Anton Zeilinger's comment about free will being required for science

[PeterDonis]

My problem is I have no confidence that my understanding of your words is correct.

Yes, this is always a problem when using imprecise ordinary language. It is possible to give words precise technical definitions in particular domains, but you have to have something other than just words, such as math, to ground the definitions.

My understanding is that philosophy (which includes the concept of free will) is not supposed to be like that.

If you mean that philosophy is supposed to have precise definitions of words, and not to have to fall back on math for precision, as above, that can only be done if you have something other than the words to ground the precise definitions. And that's the case much more seldom in philosophy than most philosophers like to think. It's not impossible to have precise groundings for definitions of words without math, but it's a lot more difficult.

I accept with disappointment that you may well feel that you have no reason to have any real interest regarding whether or not I understand your words.

I'm certainly interested in having communication that leads to understanding, but I also know that goal is never perfectly achievable.

My advice would be to think very carefully about how you would ground your definition of a word before using it. If you can't ground it in math (for example, by grounding the words "quantum state" in a particular mathematical expression that appears in a particular mathematical framework), you need to think hard about how else you can ground it. For example, when you use the word "physical", how would you ground your definition of that word?

 

[PeterDonis]

My advice would be to think very carefully about how you would ground your definition of a word before using it.

And, from the other end, to think about what the grounding is of someone else's use of particular words. For example, consider this quote of mine:

Your mind is a functional behavior of your brain and nervous system.

Do you understand what the grounding is for each of the key terms in this--"mind", "functional behavior", "brain", and "nervous system"?

 

[Buzz Bloom]

For example, when you use the word "physical", how would you ground your definition of that word?
...
Do you understand what the grounding is for each of the key terms in this--"mind", "functional behavior", "brain", and "nervous system"?

Hi Peter:

I will take a look for the definition in my antique (1962) Merriam Webster for "physical" (adj.), but for the present the following from Wikipedia seems like a good start.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical​

Physical property, any aspect of an object or substance that can be measured or perceived without changing its identity.​

A more elaborate discussion is in:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_property .​

Also used in this article is "material property", but that is not defined. Only an example is given.

Regarding the four other terms, I can find and I can use the found defintions for these also. The problem regrding communication, in my opinion, is not "grounding", but attempting to understand if there is agreement or disagreement regarding the concepts associated with the words or phrases. When reading an article this can be difficult because the writer may not have felt any reason to define the terms used. In a conversation (writen or spoken) one can ask for clarity in the form of definitions, or in the form of questions of interpretation with respect to examples. Both methods are useful and can resolve disagreements by (a) agreeing, (b) agreeing to disagree, or by (c) agreeing about an interpretation with respect to a few examples.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[Buzz Bloom]

For example, when you use the word "physical", how would you ground your definition of that word?

Hi Peter:

I now have some definitions from 1962 MW.

Def 1 was characterized as archaic and obsolete.

Def 2a:

of or belonging to all created existences in nature : relating to or in accordance with the laws of nature​

Def 2b:

of or relating to natural or material things as opposed to things mental, moral, spiritual, or immaginary​

Def 3a:

of, relating to, concerned with, or devoted to natural science​

Def 3b:

of or relating to physics : characterized or produced by the forces and operations of physics : employed in the processes of physics​

There were more definitions that had no relationship with our discussion.

I have no issues with using any of the four defintions I quoted above. However, since there are nuances between them, you might want to choose a subset for the purpose of our discussion. Or perhaps you might want to propose something not included in the four quoted definitions.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

I will take a look for the definition in my antique (1962) Merriam Webster for "physical"

That's not going to be a good approach, for two reasons: first, dictionaries give ordinary usage, not physics usage; and second, dictionaries only define words in terms of other words, so you're just pushing the problem onto a different word or phrase. For example, the phrase "without changing its identity"--what is "identity" and what counts as "changing its identity"?

When I talk about "grounding" for words, I'm not talking about dictionary definitions. I'm talking about grounding in something other than words. Dictionary definitions are just more words.

Also, you didn't read what you quoted from me very carefully, since "physical" is not one of the words I asked you if you knew the grounding for. Go look at the words I did ask about.

The problem regrding communication, in my opinion, is not "grounding", but attempting to understand if there is agreement or disagreement regarding the concepts associated with the words or phrases.

But you can't do that by just piling on more words. You have to have some other way of picking out the concepts. That's what I mean by "grounding". If you have a mathematical equation, you can point to that. If you have an actual object or set of objects that embodies the concept, you can point to that. If you have an objectively defined measurement procedure, you can point to that.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

You have to have some other way of picking out the concepts. That's what I mean by "grounding". If you have a mathematical equation, you can point to that. If you have an actual object or set of objects that embodies the concept, you can point to that. If you have an objectively defined measurement procedure, you can point to that.

