Anton Zeilinger's comment about free will being required for science

[A. Neumaier]

Just to clarify: "Free Will" (in the sense most people think of it, not in Dennett's sense) is compatible neither with deterministic nor with stochastic (nor any combination of both) evolution of a dynamical system, and as far as I know, no one has ever tried successfully to create a model of such a thing or how it works.

Only because "Free Will" (in the sense most people think of it) is a very poorly defined notion that cannot be made precise enough for scientific investigation - unless one is willing to approximate it in a way more or less like Dennett's.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

I think a better question is the following: do you believe that the physical laws that we have discover, apply to everything except for "living things", or apply to everything including "living things"?

Hi mattt:

I suggest that your distinction between living things and every thing else as it applies to freewill vs. determinism can be improved upon. It helps to have a good understandable definition of "free will".
My 19th edition of the Merriam Webster dictionary (1962) gives two definitions. Number 1 is complex and includes religious aspects. Number 2 is the following.

the ability to choose between alternative possibilities in such a way that the choice and action are to some extent creatively determined by the conscious subject at the time.​

With this definition in mind, in order to have free will the "living things" must have consciousness. The implication is that determinism does not, at least not all the time, influence consciousness. I am aware of two books discussing this, for both of which I am unable to remember sources.
1. QM phenomena are not deterministic with respect to prediction of a specific single value state, like for example, the "up" or "down" state of a photon. I remember a book (but not title or author) presenting the idea that free will can take place because of QM's non-deterministic limitations.
2. Free will can take place because the laws of nature are limited to relatively simple interactions of relatively low level organized compositions. Examples: physical items like atoms and energy, and the chemistry of molecules including proteins and DNA, and maybe also possibly single cells. These examples illustrate a hierarchy of complexity, and higher levels have properties that are emergent, meaning they are not fully explainable by the properties of the lower level constituents. Creatures with consciousness are at a much higher level in the hierarchy, say maybe level 8 or level 10, or maybe even higher. The lower levels laws do not in any way apply to these higher level organizations with very complex emergent properties, like for example consciousness.

To summarize, (2) says determinism is valid up to some level of complexity, but not higher. Therefore there is the possibility of free will existing with respect to the higher levels. However, it is also a possibility that there may be some constraints on this free will because the nature of consciousness may involve some limitations. One possible example might be that as a being with the potential for consciousness matures, habits are formed that influence choices subconsciously. In some situations, choices are made entirely by the subconscious, and according to the definition, this would not be a free will choice, but it would also not be a deterministic result either.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[A. Neumaier]

higher levels have properties that are emergent, meaning they are not fully explainable by the properties of the lower level constituents.

In a scientific context, this is not the meaning of "emergent". For example, phase transitions are emergent properties of bulk matter, but they emerge (arise) from statistical mechanics and have a full microscopic explanation.

That something is emergent just means that at the higher level of organization, a new concept is needed to describe the collective behavior in a useful way.

For example, the notion of computation in a computer is emergent (and necessary for understanding the latter) but can be fully explained by the computer's lower level constituents.

Similarly, programming languages allow computers to make choices - another emergent property fully understood in terms of lower level constituents.

Whether these choices are called 'free' or are attributed to 'free will' is a matter of how the latter terms are defined operationally. It is very questionable whether there is a fully operational definition of these terms that applies to human beings but not to sophisticated computer programs viewed (like the human brain) in a black box fashion.

 

[mattt]

Hi mattt:

I suggest that your distinction between living things and every thing else as it applies to freewill vs. determinism can be improved upon. It helps to have a good understandable definition of "free will".
My 19th edition of the Merriam Webster dictionary (1962) gives two definitions. Number 1 is complex and includes religious aspects. Number 2 is the following.

the ability to choose between alternative possibilities in such a way that the choice and action are to some extent creatively determined by the conscious subject at the time.​

​

​

For me, that definition is problematic to say the least. To many people, based on their understanding of that definition, a frog (for example) would have it.​

​

I really don't see its usefulness.​

With this definition in mind, in order to have free will the "living things" must have consciousness. The implication is that determinism does not, at least not all the time, influence consciousness. I am aware of two books discussing this, for both of which I am unable to remember sources.
1. QM phenomena are not deterministic with respect to prediction of a specific single value state, like for example, the "up" or "down" state of a photon. I remember a book (but not title or author) presenting the idea that free will can take place because of QM's non-deterministic limitations.

