYSICAL SIZE must anything have before it can qualify to possesses or have consciousnes? Does size matter? I am asking this question because in nearly every discipline, we tend to erroneously believe that only the human form of a given or well-established 'SIZE' is capable of conscious existence. This now automatically invokes my next question.

4) Does Consciousness come in DEGREES or in different GRADES? Obviously this question depends on our answer to (3), or simply on accepting that different kinds of biological organisms, regardless of their forms, sizes, time scales or modes of existence, can possesses consciousness of some sort in the first place. What I am getting at is this: couldn't we just accept and say that other organisims may or do possesses consciousness but only that this comes in different grades or degrees? If this were to be the case we ought to then argue that consciousness has a unique purpose and that coming in different grades or categories it oughts to be structurally and fuctionally improveable towards some sort of structrual and functional 'perfection'. However, even if, this still leaves one outstanding question to be cleard up: If consciousness in the end survives destruction with the human in which it is a part, which aspect of it will remain, let alone be relevant?

5) Is 'COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS' or 'GLOBAL CONSCIOUSNESS' or 'UNIVERSAL CONSCIOUSNESS' or 'POOLED CONSCIOUSNESS' possible? If it exists will this solve the 'Qualia Problem'? I ask this question, because there are some scientists who are already attmepting to take it from the realm of paranormalism into the realm of 'science'. I will provide some postings later on this.

 

[vanesch]

The only point I was ever trying to make is that consciousness is not, in principle, excluded from consideration as a naturally selected trait because it has no obvious evolutionary value.

I understood that by reading the previous posts in this monster thread. I have no hard opinion on the issue, but would like to raise a point. If something is to have evolutionary value, is it not more intelligence than conciousness ? Which then links to another question: is conciousness necessary for intelligence ? Personally, I don't think so, but I have no strong arguments. Intelligence is much more "measurable" than conciousness, and I think, in 20-30 years, we will have very intelligent machines, intelligent in the sense that they can do lots of "smart things". But to me, conciousness is that "other" aspect of our being, namely, as I wrote earlier, our "awareness", our "feelings", the fact that "pain hurts". I know this is vague, but that's exactly the problem !
There is something ethical about conciousness, because "pain hurts". Once we know that certain machines would be concious, I think ethically they should have fundamental rights, such as the right for not being tortured or so.
On the other hand, I don't think you can do unethical things to your PC. But maybe one day I will stand on trial because I made a big, conscious computer in the basement, which I then tortured during years because I'm a perverted lunatic :-)

cheers,
Patrick.

 

[vanesch]

If something is to have evolutionary value, is it not more intelligence than conciousness ?

I said the above, because I'm quite convinced that conciousness has nothing to do with behaviourism, in that conciousness _observes_ but does not necessarily _act_. If the acts come from intelligence, then the behaviour (and hence the survivalistic value) of an animal with or without conciousness, but with the same intelligence should be the same.

cheers,
patrick.

 

[balkan]

is this a thread?

 

[Egmont]

We have a quite accurate working definition of, say, an ethanol molecule. We have techniques to measure the amount of ethanol in a given liquid. We don't have anything comparable for conciousness.

That's not true. It's a lot easier for anyone to determine if a person is conscious, than it is for chemists to determine if a certain liquid contains ethanol. We don't have instruments to measure consciousness simply because we don't need them.

That's a bit silly: you reduce conciousness to a behavioural mystery. If there is no behavioural mystery, then there cannot be conciousness.

It's not silly but, as I said, it may be difficult to understand why. At least it was difficult for me. I will try and elaborate.

If you think about our knowledge, it consists primarily of two types of entities: things we can directly observe, and things we postulate to exist which cannot be directly observed. The former are what we call entities in the physical universe; the latter are called many different names: laws, principles, forces, and so on. This immediately begs the question: why do we need to postulate the existence of things which cannot be observed? Why not simply stick to what we observe?

The reason we come up with unobservable entities is quite simple: they are implied to exist as an explanation of what we observe. Here is an example: we observe objects falling to the ground all the time, but we don't understand why. Somehow it seems the fact that objects fall must necessarily imply the existence of some entity which is causing them to fall. As we all know, that entity is now known as "gravity", but it's an often ignored fact that the only way we can observe gravity is by observing its effects. To this day, no one has asserted the existence of gravity as an entity which exists on its own; in fact that is just impossible, given that the absence of observable effects implies the absence of gravity itself (one could say we have a "problem of gravity")

Back to consciousness. It certainly is not part of the physical universe, as it can't be directly observed. "Consciousness" is a postulate, an entity which we conceive of in an attempt to explain certain aspects of human behavior. And that being the case, like gravity, consciousness cannot be postulated to exist in the absence of observable effects.

So that would mean that people who's behaviour is perfectly predictable aren't concious

No, that is not what it means. The issue here is, how do we explain a certain behavior? Sometimes you have to invoke the unobservable entity called "consciousness", sometimes you can explain behavior invoking simpler, more intuitive concepts. The latter alternative is always preferrable.

It is not impossible to think of machines that do what many people do, a lot of their time.

Machines already do a lot of what people do, often better, yet no one seriously consider them to be conscious. The reason, as I said above, is simply because we have simpler, more intuitive explanations.

Again, you seem to equate conciousness with "cannot be explained". So some parts of my car are concious, until I find out how it works ?

Nope. If you are an educated person, you know that an explanation for the workings of you car exist, and you know that it doesn't involve consciousness. On the other hand, if you are an ignorant person, you may be tempted to do exactly what you said: invoke the existence of conscious entities that cause your car to behave the way it does. That's why primitive peoples tend to believe the world is filled with "spirits" - they lack better explanations, that's all.