Hi Peter:

It seems that you and I have a irreconcilable different view regarding "grounding". I agree that one cannot ground meanings using word definitions. However, I also do not believe complete grounding it possible at all. In particular I do not believe mathematics grounds concepts about what is real in the universe. Math can be used to create models which approximate some aspects of the universe, but that is not grounding the meaning of words or symbols, or pictures related to aspects of the reality. I find that the most practical grounding comes from identifying the similar experiences of multiple people.

You conceivably may be able to change my view by describing the characteristics of a grounding one of the four terms you asked me about.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

I also do not believe complete grounding it possible at all.

Even if this is true, it does not mean no grounding is possible, or that any useful grounding can be given by just defining words in terms of other words.

Instead of wandering around in generalities, can you answer the specific question I asked you in post #178? I didn't ask about your views on the general theory of grounding. I asked you whether you understood the grounding for four specific terms I used.

You conceivably may be able to change my view by describing the characteristics of a grounding one of the four terms you asked me about.

So your answer to the specific question I asked is basically "no"? You seriously have no ideas at all on any kind of grounding for any of the terms "mind", "functional behavior", "brain", and "nervous system"?

You yourself have, I believe, used all four of those terms in your own posts in this discussion. What did you mean by them? You must have meant something. Let's start with that.

 

[PeterDonis]

Math can be used to create models which approximnatge some aspectgs of the universe, but that is not grounding the meaning of words or symbols, or pictures related to aspects of the reality.

The math by itself does not do that, no. You are correct that you need to assign some kind of operational meaning to the symbols. For example, in Newton's second law, $F = m a$, you have to have some objective procedure for measuring $F$, $m$, and $a$, in order to be able to check that the law is satisfied. But you don't have to have any general theory about what "forces" are, or where "mass" comes from, or what "acceleration" "really is". You just have to have enough of an operational definition of each term in the equation to measure them.

I find tfhat the most practical grounding comes from identifying the similar experiences of multiple people.

I would think you should be able to point to similar experiences of multiple people to ground terms like "mind", "brain", and "nervous system". "Functional property" might be a little harder, but I would think you could do it there too. So can you?

 

[Buzz Bloom]

I asked you whether you understood the grounding for four specific terms I used.

Hi Peter:

I do not have any clear concept of the properties of grounding. I do not use this term in my writing or conversations. You have said words cannot create a grounding, and I agree with that. I have no idea of how to post a grounding without use of words. Therefore I have to confess that I do not have any understanding of a grounding for the four words, or any other words you might ask me about. What I do have is a personal understanding of what the concepts are which the words/phrases refer to. Generally I am content with definitions from available sources. In conversations when the question arises about what a word or phrase means, because for example the way I am using it seems to be at odds with my conversation partner's understanding, we talk a bit about definitions and/or examples, and we come to a working agreement. That approach does not seem to be working here, so I am reaching the conclusion that not only will agreement not happen, but not even a mutual understanding.

BTW: I made a try at finding something about "grounding" in the sense you are using the word, and I came up empty. Can you post an URL to some reference?

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

What I do have is a personal understanding of what the concepts are which the words/phrases refer to. Generally I am content with definitions from available sources.

Really? So if someone asks what you mean by the word "brain", you're going to go look in a dictionary, instead of just saying "the thing that's inside my skull that I think with"?

I think you are making this a lot harder than it needs to be. I am not trying to make "grounding" an abstruse thing. I am trying to do the opposite: to get you to use your common sense to give ordinary common sense meanings to ordinary common sense terms, as a starting point for talking about what physics says about them. When people talk about "mind" or "brain" or "nervous system", they're not talking about philosophical abstractions; they're talking about ordinary common sense things. I have great difficulty believing that you actually don't know what you mean when you say you have a mind, or a brain, or a nervous system, or that you have to look in a dictionary to figure out what you mean. You have to use your mind, brain, and nervous system to say anything at all; do you really not understand what is going on when you speak, or write posts here?

The only one of the four terms I asked about that isn't an ordinary common sense thing is "functional property", but that's why I used that term in a sentence--"the mind is a functional property of the brain and nervous system"--that I hoped would make it reasonably clear what I meant by "functional property" by giving an everyday example in terms of everyday things. Or, if "functional property" still wasn't clear, at least we would have a basis of clear meaning for "mind", "brain", and "nervous system" to start from. But now you seem to be saying you don't even know what "mind", "brain", and "nervous system" mean without taking a huge detour through dictionary definitions and trying to pick one. Really?