Having to religiously obey deterministic or stochastic laws don't seem to me to be very compatible with the ability to take decisions "creatively determined" by the "conscious agent" ( though that depends of course on what everyone understands of that last sentence).

2. Free will can take place because the laws of nature are limited to relatively simple interactions of relatively low level organized compositions. Examples: physical items like atoms and energy, and the chemistry of molecules including proteins and DNA, and maybe also possibly single cells. These examples illustrate a hierarchy of complexity, and higher levels have properties that are emergent, meaning they are not fully explainable by the properties of the lower level constituents. Creatures with consciousness are at a much higher level in the hierarchy, say maybe level 8 or level 10, or maybe even higher. The lower levels laws do not in any way apply to these higher level organizations with very complex emergent properties, like for example consciousness.

To summarize, (2) says determinism is valid up to some level of complexity, but not higher. Therefore there is the possibility of free will existing with respect to the higher levels. However, it is also a possibility that there may be some constraints on this free will because the nature of consciousness may involve some limitations. One possible example might be that as a being with the potential for consciousness matures, habits are formed that influence choices subconsciously. In some situations, choices are made entirely by the subconscious, and according to the definition, this would not be a free will choice, but it would also not be a deterministic result either.

Regards,
Buzz

So at one point in biological evolution, the atoms just stop obeying the laws of physics, simply because they are now forming a living body with a complex nervous system?

I would need a lot of evidence to entertain that possibility.

 

[Minnesota Joe]

This is experimentally very well disproved.

I certainly agree if I understand you correctly. The success of science seems to be very strong evidence against it.

I have not read enough superdeterminists to understand how they respond to this. There are arguments in the second link I gave to the effect that it is only for quantum systems and maybe only certain types of experiments that the statistical independence assumption breaks down. That sounds like an attempt to evade the kind of evidence (I think) you are referring to.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

So at one point in biological evolution, the atoms just stop obeying the laws of physics, simply because they are now forming a living body with a complex nervous system?

For me, that definition is problematic to say the least. To many people, based on their understanding of that definition, a frog (for example) would have it.

Hi mattt:

I think you misunderstood my post regarding "emergence".

In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own. These properties or behaviors emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole. For example, smooth forward motion emerges when a bicycle and its rider interoperate, but neither part can produce the behavior on their own.​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence​

What I interpret this to mean is that the laws of physics and the behavior of atoms continue their role with respect to the atoms in the nervous system, but the behavior of the atoms are irrelevant to the emergent behavior of the nervous system.
BTW: I found a book on the topic.

https://www.amazon.com/dp/0738201421/?tag=pfamazon01-20​

This is not the book I remember I think from the 1990s, but it seems to be on the same topic, and it is about the same period.

Regarding the definition of "free will" and frogs, I do not understand the point you are making. Can you clarify it?

Regards,
Buzz

 

[Buzz Bloom]

In a scientific context, this is not the meaning of "emergent". For example, phase transitions are emergent properties of bulk matter, but they emerge (arise) from statistical mechanics and have a full microscopic explanation.
...
For example, the notion of computation in a computer is emergent (and necessary for understanding the latter) but can be fully explained by the computer's lower level constituents.

Hi Neumaier:

If you were to tell me that in a physics context, "emergent" has a different meaning than the Wikipedia definition, it would not surprise me at all. Perhaps you might post a physics definition with a suitable reference (rather than examples) to help clarify the issue.

Regarding your computer example, how much does the Electrical Engineering of the computer contribute to the detals of computer's ability to compute and be programmed.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[mattt]

Hi mattt:

Hi Buzz

I think you misunderstood my post regarding "emergence".

In philosophy, systems theory, science, and art, emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own. These properties or behaviors emerge only when the parts interact in a wider whole. For example, smooth forward motion emerges when a bicycle and its rider interoperate, but neither part can produce the behavior on their own.​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Emergence​

What I interpret this to mean is that the laws of physics and the behavior of atoms continue their role with respect to the atoms in the nervous system, but the behavior of the atoms are irrelevant to the emergent behavior of the nervous system.

My conception of emergence is just as Arnold Neumaier described in his post.

At some circumstances, a new language (new definitions of new concepts and relations) is more useful, more practical, (at least for us humans), even if these new concepts are completely explained by the low level theory.

Examples are Thermodynamic <-- Statistical Mechanics, or even Chemistry <-- Physics.

Regarding the definition of "free will" and frogs, I do not understand the point you are making. Can you clarify it?