You know in your bones that that's not it. It is this "awareness of existence" together with what can be qualified as "feelings" we're talking about.

In all honesty, I have no idea what "awareness of existence" means, so I can't really comment on that. As to "feelings", mine are always associated, without exceptions, with bodily sensations, so it's possible they are the same thing.

linguistic abilities are not the same thing as conciousness.

I didn't say they were the same thing, I said the only way to establish the presence of consciousness for sure is by checking for linguistic abilities. That is because most other behaviors can be explained without invoking the concept of consciousness, but language cannot.

And, we might one day make machines that mimick so well ordinary human conversation, that you will be tricked into thinking they are concious.

As I said, primitive peoples are often tricked into thinking inanimate objects are conscious. The only thing that may cause a human to think a computer is conscious is ignorance of the way the computer works.

 

[vanesch]

As I said, primitive peoples are often tricked into thinking inanimate objects are conscious. The only thing that may cause a human to think a computer is conscious is ignorance of the way the computer works.

Ok, we have very different definitions of the word "conciousness" then.
Concerning your definition of what is part of the physical world (can be directly observed) and what are "explanatory concepts" (all the rest), I'm affraid that you also have a very different definition of "the physical world", a very restrictive one. You seem to say that the physical world contains only those entities that can directly influence your senses. Visible light exists, but UV light is an "explanatory concept". Rain drops exist, but water molecules are an explanatory concept. Indeed, if you reduce the physical world to this definition, then it is probably hopeless to talk about conciousness, which, if anything, you will for sure classify as an explanatory concept, together with gravity, EM waves, atoms, molecules, black holes, neutrinos and extrasolar planets.

cheers,
Patrick.

 

[vanesch]

In all honesty, I have no idea what "awareness of existence" means, so I can't really comment on that. As to "feelings", mine are always associated, without exceptions, with bodily sensations, so it's possible they are the same thing.

Yes, they are the same thing. That's part of my definition of conciousness. Does a human being have "bodily sensations" ? (yes) Does a monkey ? (highly probable) Does a rabbit ? (probably, I don't know) Does a mouse ? (probably, I don't know) Does a bird ? (probably, I don't know) Does a bee ? (don't think so, but maybe). An ant ? (don't think so) A microbe ? (don't think so) A virus ? (nope) An embryo ? (depends on the age ?) A computer ? (not for the moment) A brain ? (?)
Will it be possible, one day, to make a machine (not necessarily in silicon, might be molecular or biomolecular, but fully artificial) which is of the same complexity as an ant ? As a bee ? As a bird ? As a mouse ? As a rabbit ?
Do you see where I am aiming at ?

Also, you say that you have no idea of your awareness of existence, even when you are awake. You must not be serious when you claim that ! You are not aware that you exist ?

I have difficulties pinning down exactly my "definition" of conciousness, but that is not my fault, it is because it is a very slippery subject. But let me try to work with some of its properties. Probably the closest I come to conciousness is that "pain hurts". You can define "pain" in a behavioural way, in that an entity "tries to avoid" stimuli which are "painful". But that's of no use in itself: I can train a robot to run away from, say, a green ball, and then we should conclude that the view of a green ball is painfull for the robot.
You could also define something of the style that pain is what is conceived, correctly or incorrectly, by an entity, as something that is damageable.
But that's also not true: I can put you in an intense neutron beam, and you won't feel anything. However, you'll probably devellop a serious cancer withing the next months or years.
Conciousness is present when pain also hurts. If I hit your foot with a hammer, and when the nerve signals reach your brain, it hurts, then you are concious. The opposite is not necessarily true: it is not because you don't feel pain that you aren't concious, but if you DO feel pain, then you ARE concious. I don't think that a tree can feel pain. I'm not sure if an ant does, or a bee. A mouse, not really sure, it might be purely behavioural (a behavioural response to a stimulus which we associate with pain, by analogy, if "they would do that to us"), but you get the idea that a mouse might feel pain. A monkey, I think it does feel pain. I'm pretty sure you feel pain.

cheers,
Patrick.

 

[Egmont]

Ok, we have very different definitions of the word "conciousness" then.

Who doesn't?

Concerning your definition of what is part of the physical world (can be directly observed) and what are "explanatory concepts" (all the rest), I'm affraid that you also have a very different definition of "the physical world", a very restrictive one.

I don't find it restrictive at all. There's plenty of stuff around me that I can see, hear, touch, smell, taste.

You seem to say that the physical world contains only those entities that can directly influence your senses.

Pretty much.

Visible light exists, but UV light is an "explanatory concept".

Actually, "light" is also an explanatory concept.

Rain drops exist, but water molecules are an explanatory concept.

Exactly. But you can't overlook an important aspect: so long as we don't have a better explanation, we are forced to acknowledge that "water molecules" must exist even if we can't observe them. At the same time, to assert that we know that water molecules exist with the same certainty we assert that rain drops exist is a bit of an oversight, in my opinion.

Indeed, if you reduce the physical world to this definition, then it is probably hopeless to talk about conciousness, which, if anything, you will for sure classify as an explanatory concept, together with gravity, EM waves, atoms, molecules, black holes, neutrinos and extrasolar planets.

I don't find it hopeless. Keeping in mind that consciousness is an explanatory concept helps understand why it generates so much heated debate. As you certainly are aware, asserting the existence of explanatory concepts can be troublesome at times. So long as there are alternative explanations, the world will always be filled with people who deny that consciousness exists. I don't think I'm one of these people because, as with molecules and UV rays, we are forced to accept the existence of consciousness because it is the best explanation for human behavior. I think I only disagree that we know for sure it exists because we "experience" it. The same reasoning could be used to assert the existence of a lot of stuff, like ghosts and lake monsters.