In conversations when the question arises about what a word or phrase means, because for example the way I am using it seems to be at odds with my conversation partner's understanding, we talk a bit about definitions and/or examples, and we come to a working agreement.

Have we been using the words "mind", "brain", or "nervous system" in different or inconsistent ways? I don't see that we have. I see that I've been using them in what I think is an ordinary way, and you are refusing to use them at all without a dictionary.

 

[bobob]

I don't really see this as even a meaningful question. If you don't have free will, how would you know? What difference would it make?

 

[PeterDonis]

I do not have any clear concept of the properties of grounding. I do not use this term in my writing or conversations.

If you really are getting hung up on the term "grounding", then let's discard it and just look at the sentence I posted earlier: "Your mind is a functional behavior of your brain and nervous system."

Let's start with the last two terms: "brain" and "nervous system". Do you understand what those terms refer to? You have a brain inside your skull, and a nervous system connecting your brain to the rest of your body, and nerve signals in your brain and nervous system are involved when, for example, you read a post here, decide how you are going to respond to it, and type your response and post it. Is that clear enough to be going on with?

 

[Buzz Bloom]

When I talk about "grounding" for words, I'm not talking about dictionary definitions. I'm talking about grounding in something other than words. Dictionary definitions are just more words.

Hi Peter:

Apparently I very much misunderstood the quote above about "grounding" to be literal rather than just asking me to tell you (in words) what I think a word/phrase means off the top of my head with no dictionary lookup. Just to make sure I am getting it correctly now, is that really what you are asking me to do? If so, please explain to me why a definition of usage off the top of my head would be more useful in discussing a difficult topic than a dictionary definition?

My personal attempt to define "mind":
The mind is a subset of the collection of functions performed by a human's nervous system (and possibly that of other creatures' as well). The principle functions are in sub-categories given distinct names: the conscious, the unconscious, the libido, and the id. (There may be some additional categories also, but I do not remember them.)

My personal attempt to define "functional behavior":
Functional behavior is a category of behavior performed by individual objects and beings which have the capacity to perform functions without concurrent interventions by other independent objects and beings.

My personal attempt to define "brain":
The brain is the single organized collection of inter-operational neurons located inside the skull, but excluding the upper part of the spinal cord which is also located inside the skull.

My personal attempt to define "nervous system":
The nervous system is the entire organization of many neurons inside the body of a single multicellular animal which is of one of the many kinds that have such collections of many neurons.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

please explain to me why a definition of usage off the top of my head would be more useful in discussing a difficult topic than a dictionary definition?

It's not the difference between "off the top of your head" and "dictionary definition" that matters. It's the difference between defining words in terms of other words, and defining them in terms of something other than words.

For example:

The mind is a subset of the collection of functions performed by a human's nervous system (and possibly that of other creatures' as well).

Substitute "brain and nervous system" for "nervous system" and you have basically the same thing I said before: "Your mind is a functional behavior of your brain and nervous system". So all we need is to make sure we know what we're pointing to with "functional behavior", "brain" and "nervous system". Taking the last two first:

The brain is the single organized collection of inter-operational neurons located inside the skull, but excluding the upper part of the spinal cord which is also located inside the skull.

Fair enough, as long as "upper part of the spinal cord" is included in "nervous system". Notice that you're not just pointing at other words here: you're pointing at parts of the body, which are objects, not words.

The nervous system is the entire organization of many neurons inside the body of a single multicellular animal which is of one of the many kinds that have such collections of many neurons.

By this definition, the brain is part of the nervous system, whereas I had been treating them as separate; but either way is fine. The only reason I had put "brain" separate was to emphasize the fact that that, at least according to our best current understanding, is where our thinking happens. But the brain is made of neurons just like the rest of the nervous system, so it's perfectly valid to say it's part of the nervous system. Notice, again, that you're not just pointing at other words; you're pointing at objects.

That only leaves "functional behavior"; for that we have:

Functional behavior is a category of behavior performed by individual objects and beings which have the capacity to perform functions without concurrent interventions by other independent objects and beings.

This is a little circular since you're defining "functional behavior" in terms of "functions". But we can unpack that by giving specific examples: for example, speaking--uttering certain sounds that convey information to others--is a function. So is hearing and understanding speech. So is writing, and reading what others write. The key point is that functions are actions or processes that are performed by objects and beings.