Regards,
Buzz

I meant that the behavior of a frog is complex enough, so that it is maybe more useful to be described in terms of internal goals. Frogs can exhibit very complex behaviours, in that they are able to overcome all kinds of obstacles to achieve their goals.

Even if the fundamental laws of physics were all that is needed to explain those complex behaviors of frogs, it is anyway more useful or more practical, for us humans, to explain them in terms of internal states of the frog, goals and strategies of the frog to achieve its goals.

This kind of language used to better describe the frog's behavior, is quite similar to the definition of free will that you cited earlier, so some people would ascribe free will to the frog, based on that definition.

 

[PeterDonis]

emergence occurs when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own

This is different from the definition you used previously:

properties that are emergent, meaning they are not fully explainable by the properties of the lower level constituents

An entity can have properties that its parts do not have, and still have those properties be fully explainable by the properties of the lower level constituents. For example, a gas has the properties of temperature and pressure, which indivdual molecules do not have, but the temperature and pressure of the gas are fully explainable in terms of the properties of the individual molecules.

So you need to make up your mind which definition of "emergent" you want to use.

What I interpret this to mean is that the laws of physics and the behavior of atoms continue their role with respect to the atoms in the nervous system, but the behavior of the atoms are irrelevant to the emergent behavior of the nervous system.

I don't see how you would get this from the quote you gave. For example, as the quote you gave says, smooth forward motion is a property that a bicycle and its rider can produce together, but which neither one can produce on its own, so it is emergent; but the individual properties and behaviors of the bicycle and the rider are certainly not irrelevant to the emergence of smooth forward motion from both together. Similarly, in my gas example, the behavior of individual molecules that do not have temperature or pressure is certainly not irrelevant to the emergence of temperature and pressure as a property of the gas.

Perhaps you might post a physics definition

The physics definition is basically the one quoted at the start of this post. Note that the bicycle and rider example given in what you quoted is a physics example. So, of course, is the gas example I gave.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

This kind of language used to better describe the frog's behavior, is quite similar to the definition of free will that you cited earlier, so some people would ascribe free will to the frog, based on that definition.

Hi mattt:

I find the above very helpful to out mutual discussion. The source of differences about regarding "free will" is its definition in terms of "consciousness", which is well known to be a very confusing concept.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Consciousness​

​

The philosophy of mind has given rise to many stances regarding consciousness. The Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy in 1998 defines consciousness as follows:​

Consciousness—Philosophers have used the term 'consciousness' for four main topics: knowledge in general, intentionality, introspection (and the knowledge it specifically generates) and phenomenal experience... Something within one's mind is 'introspectively conscious' just in case one introspects it (or is poised to do so). Introspection is often thought to deliver one's primary knowledge of one's mental life. An experience or other mental entity is 'phenomenally conscious' just in case there is 'something it is like' for one to have it. The clearest examples are: perceptual experience, such as tastings and seeings; bodily-sensational experiences, such as those of pains, tickles and itches; imaginative experiences, such as those of one's own actions or perceptions; and streams of thought, as in the experience of thinking 'in words' or 'in images'. Introspection and phenomenality seem independent, or dissociable, although this is controversial.[28]

In a more skeptical definition of consciousness, Stuart Sutherland has exemplified some of the difficulties in fully ascertaining all of its cognate meanings in his entry for the 1989 version of the Macmillan Dictionary of Psychology:​

Consciousness—The having of perceptions, thoughts, and feelings; awareness. The term is impossible to define except in terms that are unintelligible without a grasp of what consciousness means. Many fall into the trap of equating consciousness with self-consciousness—to be conscious it is only necessary to be aware of the external world. Consciousness is a fascinating but elusive phenomenon: it is impossible to specify what it is, what it does, or why it has evolved. Nothing worth reading has been written on it.​

​

Since different people would often disagree regarding whether a frog has consciousness, it is clear that they would also disagree about whether a frog has free will.​

​

Regards,​

Buzz​

 

[Buzz Bloom]

So you need to make up your mind which definition of "emergent" you want to use.

but the individual properties and behaviors of the bicycle and the rider are certainly not irrelevant to the emergence of smooth forward motion from both together.

Hi Peter:

Thanks for your post.

I agree that the definition I posted from Wikipedia is a much clearer definition than the one I used before I looked at the Wikipedia's definition. I apologize, and I will try to be more careful with my definitions.