So now we know what we mean by "Your mind is a functional behavior of your brain and nervous system". We mean that "mind" is an action or process (or set of actions and processes) that is performed by your brain and nervous system.

You could, of course, cite dictionary definitions, but those would not add any useful information for this discussion. We're not trying to split hairs; we're just making sure we have a common understanding of what objects and concepts we are talking about. We're talking about brains and neurons and what functions they can perform.

 

[PeterDonis]

@Buzz Bloom now let's go back to the point where we got sidetracked on "grounding". You had said:

2. It is also clear that you are saying that function is at least partially physical. It not clear if you are saying function is all physical, or only partly physical.
3. My guess is you are saying making a conscious choice it least partially physical, but it is not clear if you mean it to be all physical or only partially physical.

And I had responded:

This is a matter of choice of words, not substance.

The reason I said that is simple: we have already established that the "function" we are talking about here is the mind as a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system. I take it you would agree that the brain and nervous system are physical. So the mind is a functional behavior of physical things. So basically you are saying that, even though we've established that the mind is a functional behavior of physical things, it's not clear to you whether that makes the mind "physical" or not. And to me that's a matter of choice of words: do you want to put the label "physical" on functional behaviors of physical things, or not? Neither choice affects what the mind is or what it does. My preference would be to call the mind "physical" since it's a functional behavior of physical things, but other people might disagree, since to them behaviors are different kinds of things than objects, and "physical" is a label that only belongs on objects, not behaviors. None of this affects any substance; it's all a matter of labeling.

Exactly the same applies to "conscious choice", since "conscious choice" is simply one of the functional behaviors of the brain and nervous system that is included in the more general term "mind". That's why my response was the same for "conscious choice" as for "mind".

It's possible that you weren't clear because I said the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system, without specifying that the mind is a functional behavior of only the brain and nervous system, and nothing else. If so, consider the "only" added to everything I said. (With the caveat that there are other physical things involved too--for example, hormones in the bloodstream, sensory apparatus like the eye, which contains other things besides neurons, etc. The mind is a functional behavior of all of those physical things put together, and only those things--no other, non-physical things are involved.)

 

[Buzz Bloom]

Notice that you're not just pointing at other words here: you're pointing at parts of the body, which are objects, not words.

Hi Peter:
I have quoted below a on-line definition of "mind" and a Wikipedia paragraph getting into a discussion of the "mind".

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mind​

the element or complex of elements in an individual that feels, perceives, thinks, wills, and especially reasons​

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mind​

The mind is the set of thinking faculties including cognitive aspects such as consciousness, imagination, perception, thinking, judgement, language and memory, as well as noncognitive aspects such as emotion. Under the scientific physicalist interpretation, the mind is housed at least in part in the brain. The primary competitors to the physicalist interpretations of the mind are idealism, substance dualism, and types of property dualism, and by some lights eliminative materialism and anomalous monism. [3] There is a lengthy tradition in philosophy, religion, psychology, and cognitive science about what constitutes a mind and what are its distinguishing properties.​

My definition did refer to some objects: " functions ", " nervous system ", "objects, "beings", conscious (as a noun), unconscious (as a noun), libido, and id. The on-line Merriam Webster definition defines the minf in terms of its functions rather than the "things" that perform the functions. As I see this, I find the functions make a more accurate definition. The "things" performing the minds' functions are subject to controversy rather then the essentials of what the mind is.

The Wikipedia paragraph has lots of "things", and more in depth discussion, which I find useful, although some is also controversial.

From the recent posts, I am getting the idea you are more comfortable discussing "things' that do functions rather than the nature of the functions described in terms of more functions. Is this so?

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

I am getting the idea you are more comfortable discussing "things' that do functions rather than the nature of the functions described in terms of more functions. Is this so?

Not at all. The whole point of my saying that the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system was to recognize the distinction between functions--actions and processes--and objects.

Again, I think you're making this harder than it needs to be. I'm trying to get back to the original substantive question that you had, the one I quoted again in post #192, not to get bogged down in a swamp of dictionary definitions. I don't think the dictionary definitions you quoted add anything significant to the discussion; coming up with a specific laundry list of functions that are included in "mind" is not what you asked about.

 

[PeterDonis]

I'm trying to get back to the original substantive question that you had, the one I quoted again in post #192

Perhaps it will help if I try to restate the key point more briefly: if it is clear that the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system, and it is clear that the brain and nervous system are physical, what is left unclear about whether the mind is physical?

 

[Buzz Bloom]

Perhaps it will help if I try to restate the key point more briefly: if it is clear that the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system, and it is clear that the brain and nervous system are physical, what is left unclear about whether the mind is physical?

Hi Peter:

From my perspective, whether the mind is or is not assigned all the attributes of being physical has implications about the role of free will. The mind being activities of something physical does not logically imply that the mind has all the attributes of something physical. If it is assumed that the mind has all the attributes of being physical, this implies that it is plausible (not proven) that the mind's activities are deterministic. If the mind is not physical, it is much less plausible that the mind's activities are deterministic. If free will is present in the conscious mind, (which most definitions of free will says is so) then the mind not being physical makes arguing that free will is not possible becomes more difficult to justify.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

The mind being activities of something physical does not logically imply that the mind has all the attributes of something physical.

Why not? What attributes of something physical would a functional behavior of something physical lack?

If it is assumed that the mind has all the attributes of being physical, this implies that it is plausible (not proven) that the mind's activities are deterministic.

Only if physical laws are deterministic. We don't know that that's the case.

If the mind is not physical, it is much less plausible that the mind's activities are deterministic

We already know that the mind is activities of something physical--it's the activities of the brain and nervous system, and those are physical. "The mind's activities" are just the mind--the mind is the activities. And those activities are activities of physical things. So we are not even talking about activities of "non physical" things (whatever those are). We are talking about activities of physical things. And those activities are governed by physical laws. So however plausible it is that physical laws are deterministic, that's exactly how plausible it is that the mind's activities are deterministic. There aren't two separate questions here, only one.

In other words, I think you don't have a consistent model in your head of what you're talking about. On the one hand, you say the mind is the activities of physical things (the brain and nervous system). On the other had, you talk about "the mind's activities" somehow being different from the activities of physical things. Those two things are not consistent with each other.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

Hi Peter:

In my mind this is a complicated topic. It's getting late, so for now I will try to give a relatively simple (imperfect) different interpretation. It is conceivable (to me) that not all possible physical activities are deterministic. (An example is the specific value of a spin state after a single measurement of a single photon.) Without specifying which actions are and which are not deterministic, and which kind of activities the mind is capable of performing, it becomes confusing to try to clearly capture the idea that the activities which are constuents of the mind are not deterministic. However, here is one element of such a distinction: only physical things are controlled by determinism, but not all behaviors are so controlled. So the brain's internals (like e.g. its cells) might be controlled by determinism, but the specific and limited emergent mind may not be. The mind does not deal with what the cells do.

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

It is conceivable (to me) that not all possible physical activities are deterministic

Yes, I've already agreed that we don't know whether physical laws are deterministic or not.

Without specifying which actions are and which are not deterministic, and which kind of activities the mind is capable of performing, it becomes confusing to try to clearly capture the idea that the activities which are constuents of the mind are not deterministic.

Which just means we don't know whether they are deterministic or not. Yes.

only physical things are controlled by determinism, but not all behaviors are so controlled

No. Physical laws control both "things" and "behaviors". There isn't one set of physical laws for "things" and another for "behaviors". (In fact, as far as physical laws are concerned, it's not even clear that there is a distinction between "things" and "behaviors". This is particularly evident in QM, where we have "things" like electrons that can only be observed through their behaviors--making spots on detector screens, producing electric currents in certain metals when light shines on them, etc. So is the "electron" a "thing" or a set of "behaviors"? The physical laws don't give an answer either way, because there are no such labels in the physical laws.)

The mind does not deal with what the cells do.

The mind is what the cells do. More precisely, it is a particular subset we've picked out of all the behaviors that are produced by the cells in the brain and nervous system.

I don't think you've fully grasped the implications of "the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system".

 

[Buzz Bloom]

Hi Peter:

I think you have made it clear that you and I do not agree about certain metaphysical ideas. Here is one example: a definition for "physical".

https://www.definitions.net/definition/physical​

involving the body as distinguished from the mind or spirit​

The reference includes several other definitions I think you would probably prefer.

I think it is likely we will also disagree about some epistemological ideas. While metaphysics seems to be OK to discuss for this thread, would discussing epistemology also be OK?

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

Here is one example: a definition for "physical".

By that definition, this whole discussion has been a waste of time because you are declaring by fiat that the mind is not "physical".

But once again, declaring that by fiat is a matter of words, not substance. You can say the mind is not "physical" in this sense, but that doesn't change the fact that the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system--i.e., it is not a functional behavior of some mysterious non-physical thing, it is a functional behavior of physical things. And functional behaviors of physical things are governed by physical laws.

While metaphysics seems to be OK to discuss for this thread, would discussing epistemology also be OK?