I have to agree with the logic of the second quote above also. I also have to agree that "irrelevant" is too strong a word. I need some time to think about vocabulary to choose a better word to use that will explain the distinction I have in mind.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[Lord Jestocost]

This thread has me wanting to understand what people really mean by super-determinism undermining science/free-will...

Gerard ’t Hooft in "The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics":

"If a theory is deterministic all the way, it implies that not only all observed phenomena, but also the observers themselves are controlled by deterministic laws. They certainly have no ‘free will’, their actions all have roots in the past, even the distant pats. ... The notion that, also the actions by experimenters and observers are controlled by deterministic laws, is called superdeterminism."
[Italics in original, LJ]

That means: In a superdeterministic universe a conscious being could only observe the deterministic unfolding of the world, it would be nothing else but a spectator being unable to make any choices.

 

[Minnesota Joe]

Gerard ’t Hooft in "The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics":

"If a theory is deterministic all the way, it implies that not only all observed phenomena, but also the observers themselves are controlled by deterministic laws. They certainly have no ‘free will’, their actions all have roots in the past, even the distant pats. ... The notion that, also the actions by experimenters and observers are controlled by deterministic laws, is called superdeterminism."
[Italics in original, LJ]

Interesting quote, thanks.

That means: In a superdeterministic universe a conscious being could only observe the deterministic unfolding of the world, it would be nothing else but a spectator being unable to make any choices.

What would a conscious being observe or fail to observe in a superdeterministic universe that they wouldn't observe or fail to observe in a deterministic universe? (ETA: Besides weird correlations.)

The problem is that the word "determinism" already implies that observers are controlled by deterministic laws. Whether or not determinism is false would be a separate discussion.

It seems to me that what "super" adds to "determinism" is the break down of statistical independence in certain cases. It isn't clear to me that we have to talk about "free will" at all.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

The problem is that the word "determinism" already implies that observers are controlled by deterministic laws.

Only in case the term "determinism" refers to mental phenomena (or mind), too.

 

[Minnesota Joe]

Only in case the term "determinism" refers to mental phenomena (or mind), too.

If it doesn't apply to everything, then you could say "determinism is false" instead. Because there is something that is not determined by prior physical states + laws.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

I thought the following might be of some interest in this context.

Regarding "free will", the approximately 16,000 word Wikipedia article (the longest I have come across so far)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will​

seems to cover all of the vocabulary related to this phrase , in particular "deterministic/determinism", starting with the ancient Greeks, and also with respect to quantum mechanics. The term "superdeterminism" does not appear in this article. However, Wikipedia has a separate article

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism​

which discusses this concept as defined specifically in the context of quantum mechanics.

In quantum mechanics, superdeterminism is a loophole in Bell's theorem, that allows one to evade it by postulating that all systems being measured are causally correlated with the choices of which measurements to make on them.​

 

[Minnesota Joe]

I thought the following might be of some interest in this context.

Regarding "free will", the approximately 16,000 word Wikipedia article (the longest I have come across so far)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will​

seems to cover all of the vocabulary related to this phrase , in particular "deterministic/determinism", starting with the ancient Greeks and also with rewspect to quantum mechanics. The term "superdeterminism" does not appear in this article. However, Wikipedia has a separate article

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism​

which discusses this concept as defined specifically in the context of quantum mechanics.

In quantum mechanics, superdeterminism is a loophole in Bell's theorem, that allows one to evade it by postulating that all systems being measured are causally correlated with the choices of which measurements to make on them.​

Yes, and this link to a paper by super-determinist Sabine Hossenfelder I gave earlier has a whole section on why free will is irrelevant to super-determinism (Gerard 'T Hooft is a reviewer on that paper interestingly):

In summary, raising the issue of free will in the context of Superdeterminism is a red herring. Superdeterminism does not make it any more or less difficult to reconcile our intuitive notion of free will with the laws of nature than is the case for the laws we have been dealing with for hundreds of years already.

I think the issue is that if superdeterminism is true, then determinism is true. And since some theories of QM are indeterministic, the superdeterminist might highlight determinism by way of contrast, giving the impression that is what it is all about. But really superdeterminism is just one of several theories of QM where observer actions are determined.