We have not been discussing metaphysics in this thread. We have been discussing physics, and I have been repeatedly pointing out that various claims about metaphysics that you have been trying to make have nothing whatever to do with physics, including the physics of how minds work.

If you disagree, go back and read the first sentence I wrote above. If you are going to rely on metaphysical definitions of terms instead of the substance of what is actually going on--that the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system--then this whole discussion is a waste of time. There is no point in trying to pick which definition out of some dictionary or encyclopedia we want to use for terms like "physical". What we should be discussing is the fact that the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system, and what that fact means for "free will"--or, to put it in a way that better reflects the discussion in this thread, what kind of "free will" is consistent with that fact.

Discussions of epistemology in the sense of how we know that the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system, would be ok. But I suspect that is not what you have in mind.

 

[Buzz Bloom]

We have not been discussing metaphysics in this thread. We have been discussing physics ...
...
Discussions of epistemology in the sense of how we know that the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system, would be ok. But I suspect that is not what you have in mind.

Hi Peter:

You are correct about what aspect of epistemology I thought might be applicable to our dialog. I have been trying to understand what in our discussion your words mean with respect to the relationship between what is "known" about physics and what is speculation about physics. You have clarified quite a bit of that, and I appreciate it. My sense of what I underlined above includes metaphysics.

One aspect of what the mind does is free will, if free will is real. Metaphysics has been exploring free will for four thousand years, and there is still no agreement among all those who still explore it. Another aspect of what the mind does is think, including forming beliefs and knowledge. Discussing what it means to have beliefs and knowledge might help the discussion related to the corresponding behavior/functioning of the neurons.

BTW, one of my favorite all time books is Quiddities by W. V. Quine (1987). Quine was a professor of philosophy at Harvard for most of his career. Quiddities is a collection of 83 philosophical essays organized alphabetically by title. I like all of the essays, but my favorite is "Belief". Here is a quote which appears to be a paradoxical conclusion near the end of that essay.

A reasonable person believes, in short, that each of his beliefs is true, and that some of them are false.​

Regards,
Buzz

 

[PeterDonis]

My sense of what I underlined above includes metaphysics.

Metaphysics is not really on topic here. We do, of course, recognize a distinction between what is known about physics and what is speculation about physics; that's why we have a separate forum, the Beyond the Standard Model forum, where the rules for discussing speculative hypotheses are more relaxed. But speculative hypotheses in physics--such as, for example, superstring theory--are still physics, not metaphysics.

One aspect of what the mind does is free will, if free will is real.

Ok, but let's now rephrase this using what we know about "mind" from previous discussion:

"One aspect of the functional behaviors of the brain and nervous system is free will, if free will is real".

Now it's clear that we're not talking about metaphysics, we're talking about physics (and about chemistry, biology, neuroscience, etc.--the problem of figuring out what kinds of functional behaviors brains and nervous systems can produce involves a lot of disciplines). We have a physical thing--the brain and nervous system--and we want to figure out what functional behaviors it can produce. That's a straightforward physical problem.

Metaphysics has been exploring free will for four thousand years, and there is still no agreement among all those who still explore it.

Yes, and as Daniel Dennett pointed out in one of his essays on the subject, that is why scientists, in all those disciplines I mentioned above, are not trying to use metaphysics to investigate free will: because metaphysics has utterly failed to solve the problem for four thousand years. So scientists are trying to solve the problem using the physical sciences and their methods instead. A lot of progress has already been made: we know a lot more now about how the brain and nervous system work and how brain and nervous system processes underlie various kinds of actions that we normally think of as products of our free will.

My advice, if you want to understand more about free will from a scientific point of view, beyond what I've said in various posts earlier in this thread, would be to spend some time with the literature on the topic--the two books by Dennett that I referred to earlier in the thread, Elbow Room and Freedom Evolves, would be a good start (both books have good lists of more technical references). Also his book Consciousness Explained, since free will and consciousness, from a scientific point of view, are closely related, and the scientific study of the two has a lot of overlap.

Discussing what it means to have beliefs and knowledge might help the discussion related to the corresponding behavior/functioning of the neurons.

Certainly, but again, discussing it from a scientific point of view--what are the brain and nervous system actually doing when we form beliefs and knowledge--seems to be making progress, whereas discussing it from a metaphysical point of view, as already noted, made no progress in four thousand years.

 

[EPR]

the the mind is a functional behavior of the brain and nervous system

While correct, the above statement is not all encompassing and cannot account for everything observed in 'mind's' activities. Hence your disagreement, imo. You both will continue to bump into the hard problem without resolution.