 

[PeterDonis]

Gerard ’t Hooft in "The Cellular Automaton Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics":

"If a theory is deterministic all the way, it implies that not only all observed phenomena, but also the observers themselves are controlled by deterministic laws. They certainly have no ‘free will’, their actions all have roots in the past, even the distant pats. ... The notion that, also the actions by experimenters and observers are controlled by deterministic laws, is called superdeterminism."
[Italics in original, LJ]

I think 't Hooft is conflating superdeterminism with plain determinism. The statement that "the actions by experimenters and observers are controlled by deterministic laws" is just ordinary physicalism--physical laws govern everything--plus the belief that all physical laws are deterministic. (Whether QM actually is deterministic is a different question.)

Superdeterminism, as I understand it, is the additional claim that the initial conditions in a deterministic universe are fine-tuned so that the physical laws we infer from experimental results are different from the actual physical laws. For example, the initial conditions would be fine-tuned so that all of the measurement settings in EPR experiments are carefully set up to produce correlations that make it look like something nonlocal is happening, when actually the underlying physical laws are just ordinary local deterministic ones.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Zeilinger seems to be saying that humans are not a part of the nature:
"If this were not true, then, I suggest, it would make no sense at all to ask nature questions in an experiment, since then nature could determine what our questions are."

Humans are part of "nature", but is everything in "nature" "physical"?

From: "Does Some Deeper Level of Physics Underlie Quantum Mechanics? An Interview with Nobelist Gerard ’t Hooft" by George Musser https://blogs.scientificamerican.co...interview-with-nobelist-gerard-e28099t-hooft/

"GM [George Musser]: Did you ever meet John Bell?

GtH [Gerard ’t Hooft]: I think it was in the early ’80s. I raised the question: Suppose that also Alice’s and Bob’s decisions have to be seen as not coming out of free will, but being determined by everything in the theory. John said, well, you know, that I have to exclude. If it’s possible, then what I said doesn’t apply. I said, Alice and Bob are making a decision out of a cause. A cause lies in their past and has to be included in the picture." [Bold by LJ]

 

[mattt]

This sums up very nicely what I think about this subject:

http://backreaction.blogspot.com/2013/07/you-probably-have-no-free-will-but-dont.html?m=1

 

[PeterDonis]

Suppose that also Alice’s and Bob’s decisions have to be seen as not coming out of free will, but being determined by everything in the theory.

"Determined by everything in the theory" is not the same as "determined by the same things that determine the state of the measured particles". The independence assumption that Zeilinger is calling "free will" only requires that the latter is not the case; it does not require that the former is not the case.

 

[Lord Jestocost]

Accepting causal determinism: So we have two chains of physical events which share no common origin.

 

[mattt]

Of course the hard work is on the "superdeterminism camp" to show how these types of correlations can arise in their superdeterministic models.

I have not read Sabbine's paper on it yet...

 

[Buzz Bloom]

Humans are part of "nature", but is everything in "nature" "physical"?

Hi Jestocost:

This is an interesting question that requires definitions that I have not yet noticed being discussed in this thread.

A important constituent of a human, like Alice and Bob, is the mind. But the mind is not made of physical stuff. The mind primarily is a part of the functional behavior of the nervous system, including the brain. Is behavior part of nature? Is behavior completely physical? In particular is making a conscious choice (possibly an illusion) physical, in contrast with it causing physical actions?

Regards,
Buzz

 

[A. Neumaier]

But the mind is not made of physical stuff.

Just like software is not made of physical stuff. But physical stuff is needed to embody software, and the correct or faulty execution of the software is governed by physical law. Mind is of a similar nature.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

Just like software is not made of physical stuff. But physical stuff is needed to embody software, and the correct or faulty execution of the software is governed by physical law. Mind is of a similar nature.

Hi Neumaier:

I was attempting to ask questions without assuming free will or determinism is part of reality, or not. When you say, "Mind is of a similar nature," are you (a) advocating free will is real, or (b) advocating determinism is real, or (c) advocating that they are not mutually exclusive, or (d) none of the above?

I am just making guesses regarding the your views on the three questions I asked in post #165, and you may want to correct me. You seem to be saying: (1) that behavior is part of nature, (2) that behavior is not completely physical, and (3) making a conscious choice is (at least partially) physical.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

The mind primarily is a part of the functional behavior of the nervous system, including the brain.

In other words, it's part of the functional behavior of physical things. The functional behavior of physical things is physical behavior and is "part of nature". The mind as functional behavior of the brain and nervous system is no different from the web browser I'm using to post this as functional behavior of my computer and the network of which it is a part, or the functional behavior of my car in getting me from one place to another.

 

[A. Neumaier]

When you say, "Mind is of a similar nature," are you (a) advocating free will is real, or (b) advocating determinism is real, or (c) advocating that they are not mutually exclusive, or (d) none of the above?

You seem to be saying: (1) that behavior is part of nature, (2) that behavior is not completely physical, and (3) making a conscious choice is (at least partially) physical.

Free will is real, and can be explained in terms of functional behavior, as explained in my comparison with computer programs in an earlier post of this thread. It is not physical, in the same way that branches in computer programs are not physical. But its realization in a human is based on mechanisms that can be completely understood in terms of physics, just as the execution of a branching statement by a computer.

Since experimental results suggest strongly that many choices are executed slightly before they become conscious, consciousness seems to be more a narration mechanism based on physical input rather than as input that modifies the physics.

Thus there is no conflict with determinism. In any case, free will is never random, so the nondeterminism of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics doesn't explain free will. On the other hand, my thermal interpretation of quantum mechanics, which I believe to be faithful to experimental practice, is fully deterministic.

 

[PeterDonis]

experimental results suggest strongly that many choices are executed slightly before they become conscious

I think these results (I assume you're referring to, for example, the Libet experiments) should be interpreted very cautiously. There is a lot of back and forth in the literature about what they actually mean.

Also, even if it turns out that consciousness is an "input" to action rather than just a "narration mechanism", that still doesn't mean consciousness must be outside of physics.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

In other words, it's part of the functional behavior of physical things. The functional behavior of physical things is physical behavior and is "part of nature". The mind as functional behavior of the brain and nervous system is no different from the web browser I'm using to post this as functional behavior of my computer and the network of which it is a part, or the functional behavior of my car in getting me from one place to another.

Hi Peter:

As I did in post #167 with @A. Neumaier, I am here guessing what your answers would be to the three question in post #165.
1. You are very clearly saying that function is a part of nature.
2. It is also clear that you are saying that function is at least partially physical. It not clear if you are saying function is all physical, or only partly physical.
3. My guess is you are saying making a conscious choice it least partially physical, but it is not clear if you mean it to be all physical or only partially physical.

Also like Neumaier, it is unclear what your view is regarding free will and determinism.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[A. Neumaier]

like Neumaier, it is unclear what your view is regarding free will and determinism.

You should read the whole discussion, and not just the newest items!

 

[A. Neumaier]

I think these results (I assume you're referring to, for example, the Libet experiments) should be interpreted very cautiously. There is a lot of back and forth in the literature about what they actually mean.

I was specifically asked about my opinion, and explained what these experiments mean to me. Of course, my views on this are controversial, as anything in this area.

Also, even if it turns out that consciousness is an "input" to action rather than just a "narration mechanism", that still doesn't mean consciousness must be outside of physics.

In both cases it should be considered as emergent from, but outside of, physics.

 

[PeterDonis]

You are very clearly saying that function is a part of nature.

Function of a physical thing is, yes.

It is also clear that you are saying that function is at least partially physical. It not clear if you are saying function is all physical, or only partly physical.

This is a matter of choice of words, not substance. I don't think it's useful to try to split hairs over whether the function of a physical thing is "physical" or "partially physical" or not. Your mind is a functional behavior of your brain and nervous system. That's the substance.

My guess is you are saying making a conscious choice it least partially physical, but it is not clear if you mean it to be all physical or only partially physical.

Same response as above, just substitute "conscious choice" for "mind".

Also like Neumaier, it is unclear what your view is regarding free will and determinism.

And my response is the same as his: read the thread.

 

[PeterDonis]

In both cases it should be considered as emergent from, but outside of, physics.

I don't think I would say that things that are emergent from physics are "outside physics" (although I might say that physics is not always the best discipline to use to study them), but this is a matter of choice of words, not substance. I think we agree on the substance.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

This is a matter of choice of words, not substance.

Hi Peter:

I interpret the above quote as that you are saying that there are different ways for using different words to describe a concept. I do not disagree with this. My problem is I have no confidence that my understanding of your words is correct. I understand that this issue is much like understanding QM. The words may help one to think about how QM works, but only the math communicates accurately, if not completely.

My understanding is that philosophy (which includes the concept of free will) is not supposed to be like that. I also understand that professional philosophers have historically chosen new words and phrases and/or new definitions of words and phrases in part to make it difficult for people who are not professional philosophers to understand what is written. There were historical periods when that was a safe way of communicating.

I accept with disappointment that you may well feel that you have no reason to have any real interest regarding whether or not I understand your words.

Regards,
Buzz