 

[PeterDonis]

the above statement is not all encompassing and cannot account for everything observed in 'mind's' activities

Really? What observed activities of the mind does it not account for?

 

[EPR]

Really? What observed activities of the mind does it not account for?

Qualia. E.g. that you observe red, but science names it 450Thz. And many others.

 

[PeterDonis]

Qualia.

Producing qualia is one of the functional properties of the brain and nervous system. At least, that is the physicalist view, and there is no known evidence that contradicts it. A lot of people don't like this view, but that's not the same as disproving it.

you observe red, but science names it 450Thz

Scienc, when talking about the light coming into your eye in isolation, denotes it by its frequency. But science can also talk about how the information carried by the light is represented in your brain. "Red" is part of that representation (for light of appropriate frequencies under appropriate conditions).

 

[RUTA]

Avshalom Elitzur wrote a nice paper on the "hard problem" of consciousness, here is a link. This statement sums it up nicely:

Suppose that, with sufficiently advanced technology, you obtain the fullest real-time description of what goes on in my brain – every neuron, axon, dendrite and synapse, every neurotransmitter molecule – when I perceive a red rose. You know better than I do what goes on in my brain when I perceive red, and still, that does not bring you any closer to my quale!

This is the way I introduce it to my students (equivalent to Avshalom's):

Suppose someday we have the complete theory and corresponding technology to understand fully what is going on inside a brain when a person sees the color red. Alice suffers colorblindness, i.e., she has never seen red, but she fully understands the theory and technology of consciousness, so she performs corrective measures to cure her of her colorblindness. After completing the procedure, someone brings her a red apple and Alice gets to see red for the first time. Does Alice possesses knowledge she didn't possesses before the procedure? Most people would agree that she does possesses new knowledge, i.e., she now knows what the experience of seeing red means. Thus, the quale of red is distinct from knowledge about all underlying physical processes and therefore it is impossible to account for it exhaustively via science.

It's simple, science can only be concerned with the objective elements of reality, but reality also contains subject elements. Thus, science cannot ever account for the entirety of reality. The "hard problem" of consciousness exists for those who believe that all explanation must be based in science. If one rather starts their worldview with what they know for certain, i.e., their own experience, then like Einstein (and many others) they realize the proper role of science. Here is a quote from our paper just published in a special issue of Entropy, "Models of Consciousness":

To provide the necessary historical background for our second axiom, let us paraphrase from Einstein’s bedrock conception of the enterprise of physics [33], quoting phrases and terms from his text. Physics is the study of “bodily objects” moving in 3-dimensional space as a function of time under the influence of their mutual forces (“the statement of a set of rules”). As Einstein pointed out, there are already some assumptions there, so it is best to start with “all sense experiences”. I am the spatiotemporal origin of “all sense experiences”. I assume a subset of “all sense experiences” represents other perceivers. For example, my perception of you is a subset of all “sense experiences”, so I will assume you also have “sense experiences”. In Einstein’s words, “partly in conjunction with sense impressions which are interpreted as signs for sense experiences for others”. Therefore I am the spatiotemporal origin of “my sense experiences”, i.e., I am just one perceptual origin (PO). I communicate with other (human) perceivers to construct a model of objective/physical reality (the
“real external world”) that reconciles the disparate, but self-consistent (see below) elements of our “sense experiences”. In Einstein’s words, “the totality of our sense experiences . . . can be put in order ”.

We then use this model to explore regularities and patterns in the events we perceive. We mathematically describe these regularities and patterns and explore the consequences (experiments). In Einstein’s words, “operations with concepts, and the creation and use of definite functional relations between them, and the coordination of sense experiences to these concepts”. We then refine our model of physical reality as necessary to conform to our results. This allows us to explain the past, manipulate physical reality in the present (to create new technology, for example), and to predict the future. While defining physics all the way down to individual “sense experiences” may seem unnecessarily detailed, it is crucial to understanding the relationship between consciousness and physics being proposed here. ...

When POs exchange information about their perceptions, they realize that some of their disparate perceptions fit self-consistently into a single spacetime model with different reference frames for each PO. Thus, physicists’ spacetime model of [objective reality] represents the self-consistent collection of shared perceptual information between POs, e.g., perceptions upon which Galilean or Lorentz transformations can be performed.

Thus, the purvey of physics is "to model and explore regularities and patterns in the self-consistent collection of shared perceptual information between POs". Accordingly, the laws of physics don't produce experience, but they are only articulations of apparent constraints on experience -- and only a particular subset at that.

 

[PeterDonis]

This statement sums it up nicely:

The statement as it stands is simply a bare assertion without proof: "You know better than I do what goes on in my brain when I perceive red, and still, that does not bring you any closer to my quale!" How does he know? He hasn't actually met anyone who has a full real-time description of everything that goes on in his brain. And it is meaningless to extrapolate from the paltry level of knowledge we have now about what goes on in the brain to a hypothetical person who knows everything about what goes on in the brain.

Alice suffers colorblindness, i.e., she has never seen red, but she fully understands the theory and technology of consciousness, so she performs corrective measures to cure her of her colorblindness. After completing the procedure, someone brings her a red apple and Alice gets to see red for the first time. Does Alice possesses knowledge she didn't possesses before the procedure? Most people would agree that she does possesses new knowledge, i.e., she now knows what the experience of seeing red means. Thus, the quale of red is distinct from knowledge about all underlying physical processes and therefore it is impossible to account for it exhaustively via science.

This is just a slightly altered version of the "Mary's Room" thought experiment of Frank Jackson. Daniel Dennett's reply to that thought experiment works just as well for this one; a good quick summary by Dennett is here:

https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/RoboMaryfinal.htm

Dennett's key point is this: "It just feels so good to conclude that Mary has a revelation of some sort when first she sees color that nobody wants to bother showing that this is how the story must go. In fact it needn’t go that way at all."

Applying Dennett's argument to the Alice scenario, "most people would agree that she does possesses new knowledge" is, again, simply a bare assertion without argument or justification, and in fact no such assertion is justified by the thought experiment. It could just as easily be the case that Alice doesn't gain any new knowledge from actually seeing the apple, because her complete knowledge of the theory and technology of consciousness had allowed her to already know what that experience would be like before having it. So the thought experiment proves nothing.

science can only be concerned with the objective elements of reality, but reality also contains subject elements. Thus, science cannot ever account for the entirety of reality.

This, again, is a bare assertion without argument or justification. It can't be proven false from what we currently know, but it can't be proven true either. It's simply a statement of opinion.

 

[RUTA]

The statement as it stands is simply a bare assertion without proof: "You know better than I do what goes on in my brain when I perceive red, and still, that does not bring you any closer to my quale!" How does he know? He hasn't actually met anyone who has a full real-time description of everything that goes on in his brain. And it is meaningless to extrapolate from the paltry level of knowledge we have now about what goes on in the brain to a hypothetical person who knows everything about what goes on in the brain.
This is just a slightly altered version of the "Mary's Room" thought experiment of Frank Jackson. Daniel Dennett's reply to that thought experiment works just as well for this one; a good quick summary by Dennett is here:

https://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/dennett/papers/RoboMaryfinal.htm

Dennett's key point is this: "It just feels so good to conclude that Mary has a revelation of some sort when first she sees color that nobody wants to bother showing that this is how the story must go. In fact it needn’t go that way at all."

Applying Dennett's argument to the Alice scenario, "most people would agree that she does possesses new knowledge" is, again, simply a bare assertion without argument or justification, and in fact no such assertion is justified by the thought experiment. It could just as easily be the case that Alice doesn't gain any new knowledge from actually seeing the apple, because her complete knowledge of the theory and technology of consciousness had allowed her to already know what that experience would be like before having it. So the thought experiment proves nothing.
This, again, is a bare assertion without argument or justification. It can't be proven false from what we currently know, but it can't be proven true either. It's simply a statement of opinion.

Again, imagine you have never seen red, suppose it is replaced by grey. Someone performs some procedure, you bump your head ... whatever ... then suddenly you see red for the first time. You now know what it means to "see red" -- not in an objective way, that is impossible to "know," but you definitely have knowledge you didn't have before. Do you disagree?

 

[PeterDonis]

imagine you have never seen red

The thought experiment in question is not about me. It is about a hypothetical person who knows everything there is to know about what is going on physically when a person has an experience. No human now or in the foreseeable future is going to come anywhere even remotely close to satisfying such a premise. It is arguable that humans in general simply don't have powerful enough brains to come anywhere even remotely close to satisfying such a premise. Which means that any appeal to our human intuitions or imaginings about what would or would not happen in the scenario under discussion is simply irrelevant. We are simply not capable of having intuitions or imaginings about beings who satisfy the premise of the thought experiment that have any bearing on the matter at all.

 

[RUTA]

We are simply not capable of having intuitions or imaginings about beings who satisfy the premise of the thought experiment that have any bearing on the matter at all.

You can only speak for yourself there, I have no issue assuming the premise. Given your personal restriction, it makes sense that you don’t understand the validity of the argument.